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Berne, November 2001 F • A • S • T Kazakhstan Country Update 4 / 2001 August – October 2001 Matthias Müller Dr. Heinz Krummenacher © Swiss Peace Foundation · Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC · Department of Foreign Affairs Berne, November 2001 F • A • S • T Table of Content 1 Risk Assessment Kazakhstan ...................................................... 1 2 Chronology Kazakhstan................................................................ 4 3 Tension Barometers Kazakhstan.................................................. 7 4 Analytical Raster Kazakhstan ...................................................... 9 Note by the authors: For more general information on Uzbekistan (e.g. socio-demographic figures) see: FAST Report on Central Asia, 2 / 2000, p.16ff. © Swiss Peace Foundation · Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC · Department of Foreign Affairs F • A • S • T 1 Risk Assessment Kazakhstan1 There is no likelihood of major domestic or international armed conflict involving Kazakhstan within the next three to six months. Although we expect no conflict escalation on the domestic level in the short term, we do see the ongoing enrichment of the country’s small elite along with the economic and political marginalisation of a considerable part of the Kazakh population as fertile grounds for Islamic extremist ideology. If opposition forces outside the government’s sphere of influence – for example, Islamic extremists – can orchestrate existing frustrations, destabilisation and armed conflict could occur in the mid- or long term. Factors increasing the likelihood of armed conflict The various FAST-Tension Barometers indicate a high degree of stability for Kazakhstan during the period under consideration. The most important indicator for stability in a country, the Conflict Carrying Capacity curve, remained at a high level, and the Goldstein average of conflict and cooperation is even increasing. Nevertheless, several events and developments could aggravate the situation within the Kazakh society and bear the potential for armed conflict in the mid- or long term: The growing disparity in the standard of living between the small Kazakh upper class and the majority of the population increases tensions and even jeopardises national cohesion. At the beginning of September, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbeyev presented the GDP figure for the first half year of 2001. According to the President, the national economy grew again by 14% and Nazarbeyev pointed out that the main goal was to double the GDP by 2010. The government is doing much to reach this goal, promoting the oil sector by all means. By far, oil exports account for the biggest part of Kazakhstan’s economic performance. However, the average person on the street is not affected by this recent economic boom. On the contrary, the standard of living – especially in Southern Kazakhstan – is receding continuously. People in this region hardly have any job opportunities, the infrastructure is almost completely run down, and they even face great difficulties in getting access to fresh water. Due to increasing prices for staple food on local markets, living conditions degraded even further during recent 1 This assessment is based on the analysis of events and developments from August to November 2001 along the FAST Analytical Monitoring Raster for Kazakhstan (see heading 4). © Swiss Peace Foundation · Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC · Department of Foreign Affairs 1 F • A • S • T months. Not surprisingly, the number of protest demonstrations (see Protest Demonstrations curve p. xx) remained on a constant level. At the end of September a group of women from Southern Kazakhstan gathered in front of the government complex in Astana to demand their outstanding social allowances. We see this demonstration as a sign that people are starting to blame not only local government authorities for their miserable living conditions but also the government in Astana. In the mid to long term, the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of one family clan (see FAST Update 3 / 2001), combined with growing disparities among rich and poor, could provide fertile grounds for Islamic extremist ideology as the only alternative to the current regime. Eventually, this could lead to armed conflict, especially in the much-deprived Southern part of Kazakhstan. Factors decreasing the likelihood of armed conflict Despite existing tensions and a considerable conflict potential which might threaten the country’s stability in the mid to long-term, Kazakhstan remains a stable country. The following factors add to the present stability in the country: First, showing sensitivity to people’s religious orientation Nazarbayev has successfully drawn a fine line between engagement with and detachment from the U.S. lead anti-terror coalition. US Senators Sam Brownback and Mary Landrieu recently characterized Kazakhstan as "ready for the United States to engage on the topic of terrorism." At the same time, Kazakhstan has been reluctant to follow Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in making airfields and other facilities available to US forces. Indeed, Defence Ministry officials have not hesitated to assure the local population that no US military-transport airplane has landed in Kazakhstan. Second, we don’t believe that the ongoing Afghan war will have a negative short term impact on Kazakhstan. Many analysts as well as the Kazakh government itself fear that the new war in Afghainstan might result in a refugee influx into the Central Asian republics that would question the current distribution of resources. We believe that the probability of such a scenario is unlikely because of the following reasons: We don’t believe that the ongoing Afghan war will have a negative short term impact. Many analysts as well as the Kyrgyz government itself fear that the new war in © Swiss Peace Foundation · Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC · Department of Foreign Affairs 2 F • A • S • T Afghanistan might result in a refugee influx into the Central Asian republics that would skew the current distribution of resources. We believe that the probability of such scenario is very low because of the following reasons: A possible refugee influx would first affect the neighbouring countries, Uzbekistan and Tajiksitan. The emergence of new refugee flows in Northern Afghanistan is very unlikely as the military battles are shifting south, rathern than north. When the Taleban launched their offensive against the Northern Alliance las year, only jew refugees tried to move in northern direction. The Kazakh government is currently strengthening its borders, especially to Uzbekistan, in order to prevent people from crossing the border. © Swiss Peace Foundation · Institute for Conflict Resolution / SDC · Department of Foreign Affairs 3 F • A • S • T 2 Chronology Kazakhstan © Reuters, Itar Tass News Service, Soros Foundation, FAST Local Network Date Events 2001 Aug 1 The Kazakh government decides to close uranium extracting enterprises and to clear the aftermath of developing uranium deposits until 2010. A government speaker pointed out that about 20 uranium deposits were developed in Kazakhstan over the past 40 years. About 40 per cent of the uranium produced in the former USSR were extracted over that period. 2001 Aug 1 Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbeyev and Senior Chevron Oil official Richard Matzke discuss the delay in the formal ceremony to mark the arrival in Novorossiisk of the first Kazakh oil exported by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. The ceremony, originally scheduled for August 6, has been postponed indefinitely. Matzke said there are no technical problems affecting the use of the pipeline. He said CPC shareholders, which include Chevron and other foreign oil companies and the governments of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Oman, will meet in Moscow on August 3 where they hope to finalize and sign an agreement on the commercial exploitation of the pipeline. 2001 Aug 3 Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a meeting of the four post-Soviet Caspian littoral states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) to discuss the legal status of the Caspian sea. 2001 Aug 3 The Turkish armed forces' General Staff opens a military office in Astana. Mustafa Oszoi, who will serve as the Turkish representative at that office, stated that Turkey is ready to contribute to the ongoing reform and modernization of Kazakhstan's armed forces. Kazakhstan's First Deputy Defense Minister and chief of General Staff, Colonel General Alibek Kasymov, said at the opening ceremony that Turkey will provide Kazakhstan with military assistance to the value of $10 million over the next decade. 2001 Aug 6 Deputy general director of the Kazakh Tengiz-Novorossiisk Pipline Project Kairgeldy Kabyldin is optimistic that the project will be ready to start operations in September. But at the same time, he stressed that the specific date of the ceremony to launch the Caspian Pipeline Project has not been determined yet. The pipeline connects Western Kazakhstan deposits with Russia's Black Sea coast. At the first stage, the pipeline's capacity will be 28.2 million tonnes of oil annually. 2001 Aug 7 Former Kazakh Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin is questioning claims by Kazakh officials that the capital amnesty that ended last month resulted in the return to Kazakh banks of over $400 million that had been illegally transferred abroad. Kazhegeldin said the actual sum returned was no more than 10 percent of the official figure, while up to $2