Abstract Kazakhstan's Presidential Elections 2011: Nazarbayev
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No. 51 – MAY 2011 Anvar Rahmetov Kazakhstan’s Presidential Elections 2011: Abstract (*) Nazarbayev Postpones Succession April 2011 elections in Kazakhstan have reinstated the On April 3, 2011 presidential elections were held in the Central Asian long-running strongman republic of Kazakhstan and the voters elected the incumbent president Nursultan Nazarbayev in power. Nursultan Nazarbayev with an overwhelming majority of 96%. The Nazarbayev enjoys genuine incumbent’s landslide victory came in stark contrast with miniscule popularity in the country with a support demonstrated for the three challengers. The result did not resource-rich economy, political surprise anyone, however – Mr. Nazarbayev enjoys genuine popularity and social stability and inter- in a fast growing resource-rich post Soviet nation and is perceived by ethnic peace. many as a personal guarantor of stability and prosperity in the country. However, due to weak political Alongside Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, Nazarbayev is the longest institutions and intra-elite serving head of state in Central Asia. struggle Kazakhstan might OSCE praised elections for high technical competence but noted many undergo a potentially irregularities, concluding that elections fell short of expectations. destabilizing succession period if Absence of real contestation was the central concern of observers, with the 70-year old President the opposition boycotting elections, while official election rivals did not becomes unable to rule the challenge incumbent’s policies or personality. One of the candidates country. To address the even admitted that he and his family voted for Nazarbayev1. reasonable concerns of international investors and the Whatever the purpose of this seemingly well-staged overture might local polity, Nazarbayev will have have been, the result is that Nursultan Nazabayev is to stay for another to solve the succession issue in five-year term and is not yet willing to leave politics. He already enjoys the nearest future. So far he has vast privileges that put him far above an ordinary civil servant. In 2007 not made any visible moves to the parliament dominated by his Nur-Otan party removed term limits for appoint a successor and address him and in 2010 granted him the constitutional status of “elbasy” (leader succession concerns and has not of the nation), endowing the first president with a wide array of even made clear if he would run patriarchal powers and immunities. again in the next elections. President’s Electoral History Anvar Rahmetov, IMT-Lucca Nazarbayev first came to power in 1989, becoming Secretary of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Communist Party of Soviet Kazakhstan. In 1991, in the first elections in Lucca, PhD Program in Political independent Kazakhstan he ran unopposed and won 98% approval. In Systems and Institutional Change. 1995 presidential term was extended till 2000 in a referendum with 96% of approval. In 1999 Nazarbayev ran for a second term and won with (*) The opinions expressed herein 81%, while his main challenger, ex-Premier Akezhan Kazhegeldin, was are strictly personal and do not disqualified for attending an unsanctioned protest2. The US Government necessarily reflect the position of and OSCE criticized the poll. In 2005 Nazarbayev won 91% of votes, ISPI. against single-digit approval for the nearest opponent in an election 1 OSCE/ODIHR, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, April 4, 2011, http://www.osce.org/odihr/76345. 2 M.B. OLCOTT, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, p. 119. 2 ISPI - Analysis marred by “a number of significant shortcomings”, e.g. intimidation and media bias3. In 2007, the Parliament passed a controversial law granting the first president of Kazakhstan an exemption from term limits, putting him only a step away from becoming a president for life. Such exemption was only made in favor of Nazarbayev as a recognition of his outstanding service to the nation. Next presidents were to be limited to two five-year terms. Opposition cried foul but the international community did not take a strongly opposing stance on the issue. In December 2010, while Kazakhstan was still chairing OSCE, the parliament voted unanimously to allow Nazarbayev stay in office until 2020 bypassing two elections. The President vetoed the bill. The Parliament that usually never counters president’s will unanimously overturned the veto and authorized citizens to collect the necessary 200,000 signatures to initiate a referendum. Activists collected almost five million signatures (representing more than half of the electorate) in about three weeks and demanded that their leader stay in power. The President in turn forwarded the case to Constitutional Court for evaluation. Constitutional Court opposed the initiative not on substantive, but technical grounds, citing minor errors of the process. Allegedly trying to mediate between the will of the people and his own veto, the President took a middle ground – snap elections in April 2011. Early elections stripped opposition of an opportunity for a meaningful campaign and any significant tactical move. In a countermove, the opposition called a boycott on the elections. After a call for public non-participation in the elections, voter turnout became the only intriguing and contentious issue. With Nazarbayev’s entourage positioning him as exceptionally popular candidate with almost universal backing, a low turnout would have been embarrassing. Therefore, the incumbent camp mobilized state resources to boost turnout. According to available anecdotal evidence and OSCE preliminary report, voters employed at public organizations were sometimes strongly compelled to vote4. A Moscow-based news website even published two internal document detailing orders and instructions by public employers to show up at elections5. As a result, registered turnout was the impressive 90%6. Factors Adding to Nazarbayev’s Popularity President Nazarbayev is genuinely popular among the majority of Kazakhstati citizens, despite his latest authoritarian tendencies. The latest survey shows that 91% of citizens approve of the President7, while not as happy with the government. Besides the absence of visible successors of the same political weight and charisma, several other conditions contributed to strong support for Nazarbayev. One such condition is the economy that grew about 9% each year starting 2000. Global financial crisis slowed down the growth to 1.2% in 2009, but the country seems to be gradually regaining pre-crisis growth rates. Gross domestic output grew 7% in 2010 and is expected to grow 4-6% this year8. Second is Kazakh Chairmanship at OSCE, an asset skillfully inflated by President’s communication team. The most important event of Kazakh chairmanship was OSCE Astana Summit, a high level meeting that took place after an 11-year interruption. Even though only a limited number of initial objectives have been achieved, holding of a summit was important as a symbolic event, especially for Kazakhstanis. Yermukhamet Yertysbaev, presidential adviser, for example, proclaimed that «when Astana became literally capital of the world and Nursultan Nazarbayev, even if for two days, politician number one in the world, all Kazakhstanis, the whole of Kazakhstan’s multinational people felt pride and patriotism for their country and for their leader»9. 3 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, February 21, 2006, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections /kazakhstan/18153. 4 OSCE/ODIHR, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, April 4, 2011, p. 2, http://www.osce.org/odihr/76345. 5 Fergana.Ru, Vybory Prezidenta Kazahstana: “Polnaya otdacha golosov” (Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan: “Full Giving of Votes”), April 4, 2011, http://www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=6934. 6 Reuters, Kazakh Election Turnout 89.9 pct – commission, April 3, 2011, www.reuters.com. 7 J. LILLIS, Citizens in Kazakhstan are High on Nazarbayev, Tepid on Democratization, in «EurasiaNet», May 26, 2010, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61158. 8 NOVOSTI-KAZAHSTAN, Natsbank progniziruyet rost VVP Kazahstana (National Bank forecasts GDP growth of Kazakhstan), January 11, 2011, http://www.newskaz.ru/economy/20110111/1038743.html and http://www.bnews.kz/main/ economics/rost-vvp-kazaxstana-v- 2011-godu-sostavit-4-5-inflyaciya-6-8-ajtzhanova/. 9 LITER, Yermuhamet Yertysbaev: Yesli zavtra vybory, to…(If elections are tomorrow, then…), December 28, 2010, http://www.liter.kz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4670&Itemid=2. ISPI - Analysis 3 Finally, a political and humanitarian crisis in neighboring Kyrgyzstan added to Nazarbayev’s popularity. April 2010 uprising in Kyrgyzstan resulted in the overthrow of second president, 73 deaths, 2000 wounded and $20 million damage10. The resulting Kyrgyz-Uzbek clashes in the south in June 2010 left between 400 and 2000 dead and 400 000 displaced11, with southern regions falling out of central government’s de facto jurisdiction. The initial democratic nature of the uprising led to democracy and popular politics being association with political instability and inter-ethnic tensions in Central Asia. Kazakh president has drawn implicit parallels between stability in Kazakhstan that he was upholding and troubles in Kyrgyzstan at his speech to the XVI Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan in October 20101213. Interest Groups in Kazakh Politics Elections and public debates are only a visible tip of Kazakh political iceberg. The more fundamental