IN THIS ISSUE Canadian Special Security Events: An Improved Framework for Royal Canadian Air Force Command and Control Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the Phenomenon of Globalization? and much more! THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL is an official publication of the Commander Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and is published quarterly. It is a forum for discussing concepts, issues, and ideas that are both crucial and central to aerospace power. The Journal is dedicated to disseminating the ideas and opinions of not only RCAF personnel, but also those civilians who have an interest in issues of aerospace power. Articles may cover the scope of air force doctrine, training, leadership, lessons learn- ed, and air force operations: past, present, or future. Submissions on related subjects such as ethics, technology, and air force history are also invited. This Journal is therefore dedicated to the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of air warfare and is central to the intellectual health of the RCAF. It serves as a vehicle for the continuing education and professional development of all ranks and personnel in the RCAF as well as members from other environments, employees of government agencies, and academia concerned with air force affairs.

EDITORIAL STAFF Editor-in-Chief: Colonel Martin Cournoyer, CD Senior Editor: Major William March, CD, MA

EDITORIAL BOARD Colonel William Lewis (Retired), OMM, CD, M Eng, M Ed, MBA, MDS, PhD Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Johnston, CD, MA – Canadian Forces College Major Raymond Stouffer, CD, PhD – Royal Military College Dr. Allan English, CD, PhD – Queen’s University Dr. James Fergusson, PhD – University of Manitoba Dr. Stephen Harris, CD, PhD – Directorate of History and Heritage Dr. Randall Wakelam, CD, PhD – Royal Military College

Published by Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, Trenton, Ontario ISSN 1927-7601

ASSISTANT EDITORS Adri Boodoosingh, Lisa Moulton and Françoise Romard

GRAPHIC DESIGN Denis Langlois and Luc Leroy

ONLINE EDITION ANIMATION Hope Smith http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/eLibrary/Journal/Current_Issue_e.asp http://trenton.mil.ca/lodger/cfawc/eLibrary/Journal/Current_Issue_e.asp

PRODUCTION MANAGER Anne Pennington

For copies of this publication or to be placed on a distribution list contact [email protected]

NOTE TO READERS As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where quotations are translated from their original language, we will use the term [Translation] at the end of the quote to indicate that readers can find the original text in the other language version of the Journal. Unless otherwise noted, photographs appearing in the RCAF Journal are attributable to the public domain.

S UbmiSSIon REQUIREMENTS The ROYAL Canadian Air Force Journal welcomes the submission of articles, book reviews and shorter pieces (which will be published in the Letters to the Editor, Points of Interest and Pushing the Envelope sections) that cover the scope of air force doctrine, training, leadership, lessons learned and air force operations: past, present or future. Submissions on related subjects such as ethics, technology and air force history are also invited.

J ECTOurnal S IonS ITEM WORD LIMIT* DETAILS LETTERS TO 50-250 Commentary on any portion of a previous Journal. THE EDITOR ARTICLES 3000-5000 Written in academic style. Written in academic style and must include: • the book’s complete title (including sub-title); • the complete names of all authors as presented on the title page; BOOK 500-1000 REVIEWS • the book’s publisher, including where and when it was published; • the book’s ISBN and number of pages; and • a high resolution .jpg file (at least 300 dpi and 5 by 7 inches) of the book’s cover. POINTS OF 250-1000 Information on any topic (including operations, exercises, and anniversaries) that is of interest to the INTEREST broader aerospace audience. PUSHING THE 250-2000 Forum for commentary, opinions, and rebuttal on Journal articles and/or issues that are of interest to the ENVELOPE broader aerospace audience. * Exclusive of endnotes AUHR T O S ARE ASKED TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES • Submissions may be made in either official language. • Authors must include a brief (one paragraph) biographical sketch which includes current appointment/position, telephone number, and email address. Please include all professional and academic designations as well as military decorations. • Selected articles that have been peer reviewed have a to the left of the title. • The Senior Editor will notify contributors on the status of their submission. It may not be possible to publish all submissions. • All text submissions must be digital, in Microsoft Word or rich text format. Files must not be password protected and must not contain macros. Files may be submitted by mail or email at the addresses provided below. • All supporting tables, images and figures that accompany the text should be sent in separate files in the original file format (i.e., not imbedded in the text). Original vector files are preferred; high resolution (not less than 300 dpi) .psd or .jpg files may be submitted. • Authors are now required to provide “alternate text” with detailed description for all figures. Not to be confused with captions, which are still needed. Right mouse click over your illustration and select “format picture” insert “Alternative text:” and click “OK”. • Copyright permissions are required for all material that is not Department of National Defence or author originated. It is the author’s responsibility to obtain and submit the necessary written permissions which must include the author’s/artist’s name as well as the publisher’s name and location. Any material not meeting these requirements may be omitted from the article. • The Senior Editor may select images or have graphics created to accompany submissions. • Authors should use Oxford English or Petit Robert spelling. When required, reference notes should be endnotes rather than footnotes and formatted in Chicago style. For assistance refer to The Little, Brown Handbook, Le guide du rédacteur, or CFAWC Production Section at [email protected] • Acronyms and abbreviations should be used sparingly: • If they are required in the text, the term is to be written out in full the first time it is used and then followed by the abbreviated form in brackets. • If they are required in tables or figures, each table and figure will contain a list of abbreviations. • A list of all abbreviations (and their terms) used in the text will be included at the end of each submission. • The Senior Editor reserves the right to edit submissions for style, grammar, and length, but will not make editorial changes that will affect the integrity of the argument without consulting the author. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION OR TO MAKE A SUBMISSION Call for Submissions PLEASE CONTACT THE EDITOR AT: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre For the Fall 2013 issue: 30 July 2013 8 Wing Trenton For the Winter 2014 issue: 30 October 2013 Box 1000 Stn Forces For the Spring 2014 issue: 30 January 2014 Astra, Ontario K0K 3W0 For the Summer 2014 issue: 30 April 2014 Attn: Major William March [email protected] D ISCLaimER Opinions expressed in the Journal remain those of the author and do not represent Departmental or Canadian Forces policy. Doctrine, training and other material published in the Journal does not represent authority for action on that particular topic. All published material remains copyright of the Depart- ment of National Defence and may not be used without written permission. Vol. 2 | No. 2 ARTICLES Spring 2013 Cana dian Special Security Events: 7 An Improved Framework for Royal Canadian Air Force Command and Control By Major Ken Craig, CD e ditor’s U nshakeable Faith: The Flawed message 18 Command of Bomber Harris 4 By Major Lynne Chaloux, CD O peration AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s letters to 32 Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift the editor By Matthew Trudgen, PhD 6 w ere the Events of September 11, 2001, 42 a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the Phenomenon of Globalization? By Captain Samuel Boudreault

BOOK REVIEWS Cata clysm: The War on the 55 Eastern Front, 1941–45 CF Photo: Cpl Sylvie Kervin Review by Major Chris Buckham, CD, MA

Gone to Russia to Fight: 57 The RAF in South Russia 1918–1920 Review by Officer Cadet Joshua Wanvig

T he Next Decade: Where We’ve Been … 58 and Where We’re Going Review by Officer Cadet Bradley Ticky

S oviet Air Force Theory, 1918–1945 CF Photo: Cpl Pierre Habib 60 Review by Major Nathan Burgess, CD

CF Photo: Cpl Aydyn Neifer The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Erdito ’s MESSAGE

nniversaries are important—just in the establishment in this nation of an air ask anyone who has forgotten industry and training organization from to appropriately note one that the ground up and although Canadians had A involves their significant other. For fought on far distant fields of battle before, organizations, such as the Royal Canadian this would be the first time that they would Air Force (RCAF), the commemoration of do so in the air. These achievements—not to important historical achievements is equally mention the exploits of our aeronautical pion- necessary. Commemorative activities provide eers and heroes such as Barker, Bishop and opportunities to collectively celebrate our McLeod—should be commemorated during shared heritage, inculcate our customs and this centenary. traditions with new members and highlight the yeoman service the RCAF has provided, Stretch the above dates a bit—from and continues to provide, to Canada. Hence September 2014 to August 2020—and they the importance placed on events such as those encompass the 75th anniversary of the Second surrounding the recognition of the RCAF’s World War. While the “War to End All Wars” role in the Battle of Britain each September well and truly set Canada upon the world’s and the celebration of our “birthday” on stage, the Second World War, a generation 1 April. later, cemented Canada’s role as a member of the international community. Aviation would Why am I focusing on anniversar- be a critical element of Canada’s contribution ies in this issue of the Journal? Simply put, to the war effort, as the nation focused its within a few short months there will be a efforts on the sinews of air power by providing “perfect storm” with respect to significant raw resources, producing aircraft and training historical events. August 2014 to November personnel via the British Commonwealth Air 2019 will mark the 100th anniversary of the Training Plan. In the air, the RCAF would First World War—a cataclysmic event that grow from a few thousand souls in 1939 to changed the face of Canada forever. From an become the fourth largest Allied air force in air power perspective, the war would result 1944. Canadian airmen and airwomen would

4 Editor’s Message The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

serve throughout the world, building a record our history and heritage but also permit second to none. These achievements, both the RCAF to make a meaningful contribu- national and personal, should be celebrated. tion to the development of national plans. And, to highlight the importance of these Whether it is an article on the formation events—especially for those 75th anniversary of the Canadian Aviation Corps, our first celebrations, it will be the last time that we military air “unit,” or a ceremony placing a can expect a significant number of Second plaque at the site of a Royal Flying Corps World War veterans to be present. (Canada) training field, the scope of possible activity is virtually endless. They could focus Let’s give it some thought, shall we. on an individual or a squadron (most of our current crop of 400-series squadrons were Sic Itur Ad Astra formed overseas during the Second World War); indeed, I would be hard-pressed to think of a better reason for a reunion. Finally, they could also embrace communities and industries that played a large role in creating and sustaining the RCAF.

With this in mind, perhaps it is time Major William March, CD, MA for the RCAF to commence thinking about Senior Editor what it intends to do. Be they large or small, there is no doubt that commemorative events will take place, probably as part of a national Abbreviation campaign. However, a proactive approach would not only ensure that we celebrate RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force

Editor’s Message 5 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013 LETTERS TO THE EditOR

Dear Sir, Mr. McDonald:

I am writing in response to a book review Thank you for your keen observation— in The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal, Fall there were indeed three Ministers of National 2012, Vol. 1, No. 4. The review was on the Defence (MND) with RCAF experience. book Gilles Lamontagne: Sur tous les fronts, Erik Hersholt Nielsen was MND during and in the article, the author states there the period you noted until replaced by Perrin were only two Ministers of National Defence Beatty. He was awarded a Distinguished with Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Flying Cross (DFC) while serving as a pilot experience: James Armstrong Richardson with 101 Squadron of the Royal Air Force. (Minister of Defence, 1972–1976) and This squadron was engaged in radio counter- Gilles Lamontagne (Minister of Defence, measures, whereby they would participate in 1980–1983). There was another, not listed bombing raids with special equipment and in the article. The Honourable Erik Nielson, operators (German-speaking) on-board to Conservative Deputy Prime Minister, was listen to, and learn from, enemy radio traffic. appointed Minister of National Defence on After the war, Nielsen served in the RCAF as the 27th of February 1985, after the resigna- a legal officer from 1946 to 1951. tion of Robert Coates, and held the post until the 29th of June 1986. His parliamentary Cheers, biography states his military service was as a Bill pilot in the RCAF from 1939 to 1945.

Thank you,

Alan McDonald Sergeant (Retired)

6 Letters to the Editor CF Photo: MCpl Chris Ward The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

I ntroduction forces operated in the same joint operations area (JOA). The JTFG ACC operated from the he 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic RCMP integrated security unit (ISU) located and Paralympic Games (Operation in Richmond, British Columbia, exercising T [OP] PODIUM) and the 2010 G8/ operational control of CH124 Sea King, G20 Summits (OP CADENCE) showcased CH146 Griffon, CC138 Twin Otter, CP140 the ability of the Royal Canadian Air Force Aurora and CH149 Cormorant aircraft. The (RCAF) to successfully integrate unique air ACC was responsible to Commander JTFG power capabilities with both domestic and who in turn reported to Commander Canada international partners during high-profile Command. Commander Canadian NORAD Canadian special security events (CSSEs).1 Region (CANR) operated from the combined RCAF personnel should be justifiably proud air operations centre (CAOC) located in of their collective efforts supporting the varied Winnipeg, Manitoba, exercising operational security objectives of the Royal Canadian control of CF188 Hornet, C130 Hercules, Mounted Police (RCMP) in challenging C150 Polaris tanker aircraft and ground-based maritime, land and airspace environments. radar units. Commander CANR, using his Nevertheless, as the Canadian Forces (CF) combined force air component commander will undoubtedly continue to be called upon (CFACC) responsibilities, in turn reported to support CSSEs, we need to look critically at to Commander NORAD. If we add the how the RCAF was organized during recent Canadian Special Operations Forces Command special security events, such as OP PODIUM (CANSOFCOM) aviation units that reported and OP CADENCE, to determine if there directly to Canada Command, there were three is a better means to deliver air power in lines of command ultimately responsible to the support of law enforcement mandates. This Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). is an especially important issue as Canada will likely host future G8 leaders’ summits, The RCAF organizational structure summits of the Francophonie, North during OP CADENCE mirrored OP American leaders’ summits and Asia-Pacific PODIUM except that the joint task force Economic Cooperation forums. In two years (JTF) air component functions were assigned time, we are hosting the Toronto 2015 Pan to a CFACC forward, operating from the American / Parapan American Games. RCMP ISU located in Barrie, Ontario. R ecent Canadian special security event Directly supporting the JTF commander, force structures the CFACC forward was responsible for coordinating CH146 Griffon helicopters During OP PODIUM, RCAF elements supporting internationally protected were organized under two separate lines of persons (IPP) movement and CP140 command—Joint Task Force Games (JTFG) Aurora aircraft conducting intelligence, Air Component Command (ACC) and North surveillance and reconnaissance missions. American Aerospace Defence Command CANR responsibilities were retained by (NORAD). The JTFG air component the Winnipeg-based CFACC executing was assigned maritime surveillance, land operational control of CF188 Hornet, surveillance, air mobility, search and rescue CH124 Sea King and ground-based radar as well as logistics support mission sets; units supporting the aerospace warning whereas, NORAD was assigned aerospace and control mission sets. Again, the JTF warning and control mission sets. This commander reported to Commander Canada division of responsibilities essentially meant Command; whereas, Commander CANR that the RCAF was split along two separate reported to Commander NORAD. As with and distinct reporting chains, although both OP PODIUM, during OP CADENCE,

8 Canadian Special Security Events: An Improved Framework for Royal Canadian Air Force Command and Control The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

RCAF resources were divided along two is logically consistent with our own doctrine separate lines of command, each with their and designed to effectively complement own distinct reporting chain. the RCMP and other agencies involved in planning and executing a complex domestic The division of Air Force command security operation. and control between Commander NORAD and Commander Canada Command during Lsn es o s identified from previous OP PODIUM appeared inefficient and Canadian special security events unnecessarily onerous. There were, in effect, The uncoordinated and confusing CF two commanders running two separate command and control approach to supporting lines of air power operations, each with domestic security events has been a recurrent complementary mission sets and both in theme in CSSE post-deployment reports. support of RCMP security objectives. Close Following the 2007 North American Leaders’ coordination between the two commands Summit (OP LOBOS) held in Montebello, throughout the planning, deployment, Quebec, after-action observations noted the execution and redeployment phases was a lack of strategic direction in the aerospace necessity for overall operational success. realm as a potential source of friction The two air force commands shared vital between Canada Command and NORAD. logistical support. This was a challenge for To address these concerns, in 2008 the the air component A4 support organization, Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre which needed to separate ACC support (CFAWC) was directed to convene a requirements from CANR support working group involving the RCMP, Canada requirements; in many cases, ACC and Command and the 1 Canadian Air Division CANR requirements overlapped. To confuse Headquarters CFACC to resolve command matters further, the JTFG ACC and CANR and control issues. The working group was shared limited CH146 Griffon resources tasked to develop a framework for domestic requiring aircrews to be prepared to conduct airspace defence and security in the context RCMP surveillance and movement tasks (a of a special security event.2 The result of JTFG ACC responsibility) and low-speed these deliberations was a draft framework air intercept tasks (a CANR responsibility). that attempted to distinguish the defence This convoluted command and control of Canada mission (a CF responsibility) organization was confusing to not only those from domestic airspace security (an RCMP within the RCAF but, just as importantly, also responsibility) by explicitly defining specific the CF land, maritime and support elements. mission sets. The proposed framework This organizational structure was even more espoused a command and control arrangement puzzling to the other government department that separated air power along three lines of (OGD) agencies involved in security planning; command—NORAD, Canada Command they were bewildered by the requirement and CANSOFCOM. The draft framework to contact two separate segments of the still required the RCMP and OGDs to liaise RCAF, depending on the type of mission set with two separate organizations (NORAD involved. This separation of responsibilities and Canada Command), leaving the RCAF became a source of frustration for the OGDs open to criticism that it lacked unity of as the RCAF planning effort appeared effort and unity of command in planning disjointed and lacked synchronization. It an operation limited in time and space. became readily apparent over the course of Unfortunately, the draft framework was never a two-year planning period that the RCAF ratified, as it would have laid the foundation could have taken steps to support our security for subsequent refinement following the OP partners with an organizational structure that PODIUM and OP CADENCE experiences.

Canadian Special Security Events: An Improved Framework for Royal Canadian Air Force 9 Command and Control The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

The OP PODIUM JTFG post-operation citing the establishment of multiple supported report identified the lack of defined command commanders as an issue that led to potentially and control relationships among JTFG, unclear command relationships. The CANR and CANSOFCOM as an area for command relationship between NORAD concern and much needed improvement.3 and Canada Command defined one as the The report indicated that the OGD security supported commander for their particular and consequence management partners mission and the other as the supporting found the numerous CF commands difficult commander. Unfortunately, these terms, to comprehend and work with in building and their accompanying responsibilities, their own plans. Despite the lack of a were not clearly articulated in planning defined command and control relationship guidance documents, leaving interpretation among CF entities, coordination and liaison and resulting planning requirements subject necessarily occurred at the staff level. It was to the willingness of the staffs involved not an ideal situation to leave our collective to cooperate. The concept of supported success subject to the willingness of the commanders is generally considered a various staffs to cooperate with one another. working relationship, rather than a reporting Command relationships and responsibilities one; although, this too is open for debate. must be clearly defined and agreed upon at Specific observations from the staff action the highest levels rather than left open to directive include: insufficient guidance in the interpretation and subjective application by initiating directive detailing the roles and planning officers. The JTFG report further responsibilities of the commanders during described challenges between JTFG and each phase of the operation; lack of “strategic CANR in developing synchronized plans, consistency” between Canada Command identifying firm support requirements and and NORAD; and Canada Command had providing standardized administrative responsibility, without the corresponding policies. During OP PODIUM these issues authority, for budgets and support activities became a source of frustration for all planning that in some cases were in response to staffs. JTFG was ultimately responsible for other command requirements. An example providing logistic, real-property management of a lack in strategic consistency between and communication and information systems commands during OP PODIUM occurred (CIS) support to CANR operational in the transition phase between the Olympic deployment requirements, yet JTFG was and Paralympic Games. At the conclusion of unable to influence these decisions to the Olympics, JTFG resources were asked to effectively harmonize CANR actions with adopt a reduced level of effort and readiness the other JTF component command planning posture in response to the lower threat level activities. In short, the concept of the RCAF identified by the RCMP for the Paralympics. operating multiple lines of command in CANR, on the other hand, elected to maintain a shared JOA, but responsive to separate a heightened alert for a period of time into commanders, was seen as inefficient and the Paralympics phase, once again confusing lacking synchronization. our OGD security partners, as it reflected two commands working under two different Following OP PODIUM and OP operating assumptions yet supporting the CADENCE, Canada Command issued a same law enforcement authority. CSSE lessons learned staff action directive that collected observations and provided To address deficiencies in command and recommendations for improvement.4 control relationships, the Canada Command Command and control in both operations lessons learned directive recommended was viewed as an area for improvement, that the principle of multiple supported

10 Canadian Special Security Events: An Improved Framework for Royal Canadian Air Force Command and Control The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

CF Photo: MCpl Chris Ward commanders be enshrined in doctrine that “the assignment of command authorities with clearly delineated authorities and by the CDS for Vancouver 2010 and 2010 responsibilities. Formalizing the supported/ G8 does not imply that two supported supporting commander relationship in commanders will be the preferred command doctrine is a good first step, but it does not go relationship in the future.”5 far enough in addressing concerns regarding Canadian Forces aerospace doctrine limited RCAF capabilities reporting to multiple commands. The supported command A guiding concept in military command relationship becomes even more blurred and control is the principle of unity of when we consider that respective planning command, commonly understood to mean activities must be closely coordinated and that a single commander is appointed for involve the sharing of aircraft and aircrews for each operation.6 This commander has the certain tasks. Nor does this recommendation authority to plan and direct operations and adequately respond to criticism that security is held responsible for an operation’s success partners find the RCAF organizational or failure. As already stated, recent CSSEs structure difficult to comprehend and, indeed, strayed from this principle by assigning a challenge to effectively synchronize with in separate and distinct mission sets to the JTF satisfying their own planning requirements. commander and the NORAD commander. Interestingly, in 2009 a Tri-Command Study In the case of OP PODIUM, the JTFG ACC involving NORAD, United States Northern was left in the unenviable position of acting Command (USNORTHCOM) and Canada as a conduit between NORAD/CANR and Command was established to investigate the JTFG to ensure that both staffs were aware of future roles, missions and relationships for the each other’s planning activities and concerns. commands. An initial product of this study From an inward-looking CF perspective, we concluded that the 2007 North American appeared to adhere to the unity of command Leaders’ Summit (OP LOBOS) command principle; although, this was less than obvious authorities were not sufficiently clear and to our security partners. In this regard, the

Canadian Special Security Events: An Improved Framework for Royal Canadian Air Force 11 Command and Control The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

RCMP raised an interesting observation mission to mission across the entire JOA and during the design of their Olympic Theatre at short notice, thus enhancing unity of effort. Command Centre and Summits Unified And third, advances in communications Command Centre. Air Force planners stated technology and situational awareness tools a requirement for three work stations in the allow air power to be centrally controlled in RCMP command centres: one for the JTF real-time through an air operations centre.8 air component, one for CANR and one for Despite the recognition of centralized NORAD. It was unclear to RCMP planners control as a fundamental tenet to air power why the RCAF required separate stations for success, in recent CSSE operations the the CANR and NORAD functions when RCAF deviated from doctrine and separated they were simply described as being necessary limited resources along two or even three for liaison activities between the RCMP. lines of control. This has likely been done to Surely CANR, through the Winnipeg- satisfy the standing headquarters—NORAD based CFACC, could have facilitated the and Canada Command (now Canadian informational and liaison linkages between Joint Operations Command [CJOC]). CANR and NORAD. It would be interesting Interestingly, past expeditionary operations, to note whether a United States special such as OP MOBILE (Libya 2011), retained security event would see the Continental centralized control by a single air commander NORAD and NORAD differentiation in an as an important factor when organizing air American law enforcement operations centre. power (less organic rotary wing assets that are Unity of command was difficult to achieve in traditionally assigned to land and maritime the planning and execution phases for JTFG component commanders). ACC and CANR, as they reported to two different commanders. CF aerospace command and control doctrine is generally focussed on exped- CF aerospace doctrine offers several itionary operations and offers little clear important factors to consider when organizing guidance with respect to domestic operations. air power. The fundamental tenet of aerospace Canadian Forces Aerospace Command Doctrine power is centralized control which “ensures the (Command is one of the six Air Force func- most efficient use of limited aerospace assets, tions: Command, Sense, Act, Shield, Sustain and permits one commander to confirm and Generate) discusses domestic operations all of the requirements and then assign or only briefly under a “chain of command” reassign resources to specific missions, based sub-heading.9 This publication indicates that on changing circumstances and priorities.”7 the ACC will exercise operational control of Centralized control assigns a single all assigned CF aerospace forces in support aerospace commander the responsibility of the JTF commander but then states that for the planning, direction, prioritization, Commander CANR will exercise operational allocation, synchronization, integration and control over allocated forces for air defence deconfliction of all aerospace assets. The in the region on behalf of Commander reasons for centralized control are readily NORAD. Again, in a CSSE context the apparent, have evolved from past experience outcome of this guidance is multiple com- and remain relevant in a domestic operation manders operating limited air resources context. First, in most cases the aircraft in a constricted JOA, voiding the tenet of available for an operation are relatively centralized control. The challenge in a CSSE limited in number—demand traditionally is to develop an organizational construct outweighs availability. Second, aircraft that leverages and integrates the expertise characteristics of speed, range and flexibility of NORAD with the JTF to attain unity of allow air power resources to be retasked from command and centralized control.

12 Canadian Special Security Events: An Improved Framework for Royal Canadian Air Force Command and Control The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

P roposed RCAF CSSE command and There is no arguing that NORAD has control framework been an enduring and highly successful defence agreement between two nations with The means to address CF command and shared interests concerning the defence of control shortcomings during a CSSE lies in North America. However, it should be noted achieving unity of command and centralized that up until the September 11, 2001, attacks, control. This is logically accomplished by NORAD had an exclusively outward focus on assigning all RCAF assets, regardless of the airspace approaches to North America, assigned mission set, to one commander. And rather than an inward focus on domestic the commander best situated to exercise overall airspace. It was only after 9/11 that NORAD command in the JOA is the commander with assumed responsibility for enforcing multi-environment responsibilities, namely temporary airspace restrictions for special the JTF commander. This is generally the type security events.10 During a CSSE, CF support of force structure developed for expeditionary is normally assigned under the auspices of operations and should be considered the norm National Defence Act, Article 273.6(2) which for domestic operations. One entire mission authorizes “the Canadian Forces to provide set should not be separate and distinct assistance in respect of any law enforcement from the JTF simply because its supporting matter.” And herein lies a key point of debate force structure formally exists prior to the between NORAD and a JTF supporting a establishment of the CSSE. Under a single law enforcement agency—the overlapping commander construct, all RCAF resources jurisdictions between defence (military) and would be delegated to the JTF ACC. CANR law enforcement (police) mandates. Although assets necessary to support the RCMP in a civilian aircraft can be of legitimate interest their law enforcement mandate would be to both the military and law authorities, it tasked by the CDS through Commander CJOC to the assigned JTF commander. As must be recognized that an airborne threat an aside, the same approach could be taken is not necessarily an armed attack. And in the United States whereby Continental if this is the case, the police of jurisdiction NORAD Region assets could be similarly should be taking the lead in prosecuting assigned to a USNORTHCOM-mandated the event as the NORAD Agreement does not assign NORAD the task of enforcing JTF supporting a special security event. In 11 the Canadian context, select elements from domestic criminal law. Under the terms of CANR may be double-tasked to support the the NORAD Agreement and its terms of JTF commander within the defined JOA and reference, the tasks assigned to NORAD to support the NORAD commander outside include aerospace warning, aerospace control the JOA. The Canadian Air Defence Sector at and maritime warning. In the security realm, North Bay is one such example of a resource NORAD should ensure its defence mission that could support both the JTF and CANR. complements the security objectives of the Under this proposed construct, the CANR civil authorities. The challenge for Canadian forces would understand clearly who they law enforcement authorities is that they do are supporting depending on the location of not yet have the means to intercept potential the perceived threat, and the RCAF would airborne threats; thus, they are forced to rely speak with a unified and coherent voice on the resources available through NORAD. when working with OGD security partners. Assigning all air power resources to the JTF The liaison linkages and modified reporting ACC would ensure that the appropriate law relationships between CJOC and NORAD enforcement agencies are fully involved in the would be an internal CF matter, rather than development of the decision processes that a point of distraction for our OGD partners. would cause an air contact to be engaged.

Canadian Special Security Events: An Improved Framework for Royal Canadian Air Force 13 Command and Control The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

The assignment of all aerospace then exercise command and control through resources to the JTF will permit the RCAF one of two means: either use the CFACC to speak with a unified voice when planning in Winnipeg or designate a JTF ACC. If and executing operations with the other the intention is that the CFACC will retain component commanders and security national ACC functions, then the CFACC partners. This construct would also allow the should report to the JTF commander to JTF to remain fully apprised as events unfold ensure effective synchronization of effort with in the aerospace realm; this is important given the JTF headquarters as well as the maritime, that the JTF is most likely to be tasked with land and support element commands. This supporting the consequence management can best be accomplished by deploying an air phase of an interdiction after surveillance component coordination element (ACCE) and interdiction resources have terminated with delegated authority to recommend engagement activities. The end result in courses of actions, conduct liaison and establishing a single air power command planning activities as well as ensure that and control construct is one commander assigned aerospace forces are employed responsible for all air movements within effectively. This organizational structure the CSSE JOA, regardless of their assigned is suited to a CSSE of short duration and role. The RCAF should be developing limited scope. senior officers with the requisite knowledge and skills to effectively plan, lead and On the other hand, a large-scale CSSE coordinate air operations across the broad that employs forces for a lengthy period spectrum of air power. There is no reason can best be supported by a dedicated ACC to exclude a maritime navigator or tactical reporting to the JTF commander. A CSSE aviation pilot from a leadership position that requires considerable lead planning and in an air component that is responsible for synchronization of effort with the RCMP aerospace warning and control, much as a and security partner OGDs requires a fully fighter pilot and aerospace controller can empowered and focussed planning team. lead an air component that is charged with A dedicated air component will be able maritime surveillance and IPP movements. Interestingly, a 2007 report validating the to effectively exercise control over all air transformed CF command structure stated resources in the JOA. This will facilitate that “to achieve the intent of having a single important relationship building among commander in place for the entire AOR [area security partners, which is an essential of operations], such a transfer of command of element during any domestic operation, CANR to Commander Canada Command especially one in which CF resources are should be pursued, absent of any objection in support of law enforcement agencies. from NORAD.”12 Working relationships based on trust and a full appreciation of each agency’s respective To support the proposal of unifying JTF concerns can best be achieved by collocating and CANR resources under one umbrella, it the planning teams in the lead up to an is necessary that initiating directives clearly operation. This will also facilitate integration identify a single ACC responsible for all air and a shared understanding of the varied roles operations in the CSSE JOA. The NORAD and responsibilities of the participating OGDs terms of reference do not appear to preclude during the employment phase of an operation. the CDS from tasking NORAD to assign An air component commander separate necessary forces to the CJOC during a from the Winnipeg-based CFACC should CSSE. With the establishment of a single be considered the normal organizational ACC reporting to the JTF, the RCAF can structure for a large-scale CSSE.

14 Canadian Special Security Events: An Improved Framework for Royal Canadian Air Force Command and Control The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Summary Abb reviations

A recurring theme in CSSE after-action ACC air component command reporting is the need to clarify the command and control relationship between NORAD CANR Canadian NORAD Region and Canada Command (now CJOC). There CANSOFCOM Canadian Special are no easy solutions, and attempts to clarify Operations Forces the relationship (such as the draft “Strategic Command Framework for Domestic Airspace Defence CDS Chief of Defence Staff and Security,” produced by CFAWC) have not been ratified. Indeed, it is likely they CF Canadian Forces didn’t go far enough in addressing the CFACC combined force air concerns of our OGD security partners. If component commander we take a step back and ask ourselves how we CFAWC Canadian Forces Aerospace would organize the ideal JTF to support the Warfare Centre RCMP in securing a CSSE, we most likely wouldn’t create a NORAD-like headquarters CJOC Canadian Joint Operations separate from other air force missions Command and component commanders. There is no CSSE Canadian special questioning NORAD’s success in providing security event aerospace warning and control, and this is IPP internationally protected not an endorsement of the dissolution of persons this important headquarters. This paper ISU integrated security unit simply proposes a temporary organizational structure for a CSSE that strives to achieve JOA joint operations area unity of command and centralized control JTF joint task force by assigning NORAD responsibilities, and accompanying resources, limited in time and JTFG Joint Task Force Games space under the operational control of the NORAD North American Aerospace JTF commander. This temporary structure Defence Command would facilitate synchronized planning among RCAF units and with our external OGD other government security partners. It would also allow for department a distinction between support to a defence OP operation of Canada mission and a policing security RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force mission, recognizing that CF contributions to a CSSE are in support of a law enforcement RCMP Royal Canadian mandate. Ongoing CF transformational Mounted Police realignments involving the recently created USNORTHCOM United States Northern CJOC, the ongoing Tri-Command Study and Command the upcoming Toronto 2015 Pan American / Parapan American Games should be viewed as opportunities to address clearly identified shortcomings in RCAF command and control during recent CSSEs.

Canadian Special Security Events: An Improved Framework for Royal Canadian Air Force 15 Command and Control The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Major Ken Craig was the OP PODIUM 6. Canada, Department of National Defence, Joint Task Force Games air component B-GA-400-000/FP-000, Canadian Forces Aerospace lead planning officer from June 2008 to Doctrine, 2nd ed. (Winnipeg: Royal Canadian Air January 2010. During OP PODIUM and Force, December 2010), 54. Op CADENCE he was employed as a 7. Ibid., 28. commander in the RCMP Air Security Operations Coordination Centre. Major 8. Allan English and Colonel John Westrop Craig is currently an Air Reservist at Joint (Retired), Canadian Air Force Leadership and Task Force Pacific Headquarters. Command: The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations (Trenton, ON: Department of National Defence, 2007), 148. Notes 9. Canada, Department of National 1. A Canadian special security event is Defence, B-GA-401-000/FP-001, Canadian defined as “an event of national significance Forces Aerospace Command Doctrine (Winnipeg: that requires extraordinary measures to ensure Royal Canadian Air Force, March 2012). security.” Examples include international summits, sporting events and conferences 10. Lieutenant-General Tom Lawson with involving internationally protected persons. Captain Michael Sawler, “NORAD in 2012 The United States equivalent is “national – Ever Evolving, Forever Relevant,” Canadian special security event (NSSE).” See the glossary Military Journal 12, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 5–17, in Canada, Department of National Defence, http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vol12/no3/index- B-GJ-005-302/FP-001, Canadian Forces Joint eng.asp (accessed February 7, 2013). Publication CFJP 3-2, Domestic Operations (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 11. Canada and United States, “Agreement November 2011). Between the Government of Canada and the Government of United States of America 2. Commanding Officer, Canadian Forces on the North American Aerospace Defense Aerospace Warfare Centre to Commander, Command,” (April 28, 2006), http://www. 1 Canadian Air Division, “National Special treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105060 Security Events (NSSE) Framework for (accessed February 7, 2013). Domestic Airspace Defence and Security,” April 11, 2008, http://17wing.winnipeg.mil. 12. Lieutenant-General R. R. Crabbe, Vice- ca:1400/1cad/FilesO/DMCS-10228.pdf Admiral L. G. Mason and Lieutenant-General (accessed February 7, 2013). F. R. Sutherland, “A Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Command 3. Joint Task Force Games Headquarters, Structure,” (31 January 2007), http://dmcs- “Joint Task Force Games Post-Operation ops.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/DMCS-STR/FilesO/ Report – OP PODIUM,” (August 19, 2010). DMCS19507.PDF (accessed February 7, 2013).

4. Canada Command, “Canadian Special Security Event (CSSE) Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive,” Annex A to 6397-09900-02- 147938 (Canada Com LL), (January 31, 2011).

5. Canada and United States, “Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation among North American Aerospace Defense Command, United States Northern Command, and Canada Command,” (September 2009), 12, www.northcom.mil/News/Signed%20 Framework%20Sep%2009.pdf (accessed February 7, 2013).

16 Canadian Special Security Events: An Improved Framework for Royal Canadian Air Force Command and Control CF Photo: MCpl Andrew Collins The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

18 Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris Te h Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

U nshakeable Faith: T he Flawed Command of Bomber Harris By Major Lynne Chaloux, CD

Introduction production capacity by area bombing its cities. his article focuses on Air Chief This inflexible approach inhibited his ability Marshal Sir Arthur Harris’ wartime to see the bigger picture with any measure of T command of the Royal Air Force’s objectivity and was the Achilles heel of his (RAF) Bomber Command from 1942–1945. leadership, limiting his command capability, This analysis utilizes Dr. Ross Pigeau and resulting in an abuse of his authority and, Carol McCann’s model to evaluate the ultimately, having a detrimental effect on dimensions relating to Harris’ competency, the Allied offensive. His unshakeable faith authority and responsibility (CAR) and to became a measure of “obstinacy and dogma- tism … [that] prevent[ed] Harris from being assess the overall balance and effectiveness 1 of Harris’ command. The CAR model allows called a truly great commander.” for the necessary depth of analysis into Harris’ abilities, responsibilities, beliefs, actions and Background reactions over a specific timeframe and is, therefore, deemed most suitable to dissect The Battle of Britain denied Germany the pertinent aspects of this complex and contro- air superiority required for a land invasion of versial commander. England in World War II, so Hitler changed tactics in September 1940. The Luftwaffe This article illustrates that Harris, engaged in night bombing raids on British cit- although highly skilled in many areas and ies, known as the Blitz, which killed 40,000 having demonstrated impressive successes Britons and rendered 750,000 homeless by at the helm of Bomber Command, had a the time it ended in May 1941. Despite the singular and seemingly intractable approach Blitz’ onslaught, “British morale failed to to war—to obliterate Germany’s war buckle; rather, it hardened … . [Hitler] left a

Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris 19 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

United Kingdom that was physically scarred Physical competency encompasses “physical but morally and psychologically strengthened strength, sophisticated sensory motor … and determined to give it back to the skills, good health, agility and endurance.”8 Germans.”2 As Harris did not engage in actual flying operations, his physical strength and motor Notwithstanding these intentions, the skills were not required to the same degree as first years of the war did not yield success- a line pilot. He did suffer from a chronic and ful results for Bomber Command. In August untreated stomach ulcer,9 but this did not seem 1941 (six months before Harris took com- to affect his ability to withstand the exigencies mand), a report to Prime Minister Winston of his duties. Churchill’s War Cabinet criticized Bomber Command’s performance, stating that only Emotional competency one-third of bomber sorties produced attacks Emotional competency relates to stabil- coming within five miles [8 kilometres] of ity, “resilience, hardiness and the ability to their target, while many bombers were simply cope under stress.”10 By all accounts, Harris dropping their bombs in the open country- 3 possessed these qualities in spades. He “was side. Furthermore, only two of every three sombre in spirit, single-minded, dogged, bombers dropped their loads within 75 square 4 determined, and … thick-skinned, all qualities miles [194 square kilometres] of their target. he needed at Bomber Command”11 and in the As precision bombing appeared to be face of significant pressures on multiple fronts. failing, the Air Ministry changed its policy Harris’ responsibilities were daunting. on 14 February 1942, abandoning it in favour “Perhaps no airman had ever been given of bombing “focused on the morale of the a more difficult job: to create from scarce enemy civilian population and in particular 5 resources a bomber force that would be the the industrial workers.” This new policy of one sure means of taking the war directly area bombing aimed to destroy Germany’s to Nazi Germany.”12 The stakes were high. ability to wage war by systematically deci- As Prime Minister Churchill wrote to mating its cities, where war potential was Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Aircraft concentrated. There was no better person Production, during the Battle of Britain: to implement this policy than Harris, who took over as commander-in-chief of Bomber Command a week later.6 When I look round to see how we can win the war, I see that there is [Harris] was the living embodi- only one sure path … [a] devastating, ment of the “bomber dream,” the exterminating attack by very heavy theory that bombing could win wars bombers from this country upon the without the need for land offensives Nazi homeland. We must be able to and perhaps, by taking wars off the overwhelm them by this means, with- battlefields and into the homes of out which I do not see a way through.13 the civilian population, make war 7 itself impossible. Despite the formidable pressure of being responsible for the one weapon deemed Competency capable (before 1944) of bringing the war to Germany itself14 (but which had demon- Pigeau and McCann define com- strated sorely disappointing results to date), petency as a four-pronged dimension, Harris never wavered in his belief, enthusiasm encompassing physical, emotional, or commitment to destroy Germany by indus- intellectual and interpersonal aspects. trial bombing.

20 Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

On an emotional level, Harris’ stead- Intellectual competency fastness could not have been easy to uphold. Despite his enduring affection, respect and Pigeau and McCann describe intellectual concern for the welfare of the crews under his competency as: command, Harris nonetheless exposed them critical for planning missions, mon- daily to “a danger which at times was so great itoring the situation, using reasoning, that scarcely one man in three could expect making inferences, visualizing the 15 to survive his tour of 30 operations.” Harris problem space, assessing risks and never shirked from this responsibility and saw making judgements. … [S]ince no it as being his alone, and although he worked two missions will ever be the same, diligently to ensure his men were not put at intellectual competency must include 16 risk unnecessarily, he rationalized the heavy creativity, flexibility and a willing- and regular casualties as being necessary for ness to learn.23 the greater good.17 Harris displayed very high intellectual In the face of moral questions surround- competency when addressing issues related ing the bombing of innocent civilians, Harris to his passion for area bombing. He had a was unremorseful. He compared it to World profound level of understanding about the War I and rationalized it as better than the bombing business and demonstrated a frank Flanders killing fields and no different than approach to operational problems.24 starving Germans to death during the naval 18 blockade. “Harris was … ruthless, but ruth- Perceptive and articulate,25 Harris was lessness was necessary in order to prosecute 19 clever and creative and also employed skilful the war.” problem solving and oratory in convincing superiors of the need for more and better The inter-service rivalries and com- resources for Bomber Command. He pro- peting demands for resources that duced impressive results. For example, during characterized Harris’ tenure meant he was his tenure, Harris more than doubled his constantly engaged in a fight—not only to get number of squadrons (from 51 to 108) and air- more resources for his command but to ensure craft, and he decreased their non-operational they were not poached by the other services. rate from 27 per cent to less than 1 per cent. Naturally combative, “he took up these chal- At the same time, “[h]is night-fighting fleets 20 lenges with relish.” overcame poor equipment and training and pioneered such essentials of modern warfare Harris was under considerable personal 26 21 as electronic countermeasures … .” financial stress during the war and was simultaneously raising a young child born at the outbreak of war when Harris was 47. Another of his successful tactics was He upheld his family responsibilities, and his recognizing and harnessing the potential of daughter attested that he was a “wonderful positive public relations. Prior to Harris tak- father with a great sense of humour and sense ing over in 1942, Bomber Command had of fun … [who] almost always seemed to have “claimed to be the war-winning arm but had time for me.”22 so far failed to produce much evidence to sup- port that assertion” resulting in pressure that A man of lesser resilience and hardiness “the RAF should abandon its attempt at mak- would surely not have fared so well in the face ing a strategic impact on the war and revert to of such intense daily pressures, hardships and being a tactical force [strictly in support of the challenges that confronted Harris during his Navy and Army].”27 Bomber Command was tenure at the helm of Bomber Command. also subject to political criticism.

Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris 21 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Within weeks of Harris assuming com- ability to pull together the near impossible to mand in 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps made attain his higher-level objectives demonstrate a speech in the House of Commons that his adept assessment of the situation, political seemed to put the future of strategic bombing shrewdness, advanced planning skills and a into doubt. Harris, therefore, devised plans willingness to take risks to ultimately achieve to quell his critics and convince politicians of great effect and advance his cause. As stated by the importance of area bombing and of the John Terraine, a renowned historian, “Harris’ true potential of overwhelming airpower. calm and deliberate decision to stake his whole His experimental raids on Lübeck, Augsburg force and its future on that night showed the and Rostock in the spring of 1942 proved true quality of command.”31 However, it soon that his preferred method of area bombing at became apparent that Harris’ superior vision night was the only feasible method of attack was severely constrained. and that it was highly effective. Later that spring, he devised a clever plan that essen- “When Harris finally molded Bomber tially amounted to an exercise in propaganda, Command into an efficient organization for whereby an overwhelming demonstration of massed night bomber raids, he wanted to use effectiveness would silence naysayers and gain his crews for nothing else.”32 His intellectual 28 public and political support. He conceived competency was hampered considerably by and managed to cobble together a series of his single-minded pursuit of area bombing. 1000-bomber raids, beginning with Cologne He could not—or would not—see the forest in May 1942. At that time, the highest through the trees. monthly average of aircraft and crews avail- able for operations in Bomber Command That very single-mindedness which was to was 373. It was a remarkable achievement, prove such an asset in pulling his Command in which Harris mustered every conceivable together and focusing it on its task also did not resource and used them in an “as yet unheard permit him to develop the broadness of vision 33 of concentration of force.”29 to see the other side of the coin. He was “utterly convinced that a con- centration of force over a selected range of “When Harris industrial cities would break German morale finally molded and fatally damage the enemy’s war-making Bomber Command capacity.”34 He believed area bombing was into an efficient the only way to deal the decisive blow to organization Germany, and this led to serious lapses in for massed night strategic judgement. bomber raids, he Harris claimed Army Cooperation wanted to use Command was a “gross misuse of the RAF,” his crews for and he refused to consider their requirements. nothing else.” Furthermore, he felt that Coastal Command was an “obstacle to victory” and fought against giving them any long-range aircraft for sub- marine hunting.35 In particular, the latter The effect was a public relations bonanza, viewpoint demonstrated seriously flawed a reprieve from political sniping, support for strategic thinking. German U-boats were more resources for Bomber Command, and a winning the Battle of the Atlantic in 1942/43, much-needed morale boost for his airmen and and “the next step towards winning the war— the British public at large.30 This plan and his or avoiding defeat—was beating the U-boat

22 Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris Te h Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

menace in the North Atlantic.”36 Without Staff and the Allied high command wanted Allied success, “the Combined Bomber him to join a combined attack on German Offensive was not going to happen, and oil supplies and communications to limit neither was re-invasion of the continent.”37 the German forces’ ability to manoeuvre and Harris’ firm belief, however, was that with prevent Germany from continuing the war.39 provision of adequate resources, “he could He eventually had to be strong-armed by his smash Germany from the air—which would boss, Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal, into make a seaborne invasion unnecessary.”38 finally cooperating, although the extent of this cooperation is debatable.40 “Harris had Remaining fully committed to area other ideas about the best use for Bomber bombing, Harris did not believe in so-called Command. . . . His single-mindedness not “panacea targets”—precision bombing targets only bedevilled Allied strategic planning, but aimed at critical vulnerabilities in Germany’s also frustrated and alienated colleagues … .”41 ability to wage war, which were selected on Harris also strongly “opposed the diversion of the advice of intelligence and industrial airpower to support the Normandy invasion, research experts. In late 1944, the British Air downplayed the need to bomb the German

RAF night attack

Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris 23 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

V-2 missile sites,”42 and, increasingly, resented He was described as brusque, opinionated suggestions that Bomber Command should be and outspoken;47 aggressive, blunt and, some- used for anything but area bombing of cities.43 times, extremely rude.48 He was “incapable of deploying guile, diplomacy, or charm as In short, Harris saw everything except weapons in his armory.”49 He had “a reputa- area bombing as a diversion; however, these tion for being prickly and did not suffer fools “diversions” were what the war was really all gladly—irrespective of their seniority.”50 about. Although area bombing was indeed the only means available at the beginning of Harris was a stern wartime commander the war, this was certainly no longer the case whose feelings of intense rivalry and distrust by 1944. Harris, however, “delayed switching of the Army and Navy caused consistent to selective targeting after Bomber Command antagonism toward them.51 He showed con- had developed the capability.”44 Instead of tempt toward Air Ministry officers, and seeing the war effort as a joint utilization his relations with them were distrustful of resources, he viewed it as a competition and extremely strained,52 with exchanges between services. characterized as “often acerbic.”53 As well, Harris didn’t trust intelligence experts and Harris held on to his narrow view fero- discounted information that contradicted ciously. He “made a habit of seeing only one his expectations. Although generally wary side of a question and then exaggerating it. of all civilian advisors, he was particularly He had a tendency to confuse advice with contemptuous of the Ministry of Economic interference, criticism with sabotage and 45 Warfare (MEW), whom he accused of being evidence with propaganda.” Such a narrow “amateurish, ignorant and irresponsible.”54 and intractable approach to war inhibited his By the end of 1943, Harris would not even ability to see the bigger picture objectively, consider any targets suggested by MEW. collaborate with the other services and volun- This had serious consequences for British tarily use his formidable resources where they strategy in 1944, when MEW advocated oil would have the greatest effect toward winning and communications targets, key weaknesses the war or averting defeat. of Germany’s war effort.55 Clearly, Harris was not focused on interpersonal relations, and his Although a brilliant tactical- and obstinacy and inflexibility were not conducive operational-level commander, Harris’ unwill- to the sort of teamwork necessary in such ingness or inability to grasp the strategic complex operations. picture points to a marked limitation of his intellectual competency as a higher-level com- All that said, Harris made good use of mander, who would be expected to maintain relationships he had managed to build over his the flexibility of mind to offer creative solutions career. He was a “convivial host at home and in the face of the war’s changing landscape. canvassed unceasingly for Bomber Command Interpersonal competency in the process.”56 He also leveraged his personal power with Churchill to great effect. As such, it Social skills are the basis for inter- appears the interpersonal skills he did possess personal competency, which “is essential were utilized for Bomber Command’s gain. for interacting effectively with one’s sub- ordinates, peers, superiors … and other Overall competency government organizations. … [They include assessement the] attributes of trust, respect, perceptiveness and empathy that promote effective team- Harris’ extremely high emotional work.”46 Harris was a difficult man. Social competency cannot make up for his lack skills and diplomacy were not his forte. of intellectual competency as a strategic

24 Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

commander. Regardless of his high intellectual link that a strong commander can forge with competency as an operational commander, “the his subordinates.”60 “No one doubted that he hallmark of the great senior commander is was a master of his trade and had been so the ability to grasp the big strategic picture, since the first years of the RAF’s existence.” and Harris certainly failed in this respect.”57 Furthermore, the crews of Bomber Command Coupled with his difficult personality, obstin- “were, and remain, Harris’s men, and the acy and general lack of interpersonal skills judgement of his subordinates and contem- that negatively affected most of his working poraries [was] that he was a fine man and an relationships, Harris’ competency is judged as inspiring leader … .”61 Harris also had very low-medium. high personal authority with his superiors, particularly in the first years of his tenure.62 Authority

Authority refers to command’s domain As a war leader, Churchill supported of influence and is the degree and scope of a Arthur Harris, finding him a kin- commander’s power and the resources avail- dred spirit, a man who would not able for enacting their will. There are two “flag or fail,” someone who would fight the war to the finish, however types of authority: legal (which is assigned) hard the road to victory, however and personal (which is achieved). Legal high the cost.63 authority is formalized power and officially assigns commanders the resources and per- However, as the war progressed, Harris’ sonnel to accomplish the mission. Personal personal authority with his colleagues and authority is tacit, given informally and earned superiors began to wane. By 1944, techno- over time based on reputation, experience and logical improvements and more reliable character. It is tied to professional compe- intelligence meant that Bomber Command tence, ethics, values and courage, and it serves 58 was capable of identifying and hitting to motivate others. selective targets with the potential to cripple Germany. However, he remained stubbornly As the Commander-in-Chief of RAF committed to area bombing and continued Bomber Command from February 1942 until to choose industrial city targets to an over- the end of the European war in 1945, with whelming degree, despite the new policy responsibility for its resources and personnel, prioritizing precision targets, like oil. His Harris clearly had appropriate legal author- unwillingness to conciliate, despite prods ity by virtue of his position. As well, by all and orders from the Air Ministry, alienated accounts, Harris had exceptional personal superiors and compromised his reputation authority with those under his command. with his colleagues.64 When he took over in February 1942, “a fresh air of optimism swept through the squadrons Authority assessment of Bomber Command.” He arrived with “a 59 Despite his failings, Harris had built up reputation for getting things done, a leader.” so much personal authority with his airmen and with the public at large that Air Chief As their commander-in-chief, Harris Marshal Charles Portal could not fire him was revered by his men. They knew he had without public backlash and/or a huge drop in their interests at heart, despite the fact he Bomber Command morale.65 This essentially never went out of his way to court popularity enabled Harris to wage his own personal war and they rarely saw him at their stations. “By to a certain degree, allowing him more power some mysterious process, he knew the crews than his position should have allowed. As a and they knew him—a curious example of the result, his overall authority is judged as high.

Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris 25 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

R esponsibility Harris refused to concede and continued to Responsibility “addresses the degree to bomb cities, first and foremost. which an individual accepts the legal and In a series of heated written exchanges moral liability commensurate with com- with Portal, over Harris’ unwillingness to mand” and has two components: extrinsic cooperate in bombing (prioritized) oil tar- and intrinsic. Extrinsic responsibility is the gets, Harris was argumentative, unapologetic degree to which an individual feels account- and insubordinate as he virtually disobeyed able—both up to superiors and down to 74 66 Portal’s orders. He eventually acquiesced subordinates. There is no doubt Harris felt to a certain degree, increasing attacks on oil completely accountable toward his airmen. targets from 6 per cent in October 1944 to He fully accepted the responsibility for the more than 24 per cent the following month. missions assigned to them and personally 67 It has been estimated that had Harris com- selected their targets. He was respectful of plied with just one or two more attacks on oil their courage and efforts, stating in Bomber targets per month, it “might have made a dis- Offensive: “There is no parallel in warfare to cernible difference to the German war effort such courage and determination in the face 68 and inhibited, if not precluded, the Ardennes of danger over so prolonged a period.” In Offensive in December 1944.”75 a final act of loyalty, Harris declined (out of protest) his own individual honours after the January 1945 represented the peak of war, because his crews had been denied the Bomber Command’s contribution to the oil recognition he believed they deserved, includ- 69 campaign, with 30 per cent of their bombs ing a Bomber Command campaign medal. hitting oil targets and 40 per cent hitting cit- 76 Harris’ feelings of accountability toward ies. In his continued exchanges with Portal his superiors in his chain of command were over his lack of commitment to assigned prior- altogether different. He regularly dismissed ities, Harris was unrepentent and unrelenting, or seriously delayed his obligations to com- threatening to resign if Portal was not prepared ply with their orders and did virtually as he to accept continued area bombing over the next wanted—i.e., area bombing, regardless of three months. Portal backed down. However, assigned directives and pressure from superi- had Portal actually relieved Harris of command, ors to concede. For example, he dismissed some historians estimate: intelligence reports, selectively interpreting City bombing might have ended or the joint June 1943 Pointblank directive that at least been sharply reduced, and prioritized targets aimed at crippling the 70 airplanes could have been redirected German war industry, and then repeatedly toward key oil and transportation ignored attempts by the British Air Staff targets. Tens of thousands of civil- in late 1943 to persuade him to follow his 71 ians would not have lost their lives, assigned priorities. more than a dozen cities would have Of particular note was Harris’ outright been spared, Germany might have refusal to attack ball bearing factories, which capitulated earlier, and thousands of 77 experts correctly predicted to be absolutely vital Allied lives might have been saved. to Germany’s war industry.72 German Minister of Armaments Albert Speer was terrified at the According to Pigeau and McCann, prospect of sustained attacks on ball bearing “[c]ommanders must be held accountable for plants, which he believed would slow or even their creative actions … in a manner consist- halt the growth of industrial production, lead- ent with the intent of the commander.”78 In ing to Germany’s defeat.73 Yet regardless of Harris’ case, he took the courage of his con- orders, expert advice and sustained prodding, victions too far and remained unwilling to

26 Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

dispense his considerable power in accordance responsibility toward the larger war mission, with commander’s intent (assigned direc- his overall responsibility is judged as medium. tives), which he dismissed, ignored or, at best, selectively interpreted on multiple occasions Conclusion beginning in mid-1943—thereby displaying Using Pigeau and McCann’s model, low extrinsic responsibility toward his RAF Harris’ high authority and medium level of supervisors. responsibility, that was coupled with a chain Intrinsic responsibility is the degree of command that failed to keep him in check, of self-generated obligation a person feels ultimately led to a situation bordering on dan- toward the military mission—the amount of gerous command or abuse of authority. Harris’ resolve demonstrated, ownership taken and overall competence was largely inhibited by commitment expressed.79 There is absolutely his stubbornness, lack of diplomacy, lack no question of Harris’ deep and enduring of flexibility and unwillingness to exercise commitment to the Bomber Command mis- creative thought by considering the strategic sion, specifically to area bombing. picture. This is not reflective of the balanced command aspired to by the CAR model.

We are going to scourge the Third Nonetheless, this is an accurate portrayal Reich from end to end. We are of a talented yet flawed commander, whose bombing Germany city by city and considerable power exceeded his abilities ever more terribly in order to make it to wield it most effectively. The complex impossible for her to go on with the interrelationships and dynamic interaction war. That is our object, and we shall between Harris’ strengths and weaknesses 80 pursue it relentlessly. are depicted in Figure 1, which represents the nexus of Sir Arthur Harris’ command Harris’ staunch resolve and steadfast capabilities, and it serves to illustrate how determination—some might call it obses- these competencies interrelate. The key nodes sion—were incontestable. However, this (or central competencies from which all extremely high intrinsic responsibility was others stem) are strategic intelligence / flex- directed toward getting “his” mission accom- ibility of vision, interpersonal competency, plished and employing only his methods, and tactical/operational intelligence and emo- this proved to be his biggest failure. He lost tional competency. focus of the larger picture, which in the end had a detrimental effect on the war effort. There can be little doubt … that It also turns out that Harris’s adherence to Harris served the interests of area bombing was not particularly effective. Bomber Command to the best of his After the war, reports and surveys generally ability and was primarily responsible indicated that area bombing was inefficient, for putting in place those factors failed to weaken German morale or cause a which made Bomber Command 81 noticeable decline in worker efficiency. a decisive weapon. By the force of his convictions, he inspired confi- R esponsibility assessment dence not only in his aircrews at a There is a complete dichotomy between time when they were suffering dev- Harris’ high extrinsic responsibility toward astating losses, but he also gave a his subordinates and low extrinsic respon- very necessary fillip to the nation’s sibility toward his superiors. Coupled with a morale at a point in the war when high intrinsic responsibility toward his area- Britain had suffered more defeats 82 bombing mission, but a compromised intrinsic tan victories.

Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris 27 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Extrinsic responsibility toward superiors Personal authority Personal with Air Ministry authority with colleagues, superiors MEW and civilian AFTER 1944 Intrinsic experts responsibility toward larger war mission

Strategic intelligence / exibility of vision Emotional Interpersonal competency competency Tactical / operational intelligence

Personal authority Intrinsic with superiors responsibility BEFORE 1944 and toward area personal authority bombing mission with public at large

Extrinsic responsibility toward his airmen

High competency Medium (or compromised) Personal authority competency with his airmen Low competency

Figure 1. Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris’ nexus of competencies

However, Harris had always said the only Command and had a detrimental effect on thing that mattered was the success of the the Allied offensive during the final years bomber offensive, and he had an intractable of the war. “Whatever Bomber Command bias toward area bombing. This narrow mind- accomplished … was compromised by Harris’ set promoted his disregard for other theatres refusal to give up area bombing.”84 of war and strategies, and it fuelled arguments over issued directives.83 In the end, it was Harris’ unshakeable faith and unwavering commitment to the Ironically, the stubbornness and deter- systematic decimation of German cities that mination that so appealed to the Air Staff prevented him from thinking and acting when they needed a strong leader eventu- strategically. This was his ultimate failing as a ally constrained the effectiveness of Bomber higher-level commander.

28 Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Abbv re iations 4. Hansen, 22. CAR competency, authority and responsibility 5. Ibid., 31. MEW Ministry of Economic Warfare 6. Ibid., 26. PAO public affairs officer 7. Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive against Nazi Germany (New RAF Royal Air Force York: The Overlook Press, 2001), 104. RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force 8. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Reconceptualizing Command and Control,” Canadian Military Journal 3, no. 1 (Spring 2002): Major Lynne Chaloux is a Royal Canadian 58, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo3/no1/ Air Force (RCAF) public affairs officer index-eng.asp (accessed February 12, 2013). (PAO). A graduate of Le Collège Militaire 9. Neillands, 5. Royal de St-Jean, she has served in a variety of public affairs capacities at the wing, oper- 10. Pigeau and McCann, 58. ational and strategic levels of the RCAF as 11. Tami Davis Biddle, “Bombing by the well as positions within Assistant Deputy Square Yard: Sir Arthur Harris at War, 1942– Minister (Public Affairs)’s (ADM[PA]) 1945,” The International History Review 21, no. 3 ministerial communications and national (September 1999): 635. media liaison. She deployed as a PAO to the Canadian Contingent Commander of 12. Grant, 68. NATO’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia– 13. United States Air Force Association, “Air Herzegovina and, after becoming a reservist in Power Quotes,” United States Air Force Association, 2006, also served as the PAO to the President http://www.afa.org/quotes/Quotes_81208.pdf of North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (accessed February 12, 2013). Confedération Interallié des Officiers de la 14. Neillands, 399. Réserve (CIOR). She currently works as the Communications Advisor to the Director 15. Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive General Air Personnel within the Chief of (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1990), 267. Air Force Staff and is completing the Joint 16. Group Captain Peter W. Gray, review Command and Staff Programme (Distance of Bomber Harris: His Life and Times, by Henry Learning) at Canadian Forces College. Probert, Air Power Review 4, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 5, http://www.airpowerstudies.co.uk/airpower- Notes review.htm (accessed February 12, 2013).

1. Christina Goulter, “Sir Arthur Harris: 17. Harris, 269. Different Perspectives” in The Challenges of High Command: The British Experience, ed. Gary 18. Ibid., 176–77. Sheffield and Geoffrey Till (New York: Palgrave 19. Neillands, 398. Macmillan, 2003), 127. 20. Ibid., 105. 2. Randall Hansen, Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany, 1942–1945 (New York: New 21. Gray, 5. American Library, 2008), 19. 22. Jacqueline Assheton, “Sir Arthur Harris: 3. Rebecca Grant, “Bomber Harris,” AIR A Personal Note by his Daughter” in Bomber FORCE Magazine 88, no. 1 (January 2005): Offensive (see note 15), xv. 69, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/ 23. Pigeau and McCann, 58. MagazineArchive/Documents/2005/January%20 2005/0105harris.pdf (accessed February 12, 2013). 24. Goulter, 135.

Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris 29 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

25. Biddle, 631. 53. Gray, 6. 26. Grant, 68. 54. Biddle, 651. 27. Neillands, 109. 55. Goulter, 133. 28. Ibid., 108–19. 56. Gray, 5. 29. Neillands, 121. 57. Goulter, 130. 30. Sebastian Cox, “Sir Arthur Harris and 58. Pigeau and McCann, 58–59. the Air Ministry” in Airpower Leadership Theory 59. Both quotes, Neillands, 105. and Practice, ed. Peter W. Gray and Sebastian Cox, (London: The Stationery Office, 2002), 216–17; 60. Ibid., 110. and Biddle, 636. 61. Both quotes, Ibid., 105–6. 31. John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The 62. Cox, 213; and Hansen, 30–31. Role of the RAF in World War Two (Hodder & Stoughton, 1985), quoted in Gray, 6. 63. Neillands, 400. 32. Grant, 71. 64. Biddle, 649–51. 33. Cox, 215. 65. Goulter, 135; and Biddle, 652. 34. Goulter, 131. 66. Pigeau and McCann, 59 (including quote). 35. Ibid., 129, 130. 67. Neillands, 110. 36. Neillands, 116. 68. Harris, 267. 37. Goulter, 131. 69. Biddle, 657. 38. Neillands, 116–17. 70. Biddle, 640; and Neillands, 200–2. 39. Biddle, 626. 40. Ibid., 648–51. 71. Hansen, 130; and Biddle, 640. 41. Ibid., 626. 72. Goulter, 133. 42. Grant, 68. 73. Hansen, 124–25. 43. Biddle, 640. 74. Biddle, 663. 44. Ibid., 659. 75. Ibid., 652–53.

45. C. Webster and N. Frankland, The 76. Hansen, 244. Strategic Air Offensive over Germany, 1939–45 77. Ibid., 246. (London, HMSO, 1961): 80, quoted in Goulter, 133–34. 78. Pigeau and McCann, 57.

46. Pigeau and McCann, 58. 79. Ibid., 60. 47. Biddle, 631. 80. Sir Arthur Harris, quoted in United 48. Neillands, 105. States Air Force Association. 49. Sebastian Cox, quoted in Grant, 68. 81. Biddle, 658–60. 50. Gray, 6. 82. Goulter, 131. 51. Biddle, 627, 631, 638. 83. Ibid., 135.

52. Cox, 217–22. 84. Biddle, 661–62.

30 Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris Te h Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Unshakeable Faith: The Flawed Command of Bomber Harris 31 TheOperation Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013 AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift By Matthew Trudgen, PhD

32CF Photo Operation AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Introduction cultural marginality and ‘ancient hatreds’ [has] dominated public discourse about the rom July 1992 to January 1996, the war.”5 Nevertheless, these existing ethnic and Canadian Air Force participated in religious cleavages—when combined with the F the United Nations (UN) led airlift of severe economic difficulties that Yugoslavia humanitarian aid into the city of Sarajevo, the endured in the 1980s and, most importantly, capital of Bosnia–Herzegovina. During this the leadership vacuum at the centre that mission, which was code named Operation opened up with the death of Marshal Tito AIR BRIDGE, Canadian CC130 Hercules in 1980—created an opening for nationalist transports carried out 1,806 flights, or chalks, demagogues to gain support.6 The most which was more than countries such as notable of these figures was Slobodan Germany and the Netherlands and almost as 1 Milosevic, who emerged as the leader of many as Great Britain. In fact, Canada was Serbia in the late 1980s.7 the fourth leading contributor to this airlift.2 However, this achievement has largely been Milosevic first came to prominence overlooked because Canadian academics by trumpeting the rights of the Serbian and commentators have mostly focused on minority in Kosovo, an autonomous province Canada’s ground operations in the former on Serbian territory, which despite its Yugoslavia, particularly the problems that the predominantly Albanian population was Canadian Army endured in trying to serve regarded as the heartland of Serbia because as peacekeepers in a place in which there was 3 of the historical importance of the Battle no peace to keep. This experience has been of Kosovo.8 Over time, he was able to gain further obscured by the various scandals support from the Serbian Orthodox Church related to the events in Somalia and then later and many Serbian intellectuals. He then by the narrative of the 1990s being “A Decade consolidated control in Serbia by eliminating of Darkness” for the Canadian Forces (CF). the autonomous status of Kosovo as well as the other autonomous province (Vojvodina) This article will seek to fill this gap in the that had been established by Tito in 1974.9 He historical literature by examining Canada’s was also eventually able to gain control over participation in the Sarajevo airlift. I will the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army first provide some historical background to (YNA). Milosevic was, thus, in a position the breakup of Yugoslavia and the events that to achieve his goal of a more centralized, led up to the siege of that city. Then, I will Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, which greatly examine Canadian operations through the unnerved the other Yugoslav republics, use of a variety of primary sources, including namely Slovenia and Croatia.10 an oral history interview and archival documents.4 Finally, this article will conclude with a brief examination of what lessons can Consequently, the situation in Yugoslavia be learned from this experience. quickly deteriorated, and when the annual rotation of the federal presidency was blocked The origins of the conflict by Milosevic in May 1991 because it would have meant the replacement of one of his It would be cliché to state that the Serb allies with a Croat, Slovenia and Croatia conflict in Yugoslavia during the 1990s was seceded in June of that year.11 The result was the result of centuries-old hatreds between that the YNA intervened in both countries, the various ethnic groups that made up and while the conflict in Slovenia was brief, this nation. Indeed, the American scholar significant fighting broke out in Croatia, Norman Naimark noted that “the notion where the army supported the local Croatian of a Balkan world of perpetual violence, Serb population, which had been previously

Operation AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift 33 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

armed by the Serb authorities. By the time there, it did not yet have a mandate to operate both sides had agreed to a UN-mandated in Sarajevo.16 Nor was there any interest in the ceasefire in late November 1991, the Serbs UN or elsewhere in using force to break the controlled one-third of this country.12 siege. Instead, the international community began to consider the option of an airlift. This Having gained their objectives in Croatia, idea gained further traction when the United the Serbs then turned to Bosnia, which also States Air Force (USAF) flew in “35 pallets had a sizeable Serb minority. The result was of food rations and 24 pallets of medical that Bosnia, which was the most ethnically supplies and blankets” in April 1992.17 But it diverse of all the Yugoslav republics, was would not be until June 5 that the Sarajevo placed in a very difficult situation.13 On one Airport Agreement was negotiated between hand, if it declared independence, it would UNPROFOR, the Bosnian government and face intervention by the YNA forces that the Bosnian Serb authorities, and even then, were already located on Bosnian soil, but it took the symbolic act of France’s President if it remained part of Yugoslavia, it would François Mitterrand flying into Sarajevo face domination by Milosevic. Further to get this airlift underway.18 Nonetheless, complicating the situation was that the this humanitarian effort was hampered by a Bosnian Serbs, under their leader Radovan number of flaws with the airport agreement. Karadzic, had already declared four enclaves in Bosnia to be Serbian Autonomous Regions These problems existed because of the (SARs) and had even established their own lack of leverage that the UN had when the parliament.14 Ultimately, after a referendum agreement was negotiated due to the fact that was boycotted by the Bosnian Serb that the Bosnian Serbs not only held the community, the population of Bosnia voted military advantage but also had already to separate from Yugoslavia on March 1, been subject to economic sanctions as well 1992. Soon after, despite the best efforts as vilification by the international media for of the European Community to broker a their actions in Bosnia.19 These weaknesses peaceful solution to this crisis, the Bosnian included a clause that allowed the Bosnian Serbs declared the existence of “the Serbian Serbs to inspect shipments at the airport Republic of Bosnia–Herzegovina” and war to create difficulties with the delivery of began. Within six weeks, the Bosnian Serbs— aid. Moreover, the agreement contained with the support of the new Federal Republic another problematic clause, Article 8, of Yugoslavia (which now consisted of just which stated that “humanitarian aid will Serbia and Montenegro) and its army as well be delivered to Sarajevo and beyond, under as numerous Serb paramilitary groups—had the supervision of the United Nations, in a 15 seized 60 per cent of Bosnia. However, they non-discriminatory manner and on the sole had not been able to seize Sarajevo; instead, basis of need.”20 Unfortunately, Article 8 was the city was besieged and subject to intense interpreted in such a way that was reciprocal bombardment by artillery and mortars. and proportional rather than impartial, which allowed the Bosnian Serbs to receive much of The beginning of the airlift the aid flown into the city. Indeed, up to 25 per cent of these supplies were allocated to Once Sarajevo had been surrounded, Serb populations in and “beyond” Sarajevo, fears quickly emerged about the humanitarian even if they did not really need it.21 situation in the city, and the international community began to discuss what could be Moreover, it should be recognized done. While the United Nations Protection that the amount of aid that was delivered Force (UNPROFOR) was headquartered by the airlift was not sufficient for Sarajevo

34 Operation AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

to survive.22 The supplies that Sarajevo relied metric tons of food and 15,850 metric tons of upon reached the city through a variety of medicine were flown in, and 1,100 medical other methods, including through a tunnel patients were evacuated.27 Having provided under the airport that the UN never officially an overview of the crisis in Yugoslavia, I acknowledged the existence of, through land will now explore Canadian air operations in convoys, and even through food sold by the greater detail. Serb besiegers.23 Finally, many scholars have argued that the airlift helped to make the The Canadian experience siege more tolerable for the international community, since there was the reality that Canada’s contribution to the Sarajevo participation in this humanitarian effort airlift was one Hercules transport, two flight allowed these nations to avoid contributing crews, ground and support personnel as well to an attempt to actually relieve the city.24 as a small medical staff.28 At the beginning Nonetheless, the airlift was a significant of Operation AIR BRIDGE, the Canadians accomplishment for both the Canadian Air flew out of Zagreb, Croatia, but when an Force and the other nations that took part in Italian Air Force G222 transport was shot it, and even strong critics of the airlift, such as down on September 3, 1992, killing four Carol Off, praised the efforts of the military crewmembers, the Italians withdrew, and the personnel who made it work.25 Canadians took over their slot from Ancona, Italy, which was much closer to Sarajevo.29 Ultimately, the airlift would last three and a half years, which was three times At the peak of this airlift, the Canadians as long as the Berlin airlift, and involved flew three missions a day,30 and each of 12,591 flights into Sarajevo.26 In all, 144,827 these chalks transported 35,000 pounds

CF Photo

Operation AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift 35 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

[16 metric tons] of food and aid.31 The the day. Moreover, because the aircraft were Canadians also flew passengers in and out not fired at when they were on the ground, of the city. Some of these were journalists some Sarajevoans would use these times to and very important persons (VIPs) such as travel across the runway in order to reach the Bosnian Ambassador to Italy; however, villages on the other side of the airport, even 36 others included Canadian personnel going when the aircraft was landing or taking off. out on leave as well as medical evacuations (MEDEVACS) of wounded civilians.32 Another serious problem was radar locks In fact, the Canadians concluded that the on Canadian aircraft. Many of these came United Nations High Commission for from the ground radars of the warring factions, Refugees had become reliant on the “CF for which would expose the Hercules transports MEDEVAC because of [the] availability and to attack from surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); however, some of them came from expertise of [the] CF med[ical] team,” which North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a problem because these MEDEVACS fighters enforcing the no-fly zone under were often complicated by bureaucratic and Operation DENY FLIGHT. The Canadians political factors.33 Nonetheless, despite these were particularly annoyed by these friendly difficulties, the Canadians continued to lock-ons and filed numerous complaints with evacuate civilians throughout the mission. NATO about them. For example, in June Sometimes these operations were planned, but 1993, they complained that such lock-ons others took place in response to emergencies were “very distracting in the high threat area such as a major mortar attack on Sarajevo in 37 34 of the Sarajevo terminal area.” In addition, February 1994. the Canadians were hit by ground fire from the warring factions, some of which was due to drunken combatants taking pot shots at At the peak of this airlift, the aircraft with small arms.38 Nonetheless, the Canadian air component was able to the Canadians flew three overcome all these difficulties. missions a day, and each of One thing that the Canadians did was these chalks transported to upgrade their equipment. When they were 35,000 pounds [16 metric deployed, they were not prepared for the challenges posed by operating in a war zone, tons] of food and aid. but once it was recognized that lives were in danger, the Canadian Air Force stepped up, and the procurement process was accelerated. This process was helped by the fact that the On these chalks, the Canadians Air Transport Group (ATG) was a small encountered a wide variety of challenges, organization, and it could move quickly to such as numerous mechanical issues that address problems. As a result, the Hercules rendered the aircraft unserviceable. They were re-equipped with Kevlar armour also faced other problems ranging from the plating and state-of-the-art missile approach lack of freight at Ancona, to the smuggling and warning systems. In fact, much of this of contraband (such as drugs), to issues equipment arrived so quickly in Ancona that communicating with Sarajevo, especially in training had to be done in theatre.39 getting good weather reports.35 In particular, fog was a serious problem, partially because Furthermore, the Canadians could rely the Canadians were assigned the first chalk of on the fact that they were well prepared to

36 Operation AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

take part in this mission. For instance, only Another advantage was that the Canadians crews that had qualified for tactical airlift were were able to establish a good relationship with allowed to fly on this operation.40 In addition, the other nations flying out of Ancona, which the Canadian personnel were eager to put their included the Germans, the British and later training to the test. One example was that in the Americans. All these contingents worked the 15 minutes when the Hercules was on the together to make the mission work.46 For ground in Ancona between the first and second instance, in late October 1993, rivets to fix a chalks of the day, the ground crew would refuel Canadian Hercules were flown from Frankfurt and check out the aircraft, fix problems that to Sarajevo by USAF and were then transported could be addressed, unload empty pallets41 and to Ancona by the Royal Air Force.47 There load the cargo for the flight. Even the medical was also one occasion when a Canadian flight staff would help out by cleaning the windows. engineer helped an American crew change a tire The armourers would not only swap out any on their aircraft, since the USAF crew did not spent cartridges from the flare dispensers for have a spare tire or a tire change kit and were the missile warning system but also fix the “unfamiliar with the task.”48 flight crew breakfast, as they had not had a chance to eat. During the interview, Major Bill The most important of these relationships Lafontaine stated: “I have never seen people for both the Canadians and the mission as a work together that closely or service that great whole was the one with the British. It became at any home base,” and the reason was that they especially close, since they both used a small were on operations overseas doing something number of crews, unlike the Americans.49 The that they had trained for. It is important to result of this closeness was that the British remember that the timing of these flights was and Canadians took the lead in deciding how very critical, as there were only brief windows operations out of Ancona would work. This to land and takeoff at Ancona and Sarajevo, was often done “below the table,” but it worked due to the number of aircraft involved in the well because the Canadians and British airlift.42 knew each other so well. For example, they developed procedures for flights to continue The Canadian personnel also adapted their when visibility was poor.50 The Canadians procedures to deal with the challenges posed by were, thus, able to make an important this mission, including altering their checklist contribution to this humanitarian effort. to reduce chatter during stressful periods, such as during the approach to the city. Moreover, The end of the airlift and lessons learned the Canadians flew using portable oxygen bottles because of a fear that random ground Eventually the UN airlift into Sarajevo fire would hit the main oxygen tank.43 The would come to a close. Major offensives by the Canadian crews even utilized handheld global armies of Croatia and Bosnia when combined positioning system (GPS) units to give them with extensive NATO air strikes—which had that capability, since their Hercules aircraft did been triggered by an exhaustion of patience not have a GPS installed on board.44 It should with the Bosnian Serbs as well as Serbian be noted that not everything the Canadians atrocities such as the massacre at Srebrenica did was successful. One example was that in July 1995 and a mortar attack on a Sarajevo Fighter Group sent over personnel in an effort market in late August—had changed the to help address some of the problems that the military situation dramatically. The result was mission faced. However, my interviewee had a ceasefire in October 1995 and the end of the concluded that they were of limited utility and siege.51 Operation AIR BRIDGE, therefore, were eventually withdrawn because of the cost began to be wound down, and there were several of maintaining these personnel in theatre.45 days in late 1995 when there were no missions

Operation AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift 37 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

due to a lack of freight. The last Canadian chalk and burden sharing in alliances such as took place on January 7, 1996.52 NATO. Finally, there is one other lesson that I garnered from this research, which is The Sarajevo airlift was a great feat of that there is a need to study missions such as logistics. It lasted three times as long as the Operation AIR BRIDGE in greater detail, Berlin airlift and helped the city hold out not just to learn lessons but to tell the stories against the Bosnian Serbs; although in the of the Canadian Air Force personnel who end, it could not actually lift the siege, which participated in them. While the Canadian was what was really required. Nonetheless, this contribution to the Sarajevo airlift was small, reality should not distract from the efforts of Canada still played a major role in this effort, the air forces, including the Canadian, which and it should not be forgotten. had carried out this mission, as they had been given this task and had to make it work. Abbreviations Having examined the Canadian experience, one other issue remains: what ATG Air Transport Group can be learned? One lesson is the importance CF Canadian Forces of maintaining a high level of training and skill among Canadian Air Force personnel in DHH Directorate of History and Heritage order to prepare them for whatever challenges they are going to have to face on operations GPS global positioning system because sometimes these missions can be more difficult than they seem at first glance. MEDEVACS medical evacuation Indeed, Lafontaine noted that Operation AIR NATO North Atlantic Treaty BRIDGE represented the riskiest flying the Organization 53 CF had done since the Korean War. It should SAM surface-to-air missile also be emphasized that it was a credit to both the Air Force and the Hercules community SITREP situation report that they were able to maintain this level UN United Nations of proficiency at a time of severe financial cutbacks. Another thing that can be taken UNPROFOR United Nations from this mission was that the procurement Protection Force system was accelerated so that the Canadian USAF United States Air Force air contingent got the equipment it needed. In fact, this achievement is something that YNA Yugoslav National Army needs to be studied in greater detail because one of the complaints of the mission in Afghanistan was that the procurement system Dr. Matthew Trudgen received his PhD in was not responsive enough to requests from History from Queen’s University in 2010. the field. This experience further illustrates He was then the R. B. Byers Post-Doctoral the importance of establishing good relations Fellow at Centre for Military and Strategic with one’s partner nations on operations. Studies at the University of Calgary. In These relationships not only helped Canadians September 2012, he took up another Post- conduct their own chalks, but they also Doctoral Fellowship at Dartmouth College improved the performance of operations out in New Hampshire. of Ancona as a whole. These kinds of ties will only become more important in the future due to the drive towards interoperability

38 Operation AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Notes 5. Norman M. Naimark, “Preface” in Yugoslavia and Its Historians: Understanding 1. United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, ed. Norman M. Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New Naimark and Holly Case (Stanford: Stanford York: United Nations Department of Public University Press, 2003), xv. Information, 1996), 500. 6. Josip Broz Tito was the leader of the 2. Benjamin Zyla, “A Bridge Not Too communist-led partisan movement that Far? Canada and European Security, 1989– opposed the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia 2001” (PhD thesis, Royal Military College of during the Second World War. After the Canada, 2008), 319. end of this conflict, the communists took 3. Examples of such works include control of Yugoslavia, and Tito served as this Donna Winslow, “Canadian Warriors in country’s president for 37 years until his death Peacekeeping,” in Warriors in Peacekeeping: in 1980. Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: Points of Tension in Complex Cultural Encounters; The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death A Comparative Study Based on Experiences of Tito to Ethnic War (Oxford: Westview in Bosnia, ed. Jean Callaghan and Matthia Press, 1998), 7. Schönborn (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction 7. Ibid., 300; In addition to Ramet’s Publishers, 2004); Sean M. Maloney and John work, more detailed examinations of this Llambias, Chances for Peace: Canadian Soldiers crisis include Carole Rogel, The Break-up of in the Balkans, 1992–1995 (St. Catharines, ON: Yugoslavia and Its Aftermath (Westwood, CN: Vanwell, 2002); Carol Off, The Ghosts of Medak Greenwood Press, 2004); John R. Lampe, Pocket: The Story of Canada’s Secret War (Toronto: Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Random House, 2005); Carol Off, The Lion, the Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Fox and the Eagle: A Story of Generals and Justice Press, 2000); and David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: in Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Toronto: Vintage Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: Canada, 2001); Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: A Touchstone Book, 1996). The Road to Sarajevo (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1994); and Dawn M. Hewitt, From Ottawa to 8. Rogel, 17. The Battle of Kosovo took Sarajevo: Canadian Peacekeepers in the Balkans place in 1389 and involved the medieval (Kingston, ON: Queen’s Centre for International Serbian state versus the Ottoman Turks. Relations, 1998). While the battle was largely a draw, it seriously weakened Serbian power and led to the end of 4. The primary sources for this project this Serbian state by 1459. Lampe, 17. included an interview with Major Bill Lafontaine conducted on August 17, 2011. 9. Rogel, 17. He served 3 five-week tours as a pilot on this mission, and this interview can be found at the 10. It should be emphasized that the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre. I rise of Croatian nationalism under the also utilized the situation reports (SITREPS) Croatia’s new president, Frajo Tudjman, that were compiled by the mission and sent had also generated concern in Serbia and back to 8 Wing in Trenton between February among Croatia’s Serbian population because 1993 and January 1996. They are located at of this nationalist government’s alleged ties the Directorate of History and Heritage to the Ustasha. The Ustasha was the name (DHH) in Ottawa. These SITREPS, while for the Croatian fascist movement that being fairly standard in form, varied greatly controlled the government of the nominally in detail, as that depended on how thorough independent Croatian state that the Germans the officer writing them was. had established after they invaded Yugoslavia

Operation AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift 39 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

in 1941. In the words of the historian John Refugees [UNHCR], 1999), 19, http://www. R. Lampe, the Ustasha had sought to “create unhcr.org/3ae6a0c58.pdf (accessed February an ethnically pure Croatian state from which 12, 2013). Serbs, Jews and gypsies would be permanently cleansed.” Lampe, 209. 21. Gordon, 65.

11. After Tito’s death in 1980, it had 22. James Gow, Triumph of Lack of Will: been decided to rotate the federal presidency International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War every year between representatives of the six (New York: Columbia University Press, republics and the two autonomous provinces. 1997), 109. Rogel, 22. 23. Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black 12. Ibid., 23. Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 13. According to the April 1991 census, Press, 2010), vii, 8. the breakdown of population by ethnic group 24. Ibid., 13. was 43.77 per cent Muslims, 31.46 per cent Serbs and 17.34 per cent Croats. Ramet, 244. 25. Off, The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle, 5.

14. Rogel, 28–29; and Hewitt, 20. 26. United Nations, 500; William T. Y’Blood, “From the Deserts to the Mountains,” 15. Rogel, 25. The sixth Yugoslav in Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the republic, Macedonia, was allowed to secede United States Air Force, Volume II, 1950–1997, peacefully in January 1992. Ramet, 230. ed. Bernard C. Nalty (Washington, DC: 16. Hewitt, 32. Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 497; and Ripley, 14. 17. Daniel Haulman, The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations 27. United Nations, 500. 1947–1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force 28. The aircraft and flight crews were History and Museums Program, 1998), rotated every five weeks. Lafontaine interview. 269–70. 29. Ripley, 12–13; United Nations, 500; 18. Stuart Gordon, “The Anatomy of and Lafontaine interview. Occasionally, the Conditionality and Linkage: Negotiating for Canadians would also utilize the airport at Life,” in Negotiation in International Conflict: Split in Croatia. Report from October 1993, Understanding Persuasion, ed. Deborah 2008/10 UNHCR – Airlift Ancona Sarajevo Goodwin (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 63; Airlift, Airlift Sitrep, July to October 1993, and Tim Ripley, Conflict in the Balkans 1991– File 5689, DHH. 2000 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2001), 11. 30. There were occasions when the airlift was suspended. One such example was from 19. Gordon, 63. April to September 1995. United Nations, 500.

20. Quoted in Mark Cutts, “The 31. Lafontaine interview. Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, 1992–95: Dilemmas of Negotiating Humanitarian 32. Report from October 1994, 2008/10 Access” (Working Paper No. 8, New Issues UNHCR – Airlift Ancona Sarajevo Airlift, in Refugee Research, Policy Research Unit, Airlift SITREP, February–June 1994, United Nations High Commission for File 5691, DHH. When they transported

40 Operation AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

civilians, the Canadians made sure that an 41. The Canadians would also fly out armed military policeman was in the hold for empty pallets so they could be reused in the supervision. Lafontaine interview. airlift. Lafontaine interview.

33. Report from September 1993, File 42. Ibid. The French ground crew in 5689, DHH; and Report from October 1993, Sarajevo was equally capable. While the File 5689, DHH. Canadians formally had 10 minutes from landing the aircraft to taxi into the terminal, 34. Report from February 1994, 2008/10 have their cargo unloaded and to get off the UNHCR – Airlift Ancona Sarajevo Airlift, ground, the French personnel got to the Airlift Sitrep, February–June 1994, File 5691, point that this could be done in six to seven DHH. minutes.

35. Report from April 1994, File 5691, 43. Ibid. DHH; Lafontaine interview; and Andreas, 46, 55. One SITREP noted that the mission 44. Ibid. These improvisations were not had done a good job of handling the drug popular with some personnel with the ATG. issue, although one suspects that given the problems of corruption described in the 45. Ibid. scholarly literature that these comments 46. Ibid. Previously, the Americans represented some wishful thinking. Report had flown their missions out of Frankfurt, from March 1994, File 5691, DHH. Germany. 36. Lafontaine interview. They did this 47. Report from October 1993, File 5689, to get food and supplies from these villages, DHH. which were not cut off by the siege. 48. Report from February 1995, 2008/10 37. Report from June 1993, 2008/10 UNHCR – Airlift Ancona Sarajevo Airlift, UNHCR – Airlift Ancona Sarajevo Airlift, Airlift SITREP, January–April 1995, File Airlift SITREP, February–July 1993, File 5694, DHH. 5688, DHH. Indeed, Lafontaine described it as quite unnerving the first time his Hercules 49. The Americans rotated their crews was locked on. Lafontaine interview. every week, which meant that the personal relations between their personnel and the 38. The pilots did not know how often Canadians, while good, were not as close as their aircraft were under fire from the ground. those with the RAF. Lafontaine interview. Lafontaine only learned of this from Royal Canadian Mounted Police personnel who 50. Ibid. were being brought out of Sarajevo for rest and relaxation. Lafontaine interview. 51. Andreas, 104–8; and Lampe, 30.

39. Ibid. For instance, the Canadians had 52. Report from November 1995, to work out what was the best way to use the 2008/10 UNHCR – Airlift Ancona Sarajevo flare and chaff system to defend the aircraft Airlift, Airlift SITREP, September 1995 – against SAMs. January 1996, File 5693, DHH; and Report from January 1996, File 5693, DHH. 40. This requirement meant that these personnel saw extensive service in this airlift. 53. Lafontaine interview. Lafontaine interview.

Operation AIR BRIDGE: Canada’s Contribution to the Sarajevo Airlift 41 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013 Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the Phenomenon of Globalization?

42 Were the Eventsby of SeptemberCaptain 11, 2001, aS Manifestationamuel of PoliticalBoudreault Violence Generated by the Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

War is the continuation of politics securing supplies of raw materials. However, by other means.1 the search for new economic partnerships (at the basic level) has not been without con- Carl von Clausewitz flict. According to the theories presented by English economist David Ricardo, countries benefit by specializing in a type of trade in Itroductionn which they have a comparative advantage. For he above quotation is still relevant this theory to work, countries must practice today, maybe more relevant than when free trade among each other. These days, this it was first published in 1832. Indeed, type of trade is rare; because of economic theT world is currently in conflict. The sources fluctuations, countries generally adopt pro- and causes of these conflicts are very numer- tectionist policies. These policies are used to ous. But certain countries or interest groups protect local producers. lack the resources or level of organization required to enter into open and direct conflict Industrialized countries generally take with another country. These belligerents are advantage of developing countries by setting increasingly turning to asymmetric warfare. up subsidiary workshops that will produce The emergence of transnational violence can- goods to satisfy local demand and for export. not be denied. Furthermore, globalization is This procedure serves primarily the developed no stranger to war. Some even say that they countries, since working conditions in produ- are inseparable.2 Various global markets have cer countries are often miserable. been integrated, but this process has had con- sequences. While the purpose of large-scale For this study, we will start from the terrorist attacks such as those of September hypothesis that globalization is advanta- 11, 2001, is to communicate a message on an geous to only one part of the world, primarily international level, the various terrorist acts the West and Western Europe, because of committed every day throughout the world unequal economic exchanges. The growth show a dramatic level of distress and a general of various types of media also makes com- malaise. Can it be said that those who have munication virtually instantaneous, which not profited from globalization have become contributes to spreading both information and resentful? disinformation. It, therefore, becomes easier to manipulate information, which means that In this context, the purpose of this study nations traditionally left in ignorance are is to answer the following question: were the now becoming aware of the inequalities and events of September 11, 2001, a manifestation of their difficult living conditions compared of political violence generated by global- with the rest of the world. ization? While it is obvious that the terrorist st group behind this event that marked the 21 The September 11, 2001, terrorist century hated Americans, we must dig deeper attacks by members of the al-Qaeda jihadist to reach the source of the malaise to properly network had major symbolic business and appreciate how things fell into place to lead to military targets. For the terrorists, it was a such an event. strong message: hurt the Americans at home by striking symbols of their pride. Prior to these terrorist attacks, the tension between H yPOTHESIS the United States and the radical Islamist Globalization is not new. For several cen- movement had reached a breaking point. The turies, nations have tried to expand their reach question will, therefore, consist of verifying by finding new markets for their products or whether September 11, 2001, was indeed a

Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the 43 Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

manifestation of political violence generated analysed and conceptualized. The following by globalization. section is, therefore, intended as a tentative definition of this notion. The terrorist claim to be acting on behalf of the poor is a patent The French Larousse dictionary defines falsehood.3 terrorism as “all acts of violence (attacks, John Paul II hostage-taking, etc.) committed by an organization to create a climate of insecurity; to coerce a government; or to satisfy hatred against a community, country or system.”4 Teh notion of terrorism (Translation) The September 11, 2001, attacks For the majority of North Americans, easily fit this definition. Officially, the perpe- terrorism is a notion with which we have trators of these acts belonged to al-Qaeda, become familiar following the terrorist attacks which is recognized as a terrorist group by of September 11, 2001. We participated in the Government of Canada,5 the Council of the two World Wars, the Korean War, the the European Union6 and the United States Vietnam War and the Gulf War, but the Department of State,7 to name only those conflicts of the last century always took place few. In part, al-Qaeda’s objectives are to in foreign lands. After the attacks against unite Muslims against the United States and the World Trade Center, the game changed: its allies, overthrow regimes it judges to be hostilities had moved to American soil. In the non-Islamic and expel Westerners and non- hours following the sadly famous attacks, the Muslims from Muslim countries.8 whole world learned of the existence of one Osama bin Laden and the terrorist network For countries involved in hunting terror- he led, al-Qaeda. The West was shaken, ists, this process can mean deploying military and the hunt for those responsible began. forces in a war zone. However, the examples For Nathalie Cettina, a PhD in public law of Iraq and Afghanistan show that these are involved in teaching and research in the legal not traditional conflicts and that the countries careers section of the Institut Universitaire find themselves engaged in an asymmetric de Technologie [University Institute of war. Since al-Qaeda has no organized armed Technology] in Laon, France, the classic forces or satisfactory material resources, they vision of terrorism produced by a small core of have no other choice than to turn to this individuals within a state against that state’s type of conflict. This operating method is institutions is losing steam. Transnational useful to them, since neither the traditional organizations use an extra-territorial strategy military response nor current law enforce- to carry out the strike that will have the most ment methods are able to adequately deal spectacular impact on international public with asymmetric conflicts.9 The cost of this opinion. And this is exactly the “exploit” that war has been calculated by the Institute for al-Qaeda accomplished 11 years ago. International Studies at Brown University in New York. According to this group of There is no universal definition of the experts made up of economists, anthropolo- notion of terrorism. It is often a matter of gists, lawyers, humanitarian aide organizers perspective. The relationship between Israel and political scientists, the costs of this war and Palestine is a perfect example. There are were assessed as being reportedly about 4,000 international guidelines and principles that billion dollars and 225,000 human lives.10 allow socio-political violence to be denounced The costs incurred in hunting terrorists are or defined, but the full spectrum of acts of immense. Considering that it all started the violence to this day has not yet been rigorously day after September 11, 2001, we could say

44 Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

that the disciples of Osama bin Laden suc- victims evoked the image of a surgical oper- ceeded in inculcating a climate of fear and ation that the revolutionary government was forcing the West to launch an expensive and performing on the body politic to bring about endless war. its regeneration. The French Revolution, by introducing a political action based on The ruling to kill the Americans violence and the use of exceptional measures, and their allies—civilians and established a reign of terror. This was the first military—is an individual duty expression of what would become known as for every Muslim … .11 state terrorism. The Terror that started with the fall of the Girondins, in June 1793; lasted Osama bin Laden until the fall of Robespierre, on July 27, 1794; Acts that could be described as terrorism was implemented by the Committee of Public are not a recent invention. Resistance to and Safety; and was supported by the exceptional uprising against a higher authority holding jurisdiction of the revolutionary court drew legal power date back to antiquity.12 Indeed, its legitimacy from safeguarding the social order the revolutionaries established by using terrorist attacks have been reported since the 14 first century of the Common Era (CE). For the state’s power. Can we then call this real example, the Sicarii, a faction of extremist legitimacy? Regardless of the situation, the Jewish dissidents, tried to expel the Romans state always appropriates the use of violence, and their supporters from Judea through and its use must be regulated. assassination. Their political motivation “The Terror played a decisive role in this pushed them to continue this practice for 60 catastrophe that was inflicted on France’s years, until the destruction of Jerusalem in public imagination from 1789 to 1795: for two 70 CE. The timeless nature of the terrorist years, the Revolution used the machine in a undertaking, as well as its use by both state very mechanical, more specifically machine- and subversive forces without distinction, like, way. It used the guillotine for political makes it difficult to paint an overall picture purposes that certainly exceeded the inten- of this method. However, it is possible to 15 tions of its original designers.” (Translation) distinguish through history the objectives and methods employed by those who turned 13 At the precise connection of the indi- to terrorism. vidual body and the body politic, the fall of the guillotine blade brought together many So-called modern terrorism dates back to thoughts, passing through the medical register Maximilien Robespierre, who, following the to the political domain and to the metaphysical French Revolution of 1789, began a reign of realm.16 “In the same way that the revolutionary terror in France. When he was at the head of government embodied the will of the people the Jacobins club, he declared that the revolu- it represented, the guillotine implemented tionary dictatorship was necessary to defend revolutionary law: the people possessed the the revolution because of the threats made instrument that proudly represented them in by the domestic opposition and the risk of its act of justice.”17 (Translation) foreign invasion. Under his leadership, thou- sands of nobles and enemies of the French From the Sicarii to the Jacobins, the nation were executed. The guillotine, which actions of these radical groups were primarily was used for public executions, projects a politically motivated. It is easy to see that, strong image and quickly became a symbol of while the operating methods have evolved, terror. For Daniel Arasse, the political effect- the basic motivations for these actions remain iveness of the guillotine was unquestionable, practically the same. Certain groups engaging and the relationship of the guillotine with its in political struggle against a state, another

Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the 45 Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

nation or an invader, therefore, do not hesitate the threat is omnipresent and the motivations to use violence and acts of terrorism. of these actors are incomprehensible to most people. According to Islam, suicide is forbid- Eco-terrorism, low- or high-tech ter- den. However, becoming a martyr or killing rorism, computer terrorism—there are infidels in battle is not. For al-Qaeda, it is not thousands of ways to cause material, human “profitable” to use the leaders of the move- and financial damage. Since the use of ment, and they must continuously seek new gunpowder spread around the world, bombs “volunteers.” Many verses of the Quran incite have been the primary method used by ter- Muslims to fight to the finish, while others rorists. What distinguishes so-called modern present Islam as a peaceful religion that terrorism from the ancient version is not the intends no harm and seeks peace. Religion on use of explosives itself, but rather the sur- its own is, therefore, not the motivation for rounding technologies. “The most obvious suicide attacks. However, religion could be a and important process in the ‘modern’ age of response in cases of alienation. In fact, since terror (generally identified as the period from most of the Afghan population is illiterate, it 1968 to the present) has been the develop- is easy for religious and social leaders to influ- ment of technology itself.”18 The use of new ence them. The country that hosted al-Qaeda types of detonators, explosives and triggering is, sadly, second-last in terms of literacy, with devices is constantly evolving, which makes a rate of only 28.1 percent in 2000.21 Although preventing acts of terror more complicated. there are certain indicators, too many factors The example of 20-year old, Ontario resident must be taken into consideration, and the Zakaria Amara—arrested in 2006 for having profile of exactly who commits suicide attacks ordered three tonnes of fertilizer to use in remains impossible to determine. making explosives—is a typical case showing that the threat is real and omnipresent. In a Globalization and world of extremely swift travel between cities causes of terrorism and countries, potential targets are abundant. After the end of the cold war, the United States redefined an integrated strategy aimed There are many currently active conflicts. at allowing it to remain a superpower and It is readily apparent that the conflicts are to assert its economic interests. Since then, mostly located in the Middle East and Africa. global geopolitics have been dominated by st In the first decade of the 21 century, the this superpower, the objective of which is to Middle East experienced a rate of terrorist acts master global capitalism, shape the market four times higher than Western Europe on a to suit it and ensure that globalization is per-capita basis and ten times higher than Asia, Americanization on all fronts.22 Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.19 Globalization has undeniably become As in the cases of the World Trade the driving force of many aspects of con- Center and the Pentagon, in the United temporary society. The opening of borders States, al-Qaeda’s preferred method is the and free movement of people, goods and suicide attack, since it symbolizes the group’s capital associated with globalization of all tenacity, inspires many young Muslims and types of trade flows offers a breeding ground contributes to creating more fear and ter- for increased international organized crime, ror than any other type of weapon.20 This which can only feed the practice of terror- approach differs from others, particularly ism.23 The various groups around the world because of the image it projects. The terrorist that challenge this phenomenon generally use is prepared to die for their cause. This type of the same arguments, namely globalization practice induces fear in the population because results in increased poverty, the growing gap

46 Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

between rich and poor, and the substitution of obtains interesting empirical data and, thus, perceived global elite values and customs for highlights the three phenomena observed local ones. However, it is interesting to note which are of key importance to this study, that those who oppose globalization are gen- namely the following:26 erally among the first to use the technologies that are the very image of globalization. The 1. The effects of democracy and globaliza- Internet, cellphones and other sophisticated tion on terrorism differ for source and technologies have allowed antiglobalization target countries. protestors to plan, communicate, coordinate, 2. Terrorism falls with democracy and promote and protect their activities, which would have otherwise been impossible for globalization in the source countries. them. Furthermore, a study published by the 3. Terrorism rises with democracy and World Values Survey found obvious links globalization in the target countries. between individual beliefs and the charac- teristics of societies in which the individuals lived.24 Professor Ronald Inglehart of the “We find that the advent of University of Michigan Institute for Social democratic institutions, high Research analysed the results of this research income, and more openness in a source country significantly reduce and was able to demonstrate that economic 27 development eventually reaches a point of terrorism.” diminishing returns in terms of increasing human happiness. This conclusion is major One of the unintended consequences because it explains the change in values and of globalization is the conflict between it goals of industrialized and advanced societies, and Islam. The impact of globalization on which, in turn, contributes to generating Muslims living in Western countries is par- anger in other nations that see themselves as ticularly profound but represents, above all, victims of these advanced states. a challenge, since many Muslims are used to traditional values, family and social structure, Krug and Reinmoller conclude that all of which appear threatened by globaliza- globalization is an important determining tion.28 This is one of the reasons that explain factor for terrorism. In their study, they build a in particular the desire to go back to the model to explain that the internationalization glory days of Islam. Western society extols of terrorism is a natural response to a global individualism, while most Arab countries economy. As countries become economically favour community life. Many young Muslims integrated and market-oriented, there is no consider Western society to be impersonal, longer discrimination between what some insular and solitary, and they lose their sense terrorist groups may consider as good and bad of dignity in it.29 Muslims are also affected products or investments.25 This same type of by globalization because, according to their reasoning also applies to military technolo- beliefs, Islam is the supreme religion that pre- gies and goods. However, we cannot blindly vails over all others. Unfortunately for them, believe that globalization leads necessarily to Islam is in decline. Globalization may be one terrorism. The popular discourse states that of the reasons for this cognitive dissonance globalization increases the rate of exchange of felt by many Muslims, since it made possible goods, services, ideas and people and allows the decline of certain Arab regions, which cultures to cross borders more easily. Using is, in comparison with others, impossible to complex mathematical models that take ignore.30 The collateral damage of a conflict into account the economic centre of gravity, within Islam is a direct effect of globaliza- distance, language barriers, gross national tion, which is then transformed into hatred product and gross domestic product, Loayza towards Western countries.

Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the 47 Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Islam, as a religion conscripted to serve outside world, Islamists engage in a jihad a radical ideology, is used to push worldwide against foreign oppression, going as far as terrorist practices intended to both spread to refuse any cooperative relationship with a Islamic ideology and punish non-Muslims.31 West that is a bearer of corrupting, colonial In his book entitled The Canons of Jihad, Jim imperialism.36 Lacey, a former American infantry officer who became an analyst for the Institute for As a general rule, many people, groups Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia, and regimes are angry with Western society explains that Muslims must go to war only to and hostile towards the United States for spread Islam throughout the world. In fact, reasons that are fundamentally cultural, socio- the Prophet Mohammed specified that jihad economic and political.37 Anti-Americanism, must not be used for the purpose of personal while it can be analysed in different ways, can 32 gain, oppression or tyranny. Jihad is rational- be grouped into three main categories: the ized by the nature of the message of Islam. United States’ (US) support for the state of For Islam, there are only two societies: Islamic Israel, oil-related issues as well as the rela- society and jahili. Islamic society is one in tive and calculated assistance the Americans which people live according to the customs provide to Third World development, and in and beliefs of Islam in laws, organizations, particular to Arab countries. morals and behaviour, while jahili society does not follow the values, standards, laws 33 “Arabs and Muslims are specifically angry or regulations of Islam. By its very nature, at the U.S. government for its unconditional Islamic society, therefore, sees itself as the only and excessive support of Israel.”38 The facts so-called civilized society. The Arabic term that the Americans give without limit and jihilayyah is a concept signifying the ignorance that Israel can do practically whatever it wants of divine guidance or the state in which some- with no conditions have caused a great deal one exists without the assistance or help of of irritation to the leaders and socio-political Allah. It can also be used to describe a person groups of the Arab world. There are many or state that does not follow the way of Islam. works and publications that try to analyse this For Muslims, it is not possible to mix Islam assistance, and the conclusions are as wide- with jahili or jihilayyah. The explanation they ranging as they are far-fetched. However, the provide in this regard is that truth is one and tensions this assistance causes are very real. cannot be divided. “The mixing and coexist- 34 The city of Jerusalem is considered a holy place ence of truth and falsehood is impossible.” by Christians, Muslims and Jews, three of the most important religions. For some Muslims, As stated by Cettina, “the disenchant- it is an affront for infidels to occupy a holy ment with the world analysed by Max Weber place. For other, more radical Arabs, all non- allows Islamism to establish itself at the heart Muslims should be expelled from Muslim of Muslim societies. The intrusion into a trad- countries. The United States’ extravagant itional society of Western techniques as well support (financial, military and diplomatic) as political, economic, social and ideological for Israel certainly generates tension towards models (industrialization, urbanization, global- these two countries. In fact, since the creation ization) generates social instability, which leads of the state of Israel in 1948, the Americans to exclusion, trauma, growing poverty, loss of have committed to supporting Israel so that 35 meaning and tensions.” (Translation) Israelis could feel safe, by providing them with military equipment but also by sup- Terrorist violence is used to resist power porting them diplomatically and financially. and to fight against international pressure. The Arab League, except for Egypt, still does Opposing the “house of Islam” against the not recognize Israel’s legitimacy as a state.

48 Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

For the Arab League, this situation is an source of energy. The internal combustion indirect confrontation that humiliates them engine has still not been replaced, and black and undermines their credibility. gold is becoming more of an issue than ever with the industrialization of some countries, The Americans are often perceived, including China, India, Brazil, etc. rightly or wrongly, as wanting to dominate the world. Their foreign policies are often T eRRORIST violence is decided without consultation, consideration used to resist power or coordination with the leaders of other and to fight against nations. Their trade policy “does not just respond to US commercial and strategic international pres- interests, it also conveys their values, in sure. Opposing the particular those of freedom, democracy and “house of Islam” 39 individual responsibility.” (Translation) The against the outside Americans have always been very aggressive world, Islamists in their negotiations on international markets engage in a jihad and in using all legal resources available. Globalization, once supported by the govern- a gainst foreign ment, had no further obstacles. The point of oppression, going as no return may have been crossed in recent far as to refuse any decades. It is no longer possible to simply state cooperative rela- that trade agreements contribute to the gen- tionship with a West eral well-being and to think that one can take that is a bearer of it on faith that one can obtain public support for economic internationalism when, in fact, corrupting, colonial workers and public opinion are well aware imperialism. that what may be good for businesses and the global economy is not necessarily good Oil imports never stopped growing (with 40 for them. It is easy to imagine the effects in the exception of the early 1980s) and have developing countries when the social fabric of proven to be an obvious source of conflict. a superpower is in the process of crumbling. Considering that the world’s oil reserves are This is, among other reasons, because mas- primarily located in Arab lands, the games tery of globalization has slipped through the of alliances between the Americans and Americans’ fingers and because a part of the their economic partners cause tension within world developed such hate for them. OPEC and the Arab League. Figure 1 shows net American oil imports since 1975. It is Oil is the only resource the Muslim ironic to see the trend of this graph given that, countries have that is coveted by the rest of the in 1979, US President Jimmy Carter declared, world.41 The members of the Organization of “I am tonight setting a clear goal for the the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) energy policy of the United States. Beginning supply approximately 40 percent of world oil this moment, this nation will never use more output and have control over more than three foreign oil than we did in 1977—never.”42 quarters of the world’s crude oil reserves. The After ties had been broken off between Iran organization is under the complete control of and the United States, the latter had to seek Muslim countries, which became involved new business partners and strengthen relations in OPEC at a time when they considered it with others. The support they then offered to appropriate to use oil as a weapon to defend certain nations fuels some Muslims’ anger Muslims. Oil currently remains the primary and contributes to anti-American hatred.

Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the 49 Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

18 historical data projected data 16 14 12 10 8 6 Millions of Barrels per Day Millions of Barrels 4 2 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

Figure 1. Net US oil imports 1975–203043

For example, the US helped Yemen’s govern- communiqués claiming responsibility for ter- ment to fight al-Qaeda. In the 2001 report rorism as the primary rationale for the attacks of the Presidential Study Group entitled committed.46 Revenge, therefore, appears to Navigating through Turbulence: America and the be the main driver of terrorism and its cur- Middle East in a New Century, “it is suggested rent persistence. Through their cultures, the that a better mutual understanding should aggressor and the victim, both supporters of be encouraged between the United States the heavy-handed use of force, indiscrimin- and so-called pro-Western Arab countries ately apply the rule of “an eye for an eye, a 47 in order to preserve the ‘vital interests’ of the tooth for a tooth.” United States. On this point, it is remarkable that, under the heading of strengthening cooperation in the field of ‘energy, military Rviewe of the hypothesis and economic security’, the report emphasizes At the beginning of this study, the primarily the strengthening of the American hypothesis was stated that the events of military presence in certain Arab countries September 11, 2001, were a manifestation at the risk of causing those countries serious of political violence generated by global- 44 internal problems.” (Translation) ization. The starting hypothesis claimed that industrialized and technologically advanced Al-Qaeda’s decision to expand its oper- countries were taking advantage of less- ations onto the world stage reflects a change developed countries, in particular by setting in strategy. During 1995/1996, following up subsidiaries and workshops in which heated internal discussions, al-Qaeda decided employees have access to neither the salary to no longer attack its near enemies, the nor the benefits of workers in Western society. Arab regimes seen as apostates, but instead Since globalization favours only one part of its far enemies, the Western infidel nations, the world, the other part revolted, and the but above all the United States.45 Vengeance attacks in New York and Washington were is explicitly mentioned in many of their the result.

50 Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

P iPELINES in the Burgan oil field in Kuwait

After analysing various arguments, Since the latter cannot fight on equal terms, we are in a better position to state that this terrorism became the default choice. With hypothesis is true, but incomplete. In fact, scarce means, they nevertheless managed to globalization was one of a group of factors that express their grievances on the world stage. led to the attacks. The export of American The exploitation of developing countries by ideology in addition to the proliferation of the Americans and Western society, in addi- communication media and information tech- tion to the decline of Islam and traditional nology contributed to the general hatred of Muslim values, supported the creation or at the Middle East towards the United States. least the strengthening of the radical religious The Afghan jihad became radicalized more wing that spread a message of hate towards quickly because of the decline and stagna- the United States, leading to the events of tion of the Middle East, combined with the September 11, 2001. humiliation of the Islamic world.

British historian Tony Judt said that C oNClusion “inequality has a corrosive effect. It rots In conclusion, globalization has certainly societies from the inside. It illustrates and delivered a lot. A spirit of openness has broken amplifies the loss of social cohesion; it is the down walls all over the world, allowing for disease of our age and the greatest threat the sharing of information and technology 48 to the health of any democracy.” There across borders and between people on a scale was not a single cause or unique event that never before seen in human history. But led al-Qaeda to attack the World Trade globalization also had a dark side. Lurking Center, but a development in their way of behind it was a large and growing chasm seeing Western society. For the wealthier between rich and poor—especially within countries that exploited the more vulnerable countries. An inequitable distribution of countries, a point of no return was reached, wealth can wear down the social fabric. More and the grievances of the poorer countries unequal countries have worse social indica- often transformed into acts of violence. tors, a poorer human development record, and

Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the 51 Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

higher degrees of economic insecurity and Captain Samuel Boudreault, 438 Air anxiety. Fundamentally, the growth model Expeditionary Wing (430 Tactical Helicopter that coexisted with globalization was unbal- Squadron is his home unit in Canada) anced and unsustainable. Growth was driven is currently deployed with Operation by too much borrowing in some countries, ATTENTION as mentor at the air com- made possible by too much saving in others. mand and control center (ACCC) in Kabul, Inequality goes against notions of fairness Afghanistan. He is a former Royal Canadian and solidarity, but it also threatens economic Navy maritime surface officer (MARS) cur- and social stability. This is especially true in rently awaiting aerospace controller (AEC) poorer countries.49 training.

Globalization is a platform for the immediate, transnational distribution of Abb rEVIATIONS grievances. Globalization has also increased CE Common Era the number of grievances in some regions, since modern tools and the innovations of OPEC Organization of the Petroleum globalization, such as broader and cheaper Exporting Countries access to information in various parts of the US United States globe, have exacerbated these grievances by making it easier for individuals in one culture to compare their circumstances and living conditions with those of another culture.50 N oTES The events of September 11, 2001, 1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. disrupted the whole world and affected Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Americans in the heart of one the largest Princeton University Press, 1989), 88. cities in the country. Further to the clarifica- tions presented in this work, it can be claimed 2. Jean-François Daguzan, “Terrorisme that the events of September 11, 2001, were et Mondialisation : La coopération, réponse indeed a manifestation of political violence à la menace transnationale,” (master’s thesis, resulting from globalization. Of course, there Université de Paris, 2012). are other adjacent causes, but globalization bears a large share of the responsibility. 3. John Paul II, “Justice Can Be Done The excessive export of American ideology only by God,” (message for the World Day combined with the conflict with Islam in of Peace, December 8, 2001), http://www. a context of globalization is a dangerous traces-cl.com/gen02/justice.htm (accessed cocktail. It will be interesting to see what the April 2, 2013). American approach will be in coming years 4. Dictionnaire Larousse (2012). with the re-election of the Democratic Party candidate, Barack Obama, who promised in 5. Government of Canada, Public Safety his first term to restore American leadership Canada, “Currently Listed Entities,” Public on the world stage while keeping Americans Safety Canada, http://www.securitepublique. safe. The wager President Obama made is gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng.aspx#Hizballah ambitious, and it will be interesting to analyse (accessed April 2, 2013). how it will be received by Arab nations in the coming years. 6. France, The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “La lutte contre le ter- rorisme au sein de l’Union européenne,” The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

52 Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/enjeux- edu/acad/intrel/news/osama.htm (accessed internationaux/defense-et-securite/ April 2, 2013). terrorisme/la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-au/ article/la-liste-anti-terroriste (accessed 12. Nathalie Cettina, Terrorisme: L’histoire de October 26, 2012, site discontinued). sa mondialisation (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001), 24. 7. United States, Department of 13. François Géré, Pourquoi le terrorisme? State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” [Why Terrorism?] (Paris: Larousse, 2006), 24. Department of State, September 28, 14. Cettina, 9. 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/ des/123085.htm (accessed April 2, 2013). 15. Daniel Arasse, La guillotine et l’imaginaire de la Terreur (Paris, Flammarion, 1987), 46. 8. Government of Canada. 16. Ibid., 47. 9. Julie Breton, Dany Deschênes and Richard Garon, “La politique canadienne 17. Ibid., 97. de sécurité nationale, une conséquence de la transformation des institutions publiques de 18. David Martin Jones, Globalisation sécurité depuis la fin de la Guerre froide?,” and the New Terror: The Asia and Pacific Institut québécois des hautes études inter- Dimension (Northampton, MA: Edward nationales, Programme Paix et sécurité Elgar Publishing, 2004), 80. internationales, Québec, Laval University, 19. Keefer Loayza, Terrorism, Economic 2004, (paper presented at the Conference of Development and Political Openness Defence Associations Institute (CDA)-CD (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 95. and Foreign Affaires Institute (CDFAI) 7th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, 20. Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization Royal Military College of Canada, of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Kingston, ON, October 29–30, 2004). Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 44. 10. Eisenhower Study Group, The Cost of War Since 2001: Iraq, Afghanistan, and 21. United States, Central Intelligence Pakistan, Executive Summary (Providence, Agency, “The World Factbook: Afghanistan,” RI: Watson Institute for International Central Intelligence Agency, https://www. Study, Brown University, June 2011), cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/~/~/ factbook/geos/af.html (accessed October 29, media/Fiscal-Times/Research-Center/ 2012, content updated). Budget-Impact/Think-Tanks/2011/06/29/ The-Costs-Of-War-Since-2001. 22. Observatoire d’études géopolitiques, ashx?pid=%7B1C75F3DB-0DE3-4470- “La politique des États-Unis au Proche- 8A8C-DB8E4C8DA971%7D (accessed Orient,” http://www.etudes-geopolitiques. April 2, 2013). com/article5.asp (accessed November 2, 2012, site discontinued). 11. Emergency Response and Research 23. Cettina, 9. Institute, “Summary/Review of Reports Concerning Threats by Osama Bin Laden to 24. Jones, 41. Conduct Terrorist Operations Against the United States and/or her Allies – 23 February 25. Loayza, 122. 1998 to 16 June 1998 (includes original 26. Ibid., 135. February “fatwa”),” Emergency Response and Research Institute, https://www.mtholyoke. 27. Ibid., 95.

Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the 53 Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

28. Moghadam, 120. 42. Thom Hartmann, “Carter Tried to Stop Bush’s Energy Disaster—28 Years Ago,” 29. Ibid. May 3, 2005, Common Dreams, http://www. commondreams.org/views05/0503-22.htm 30. Ibid. (accessed April 2, 2013). 31. Cettina, 77. 43. United States, US Department of 32. Jim Lacey, The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Energy, “Fact # 456: February 12, 2007 Strategy for Defeating America (Annapolis, MD: Oil Imports, Today and Tomorrow,” US Naval Institute Press, 2008), 9. Department of Energy, http://www1.eere. energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/facts/2007_fcvt_ 33. Ibid., 27. fotw456.html (accessed April 2, 2013).

34. Sayyib Qutb, Milestones (Salimiah, 44. Obervatoire d’études géopolitiques. Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, distributed by Kazi 45. Moghadam, 44. Publications, 2003), 130. 46. Mathieu Guidère, Les nouveaux terro- ristes (Paris: Autrement Paris, 2010), 89. 35. Cettina, 79. 47. Ibid. 36. Ibid., 90. 48. Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land: A 37. Lynne Jackson, Understanding Treatise on Our Present Discontents (London: Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences Allen Lane, 2010). and Interventions (Washington, DC: American 49. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, “Human Psychological Association, 2004), 80. Development and Wealth Distribution,” (speech, International Monetary Fund, 38. Ibid., 81. Agadir, November 1, 2010), http://www.imf. org/external/np/speeches/2010/110110.htm 39. Christian Deblock, “La politique (accessed April 2, 2013). commerciale des États-Unis en perspective,” (Centre d’études sur l’intégration et la mon- 50. Moghadam, 121. dialisation, University of Quebec at Montreal, December 7, 2009), http://www.ceim.uqam. ca/IMG/pdf_intro-pol-com.pdf (accessed April 2, 2013).

40. Ibid.

41. Mbola, “Comment les pays Musulmans utilisent le pétrole comme une arme [How Muslim Countries Use Oil as a Weapon],” Muslim Academy, October 2, 2012, http://muslim-academy.com/ comment-les-pays-musulmans-utilisent- le-petrole-comme-une-arme/ (accessed February 14, 2013). [English version available at http://muslim-academy.com/how-muslim- countries-are-using-oil-as-a-weapon/]

54 Were the Events of September 11, 2001, a Manifestation of Political Violence Generated by the Phenomenon of Globalization? The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Cataclysm: The War on the and the Axis, over 4 million military fatal- Eastern Front, 1941–45 ities. Fought with a degree of brutality not By Keith Cumins witnessed in any of the other theatres of oper- ations, the war in the east, to a great extent, Helion and Company, 2 011 decided the outcome of World War II. ISBN 978-1-907677-23-6 359 pages Keith Cumins’s Cataclysm undertakes to capture the breadth and nature of the war in the east in one book; a daunting challenge to say the least, but one that he accomplishes quite handily. The amount of literature available pertaining to the German/Soviet Review by conflict is vast and covers the spectrum Major Chris Buckham, CD, MA from micro to macro analysis. Certainly, Cumins’s work is presented on a much larger canvas (covering the period 1941–1945), but he Eastern Front during World War II it is very successful at presenting the reader encompassed a military landscape that with a broad brush account of the events on by any standard beggars the imagina- the Eastern Front. The work is presented in T tion. Over a north/south distance of chronological manner, thereby enabling the 2,900 kilometres (1,800 miles), 4 million reader to easily follow the unfolding of events Axis troops, 750,000 horses and 600,000 despite the often overlapping of operations vehicles swept into the Union of Soviet and movement. Socialist Republics (USSR), driving forward to the gates of Moscow and Stalingrad before Despite the fact that the air conflict on ultimately being driven back to Berlin and the Eastern Front was as involved and far defeat. The cost to the USSR was staggering: reaching in complexity as any other element, over 8 million military dead; for Germany Cumins focuses on the ground campaign.

Cataclysm: The War on the Eastern Front, 1941–45 55 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

This does not take away from the impact of a contextual overview and break between sec- the text; in fact, it is beneficial, as it ensures tions within the chapters. that the work retains a reasonable length and depth. A series of colour maps are included Overall, Cumins’ book is a notable in the book that are very valuable in assisting success. While not adding new information the reader in following the flow of events on to the BARBAROSSA story, he succeeds the ground. The author offsets the fact that admirably in condensing the complexity of the maps are all centrally located within the the operation into a manageable and useful book by providing references to the appropri- narrative at both the strategic and operational ate map along the border of the text. This is levels of engagement. For the aspiring histor- extremely helpful and a nice touch. ian and casual military enthusiast, this is a highly recommended book as a starting point Additionally, he includes appendices that from which to branch into more detailed provide outstanding synopses of place names, accounts; made more so by the fact that it is orders of battle and divisional structures presented in a lucid and engaging style. for both the German and Soviet sides. The orders of battle are further broken out into the Major Chris Buckham is a Logistics Officer phases of: June 22, 1941; Operation BLAU; in the Royal Canadian Air Force. He has Operation CITADEL; and the Operation experience working with all environments, BAGRATION periods. Another plus regard- including special operations forces (SOF). ing the book layout is the fact that footnotes A graduate of the Royal Military College are placed at the bottom of the pages on which of Canada, he holds a Bachelor of Arts they are found, as opposed to at the end of the in Political Science and a Master of Arts book. I prefer this method, as it allows one in International Relations. He is pres- to review the additional information provided ently employed as an International Line of without breaking the flow of the book. A Communication (ILOC) officer with the slight drawback is the partial bibliography, as multinational branch of European Command it would have been helpful to have all of the (EUCOM) J4 in Stuttgart, Germany. source material included.

Cumins’ writing style is fluid and smooth; Abbreviation therefore, despite having to approach the battles from different viewpoints and multiple USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regions, he is easy to follow and understand. Maintaining a strategic and operational view of the conflict enables Cumins to follow the flow of battle from the northern to southern theatres and include the actions within the German allies’ spheres of influence. Additionally, from a structure perspective, he opens his narrative with a synopsis of the strategic situation leading up to the initiation of Operation BARBAROSSA. Again, while it is somewhat cursory in length, it hits all of the major points to provide the reader with the background needed to tackle the enormity of the activity that followed. Cumins also breaks his narrative into manageable subunits through the use of sectional titles that provide

56 Cataclysm: The War on the Eastern Front, 1941–45 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Gone to Russia to Fight: The the discussed military objectives constituted RAF in South Russia 1918–1920 progress for the RAF and its allies or perhaps By John T. Smith the reverse. On a similar note, Smith has a tendency Gloucestershire, UK: Amberley Publishing, to use nicknames for persons of interest who 2010 are referred to, with little to no re-introduction 214 pages even though the individual may not have been ISBN 978-1-84868-891-9 referred to in detail for a number of chapters.

Following the absence of context, Smith does not introduce the specific squadrons or flights before delving into their individual Review by exploits or plans. As a result, it is often neces- Officer Cadet Joshua Wanvig sary to return to earlier portions of the book in order to figure out which group of airmen his book discusses and provides is being discussed at a particular point in the historical information regarding the text so as to recall the relevant individuals involvement of the Royal Air Force as well as their area of operations. After you (RAF) in the civil war that plagued have determined which squadron or flight is T being discussed, the difficulties do not end, the Russian people in the wake of the First World War. as Smith is likely to shift the historical focus without notice or indication of the change. As To begin, the text appears to be dis- this is a historical text, it would make sense jointed and poorly organized. It is habitual to follow a chronological order as the events within historical texts to provide some degree took place. However, it appears Smith chose of background or preliminary information in a different approach that discusses the events order to set up the political, economic and of one group in a chronological order followed social motivations for the events in question by an unannounced return to the beginning of to be discussed in a more coherent man- the time period. This approach made the text ner. However, this text does not follow the significantly less effective than the alternative usual template in any manner, neglecting to of placing each of the independent foci side by define key terms with which the reader may side in order to provide context and the ability be unfamiliar. For example, for readers such to compare the operations of each air group at as me who are not versed in Russian history, any given time. the text leaves us to independently research political and military terms which happen to The content of Smith’s text is substan- be integral to the context of the conflict. tially more impressive than the organizational and literary shortfalls. Smith provides numer- In the first chapter, with only a brief ous accounts of events in the form of diary, introduction concerning the commencement archive and flight log entries by persons of of the Russian civil war, Smith makes several interest in order to authenticate his research references to the Bolsheviks and their earlier while simultaneously offering the view from influences on Russian history but does not the perspective of the serving man rather than provide detailed information to explain their the strategist. The in-flight log, as dictated by political associations or goals. This want of either the pilot or gunner, often described information, in turn, made it substantially the payload as well as the missions in a very more difficult to follow the progression of the succinct manner. For example, in an excerpt conflict, as the reader does not know whether from 47 Squadron’s diary, Captains Elliot and

Gone to Russia to Fight: The RAF in South Russia 1918–1920 57 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Anderson flew on 17 August 1919: “Height At the time of writing, Officer Cadet Wanvig 1,500. Four 112lb. [50 kilogram (kg)] and was working in the Research Branch of the sixteen 20lb. [9 kg] Bombs were dropped Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre onto troops and horse transport in the square at 8 Wing Trenton. In September 2012, he and streets …”1 It is apparent from the various returned to the Royal Military College for his diary excerpts that many of the airmen and final year, pursuing an undergraduate degree crew resented their living conditions and, in Military and Strategic Studies. in fact, being in Russia to begin with. The ever-present weather was one of the largest Abbreviations difficulties for both man and machine and is described by “Knock” as, “No joke trying to kg kilogram keep warm. Big log stove going in quarters lb pound and all available clothing used with blankets on bed. Still cold … Have to break ice in a tub RAF Royal Air Force outside to get wash and water ...”2 It is obvious that considerable effort and N otes diligence went into proper research, as there 1. John T. Smith, Gone to Russia to are numerous citations from official sources. Fight: The RAF in South Russia 1918–1920 However, this is not to say that Smith (Gloucestershire, UK: Amberley, 2010), 129. accepted information in the various archives at face value. Throughout the book there are 2. Ibid., 44. a number of contradictions to mainstream historical beliefs, which Smith highlights and 3. Ibid., 107. often comments on for the ridiculous nature of the grandiose assertions in question, citing the impossibility of certain situations or events based on simple math and cross-referencing. The Next Decade: Where We’ve For example, during a combined attack on Been … and Where We’re Going Tsaritsyn in late June 1919, RAF personnel By George Friedman claim to have dropped a 112-lb [50-kg] bomb squarely on a building filled with Russian New York: Double Day, commissars, killing everyone within. To this 2 011 assertion Smith responds, “No mention of the 243 pages incident can be found in the official records. ISBN 978-0-385-53294-5 Neither … were present in the area before the fall of Tsaritsyn, or just after, and this story may not be accurate.”3 This book is extremely interesting for those curious about the RAF campaigns in Review by Russia or the development of the RAF in Officer Cadet Bradley Ticky general, but I would not recommend it as an introduction to the topic for the reasons A century is about events. A decade is about cited above (no background information or people. … context). Due to the relative and repeated mistakes of the RAF during the campaign in This book is about the short run of the next question, this text may be viewed as a guide ten years: the specific realities to be faced, the of what to avoid and of lessons learned from specific decisions to be made, and the likely conse- 1 the mistakes of the early RAF. quences of those decisions.

58 The Next Decade: Where We’ve Been … and Where We’re Going The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

n the first page of the introduc- the reader of just how difficult it is to predict tion of The Next Decade, George the future throughout The Next Decade by not Friedman reveals what may be giving any solid conclusions for what might O expected within his book. The occur. Friedman declares that the president Next Decade starts by looking into America’s has many tasks ahead of him for the next ten past. Friedman examines the past conflicts years, but he offers little to no information or and events that have occurred throughout insights on how any of the problems might American history and then explains how the be addressed. For a book that is supposed to decisions taken by various presidents in rela- explain “the specific decisions to be made”5 tion to these events (such as when presidents in the next ten years, The Next Decade fails to Roosevelt and Nixon created “alliances with achieve its goal in that respect and leaves the countries that had previously been regarded reader a little disappointed. as strategic and moral threats”2) have come to shape America into what he believes it is The Next Decade may not have accom- today: a global empire.3 Friedman looks at plished all of its stated goals, but that by no America’s involvement with every continent, means makes it a bad book. What it does with the more important regions, such as accomplish, however, is that it examines the Israel, receiving more attention in order to decisions taken by American leaders that properly examine the situation. brought their country to where it is today as well as the issues that they may face in the It is clear from reading The Next Decade near future on the political side. I recom- that Friedman has done significant research mend this book to those who are interested on his subject and that he is well versed in in American history or geopolitics, or even American history. He presents his informa- international relationships. tion in a clear manner, using simple but effective language that any reader can follow At the time of writing, Bradley Ticky was an without leaving out any pertinent informa- officer cadet at the Royal Military College of tion. As his book also discusses geopolitics, Canada and was in his second year of uni- Friedman often uses maps of the region versity, with the aim of acquiring a bachelor’s discussed in order to emphasize his point degree in civil engineering. about how the geography of an area affects its economy as well as its politics. Friedman Notes shows a great deal of insight in The Next Decade by identifying many international 1. George Friedman, The Next Decade: problems that the Americans may face in the Where We’ve Been … and Where We’re Going near future, such as “limiting a relationship (New York: Double Day, 2011), 1. between Russia and Germany which could, in succeeding decades, create a power that could 2. Ibid., 112. challenge American hegemony.”4 3. Ibid., 10. Although the book accomplishes quite a 4. Ibid, 165. few things, it still leaves much to be desired. A major issue with The Next Decade is the 5. Ibid., 1. complete lack of citations. It is unacceptable to present statistical data without referen- cing a source; the data loses all credibility. Predicting the future is a difficult endeavour; there are just too many uncertainties that cannot be accounted for. Friedman reminds

The Next Decade: Where We’ve Been … and Where We’re Going 59 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

Soviet Air Force Theory, situation, industrial capabilities, and the per- 1918–1945 ceived threats from enemy forces all played a By James Sterrett role in how they developed unique ideas on air warfare. That being said, the Soviets did not New York: Routledge, 2007 ignore publications on air power theory from 208 pages the West; rather, they adopted ideas where ISBN-10 0415651867 they fit into their theories on air warfare. ISBN-13 978-0415651868 The author uses a host of primary and sec- ondary sources, including countless published documents, articles, and books written by the leading air power thinkers of the time. He brilliantly includes extracts from Soviet field Review by manuals, allowing the reader to delve into Major Nathan Burgess, CD the minds of the strategists of that era. The book is divided into four chapters, organized n Soviet Air Force Theory, 1918–1945, James th chronologically from the early days of the 20 Sterrett provides a comprehensive examina- century through the end of the Second World tion of Soviet air power theory­, arguing that War. The first chapter, “Early Concepts, while Soviet thinkers considered Western I 1900–1928,” deals with emerging theories theories on airpower, they largely developed on air power. The author, rather confusingly, their own unique doctrine applicable to the jumps around chronologically from observa- circumstances of the Soviet Union. tion balloons utilized during manoeuvres in 1895, to field regulations published in 1936. His book provides an overview of the Nonetheless, this chapter outlines how the development of Soviet air power theory from th Russian Revolution left the Soviets with a the early days of the 20 century until the end small, inexperienced Red Air Force in 1918 of the Second World War. The book focuses coupled with a very weak industrial sector and specifically on what Soviet theorists thought economy. about properly utilizing these new airborne capabilities. The author discusses some Sterrett discusses the debates between broader issues, such as the economy and the different thinkers of the time, who argued, nation’s industrial capacity, but only insofar amongst other things, whether air power as they related to Soviet air power theory. He should be organized into a centralized com- does not discuss other related themes, such as mand or subordinated to the army. Other the technical specifications of aircraft, instead arguments include whether aircraft should be choosing to focus on what the Soviets were concentrated en masse or utilized in disparate thinking about tactics and doctrine during missions, whether the primary mission of the that time period. air force is to support land forces or conduct more independent missions in pursuit of air Sterrett demonstrates, through a thor- superiority, what air superiority means, and ough examination of the dialogue amongst what the nature of future air power will look theorists of the time, that the Soviets did like. In the end, it appears the Soviets, along not simply adopt or copy foreign ideas about with most other countries with a significant air power. Instead, they examined the use of threat along their land frontier, favoured an air power within the context of their unique air force whose primary mission was to sup- Soviet circumstances. Their geography, port land forces. Nations such as the United geopolitical situation, confidence in aircraft States of America (USA) and Great Britain, capabilities and technologies, the economic who did not have a threat along their border,

60 Soviet Air Force Theory: 1918–1945 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

favoured an air force whose primary mission in Spain, Mongolia, China, and Finland. He was strategic bombing. discusses the successes and failures during the various conflicts. There were many lessons An underlying assumption throughout learned during these clashes, and while the this period was that the Soviet Red Air Force theoretical debates continued, there appeared would be relatively small in numbers, with a to be some consensus building that the air small budget and weak industrial sector to force must do a better job of cooperating rely on. This all changed in 1928, when the with and supporting ground forces. In order first Soviet Five-Year Plan was approved, to do this, coordination and communications providing a major military rearmament. needed to be improved.

Chapter 2, “Expansion, 1928–1937,” deals In Chapter 4, “The Great Patriotic War, with the growth of the Soviet Red Air Force, 1941–45,” the author examines the largest now well funded and strongly supported by land war in history, code-named Operation heavy industry. The author demonstrates that, BARBAROSSA by the Germans. While while aircraft capabilities and numbers were many aspects of air power theory continued to significantly improved, intellectual freedom be debated, Sterrett shows that there was rela- was somewhat stifled by the political events of tive consensus in certain areas—namely, the the time—namely, the Soviet Party “cleansing” employment of aircraft en masse down the in 1932, the Spanish Civil War in 1936, and main axis of ground effort and the primacy of the military purges in 1937. supporting land operations. This was in con- trast to leading Western theorists in the USA Nonetheless, the theoretical debates on and elsewhere, who focused on the primacy of air power continued, with consensus build- independent strategic bombing missions over ing in some areas, such as the requirement to support to land forces. gain “air superiority.” Theorists were still at odds, however, on a number of issues. These Sterrett makes a strong argument that issues included whether air superiority was Soviet theorists did not slavishly copy Western achieved through strategic bombing of air air power doctrine from 1918–1945. Through bases, industry, and so on (thus gaining air the use of primary and secondary sources, superiority through the strategic elimination including documents written by top theorists of enemy air forces); through the use of fight- of the time, Sterrett proves that Soviet air ers in aerial combat providing temporary air power theory was developed using independent superiority; whether the primary mission of Soviet thought, in accordance with their own the Air Force was in support of land and naval unique circumstances. While Soviet theorists forces or to conduct independent strategic took Western publications on air power theory missions; or whether air power should be used into consideration, they adopted those ideas en masse or in separate coordinated actions. only where they fit into their own theories Sterrett shows that the results of the Spanish on air warfare. Sterrett’s use of excerpts from Civil War, in which bombers performed Soviet strategists, coupled with the fact that poorly relative to fighters, all but ended the Soviet air power doctrine was very different debate regarding strategic bombing. The from that in the West, provides a compelling purges of 1937 “eliminated” almost all of the argument that Soviets produced their own contemporary Soviet air power theorists, thus unique air force theory. hindering and altering the theoretical debate moving forward. Reviews of the book are difficult to find; however, there is one excellent academic In the third chapter, “Small Wars, review written by Beatrice Heuser. In her 1936–1940”, Sterrett covers the small wars review, she applauds Sterrett for the academic

Soviet Air Force Theory: 1918–1945 61 The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 2 | No. 2 spring 2013

discipline and rigour required to study such theory, proving that, while Soviet theorists a difficult subject. She admires his thorough considered Western theories on air power, use of extracts and other primary and second- they developed their own unique doctrine ary sources that provide exceptional insight applicable to the circumstances of the Soviet into the thinkers of the time. In fact, her Union. Heuser’s book review supports this only negative commentary is that she wishes claim, citing Sterrett’s strong use of sources. Sterrett used more extracts. She insightfully Sterrett’s holistic approach to air power theory notes that, perhaps contrary to Sterrett’s aim, is consistent with the broader discourse on air he provides evidence to support the many power theory, and overall, an excellent piece Western historians who seek to find evidence of academic work. of Soviet air force thinkers who prescribed to the use of aviation for strategic bombing (i.e., Major Nathan Burgess is a communications of deep targets such as cities). Nevertheless, and electronics engineering officer in the Heuser very much appreciates the important Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). He has contribution that Sterrett has made to the held positions within various RCAF and study of Soviet aviation. Her review of this Canadian Forces organizations including the book is thought-provoking and in accordance Directorate Aerospace Equipment Program with my opinion of the book, citing strong Management (Radar & Communication use of sources, including excerpts, which Systems), 42 Radar Squadron as well as 4 provide a sound basis for Sterrett’s argument. Wing Telecommunications and Information Her abovementioned comments regarding Services Squadron at 4 Wing Cold Lake, 1 strategic bombing were intriguing. Canadian Operational Support Command, and the Canadian Forces School of As a communications officer, and consist- Communications and Electronics. He is ent with this theme, it is interesting to note currently being sponsored by the Canadian that signals and communications—which Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre (CFAWC) enabled command, control, coordination, to do his Master of Arts in War Studies (with and reconnaissance—were germane to the an aerospace power concentration) at the successes and failures of the Soviet Red Air Royal Military College of Canada. His target Force throughout this time period. Sterrett position upon graduation is the C4ISR space repeatedly provides examples where the lack position at CFAWC. of radio communications crippled operations, calling it the Soviets’ “Achilles heel”2 and, Abbreviations conversely, where the effective use of radio communications provided the necessary sinew C4ISR command, control, communications, to ensure effective operations. These problems computers, intelligence, surveillance are ironically similar to those described in and reconnaissance contemporary articles on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, USA United States of America surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). While technology has advanced and we Notes have coined new acronyms such as C4ISR to 1. Beatrice Heuser, “Review of Soviet Air describe this problem-space, we are far from Force Theory, 1918–1945, by James Sterrett,” Cold properly implementing an effective solution. War History 9, no. 3 (August 2009): 441–52. This is an area of war studies / military history that requires further study. 2. James Sterrett, Soviet Air Force Theory, 1918–1945 (New York: Routledge, 2007), 111. James Sterrett provides a rather com- prehensive examination of Soviet air power

62 Soviet Air Force Theory: 1918–1945 ORDER YOUR BOOKS NOW!

THESE PUBLICATIONS ARE AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST. Email: [email protected]