Number 20, Spring/Summer 2011 Seeing Russia Straight

David Satter deteriorating domestic conditions Oleg Kalugin between democracy and dictatorship Svante Cornell coveting the “Post-Soviet Space” Kevin Ryan the path to strategic cooperation Richard Weitz the hurdles for NATO-Russian BMD Ilan Berman Losing the struggle against radical Islam Gal Luft Moscow’s energy strategy and the West Andrei Shoumikhin Surveying Russia’s arms sector Giorgi Baramidze the ongoing war on Georgia Challenges to American Primacy featuring the Honorable Jim Talent & Amitai Etzioni • Unintended consequences of the “Arab Spring” • A dwindling defense budget • China’s geopolitical rise • Law and the military Perspective $7.95 US $12.50 CAN 1 1 Ambassador Ryan Crocker Former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

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For more information visit www.finmec.com Number 20, Spring/Summer 2011

From the Publisher Tom Neumann 3 Editor’s Note Ilan Berman 5

Seeing Russia Straight

State of Fear David Satter 7 From bad to worse in Putin and Medvedev’s Russia. Russia’s Future Imperfect Maj. Gen. (KGB) Oleg Kalugin (ret.) 15 Russia isn’t headed toward democracy. But it isn’t headed back to the Soviet era either.

No Reset in the Post-Soviet Space Svante E. Cornell 19 Russia’s empire might be gone, but it hasn’t been forgotten in Moscow.

Preventing the Unthinkable Brig. Gen. Kevin Ryan, USA (ret.) 33 Moscow and Washington must work together to prevent nuclear attack.

Dialogue of the Deaf Richard Weitz 43 Don’t let the diplomatic niceties fool you. On missile defense, Russia and NATO remain worlds apart.

The Caliphate Comes Home Ilan Berman 53 Two decades on, the verdict is in: Russia is losing its own “war on terror.”

Heavy Fuel Gal Luft 63 The promise and peril of Russia’s global energy drive.

Guns and Butter Andrei Shoumikhin 73 The shape of Russia’s troublesome arms trade. Tbilisi in the Crosshairs Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze 81 Russia’s war on Georgia is enduring, and ideological in nature.

Challenges to American Primacy

Shifting Sands Amitai Etzioni 87 Absent American resolve, the Islamic Republic of Iran will inherit the Middle East. The Dangers of Defunding Defense Jim Talent & Mackenzie Eaglen 99 America can’t remain a global power if it no longer funds a world-class military. Our China Challenge Chuck DeVore 109 Needed: some clear thinking about the implications of China’s rise. Tangled Up in the War on Terror Maj. Gen. Sid Shachnow, USA (ret.) 117 Grappling with the changing nature of conflict, and its legal implications.

Perspective

Bridging the Divide 125 An Interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker

Dispatches

TALLINN: A Nordic Leader MP Marko Mihkelson, Estonia 129 SINGAPORE: India’s Stake in Afghanistan Shanthie Mariet D’Souza 131 TASHKENT: Russia’s Energy Challenges Vladimir Paramonov 133 Book Reviews

Staying the Course Micah N. Levinson 135 Stephen Kinzer’s misguided quest to remake America’s alliances in the Mideast.

Toxic Tradecraft Paul Janiczek 139 Russia’s favorite political weapon, as exposed by Boris Volodarsky.

Learning to Live With the Bomb George Michael 141 John Mueller challenges the conventional wisdom surrounding nuclear arms.

The Next Battleground James Colbert 145 Robert Kaplan’s convincing case for why the Indian Ocean region matters. From the Publisher

For Americans, the recent turmoil in the Middle East has raised a multitude of questions about our foreign policy—challenging questions that go to the very soul of our national character.

One concerns the objectives of our foreign policy. Are we just another country seek- ing our own benefit and advantage, or do we have a more idealistic mission to export freedom, equality, justice and democracy to the world? I suspect most Americans believe it to be the latter. We are therefore justifiably horrified when we are incon- veniently reminded that some of our client states are, in effect, dictatorships. And, when pressed, we quickly seek the moral high ground by disassociating ourselves from them. Our abrupt abandonment of Egypt’s long-serving strongman, Hosni Mubarak, is only the most recent example of this trend.

The word “revolution” brings to the American mind a vision of hungry, downtrod- den people rising up against some brutal force in pursuit of “liberty, fraternity and equality.” It’s worth remembering, however, that those three words were authored by the same people who subsequently brought France the “reign of terror.”

Vladimir Ilych Lenin, too, couched the Russian revolution in terms of a dramatic change that would equalize wealth between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” was the revolu- tionary slogan. And the Russian variation of “fraternity” was the term “comrade.” Later, George Orwell put it in perspective in Animal Farm when he wrote: “All ani- mals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.”

These were followed by such revolutionary leaders as Franco, Castro, and the Aya- tollah Khomeini, all of whom captured America’s imagination—and its sympathy. And let’s not forget that Gaddafi came to power because he unseated King Idris, and Nasser liberated Egypt from King Farouk.

All these revolutions have two things in common: empty promises and sloganeer- ing. They are not revolutions for the people, although they are certainly by the people. There is usually some organization behind these revolutions pulling the strings and taking advantage of the hopes and fears of the disenfranchised.

So what makes us so sure this time that the rioting in Bahrain’s Pearl Square or Cai- ro’s Tahrir Square is in fact the true voice of the people and not that of the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, the military or the socialists? Maybe they are not, but we should approach them with some skepticism and require more than a bit of validation. After all, history has taught us many lessons about “popular” revolutions. Most we have lived to regret.

Tom Neumann Publisher

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300-60210_ITNetworking_JINSA.indd 1 2/25/11 3:01 PM Editor’s Note

“Russia,” British Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously remarked in the opening days of the Second World War, “is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.” More than seven decades later, Russia continues to bedevil Western policymakers. Can it be classified as an ally of the United States and Europe, or as their mortal enemy? Is it largely pragmatic in its foreign policy practices, or driven by the ideological urge to recreate lost empire? Clear answers to these questions are hard to come by. Even the nature of Russia’s leadership—shared by its hard line premier, Vladimir Putin, and his more moderate protégé, Dmitry Medvedev—defies easy classification.

In this edition of The Journal, we take a look at the enduring puzzle that is today’s Russia. David Satter of the Hudson Institute starts us off with a damning review of the deepening repression and anti-democratic drift that have come to char- acterize the rule of the Putin-Medvedev “tandem.” Former KGB officer Oleg Kalugin then outlines the conflicting ideological pulls that exist within Rus- sian politics. Subsequently, Svante Cornell of Johns Hopkins University takes a look at Russian policies in the “post-Soviet space,” and explains how (and why) Moscow continues to covet the region. Brigadier General Kevin Ryan of Har- vard’s Belfer Center proposes two concrete areas—missile defense and counter- ing catastrophic terrorism—where Washington and Moscow can substantively cooperate. The Hudson Institute’s Richard Weitz takes a contrasting view, out- lining the enduring impediments to missile defense cooperation between Russia and Europe. From there, yours truly chronicles the increasing threat to Russian stability posed today by the growing power and prevalence of radical Islam. Gal Luft of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security details the drivers—and the manifestations—of Russia’s global energy strategy. Missouri State Univer- sity’s Andrei Shoumikhin then examines the strategic importance of Russia’s arms trade with the world. We conclude the section with a contribution from Giorgi Baramidze, Georgia’s Vice Prime Minister, who provides a firsthand look at the causes and consequences of Russian aggression toward his country.

Russia, however, isn’t our only concern. We also take a look at emerging chal- lenges to American primacy in a quartet of hard-hitting articles. George Wash- ington University’s Amitai Etzioni underscores the downside of the current revolutions taking place in the Middle East: the rise of Iran as a regional hege- mon. Heritage Foundation scholars Jim Talent and Mackenzie Eaglen detail the deleterious effects that declining defense spending will have on U.S. interests and our ability to project power globally in the years ahead. Former California legislator (and Reagan-era Pentagon official) Chuck DeVore maps the contours of China’s rise—and what it is likely to mean for Washington. And retired Major General Sid Shachnow chronicles how changing legal norms in the “War on Terror” are increasingly affecting America’s warfighters.

Our “Perspective” interviewee for this issue is Ambassador Ryan Crocker, the former U.S. envoy to Iraq (among other posts), with whom we explore

The Journal of International Security Affairs 5 the changes taking place in the Middle East—and how the U.S. can best navigate them.

This time out, we also have “Dispatches” from Estonia, Singapore, and Uzbeki- stan, and book reviews dealing with Mideast strategy, Russia’s predilection for unconventional weapons, novel thinking on nuclear strategy, and the primacy of the Indian Ocean.

In other words, we’ve put together another issue chock full of fresh insights on foreign policy and national security. And we’re confident that, once you’ve perused these pages, you’ll be richer for it.

Ilan Berman Editor

6 The Journal of International Security Affairs State of Fear

David Satter

s Russians look to the future, three recent events have shaken the complacency of those hoping for a democratic evolution in Athe country. The first was the New Year’s Eve jailing of oppo- sition leader Boris Nemtsov for his participation in an anti-Kremlin rally. The second was the guilty verdict in the trial of Mikhail Khodor- kovsky, the former head of the Yukos oil company on fresh (and clearly fabricated) corruption charges. The third was the devastating terrorist attack at Domodedovo Airport that left 35 dead and 41 seriously injured.

Russians are good at reading tea leaves, and it is widely assumed that these events, coming as they did nearly simultaneously, have deep significance for the future. The jailing of Nemtsov and the repeat conviction of Khodorkovsky are signs that the regime is unrelenting in its determination to suppress real political competition. The attack at Domodedovo raises the possibility that the unending crisis in the North Caucasus will wreak havoc in the rest of Russia as well.

One-party state It is not by accident that Russia today appears to rely only on force to resolve its social, economic and national problems. The country lacks democratic mech- anisms while a handful of corrupt leaders monopolize power and wealth. The parliament is dominated by the pro-Putin United Russia party, which con- sists largely of government officials and lacks any ideology aside from support for

David Satter is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a fellow of the For- eign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced Inter- national Studies (SAIS). His latest book on Russia and the communist past is due out this Fall from Yale University Press. David Satter

the regime. The highest government for expressing opposition. For nearly officials sit on the boards of Russia’s two years, supporters of the right to largest state-run companies. Dmitry free assembly have tried to gather Medvedev, before becoming president, in Triumfalnaya Square in central was deputy prime minister and the Moscow on the 31st of each month chairman of state natural gas monopoly with 31 days. The 31st was chosen Gazprom. Igor Sechin, a deputy prime because of its symbolism; article 31 of minister, is the current head of Rosneft, the Russian Constitution guarantees the state-run oil company. the right of free assembly. Permis- sion was repeatedly denied on a vari- Even though present-day Russia ety of pretexts. Protestors, however, gathered anyway and these unau- is much freer than the Soviet thorized demonstrations were regu- Union, it appears determined, larly broken up, sometimes violently. like its predecessor, to provoke On October 31, 2010, the dem- onstrators, for the first time, were eventual chaos through its refusal allowed to protest without harass- to reform. ment. This may have been because the new mayor of Moscow, Sergei The national television stations, Sobyanin, had taken office only a the main source of news for 90 per- week before. However, at the next cent of the population, are censored demonstration, on December 31, and controlled by the regime. With 2010, 70 persons were detained and a few notable exceptions (such as Mr. Nemtsov and other opposition Novaya Gazeta and Ekho Moskvy), activists were arrested and sen- other media outlets avoid any serious tenced to jail terms. Mr. Nemtsov criticism of the Kremlin. The courts was charged with aggressive behav- likewise are fully controlled through ior toward the police, although video local court chairmen who carry out footage showed him obeying police political orders. As a result, the aver- orders without resistance. age Russian has no faith in either the In the end, Mr. Nemtsov was held police or the courts. No less than for 15 days. He spent two days in a win- Alexander Konovalov, the minister of dowless cell without a bed or toilet. justice, summed up the situation by But his treatment was mainly signif- saying, “There was never any respect icant for the fact that he is a former for law in Russian life and there is deputy prime minister and Russia’s none today.”1 most credible opposition politician. It was against this backdrop His arrest is a sign that the Kremlin that recent events in Russia have led is not prepared to tolerate peaceful to feelings of hopelessness. Even dissent, no matter who is involved or though present-day Russia is much what is written in the constitution. freer than the Soviet Union, it appears determined, like its predecessor, to A rigged system provoke eventual chaos through its The matter is not trivial, for refusal to reform. there may be ample reasons for In this context, the jailing of Mr. peaceful protest in the near future. Nemtsov holds considerable sym- Russia will have new parliamentary bolic significance. Demonstrations elections in December, to be fol- are one of the few remaining avenues lowed by presidential elections in

8 The Journal of International Security Affairs State of Fear early 2012, and it is expected on the The high cost of defiance basis of past experience that there Besides the arrest of Mr. will be massive falsification. Nemtsov, another source of deep In past elections under Putin, concern for liberal-minded Russians the financial resources of Russian was the verdict in the case of Mikhail business and the administrative Khodorkovsky. His sentence of 13.5 resources of the state bureaucracy years for fraud means that he will not were all deployed on behalf of Krem- be a free man until 2017, if then. lin-supported candidates. During the December 2007 parliamentary elections, for example, voters were The Domodedovo attack has often promised bonuses by their raised fears that ordinary Russian bosses for voting for United Russia, citizens will now be caught in the and threatened with penalties for not middle as the Kremlin employs doing so. In addition, electoral results indiscriminate force in the North were falsified. In Chechnya, where Caucasus—thereby guaranteeing the pro-Kremlin leader Ramzan that terror escalates and the Kadyrov rules with the help of a reign of terror, United Russia report- insurgency spreads. edly racked up 99.4 percent support from eligible voters.2 The other ten The charges against Mr. Khodor- parties in contention split 0.1 percent kovsky and his onetime business of the vote, and only 0.5 percent of partner, Platon Lebedev, were absurd eligible voters did not participate. In on their face. The two were charged other economically-depressed areas, with stealing 200 million tons of oil including Ingushetia, Karachevo- from Yukos subsidiaries, more than Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, the total yearly output of many oil- Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, the producing countries. Indeed, Viktor results were also 99 percent in favor Khristenko, the Russian trade minis- of United Russia.3 In a letter to Putin, ter, said at Khodorkovsky’s trial that Sergei Kovalyev, Yeltsin’s former the theft of oil is a serious problem, commissioner on human rights, pro- but that he knew “nothing about theft tested the rigged result. “I would on the scale of millions of tons.”6 not claim,” he wrote, “that United In 2003, the year of his arrest, Mr. Russia would not have won first place Khodorkovsky was defying the rules in these elections. This is a separate as handed down by then-President problem. But now, gentlemen… elec- Putin. These called for oligarchs to tions, the chief criterion of democ- limit their role in politics to support racy, no longer exist.”4 for the Putin regime. Khodorkovsky, These results were far from an however, was the principal backer of anomaly. In the April 2008 presi- the “Yabloko” party, the only truly dential elections, up to a third of the independent liberal opposition party. votes for Dmitry Medvedev to be Rus- He also backed the Union of Right sia’s next president were apparently Forces (SPS) and, out of faith in rigged, inflating Medvedev’s margin the need for pluralism, the commu- of victory and creating the impres- nists. Following Mr. Khodorkovsky’s sion that he enjoyed massive support arrest, the Kremlin made it clear that as Putin’s chosen successor.5 all financing of opposition parties

The Journal of International Security Affairs 9 David Satter

henceforth needed to be approved There are strong parallels by the presidential administration. between the fate of Mr. Magnitsky In the 2007 parliamentary elections, and that of Yuri Shchekochikhin, a SPS and “Yabloko” were both starved State Duma deputy and investigative of money for salaries, facilities and journalist, who died June 2, 2003, after advertising. As a result, neither gath- investigating a case of massive corrup- ered enough votes to enter the Rus- tion involving high-ranking members sian parliament. of the security services. Shcheko- The fate of Mr. Khodorkovsky chikhin had been investigating the was echoed by those of others who Tri Kita (“Three Whales”) furniture paid for their defiance of the Putin chain, which allegedly imported furni- regime with their lives. A particularly ture without paying millions of dollars harrowing case was that of Sergei in customs duties. One of the directors Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer for of the chain was Yevgeny Zaostrovtsev, London-based hedge fund Hermit- a former general in the Russian foreign age Capital, who died in the Matross- intelligence service. His son, Yuri, was kaya Tishina prison on November 16, a first deputy director of the FSB in 2009, after being denied urgent medi- charge of economic crimes. Shcheko- cal care for pancreatitis. chikhin became ill and died after his skin erupted in a series of blisters A regime which does not want and began to peel off. An autopsy con- cluded that Shchekochikhin died of to share power and relies on an extremely rare allergic reaction to falsification and the use of medication. No traces of medication, force faces a population that is however, were found in his system. Shchekochikhin’s colleagues at disillusioned with what looks like Novaya Gazeta are convinced that he a permanent leadership and a was poisoned. His case is from time to president for life and a terrorist time ritually reopened, but largely for threat within the country that has political reasons—as a way of settling scores within the force ministries. become more lethal by the day. Others who dared to expose the crimes of high-ranking officials In 2007, Mr. Magnitsky uncov- met similar fates. On July 15, 2009, ered a $230 million tax fraud by Natalya Estemirova—at the time vir- high-ranking officials of the Rus- tually the sole source of information sian interior ministry. He was then on torture, abductions and murders arrested on charges of tax avoidance carried out in Chechnya by the secu- by the same persons whose theft he rity forces of Ramzan Kadyrov—was had uncovered. While in prison, he abducted and murdered in Grozny. was held in squalid conditions in an Anna Politkovskaya, Russia’s best- attempt to pressure him to retract known investigative journalist, was his testimony. He developed gall- murdered in October 2004. In all, stones and pancreatitis, and when since 2000 there have been at least 16 he continued to refuse to renounce journalists murdered in Russia. Not his testimony was denied urgently- a single one of their killers has been needed medical care. In the end, he arrested, and in the majority of cases was left without treatment to die in the mastermind of the murder has an isolation ward. been neither identified nor sought.

10 The Journal of International Security Affairs State of Fear

Caucasus blowback The elected president of Chech- The arrest of Mr. Nemtsov and nya, Aslan Maskhadov, ruled during the verdict against Mr. Khodorkovsky the period between the two wars. An were followed by an event that, for opponent of terrorism, he proclaimed Russians, was far more frightening: a unilateral cease-fire in March 2005 the terrorist attack on Moscow’s in an effort to induce Moscow to Domodedovo Airport. Domodedovo agree to talks. The Russians, how- is Russia’s principal airport and the ever, refused and, just weeks later, attack, coming only nine months after Maskhadov was killed. the suicide bombing of the Moscow Mr. Maskhadov was succeeded metro, reminded Russians of their by Doku Umarov, one of his top com- physical vulnerability. It also raised manders. Like Maskhadov, Umarov fears that ordinary Russian citizens said that he opposed terrorism and will now be caught in the middle as condemned the Beslan school hos- the Kremlin employs indiscriminate tage taking in September 2004. In force in the North Caucasus—thereby the meantime, however, Moscow guaranteeing that terror escalates installed Ramzan Kadyrov as presi- and the insurgency spreads. dent of Chechnya, and he consoli- Islamic fanaticism is a worldwide dated his grip on power with the help threat, but it is not the same every- of a reign of terror. where. In the North Caucasus, the By 2007, the insurgency in confrontation with Russia began as Chechnya had been largely sup- a separatist struggle on the part of pressed. At that time, Mr. Umarov, the republic of Chechnya. It was only under pressure from Islamic radicals after many years of war and Russia’s who were growing in strength, aban- mass killing of civilians that the con- doned the drive for Chechen indepen- ditions were created for the Islamist dence and called for an Islamic state threat to emerge in its present form in the North Caucasus. Russia reacted in the North Caucasus. (In this by installing corrupt local leaders regard, it is important to bear in mind (like Murat Zyazikov in Ingushetia that although there have been terror- and Mukhi Aliev in Dagestan) whose ist incidents in the Muslim parts of murderous tactics only served to fuel Russia that did not experience war, the insurgency. such as Tatarstan and Bashkorto- stan, the threat is far less serious.) In 2000, Russia was 82nd in the The first invasion of Chechnya took place in 1994. Then-President global ratings of Transparency Boris Yeltsin refused to negotiate International. By 2009, it had with Chechen separatists, although fallen to 146th place on a level their maximum demands at the time with Ecuador, Cameroon, and amounted to being granted a form of autonomy. The second invasion came Sierra Leone. in 1999 after apartment buildings were blown up in Russia. The crime Ostensibly in response to Rus- was blamed on the Chechens, but sian atrocities, Mr. Umarov turned to convincing circumstantial evidence terror. In a video address, he warned suggests the buildings were bombed that “blood will not only flow in our by the Russian FSB as part of an cities and villages” but also in the operation to bring Putin to power.7 streets of Russia.8 He took credit for

The Journal of International Security Affairs 11 David Satter

the bombing of the “Nevsky Express” At the same time, economic (Moscow to St. Petersburg express growth has been accompanied by train) in November 2009, in which 27 gross differences in wealth. The were killed, and for the March 2010 income of the top 10 percent of the attack by two female suicide bombers population in Russia is 16.9 times on Moscow metro stations that killed higher than that of the lowest 10 per- 38. He said that the attacks on the cent.11 This is a result not in modern Moscow metro were revenge for the countries, only in those of the Third killing by security forces of 18 villag- World. Russia, meanwhile, boasts 62 ers near the Chechen-Ingush border. billionaires, including a collection of There were reports that all of them Putin’s personal friends who, as Boris were innocent civilians. Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov outline in their pamphlet, Putin: The Results Crises to come of Ten Years, were “nobodies” before As thoughtful Russians look his ascent to power.12 ahead, they are experiencing a real The global economic crisis was sense of foreboding. A regime which extremely damaging for Russia, does not want to share power and causing the national product to relies on falsification and the use of plummet by 7.8 percent. By way force faces a population that is disillu- of comparison, this was a greater sioned with what looks like a perma- decline than Russia experienced nent leadership and a president for during the 1998 default and far life and a terrorist threat within the exceeded the fall in income of the country that has become more lethal leading Western countries. Other by the day. former Soviet republics, meanwhile, experienced economic growth. The Russian leaders have described effect on the psychology of Russians was significant because the years of their system as “managed relative prosperity under Putin fol- democracy,” or “sovereign lowed decades of deprivation under democracy,” but it is really the first the communists and then Yelt- façade of democracy behind sin. The evaporation of economic gains for a people that long awaited which is a singular determination them is a source of instability and by a kleptocratic oligarchy to could have explosive consequences. preserve its hold on power. Russia’s social and economic problems may also be greatly exac- The extremely high level of cor- erbated by the spillover effects of ruption in Russia is destroying the the growing civil war in the North country’s future. In 2000, Russia Caucasus. In 2000, Putin promised was 82nd in the global ratings of to “destroy the terrorists in their Transparency International. By outhouses.” After the attacks on the 2009, it had fallen to 146th place on Moscow metro, he said that he would a level with Ecuador, Cameroon, and reach the terrorists “in their sewers.” Sierra Leone.9 Today, the corruption Despite these and other blood- market in Russia is valued by the curdling threats, the danger from Indem think tank at more than $300 terrorism in Russia has only grown, billion annually, or about a quarter of from 130 terrorist acts in 2000 to the national product.10 more than 750 today.

12 The Journal of International Security Affairs State of Fear

At the same time, the regime on the basis of a normal numerical distri- shows no sign of being ready to sur- bution. Shpilkin also calculated that only 56 per cent of Russians had voted, instead render power. There has been no of the 69.7 percent that was claimed by the formal announcement of whether Mr. Central Election Commission (CEC). See Medvedev will seek the presidency Tony Halpin, “Dmitri Medvedev Votes Were for another term or whether Mr. Putin Rigged, Says Computer Boffin,” Times of London, April 18, 2008. will run for that office. However, it 6. See David Satter, “Khodorkovsky’s Fate,” is taken for granted that one or the National Review Online, December 30, other of that diarchy will run for and 2010, http://www.nationalreview.com/ capture the presidency with or with- corner/256106/khodorkovsky-s-fate-david- satter. out the support of the population. 7. See David Satter, Darkness at Dawn: The Russian leaders have described Rise of the Russian Criminal State (New their system as “managed democ- Haven and London: Yale University Press, racy,” or “sovereign democracy,” but 2003). 8. Tim Lister, “Moscow Attack Renews Spot- it is really the façade of democracy light on ‘Emir of the Caucasus,’” CNN, behind which is a singular determi- January 26, 2011, http://articles.cnn. nation by a kleptocratic oligarchy to com/2011-01-26/world/russia.umarov_1_ preserve its hold on power. No one chechnya-russian-special-forces-doku-uma- rov?_s=PM:WORLD. can be sure what will be required for 9. Christopher Hope, “Transparency Inter- the present regime to maintain itself, national’s 2009 Corruption Index: the but there is every reason to fear that Full Ranking of 180 Countries,” Telegraph the bleak situation of human rights in (London), November 17, 2009, http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/ Russia will get even worse, threaten- mps-expenses/6589735/Transparency- ing not only the freedoms of Russians Internationals-2009-corruption-index-the- but world stability as well. full-ranking-of-180-countries.html. 10. Lara Marlowe, “Leaked US Cables Claim Corruption Rampant in Russia,” Irish Times, December 3, 2010, http:// www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ world/2010/1203/1224284681166.html. 11. Vladimir Milov and Boris Nemtsov, “Putin: What Ten Years of Putin Have Brought,” 1. polit.ru, June 15, 2008. n.d., 18, http://www.putin-itogi.ru/putin- 2. “Chechnya Votes 99.4pc for Putin,” Reuters, what-10-years-of-putin-have-brought/. January 1, 2009, http://www.stuff.co.nz/ 12. Ibid., 3-4. world/160873. 3. Sophia Kishkovsky, “Putin’s Party Wins in Regional Elections Across Russia,” New York Times, October 12, 2009, http:// www.nytimes.com/2009/10/13/world/ europe/13russia.html. 4. Sergei Kovalyev, “Otkr’itoe Pis’mo,” Feb- ruary 26, 2008, http://www.kasparov.ru/ material.php?id=47C3D48OC3926. 5. Sergei Shpilkin, a physicist and computer programmer, said that 14.8 million of the 52.5 million votes cast for Medvedev could not be explained to be anything other than the result of falsification. He said that Med- vedev’s support followed the normal pat- tern until it reached 60 percent and then showed a series of sharp spikes. The map of districts where this occurred matched that of districts where results for Medvedev ended in zero or five. The total number of such districts could not have been explained

The Journal of International Security Affairs 13 THE SPIRIT OF INNOVATION.

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® Copyright © 2011 Elbit Systems of America, LLC. All rights reserved. The Spirit of Innovation Russia’s Future Imperfect

Oleg Kalugin

hither Russia? It isn’t back to the USSR, that much is clear. Nei- ther, however, is Russia headed toward genuine democracy. The Wspirit of the millions of its citizens tortured or killed for the sake of Paradise on Earth is still very much alive, and it holds Russia in its thrall.

Some political figures prefer to ignore it. For them, the collapse of the Soviet regime was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th Century.” Indeed, when Joseph Stalin, the ruthless Soviet dictator, passed away, mil- lions of people around the world cried. Their shock was only amplified three years later, when Stalin’s successor as General Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, laid bare the criminal nature of his country’s system. That was the beginning of the end of the grand illusion that one can build universal happiness on the corpses of millions. The dramatic events that followed—popular uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia—left no illusions about the nature of socialism, Soviet style. Under Leonid Brezhnev, shortages of food and basic commodities called into question the very idea of Russia’s special role in the world commu- nity. The stagnation of Brezhnev was followed by Mikhail Gorbachev’s quest for socialism with a “human face.” The Gorbachev era marked a sort of “spring” in the political and economic life of the country—albeit one that did not last long. In August of 1991, the

Oleg Kalugin is currently a professor at The Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies in Alexandria, Virginia. He is a retired Major General in the 1st Chief Directorate of the KGB. He played a major role in the John Walker spy ring as Deputy Chief of the KGB station at the Soviet Embassy in Washing- ton, DC. He was an elected member of the Soviet parliament during General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s administration. Oleg Kalugin

old guard—the Communist Party President Vladimir Putin promised bureaucracy, the military establish- to restore order, security and stabil- ment and, of course, the KGB, the ity to Russia. In 2008, the conflict mainstay of the system ever since in Chechnya was officially declared it appeared on Russian territory— to be over. Ramzan Kadyrov, the tried to stop the progress of Soviet Kremlin-designated dictator in that disintegration. They failed, but the war-torn republic, was rewarded for USSR would never be the same. That his loyalty with billions of rubles in became dramatically clear when economic aid and the title of “Hero of Boris Yeltsin declared that the Rus- Russia” was bestowed on him. But the sian Federation had become an inde- separatist movement there has not pendent entity. Ever since, Russia has been quashed. Sporadic outbursts of gone its own way, with problems— violence and assassinations continue. old and new—mounting with every Moreover, the conflict increasingly passing year. has spilled over into the neighboring territories of Dagestan and Ingush- etia. There have even been reports of Before its collapse, the Soviet growing separatist sentiment in the system was essentially built on Muslim communities in Tatarstan three pillars: the Communist and Bashkortostan, hundreds of miles east of Moscow. Party, the KGB, and the military- A myriad of other problems industrial complex. Today’s Russia persist. With the Russian Far East is ruled by a new triumvirate: the under-populated and traditionally neglected, the prospects of growing new generation of the KGB, the Chinese influence have increased Russian Orthodox Church, and dramatically. So, too, have frictions in big business. the “post-Soviet space.” Until the col- lapse of the USSR, Russians had no Realities of the special problems with Georgia, Arme- nia and Azerbaijan. In fact, some indi- new Russia viduals from these Soviet republics Before its collapse, the Soviet occupied top positions in the Kremlin system was essentially built on ruling circles; Joseph Stalin, Lavrenti three pillars: the Communist Party, Beria, Anastas Mikoyan and Geidar the KGB, and the military-industrial Aliyev left an indelible imprint on the complex. Today’s Russia is ruled by history of the USSR. The situation a new triumvirate: the new genera- in that region changed dramatically tion of the KGB, the Russian Ortho- when Russia and Georgia clashed dox Church, and big business. In militarily over South Ossetia and this equation, however, the KGB Abkhazia, and the end of that conflict is the senior partner; the church, is not yet in sight. including the current patriarchate Russia likewise remains unwill- of Moscow (like all previous ones), ing to talk to Japan about the long- is controlled by the KGB, while Rus- running territorial dispute with Japan sian big business is penetrated and over several islands in the Pacific manipulated by it. Ocean. That impasse has kept Russia But this control has not brought and Japan from signing a formal safety. In the year 2000, then- peace treaty ending their World

16 The Journal of International Security Affairs Russia’s Future Imperfect

War II hostilities. In his recent state- The growing xenophobia, numerous ment, the Japanese prime minister problems with migrant workers, and demanded a fair return of the islands general economic slowdown have and called the recent visit there by created tensions across the country. President Medvedev “an unforgiv- able outrage.” Since Medvedev and his team are often pictured as “pro- Ever since the KGB junta took Western liberals,” they are eagerly over the country, reforms looking for opportunities to present have stalled and repression has a hard line. In the Kurils, they have found one. deepened. In turn, the lack of On the positive side of the ledger, transparency, accountability, and high energy prices have helped a selective application of justice lot, but paradoxically they have also now visible in Russia has made it delayed the modernization of the country both economically and politi- a less-than-attractive partner for cally. Ever since the KGB junta (which foreign nations. makes up as much as 70 percent of the top Kremlin administration, Forks in the road according to well-informed sources) But twenty years of national took over the country, reforms have degradation, wryly termed “liberal stalled and repression has deepened. empire” by some and pessimisti- In turn, the lack of transparency, cally dubbed “mafia state” by others, accountability, and selective applica- may be coming to an end in the next tion of justice now visible in Russia decade, thanks to the “moderniza- has made it a less-than-attractive tion” program announced by Presi- partner for foreign nations. dent Medvedev. This latest political This does not mean that Russia slogan is championed, in word and in is without its allies, however. Mexico, deed, by both Medvedev and Prime Brazil and the United Arab Emirates Minister Putin. “The Russian transi- all trust Russia as a business part- tion is underway,” blares the Russian ner. Russian business inspires trust media. “The tandem is determined around the world: 38 percent on aver- to transform Russia into the greatest age. In the United States, UK, and power on Earth.” Sweden, confidence toward Russia is Medvedev stresses the need much lower: 12-15 percent. to “optimize” the Russian political Even Russia’s relations with the system. This has included the reelec- United States, China, and Europe tion of the government and bureau- have improved of late. Medvedev’s cracy, restructuring of the armed meetings with world leaders have forces, substantial cuts in law enforce- helped create a better understand- ment agencies, and keeping censor- ing of mutual problems. (Russian ship within limits. Under President commercial deals with Iran, which Medvedev, the Russian security and are potentially uncomfortable for intelligence services have been redi- the United States, have been han- rected. No more world revolutions, dled discreetly.) territorial expansion, or subversion. On the whole, Russian society is The post-Soviet space has become fragmented, with the elites contemp- their main concern: to keep Ukraine tuous of the masses and vice versa.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 17 Oleg Kalugin out of the Western orbit, to prevent Georgia from joining NATO, and to facilitate Russian engagements abroad, particularly in economic and trade areas, to work with Russian émigré communities through “friend- ship clubs” or the Russian orthodox Church priests. In short, to promote the image of “New Russia” and obtain information helpful to modernization. On the surface, this activism looks promising. Yet many view the “tandem” as little more than fiction. After all, according to recently pub- lished reports, people loyal to Putin occupy 73 of the 75 key positions in the Russian state. According to these estimates, Putin inevitably will again run for president in 2012. And when he does, his choice as the prime minister will not be Medvedev but Sergei Sobya- nin, his old friend and the newly- appointed mayor of Moscow. But can Medvedev be expected to leave the scene quietly? Russia’s current president is popular, and highly valued by the Russian Ortho- dox Church. He has close personal ties with the patriarch of Russia, and has been of great political benefit to the Church. Medvedev, then, can count on powerful allies if he chooses to stay and fight. Whatever the outcome of the forthcoming elections, Russia is most unlikely to reverse the process of change, though no one knows where this change will lead. But one thing is certain: Western ambivalence will not help the prospects of democracy in Russia.

18 The Journal of International Security Affairs No Reset in the Post-Soviet Space

Svante E. Cornell

n August 2008, Russian imperialism was on brazen dis- play to the world. As Russian tanks rolled into neigh- Iboring Georgia, the Kremlin manifested the extent of its ambitions to reassert dominion over its neighborhood.

Subsequent research has left no doubt that Russia had planned its inva- sion long in advance, and that any political miscalculations made by the Geor- gian leadership were merely a pretext for the resulting conflict, rather than its cause.1 Indeed, soon after the end of hostilities, Russia not only recognized the secessionist Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as indepen- dent states, although both were controlled to a large degree by Russian spe- cial services. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev also announced an overtly imperialist doctrine, declaring that “Russia, like other countries in the world, has regions where it has privileged interests,” and that these include Russia’s “border region, but not only.”2 Shortly thereafter, Medvedev pushed forward with his plan launched earlier that year for a new European security architec- ture—one that would weaken NATO’s position as the cornerstone of European security. Russia was clearly on the move. The Russian invasion of Georgia was understood in its immediate aftermath as a watershed event. By directly and unilaterally attacking another sovereign state, Russia had broken the most basic principles of the post-Cold War order in Europe. The implications of the attack for European security moved to the very top of the

Svante E. Cornell is research director of the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, a joint center affiliated with Johns Hopkins Uni- versity’s School of Advanced International Studies and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy, where he serves as co-director. Svante E. Cornell

international agenda. Yet very soon, Does this mean that Moscow’s international events relegated the issue goals have changed, and that Russia to the backburner; only weeks later, no longer views the world in zero- in late September, the U.S. financial sum terms? Has Russia abandoned system stood on the verge of collapse, its ambition to establish a sphere of leading to the global financial crisis that influence in the former Soviet Union, still plagues the Euro-Atlantic area. As including in areas that matter signifi- world leaders struggled to save the cantly to U.S. national security inter- world economy, the crisis in Georgia ests? A closer analysis of Russian appeared less important. policies suggests that the answer is Moreover, a consensus of sorts not that simple. also emerged abroad that the crisis had changed Russia itself. Indeed, With Georgia, war by Medvedev’s proposals and the war other means in Georgia all occurred at a time Although the urgency of 2008 when Russia, buoyed by record oil has abated, the ongoing situation con- prices, was flush with money and cerning Georgia and its secessionist self-confidence. But even before the regions—Abkhazia and South Osse- financial crisis hit, Russia saw a mas- tia—remains the main area of discord sive outflow of capital as a result of the 3 between Russia and the West. In fact, war. The Kremlin initially appeared little has changed in Moscow’s poli- to believe its large cash reserves cies toward Georgia. Indeed, the war would insulate it from the global eco- of August 2008 should not be seen nomic downturn. Yet it soon emerged as an isolated event, but as the most that Russia was among the econo- violent and acute phase of a Russian- mies worst hit by the crisis, forced Georgian conflict that dates back to to use close to $200 billion, a third of the late Soviet period. its currency reserves, to prop up its This was hardly the first time economy. Russia’s GDP likewise con- Russia had used force against Geor- tracted by nine percent in 2009. gia; long before the 2008 war, Georgia Ever since, Russian policies stood out as the post-Soviet country toward the West have appeared to where Russia had most aggressively take on a new and more concilia- asserted itself. In the early 1990s, its tory tone. Russia moved to resolve military had taken an active role in the a decades-old dispute with Norway secessionist wars. In the mid-1990s, on maritime boundaries, to patch up considerable evidence suggests ele- its long-standing differences with ments in Moscow were involved in an Poland, and in 2010 worked with attempt to assassinate then-Georgian NATO toward a compromise on the President Eduard Shevardnadze.4 issue of missile defense. In 2011, And at several occasions before cur- Russia did not prevent the West’s mil- rent President Mikheil Saakashvili’s itary intervention in Libya. Likewise, rise to power, Moscow bombed Geor- Moscow has appeared to reciprocate gian territory—making it the only the Obama administration’s “reset” country where Russia had used out- diplomacy, cooperating with the U.S. right military power.5 This historical on Iran sanctions and logistics to context is important, because it indi- Afghanistan. Simply put, Russia— cates that—while the war between a problem on the West’s agenda in Russia and Georgia may be over—the 2008—no longer seems to be one.

20 The Journal of International Security Affairs No Reset in the Post-Soviet Space conflict between Moscow and Tbilisi continues at other levels. Russian policies in the “post- Nor has the threat of a new Rus- Soviet space” continue to be in sian invasion abated. In the early open conflict with fundamental summer of 2009, a considerable American interests in the number of analysts deemed a renewed Russian military attack on Georgia— region, whether it be in terms of one designed to finish the job of oust- governance, security, or energy. ing the Saakashvili regime—to be likely.6 While it is nearly impossible Diplomatically, Moscow has to know if such a war was indeed engaged in two key efforts toward being planned, the diplomatic and Georgia. First, while building up its military preparations were certainly own military capabilities on Georgian observable.7 If a war was indeed territory, it has successfully forced planned, the warnings delivered by the equivalent of an international the Obama administration during the arms embargo on the country. The President’s July 2009 visit to Moscow method has been, on the one hand, appear to have averted it.8 to intimidate arms suppliers such as In any case, Russia continues to Israel, with the threat of arming Syria violate the 2008 cease-fire agreement if Jerusalem stopped selling weapons negotiated by the European Union. It to Georgia; and on the other, to falsely continues to overtly demand regime accuse the U.S. and other Western change in Georgia, and its activities states of supplying large quantities to undermine the democratically- of weapons to Georgia, thus obtain- elected Georgian government have ing assurances that such deliveries not ceased. Russia likewise has rap- have not been made—and an implicit idly expanded its military presence in acceptance that they should not in the territories that it effectively occu- the future. As analyst Vladimir Socor pies. On the basis of agreements with has observed, “The claim about those the de facto governments in Sukhumi arms deliveries is intended for a U.S. and Tskhinvali, Moscow has built and NATO audience. The Russian permanent military bases in both government must know that this audi- territories.9 Moreover, these include ence knows that their claim is false. sophisticated hardware, some of The purpose of such statements is which appears directed at threaten- simply to draw, or reinforce, Mos- ing the Georgian capital. cow’s red lines regarding Western In late 2010 and early 2011, it was policies.”11 This effectively serves to reported that Russia had deployed sustain Georgia’s acute vulnerabil- Smerch (Tornado) multiple-launch ity, leaving Tbilisi defenseless to a rocket systems and Tochka-U (SS-21 renewed Russian invasion at some Scarab B) short-range tactical ballis- point in the future, and enabling tic missile systems in South Ossetia, Moscow to intimidate the present and less than 60 miles from Tbilisi.10 In future governments there. addition to the military buildup, Rus- Secondly, Moscow is seeking sia’s wholesale economic embargo on to distort the reality in the conflict Georgia is still in place, and Moscow zones. Before the 2008 war, Moscow continues to fund the most radical interfered increasingly directly in elements of the Georgian opposition. the affairs of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for example through the

The Journal of International Security Affairs 21 Svante E. Cornell

illegal distribution of Russian pass- reference by Anton Denikin, com- ports there, economic investments, mander of the anti-Bolshevik White and through the direct seconding of armies, to “Big Russia and Little serving Russian state employees to Russia,” the latter being Ukraine, the unrecognized governments of emphasizing that “no one should the two entities. A the same time, it be allowed to interfere in relations sought to portray itself as an honest between us; they have always been broker, mediator and peacekeeper in the business of Russia itself.”15 the conflict—and obtained Western It should therefore come as no confirmation of such status, as well surprise that the Russian govern- as regular praise in UN resolutions. ment has paid extensive attention in Taking a page out of that play- the past two years to Ukraine. Unlike book, Moscow now argues that it is in Georgia, Moscow did not need to not a party to the conflict—that the topple the administration of Orange conflicts are between Georgia on Revolution leader Viktor Yush- the one hand and the “independent chenko by force; the internal rivalries states” of South Ossetia and Abkha- between Yushchenko and his erst- zia on the other.12 This ploy became while ally, Yulia Timoshenko, and most obvious in December 2010, after their continuous mismanagement of Georgian President Mikheil Saakash- Ukraine’s economy allowed Moscow vili made a unilateral pledge in the simply to wait them out. When the European Parliament not to use force presidential election of February 7, to recover the secessionist territories. 2010, returned to power Viktor Yanu- But Moscow refused to follow suit and kovich, the Moscow-supported loser make a pledge not to use force against of the 2005 election that precipitated Georgia, arguing again that it is not a the Orange Revolution, the Russian party to the conflict.13 leadership lost no time. Since then, This diplomatic initiative has Ukraine has moved closer domes- not met with success, and indeed, tically to the Russian authoritar- Georgia has remained the main ian model; in foreign policy, it has thorn in Russia’s relationship with returned largely to the Russian camp; the West and in its international and the Yanukovich regime has also image. Contrary to the case before begun to suppress the evolution of August 2008, the world now views Ukraine’s distinct national identity. Russia as a party to the conflict. Already in mid-April—just over two months after the election—Presi- Coveting Kyiv dents Medvedev and Yanukovich The Russian leadership has con- signed an agreement to prolong Rus- tinuously made it clear that it does sia’s basing rights at the Sevastopol not consider Ukraine an independent naval base on the Black Sea for a state. Addressing President Bush at quarter-century beyond its slated the 2008 NATO summit in Bucha- expiration in 2017, with a possibility rest, Vladimir Putin said as much: of another five-year extension. Russia “Do you understand, George, that in return agreed to provide a 30 per- Ukraine is not even a state?” adding cent discount on Russian gas supplies that most of Ukraine’s territory was to Ukraine over a certain price. This “given to it” by Russia, and that deal was pushed through the Ukrai- Ukraine would break apart if it joined nian parliament without debate, in NATO.14 A year later, Putin cited the spite of its being in clear violation of

22 The Journal of International Security Affairs No Reset in the Post-Soviet Space the Ukrainian constitution (which Finally, the Yanukovich govern- prohibits foreign military bases ment has reversed its predecessor’s beyond 2017). Furthermore, Russia attempts to build a Ukrainian national in early 2011 announced a large-scale identity separate from the Russian modernization program to develop one, especially in the controversial the Sevastopol base and add signifi- debates over Ukrainian history. The cant military capabilities there.16 most acrimonious issue is the Holodo- The growing Russian influence mor, the Soviet-imposed famine of on Ukrainian foreign and secu- 1932-33 that led to the death of up to rity policy has been increasingly four million Ukrainians from starva- visible throughout 2010, includ- tion. Ukrainian nationalists argue ing through Moscow’s influence that the Holodomor constituted an on Ukraine’s Security Service, the act of genocide by Stalin against the SBU, and Yanukovich’s personal Ukrainian people. Making the issue entourage—manifested through per- central to the historical memory of sonnel policies, as well as the grow- the nation, they also reject Russia’s ing alignment of Ukrainian positions official interpretation (which contra- with Moscow’s.17 Thus, as Chatham dicts the thrust of independent histo- House’s James Sherr puts it, “Med- rians) that this tragedy did not target vedev and Prime Minister Vladimir the Ukrainian people specifically, but Putin, without international oppro- affected Russians and others alike. brium or loss of life, have secured Yanukovich, hailing from the greater geopolitical dividends than Russian-speaking eastern areas were realized as a result of victory of Ukraine that retain strong ele- in the Georgian war.”18 ments of Soviet identity, has vehe- In parallel, Moscow has formed mently rejected the definition of the the model for, and eagerly supported, Holodomor as genocide, thereby also the gradual dismantling of democ- effectively abandoning a distinctly racy in Ukraine, which has proceeded Ukrainian historical narrative—and rapidly in Yanukovich’s first year in instead adopting the Russian one.21 office. Shortly after coming to power, This has been coupled with a further Yanukovich’s government began to dismantling of the nation-building shrink the relatively free media cli- policies of the Yushchenko adminis- mate in Ukraine. Two critical televi- tration, especially those emphasizing sion stations saw their frequencies the revival of the Ukrainian lan- revoked, beatings and harassment guage, amounting to what Alexander of journalists have returned, and the Motyl of Rutgers University terms an country’s journalists in near unison “assault on Ukrainian identity.”22 complain of direct pressure from the ruling authorities not to criticize the Controlled instability in government.19 State security pres- the South Caucasus sure on university campuses has also During 2009 and 2010, the unre- been ramped up, while the govern- solved conflict between Armenia and ment has selectively targeted high- Azerbaijan has been slowly escalat- level figures of the former regime ing, with the war of words between with criminal proceedings over cor- the two countries mounting and ruption allegations, and engaged in skirmishes along the cease-fire line administrative and legal tactics to increasing.23 Unfortunately, this evo- undermine its opposition.20

The Journal of International Security Affairs 23 Svante E. Cornell lution is partly a result of Western received stronger commitments from neglect of the conflict, and of the now Moscow for defense against a pos- collapsed U.S.-sponsored Turkish- sible Azerbaijani attack to reclaim Armenian reconciliation process. its lost territories. To make good Moscow’s policies have been two- on these commitments, Russia also fold: asserting its role as the primary transferred large amounts of arma- mediator between the parties, and ments to Armenia.25 stepping up its provision of military But Moscow is playing both sides hardware to both of them. of the fence. While its main focus Soon after the war in Georgia, has continued to be Armenia, Russia Russian President Dmitry Medvedev appears to have sold S-300 advanced took a leading role in the negotiations anti-aircraft missile systems to Azer- between Armenia and Azerbaijan. baijan as well, and to have provided This served two purposes: first, to Baku with considerable numbers of improve Russia’s tarnished interna- tanks and other armaments.26 tional reputation; and second, to rein- Thus, Moscow’s policy in the force Russia’s role as the predominant Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute seems force in the South Caucasus. While to be to seek a negotiated solution both the Azerbaijani and Armenian on its own terms, one that would presidents played along, not least in certainly involve Russian troops on a high-profile summit in Moscow in Azerbaijani territory in some form of November 2008, the negotiations peacekeeping function. Barring that, went nowhere because of the vola- it strives to sustain a controlled level tile post-war regional atmosphere. In of instability in the South Caucasus, spite of this fact, Medvedev in Octo- one that ensures Armenia’s contin- ber 2010 continued to voice optimism ued dependence on Moscow while that a deal would be reached by that attaching costs to Azerbaijan’s inde- December. Needless to say, there was pendent policies. no progress in that direction.24 Armenia has been Moscow’s The morass that main outpost in the Caucasus for the is Moldova entire post-Soviet period. Following Moldova, with its unresolved the successful extension of Russia’s conflict in Transdniester, has long basing rights at Sevastopol, Moscow been Europe’s poorest, and perhaps applied the same blueprint in Arme- most forgotten, country. Ever since a nia. August 2010 saw the amend- short conflict in 1992, Russian mili- ment of the 1995 Russian-Armenian tary forces have been deployed in bilateral defense treaty, extending the eastern Transdniester region, the lease of Russia’s military base where a secessionist pro-Russian, at Gyumri until 2044. At the same neo-communist regime remains in time, the wording of the agreement control. Moldova emerges in the itself was altered; whereas the origi- headlines mainly because Russia’s nal treaty included a commitment by military presence there—against Russia to come to Armenia’s defense the will of the Moldovan government if the country was attacked “by a state and in contravention of its consti- outside the CIS”(a reference at the tution—has been one of the chief time mainly referring to Turkey), the stumbling blocks for the entry into amended treaty language included force of the Treaty on Conventional no such clause. Instead, Yerevan Forces in Europe.

24 The Journal of International Security Affairs No Reset in the Post-Soviet Space

This issue gained salience fol- the Smirnov regime in Transdniester, lowing the German government’s while demanding a resolution and a initiative in 2010 to explore closer “reliably guaranteed” special status security cooperation between Europe for Transdniester as well as Moldo- and Russia. At a summit in Meseberg, va’s “constitutional neutrality” before near Berlin, in June 2010, German any military withdrawal. Chancellor Angela Merkel and Rus- The reason for Moscow’s lack of sian President Medvedev signed a movement is likely that Berlin made it memorandum to “explore the estab- clear that any solution to the conflict lishment of an EU-Russia Political would involve the withdrawal of Rus- and Security Committee,” which sian military forces from Moldova, would be a considerable step toward and an autonomy solution for Trans- changing the architecture of Euro- dniester within Moldovan sover- pean security.27 Indeed, the move had eignty. taken place without consultations with Washington, and the intended Leveraging Kyrgyzstan body would surpass the institutional While much is made of the forms of coordination between the fact that Moscow has cooperated EU and NATO, or between the EU with Washington on logistics to and the United States. Afghanistan, it is often forgotten However, there was a small that Moscow simultaneously worked catch: Merkel explicitly raised reso- hard to undermine the U.S. base at lution of the conflict in Transdniester Manas in Kyrgyzstan. as a test case of EU-Russia security It was on February 3, 2010, in cooperation, and the memorandum Moscow, that then-Kyrgyz President promised joint efforts in that direc- Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced his tion.28 Berlin kept up the pressure: decision to close the U.S. air base at Soon after the Meseberg summit, Manas. Bakiyev had just come out Guido Westerwelle became the first of a meeting with Russian President German Foreign Minister to visit Mol- Medvedev, in which he had been dova.29 Berlin then raised the issue promised an assistance package of with French and Polish leaders in the over $2 billion.30 While both leaders consultations known as the Weimar denied any connection between the triangle, and Merkel further coordi- two events, such a connection was nated with Romanian leaders during obvious for all to see—and Bakiyev a state visit in October 2010. Yet as of likely made the announcement at March 2011, Moscow had only recip- the time and place he did in order rocated verbally after several months to reinforce the point that it was not of silence; it has yet to indicate that it his decision. Indeed, four months is prepared to work toward a solution. later, the decision was reversed fol- In spite of the great benefits lowing intense U.S.-Kyrgyz negotia- and prestige a developed security tions and a hefty increase in the rent relationship with the EU would offer paid to Kyrgyzstan.31 This aroused Moscow, the initiative has yet to Moscow’s fury: Russia cut aid to bear fruit. Observers with first-hand Kyrgyzstan, suspended investment information about the negotiations projects, and abrogated the country’s suggest that Russian negotiators preferential customs status.32 Simul- have yielded nothing of substance. taneously, almost immediately after Indeed, Moscow continues to back Bishkek announced the renewed deal

The Journal of International Security Affairs 25 Svante E. Cornell with Washington, Moscow bullied incongruous with the picture of Rus- the Bakiyev regime into accepting sian actions presented here, it points Russia’s long-standing aim to deploy to Moscow’s long-term objective: not a military base in southern Kyrgyz- necessarily to force America out of stan, near the city of Osh—against the base, but to ensure that Wash- strong Uzbek opposition.33 ington negotiates with Moscow, not By late March 2010, the Rus- Bishkek, to maintain its presence in sian state-controlled media—the Central Asia—and thus to be forced prime source of information for most to reciprocate in areas of greater Kyrgyz—had launched a fierce cam- importance to the Kremlin. Indeed, paign of black propaganda against the Moscow’s attempts to replace the Bakiyev regime, accusing the presi- Kyrgyz government as the provider dent’s family of a variety of acts of cor- of fuel to the U.S. military are an ruption and crime.34 While Moscow’s example of this ambition.36 economic pressure, which Bakiyev passed on in the form of price hikes to Russian policies… the population, contributed to boost- and results ing anti-government sentiment in the The discussion above reinforces country, the Russian media attack the analysis of numerous scholars also served as a green light, indeed that Russia has interpreted the “reset” an encouragement, to the fractured policy as a one-way street.37 Indeed, Kyrgyz opposition to seek Bakiyev’s Russian policies continue to be in ouster. Only days later, a popular open conflict with fundamental Amer- upheaval unseated him. ican interests in the region, whether In June 2010, mounting inter- it be in terms of governance, secu- ethnic tensions between Uzbeks rity, or energy. In fact, these three and Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan categories are deeply intertwined; erupted into the region’s worst ethnic from Moscow’s zero-sum perspec- clashes in 20 years, with the Uzbeks tive, European influence in the field bearing the brunt of the violence. of governance, energy and security The leadership of Uzbekistan overtly in the region all contribute to denying accused Moscow of instigating the Russia’s domination over the region, violence, although evidence to that something that it in turn perceives as effect remains to be produced. But a threat to its own security. Moscow did take the opportunity to The driving force behind Rus- push for the deployment of Russian sia’s antagonistic policies is as much “peacekeepers” in the country— based on ideology as it is realpolitik. clearly a first step toward a permanent This aspect is central, but often over- military base. That move was stifled looked. In fact, it is no mere coinci- partly due to the skepticism among dence that Russian foreign policy the Russian military leadership of has become progressively more the logistics of such an operation, but antagonistic as its domestic trajec- mainly because of vocal opposition tory has become its increasingly not from the West but from Uzbeki- 35 authoritarian. The consolidation stan and China. in the Kremlin of an authoritarian As of early 2011, the Manas base regime asserting control over Rus- is still in place, in spite of a Russian- sia’s economic wealth has led Rus- inspired coup d’état in Kyrgyzstan. sian policies to increasingly oppose While this may at first sight seem

26 The Journal of International Security Affairs No Reset in the Post-Soviet Space

Western support for democratiza- energy prices, punishments are tion, either in Russia itself or in legion. They include economic sanc- its neighborhood. Russian leaders tions and embargos, manipulation of openly argue that Western-style the price and supply of energy, inter- democracy is unsuitable for Russia vention in domestic politics and unre- or other former Soviet states, and solved conflicts, subversive activities, that its own authoritarian system— military provocations, and ultimately, described under the euphemisms as in Georgia, the use of full-scale “sovereign democracy” and “vertical military force. of power”—is the most appropriate model for political development.38 The consolidation in the Thus, Moscow on the one hand Kremlin of an authoritarian sees the emergence of pro-Western and democratic governments in regime asserting control over its neighborhood as a danger to its Russia’s economic wealth has led regional influence. Indeed, democ- Russian policies to increasingly racy is incompatible with a “sphere of oppose Western support for influence”—which presupposes that a country’s leaders are accountable to democratization, either in Russia Moscow, and not to their own people. itself or in its neighborhood. On the other hand, Moscow also views with alarm the contagion of Moscow’s agenda has thus been democratic and reformist sentiment both unchanged and ambitious. But it across the post-Soviet space, because has not been successful. Ukraine rep- it fears that the trend could spread to resents the main area of success for Russia and endanger the ruling elite’s Russian policy—and the most impor- own position in power. tant one. The question, however, is Against this background, Rus- whether Moscow’s geopolitical gains sian efforts to undermine democ- in Ukraine are sustainable. Indeed, ratizing and pro-Western countries former President Yushchenko fol- in the region through subversion lowed a foreign policy that was often and manipulation of unresolved con- blamed for being out of synch with flicts, to bolster authoritarianism, the wishes of the majority of Ukraine and to continue to dominate energy in its zeal to join NATO and distance transport routes should all be seen itself from Russia. But that pales as interrelated, and closely linked in comparison to the divisiveness to the emphasis placed by Russia on of President Yanukovich’s policies, preventing the emergence of demo- which have also been coupled with a cratic and sovereign states willing to growing element of repression never integrate with the rest of Europe on present under his predecessor. its borders. In other areas, Moscow has Russia makes use of a range of been much less successful. The gov- mechanisms inherited from the Soviet ernment of Mikheil Saakashvili in Union to reward positive behavior or Georgia survives, having weathered punish undesirable actions on the serious internal storms while main- part of neighboring states. However, taining substantial public legitimacy it makes much more use of sticks and continuing its reform agenda, than carrots. While rewards include though perhaps at a slower pace than privileged export deals or subsidized before. Moscow’s war against Geor-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 27 Svante E. Cornell

gia caused enormous damage to that accept the establishment of Rapid country, but also made inconceivable Reaction Forces under the auspices the arrival to power of a pro-Russian of the Russia-led Collective Secu- politician of the Yanukovich mold. rity Treaty Organization.41 Ties with Indeed, if not before, 2008 was the Moscow reached the freezing point year when Russia lost Georgia. with Russia’s meddling in Kyrgyz- Similarly, Russia’s renewal of stan’s affairs in 2010 and the unrest its basing agreement with Arme- in southern Kyrgyzstan. Finally, nia, and attached arms supplies, led relations between Russia and Turk- to the abrupt end of any Russian- menistan have also deteriorated, Azerbaijani honeymoon, preventing following a May 2010 explosion on Moscow from capitalizing on Baku’s a gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan frustration with the West. While the to Russia, which appeared to be a Azerbaijani government is cautious result of Russia shutting valves to in its relations with Moscow and the pipeline. This followed efforts cooperates in areas of its own inter- by Turkmenistan’s president, Gur- ests—such as gas sales and arms banguly Berdimukhamedov, to procurement—nothing has changed further diversify Turkmenistan’s in Azerbaijan’s independent foreign gas export routes, and his refusal policy. Even in Armenia, Moscow’s to commit to building additional position is based on Armenia’s gas pipelines to Russia.42 Ber- dependency, a fact not lost on Arme- dimukhamedov blamed Russia for nia’s leaders. In Moldova, Russian the blast, and has redoubled efforts encroachments failed to measure to reduce the country’s dependence up to the gravitational pull of the on Russian transport routes. European Union. In November 2010, In sum, Moscow’s aggressive the fractured coalition government, tactics have largely failed to bear aptly named the “Alliance for Euro- fruit—but have contributed to deep- pean Integration,” won renewed ening the instability of the entire confidence in an election, and was post-Soviet sphere, and to complicat- reconstituted, dashing Moscow’s ing efforts at conflict resolution and hopes of returning the Communist development in that region. party to power.39 Meanwhile, Russia’s relationship America’s (lack of) with close ally Belarus has deterio- response rated in the past two years, given the What has been the U.S. response Lukashenko government’s grow- to these Russian policies? Simply put, ing resentment at Russian pres- it has been underwhelming. With a sure and growing disagreements policy focused almost exclusively on over the pricing of oil shipments the “reset” with Russia, Washing- for Belarus’ refineries. In a similar ton has avoided policies that would vein, Uzbekistan has increasingly annoy Moscow. On the positive side, distanced itself from Moscow fol- the Obama administration did realize lowing the short-lived warming of the danger of renewed war in Geor- relations following the closure of gia, and passed the right messages the U.S. base at Kharshi-Khanabad 40 to Moscow in the summer of 2009. in 2005. While courting Western Moreover, visiting Georgia in June powers again, Tashkent, joining 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clin- Minsk, in summer 2009 refused to

28 The Journal of International Security Affairs No Reset in the Post-Soviet Space ton directly referred to Russia’s troop neglect of both Azerbaijan and the presence in Georgia as “occupation.” conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. If But that is where the positive the war in Georgia showed anything, steps end. This declaratory policy it was that there are no “frozen con- on Georgia has not been followed flicts.” Having failed to prevent war in up by action to reverse the situation Georgia, avoiding escalation between on the ground, or to reduce Russian Armenia and Azerbaijan would have pressure on the country. Washing- seemed logical. Instead, Washington ton has seemed to agree to disagree decided to de-link the Armenian- with Moscow on Georgia, but not to Azerbaijan process from the Turkish- devise policies to help Georgia regain Armenian reconciliation process, its territorial integrity, attach costs to and to push the Karabakh conflict Russia for its occupation, or to provide even deeper into the “freezer.” The security for Georgia. In this context, message to Baku was that if it wanted perhaps the most disturbing policy international attention to the conflict, is U.S. policy concerning arms sales its only option was to escalate. to Georgia. While Russia is arming In short, the Obama administra- itself to the teeth in Abkhazia and tion has abdicated the bipartisan tra- South Ossetia, the United States has dition, launched by the Clinton White refused to sell Georgia even defen- House and dating back almost two sive weapons. decades, of viewing the South Cau- U.S. weapons sales to Georgia casus and Central Asia as regions in have surpassed $10 million since their own right, and as subjects of 2003; in 2009, they dropped to international affairs where the United zero.43 In effect, the State Depart- States has significant interests. ment simply refuses to either Instead, it has appeared to fold the approve or deny requests for per- component countries of the region mits for arms sales to Georgia, into other portfolios—and subjugate thereby effectively upholding Rus- them to its desire for a new tenor in sia’s preferred policy on Georgia— relations with Russia. The results so a de facto arms embargo.44 far suggest that another policy revi- Washington likewise failed to sion is sorely needed. react to Moscow’s assertive military moves, especially the extensions of the Russian bases in Armenia and Ukraine, in spite of their negative effect on regional security. Similarly, there was no American reaction to 1. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in the French government’s sale of Georgia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2009); Mistral warships to Russia—former See also Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War That National Security Advisor James Shook the World: Georgia: Russia and the Jones even stated that the issue was Future of the West (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2010). 45 not “of particular concern to us.” 2. Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Claims Its Washington’s lack of engagement on Sphere of Influence in the World,” New Moldova persisted, and in Kyrgyz- York Times, August 31, 2008, http:// stan it remained mum about Russia’s www.nytimes.com/2008/09/01/world/ europe/01russia.html. efforts at destabilization. 3. “Russia Sees Massive Capital Outflow Finally, Washington’s perhaps on War with Georgia,” Marketwatch. most unfortunate move was its com, August 22, 2008, http://www.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 29 Svante E. Cornell

marketwatch.com/story/russia-sees- content/Is_War_Off_The_Table_In_Geor- massive-capital-outflow-on-war-with-geor- gia/1776909.html. gia-2008822931500?dist=hplatest. 9. Philip P. Pan, “Putin Visits Breakaway 4. Then-Georgian security minister Igor Gior- Georgian Region, Unveils Plan for Military gadze, who had been appointed at Mos- Base,” Washington Post, August 13, 2009. cow’s urging, was the prime suspect in a 10. “Tbilisi Condemns Russia’s Smerch Rocket 1995 attempt on Shevardnadze’s life. He Systems in S. Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, was spirited away from Georgia on a Rus- December 7, 2010, http://www.civil.ge/ sian jet leaving the Russian Vaziani military eng/article.php?id=22932; “Reports: Russia base outside Tbilisi in September 1995, Deploys Tochka-U Rockets in S. Ossetia,” where he remains to this day in spite of an Civil Georgia, January 24, 2011, http://www. Interpol warrant against him. See Thornike civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23077. Gordadze, ”Georgian-Russian Relations in 11. Vladimir Socor, “Russia Calls for Arms the 1990s,” in Svante E. Cornell and S. Fred- Embargo on Georgia after War’s Second erick Starr, eds., The Guns of August 2008: Anniversary,” Jamestown Foundation Eur- Russia’s War in Georgia, p. 39; David Dar- asia Daily Monitor 7 no. 157, August 13, chiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and 2010. Military Reform,” in Bruno Coppieters and 12. Ibid; “We Don’t See Conflict Between Robert Legvold (eds.), Statehood and Secu- Russia and Georgia—Lavrov,” News.az, rity: Georgia after the Rose Revolution (Cam- December 3, 2010, http://news.az/articles/ bridge, Mass. MIT Press), pp. 129-130. georgia/27708; “Russia Warns of ‘Con- 5. Svante E. Cornell, Georgia after the Rose frontational’ UN Document on Refugees,” Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and Russia Today, August 26, 2009, http:// Implications for U.S. Policy (Carlisle, PA: rt.com/politics/russia-warns-confronta- U.S. Army War College, March 2007), tional-document/. http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/ 13. “Moscow Responds to Saakashvili’s Non- publications/2007/0703USAWC.pdf. Use of Force Pledge,” Civil Georgia, Novem- 6. Michael Mainville, “Russia, Georgia Trade ber 24, 2010, http://www.civil.ge/eng/ Barbs as War Anniversary Looms,” AFP, 4 article.php?id=22891. August 2009; Kim Zigfeld, “Russia Seek- 14. “Putin Hints at Splitting Up Ukraine,” ing Provocation in Georgia,” American Moscow Times, April 8, 2008. Thinker, 20 April 2009; Brian Whitmore, 15. James Marson, “Putin to the West: “Is a New Russia-Georgia War on the Hori- Hands Off Ukraine,” Time, May 25, 2009, zon,” RFE/RL, 26 May 2009, http://www. http://www.time.com/time/world/arti- rferl.org/content/Is_A_New_RussiaGeor- cle/0,8599,1900838,00.html. gia_War_On_The_Horizon/1740028.html; 16. Vladimir Socor, “Russian Military Power Gregory Feifer, “Friction Feeds Fear of Advancing in the Black Sea-South Caucasus New Russia-Georgia Conflict,” RFE/RL, 29 Region,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 7, no. June 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/ 157, 13 August 2010. Fears_Grow_Of_New_RussiaGeorgia_Con- 17. Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine’s Foreign and Secu- flict/1765258.html. rity Policy Controlled by Russia,” James- 7. Paul Goble, “Russian Experts Divided on town Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor 7 Probability of New War with Georgia,” no. 187, October 18, 2010; James Sherr, “The Window on Eurasia, 1 July 2009, http:// Mortgaging of Ukraine’s Independence,” windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2009/07/ Chatham House Briefing Paper, August window-on-eurasia-russian-experts.html; 2010. “Russia to Plot a Second War Against Geor- 18. Sherr, “The Mortgaging of Ukraine’s Inde- gia?” Panarmenian.net, June 29, 2009, pendence,” 3. http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/world/ 19. “Back to the Bad Old Days,” Economist.com, news/33516/; Gregory Feifer, “Friction September 24, 2010, http://www.economist. Feeds Fear of New Russia-Georgia Con- com/blogs/easternapproaches/2010/09/ flict,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June media_ukraine; Tomas Valasek, “Ukraine 29, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/ Turns Away from Democracy and the EU,” Fears_Grow_Of_New_RussiaGeorgia_Con- Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, flict/1765258.html; Yulia Latynina, “New October 2010, 3, http://www.cer.org.uk/ War With Georgia Could Lead to ‘Col- pdf/pb_ukraine_eu_valasek_oct10.pdf. lapse of Russia,’” Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal 20. Sherr, “The Mortgaging of Ukraine’s Inde- (Moscow), August 3, 2009. pendence,” 5. 8. Brian Whitmore, “Is a Russia-Georgia War 21. Alexander J. Motyl, “Deleting the Holodo- Off the Table?” Radio Free Europe/Radio mor: Ukraine Unmakes Itself,” World Liberty, July 14, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/ Affairs, September/October 2010, 25-34.

30 The Journal of International Security Affairs No Reset in the Post-Soviet Space

22. Ibid., 25. Daily Monitor 7, no. 117, June 17, 2010; Ste- 23. Nina Caspersen, “Mounting Tensions over phen Blank, “A Sino-Uzbek Axis in Central Nagorno-Karabakh,” Central Asia-Caucasus Asia?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst 12, no. Analyst 7, no. 13, July 7, 2010, http://www. 16, September 1, 2010, http://www.caciana- cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5363; Armenia lyst.org/?q=node/5395. and Azerbaijan: Preventing War, Interna- 36. See Blank, “A Sino-Uzbek Axis in Central tional Crisis Group Europe Briefing no. 60, Asia?” February 8, 2011. 37. Stephen Blank, “The Real Reset: Russia 24. “Medvedev Seeks Karabakh Deal by Decem- Refights the Cold War,” World Affairs, Sep- ber,” Moscow Times, October 28, 2010. tember/October 2010; Sergei Strokan and 25. Fariz Ismailzade, “Russian Arms to Arme- Dmitry Sidorov, “In the World: and Now the nia Could Change Azerbaijan’s Foreign Rest,” Kommersant Online (Moscow), July Policy Orientation,” Central Asia-Caucasus 27, 2009. Analyst 11, no. 2, January 28, 2009, http:// 38. Thomas Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash: cacianalyst.org/files/090128Analyst.pdf. Russian Resistance to Democratization in the 26. Shahin Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: Baku Former Soviet Union, Burlington, VT: Ash- Embarks on Military Spending Surge, Seek- gate, 69-104. ing Karabakh Peace,” eurasianet.org, Octo- 39. Vladimir Socor, “Moldova’s Alliance for ber 22, 2010, http://www.eurasianet.org/ European Integration: A Team of Rival Par- node/62223. ties,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily 27. Vladimir Socor, “Meseberg Process: Ger- Monitor 8, no. 5, January 7, 2011. many Testing EU-Russia Security Coop- 40. See John C.K. Daly, Kurt H. Meppen, eration Potential,” Jamestown Foundation Vladimir Socor, and S. Frederick Starr, Eurasia Daily Monitor 7, no. 191, October “Anatomy of a Crisis: U.S.-Uzbekistan Rela- 22, 2010; George Friedman, “Germany and tions, 2001-2005,” Central Asia-Caucasus Russia Moving Closer Together,” Stratfor, Institute & Silk Road Studies Program June 22, 2010. Silk Road Paper, February 2006, http:// 28. See, for example, Judy Dempsey, “Challeng- www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/ ing Russia to Fix a Frozen Feud,” New York publications/0602Uzbek.pdf. Times, October 28, 2010. 41. Tamerlan Vahabov, “Uzbekistan and Belarus 29. “The First Visit by a German Foreign Min- Reveal Serious Disagreement within the ister to Moldova,” Eastweek, June 30, 2010, CSTO,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst 11, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ no. 14, July 15, 2009, 6-8, http://cacianalyst. eastweek/2010-06-30/first-visit-a-german- org/files/090715Analyst.pdf. foreign-minister-to-moldova. 42. Robert N. Cutler, “Turkmenistan Confirms 30. David Trilling and Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyz- Export Shift Away from Russia,” Central stan: President Bakiyev Wants to Close US Asia-Caucasus Analyst 12, no. 16, September Military Base Outside Bishkek,” eurasianet. 1, 2010, 9, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/ org, February 3, 2009, http://www.eur- new/docs/publications/100901analyst.pdf. asianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/ 43. See Richard Lugar, Striking the Balance: eav020309b.shtml. U.S. Policy and Stability in Georgia, Report 31. “Kyrgyz-US Airbase Deal Made Law,” BBC, to the Committee on Foreign Relations of July 7, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ the U.S. Senate, December 22, 2009, 14, hi/8138530.stm. http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/ 32. David Trilling and Chinghiz Umetov, “Kyr- georgia/. gyzstan: Is Putin Punishing Bakiyev?” 44. Author’s interviews with Defense Depart- eurasianet.org, April 5, 2010, http://www. ment official, Washington, DC, May 2010; eurasianet.org/node/61025. Joshua Kucera, “Tbilisi Pressing Washing- 33. Simon Shuster, “Russia Reaches Deal to Open ton to OK Defense Purchases,” eurasianet. 2d Base in Kyrgyzstan,” Boston Globe, August org, September 15, 2010, http://www.eur- 2, 2009; Erkin Akhmadov, “Uzbekistan Con- asianet.org/node/61934. cerned over Russian Military Base in Fer- 45. Laure Mandeville, ”La Relation entre Sar- ghana,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst 11, kozy et Obama est Très Saine,” Le Figaro no. 15, 19 August 19, 2009, 17-18, http://www. (Paris), March 26, 2010. cacianalyst.org/files/090819Analyst.pdf. 34. Erica Marat, “Russian Mass Media Attack Bakiyev,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor 7, no. 63, April 1, 2010. 35. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Moscow Caught Unpre- pared by the Carnage in the Ferghana Valley,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia

The Journal of International Security Affairs 31 “Unconventional warfare requires unconventional thinkers.” —Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 2008

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Preventing the Unthinkable

Kevin Ryan

he one game-changing threat that exists in the world is a nuclear attack. Only a nuclear explosion has the capacity to kill millions in Tseconds and unhinge our geopolitical framework. During the Cold War, the threat of a nuclear attack came mainly from the U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals: thousands of nuclear weapons poised to assure that an attack by one side would be met with devastating retaliation by the other. Today, however, the United States and Russia have been forced to adapt to a new nuclear threat—that of dedicated terrorists with money and technological access who seek to obtain and use a nuclear device.

Preventing a nuclear attack has been a point of common interest for the United States and Russia since 1949, when the Soviet Union joined the nuclear club and exploded its first nuclear bomb on the Kazakhstan steppe. In the past, the two countries have overcome serious differences through treaties and agreements that ultimately reduced nuclear arsenals and tensions, lessening the possibility of a nuclear war and gradually building trust along the way. The threat of a nuclear attack, which long served as a tool of intimidation, is now poised to become a point of cooperation, if the two countries can agree on a way to go forward.

Brigadier General Kevin Ryan, USA (ret.) is Executive Director for Research at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. A career military officer, he has extensive service in air and missile defense, intelligence, and political-military policy areas. He served as Senior Regional Director for Slavic States in the Office of Secretary of Defense and as Defense Attaché to Russia. He also served as Chief of Staff for the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command. Kevin Ryan

The two best opportunities for sile defense cooperation. The United the United States and Russia to coop- States does not need Russia to create erate against the threat of nuclear or deploy missile defense; it has attack are in creating missile defense already developed most of the tech- and preventing nuclear terrorism. nology necessary to do so. The United Although they appear to be about two States, however, does need Russia in different problems, these initiatives order to prevent a missile attack. That are actually about the same thing: is because, for the foreseeable future preventing a nuclear attack. And if (the next 30 years at least), Russia the United States and Russia can will retain the capacity to attack the cooperate in these efforts, then the American homeland with nuclear result will be a safer world. missiles despite our missile defense deployments. Even in our most opti- Creating missile defense mistic projections, we will not be able Today, to prevent a nuclear mis- to stop a Russian missile attack purely sile attack, the United States and with long range interceptors. Indeed, Russia are pursuing two funda- creating missile defense is only a part mentally opposing strategies: one of the answer to preventing a mis- through the development of a mis- sile attack. America should not get sile defense system, and one through so attached to missile defense that it the development of the capability loses sight of the big picture—a world to defeat it. U.S. plans for missile in which we are no longer threatened defense, if taken to their logical con- by nuclear missiles. clusion of a robust global system, Today, Russia may not have the would be a direct threat to Russia’s capacity to build a missile defense means of preventing a nuclear missile system on the scale of ours, but its attack—that is, the threat of massive leaders definitely have the capacity to nuclear retaliation. Russia’s develop- build offensive weapons to defeat and ment of missile defense countermea- overwhelm it if they so choose. Rus- sures and new nuclear weapons, in sian leaders have made clear that con- turn, represents a threat to American tinued development and deployment missile defense efforts. The United of a missile defense system that can States and Russia are aiming for the intercept Russian Intercontinental Bal- same goal—freedom from a nuclear listic Missiles (ICBMs) could scuttle missile attack—but our strategies the recently ratified START treaty. are no longer the same, the way they Such development, moreover, could were before we scrapped the Anti- preclude any discussions on mutual Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, 2002. To understand how we should and even begin an escalation in the reli- proceed in preventing a nuclear mis- ance on nuclear weapons that reverses sile attack, and why we should coop- the gains of the past 40 years of arms erate with Russia in missile defense, control.1 Yet America’s commitment to we should understand first what the missile defense is long-standing, made two countries’ positions are regard- clear over three decades and by five ing missile defense, and we should successive presidents. We must find a appreciate the fact that both positions way to create a defensive system that proceed from the same goal. does not by its very existence make it To begin with, let’s be frank harder to achieve our goal of freedom about the subject of U.S.-Russian mis- from a nuclear missile attack.

34 The Journal of International Security Affairs Preventing the Unthinkable

U.S. government officials fre- Moreover, the offer from NATO quently point out that the U.S. goal and the United States at the Novem- today is a “limited missile defense ber 2010 Summit in Lisbon to cooper- system” and that the U.S. side has ate with Russia on this new European proven to the Russian side, through missile defense plan gives the arguments based on physics and con- United States a way to work openly fidential data, that this limited system together, increase the transparency is not able to threaten the capacity of of the technology and its true capa- the Russian nuclear deterrent force. bilities, and decrease uncertainty in This may be true today, but it was not Moscow about the nature and aim the purpose of the system as origi- of the system. It allows us to deploy nally envisioned by President Reagan the system in a way that achieves our in 1983. And although our country’s goal of preventing a limited nuclear leaders today try to make clear our missile attack by Iran while preclud- system at present is a limited one, ing an arms race with Russia that there is no guarantee, no treaty that could derail the whole effort. binds the United States to this objec- tive. These realities are worrisome to The U.S. and Russia are aiming for Russian observers. If we hope to avoid a potentially the same goal—freedom from a even greater threat from Russia’s nuclear missile attack—but our nuclear force, we must reconcile two strategies are no longer the same, seemingly irreconcilable positions. the way they were before we The first is that the United States is dedicated to deploying a missile scrapped the Anti-Ballistic Missile defense system that ultimately will be (ABM) Treaty in 2002. able to intercept ICBMs. The second is that Russia sees the U.S. system The mechanics of cooperation as a direct threat to the strategic bal- on that system, however, remain to ance and Russian security. be worked out. For example, NATO That is why President Obama’s Secretary General Anders Fogh- decision to reschedule the deploy- Rasmussen proposed the defensive ment of missile defenses in system be a “security roof” that Europe—deferring work on long- includes all of NATO and Russia, from range interceptors until the end Vancouver to Vladivostok. But he has of this decade—is so important. It also cautioned that any system NATO guarantees that existing counter- and Russia create would not be “joint” ICBM capabilities will remain lim- or “unified.” Rasmussen explained ited for the next decade (stuck at that the alliance’s concept is two sep- about twenty silo-based intercep- arate systems (NATO and Russian) tors in the United States) while linked together.2 The Secretary Gen- we focus instead on interceptors eral’s plan for two separate systems against intermediate- and short- is realistic for the missile defense range missiles of the kind that Iran capabilities as they exist today, but it might achieve in the next ten years. is not a good enough vision for where It gives us the breathing space to we should be headed. find a way to pursue American mis- Russian President Dmitry Med- sile defense goals without driving vedev, for his part, has made clear Russia to thwart those objectives. the Russian expectations for missile

The Journal of International Security Affairs 35 Kevin Ryan

defense cooperation. According to Russia on missile defense, and Presi- him, what is needed is a “full-fledged dent Reagan even offered to share the joint mechanism of cooperation”—a technology with Russia. single shield, encompassing Russia But the United States has sent and the 28 NATO allies. Medvedev other signals too. The United States proposed what he called a “sector has not, for example, adequately approach” to the defense, in which updated its export controls from the Russia and NATO would be respon- Cold War to permit full technology sible for shooting down any missiles cooperation with some longtime part- that flew over their territory, whether ners, let alone Russia. Previous U.S. headed for Russia or NATO.3 It might administrations established inter- seem reasonable as a plan, except nal secret policies that specifically that Russia has not fielded missile blocked missile defense technology defenses with the capability to shoot from being shared with Russia.5 Pres- down intermediate range missiles ident Obama has rejected in writing as they pass over Russian territory the idea of a joint system with Russia headed to western countries. Medve- in Europe.6 To be sure, America dev’s plan is a better vision for where should not “give away the farm” in its we should be headed, but it is not a cooperation with Russia, but we must realistic plan for right now. align and clarify our position if it is to stand up under scrutiny. If Russia and the U.S./NATO can These are the starting positions on European missile defense. The cooperate successfully on missile technological realities of today pre- defense in Europe, we will have clude a truly joint system, but even a safer, more stable region and separate systems can be combined world. If we cannot, danger and at some level to provide a better over- all defense. How can we have a joint instability will follow. effort but separate systems? The par- ties have agreed to analyze the pos- As for the United States, we have sibilities between November’s Lisbon had a somewhat conflicted approach Summit and the next NATO defense to cooperation in the missile defense ministerial meeting in June 2011. arena. The Department of Defense’s What we need to do is “jointly develop Missile Defense Agency (MDA) separate systems” in the near term, website states that the United States while working toward a fully unified seeks to leverage the industrial base system in the long term. What follows of foreign partners: sharing infor- are some recommendations that could mation with allies and partners and allow the United States to deploy a promoting interoperability between system now that protects against a systems. With Russia specifically limited nuclear missile attack from the MDA says it seeks transpar- Iran while reducing Russian concerns ency and strategic cooperation: “We about defensive missile deployments. also welcome Russian cooperation First, we need a joint assess- to bring its missile defense capa- ment of the threat. Russia, NATO bilities into a broader defense of our and the United States need to share common strategic interests.”4 Indeed, intelligence and warning indicators every administration since 1980 has about ballistic missile developments declared its willingness to work with in Iran and elsewhere. (NATO and

36 The Journal of International Security Affairs Preventing the Unthinkable

Russia agreed to conduct a joint bal- system is currently the Aegis ship- listic missile threat assessment and based SM-3 missile. Russia has no develop a joint analysis of the future mid-course missile defense system, framework for missile defense coop- so it is not able to intercept ballistic eration, all of which should be dis- missiles headed across its territory cussed at the June defense ministers toward third countries. meeting.) We may not come to full A NATO-Russia European mis- agreement about the threat, but the sile defense system in Phase I would process of identifying and confirm- consist of Russian S-300/400 sys- ing the facts on which we do agree tems at Russian and possibly Ukrai- is a vital first step in a process that nian sites, and U.S./NATO Patriots needs to be a regular sharing of and THAAD systems at NATO sites. threat assessments and information. Each of these site defenses operates Second, we need a missile its own radars and does not require defense architecture that recognizes integration with adjacent units to the capabilities of the two sides operate. Their performance can be (NATO/U.S. and Russia) today but improved, however, if they share sets us on a path to better integration early warning data and informa- tomorrow. Creating this architecture tion about missile attacks. The level is complicated by the confusion over of interoperability, or “jointness,” terminology and capabilities of cur- required between U.S. and Russian rent missile defenses. To understand terminal phase systems would be what this near term architecture small. Likewise, because the U.S. might look like, consider the follow- SM-3 is the only mid-course missile ing description. defense system, there is no demand In Phase I of the European for integration at that level between deployment (through 2015), missile U.S. and Russian systems. defenses would consist of the ter- The reality today is that our two minal phase interceptors and mid- systems cannot be easily combined. course phase interceptors that are But we can begin developing ways fielded today. Terminal phase inter- to link the systems, starting with ceptors—U.S. Patriots, THAADs and early warning data and progress- Russian S-300/400s—which engage ing to targeting and intercept data. offensive ballistic missiles as they NATO should begin working with are in their final stage of flight, must Russia to include its systems into the be located at or near the defended ALTBM, the Active Layered Theater assets.7 Terminal phase interceptors Ballistic Missile command and con- can protect only the site at which they trol system. This will ensure that as are located, and are not capable of the two systems mature they will be protecting those that are more than ready to operate together. a few miles away. For a large city, a NATO, Russia and the United military planner might assign a bat- States should share early warning, tery or battalion of such systems as acquisition, tracking and target- a protective force. Mid-course mis- ing data. The Joint Data Exchange sile defenses intercept ballistic mis- Center (JDEC), which the U.S. and siles in the middle of their flight Russia started in the 1990s but did path and do not need to be located not complete, is a good basis on immediately near the defended asset. which to build. We must be willing The U.S. mid-course missile defense to plan together, train together, and

The Journal of International Security Affairs 37 Kevin Ryan

operate together. By jointly develop- negatively impacting U.S. competi- ing our two separate systems into a tiveness and security. NATO, for its unified one, we create transparency, part, can increase the access of the ease suspicions, and move toward Russian defense industry to com- Secretary General Rasmussen’s pete in NATO tenders for equipment vision of a “missile defense shield and arms sales. France’s announced from Vancouver to Vladivostok.”8 sale of Mistral warships to Russia, which transfers some technology but is a good business deal for France, Although the top levels of demonstrates that there is benefit to government in both countries have be had in defense cooperation with made clear their concern over Russia. As for Russia, it must open its defense industry to this cooperation nuclear terrorism, their respective as well and sign an umbrella agree- bureaucracies have been slower ment about cooperation in technol- to cooperate across international ogy—an agreement which they have boundaries. In some cases, the thus far declined to sign. Fourth, U.S. and Russian arms bureaucracies simply don’t share control experts need to start openly their leaders’ assessments. In most, discussing the balance between however, cooperation is stymied by offensive and defensive strategic weapons (that is, ICBMs and missile human factors. defense interceptors). Up to now, the United States has been adamant that Third, besides a common under- there will be no deals trading missile standing of the threat and agreement defense deployments for offensive on architecture, a sure way to garner weapons reductions. Nevertheless, Russian support of U.S./NATO plans both sides understand that there is to involve Russian industry in the always has been and always will be research and development of missile a relationship between offensive and defense technology. The U.S. must defensive forces, both nuclear and change its policies on export con- conventional, when they calculate the trols and sharing technology, which strategic balance that for six decades currently hinder such cooperation, has prevented nuclear war. and seek ways for Russian industry For many good reasons the to be involved in substantive devel- United States has already limited opment and manufacturing. We can its deployment of missile defense do this by loosening the restrictions in Europe without asking for a quid on U.S. industries working with Rus- pro quo from Russia. That may have sian industries. been a missed opportunity. Going According to a 2009 study forward, we should be open to limita- headed by former National Security tions on our long-range interceptors Advisor General Brent Scowcroft,9 in exchange for agreements on Rus- the current system of export controls sian strategic and tactical nuclear developed during the Cold War to weapons. Russia, for its part, should prevent the transfer of technology to recognize openly the reality that U.S. our enemies now harms U.S. national missile defense capabilities will not security. It restricts the flow of infor- threaten its deterrent for the foresee- mation, technology, and scientists, able future.

38 The Journal of International Security Affairs Preventing the Unthinkable

Fifth, besides missile defenses resolve that crisis, collapsed over dis- and arms reduction treaties, we can agreements on missile defense. One also reduce the possibility of a nuclear year later, however, the United States missile attack by pursuing a more and Russia signed an historic treaty global goal: eliminating or restricting eliminating all intermediate range ballistic missiles altogether, starting nuclear missiles. Today, we can take with missiles of intermediate range another historic cooperative step, as and below. Intermediate range and we did in 1987, or we can return to the medium range missiles present the dangerous days of 1986. risk of sudden and unexpected attack. When coupled with nuclear warheads, Preventing nuclear these missiles threaten the destruc- terrorism tion of whole cities with only minutes’ A second opportunity for the warning. In that respect, they can be United States and Russia to cooper- considered more destabilizing than ate in preventing a nuclear attack also tactical nukes, which have smaller exists. It lies in a synergistic approach yields and are more appropriate for to countering nuclear terrorism. use against armed formations than How real is the threat? During civilian targets. The Russians are also a Harvard conference in April 2010, thinking along these lines, and Prime twenty-five U.S. and Russian general Minister Putin called for such a ban 10 officers were asked whether nuclear in 2007, when he was President. war between the United States and We can start by looking to the U.S.- Russia or an incident of nuclear ter- Russian INF (Intermediate-Range rorism was a greater threat.11 The Nuclear Forces) Treaty of 1987 and group unanimously answered that the MTCR (Missile Technology Con- nuclear terrorism posed the greater trol Regime). The MTCR, which is a threat. They went on to agree that the voluntary association of countries for best way to address the threat from non-proliferation of unmanned deliv- nuclear terrorism was through the ery systems for Weapons of Mass combined efforts of both countries. Destruction (WMD), could act as a Their views echoed a con- baseline for a new, binding regime. sensus on the part of the national The INF Treaty, which successfully leadership in both Russia and the eliminated all U.S. and Russian inter- United States. According to Presi- mediate range missiles, could provide dent Obama, nuclear terrorism is the inspection protocols necessary to the greatest threat to the Ameri- carry out the agreement. can homeland.12 Russian President In the end, if Russia and the U.S./ Dmitry Medvedev also has identi- NATO can cooperate successfully on fied nuclear terrorism as one of the missile defense in Europe, we will main threats facing his country.13 have a safer, more stable region and Yet cooperation in this arena world. If we cannot, danger and insta- still remains problematic. In the fall bility will follow. We had a preview in of 2009, the Belfer Center at Harvard the 1980s of what such a world might University’s Kennedy School of Gov- look like. Twenty-five years ago, ernment, with the support of Senator Russia and the United States had hun- Sam Nunn’s Nuclear Threat Initia- dreds of intermediate range nuclear tive, created the U.S.-Russian Initia- missiles deployed in Europe. In 1986, tive to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, a the Reykjavik Summit, intended to

The Journal of International Security Affairs 39 Kevin Ryan

non-governmental effort to support ing nuclear materials for weapons U.S.-Russian government coopera- and energy plants. Both countries’ tion in preventing nuclear terrorism. intelligence and security apparatuses As part of this effort, retired CIA recognize that there is a threat that officer Rolf Mowatt-Larssen and I terrorist groups could obtain or make traveled first to Moscow to find out a nuclear device, and both agree that what was being done about the threat terrorist organizations are trying to of nuclear terrorism. We then trav- do just that. The guidance from the eled to Washington to do the same. top levels of U.S. and Russian govern- What we found was that although ments is in synch and the countries the top levels of government in both seem on the same track as far as the countries have made clear their con- nuclear terrorism threat goes. In that cern over nuclear terrorism, their sense cooperation in this arena is respective bureaucracies have been much further along than cooperation slower to cooperate across interna- on missile defense. tional boundaries. In some cases, But nothing is easy when it the bureaucracies simply don’t share comes to nuclear materials and their leaders’ assessments. In most, weapons. The secrecy and sensitiv- however, cooperation is stymied by ity that surround all things nuclear human factors: Cold War attitudes quickly complicate cooperation in toward cooperation or simply a lack this area. There are very few people of ideas. in government who understand all of the aspects of the nuclear terror- Twenty five years after the ism issue: technical, threat, security, military and political. Few who work Reykjavik summit, a lack of trust on one dimension (i.e., the threat) get is still the underlying issue in U.S.- to see how a nuclear weapon is made Russian relations. or works, and vice versa. Political actors, meanwhile, either don’t have The good news is that for both access to any of that information or the United States and Russian don’t understand it. And the techni- bureaucracies, preventing nuclear cal people, who are vital to under- terrorism is a relatively new task, and standing how terrorists could make the two sides can approach coopera- a nuclear explosion, are cloistered tion with comparatively clean slates. away by security and counterintelli- Simply put, there are few bad his- gence agencies to protect the knowl- tories or conflicts in policy to over- edge they possess. come. Also, for the most part, nuclear Recognizing how hard it can terrorism is a threat that emanates be to gather these kinds of experts from third parties, not from each within our own government, much other. (Although we must admit here less across national boundaries, our that as the owners of over 90 percent initiative at the Belfer Center never- of the world’s nuclear material, our theless attempted to do just that in countries can be the unwanted and October 2010. We brought together even illegal sources of fissionable five retired general officers from materials and nuclear know-how.) each country, the United States and Both countries have robust nuclear Russia, whose experience spanned security programs—the result of military, police, nuclear, intelligence decades of creating, testing and stor- and political arenas. They were

40 The Journal of International Security Affairs Preventing the Unthinkable former four- and three-star generals ism center in Abramovo, Russia, who served in the FSB, CIA, GRU for training scientists and nuclear (military intelligence), DIA, and technicians is a good first step. If interior forces. The meeting, held in the United States and Russia can Istanbul, spanned two days and cen- be seen working together on this tered on how our two governments problem, the rest of world will be could cooperate in preventing nuclear more likely to follow our lead. terrorism. The overall findings of the group echoed the statements of their • Improved information sharing, presidents about the seriousness of planning, and operational coop- the threat and the need to address it eration between our two govern- on a number of fronts, and yielded a ments is needed when it comes series of recommendations: to addressing terrorism. As one Russian officer told me in a sepa- • Russia and the United States rate meeting, “The reason we are should conduct a meaningful having such trouble is that the joint assessment of the threat terrorists are cooperating better from nuclear terrorism. Accord- with their former enemies than ing to former CIA officer Rolf we are with ours.” Both govern- Mowatt-Larssen, this has not ments should expand collabora- been done to date. As a means tion between the militaries on of “kick starting” that process, efforts like interdiction planning the group endorsed an unclassi- and between emergency minis- fied joint threat assessment being tries on planning for, and man- drafted by the Belfer Center and aging the consequences of, a the Russian Academy of Science’s terrorist nuclear attack. We must USA-Canada Institute. That share forensic data on nuclear unclassified assessment will be materials so we can be prepared the basis for more dialogue on to trace any terrorist nuclear cooperation and will provide a device that we encounter. Mecha- model for similar cooperation at nisms already exist for executing the governmental level. this cooperation. They include the U.S.-Russia military-to-mil- • Both governments should con- itary cooperation plan and the tinue to raise awareness of bilateral commission counterter- nuclear terrorism and to share rorism group. best practices in preventing the threat. No other governments • A more sustained dialogue have the experience and know- between Russian and U.S. intelli- how with nuclear materials that gence agencies is also necessary: Russia and the United States cooperation that should be sus- have gained over many years. tained irrespective of the daily ups We must invigorate exchanges and downs of political relations. between our nuclear scientists This recommendation is particu- to improve understanding of the larly important, given the control- nature of the threat and how to ling role that secrecy and security deal with it. The recent decision play in questions of nuclear issues. by the United States and Russia Its message was driven home by to create a nuclear counterterror- the experience of two of our gen-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 41 Kevin Ryan

erals—former heads of the Rus- 2. “Russia, NATO – a Dramatic Change.” Euro- sian GRU and U.S. DIA—who had post, November 5, 2010, http://www.euro- post.bg/article?id=249. been counterparts for a number 3. Dmitri Medvedev, RIA Novosti, Lisbon, of years while on active duty but 21:21, 20 November 2010. had never been permitted to meet 4. Missile Defense Agency, “International until after retirement. Cooperation,” n.d., http://www.mda.mil/ system/international_cooperation.html. 5. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-17, Trusting one another December 11, 1993. In 1986, the Reykjavik summit 6. Obama December 2010 letter to Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, as between the United States and cited in Craig Whitlock, “For the U.S. Russia, intended to reduce the threat and Russia, a New Cooperation on Mis- from nuclear attack, fell apart from a sile Defense,” Washington Post, March 22, lack of trust. Twenty-five years later, 2011, http://ebird.osd.mil/ebird2/ebfiles/ e20110322810346.html. a lack of trust is still the underlying 7. “Terminal phase intercept” means the abil- issue in U.S.-Russian relations. ity to strike a ballistic missile during its The United States and Russia final few seconds of flight, as it is over or can really only gain trust in one near the defended asset. Mid-course inter- cepts occur in the middle of the ballistic mis- another through an accumulation of siles flight path, far away from the defended successful cooperation. In the years asset. THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air since the end of the Cold War, some Defense) and Patriot are U.S. systems that of that foundation has been success- intercept ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their flight. S-400s and S-300s are fully laid. We have successfully con- Russian missile systems similar to Patriot. tinued reductions in nuclear arms 8. “One Security Roof from Vancouver to and we have joined forces in com- Vladivostok,” NATO News, March 27, 2010, bating nuclear terrorism. The U.S.- http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ news_62391.htm. Russia relationship today is far better 9. Beyond “Fortress America”: American than the one of 1986. There remain National Security Controls on Science and many things that separate us but Technology in a Globalized World (Washing- there are a growing number that bind ton, DC: National Academies Press, 2009). 10. Tony Halpin, “Vladimir Putin Confronts us together. Of the latter, a constant US With Threat to Arms Pact,” Times of for sixty years has been the shared London, October 13, 2007, http://www. goal of preventing a nuclear attack. timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/ In 1987, a year after our failure article2648440.ece. 11. Annual U.S.-Russia Security Program in Reykjavik, the United States and (Harvard Generals Program), Harvard Russia stunned the world with an University Kennedy School of Government, agreement that eliminated an entire Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 2010. class of ballistic missiles and, possibly 12. David Jackson, “Obama: Nuclear Terror- ism is ‘the Single Biggest Threat’ to U.S.,” more than any other treaty, helped to USA Today, April 11, 2010, http://content. build trust between the United States usatoday.com/communities/theoval/ and Russia. Such a breakthrough post/2010/04/obama-kicks-off-nuclear- should be our goal again today. summit-with-five-leader-meetings/1. 13. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement by President Barack Obama of the United States of America and President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Cooperation,” July 6, 2009, www. whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint- Statement-by-President-Barack-Obama- 1. Dmitri Medvedev, Third Address to the Fed- of-the-United-States-of-America-and-Pres- eral Assembly of the Russian Federation, ident-Dmitry-Medvedev-of-the-Russian- November 30, 2010. Federation-on-Nuclear-Cooperation.

42 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dialogue of the Deaf

Richard Weitz

any observers hope that the November 20, 2010 NATO-Rus- sia Council summit in Lisbon marked a new era in NATO- MRussian cooperation. The Alliance’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at that meeting, states that “NATO poses no threat to Russia… We want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia… The security of NATO and Russia is intertwined.”1

This may indeed be the case with Afghanistan, where NATO and Russia have several important shared interests against the mutual threat of Islamist extremism, but it is unlikely to prove true in the case of a key issue now on the table between Moscow and the Atlantic Alliance: ballistic missile defense (BMD). Divergent threat perceptions compound the technical and political problems of trying to establish joint—or even cooperative—NATO-Russian missile defense systems. Recurring obstacles likewise persist; Russians remain concerned about their limited influence on the Alliance’s missile defense plans, and still fear that NATO BMD efforts could end up weakening Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

What NATO wants NATO officials have said they want to try to cooperate with Russia on mis- sile defense because, in principle, they see several advantages in securing Mos- cow’s support for NATO’s BMD efforts.

Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, is the editor of The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow and author of both Global Security Watch-Russia and Revitalising US–Russian Security Cooperation: Practical Measures. Richard Weitz

First, such collaboration would the United States was so eager to make NATO missile defense efforts secure Russian participation in its more transparent to Russian policy- missile defense initiatives was that, makers and help overcome their con- before the summit, several Allies cerns that NATO BMD systems could were reluctant to support a NATO be used against them. Since 2006, missile defense effort unless Russian senior Russian government officials, opposition was neutralized: “Some military officers, and policy analysts wanted to have missile defenses now; have presented a range of complaints others wanted to have it only if the regarding the planned deployment of Russians were okay; some wanted U.S. missile defenses in the countries to make the reset with Russia more of the former Soviet bloc. For exam- important than the deployment of ple, they have argued that a purpose missile defenses.”5 In other words, of NATO’s BMD deployments near although Russian threats had not Russia is to intercept strategic mis- deterred NATO from working with siles launched from Russia.2 More- the United States on missile defense over, Russian officials have professed outright, they had certainly made it the fear that the United States could harder for American diplomats to win rapidly deploy additional BMD sys- support from Alliance members for tems in a missile defense breakout their endeavor. that would prove difficult for Russian Third, NATO officials believe offensive forces to match.3 Further- that missile defense collaboration more, some Russian analysts claimed with Russia could help them counter that the United States could rapidly an Iranian threat. Soon after taking replace the defensive interceptors office, President Obama sent a letter with offensive ballistic missiles that to Russian President Dmitry Medve- could attack nearby targets in Russia dev that underscored the connection with minimal warning time for the between U.S. missile defense efforts defenders.4 Russian representatives, and the Iranian threat: it noted that in turn, have indicated they would progress in limiting Iran’s nuclear take vigorous measures to counter and ballistic missile development these threats—including by enhanc- efforts would reduce the need for ing the ability of Russian missiles to U.S. and NATO missile defenses.6 overcome NATO defenses. The following month, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) characterized such From Russia’s point of view, the collaboration as a possible “game most desired outcome is if NATO changer” in constraining Iranian missile programs.7 and the United States would not In response, the Russian govern- pursue any missile defenses at all. ment has made several conciliatory moves. It has canceled the planned Another consideration driving sale of units of the advanced S-300 air NATO policymakers to seek coop- defense system to Iran, which could eration with Moscow on BMD is have provoked a preemptive Israeli that reducing Russian opposition to military attack, and has supported NATO’s missile defense plans would the imposition of new UN sanctions facilitate Alliance management. Ivo against Tehran. Nonetheless, Iran, Daalder, the U.S. Ambassador to like North Korea, has persistently NATO, has explained that one reason developed its nuclear weapons poten-

44 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dialogue of the Deaf tial regardless of the position of Russia they consider the anticipated speed, or other foreign countries. In light of number, and widespread deploy- Iran’s persistent nuclear effort, the ment of NATO interceptor mis- thinking today goes, Moscow might siles disproportionate to the modest enhance NATO’s missile defenses by level of threat presented by Iran or allowing the Alliance to take advan- other states.8 Russia’s more color- tage of certain Russian BMD assets, ful Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry including Russian military technolo- Rogozin, explained that, in Moscow’s gies and Russian-controlled radars view, NATO’s BMD plans were “like near Iran. killing a fly on the head of your com- rade with a sledgehammer.”9 What Russia wants Russian leaders have sought From Russia’s point of view, how- to constrain U.S. missile defense ever, the most desired outcome is if programs by linking them to bilat- NATO and the United States would eral negotiations to limit each side’s not pursue any missile defenses at all. strategic offensive nuclear forces. Despite having initiated significant As long ago as the early 1980s, after BMD research during the Cold War President Reagan re-launched U.S. and, until recently, having the world’s missile defense programs, Soviet only operational territorial missile negotiators tried to contain them defense system around Moscow, by proposing various arms control Soviet and Russian policymakers deals, including an offer by Soviet have always feared that America leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the could pull off a technological coup, October 1986 Reykjavik summit to developing missile defenses so effec- eliminate first all ballistic missiles tive that they would compromise the and then all nuclear weapons.10 effectiveness of the Soviet/Russian Fast forward two-and-a-half nuclear deterrent. decades and little has changed; Unable to avert U.S. and NATO during the post-START negotiations missile defense research and devel- with the Obama administration, Rus- opment, the Kremlin has been trying sian officials have argued that they to prevent these R&D efforts from cannot accept major reductions in leading to the fielding of actual BMD their strategic offensive missiles as systems—or at least keeping their long as U.S. and NATO BMD remain numbers and effectiveness as limited unconstrained because they claim as possible. Soviet and subsequently these BMD systems could theo- Russian leaders have sought to pro- retically affect a strategic nuclear hibit or at least limit U.S. missile exchange between Russia and the defense programs for decades, begin- United States. ning with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Although not spelled out, Rus- Missile Defense (ABM) Treaty, sian strategists presumably have in continuing against Ronald Reagan’s mind a scenario in which NATO con- Strategic Defense Initiative, and ducts a surprise first strike attack persisting through the post-Cold against Russian nuclear forces and War period. Even after the Lisbon then uses BMD systems to negate summit, Russian President Dmitry Russia’s weakened response.11 Medvedev said that Russian officials Russians have also offered to were still trying to persuade NATO assist U.S. nonproliferation efforts to scale back its BMD plans because against Iran and other countries if

The Journal of International Security Affairs 45 Richard Weitz the United States restricts its mis- absence of a perceived shared threat, sile defense activities.12 Russia would not approve of the United States and NATO deploying Sticking points missile defenses near its border. Russian policymakers likewise More recently, Russian leaders have periodically proposed that have professed a willingness to coop- Russia, the United States, and other erate closely with NATO on defend- NATO countries cooperate in estab- ing their populations and territories lishing a collective European missile against missile threats. Russians defense initiative. Such a construct insist that they be treated as full and would rely on shared threat assess- equal partner in any joint program. ments; only if the member states Shortly before the Lisbon summit, agreed that a genuine threat was Russian Foreign Minister Sergei emerging would the participating gov- Lavrov told the press that “we will be ernments establish effective defenses ready to participate in creating such to counter it. These defenses could a joint system, starting with a joint combine the BMD assets of the par- analysis of what could be done, and, ticipating countries and be run and of course, based on the equal con- controlled collectively. Russian offi- struction of a system which would be cials see such a construct as valuable aimed at neutralizing the common because it would put their country challenges for all of us.”15 “on an equal footing as a participant” At the summit, President Med- in Alliance defense.13 vedev proposed that NATO and From NATO’s perspective, Russia establish a “sectoral” missile however, the problem with this defense architecture in which the approach—waiting until Moscow two parties would each build and and the Alliance concur that a mis- operate BMD systems for their own sile threat exists and then agreeing territories.16 Although the NATO that missile defenses are a desirable and Russia defense establishments means to counter the challenge—is could exchange data and monitoring that Russia would have de facto veto teams,17 each party would operate power over NATO BMD deploy- its BMD systems independently of ments. Indeed, Russia and the West the other. Defense Minister Anatoly have over the past decade acutely Serdyukov argued that such a joint differed regarding their assessment approach would pool their efforts and of the emerging missile threat from reduce the parties’ financial and mili- Iran. For example, a memorandum of tary costs—as well as “relieve our a 2009 meeting between Russian and certain concerns of against who[m] American missile experts released by it is really aimed at.”18 Ambassador Wikileaks shows major differences Rogozin, in turn, explained how such in Russian and U.S. perceptions a sectoral system would work in the regarding Iran’s potential and ambi- event of a threatening missile launch: tions. The Russian representatives “If there is a missile flying over our discounted their American counter- territory that is heading toward the parts’ fears that Iran, thanks partly U.S., we will shoot it down. If there is to North Korean assistance, was a missile coming toward Russia over making great progress in extending the U.S. zone of responsibility, then the range of its solid-fuel missiles.14 the Americans will shoot it down. The divergence is instructive; in the But in either case, Russia retains

46 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dialogue of the Deaf control over its own missile-defense In essence, Russia is arguing system, and NATO over its own.”19 that NATO should abstain from Needless to say, such independent developing any capacity to engage NATO and Russian missile defense ballistic missiles over Russian ter- systems would overcome some of the ritory, easing Moscow’s concerns technical problems of attempting to about the survivability of its nuclear integrate the two systems in a single deterrent. In exchange, Russia would architecture, but would require an commit to shoot down any potentially unprecedented (and implausible) hostile ballistic missile, even if it were level of trust to work effectively. only passing over Russia on its way to In addition, Russians advocate NATO members’ territory and cities. this sectoral proposal because they can more credibly object to NATO’s Russian leaders have sought to seeking a capacity to detect and intercept ballistic missiles over Rus- constrain U.S. missile defense sian territory. Since Russian officials programs by linking them to say they will protect this sector from bilateral negotiations to limit third-party missiles for NATO, they can more effectively argue that the each side’s strategic offensive Alliance has no plausible reason to nuclear forces. have a capacity to track and engage missiles over Russian territory unless The vulnerability that would they seek a means to attack Russia’s result is obviously unacceptable to own nuclear missiles. Rogozin has NATO governments responsible for explained that any Russia-NATO protecting their populations. They joint missile defense system “should might plausibly doubt that a Russian be oriented exclusively at the (areas) government would act as required outside the Euro-Atlantic space, to protect them, especially since the the concentration of ABM facilities remnants of any successful missile should correspond to the real chal- interception, which could include a lenges and risks and only in the areas nuclear warhead, would then fall on which are recognized by experts as Russian territory. They could even missile hazardous. If missile defense more plausibly doubt that Russia has elements appear near the north- the capabilities to fulfill a mutual west border of the Russian Federa- missile defense commitment even if tion under the pretext of setting up a Moscow intended and sought to do global ABM system, we will consider so. The Russian military has never this a threat to our security with all demonstrated an ability to intercept the ensuing military and techni- ballistic missiles in outer space above cal consequences.”20 Unfortunately, its territory. In addition, the Russian NATO experts believe that Iranian armed services have only recently or North Korean ballistic missiles begun to deploy the advanced S-400 aimed at NATO Europe could—and air defense system, which has lim- probably would—traverse some Rus- ited BMD capabilities. Most Russian sian territory en route to their Euro- air defense units still possess the pean target, so Alliance defenses S-300, which lacks such capabilities, need the capacity to monitor and while the more sophisticated S-500, intercept missiles in the atmosphere designed to have comprehensive above Russian territory.21 missile interception capabilities, is

The Journal of International Security Affairs 47 Richard Weitz

still under development.22 In con- More recently, Russian officials trast, since Russian policymakers do have warned that NATO’s refusal to not believe Iran would ever launch a give Moscow equal status in any pan- nuclear missile at their country, they European missile defense system have no problem assigning NATO the could lead to a new arms race, since role of guardian of Russia’s survival. Russia would have to enhance, quali- Yet, Russian policymakers insist, if tatively and quantitatively, its own any NATO missile defense architec- offensive strategic forces in response ture could cover Russian territory in order to guarantee the ability of then Russian policymakers must its nuclear deterrent to overcome participate in the decision to use the NATO defenses even after suffering system over Russia, which raises all a potential NATO first strike. Only the problems discussed above. two weeks after the Lisbon summit, Medvedev said in his early December From NATO’s perspective, State of the Nation address, “I would the problem with waiting until like to openly say that the choice for us in the coming decade is as follows: Moscow and the Alliance concur We will either come to terms on mis- that a missile threat exists and sile defense and form a full-fledged then agreeing that missile defenses joint mechanism of cooperation or we are a desirable means to counter will plunge into a new arms race and have to think of deploying new strike the challenge is that Russia would means. It’s obvious that this scenario have de facto veto power over will be very hard.”23 NATO BMD deployments. Possible Russian countermea- sures could include increasing the In addition to offering various number and effectiveness of Russia’s enticements to shape NATO’s missile offensive nuclear forces as well as defense decisions, Soviet and Russian targeting nearby U.S. BMD systems leaders have threatened to respond in with Russian offensive weapons sys- menacing ways should the Alliance tems. A recurring Russian threat is to nonetheless deploy BMDs that Rus- deploy Russian short-range Iskander sians conclude could threaten their missiles in Russia’s Baltic enclave of own missile forces. The most recent Kaliningrad and other parts of Russia threat campaign, as often in the to target U.S. BMD facilities in east- past, was directed against NATO’s ern Europe. If Russia is barred from European members, many of whom building the missile defense shield, do not want to antagonize Moscow Serdyukov said after the Lisbon for various security, economic, and meetings, Russia will have to take other reasons. Russians have clearly “military and other measures” and hoped that these threat campaigns “will have to develop a system, which would intimidate the allies from field- will penetrate through the European ing BMD systems. Another Russian missile defense and preserve the Rus- aspiration might have been to split sian nuclear potential.” NATO by inducing its members to In addition to meeting their engage in intra-alliance squabbles stated strategic concerns, Russian over whether to persist with missile leaders seek to affirm their view that defense, even in the face of vigorous Russia, as one of the world’s leading Russian opposition. powers, should be consulted, and

48 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dialogue of the Deaf have the right of veto, over all major not seeking the capacity to neutralize European security questions. The Russia’s deterrent. underlying principle behind the Euro- Still, Russia and NATO could face pean Security Treaty that Medvedev a real choice in about a decade. Even has been promoting for the past two Russian analysts admit that NATO’s years is the indivisibility of continen- BMD plans and capabilities, espe- tal security and Russia’s equal role in cially under the Obama administra- European security decisions. Russian tion’s redesigned “Phased Adaptive leaders especially seek to affirm that Approach,” will not present a threat to any major NATO security action near Russia’s strategic nuclear missiles for their country requires Moscow’s per- the next few years. If the administra- mission. For geopolitical, historical, tion’s Phase Four plans to deploy the and other reasons, Russian policy- SM-3 Block IIB to counter medium-, makers tend to consider the former intermediate-, and intercontinental- Soviet bloc nations as falling within a range missiles are implemented special zone of concern for Moscow. around 2020 as planned, however, Russian leaders react extremely nega- then even U.S. officials acknowledge tively when NATO offers membership that NATO will obtain the theoretical to these countries or seeks to deploy capacity to intercept a few Russian military forces, including BMD sys- missiles—though certainly not Rus- tems, in them. Russian officials do not sia’s entire nuclear arsenal.26 believe NATO assurances that the Alli- Aware of this possibility, U.S. ance’s enlargement actually enhances Senators recently pressed the Obama Moscow’s security by creating a belt administration to commit to deploy- of prosperous liberal democracies ing all four phases of its European around Russia and by addressing the BMD strategy during the recent rati- common menaces of WMD prolifera- fication debate regarding the New tion and Islamist terrorism. Russian START agreement. President Obama policymakers still often interpret the responded by writing a letter in which same threats differently and therefore he insisted that New START “places favor diverging solutions. no limitations on the development or deployment of our missile defense The choice programs” and that he “will take Russian officials are trying to every action available to me to support present NATO with a stark choice. the deployment of all four phases” of a Echoing the “with us or against us” missile defense system in Europe.27 rhetoric that Russian policymakers Following this assurance, on regularly criticized the Bush adminis- December 22, 2010, the U.S. Senate tration for using, Ambassador Rogozin ratified the New START treaty, told a Moscow press conference fol- which establishes new lower limits lowing the Lisbon summit, “Missile on the number of offensive strategic defense in Europe can only be cre- nuclear forces that the United States ated with Russia, or directed against and Russia can possess and reestab- Russia. There is no third option.”25 lishes mutual means of verification. Rogozin is clearly wrong: for the past Although the treaty’s preamble, like decade, the United States and NATO previous Russian-American arms have been seeking to construct a Euro- control agreements, notes that an pean missile defense system sufficient inherent relationship exists between only to counter an Iranian threat while strategic offensive and strategic

The Journal of International Security Affairs 49 Richard Weitz

defensive forces, this text is not legally likely that, since NATO will have binding and the treaty itself only con- to continue to live with a Russian strains Russian and U.S. long-range nuclear threat in any case—Moscow offensive nuclear forces. will retain sufficient nuclear capac- ity to destroy NATO Europe under The underlying principle behind any plausible scenario—then future NATO governments will pursue the European Security Treaty that whatever missile options they believe Medvedev has been promoting will best enhance their security. for the past two years is the indivisibility of continental security and Russia’s equal role in European security decisions. 1. “Active Engagement, Modern Defence.” Russian leaders especially seek North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Novem- to affirm that any major NATO ber 19, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natolive/official_texts_68580.htm. security action near their country 2. Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Follow- ing Discussion at the Munich Conference requires Moscow’s permission. on Security Policy,” Munich, Germany, February 10, 2007, http://www.natomis- If by 2020 sanctions or other sion.ru/en/print/46/14/; Yury Zaitsev, preventive measures are unable “New START Agreement Should Not Run to prevent Iran from developing Counter to Russian Interests” RIA-Novosti, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles June 24, 2009, http://en.rian.ru/valdai_ op/20090624/155340446.html. capable of hitting targets in Europe, 3. Nikita Petrov, “Outside View: ABM Talks and NATO BMD technologies look Deadlock—Part 2,” United Press Interna- capable of dealing with such a threat, tional, March 26, 2008, http://www.upi. then NATO governments will have a com/International_Security/Industry/ Analysis/2008/03/26/outside_view_ choice. They can decide the Iranian abm_talks_deadlock_--_part_2/2457/; threat is sufficient to warrant enhanc- “Russian Expert Opposes U.S. Missile ing NATO’s missile defenses despite System,” United Press International, the risk of alienating Moscow, or they January 31, 2007, http://www.upi.com/ NewsTrack/Top_News/2007/01/31/rus- can rely primarily on traditional pre- sian_expert_opposes_us_missile_system/; emption and deterrence strategies Nikolai Khorunzhy, “Who Can Europe- that would aim either to destroy the Based Missiles Threaten?,” RIA-Novosti, Iranian missiles before they could be October 17, 2006, http://en.rian.ru/analy- sis/20061017/54890694.html. used or to rely on the threat of retali- 4. Yurii Baluyevskiy, “Pro Soedinnyx Shta- ation to avert an Iranian first strike. tov: Shto Dal’she?: Komu I Zachem Nuzhen If NATO leaders decide to bol- Protivoraketnyy Zontik [American BMD: ster their defenses as a complement What Next? Who Needs a Protective Umbrella, and Why],” Voenno-Promishlen- to their deterrent and preemption niy Kur’er, July 26, 2006; Andrei Kislyakov, capabilities even without Moscow’s “Missile Defense And Its Consequences,” approval, then future Russian govern- RIA-Novosti, February 15, 2007, http:// ments will need to decide whether the en.rian.ru/analysis/20070215/60788503. html. Lavrov’s comments can be found NATO response is sufficient to war- in “German FM Calls for Civilized Dia- rant a compensatory buildup of Rus- logue on U.S. Missile Shield,” RIA-Novosti, sia’s offensive nuclear forces. In turn, February 22, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/ NATO will need to decide whether world/20070222/61126427.html. 5. Ivo Daalder, “Success at the Lisbon Summit: and how to match the buildup. It is The U.S. Perspective,” Presentation at the

50 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dialogue of the Deaf

Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, New Arms Race,” Christian Science Monitor, November 22, 2010, http://www.brookings. December 14, 2010, http://www.csmonitor. edu/~/media/Files/events/2010/1122_ com/World/Global-Issues/2010/1214/How- lisbon_summit/20101122_lisbon_summit.pdf. NATO-Russia-talks-on-missile-defense- 6. Peter Baker, “Obama Offered Deal to could-halt-or-launch-a-new-arms-race. Russia in Secret Letter,” New York Times, 18. “Serdyukov Nadeetsya Dostich’ Konsensusa March 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes. S NATO [Serdyukov Hopes to Reach Con- com/2009/03/03/washington/03prexy. sensus With NATO],” RTsB.RF, December html. 13, 2010, http://www.rcb.ru/news/64788/; 7. Michael Bruno, “NATO General, Sena- “Russia Vows ‘To Share Responsibility’ Over tors Discuss Missile Deal,” Aviation Week, Europe Missile Shield,” RIA-Novosti, http:// March 24, 2009, http://aviationweek. en.rian.ru/russia/20101213/161751524. com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/ html December 13, 2010. COMP032409.xml&headline=NATO%20 19. Alexander Goltz, “Sectorialnoye Uluchsh- General,%20Senators%20Discuss%20 enie [Sectoral Improvement],” Ezhednevnyi Missile%20Deal&channel=defense. Zhurnal (Moscow), November 22, 2010, 8. Patrick Goodenough, “As NATO Wraps http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=10573. Up a Deal on Missile Defense, The Threat 20. Itar-TASS, December 9, 2010, as printed Remains Unnamed,” CNSNews.com, in “Russia in Review,” Harvard University November 22, 2010, http://www.cnsnews. Belfer Center for Science and International com/news/article/nato-wraps-deal-missile- Affairs, December 10, 2010, http://belfer- defense-threater. center.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20607/ 9. Ibid. russia_in_review.html?breadcrumb=%2Fr 10. Nikolai Sokov, “Reykjavik Summit: The egion%2F131%2Frussia_and_the_former_ Legacy and a Lesson for the Future,” James soviet_union; See also Goltz, “Sectorialnoye Martin Center for Nonproliferation Stud- Uluchshenie.” ies, December 2007, http://www.nti.org/e_ 21. Weir, “NATO-Russia Talks.” research/e3_95.html. 22. “Russian S-400 Missiles to Go Into Serial Pro- 11. “Russia Says U.S. Missile Plans Hamper duction,” RIA-Novosti, April 30, 2010, http:// Nuclear Arms Cuts Talks,” RIA-Novosti, en.rian.ru/russia/20100430/158814778. February 6, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/ html; Viktor Litovkin, “EvroPRO Dlya Rossii russia/20100206/157794552.html. I NATO”; and Yuly Estinko, “Dyryavyi 12. Itar-TASS, as cited in “Russia Not to Compro- Zontic Stolicy,” [The Capital’s Hole-Ridden mise on Missile Deal,” Xinhua, September BMD Umbrella] NVO, February 26, 2010, 19, 2009, http://big5.cri.cn/gate/big5/eng- http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-02-26/1_pro. lish.cri.cn/6966/2009/09/18/2041s516818. html. htm. 23. Weir, “How NATO-Russia Talks.” 13. “Russia Wants Equal Role in NATO Missile 24. “Russia Must Penetrate Any Missile Shield Shield: Minister,” Defence Talk, October 25, – Defense Minister,” Russia Today, Decem- 2010, http://www.defencetalk.com/russia- ber 13, 2010, http://rt.com/politics/russia- wants-equal-role-in-nato-missile-shield- nato-us-serdyukov/. minister-29671/. 25. “European Missile Defense System Either 14. David E. Hoffman, “WikiLeaks: Russia’s With Russia or Against Russia – NATO Doubts About Iranian Missiles,” Foreign- Envoy,” RIA-Novosti, December 2, 2010, Policy.com, November 29, 2010, http://hoff- http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/ man.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/29/ library/news/2010/space-101202-riano- what_russia_said_about_those_iranian_ vosti01.htm. missiles. 26. White House, Office of the Press Secre- 15. Transcript of Russian Foreign Minister tary, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Missile Defense Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers at Policy: A ‘Phased, Adaptive Approach’ for Joint Press Conference Following Talks Missile Defense in Europe,” September with NATO Secretary General Anders 17, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ Fogh-Rasmussen, Moscow, Russia, Novem- the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Mis- ber 3, 2010. sile-Defense-Policy-a-Phased-Adaptive-Ap- 16. Viktor Litovkin, “EvroPRO Dlya Rossii I proach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe/. NATO [Euro-BMD for Russia and NATO],” 27. Mary Beth Sheridan, “In Letter to Senate, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 17, 2010, Obama Says New START Pact Won’t Limit http://www.ng.ru/world/2010-12-17/1_ Missile Defense,” Washington Post, Decem- europro.html. ber 19, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost. 17. Fred Weir, “How NATO-Russia Talks on com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/18/ Missile Defense Could Halt – Or Launch – A AR2010121803058.html.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 51

The Caliphate Comes Home

Ilan Berman

he suicide bombing which killed thirty-five travelers and injured over a hun- dred more at Moscow’s bustling Domodedovo Airport in late January did Tmore than temporarily bring air traffic in Russia to a standstill. The attack, the second major terror incident to hit the Russian capital in less than a year, laid bare the dirty little secret the Kremlin has worked diligently to hide from the world.

Nearly two decades into Russia’s own version of the “war on terror,” it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that the country is in the throes of a rising Islamist insurgency—or that the Russian government, which once promised a swift, decisive victory over “Wahhabism,” increasingly seems to have little idea what to do about it.

Chaos in the Caucasus It was not always this way. Two decades ago, the threat posed by Islamic radicalism was still distant and ephemeral for most Russians. True, the collapse of the USSR had unleashed a wave of ethnic separatism on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Over the span of thirteen months, fifteen new countries, six of them majority-Muslim, emerged from the wreckage of the “evil empire.” As a result, the aggregate number of Muslims within Russia proper actually decreased.1 And, after more than seven decades of officially-atheist Soviet rule, those Muslims that remained within the Russian Federation lacked a clear reli- gious direction or sense of spiritual identity.

Ilan Berman is Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council, and Editor of The Journal of International Security Affairs. Ilan Berman

But if the growth of Islamic an array of other Islamist forces, radicalism wasn’t an immediate from Saudi charities to al-Qaeda, all concern, a further fragmentation of whom had an interest in promoting of the Russian state was. The cor- a religious alternative to the Russian rosive example of independence state.5 By the time of the signing of on the part of the countries of the the Khasavyurt agreement formally Caucasus and Central Asia ignited ending the first Chechen war in dreams of the same in many cor- August 1996, Chechen politics had ners of the Russian Federation. This become both thoroughly Islamized was particularly true in Russia’s and internationalized—laying the Caucasus republics—the majority- groundwork for future conflict. Muslim regions which abutted the Instability followed. Subsequent newly-independent nations of Geor- years saw the deterioration of the gia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. These republic into rampant criminality stirrings were given concrete voice and lawlessness. They also saw the by the November 1991 declaration of rise of local warlords, such as Shamil independence by Chechnya’s nation- Basayev, who strengthened the alist leader, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Chechen Islamist movement’s ties to international terror and engaged in Today, despite regular public increasingly brazen acts of domestic terrorism against Russian interests.6 pronouncements to the contrary And as the situation in Chechnya from officials in Moscow, the deteriorated, the domestic conditions Caucasus remains a political in neighboring Russian republics fol- lowed suit.7 quagmire for the Kremlin—and a Two events propelled Russia locus of resilient Islamic radicalism. back into open conflict with its unruly hinterlands. The first was the Notably, Dudayev did not ini- August 1999 invasion of Dagestan by tially embrace Islam as the founda- an Islamist militia led by Basayev and tion for an independent Chechnya.2 Jordanian-born rebel commander Slowly but surely, however, the Omar Ibn ul-Khattab. The second Chechen self-determination strug- was the September 1999 bombing gle metamorphosed into an Islamist of four apartment blocks in the Rus- jihad. This was due in large part to sian cities of Moscow, Buynansk and the influx of “Afghan alumni”—for- Volgodonsk, allegedly by Chechen eign (mostly Arab) mujahideen who rebels. (Notably, considerable contro- previously had fought the Soviets in versy surrounds the terrorist attacks, Afghanistan—into the breakaway with some claiming that the blasts republic in the early 1990s.3 These were orchestrated by Russia’s domes- forces helped bolster the ranks of the tic intelligence service, the FSB, to Chechen resistance against Russian provide a pretext for renewed war in forces, which had been dispatched to the Caucasus.)8 pacify the republic in 1994. But they By then, however, the nature of also served to progressively alter its the conflict had changed fundamen- character. Experts estimate that, by tally. Whereas the first Chechen the following year, some 300 “Afghan” war, at least in its opening stages, Arabs were active in Chechnya and was still mostly a struggle for self- engaged in hostilities there.4 So were determination, the war’s second

54 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Caliphate Comes Home iteration had an overtly Islamist, could be found in the aftermath of missionary character. Instead of the Russian military’s onslaught has being localized to Chechnya, it also long since dissipated. The Cauca- increasingly implicated the republic’s sus remains a political quagmire for Caucasian neighbors (most directly the Kremlin—and a locus of resil- Dagestan and Ingushetia). And while ient Islamic radicalism. Indeed, in the first Chechen war took on the form recent months, Chechnya’s Islamic of a fast-moving asymmetric conflict, militants have staged a savage come- the second assumed the character of back. Back in August 2010, guerrilla a war of attrition. A grinding, bloody commandos carried out a brazen raid campaign inevitably followed. on the native village of regional presi- In this effort, the Kremlin was dent Ramzan Kadyrov, the Moscow- not without its victories. In April of approved strongman who rules the 2002, Russia’s security services suc- republic with an iron grip.13 Just two cessfully assassinated Khattab, the months later, three Chechen com- Jordanian-born jihadist rumored to mandos launched a suicide raid on be Bin Laden’s man in the Caucasus.9 the regional parliament, killing six Four years later, in July 2006, war- people and wounding 17.14 lord Shamil Basayev, the mastermind behind the 1999 Dagestan raid, was Even in Russia’s Volga region, similarly eliminated.10 On the surface, these successes where the tolerant Tatar strain appeared to shift the momentum of of Islam has historically coexisted the conflict in Moscow’s favor, and peacefully with both federal the Kremlin was quick to declare vic- tory. In April of 2009, Prime Minister authorities and the Orthodox Vladimir Putin, in a Russian throw- Church, there are now telltale back to President Bush’s ill-fated May signs of extremist activity—and 2003 “mission accomplished” speech of a growing challenge to the aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, proudly declared victory in Russia’s established status quo. counterterrorism campaign.11 That sense of triumph, however, As violence has surged, Russian turned out to be anything but lasting. optimism has withered. A July 2010 By the summer of 2009, extreme vio- exposé by Germany’s influential Der lence returned to the region. Over the Spiegel magazine found that some span of three months (June through high-ranking Russian officials have August), 436 people were killed in become convinced that it will take Chechnya alone, more than triple years to defeat extremist groups in the number of casualties during the the restive region—if such a feat same time period a year earlier. And can be accomplished at all.15 Indeed, the number of terrorist attacks in although Prime Minister Vladimir the republic, which stood at 265 for Putin has vowed that the area will the summer of 2008, nearly doubled, be safe for the nearby 2014 Winter jumping to 452.12 Olympics in Sochi, local security has So the situation remains. Today, deteriorated to an unprecedented despite regular public pronounce- degree. Armored vehicles and heli- ments to the contrary from officials copters are now de rigeur for all vis- in Moscow, what fleeting stability iting Kremlin officials, and traffic

The Journal of International Security Affairs 55 Ilan Berman

policemen in the republic require the an upsurge in support for Islamic protection of Interior Ministry units. extremism and adherence to radical “It will take years to change the situ- religious ideas there.17 ation here,” one Russian general told In other words, despite official the German newsweekly. “For every claims that the region has been paci- dead terrorist, two new ones rise up fied, the North Caucasus is more and to take his place.” more a place where the Kremlin’s authority is ignored or challenged, and where religious identity trumps For years, Russia’s leaders have nationalist sentiment. banked on a hard-power campaign against Islamic radicalism in A spreading contagion their hinterlands, hoping that Nor is the problem localized overwhelming force would pacify to the Caucasus. Even in Russia’s Volga region, where the tolerant the country’s restive republics. In Tatar strain of Islam has histori- doing so, they also have gambled cally coexisted peacefully with both that their policies, however federal authorities and the Ortho- dox Church, there are now telltale bloody, would remain popular so signs of extremist activity—and of long as ordinary Russians believed a growing challenge to the estab- the Islamist threat to be both lished status quo. In late November, marginal and distant. a bloody skirmish between Islamic militants and local law enforce- ment in the Nurlatsky district of the The reason for Islamism’s republic of Tatarstan left three dead resilience—indeed, its growing and local calm shattered. In its after- appeal—has a great deal to do with a math, regional officials were quick hardening of local attitudes. Take, for to paint the episode as an anomaly.18 example, the poll conducted in early For local experts, however, the 2011 among Dagestani youth by the writing is increasingly on the wall. regional journal Nations of Dagestan, The incident, wrote Yana Amelina which produced a worrying picture of of Kazan State University, one of public sentiment regarding the ongo- the republic’s leading observers of ing conflict in the restive Russian Islamist activity, was a telling reflec- republic, and the role religion should tion of “the growing influence of play in society there. Thirty per- Wahhabis in the region.”19 Indeed, cent of the study’s participants, who Amelina points out, Doku Umarov, included members of Dagestan’s uni- the leader of the Caucasus Emirate, versities and police schools, said they Chechnya’s main Islamist group- would choose to live under a Muslim- ing, has talked publicly about the run religious regime. Similarly, more eventual expansion of jihadist activ- than a third of those polled indicated ity along the Volga, and the subject they would not turn in a friend or of radical Islam’s growth in Russia’s family member responsible for terror- heartland has become a topic of dis- ism to authorities.16 These findings cussion among Islamists now active track closely with those of human in Russia. As a result, she warns, the rights groups and NGOs active in the recent clashes in Tatarstan “should Caucasus, which have documented serve as a warning bell.” It is clear,

56 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Caliphate Comes Home she writes, that this incident “will not rency of extremist religious ideas be the last.” isn’t just confined to social life; they Even neighboring Bashkorto- are increasingly evident among the stan, whose capital city, Ufa, serves regional spiritual leadership as well. as the spiritual seat of Muslims in This was hammered home by the Russia, has not proven immune. resignation of Tatarstan’s chief mufti, The past year-and-a-half has seen a Gusman Iskhakov, in early January. marked growth in grassroots Islamist Officially, Iskhakov’s departure militancy in the region, and wide- was chalked up to “health reasons,” spread banditry by these elements.20 but regional religious officials say This instability contributed in part to that the real cause was his failure to the ouster of the region’s long-serv- comply with the traditional, moderate ing president, Murtaza Rakhimov, Tatar brand of Islam—and his affin- last summer, and his subsequent ity for a more extreme variant of it.24 replacement with a new, Kremlin- Moreover, this is just the tip of the ice- selected strongman, Rustem Khami- berg. Regional officials have cautioned tov. A new offensive against Islamic that Iskhakov’s replacement will face a militants and ethnic separatists alike growing challenge: the need to replace has followed, unearthing some trou- a number of local imams espousing bling linkages with the Caucasus in to an extreme Salafi interpretation of the process. (Most recently, in Febru- Islam who assumed their posts on the ary, Bashkir security forces arrested former mufti’s watch. four suspected Islamists from the Perhaps the clearest sign of this western town of Oktyabarsky. At shifting momentum can be found on least one of the suspects is believed Gazovaya Ulitsa, a busy thoroughfare to be the leader of the “Oktyabarsky in Tatarstan’s capital city of Kazan. Jamaat,” a local affiliate of Umarov’s There, the Russian Islamic Univer- Caucasus Emirate.)21 sity—the region’s premier religious The rising appeal of Islamism university, dedicated to promul- in Russia’s heartland is in part a gating moderate Tatar Islam—sits function of the flagging ideological opposite an imposing mosque, the allure of traditional, Tatar Islam. To largest Wahhabi place of worship in be sure, this moderate, assimilation- the republic. The juxtaposition serves ist interpretation of the religion still as a telling reminder to all who visit has its proponents,22 and it remains that the established religious order in the brand of Islam officially endorsed the region is being challenged, and and embraced by the Russian state. that, while Tatar Islam is increasingly But as conversations with regional seen as stagnant, its radical counter- religious experts quickly make pain- part is on the march. fully clear, the movement as a whole today lacks a compelling overarching Hard power, not narrative that appeals to the region’s smart power Muslim youth. More than anything else, this Islamists, by contrast, do—a proliferation of Islamic radicalism in fact evidenced by the growth of Russia underscores the bankruptcy “Wahhabi” grassroots activism in of the Kremlin’s approach to counter- the form of social organizations, terrorism. For years, Russia’s lead- spiritual retreats and informal youth ers have banked on a hard-power gatherings.23 But the growing cur-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 57 Ilan Berman

campaign against Islamic radical- tallies offered by Moscow, however, ism in their hinterlands, hoping that are more modest.) Over time, these overwhelming force would pacify security operations—and a corre- the country’s restive republics. In sponding lack of serious, sustained doing so, they also have gambled that investment in grassroots prosperity their policies, however bloody, would and civil society in the Caucasus— remain popular so long as ordinary have led to widespread disaffection Russians believed the Islamist threat with Moscow. The feeling, more- to be both marginal and distant. Yet over, is increasingly mutual; as the a steady stream of terrorist incidents Carnegie Moscow Center’s Alexei in recent years—most prominent Malashenko has put it, most Rus- among them the 2002 hostage taking sians have come to see the Caucasus at Moscow’s Nord-Ost theater, the as their “internal abroad”—an area 2004 Beslan school massacre, and qualitatively different from the rest of the 2009 bombing of the Moscow Russia, which must be pacified rather metro—have put the lie to that claim. than engaged.27 The January 24th attack at Domode- Runaway regional corruption dovo was but the latest in this bloody plays a large role in this disaffection. chain of events. Over time, the Russian government has come to rely on a succession of Kremlin-approved strongmen to Russia’s success or failure vis-à-vis maintain local order in its majority- radical Islam is likely to serve as Muslim republics—and to preserve a barometer for the character of their allegiance to Moscow. It has the state writ large. By extension, also subsidized the lion’s share of their expenses; estimates suggest it will dictate what kind of Kremlin the Kremlin currently provides Washington will be forced to deal between sixty and eighty percent with in the years ahead. of the operating budgets of regional republics such as Chechnya.28 But accountability and transparency Why have Russian efforts to have lagged far behind. Not sur- combat Islamic radicalism so far prisingly, corruption and graft have failed? Much of the problem lies in proliferated, and the Caucasus has the way Moscow conceptualizes its gained global notoriety for its crimi- struggle with Islamic forces. Indeed, nality and lawlessness. while some in Russia recognize the While hard numbers are difficult need for an “intellectual war” against to come by, President Medvedev him- Islamic extremism,25 the Kremlin’s self has identified regional corruption approach to the issue remains over- as so pervasive and destabilizing as to whelmingly kinetic in nature. The be “a major threat for national secu- Russian military’s engagement in the rity.”29 In response, Russian officials Caucasus over the past two decades have proposed an array of remedial can best be described as a scorched measures intended to make regional earth policy that has left more than governments more transparent and a hundred thousand dead. (In 2005, accountable.30 But these steps remain an unofficial Chechen estimate mostly notional; substantive changes placed the death toll from the two to entrenched cronyism, experts say, Chechen wars at 160,000.26 Official are exceedingly hard to find.

58 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Caliphate Comes Home

What is clear, however, is that not long ago, a further deterioration this status quo is unsustainable. One of Russia’s internal security situation reason is demographics. Russia’s “may invoke public safety to justify population is declining precipitously. the further restriction of civil liberties Even under optimistic predictions, it and concentration of power inside the is estimated that the country’s over- Kremlin.”33 Russia’s success or failure all population will constrict by more vis-à-vis radical Islam, in other words, than 20 million people over the next is likely to serve as a barometer for the four decades, potentially bottom- character of the state writ large. By ing out at just 116 million by 2050.31 extension, it will dictate what kind of Pessimistic forecasts peg that figure Kremlin Washington will be forced to much lower: at 100 million souls by deal with in the years ahead. the middle of this century. But this decline isn’t uniform. Negative demo- graphic trends have hit Russia’s Slavs The United States has a vested the hardest. Russia’s Muslim popu- interest in helping the Russian lation, by comparison, is thriving. government plot a constructive According to official estimates, Rus- sia’s Muslims, who currently account course that engages—rather than for some fifteen to twenty percent of alienates—its Muslim population, the country, will swell to a third or even as it reduces the appeal more in twenty years. By the middle of Islamist ideologies within the of the century, officials in Moscow predict, they will make up the major- Russian Federation. ity of all Russians.32 Time, in other words, is not Needed: a reset on working in Moscow’s favor. Russia’s radical Islam already-unpopular counterterrorism For the United States, Russia’s strategies are likely to become all the Islamist crisis represents a distinct more so in the years ahead, as the opportunity. Since taking office, the community most directly affected Obama administration has made a by them becomes increasingly large “reset” of relations with the Kremlin and vocal. At the same time, Russia’s a central part of its foreign policy. But swelling Muslim cohort represents the hook upon which it has chosen to an inviting audience for Islamist hang this new relationship—strate- groups and foreign radicals—par- gic arms control—does not address ticularly given the Kremlin’s system- what is the most pressing concern for atic failure to meaningfully engage the Russian leadership. These days, its Muslim minority on a societal and officials in Moscow are preoccupied economic level. above all else with stabilizing their All of which should matter a turbulent periphery, and preventing great deal to the United States. Rus- the incursion of radical Islamic forces sia’s inability to contain the radical into the Russian heartland. Islamist forces now active within its Counterterrorism, moreover, borders could lead to an accelera- represents one of the very few areas tion of its drift away from democratic where Moscow and Washington see values—and toward totalitarianism. eye to eye. Although there is con- As scholars Charles King and Rajan siderable evidence that significant Menon pointed out in Foreign Affairs

The Journal of International Security Affairs 59 Ilan Berman differences remain in Russian and In other words, if America wants American attitudes toward arms a real reset in relations with Russia, reductions, nuclear modernization one that truly brings Moscow and and missile defense—the three Washington closer together, it would topics that cumulatively make up do well to focus on the shared strug- the crux of the current bilateral dia- gle against radical Islam. There it is logue between the two countries— likely to find far more fertile soil for commonality on the threat posed lasting cooperation with the Kremlin by Islamic extremism is a good deal than that which is currently being easier to find. While some diver- tilled by the White House. gences exist (most notably in the case of Iran, which the United States sees as a global threat and Russia continues to support as a strategic partner), the overall characteriza- tion of Islamism as a national secu- 1. Authoritative statistics are difficult to come by, but some tentative metrics are available. rity challenge in Washington and As of 1989, scholars estimate, Muslims Moscow is strikingly similar. made up some 19.2 percent of the overall This synergy has already Soviet population of nearly 287 million. See provided a limited basis for coop- Daniel Pipes, “The Problem of Soviet Mus- lims,” Asian Outlook (Taipei), March-April eration. Fears of the potential desta- 1991, http://www.danielpipes.org/206/the- bilizing regional effects of a Taliban problem-of-soviet-muslims. The breakup resurgence have led the Russian of the USSR, however, constricted that government to adopt a supportive number precipitously, and only around 10 million remained in post-Soviet Russia attitude toward Coalition opera- (accounting for less than six percent of the tions in Afghanistan, for example. country’s 148-million-person population). But a broader, sustained dialogue See Jonah Hull, “Russia Sees Muslim Popu- regarding the threats posed by radi- lation Boom,” Al-Jazeera (Doha), January 13, 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/eur cal Islam—and how Washington ope/2007/01/2008525144630794963.html. can help Moscow better address its 2. Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat Islamist challenge through economic, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 31. social and political initiatives—is still 3. For an in-depth account of this trend, see Paul Murphy, The Wolves of Islam: Russia mostly notional. and the Faces of Chechen Terror (London: It shouldn’t be. How Russia Brassey’s, 2004). responds to the growing challenge to 4. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, 36. its security and stability posed by radi- 5. Ibid., 36-37. 6. Ibidem, 38-29. cal Islam today will determine a great 7. Jim Nichol, Stability in Russia’s Chechnya many things, from the character of the and Other Regions of the North Caucasus: Russian government itself to whether Recent Developments (Washington, DC: the country’s swelling Muslim minor- Congressional Research Service, January 27, 2010), 10-11, http://assets.opencrs.com/ ity emerges as a threat to it—and to rpts/RL34613_20100127.pdf. the region. The United States has a 8. See, for example, Alexander Litvinenko and vested interest in influencing these Yuri Felshtinsky, Blowing Up Russia: The decisions, and in helping the Russian Secret Plot to Bring Back KGB Terror (New York: Encounter Books, 2007). government plot a constructive course 9. “Obituary: Chechen Rebel Khattab,” BBC, that engages—rather than alien- April 26, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ ates—its Muslim population, even as europe/1952053.stm. it reduces the appeal of Islamist ideolo- 10. “Chechen Rebel Chief Basayev Dies,” BBC, July 10, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ gies within the Russian Federation. hi/5165456.stm.

60 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Caliphate Comes Home

11. Tony Halpin, “Chechen Rebellion Has Been 24. “Prichinoy Otstavki Muftia Tatarstana Crushed, Says Kremlin,” Sunday Times Nazuyvaiut ‘Kompromisi i Pokrovitelstvo (London), April 17, 2009, http://www.times- Salafitam’ [‘Compromise and Deference to online.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/arti- Salafists’ Identified as the Reasons for the cle6108444.ece. Resignation of Tatarstan’s Mufti], Regnum, 12. Statistics compiled by the Center for Stra- January 14, 2011, http://www.regnum.ru/ tegic & International Studies, as cited in news/fd-volga/tatarstan/1364425.html. “Chechnya,” New York Times, October 19, 25. See, for example, “Pamfilova: Kremlin 2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/ Enables ‘Endemic Corruption’ in North international/countriesandterritories/rus- Caucasus,” The Other Russia, April 23, 2010, siaandtheformersovietunion/chechnya/ http://www.theotherrussia.org/2010/04/23/ index.html. pamfilova-kremlin-enables-endemic-corrup- 13. Luke Harding, “Islamist Rebels Launch tion-in-north-caucasus/. Deadly Attack on Chechen President’s Vil- 26. “Chechen Official Puts Death Toll for 2 lage,” Guardian (London), August 29, 2010, Wars at up to 160,000,” New York Times, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/ August 16, 2005, http://www.nytimes. aug/29/chechnya-president-islamist-attack. com/2005/08/15/world/europe/15iht- 14. Simon Shuster, “Chechen Terrorists, Despite chech.html. a Schism, Come Back Ferociously,” TIME, 27. Alexei Malashenko, as cited in “U Nikh October 21, 2010, http://www.time.com/ Tut Portreti Putina, Medvedeva, No Oni za time/world/article/0,8599,2026737,00. Shariat [Here they have portraits of Putin html. and Medvedev, but believe in Sharia],” Slon. 15. Matthias Schepp, “Anarchy in Dagestan: ru, December 3, 2009, http://slon.ru/arti- Islamists Gain Upper Hand in Russian cles/203931/. Republic,” Der Spiegel (Hamburg), July 30, 28. Charles King and Rajan Menon, “Prison- 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/ ers of the Caucasus,” Foreign Affairs, July/ world/0,1518,709176,00.html. August 2010, 31. 16. “Sotseologi: 30% Molodezhi Dagestana Kho- 29. “Russia’s Medvedev: Caucasus Corrup- tyat Zhite v Religioznom Gosudarstve [Soci- tion Threatens State,” Reuters, May ologists: 30% of Dagestan’s Youth Wants 19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/arti- to Live under a Religious Government],” cle/2010/05/19/idUSLDE64I2GB; “Medve- Regnum, January 11, 2011, http://www. dev Advocates Tough Corruption Measures regnum.ru/news/polit/1363203.html. for North Caucasus,” Russia Today, May 17. Nichol, Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and 19, 2010, http://rt.com/politics/medvedev- Other Regions of the North Caucasus, 13. measures-corruption-caucasus/. 18. Author’s interviews, Kazan, Russia, Decem- 30. “Russia’s Medvedev: Caucasus Corrup- ber 20-21, 2010. tion Threatens State,” Reuters, May 19. Yana Amelina, “Djihad v Tatarstane [Jihad 19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/arti- in Tatarstan],” Zvezda Povolzhya (Kazan), cle/2010/05/19/idUSLDE64I2GB; “Medve- December 2, 2010. dev Advocates Tough Corruption Measures 20. Ranis Islamov, “Ufa Zamedlennogo Deist- for North Caucasus,” Russia Today, May viya [Ufa in Slow Motion],” Russkiy Repor- 19, 2010, http://rt.com/politics/medvedev- tyor (Moscow), July 26, 2010, http://www. measures-corruption-caucasus/. rusrep.ru/2010/28/baskiriya/. 31. “Aging Population Worry for Russia,” New 21. “Alleged Islamic Extremists Detained Zealand Herald, February 13, 2011, http:// in Bashkortostan,” Radio Free Europe/ www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article. Radio Liberty, February 8, 2011, http:// cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10705944. www.rferl.org/content/bashkortostan_ 32. “Cherez polveka Musulmani v Rossii Mogut islamists/2301430.html. Stat Bolshenstvom – Posol MID RF [In 22. Of these, perhaps the most well-known Half a Century, Muslims in Russia Could (albeit not the most mainstream) is Raphael Become the Majority – Russia’s OIC Ambas- Khakimov of the Tatarstan Academy of Sci- sador],” Interfax (Moscow), October 10, ences. Khakimov’s views on the compat- 2007, http://www.interfax-religion.ru/ ibility of Islam and modernity, and his ideas islam/print.php?act=news&id=20767. about “Euro-Islam,” are detailed in Raphael 33. King and Menon, “Prisoners of the Cauca- Khakim, Ternistuy Put k Svobode [The sus,” 23. Thorny Path to Freedom] (Kazan: Tatarstan Book Press, 2007). 23. Author’s interview with regional expert on radical Islam, Kazan, Russia, December 20, 2010.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 61 Smart people solving hard problems

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Gal Luft

y any yardstick, Russia is an energy superpower. The country has the world’s largest conventional reserves of natural gas (23.7 percent of Bthe world’s total) and the seventh-largest proven oil reserves. It also has gigantic coal reserves, second only to those of the United States. Large unexplored areas in Eastern Siberia and the Arctic would no doubt add a great deal of hydrocarbons to Russia’s reserve base. Russia’s production level is in accordance with its reserves; in 2009, Russia accounted for 17 per- cent of the world’s gas production and 13 percent of its oil output, surpass- ing even Saudi Arabia.1 With a declining population and sluggish economic growth, oil and gas revenues are an important part of Russia’s economy.

But for the Kremlin, energy is far more than simply a source of income. In fact, hydrocarbon revenues make up only 17 percent of Russia’s GDP, and that figure is projected to fall to 13 percent by 2020.2 Rather, for Russia, energy is first and foremost an instrument of foreign policy. In recent years, Russia has showed no compunction about using its energy resources as a tool of coer- cion and intimidation against its central and east European neighbors, includ- ing Belarus, Poland, the Czech Republic, Georgia and, most notably, Ukraine. Russia has done its utmost to maintain its dominance over Europe’s energy markets, controlling existing energy corridors and downstream facilities while disrupting European efforts to construct alternative supply routes through divide-and-conquer tactics.

Gal Luft is Executive Director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Secu- rity (IAGS). He is co-author of Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century (Praeger, 2009) and Turning Oil into Salt: Energy Independence through Fuel Choice (Booksurge, 2009). Gal Luft

Russia’s energy shenanigans inflicted, and can therefore resolve have become a source of anxiety in itself through different choices in Europe, and in their effort to weaken the EU’s energy policy. The strong Moscow’s grip some European coun- Trans-Atlantic relations between tries have tried to convince suc- Europe and the United States should cessive U.S. administrations that not dictate blind American support Europe’s strategic dependence on for the EU’s energy security inter- Russia threatens U.S. vital interests. ests. Neither should they mask the In response, they argue, the United benefits and opportunities that some States should throw its weight of the components of Russia’s strat- behind pipeline projects aimed at egy hold for Washington. circumventing Russia’s territory. Over time, these efforts have cre- The method to ated a near-consensus in Washington Moscow’s madness that America has a vested interest Contrary to popular belief, Russia in Europe’s energy security, and is much more of an oil exporter than that Europe and the United States a gas exporter. In 2009, Russia pro- should work together to mitigate the duced 10 million barrels per day adverse effects of Europe’s energy (mbd) of oil, while consuming only dependency on Russia. Some experts 2.7mbd. This means that 73 percent have proposed that the United States of its crude production was exported work with European governments or processed into petroleum products, to apply anti-monopoly legislation half of which were sent abroad.5 By to Russian government-owned com- contrast, when it comes to gas, most of panies if Moscow continues to deny Russia’s production remains at home. upstream access to Western compa- 3 In 2009, Russia consumed 390 billion nies. Others have gone even further, cubic meters (bcm) of the 475 bcm it calling on NATO to invoke its mutual produced, leaving only 12 percent of defense clause against Russia in the 6 4 total production for exports. To free event of an energy supply cutoff. more natural gas for exports, Russia aspires to buy gas from its neighbors Russia’s energy shenanigans have and has implemented since 2006 a new become a source of anxiety in energy strategy to augment domestic Europe, and in their effort to power generation with coal.7 weaken Moscow’s grip some Despite all that, Russia’s geopo- litical power is derived much more European countries have tried from exporting gas than oil. The to convince successive U.S. reason so much attention is paid to administrations that Europe's gas is that it is far less fungible a com- modity than oil. Oil can be exported strategic dependence on Russia via tankers all over the world and sup- threatens U.S. vital interests. pliers can be shifted at will, so that no one supplier can hold too much Yet, while Russia is certainly a power over any given consumer. The challenge for Europe’s energy secu- gas trade, on the other hand, is tied rity, Moscow’s energy strategy is not to long-term contracts and expensive necessarily entirely detrimental to pipeline infrastructure or the avail- U.S. vital interests. Europe’s depen- ability of liquefied natural gas (LNG) dence on Russian gas is largely self- terminals. Once a consumer enters

64 The Journal of International Security Affairs Heavy Fuel a long-term contract with a supplier card that Moscow cannot be expected and billions of dollars are invested in to relinquish easily. Indeed, Russia is infrastructure, the relations become doing all it can to strengthen its stran- almost unbreakable. And while oil glehold over Europe’s energy market. prices are determined in the global At the core of Russia’s energy market, gas prices are decided in strategy is the effort to lock in supply direct negotiations between produc- by controlling the transnational pipe- ers and consumers, allowing export- line infrastructure. Throughout the ers to strong-arm their clients. 1990s, Moscow opposed the Baku- Another reason why, in Europe, Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline which gas is perceived as more of a prob- today allows Caspian oil to flow to lem than oil is that gas contributes to the southeastern Mediterranean Europe’s electricity supply, while oil coast of Turkey, as well the Odessa- doesn’t. Only two percent of OECD- Brody oil pipeline designed to bypass Europe’s electricity is generated Russia, connecting the Black Sea to from oil. Western Europe’s aversion European consumers. Russia is also to nuclear power on the one hand— opposed to (and works to under- France and Sweden being notable mine) the Nabucco project, which exceptions—and its reluctance to aims to bring Caspian gas to the expand coal-fired generation due heart of Europe from Turkey via Bul- to concerns about global warming garia, Romania and Hungary. It also on the other have caused the EU to opposes other proposals for a “south- increase the share of natural gas for ern corridor,” as well as the idea of power generation in its fuel mix sig- the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline that nificantly: from nine percent in 1990 would run under the Caspian Sea to roughly 20 percent today. (A few from Turkmenistan’s Caspian coast exceptions, like Belarus and Mol- to the Sangachal Terminal in Azer- dova, are 100 percent dependent.) baijan, where it would connect with Due to Europe’s insufficient domestic the existing pipeline to Erzurum in gas supply, today about half of EU gas Turkey (which in turn could be con- is imported either by pipelines or as nected to Nabucco). LNG. This figure is projected to grow Instead, Russia works to promote to more than 70 percent by 2030.8 projects that aim to maintain its hege- Of all the countries that supply mony over gas supply to Europe. Among gas to the EU, Russia stands the tall- them are the Nord Stream Pipeline est, supplying roughly one-third of which is planned to supply Germany EU imports. Some EU members, like by crossing the Baltic Sea, bypassing Finland and Estonia, are 100 percent Ukraine, Belarus and Poland and the reliant on Russia for their gas imports, already-operational Blue Stream Pipe- while others—like Germany, Poland line stretching from Russia’s North and Italy—are dependent on Russia Caucasus coast to Turkey. But Russia’s for between a third and full half of flagship project, and Nabucco’s main their imports. rival, is the planned South Stream In turn, Europe’s dependence Pipeline running from Russian terri- on Russian gas is the strongest geo- tory across the Black Sea to Bulgaria, political card the Kremlin owns. Gas bypassing both Ukraine and Turkey, exports allow Russia to retain some of and from there to northern Italy. the prestige and sway it has lost since Russia also recognizes the the demise of the Soviet Union. It is a importance of the former Soviet Cen-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 65 Gal Luft tral Asian republics as key energy ria-Algeria Trans-Saharan Pipeline is exporters, and works to ensure that constructed) but also from recently- Central Asian producers—especially developed technologies to extract Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and unconventional gas from shale, a Uzbekistan—do not develop indepen- resource with which Europe is well- dent energy relations with the Euro- endowed. If shale truly becomes the pean market. To limit Eurasia’s direct game changer many believe it to be, exposure to Europe, to attain a stron- this would have long-term implica- ger position in price negotiations tions for European gas markets and with the West and to retain more of energy security. The emergence of its own gas for future generations, this new resource would allow tran- Russia seeks to acquire a significant sition toward new pricing structures portion of Central Asia’s exported and could create disincentives for gas. Hence, Moscow supports the investment in the infrastructure proj- idea of connecting the Caspian Sea ects that Russia is promoting. to the Black Sea, either by expand- The Chinese market, on the other ing the existing Volga-Don Canal or hand, promises impressive growth through a project called the Eurasia and multiple new opportunities. China Canal, a canal four times longer than is already the world’s largest auto the Suez Canal that would traverse market and its oil imports are pro- the Russian regions of Dagestan, jected to double by 2030. Only eight Kalmykia, Stavropol and Rostov. The percent of China’s electricity is gen- latter project could have far-reaching erated from natural gas, compared to geopolitical ramifications. It would eighty percent from coal. China has allow landlocked countries in the Cas- recently become a net coal importer pian region, like Kazakhstan, Turk- and has recognized the health and menistan and Azerbaijan, to become environmental costs of high levels of maritime powers while ensuring that coal consumption. Its energy strategy Russia is the prime conduit for their prescribes a gradual shift to nuclear energy exports. It would also con- power, renewables and natural gas. tribute to the economic development All this ensures stronger energy rela- of Russia’s southern regions and the tions with its giant northern neigh- Caucasus. Perhaps most important, bor. Hence, in 2014, Russia and China it would open the door for expanded are slated to complete the 3,000-mile transit of cargo from China into the East Siberian-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) Black Sea and from there to Europe. pipeline, which could transport Rus- Which brings us to China. sian crude from Siberia not only to Russia has long been concerned with Daqing, a major oil production base in security of demand emanating from northeastern China, but also to other Europe. Moscow is aware of Europe’s Asian destinations—and potentially to attempts to not only reduce its depen- the U.S. market as well. Moscow and dence on Russia’s hydrocarbons Beijing are also in discussions about specifically but also dependence on plans to supply Russian gas to China. fossil fuels in general, due to global In total, according to Russia’s energy warming considerations. Even within strategy, by 2030 Asian markets, led the gas sector, Russian gas faces new by China, are expected to boost their challenges not only from LNG and share of Russian gas exports to twenty gas piped from North Africa (and percent from practically zero in 2008.9 potentially from Nigeria, if the Nige-

66 The Journal of International Security Affairs Heavy Fuel

The U.S. response The devil we know Since the 1990s, Washing- Washington should ponder the ton’s position toward the Russian- following question: if Europe were to European energy dilemma has been reduce its dependence on Russia, who highly sympathetic to the Europe- would fill the gap? When it comes to ans, particularly as it pertains to gas, Central Asian and North African its new Central and East European exporters could certainly play a grow- allies. Considering the fact that the ing role in displacing Russia’s energy, European Commission and many but only one country has the magni- Western European governments tude of gas reserves that can be piped have shied away from ruffling Rus- to Europe and fill Russia’s shoes. That sia’s feathers by being overly sup- country is Iran, home to the world’s portive of the energy concerns of second-largest reserves of natural gas. Central and East European states, Iran’s geographical location allows it one could argue that the United to connect to almost any pipeline proj- States has been more European ect originating in Central Asia, Turkey than the Europeans in its response or the Persian Gulf. Internationally to Russia’s aforementioned energy isolated, Iran has a strategic interest strategy. The United States was a in making Europe dependent on its staunch supporter of the BTC pipe- gas. Such dependency would provide line from the time it was first pro- diplomatic immunity for the clerical posed by Turkey in 1992 until its regime in Tehran. completion in 2005. This position Iran is already promoting the was based on the assumption that Persian Pipeline project to bring gas U.S. interests would be well-served from its South Pars field to the heart of if the Central Asian states achieved Europe through Turkey and onward to a greater degree of economic and Greece and Italy. If constructed, this political independence from post- pipeline is expected to deliver 20.4 Communist Russia. A similar ratio- bcm per year. Obviously, the United nale has spurred the United States States would oppose such a project, to support two projects currently which would give Iran access to the being erected to bypass Russia, the European market. And under the cur- Odessa-Brody oil pipeline and the rent international sanctions regime, Nabucco gas pipeline. it is highly unlikely that the Islamic Even if there was a unified Euro- Republic could secure the funds to pean position on these projects, it does build it. A more realistic outlet for not mean there is a complete overlap Iran’s gas, therefore, is Nabucco. U.S. between European and U.S. interests. support for the project comes with Nor does it dictate that Washington the caveat that no Iranian gas should is compelled to side with Europe in supply the pipeline. But in reality, once curbing Russian control over Europe’s Nabucco is constructed, it will be only energy market. U.S. interests are a matter of time before Iranian gas wider and more global than those of becomes a sought-after commodity. Europe, and one should consider how Another issue regarding Nabucco taking Europe’s side—and no doubt that Washington should consider is upsetting Moscow in the process— the role of Turkmenistan. European would impact America’s overall eco- proponents of the project have courted nomic and geopolitical interests. Turkmenistan, Central Asia’s biggest reserve holder, as a potential supplier

The Journal of International Security Affairs 67 Gal Luft

for the pipeline. This has provoked States is desperately trying to boost. feverish Russian diplomacy to keep TAPI’s most important attribute is Moscow’s grip over Turkmen gas that it would essentially block Iran’s intact. But despite Russia’s opposi- effort to connect its gas fields to the tion, in November 2010 Turkmenistan Indian market. offered to deliver 40 bcm of gas annu- For the same reason, Iran wishes ally to Europe through Nabucco, put- to supply Europe it also eyes the vast ting wind into the sails of the project. Indian market and hopes to make hun- Turkmenistan has also endorsed the dreds of millions of energy-poor Indi- Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which would ans dependent on its gas. For years, connect its gas to Nabucco. Iran has been pushing for a pipeline that would connect Iran, Pakistan and If Europe were to reduce its India (the IPI Pipeline), and in March 2010 Iran and Pakistan signed a his- dependence on Russia, who would toric deal to begin construction of the fill the gap? When it comes to gas, route. Both Pakistan and Iran, each Central Asian and North African for its own reasons, would like the exporters could certainly play a pipeline to extend to India. For now, however, India is unwilling to extend growing role in displacing Russia’s the pipeline into its territory. But with energy, but only one country has 400 million Indians currently lacking the magnitude of gas reserves that access to basic electricity, and an economy growing at ten percent per can be piped to Europe and fill year, the temptation of joining the Russia’s shoes: Iran. project is likely to be too difficult to resist indefinitely. On its face, therefore, it seems During the years of the Bush that Ashgabat’s announcement puts administration, the United States to rest concerns among Nabucco brought heavy pressure on New skeptics that there would not be suffi- Delhi and Islamabad to spurn the IPI cient gas to fill the pipeline. But while pipeline project. But by supporting American cheerleaders of Nabucco Nabucco and by giving a nod to Turk- applauded Ashgabat’s move, directing menistan to divert its gas to Europe, Turkmenistan’s gas to Europe does the United States not only compro- not necessarily serve U.S. interests. mises its relations with Russia but Washington would be better served also facilitates the creation of not one if that gas was instead directed south but two new economic lifelines for to the 1,000-mile Turkmenistan- Iran: one to Europe and the other to Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline South Asia. This is inconsistent with (TAPI), which would extend from Washington’s declared foreign policy the Dauletabad gas field in Turk- of improving relations with Moscow menistan along the highway through while isolating Tehran. Alternatively, Herat, Helmand and Kandahar in by joining forces with Russia, which Afghanistan, to Quetta and Multan in has expressed its interest in financ- Pakistan, and on to the Indian border ing TAPI,10 the United States can town of Fazlika. If built, TAPI would help shape the geopolitics of energy contribute to the economies of all in South Asia is a way that helps eco- four countries, and particularly to the nomic development of its allies in the Afghan economy, which the United region while undermining Iran.

68 The Journal of International Security Affairs Heavy Fuel

Feeding our habit the Arctic Ocean to Alaska and on Additionally, before doing to the contiguous 48 states. If the Europe’s bidding by embarking on United States is to tighten its energy policies that undermine Russia’s inter- relations with Russia, Washington ests, Washington should consider what should consider carefully to what Russia could mean for its own energy end and to what degree it is willing security. If one looks at the geopolitics to upset Russia’s energy interests in of energy, there are reasons to believe Europe at a time when its own reli- that the United States is likely to be ance on Russian energy is growing. more reliant on Russian hydrocarbons, particularly oil, than it is today. Other Scramble for the Arctic than Canada, America’s top oil suppli- In pondering its approach toward ers are all facing great uncertainties. Russia, Washington should also keep Oil production in Mexico, America’s its eyes on the 21st century’s big second-largest supplier, is in steep prize: the energy potential of the decline and within a few years the Arctic. According to U.S. government country could cease exporting oil. The figures, the Arctic holds as much third, Nigeria, is struggling with divi- as 90bn barrels of undiscovered oil, sion, political violence, and an inhos- and has as much undiscovered gas pitable investment climate, and its as all the reserves known to exist in production is in decline. Down the list, Russia.11 The Arctic, however, should Saudi Arabia, with its ailing monarchs be viewed not only as an energy-rich and a rising Iranian rival, is facing region but also as a new conduit for political uncertainty; Venezuela’s oil U.S.-Russia trade relations. The melt- industry is bruised from abuse and ing ice permits navigation several mishandling by its president, Hugo months a year not only along the Chávez, and the country’s production Northern Sea Route but also along is likewise in decline. Compared to all the northern coasts of North America of those suppliers, Russia seems like a (the Northwest Passage). paragon of stability. Russia fully recognizes the stra- Despite the fact that the United tegic importance of the region. Sev- States and Russia are respectively eral milestone events demonstrate the world’s number one oil importer that, for Moscow, the scramble for and exporter, for most of the years the Arctic has already begun. In 2007, since the Second World War geog- in a symbolic move, a Russian sub- raphy has set them apart when it marine planted a flag on the Arctic comes to energy trade. This is now seabed more than two-and-a-half changing rapidly. Until 1994, U.S. miles beneath the North Pole. In May crude imports from Russia stood 2008, Russia announced plans to build at zero. Today, Russia is already eight floating nuclear power stations America’s 6th-largest supplier of to supply energy for Arctic oil and gas crude and petroleum products, ship- operations. Then, in September 2010, ping to the United States, depend- the first commercial supertanker ing on the month, between 500,000 sailed from Murmansk in Russia to and 800,000 barrels per day. As the Ningbo in China through the forbid- world’s politics change, so does its ding waters of Russia’s Arctic pas- geography. The opening of the north- sage. The new navigation route would ern sea route will allow for grow- cut by half the traditional route, which ing imports of Russian oil across passes through the Suez Canal.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 69 Gal Luft

The future of the Arctic is uncer- in strengthening Europe’s energy tain. This is mostly because the Arctic security in ways that do not openly powers—Canada, the United States, challenge Russia’s interests or that Russia and the Nordic countries of empower America’s enemies. For Norway and Denmark—have not final- example: the United States could ized their strategic concepts regard- help Europe alleviate the need for ing the region. The UN Law of the Russian gas imports through LNG Sea Convention (UNCLOS), to which exports to European terminals and all countries involved but the United by cooperating with European gov- States are parties, determines that ernments in the commercialization countries can lay claim to their Exclu- of shale gas recovery technologies. sive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 Shale gas is already transforming the miles from their continental shelves. energy scene in North America; with But Russia’s continental shelf is still some regulatory changes and invest- not delineated, as it is not yet clear how ments it can do the same in Europe. far its landmass reaches. As the Arctic The United States should also region becomes less forbidding, sev- realize that Europe’s predicament is eral countries have made moves to to a large extent self-inflicted, stem- claim or reinforce pre-existing claims ming from Europe’s fixation with to the waters or seabed of the Arctic, climate change coupled with its tra- and the United States and the Nordic ditional anti-nuclear posture. Europe countries will likely soon find them- has today 163 nuclear power plants selves in an increasingly assertive in operation. But many of those are race against Russia to exploit the Arc- aging, and new plants are not on the tic’s energy bonanza. horizon. Of the 86 nuclear reactors Despite the significant geopo- that will be put into operation world- litical and geo-economic interests the wide by 2017, only eight will be in United States has in the Arctic, Wash- Europe (Ukraine, Bulgaria, France, ington has treated the region with Finland and Slovakia).12 Countries insufficient resources and even less like Germany, Belgium, Poland, Aus- policy attention. Russia, meanwhile, tria, Italy and Hungary, all under the is pursuing a path of aggressiveness Russian boot, have neglected their and unilateralism. The number of nuclear sector. The UK, for example, icebreakers essential for safe naviga- has 19 reactors generating about 18 tion in the Arctic is one measure of percent of its electricity, and all but American neglect of the region. The one of these will be retired by 2023. United States has only two, com- Yet nuclear power has proven itself pared to Russia’s fleet of twenty-nine, as a clean and safe source of electric- seven of which are nuclear. Neglect- ity. If the environmentally conscien- ing the Arctic could be a costly mis- tious EU wishes to be less dependent take. The time to address the issue is on imported Russian gas, nuclear now, when the global energy markets power is the only realistic recourse. are well supplied, rather than later, As the world’s largest producer of when the cost of energy is higher and nuclear power, accounting for more resources are scarcer. than 30 percent of worldwide nuclear generation of electricity, the United Rethinking the equation States can collaborate with Europe None of the above means that in the development of new nuclear the United States cannot be helpful fuel cycles and in other policies that

70 The Journal of International Security Affairs Heavy Fuel pave the way for significant growth in wars; the battle for Europe’s energy nuclear capacity on the Continent. security should not be one of them. For the United States, Russia’s energy strategy is a mixed bag. On the one hand, it is characterized by heavy- handedness, coercion, unilateralism and anti-competitive behavior, all of which are abhorred by the United 1. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010. States and should not be condoned 2. “Hydrocarbon Revenues to Fall to 13% by any administration. On the other of Russia’s GDP by 2020,” RIA-Novosti, hand, some elements of Russia’s con- December 9, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/ duct, unsavory as they may be, actu- russia/20101209/161699364.html. 3. Ariel Cohen, “Europe’s Strategic Depen- ally serve U.S. interests. In more than dence on Russian Energy,” Heritage Founda- one way, Russia’s energy strategy tion Backgrounder 2083, November 5, 2007. keeps Iran from extending its tenta- 4. Judy Dempsey, “U.S. Senator Urges Use cles into major energy markets—and of NATO Defense Clause for Energy,” New York Times, November 28, 2006. http:// hence helps contain Iran’s role as a www.nytimes.com/2006/11/28/world/ growing power. Russia’s growing role europe/28iht-nato.3702073.html. in Asia’s energy markets also serves 5. Adnan Vatansever, “Russia’s Oil Exports: U.S. interests insofar as it helps reduce Economic Rationale Versus Strategic Gains,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace China’s dependence on the increas- Carnegie Papers 116, December 2010. ingly-unstable Middle East, thereby 6. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June reducing the risk of future U.S.-China 2010. conflict over access to the Persian 7. Kevin Rosner, Russia’s Coal: Europe’s New Energy Challenge, German Marshall Gulf. Russia is also the most important Fund, Climate and Energy Papers Series, non-OPEC oil exporter, and as such it February 2010, http://www.gmfus.org/ could serve as a counterweight to the galleries/pdf/GMF753520CE20Russian- oil cartel which the United States 20Coal20Rosner20030810.pdf. 8. “Natural Gas Supply and Demand: Long aims to weaken. Term Outlook to 2030,” Eurogas, n.d., http:// Unfortunately, current U.S. policy www.eurogas.org/uploaded/Eurogas%20 toward Russia fails to recognize all of long%20term%20outlook%20to%202030%20 those potential benefits. Instead, the -%20final.pdf. 9. “Russia Unveils $2 Trillion Energy Growth United States adheres to Cold War – Plan to 2030,” Reuters, November 26, 2009, era policies aimed at undercutting and http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKGEE- alienating Russia rather than focusing 5AP25J20091126. on areas where the two powers can col- 10. “Backing Grows from TAPI Pipeline,” UPI, December 20, 2010, http://www. laborate. The United States must be upi.com/Science_News/Resource- realistic about its ability to influence Wars/2010/12/20/Backing-grows-from- energy policies in Europe, Russia, and TAPI-pipeline/UPI-65331292853333/. Central Asia. As Ambassador Keith 11. Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Smith observed: “The speed and agility Arctic Circle, U.S Geological Survey, USGS on the part of Russia’s planners make it Fact Sheet 2008-3049, 2008, http://pubs. difficult or even impossible for the U.S. usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf. to mobilize sufficient European opposi- 12. World Nuclear Association, “Plans for New Reactors Worldwide,” January 2011, http:// tion to Moscow’s maneuvers, particu- www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf17.html. larly when faced with EU lethargy.”13 13. Keith Smith, Russia-Europe Energy Rela- Under such conditions, for the tions: Implications for U.S. Policy (Washing- United States to erode its relations with ton, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2010), http://csis.org/ Russia would be anything but smart. For files/publication/100218_Smith_RussiaEu- decades, America has fought Europe’s ropeEnergy_Web.pdf.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 71 Performance is essential

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Andrei Shoumikhin

rms trade is an area of crucial strategic importance to the Russian state. Already the world’s second-largest global exporter of weap- Aons,1 Russia uses revenues generated by its arms sales to maintain and modernize its military-industrial complex (MIC), conduct accel- erated modernization of the armed forces, and even help revitalize the national economy. But arms trade is a potent foreign policy tool for the Kremlin as well. The structure and destinations of Russian exports serve as an indicator of Moscow’s geopolitical preferences—and its ambitions.

Russian arms sales, however, are also a double-edged sword. The steady growth of this trade masks serious problems that may affect the functioning of the Russian economy in the future. Specifically, Russia appears to be exhausting its stocks of Soviet-developed and Soviet-made weapon systems and technolo- gies—equipment that, until recently, represented the bulk of its arms exports. Transitioning from this legacy technology to new and innovative research and design, and erecting the production base to do so, will be a huge challenge for the Russian military industry in the years ahead. Moreover, Russia in this regard faces powerful competition not only from traditional arms-exporting countries but also from new competitors (e.g., China) which offer comparable systems to international buyers at bargain basement prices. Many traditional recipients of

Dr. Andrei Shoumikhin is a Visiting Professor at Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. From 1996 to 2009, he worked as Senior Research Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fair- fax, Virginia. Earlier, from 1976 to 1996, Dr. Shoumikhin was head of the U.S. Regional Policy Department at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Andrei Shoumikhin

Soviet/Russian weapons, meanwhile, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and are less than reliable, having over time Latin America. become the subjects of international However, rebuilding arms sanctions and export limitations. exports as an effective economic and There is still another significant foreign policy tool has been a diffi- aspect of the problem: the internal cult undertaking. With the collapse structure of the Russian arms trade of the Soviet system of client-patron system. Over the past two decades, relations, Moscow lost many of the as Russia has transitioned to an oli- traditional markets for its weapons garchy, its weapons sector has as (namely, among Eastern European well. Currently, the Russian arms countries seeking membership in the trade is made up of an intricate European Community and NATO). pyramid of bureaucracies, compa- The worldwide demand for weapons nies, enterprises, design bureaus, also declined with the collapse of the and so forth, all of which are rig- USSR and the (temporary) abatement idly controlled by the Kremlin. Like of regional conflicts that followed. At other state-run and state-dominated the same time, Moscow discovered, monopolies, it serves the goal of preserving and strengthening Mos- States that were high on the list of cow’s ruling political elite. Soviet clients were either included in the category of radical regimes or have no resources for the pur- A post-Cold War slump chase of weapons. Relations with During the Cold War, observ- them are affected by international ers have noted, “The arms exports limitations – embargoes and sanc- of the Soviet Union were motivated tions. Because of UN embargos overwhelmingly by foreign policy on military-technical assistance and security considerations, often to to such former major Soviet cli- 2 ents in the Middle East as Libya the detriment of economic benefit.” and Iraq, they appear to be lost By contrast, the post-Soviet govern- for Russian military exports ments of Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin for the foreseeable future…3 and Dmitry Medvedev, driven by new market-oriented philosophies, tried In effect, many of Russia’s arms to look at economic and financial ventures met with opposition from the advantages more keenly. However, it West. Russia was criticized for sup- would be erroneous to assume that plying 12 MiG-29s to Sudan, where political and even ideological motiva- the government was believed to use tions have receded completely into the jets against its own people in the background. Especially under the Darfur region. Russia prompted the rule of Putin and Medvedev, Western concerns with its plans to Russia has been keenly aware of the sell Iskander mobile missiles and geopolitical context of its weapons Igla portable missiles to Syria, given trade. The goal of reasserting the that they could be used for attacks Russian Federation as a global power on Israel.4 And Russian companies requires increasing Russian clout in became the targets of U.S. sanctions various regions, most immediately for their military cooperation with those close to Russia’s borders but Iran.5 Moscow, in turn, interpreted also those where other global powers these developments as unfair com- invest most of their economic, finan- petition or the application of “double cial, political and military capital: standards” by the West.6

74 The Journal of International Security Affairs Guns and Butter

Another serious problem faced flowing out of the country freely to by Moscow was the rapid deteriora- benefit many of Russia’s nouveaux tion of the MIC during the anarchic riches, as well as foreign recipients and turbulent 1990s.7 By the end of Russian arms exports. of that decade, some 70 percent of One notable example relates to the Russian Federation’s military the transfer of the technology and budget was being spent “merely to licenses for the production of the maintain troops and bureaucrats, advanced Russian Su-27 fighter to leaving precious little to maintain- China under a 1995 contract worth ing and upgrading equipment.”8 an estimated $1.4 billion. Part of Revenues from arms exports were the funds from the deal were alleg- also shrinking rapidly, contributing edly siphoned off by former Deputy to the closing of design bureaus and Prime Ministers Oleg Soskovets and production facilities, and the termi- Anatolii Chubais, with Boris Yeltsin’s nation of R&D on advanced weapon approval, into foreign bank accounts, systems.9 Things were made even some of which were later tapped for worse by mismanagement and the Yeltsin’s 1996 re-election campaign.10 outright criminal cannibalization Russian weapon transfers to of MIC properties, both of which China serve as a good illustration were taking place on a massive scale of the multiple strategic and tacti- during Yeltsin’s tenure. So too was cal dilemmas facing the Kremlin the misappropriation of proceeds in its arms trade policy. In the early from the foreign sales of the remain- 1990s, under Yeltsin, Moscow made ing Soviet assets. Exactly how much several major steps toward Beijing in Red Army property ended up in the an attempt to paper over the painful world’s “grey” and black markets, legacy of the long-running Soviet- benefiting those who were supposed Chinese rift. Most notably, the two to be its custodians, will probably countries resolved their outstanding never be known authoritatively. But border and territorial problems, and it is telling that Victor Bout, the Rus- subsequently moved to reestablish sian reported to be the world’s larg- large-scale military-technical coop- est arms dealer (now awaiting trial eration. The partnership was one in New York on charges of interna- of mutual convenience; for Russia, tional trafficking), rose to promi- the PRC became a major source of nence during this murky period of badly needed foreign revenue. For Russian history. China, meanwhile, Russian weapons and military technologies served as Arming an adversary a springboard for its arms industry It is only by a stroke of luck of and weapons modernization. Beijing historic proportions that the system could thus effectively overcome the of “wild” state capitalism that pre- arms embargo imposed by Western vailed in Russia under Yeltsin, powers in the wake of the events at characterized by the fusion of cor- the Tiananmen Square in 1989. By rupt state bureaucracies with the March 1991, Russia had already criminal underworld, did not result signed the above-mentioned agree- in massive WMD (weapons of mass ment to sell twenty-four Su-27 fighter destruction) proliferation around the planes to China.11 world. Still, it is evident that other Throughout the 1990s, despite sophisticated weapon systems were assurances by the Russian Foreign

The Journal of International Security Affairs 75 Andrei Shoumikhin

Ministry that military and techno- In April 2004, during a regular logical cooperation with China was round of negotiations with the Rus- in keeping with the country’s inter- sian Defense Minister in Beijing, the national obligations and security Chinese called for a “new approach” interests,12 Russian arms producers in bilateral military-technical coop- and exporters sought “to sell vir- eration—one that would eliminate tually anything to anybody,” espe- any barriers for the supply of the cially China.13 The Treaty on Good most advanced Russian technologies Neighborly Friendship and Coopera- to PRC, and which would “assure tion between the Russian Federation access of Chinese specialists to the and the People’s Republic of China super-secret know-how of the Rus- codified by new Russian President sian MIC.”15 This position reflected Vladimir Putin and his Chinese coun- China’s growing ambitions to build terpart, Jiang Zemin, on July 16, 2001, up the strongest army in the world. helped expand bilateral military- In part, it could also be explained by technological ties significantly. the Chinese failure to successfully Combat aircraft have been the clone the most advanced Russian chief component of Russian deliver- weapon systems, such as the S-300 ies. Besides at least six dozen trans- air defense complex. continental Su-27 fighters, China had Eventually, the Russian expert purchased forty to sixty Su-30s—two- and policymaking communities seat multirole fighters capable (with began to develop second thoughts certain modifications) of carrying about military and technology trans- nuclear weapons. Other purchases fers to China. By the middle of the include naval vessels: Sovremennyi- last decade, a strong consensus class destroyers equipped with began to emerge that “the Chinese supersonic missiles; Kilo-636 diesel- conventional potential exceeds that powered submarines; S-300 surface- of the RF and in case of a conven- to-air missile air defense complexes; tional military conflict with China, T-72 tanks; Smerch multiple rocket Russia is bound to lose.”16 It was also launchers, technologies for advanced increasingly recognized that those gas centrifuges used in uranium transfers were helping turn Beijing enrichment; and MIRVed missiles. into Moscow’s fierce competitor in But the Chinese were not con- arms markets that were tradition- tent simply with procuring the most ally havens for Russian exports. advanced Russian weapon systems; The expert recommendations to the they wanted to produce them at home. Kremlin were clear: refrain from In 1995, China agreed to pay about selling the most advanced military $1.4 billion for the technology and technologies to Beijing for fear of licenses to manufacture the Su-27 at reducing the attractiveness of Rus- a factory in Shenyang province. At sian weapons abroad, and to prevent the time, it was reported that large arming a potential adversary.17 numbers of Russian scientists and engineers with long-term contracts Threading the needle were working in Chinese design with Tehran bureaus and defense plants. Chinese The case of Russia’s arms trade engineers were being trained at Rus- with Iran helps illustrate another type sian facilities, and numerous joint 14 of limitation for Moscow: an adverse production projects were under way. international context. Russia and Iran

76 The Journal of International Security Affairs Guns and Butter are close neighbors, and as such both of June 9, 2010). Shortly thereafter, countries are naturally interested in Russia was supposed to return $166.8 cooperative ties on a range of issues. million to Iran for non-delivery of the Moreover, the potential for economic systems. Penalties for breaking the cooperation in various areas, particu- contract could end up being severe. larly energy and weapon transfers, is However, while announcing the con- considerable. Iran is also important tinuation of talks over compensation for Russian security interests: Tehran payments for the cancellation of the can easily be a partner or opponent contract, Anatoly Isaykin, the head in regional conflicts involving the of Russia’s state arms manufacturer, Russian Federation directly and indi- Rosoboronexport, made clear that rectly (in the Levant, Afghanistan, Moscow didn’t see sanctions against Iraq, the Caucasus or Central Asia), Iran as the end of the story: “If we and in situations of internal ethnic receive orders [from Iran] for arms strife, such as Chechnya. that are not included in the list of However, particularly after sanctions, we will hold discussions Moscow secured the contract to com- on the matter.”21 plete the construction of a nuclear power plant at Bushehr,18 the “Ira- Hostile takeover nian factor” became a potent irritant The way Rosoboronexport and in Russia’s relations with the United other entities belonging to Russia’s States and other Western countries. arms sector are structured, and make Throughout construction at Bushehr, their decisions, should be of special Moscow had to face accusations of interest. During the 1990s, competi- indirectly helping Tehran to acquire tion over relatively stable sources of nuclear capability. Completing the foreign currency revenues between project19 was seen in Moscow as a different high-ranking politicians and guarantee of other Iranian orders, the power groups they represented both military and civilian, and as was cutthroat. As in other areas of proof of Russian reliability for other state regulation, corruption was per- Third World clients. Iranians peri- vasive. The Kremlin tried to deal odically approached Moscow with with these problems via its preferred requests for the resumption of mili- bureaucratic method—the reshuf- tary-technical cooperation. The Ira- fling of personnel and administrative nians were especially interested in reorganizations. Russian air defense systems, armor In 1994, while still under the and combat aircraft.20 presidency of Boris Yeltsin, the Finally, in late 2007, Russia and Ministry of Foreign Economic Rela- Iran concluded a contract on the tions was replaced by the new arms supply of five battalions of one of the export agency, Rosvooruzhenie most effective Russian air defense (State Company for the Export and systems, the S-300PMU-1, at a cost Import of Armaments and Military of some $800 million. However, in Equipment), ostensibly to streamline September 2010, Moscow was forced export policy and prevent misappro- to renege on the contract in order to priation of sales revenues. Just three abide by the fourth round of UN Secu- years later, in August 1997, Ros- rity Council sanctions levied against vooruzhenie was placed under the Iran over its nuclear program (UN supervision of a commission chaired Security Council Resolution 1929 by the Prime Minister. The agency

The Journal of International Security Affairs 77 Andrei Shoumikhin

was charged with foreign sales of trade sector. However, a major conse- arms and military equipment, while quence of these transformations was two more new agencies—Rossiiskie the emergence of a closeted elite of Tekhnologii (Russian Technolo- apparatchiks with their vested clan- gies) and Promeksport (Industrial nish interests and privileges. Export)—were set up to sell, respec- FSVTS is formally subordinated tively, licenses and used arms and to the Russian Defense Ministry, but spare parts. Reportedly, MIC enter- it operates under the direct orders prises complained bitterly about the of the President. Members of its top new “division of labor” that prevented executive body—the Commission all but a few them to negotiate their on Military-Technical Cooperation— own contracts and reduced their include key officials of the Russian hard currency earnings by allowing political and military establishment, the intermediary state agency to take among them the President and Prime a sizable commission.22 By the end Minister, the heads of the Federal of his administration, Boris Yeltsin Security Service and the Foreign was forced to put the entire system of Intelligence Service, the Secretary arms exports solidly under presiden- of the National Security Council, tial control.23 the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Affairs, Justice, Industry and Trade, Putin, strengthened central con- and other top government officials.26 trol over the Russian arms trade. It is unclear to what extent On November 4, 2000, Rosvooru- the military-technical cooperation zheniye was transformed by presi- bureaucracy in Russia is affected by dential decree into Rosoboronexport, corruption, a perennial Russian ill.27 becoming “the sole state interme- However, in any case, as a govern- diary agency for Russia’s military ment bureaucracy heavily dependent exports.”24 New oversight bodies on the will and whim of a handful of were introduced, eventually leading top leaders and administrators, it may to the emergence of a mammoth fed- be prone to adopting arbitrary deci- eral bureaucracy: the Federal’naya sions outside effective controls by sluzba po voenno-yekhnicheskomu other branches of power, the media sotrudnichestvu, or FSVTS (Federal and the public at large. Service on Military-Technical Coop- eration with Foreign States).25 In the Power corrupts years since, that agency has acquired At least for now, the combina- total control and supervision over all tion of “moderate” president Dmitry aspects of Russian military relations, Medvedev and hard-line Prime Min- including arms trade with foreign ister Vladimir Putin have made Rus- states and their respective organiza- sian arms export policy reasonably tions. FSVTS is a state-run monopoly accommodating to Western concerns similar to other state monopolies and pressures. For example, Moscow operated by the Kremlin, chief among continues to comply with international them Gazprom, the largest govern- sanctions against Iran and North ment-run extractor of natural gas in Korea on nuclear weapons matters. the world. For all practical purposes, Moreover, it now talks about building it appears that actual producers of up cooperative ties with NATO and weapons have benefited only margin- other Western countries, including ally from transformations in the arms in developing joint ballistic missile

78 The Journal of International Security Affairs Guns and Butter defense systems, combating terror- and effective, strong and well-trained ism and drug trafficking, and so forth. army manned by professional offi- In an unprecedented move, the Rus- cers and soldiers.”29 sian military establishment has even So the Russian Federation can demonstrated a readiness to purchase be expected to remain a leading Western weapons for its own armed arms exporter in the world in the forces (e.g., the French amphibious foreseeable future, because its econ- ships Mistral and Israeli unmanned omy and its politics demand it. But reconnaissance vehicles).28 specific aspects of Russia’s weapons However, it is unclear whether and technology trade will remain in these tendencies would continue flux. So too will Russia’s partners under potential future shifts, such as and clients, and the way Moscow Vladimir Putin’s reelection as Rus- interacts in the military-technical sian President. The concentration of sphere with other states. extreme power in one set of hands in Russia, and the absence of appro- priate checks and balances in the system of governance, has always been a recipe for unpleasant sur- prises. It is also unclear how Moscow would react to major changes in 1. Russian arms exports increased more than 140 percent in the period from 2001 to 2009, regional situations, such as the mas- when they hit $7.4 billion. Revenues for 2010 sive unrest and political transforma- were projected at $10 billion. See Mikhail tions now taking place in the Middle Beznosov, “Russia Set to Export $9-$10 East. If old regimes in these and Billion Arms Annually – Regulator,” RIA- Novosti (Moscow), February 15, 2010, http:// other regions succumb to a wave of en.rian.ru/russia/20100215/157887254. radicalism, regional instability will html. increase, and so will, predictably, 2. Robert H. Donaldson, “Domestic Influ- demands for new weapons. Russia ences on Russian Arms Sales Policy,” Paper presented to the 43rd Annual Meeting of naturally will be tempted to take the International Studies Association, New advantage of these political shifts at Orleans, Louisiana, March 24, 2002, http:// least to augment its arms trade. isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/donald- At the same time, to be able to son.html. 3. Alexander Kislov and Alexander Frolov, compete in global markets under Russia and the International Market of Weap- any kind of scenario, Russia will ons: Ideology and Practice (Moscow: Alfa- need to continue rebuilding its MIC. Bravo, 2008), 287-289. Developing and producing advanced 4. Natalya Hmelik, “Russian Arms Trade: A New Threat,” Global Politician, December weapon systems is a guarantee of the 12, 2005, http://globalpolitician.com/21470- modernization of the Russian armed russia-military. forces and continued high demand 5. For example, on August 4, 2006, the U.S. for Russian weapons abroad. Russian State Department announced sanctions against Rosoboronexport (and the Russian thinking is clear on this account: “No aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi) for alleged matter how peace loving we are, we violations of the Iran Nonproliferation Act need to be ready to defend our coun- of 2000, thereby barring U.S. companies try. This means paying attention to from dealing with those Russian entities for two years. Russian officials denounced the our Armed Forces and their needs, action as retaliation for their Venezuelan developing modern arms, giving our arms sales. In December 2006, over Rus- servicemen decent wages and living sian protests, the sanctions against Rosobo- conditions, and building a compact ronexport were reconfirmed for two more

The Journal of International Security Affairs 79 Andrei Shoumikhin

years (although sanctions against Sukhoi October 10, 2010, http://nvo.ng.ru/con- were lifted). See “Rosoboronexport (ROE),” cepts/2010-09-10/1_choice.html. globalsecurity.org, n.d., http://www.glo- 18. Germany, the original contractor of the balsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ Bushehr nuclear power plant, opted out rosoboronexport.htm. after the regime change in Tehran in 1979. 6. “Rosoboronexport Views U.S. Sanctions 19. The Russian Federal Atomic Energy As ‘Unfair Competition,’” Interfax-AVN Agency announced that the first reactor (Moscow), October 24, 2008, http://www. at the Bushehr NPP was to be loaded on istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStock- August 21, 2010. “Bushehr,” Global Security, News/articleid/2737670. n.d., http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ 7. According to Russian government figures, world/iran/bushehr.htm/. between 1991 and 1995, 2.5 million of the 20. Ivan Safronov, “Prospects for the Sale of defense sector’s 6.1 million employees Russian Weapons to Iran,” Kommersant departed. Despite this exodus, in 1996, only (Moscow), November 12, 2003. 10 percent of the industry’s capability was 21. “Russia Ready to Discuss Arms Sales being utilized. A large part of the orders that with Iran – Arms Exporter,” RIA-Novosti were placed by the Russian military went (Moscow), November 3, 2010, http://en.rian. unpaid; at the beginning of 1998, the gov- ru/mlitary_news/20101028/161115898. ernment owed 18.5 trillion rubles to defense html. enterprises. See Alexander Sergounin and 22. See Sergounin and Subbotin, Russian Arms Sergey Subbotin, Russian Arms Transfers to Transfers to East Asia in the 1990s, Chapter 3. East Asia in the 1990s (New York: Oxford 23. See “On the Military-Technical Coopera- University Press, 1999), 15-16. tion of the Russian Federation with Foreign 8. Michael Wines, “Putin Cuts Forces by 600,000, States,” Federal Law No 114-FZ of July 19, Promising Military Overhaul,” New York Times, 1998, http://www.fsvts.gov.ru/materials/ November 10, 2000, http://www.nucnews. 492A334D72F0E528C325745C00335DEF. net/nucnews/2000nn/0011nn/001110nn. html. htm#08. 24. “Rosoboronexport,” Wikipedia.org, n.d., 9. Russian arms sales to the Third World http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosobo - dropped dramatically in the wake of the ronexport. Soviet collapse, from $28.2 billion in 1986 to 25. Online at http://www.fsvts.gov.ru/mater $5.9 billion in 1991 and $1.3 billion in 1992. ials/55DCB9061695F057C325745C00358 See Eric Schmitt, “Arms Sales to the Third 7DC.html. World, Especially by Russia, Drop,” New 26. Online at http://state.kremlin.ru/commis- York Times, July 19, 1993. sion/1/statute. 10. See Stephen Blank, The Dynamics of Rus- 27. According to the independent organization sian Weapons Sales to China (Carlisle Bar- Transparency International, Russia fell from racks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic 79th place to 147th on the group’s Corrup- Studies Institute, March 1997). tion Perception Index during Mr. Putin’s 11. See Andrei Shoumikhin, “Sino-Russian presidency. See Transparency International, Relations,” National Institute for Public 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, n.d., Policy Working Paper, December 2004, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/ http://nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/ in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table. Publication%20Archive%20PDF/Decem- In the years of Mr. Medvedev’s presidency, ber%202004%20webpage.pdf. Russia has fallen further still, down to 12. G. Krasin, “Russia Needs Strong China,” the 154th place. See “Russian President Rossiya (Moscow) no.3, March 1997, 14. Dmitry Medvedev – Political Competi- 13. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Arms for China and tion Is Essential,” Vedomosti (Moscow), Russia’s National Security,” in Russia and January 26, 2011, http://www.vedomosti. the World Arms Trade (Moscow: Carnegie ru/newspaper/article/253776/politiches- Moscow Center, 1996), 135. kaya_konkurenciya_neobhodima_dmitrij_ 14. Sergounin and Subbotin, Russian Arms medvedev#ixzz1CAPNLNgb. Transfers to East Asia in the 1990s, 92. 28. “Russia, Israel Embark on Unprecedented 15. Ibid. Defense Cooperation Agreement,” Defense 16. Aleksei Khazbiev, “VTS Problems between Update, September 6, 2010, http://defense- Russia and China,” Ekspert (Moscow), May update.com/wp/20100906_israel-russia. 24, 2004. html. 17. See Alexander Khramchikhin, “Moscow 29. “Interview with Dmitry Medvedev,” Izvestiya Is Offered a Very Unpleasant Choice,” (Moscow), May 7, 2010, http://eng.kremlin. Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Moscow), ru/news/295.

80 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tbilisi in the Crosshairs

Giorgi Baramidze

s Georgia’s Vice Prime Minister and State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, I wish that I could dwell upon Georgia, Aand not Russia. If that were realistic, what would follow would be an account of the remarkable progress that my country has made toward regain- ing its historic place in Europe. And I would mention Russia only in passing, saying that we are moving forward with—as the Georgian people ardently desire—our largest neighbor as a partner. Regrettably, because of Russia’s del- eterious policies and actions, particularly over the last decade, reality demands that I explore Russia’s conduct toward Georgia, and the reasons behind it.

Before turning to that, I want to underscore that Georgia has chosen its own destiny without regard to the pressure on us from outside. That pressure, includ- ing the occupation of our territories, is, of course, tremendous. Notwithstanding, we have moved, we are moving and we shall move forward. We would like to do that as an Eastern European country and neighbor of a Russia that has also freely chosen its own destiny, so long as that destiny includes acting within the concert of nations, respecting international law and upholding human rights. Until such time as Russia can choose such a course, we believe that Geor- gia’s choice, Georgia’s effort, in some ways, sets an example for other countries now free of the Soviet yoke, including Russia. Georgia is succeeding, and if Geor- gia, which bore the full brunt of Soviet occupation, can succeed, then there is hope for every nation of the post-Soviet space and beyond. Perhaps that is one thing that irks some in Moscow.

The Honorable Giorgi Baramidze is Vice Prime Minister of Georgia and State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Giorgi Baramidze

We never flinched at the neces- We are part of Europe—cul- sary democratic, anti-corruption, turally, historically and politically economic, social and judicial reforms. through common values, principles The November 2003 Rose Revolu- and objectives. Our goal is to join tion kicked off the groundbreaking the Euro-Atlantic institutions, par- reforms that are now improving the ticularly the EU and NATO. This lives of Georgian citizens from every objective sets up a clear, visible walk of life. This is not only my asser- target and eventual membership tion, but also the conclusion of presti- will form an important guarantee of gious international organizations. continued democratic, political and economic development. The story of Russia’s geopolitical So why are the democratic reform efforts of a country of four- itch to control Georgia can be and-a-half million people, including traced back centuries. its decision to join NATO, such a prob- lem for Moscow? The problem did not Transparency International’s begin with the 2008 war or even with 2010 Global Corruption Barometer, the NATO Bucharest Summit—and it for instance, found that seventy- is closely tied to the nature of the cur- eight percent of Georgians believe rent Russian regime. that corruption has decreased over the last three years. The World Russia’s response Bank’s Doing Business report for The story of Russia’s geopolitical 2011 named Georgia as the world’s itch to control Georgia can be traced number one reformer from 2005 to back centuries. For example, to 1801, 2010 and ranked Georgia twelfth in when it annexed the Kingdom of Kar- the world for “ease of doing busi- tli-Kakheti to the Russian Empire. ness.” In addition, the European Or to February 15-25, 1921, when Bank for Reconstruction and Devel- the Russian Red Army invaded Geor- opment named Georgia as the least gia on a pretext. Or to April 9, 1989, corrupt country in Europe. The 2011 when Soviet soldiers hacked to death Index of Economic Freedom pub- twenty people demonstrating in sup- lished by the Wall Street Journal and port of Georgian independence. the Heritage Foundation ranks Geor- More recently, Russia’s assault gia twenty-ninth out of 179 countries can be seen in the period immedi- surveyed, ahead of half the countries ately following the Rose Revolution. in the European Union. Mikheil Saakashvili was inaugurated Of course, there is plenty of room as President on January 25, 2004, and for improvement—we know this— his first foreign policy move was to and many Georgians express their extend his hand to Russian President dissatisfaction, as they are free to do. Vladimir Putin. He was criticized at We have demonstrations, even large home for doing so, and western capi- ones. That said, I must point out that tals, particularly Washington, were the overwhelming majority of citizens puzzled. Putin, too, expressed his expresses satisfaction with the prog- goodwill—if only he could appoint ress that we are making. Most Geor- the senior security officials in the new gians have understood that political Georgian government. In particular, change must be brought about in the Putin wanted to retain Valery Kha- ballot box and not in the street. burzania—openly known to be the

82 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tbilisi in the Crosshairs

FSB rezident in Tbilisi—as Minister Rhetoric was followed by action. of State Security (a position, inciden- In March 2007, Russian helicopters tally, that has since been abolished). conducted a midnight raid against In short, Putin was all for good Georgian government buildings, relations, so long as President Saa- including a school, in Upper Abkha- kashvili and the new faces in Tbilisi zia, sometimes called the Kodori accepted that Georgia was, in real- Gorge. In July 2007, Russia decreed ity, an appendage of the Russian that it would suspend its participa- Empire. Naturally, Saakashvili tion in the Conventional Forces in refused. Instead, he appointed a truly Europe Treaty by year’s end, a move Georgian government and set about that would enable it to move military the daunting tasks of reclaiming forces around the North Caucasus Georgia’s independence, building and the Krasnoyarskiy Kray without a strong democracy and promoting foreign observation. A month later, a economic development. This hap- Russian fighter-bomber launched an pened when the idea of Georgia in anti-radar missile that landed in a NATO still evoked polite chuckles, field near the Village of Tsitelubani, and before more problems in South not far from Tbilisi. The apparent Ossetia emerged. target was a Georgian radar instal- Moscow, however, could not abide lation. The pattern of escalation was Georgia making a different choice, unmistakable. and a Russian campaign to cow Tbilisi The Russian attack of August ensued. We were accused of harbor- 2008, when it finally came, had been ing terrorists, although one of Presi- prepared well in advance. That Feb- dent Saakashvili’s first moves was to ruary, Putin was emphatic that there review border security and turn over would be a Russian response to West- to Russian authorities known terror- ern support for Kosovo’s unilateral ists wanted in Russia. In response, we declaration of independence. And received border incursions, airspace in April, just after the NATO Bucha- violations, sabotage, closed border rest Summit, Russia’s foreign minis- crossings, energy cutoffs and eco- ter said that his government “will do nomic and trade embargoes. Mean- everything” to prevent Georgia from while, Moscow decided to use the joining NATO. greatest leverage it had—the proxies In May, Russia deployed heavily on the ground in the Georgian terri- armed so-called peacekeeping troops tories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. in Abkhazia, and then sent others on Passports were provided, and nation- what it said was a humanitarian mis- ality granted, in order to set up a sion to repair the rail line between pretext of needing to defend Russian Sukhumi and Ochamchire. That rail citizens later. The proxy regimes also line would figure prominently in the received major transfers of weapons. eventual attack on Georgia. Mean- When none of this succeeded in while, improvements were made to derailing Georgia from its chosen the Bombora Airfield near Gudauta, course, Moscow became ever more which Russia claimed to have aban- bellicose. On February 10, 2007, at doned in accordance with its 1999 the Munich Security Conference, Istanbul commitments. Putin railed against the West and In June and July, two exercises American-dominated unipolarity simulated aspects of a war against in particular. Georgia and moved troops into place

The Journal of International Security Affairs 83 Giorgi Baramidze for the invasion. On July 8, coincid- Some 11,000 Russian troops and ing with a visit by U.S. Secretary border guards now occupy the Geor- of State Condoleezza Rice, Russian gian territories, building fortifications military aircraft violated Georgian and deploying more weapons—tanks, airspace. Unlike earlier incidents, armored personnel carriers, artil- this time the Russian government lery, multiple launch rocket systems, not only admitted the incursion, but surface-to-surface missiles, surface- also flaunted it. Its purpose, said the to-air missiles, and MiG-29 Fulcrum Russian Foreign Ministry, was “to fighter aircraft. cool hot heads in Tbilisi.” Clearly, Of particular interest, the Rus- the die had been cast. Cyber attacks sian Ministry of Defense announced on Georgian government sites last August the deployment of the and critical infrastructure simi- S-300 air defense system in Abkha- larly began in July and continued zia. Given that the Georgian Air throughout the conflict. Force, with a handful of helicopters I shall not here offer a blow- and Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack by-blow account of the war. Suffice aircraft, cannot pose any threat, one it to say that when Russia attacked can only conclude that the S-300s are Georgia, it came with pre-positioned there to control the air corridor from supplies, prepared logistics chains, the Black Sea into Georgia in case of two land fronts, a reserve force, a further Russian aggression. well-executed air target set, a major And, recently, there have been embarkation and debarkation of naval reports that offensive weapons like infantry and a naval blockade. Despite the BM-30 Smerch multiple launch all the ink that has been spilled specu- rocket systems and Tochka surface- lating on this matter, the August 2008 to-surface missiles—known in the war was not an accidental flare-up; it West as SS-21 Scarab—have been was a Russian plan. deployed in South Ossetia. Needless It is, moreover, still ongoing, to say, these military deployments albeit in another form. Two-and-a- go far beyond anything that could be half years after the conflict, Russia needed for legitimate defense. remains in violation of the August 12, But the real human tragedy is 2008, Cease-fire Agreement negoti- ethnic cleansing. Today, there are ated by French President Nicolas literally no ethnic Georgians left in Sarkozy in the name of the European South Ossetia. And the Georgian pop- Union. It has vetoed the continuation ulation still living in Abkhazia, mostly of the OSCE Monitoring Mission in the Gali region, which abuts terri- in South Ossetia and the United tory controlled by the Georgian gov- Nations Observer Mission in Georgia ernment, is under increasing pressure in Abkhazia. Consequently, the only designed to induce it to leave. Our best international eyes on the ground are estimate is that 26,000 people were those of the European Union Moni- forced to flee their homes as a result toring Mission—and they are not per- of the August 2008 war. They join the mitted to enter the Russian-occupied roughly half-million who were chased Georgian territories. To explain all away during the conflicts of the early this, Moscow invokes “changed cir- 1990s. These people watched loved cumstances;” that is, its illegal recog- ones killed, beaten or raped, their nition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia property stolen or destroyed, only as independent countries. because of their ethnicity.

84 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tbilisi in the Crosshairs

Of course, our goal is complete On the other hand, Russia is an restoration of our territorial integrity oligarchy in which political power and and the dignified return of all people wealth form a symbiotic (but perni- who were chased from their homes. cious) relationship. A free market of Meanwhile, we ask the international ideas or economy would destroy this community to use the terms “occupa- nexus of power; therefore, it must base tion” and “ethnic cleansing.” This is itself on internal repression and exter- not a rhetorical point, but a concrete nal aggression. Quite simply, Russia’s legal matter. International recogni- political establishment has not built tion of these facts gives the world a modern, democratic nation-state community the legal right to oblige because it cannot. Ironically, some in Russia to take responsibility for the the Russian opposition cite Georgian human rights of those people still reforms as examples of the course living in these occupied Georgian that their country should adopt. territories and the dignified return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. Russia is an oligarchy in which Using the term “occupation” will political power and wealth form underline that the status quo cannot a symbiotic (but pernicious) be sustained forever and will high- light to the Kremlin that the situa- relationship. A free market of ideas tion in Georgia is unacceptable and or economy would destroy this will be continually scrutinized by the nexus of power; therefore, it must international community. Using this base itself on internal repression language will also help push the Rus- sians back to the negotiating table. and external aggression.

Divergent paths Yet without a rational 21st Cen- Why is all of this happening? The tury direction, Russia falls back on explanation is, of course, complex, dreams of past empire and imagined but here is a simplified answer. enemies. The “near abroad,” the To say that Georgia and contem- “privileged sphere of influence,” and porary Russia have chosen different “spiritual space” are all reifications of courses is an understatement. Geor- the Russian Empire. Western penetra- gia—although its evolution is still tion and influence in their various per- far from complete—has chosen the mutations, meanwhile, have become path of democracy, free enterprise compelling (if imagined) enemies. and rule of law. Our political system Under this worldview, there cannot is a cacophony of voices—some quite be true sovereign states on Russia’s critical of our government—along periphery. Georgia, then, is viewed as with foreign advisors, investors and an acute threat because it offers both observers from scores of countries ideological and concrete alternatives and international organizations. Once to a new Russian Empire. a country goes down such a path, the Ideologically, Georgia is set- aspirations of its leadership must be ting a democratic example to other toward internal democracy and exter- countries in the region—and to the nal cooperation. This is what we mean people of Russia itself. Concretely, when we say that Georgian reforms Georgia is opening up the South Cau- are now irreversible. casus East-West Corridor to that free

The Journal of International Security Affairs 85 Giorgi Baramidze

market of ideas and economy. Objec- in the regions along the Georgian- tively speaking, that would be good Russian border. for the middle of the Eurasian conti- On tougher issues, such as Rus- nent, which, by the way, includes vast sia’s bid to join the World Trade Orga- swaths of Russia. But, though new nization, we also think there is room ideas and real economic opportuni- for common ground. In the long run, ties would benefit the vast majority of Russia’s accession to the WTO would people, they would threaten the Rus- be in Georgia’s interest too, so we are sian political establishment. prepared to discuss it. And we look In sum, Moscow perceives Geor- forward to Russia playing a major role gian success—not Georgia per se—as in settling the conflicts in our region. a threat that must be undermined. In this vein, we believe that Geor- And it fears NATO and the European gia joining NATO will foster peace- Union—again, not per se—but as ful resolution of the conflicts over forces that can inhibit Moscow’s abil- the Georgian territories of Abkhazia, ity to interfere in its former holdings. South Ossetia and the Akhalgori Dis- trict. Although our accession will no doubt evoke some sound and fury Moscow perceives Georgian from certain quarters, when the din success—not Georgia per se—as subsides everyone will realize that a a threat that must be undermined. non-threatening Georgia has joined And it fears NATO and the a non-threatening NATO. At that moment, our occupied territories will European Union—again, not per lose their value to Russia. At the same se but as forces that can inhibit time, we will attract the population Moscow’s ability to interfere in its now residing in them with our demo- cratic and economic development, former holdings. just as happened in Germany with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Squaring the circle In short, we are open for discus- This leads, finally, to the matter sion in all matters, great and small. of what to do. Nobody has a greater However, we will not be cowed into stake than Georgia in seeing Russia compromising our territorial integ- turn into a country that truly operates rity, internationally recognized bor- within the concert of nations, respects ders and sovereignty. international law and upholds human In the final analysis, it would be rights. As President Saakashvili so much better if Russia and Geor- recently said, “We all want—I person- gia could cooperate on true common ally want—Russia as a partner, not an interests such as the economy, enemy.” Consequently, we support counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, the efforts of American leaders to organized crime, trafficking and the strengthen relationships with Russia. protection of the environment and For our part, we have never cultural heritage. ceased to speak of reconciliation. As President Saakashvili told the And, despite current problems, we 2011 Munich Security Conference, have extended our hand to our Rus- “Peace is the only solution, and a com- sian friends. For example, we unilat- prehensive political dialogue is the erally introduced a simplified visa only way to achieve it.” regime for Russian citizens who live

86 The Journal of International Security Affairs Shifting Sands

Amitai Etzioni

ears will have passed before we know the kinds of regimes that emerged from the uprisings that swept through the YMiddle East at the beginning of 2011. Observers are quick to project on them their fondest dreams (the rise of the elusive Arab democracy) or their worst fears (a region ripe for jihadist takeover).

One can, however, make four predictions with a considerable level of con- fidence. First, America’s influence and leverage in large parts of the Middle East will be lower than before the uprising tidal wave (extending a trend, as we shall see, that started before 2011). Second, the influence and leverage of Iran over large parts of the Middle East will rise (similarly expanding a trend that began before 2011). In some cases, this influence has been concrete—such as the six-fold increase in Iranian trade with Turkey that took place between 2002 and 2007.1 In others, such gains are less “real” but still significant, such as Iran’s appeal among Shi’a in the Middle East. Third, regional elites and the broader public believe that the United States is abandoning the region—and them—and are reacting to this perception in surprisingly different ways. Finally, it follows that America’s future role in the Middle East will be determined to a large extent by the way it deals with Iran. If Iran’s hegemonic and militaristic ambitions can be thwarted, the United States’s allies and friends will be reassured significantly, and Washington will need to worry much less about the particular political direction taken by vari- ous regional regimes. On the other hand, if Iran is not defanged, it seems set

Amitai Etzioni is a professor of international relations at The George Washing- ton University and the author of Security First (Yale University Press, 2007). Amitai Etzioni

on a course that will increasingly of South Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, pull—or force—nations in its direc- and Chile turned into stable democ- tion. Coping with Iran therefore is a racies—a range of unfavorable critical test of American credibility conditions, from high levels of unem- and resolve in this increasingly vola- ployment to low levels of education tile region. and often weak civic bodies, make the prospect for substantive change If Iran is not defanged, it seems set in the Middle East daunting. on a course that will increasingly Indeed, a review of recent regional changes hammers home pull—or force—nations in its the point that American strategic direction. Coping with Iran interests are suffering significant therefore is a critical test of setbacks, while those of Iran are American credibility and resolve in (or could be) advanced in unprec- edented fashion. this increasingly volatile region. Egypt Allies at risk Though some in the United It is already clear that the great- States view the convulsions in Egypt est effect of the convulsions that as a step toward Western-style spread through the Middle East, democracy, Iran casts the unrest as beginning with the removal of the an uprising inspired by its own 1979 Tunisian autocrat Ben Ali early in Islamist revolution. Iran’s Supreme 2011, has been a reduction in Amer- Leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khame- ica’s leverage—and a concomitant nei, has said that the “awakening of increase in Iran’s potential influence the Islamic Egyptian people is an there. To point to both developments Islamic liberation movement.” The is not to argue that the United States Egyptian political force that has should oppose the transformation of the greatest pro-Iranian potential is these regimes (or that it could stop the Muslim Brotherhood. Much has it, if it so desired), but to point out been made of the fact that the Broth- the consequences for the balance of erhood has greatly moderated its power in the region and to the chal- positions over the last decades and lenges they pose to the United States is now interested in political par- and its remaining allies. ticipation. Perhaps it has. But, in the The decline of U.S. leverage is same way the Brotherhood changed obvious. Regimes that were solid its stripes before, it can certainly U.S. allies, most notably Egypt, but do so again—especially once it no also Jordan, Bahrain, and Yemen, longer needs to fear brutal oppres- either have been toppled or are being sion by the Egyptian regime. More- severely challenged. Ultimately, over, greater attention should be they may turn into stable democra- granted to the fact that the Muslim cies that find their way to becoming Brotherhood is internally divided part of the free world. However, one over how extreme its brand of politi- cannot help but note that so far no cal Islam ought to be. For example, Arab country has made such a transi- during the 2011 uprising, Mohamed tion. And while such transformations Badi, the Brotherhood’s Supreme invariably take time—it took years Guide, “pledged the Brotherhood or longer before the military regimes would ‘continue to raise the banner

88 The Journal of International Security Affairs Shifting Sands of jihad’ against the Jews, which he to its strategic alliance with Israel called the group’s ‘first and foremost against Iran, and that Cairo is now enemies.’”2 Other Brotherhood fig- willing to do business with Tehran,” ures have made similar points. Ragib one analyst noted in London’s Tele- Hilal Hamida, an Egyptian MP and graph newspaper.5 Cairo’s unfolding Muslim Brotherhood member, has dalliance with—or, at a minimum, stated, “Terrorism is not a curse its greater tolerance of—the Islamic when given its true meaning. [When Republic suggests that the current interpreted accurately] it means transformations open doors for Iran, opposing occupation as it exists in even among traditional allies of the Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. United States. From my point of view, bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi are not The decline of U.S. leverage is terrorists in the sense accepted by some. I support all their activities obvious. Regimes that were solid since they are a thorn in the side of U.S. allies, most notably Egypt, the Americans and the Zionists.”3 but also Jordan, Bahrain, and These statements drive home a vital point: While many have pointed Yemen, either have been toppled out that the current revolutions or are being severely challenged. taking place in the Middle East are being led by secular, pro-democratic Bahrain and Saudi Arabia youth groups, one should note The unrest now taking place in that often, after revolutions, more Bahrain has shaken the leaders of extreme groups overrun the mod- Saudi Arabia to their core, and for erate ones, and extremists become good reason. Bahrain is a major- even more radical. Examples of this ity Shi’ite country ruled by a Sunni trend include the Bolsheviks and minority—one which is close to the Mensheviks of revolutionary Russia; Saudi leadership. If Bahrain’s govern- the Nazis and Social Democrats of ment were to fall, and a Shi’ite govern- Weimar Republic in Germany; and ment rise to power instead, it would the Revolutionary Guard of Iran, who be—in the eyes of the Saudis—a led the 1979 revolution from the outset major victory for their regional nem- but later overwhelmed the reform- esis, Shi’ite Iran.6 (The Saudi rulers ers and became even more strident. also fear an uprising from their own True, such an outcome is not prede- Shi’ite population, which, although a termined. Yet no one should ignore minority within the country, is located the potential for greater radicalism as mostly on the border with Bahrain.7) a result of Mideast upheavals. A political sea change in Bahrain Iran, meanwhile, is busy exploit- also could pose a major challenge to ing Egypt’s turmoil. In the wake of America’s strategic interests there, the Mubarak regime’s collapse, it particularly as it seeks to keep an eye sent two warships through the Suez on the expanding naval power of Iran. Canal—the first time it had done so 4 The headquarters of the U.S. Navy’s since the 1979 revolution. The Egyp- Fifth Fleet are based in Bahrain, just tian government acquiesced to this across the Persian Gulf from Iran— passage. The exchange was not lost one factor which has made Bahrain, on regional observers. “Egypt is sig- in the words of a former U.S. Navy naling that it is no longer committed Rear Admiral, “the enduring logis-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 89 Amitai Etzioni

tical support for the United States a colonial decision.”11 True, the king Navy operating in the Persian Gulf is well-respected and so far it looks for 50 years.”8 Moreover, the Fifth as if various reforms that are being Fleet protects the supply of oil which enacted might satisfy the protes- moves through the Persian Gulf and tors. However, once such a process the Strait of Hormuz—which totals starts—especially in the face of high thirty-three percent of all seaborne unemployment, a growing educated traded oil and seventeen percent of class, and the availability of modern oil traded worldwide.9 The Strait of communication tools—it tends to Hormuz is, in the words of the U.S. feed on itself. Department of Energy, “the world’s In the absence of a strong Ameri- most important oil chokepoint.”10 can presence in the region, Jordan is Early on, during the Egyptian likely to follow its inclination to accom- uprising, the Saudi monarchy warned modate and compromise with the the Obama administration not to powers that be, even if those powers pressure President Hosni Mubarak turn out to be Iran, rather than to to step down. The Saudi rulers saw push back against them. Thus, when an obvious parallel between their Saddam was riding high, Jordan status (and that of the royal family refrained from condemning Iraq’s that rules Bahrain) and Mubarak’s. invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It briefly They had all served the United States joined Egypt and Syria in attacking well and were in turn supported by Israel in 1967, but when Israel gained it. When the Obama administration the upper hand, Jordan was quick to proceeded nevertheless to urge a cut back its involvement—and before transition in Egypt, Saudi fears and too long, it accepted UN Security concerns were stoked. Council Resolution 242, worked out In short, two more nations, key in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, to U.S. interests in the region, now which represented a de facto transi- face uncertainty. One has been chal- tion to peace.12 In short, Jordan is lenged, and the other rests uneasily, another U.S. ally that is being under- fearing it is next in line and consumed mined and is fearful of being aban- by doubts about the extent it can rely doned by the United States. on the U.S. as its main ally. American primacy Jordan in retreat Jordan, which until recently So far, the review has encom- was viewed as a reliable and signifi- passed countries that are holding cant U.S. ally in the region, is also the line, nervously, although nobody facing challenges to its regime. Here knows what tomorrow’s headlines too, a minority group is governing a will bring. The United States is doing majority. The majority of Jordanians much less well in the rest of the region. are of Palestinian descent, while the country is governed by a Hashemite Iraq minority. The Jordanian legislature, Iraq so far has faced no major cabinet, and judiciary are merely new challenges as a result of the “democratic facades… subject to con- 2011 regional uprisings, but it con- trol by the Hashemite minority rulers tinues to experience ethnic and who were placed in charge of the confessional violent conflicts of its majority Palestinian population by

90 The Journal of International Security Affairs Shifting Sands own, especially between a Shi’a- majority government is significant, dominated government (which ben- although not without ambiguities efits from the fact that Shi’a make up and difficulties of its own. Iran has 65 percent of the population) and a provided funding, training and sanc- small but vocal Sunni minority. Addi- tuary to Shi’ite militias.16 Particu- tional conflicts take place among larly revealing is the return to Iraq other groups including Kurds, Arabs in early 2011 of radical Shi’ite cleric and Turkmen. At the same time, it is Moqtada al-Sadr from Iran, where he undergoing a drawdown in Ameri- had been living for almost four years can presence and a corresponding in self-imposed exile.17 Eight months increase in Iranian influence. of deadlock following Iraq’s 2010 par- Pursuant to the Obama admin- liamentary elections ended only after istration’s commitment, U.S. troops Sadr threw his political faction’s sup- are rapidly leaving Iraq, while those port behind the unity government that remain are positioned outside of Prime Minister Maliki—in a deal the main population centers and play facilitated by Iran in what amounts to only a very limited role in securing a key political victory.18 Any way one domestic order and in defending scores it, Iraq is a place where U.S. Iraq’s borders. The fact that General influence is diminishing while Ira- Ray Odierno, the commander of U.S. nian influence is rising. forces in Iraq, suggested not long ago that UN peacekeeping might be While many have pointed out that needed to prevent civil war in Iraq if the current revolutions taking tensions do not ease is emblematic of America’s rapidly diminishing role.13 place in the Middle East are being Indeed, Iraq’s Prime Minister, led by secular, pro-democratic, Nouri al-Maliki, has already indi- youth groups, one should note cated that the Status of Forces Agree- ment, under which U.S. forces are to that often, after revolutions, more remain in the country until the end extreme groups overrun the of 2011, will not be extended once it moderate ones, and extremists 14 expires. But significant challenges become even more radical. remain. The Iraqi government is still often unable to provide even such Syria elementary services as electricity Syria’s reaction to the Middle for more than a few hours a day.15 Eastern uprisings has been to offer The political system is deadlocked, some very limited reforms. President and violent ethnic strife continues, Bashar al-Assad has promised to ini- albeit at a much lower level than in tiate municipal elections, grant more 2005-2006. In short, one may well power to nongovernmental organi- add Iraq to the list of failing states zations, and create a new media law which the United States is leaving to (though no action has been taken largely fend for themselves. yet).19 He also announced a 17 per- Iraq once served as a major coun- cent pay raise for the two million Syr- terweight to Iran, which it fought to ians who work for the government.20 a stalemate after a grinding eight- No one can foresee at this stage year conflict. Today, however, Iraq whether these moves will shore up plays no such role. On the contrary, the regime, whet the appetite of the the influence of Iran over Iraq’s Shi’a

The Journal of International Security Affairs 91 Amitai Etzioni

weakened and oppressed opposition, Lebanon or lead in some other direction. How- Like Iraq, Lebanon needs no ever, one observation can be made input from other countries to add with great assurance: Syria, a nation to its own convulsions. It was long that the United States once hoped to considered one of the most demo- peel away from Iran and bring into cratic and pro-Western nations in the Western fold, is not moving away the region. However, in recent years from Tehran; to the contrary, it is the role of Hezbollah has gradually moving much closer. increased, first as an opposition to the regime and then—as of 2009— Iraq once served as a major as a major coalition partner whose counterweight to Iran, which power is growing. The group recently forced the government to suppress it fought to a stalemate after a the investigation of the killing of grinding eight-year conflict. Today, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri; however, Iraq plays no such role. forced out of office the pro-Western Prime Minister Saad Hariri; and Under the Bush administration, appointed a Prime Minister (Najib and especially since the advent of Mikati) favored by itself—and by the Obama administration, Wash- Syria and Iran. A Hariri ally’s state- ington has actively attempted to ment that these developments show court Syria. The United States has that “Hezbollah was trying to ‘rule done so through a number of steps, Lebanon’ and annex it for Iran”25 is including high-ranking diplomatic obviously overblown, but does reflect contacts and the reestablishment of the way the Lebanese view the shift- a U.S. embassy in Damascus after ing political sands. years without steady representation. Hezbollah often acts as an Ira- The United States has even been will- nian proxy, one that Tehran finances, ing to discuss the lifting of sanctions inspires, and arms, and one to which against Syria and pressuring Israel it has transferred numerous advanced to give up the Golan Heights.21 Syria missiles and other military equip- not only rebuffed these overtures— ment.26 Hezbollah, in turn, often fol- but moved in the opposite direction, lows instructions from Iran about closer to Iran. With great fanfare, it when to employ its arms against hosted Iran’s President Mahmoud Israeli, American, and other targets. Ahmadinejad in early 2010 in a visit So while Lebanon is often viewed that underscored the strength of the by the American media as a coun- Iranian-Syrian alliance.22 try friendly to the West, in actuality Iran has backed its diplomatic it was and increasingly is more of a support for Syria with concrete action. client state. Once it was largely con- It has transferred advanced radar to trolled by Syria; now it increasingly Syria as a means of deterring Israeli falls under Iran’s sway. military action,23 and most recently sent two warships to Syria for joint Turkey military exercises.24 Syria likewise Turkey was considered solidly serves as a main pipeline through in the Western camp: a secularized which Iran ships missiles and other state, a staunch member of NATO, a arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon, despite nation keen to join the EU, and one UN and other demands to desist. with considerable commercial and

92 The Journal of International Security Affairs Shifting Sands even military ties to Israel. However, ern power. However this is a limited since the election of Recep Tayyip rivalry between two nations that Erdogan and the Justice and Devel- have become much closer to one opment Party (AKP) in 2002, Turkey another as Turkey has moved away has become more Islamist, moved from the West. away from the West, and moved closer to Iran. In the first five years of AKP Syria, a nation that the U.S. once rule, trade between Turkey and Iran increased six-fold, as Turkey became hoped to peel away from Iran and Iran’s most important regional trad- bring into the Western fold, is not ing partner.27 Turkey is also replac- moving away from Tehran; to the ing Dubai as Iran’s financial conduit, allowing Turkish banks to help Iran contrary, it is moving much closer. circumvent UN sanctions and addi- tional ones imposed by the United 28 Afghanistan States and EU. Afghanistan’s course is particu- This increased economic cooper- larly difficult to chart. However, the ation has translated into better political United States has announced that ties, too. After Iran’s highly controver- as of July 2011, it will start scaling sial 2009 elections, President Abdul- down its forces there and will have lah Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan withdrawn by 2014, depending on were among the first international conditions on the ground. America, leaders to congratulate Mahmoud moreover, is not alone; Switzerland Ahmadinejad on his victory. Turkey’s has already removed its troops from Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, the country, while the Dutch and later argued that the election results Canadians will be gone by the end were an internal Iranian matter and of 2011. The British have announced described the elections as “dynamic they will have all their troops out 29 and well-attended.” by 2015. This is not surprising In June 2010, just before the to Afghan elites, who sense that United States finally succeeded in the United States, having already convincing Russia and even China abandoned them once (after they to support the imposition of addi- drove out the USSR), may well do tional sanctions against Iran, Turkey so again.31 They are mindful of the (working with Brazil) came up with growing opposition to the war in the a deal it had negotiated with Iran United States, as well as budgetary regarding the treatment of uranium. difficulties associated with the war Many observers view it as merely a effort. All of which makes cozying stalling tactic intended to derail the up to Iran an attractive course. Thus, sanction vote. And when the vote after President Obama flew to Kabul did take place, Turkey voted against to publically urge the Karzai govern- sanctions. Turkish leaders have crit- ment to curb corruption, President icized the West’s “double standard” Karzai signaled his displeasure by of allowing Israel to possess nuclear warmly hosting Iranian President weapons while working to prevent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.32 30 Karzai Iran from doing the same. has also admitted to receiving bags True, sometimes Turkey sees of cash from Iran in return for “good itself as competing with Iran over relations,” among other things.33 who will be a major Middle East-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 93 Amitai Etzioni

According to a 2009 State out of Afghanistan as justification to Department report on international maintain ties with militant groups terrorism, “Iran’s Qods Force pro- for future operations in Afghani- vided training to the Taliban in stan.38 Afghanistan therefore may be Afghanistan on small unit tactics, an unlikely candidate to fall under small arms, explosives, and indirect Iran’s sway. However, it is also a fire weapons. Since at least 2006, nation in which the U.S. commitment Iran has arranged arms shipments to the region is severely tested. If the to select Taliban members, including United States withdraws and leaves small arms and associated ammu- behind a failing state, many in the nition, rocket propelled grenades, region will see this is as proof posi- mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, and tive that the United States cannot be plastic explosives.”34 trusted as an ally.

If the U.S. withdraws from Israel Afghanistan and leaves behind a Today, many in Israel are wor- ried by what they see as America’s failing state, many in the region betrayal of a longtime ally, Egyptian will see this is as proof positive President Hosni Mubarak, and by that the U.S. cannot be trusted as the implications for their country’s own relationship with Washington. an ally. “American response to uprising in Egypt shows Washington has no In March 2011, the British For- qualms about ‘dropping’ a longtime eign Ministry announced that it had ally. Is Israel in danger of receiving discovered a shipment of Iranian similar treatment?” asks an article weapons en route to the Taliban, in the daily Yediot Ahronot, voicing a containing 48 long-range rockets.35 widely-held fear.39 WikiLeaks cables similarly reveal For Israelis, there is ample reason concerns over Iran’s attempts to for concern. Since 2008, both the exert influence on the Afghan par- Israeli government and a majority of liament. One cable reports that “Ira- its voters have grown suspicious of nian government officials routinely U.S. support. They have looked criti- encourage Parliament to support cally upon President Obama’s view- anti-Coalition policies and to raise points and acts, chief among them the anti-American talking points during White House’s ill-fated demand for debates. Pro-Western MPs say col- a total freeze on construction in the leagues with close Iranian contacts West Bank and in Jerusalem as a pre- accept money or political support to condition for negotiations with the Pal- promote Iran’s political agenda.”36 estinians—without seeking any such According to another, “Iranian med- concessions from the Palestinians. dling [in Afghanistan] is getting Although there is, of course, no increasingly lethal.”37 danger that Israel will fall under Iran’s True, many other powers are hegemony, it seems self-evident that seeking to influence the future of the ways it is treated by the United Afghanistan, including its various States in the near future will have a ethnic groups, Pakistan, and India. profound effect on the issue at hand. For instance, Pakistan’s government The reason is that Israel has been has used America’s eagerness to pull considered for several decades the

94 The Journal of International Security Affairs Shifting Sands closest ally of the United States in foster, and pressure various nations the Middle East. Hence the way it is in the region to support its policies treated serves, in effect, as a sort of and to stave off Iran. However, as Rorschach test of the nature of U.S. the preceding review suggests, in commitments. The argument, raised some nations such efforts are largely by some American Middle East spurned; in others, those in power experts, that Israel has turned from wonder if they can rely on the United an American asset to a liability is one States to stay the course; and others signal of a possible change.40 So is still are going to be much too con- the call on the United States to “lean” sumed with their internal travails to more on Israel,41 or impose the terms pay much mind to U.S. wishes. of a peace settlement upon it.42 Much The key to the future of the more telling will be the way the ques- Middle East in the near term, there- tion of how to deal with Iran’s nuclear fore, does not lie in dealing with the program is resolved. various nations that are subject to increased Iranian influence or might The coming test be subject to it—but with Iran itself. That the United States is reducing If Iran would cease to be a threat, its involvement in the Middle East— if it would give up its militaristic and that its influence is reduced by nuclear plans and regional ambitions, events beyond its control—cannot be the United States would have much contested, especially given the draw- less reason to be concerned with down now under way in Iraq and the the regime reforms and transforma- similar pullback expected in the near tions taking place throughout the future from Afghanistan. Neither can region. In short, the United States it be contested that some nations have can no longer hope to deal with Iran’s already moved closer to Iran (Syria, regional ambitions by dealing with Turkey), that others have been pushed the various nations in the region indi- closer (Lebanon), and still others vidually. It must confront Iran itself. are undergoing regime changes that weaken their ties to the United States. The U.S. can no longer hope to Where does the United States go from here? What are the options deal with Iran’s regional ambitions available to the United States if it is by dealing with the various nations not about to abandon the Middle East in the region individually. It must and let it be subject to increasing Ira- nian influence and leverage? Some confront Iran itself. see hope that the various regimes, led by Egypt, will evolve into stable, In the best of all worlds, a domes- pro-Western democracies. Yet this is tic uprising inside Iran would lead a course that will take years at best. to a regime change, one that would And the record of many other nations focus on serving Iran’s own people in which people power overthrew the and which would cease to meddle prevailing order is far from reassur- in the affairs of other nations. Given ing. New military regimes, contin- the persistent way in which the Ira- ued chaos, gridlock (á la Iraq), and nian regime has been able to sup- Islamic governments are much more press the opposition, however, this likely outcomes. The United States must be understood as what it is: a may continue to encourage, cajole, very unlikely development. Efforts

The Journal of International Security Affairs 95 Amitai Etzioni by the United States to engage Iran 5. Dina Kraft, “Israel Warns Iran Is ‘Taking diplomatically have clearly failed. Advantage’ of Middle East Unrest,” Tele- graph (London), February 20 2011, http:// Sanctions, for their part, seem to www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ have an effect, albeit one that, at middleeast/iran/8336712/Israel-warns- best, will hobble Iran only slowly. Iran-is-taking-advantage-of-Middle-East- Meanwhile, the region is in turmoil unrest.html. 6. Deborah Amos and Robert Siegel, “Saudis and Iran’s nuclear program seems to Uneasy Amid Arab Unrest,” NPR All Things be back on track. Considered, February 21, 2011, http://www. For obvious reasons, the United npr.org/2011/02/21/133943624/Arab- States is reluctant to consider a mili- Unrest-Makes-Saudi-Arabia-Nervous. 7. Ibid. tary option. The U.S.’s allies and the 8. Tom Bowman, “Bahrain: Key U.S. Mili- UN are exceedingly unlikely to sup- tary Hub,” NPR Weekend Edition Satur- port a strike against Iran; the U.S. day, February 19, 2011, http://www.npr. military is very leery about opening org/templates/transcript/transcript. php?storyId=133893941. another military front; and the U.S. 9. Department of Energy, U.S. Energy Infor- public favors scaling back, rather mation Administration, “World Oil Transit than increasing, U.S. commitments Chokepoints,” February 2011, http://www. overseas. Yet the question remains: eia.doe.gov/cabs/world_oil_transit_choke- points/pdf.pdf. if the United States does not find a 10. Ibid. way to curb Iran’s expansionist and 11. Alan Dershowitz, “The case against Jordan,” militaristic ambitions, can it live up Jerusalem Post, October 7, 2003. to its commitments to its allies in the 12. King Hussein, “The Jordanian Palestinian Peace Initiative: Mutual Recognition and region? Will they trust it to come to Territory for Peace” Journal of Palestine their aid? And what conclusions will Studies 14, no. 4 (Summer, 1985), 15-22, other U.S. allies—and adversaries— http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537118. throughout the world draw if the 13. “Odierno: U.S. Might Seek U.N. Peace- keepers in Iraq After 2011,” Fox News, United States gradually abandons the July 6, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/ Middle East? world/2010/07/06/general-iraq-ponders- peacekeepers-defuse-kurd-arab-tensions/. 14. Sam Dagher, “Iraq Wants the U.S. Out,” Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2010, http:// online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970 204685004576045700275218580.html. 15. Charles McDermid and Khalid Waleed, 1. Gonul Tol, “Turkey’s Warm Ties with Iran: “Dark Days for Iraq as Power Crisis A Brief History,” InsideIran.org, March 17, Bites,” Asia Times, June 26 2010, http:// 2010, http://www.insideiran.org/news/ www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/ turkey%E2%80%99s-warm-ties-with-iran-a- LF26Ak01.html. brief-history/. 16. Sam Dagher, “Iraq Wants the U.S. Out,” Wall 2. Charles Levinson, “‘Brothers’ in Egypt Street Journal, December 28, 2010, http:// Present Two Faces,” Wall Street Journal, online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970 February 15, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/ 204685004576045700275218580.html. article/SB1000142405274870462900457613 17. Saad Sarhan and Aaron C. Davis, “Cleric 5882819143872.html. Moqtada al-Sadr Returns to Iraq after Self- 3. Lydia Khalil, “Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Imposed Exile,” Washington Post, Janu- Brotherhood: United by Strategy, Divided ary 6, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost. by Tactics,” Jamestown Foundation Ter- com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/05/ rorism Monitor 4, iss. 6, March 23, 2006, AR2011010500724.html. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_ 18. Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Lara Jakes, cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=714. “Anti-American Cleric Vies for More 4. Isabel Kershner, “Israel Silent as Ira- Power in Iraq,” Washington Post, Octo- nian Ships Transit Suez Canal,” New ber 2, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost. York Times, February 22, 2011, http:// com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/01/ www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/ AR2010100101360.html. middleeast/23suez.html?hp.

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19. Jay Solomon and Bill Spindle, “Syria Strong- ALeqM5hyyMeTjC4oof3Bg5idtZZuEX- man: ‘Time for Reform,’” Wall Street Journal, LO4Q. January 31, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/ 32. Dexter Filkins and Mark Landler, “Afghan article/SB1000142405274870483270457611 Leader Is Seen to Flout Influence on U.S.,” 4340735033236.html. New York Times, March 29, 2010. http:// 20. “‘Day of Rage’ for Syrians Fails to Draw Pro- www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/world/ testers,” New York Times, February 4, 2011. asia/30karzai.html. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/ 33. Maria Abi-Habib, Yaroslav Trofimov and Jay world/middleeast/05syria.html. Solomon, “Iran Cash Trail Highlights Battle 21. “U.S. Envoy William Burns Says Syria Talks for Kabul Sway,” The Wall Street Journal, Were Candid,” BBC, February 17, 2010, October 25, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8519506.stm. article/SB1000142405270230438830457557 22. Howard Schneider, “Iran, Syria Mock U.S. 4001362056346.html. Policy; Ahmadinejad Speaks of Israel’s 34. United States Department of Sate: Office ‘Annihilation.’” Washington Post, Febru- of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ary 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost. “Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism,” in com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/ Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 (Wash- AR2010022505089.html. ington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 23. Charles Levinson, “Iran Arms Syria with August 5, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ Radar,” Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2010. rls/crt/2009/140889.htm. 24. Amos Harel, “Iran Is Celebrating Mubarak 35. Alissa J. Rubin, “British Link Iran to Downfall with Suez Crossing,” Ha’aretz Rockets Found in Afghan Province,” (Tel Aviv), February 23, 2011, http://www. New York Times, March 10, 2011, http:// haaretz.com/print-edition/news/iran-is- www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/world/ celebrating-mubarak-downfall-with-suez- middleeast/10iran.html. crossing-1.345103. 36. “U.S. Embassy Cables: Iranian Influence 25. Leila Fadel, “After Government Collapse, at Afghanistan Parliament,” Guardian Hezbollah Works to Get More Power in Leb- (London), December 2, 2010, http://www. anon,” Washington Post, January 13, 2011. guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables- 26. Viola Gienger, “Iran Gives Weapons to documents/194913 Re-Arm Hezbollah, Pentagon Says.” 37. Jon Boone, “WikiLeaks: Afghan MPs Bloomberg, April 20, 2010, http://www. and Religious Scholars ‘On Iran Payroll,’” businessweek.com/news/2010-04-20/iran- Guardian (London), December 2, 2010, gives-weapons-funds-to-help-lebanese-hez- http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/ bollah-re-arm.html. dec/02/afghan-mps-scholars-iran-payroll. 27. Gonul Tol, “Turkey’s Warm Ties with Iran: 38. Mark Mazetti, “A Shooting in Pakistan A Brief History,” InsideIran.org, March 17, Reveals Fraying Alliance,” New York Times, 2010, http://www.insideiran.org/news/ March 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes. turkey%E2%80%99s-warm-ties-with-iran-a- com/2011/03/13/weekinreview/13lashkar. brief-history/. html. 28. Bayram Sinkaya, “Turkey and Iran Rela- 39. Aviel Magnezi, “Could U.S. Abandon tions on the Eve of President Gul’s Visit: Israel too?” Yediot Ahronot (Tel Aviv), Janu- The Steady Improvement of a Pragmatic ary 2, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/ Relationship,” ORSAM, February 10, 2011, articles/0,7340,L-4022102,00.html http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle. 40. Helene Cooper, “Washington Asks: aspx?ID=408. What to Do About Israel?” New York 29. “Don’t Overshadow Dynamic Elections, Times, June 4, 2010. http://www.nytimes. Turkish FM Advises Iranian People,” Hur- com/2010/06/06/weekinreview/06cooper. riyet Daily News, June 22, 2009, http://www. html. hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=don8217t- 41. Bronwen Maddox, “Will Barack Obama Give overshadow-dynamic-elections-turkish-fm- Way When He Meets Binyamin Netanyahu advises-iranian-people. in Washington?” Times of London, May 13, 30. Casey L. Addis, et al., Iran: Regional Per- 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ spectives and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: comment/columnists/bronwen_maddox/ Congressional Research Service, January article6276150.ece. 13, 2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mid- 42. Ari Shavit, “Israel Fears Obama Heading east/R40849.pdf. for Imposed Mideast Settlement.” Ha’aretz 31. Dan De Luce, “Afghans Pose Awkward (Tel Aviv), March 29, 2010. http://www. Questions for U.S. Military Chief.” Agence haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel- France-Presse, July 26, 2010, http://www. fears-obama-heading-for-imposed-mideast- google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ settlement-1.265466.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 97 Lifting up those dedicated to securing freedom. It’s in our power™.

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PW Blue Eagle_5x8_bw_JINSA.indd 1 3/11/11 11:05 AM Client: Pratt & Whitney One Company Ad Title: PW Support Communities Publication: JINSA Trim: 5.25” x 8.5” • Bleed: 5.75” x 8.75” The Dangers of Defunding Defense Jim Talent & Mackenzie Eaglen

he storms of war have broken in Afghanistan and are gathering in the Pacific, South Asia, the Middle East, eastern Europe, and Teven in south and central America. Not since the end of World War II has America more urgently needed honest and clear thinking about its enduring national interests and a bipartisan commitment to building up the capabilities—civilian and military—necessary to protect them.

Yet Washington increasingly is looking inward. Faced with divisions at home and the challenge of a tightening fiscal climate, our policymakers spend enormous energy arguing about tactics without thinking about strategy. They react to events rather than planning for the future. Without a common purpose, they are less and less able to resist the demands of their most partisan sup- porters. And, driven by the desire to save money, they take steps which reduce military spending in the short term but vastly increase the danger and cost to America in the long term.

Death by a thousand cuts Over the past two years, the U.S. government has been cutting plans and programs which are critical to recapitalizing the legacy fleets of all the military services. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been warning that a resource-

The Honorable James Talent is Distinguished Fellow in Military Affairs at The Heritage Foundation, and served as a U.S. Senator from 2002 to 2007. Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kath- ryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heri- tage Foundation. Jim Talent & Mackenzie Eaglen

constrained environment requires that ing platform, and delayed indefinitely “hard choices” be made,1 and on that the next-generation cruiser. basis has cancelled or sought to kill a Indeed, defense spending is fall- number of defense programs, includ- ing by every metric: as a percentage ing the F-22 fifth-generation fighter, of the federal budget, as a percent- the C-17 cargo aircraft, the VH-71 heli- age of the overall economy (or Gross copter, the Air Force’s combat search Domestic Product), and in real terms. and rescue helicopter, and the ground Yet even with the dizzying pace of combat vehicle portion of the Army’s defense reductions of late, policymak- Future Combat Systems. ers are increasing their demands for Missile defenses have suf- more defense cuts. fered as well. In September 2009, Defense budget cuts are already the Obama administration abruptly having dramatic negative conse- cancelled America’s commitment quences for the U.S. military today, to place land-based interceptors in and will compromise America’s abil- Poland and a radar in the Czech ity to fight and win both war and peace Republic. Further, the Pentagon tomorrow. If America’s elected offi- reduced the overall budget for mis- cials do not reverse the rapid decline sile defense last year by $1.6 billion, in long-standing core U.S. military or 16 percent from 2009 levels. Spe- capabilities, the United States will cifically, the Administration scaled not only lose a core ingredient of the back the number of ground-based nation’s superpower status; it will be midcourse interceptors in Alaska unable to sustain the capabilities nec- and California from the planned essary to defend vital American inter- forty-four to thirty, terminated ests in an increasingly dangerous and the multiple kill vehicle program unsettled world. for defeating countermeasures, deferred the purchase of a second Gathering threats Airbone Laser aircraft, abandoned Yet an honest review of world the Kinetic Energy Interceptor events over the last year should lead program (designed for intercept- no one to be sanguine about Ameri- ing ballistic missiles in their boost can security. phase), and purged funding for the While the United States has space test bed for missile defense. made some tactical gains in the war The size of the U.S. Navy has against Islamist extremism, the cur- been cut by half since the 1980s, and rent administration lacks a coherent today it is the smallest it has been strategy for defeating the threat alto- since 1916—and still shrinking. Yet in gether. Meanwhile the top priority of a speech before the Navy League last our terrorist adversaries is to develop May, Secretary Gates ridiculed the weapons of mass destruction, and idea that the U.S. Navy is too weak.2 they are making progress; according The Pentagon’s actions belie his to the Commission on the Prevention words, however. On Gates’ watch, the of Weapons of Mass Destruction Pro- Navy has already ended purchases liferation and Terrorism, terrorists are of the next-generation DDG-1000 likely to develop and deploy a weapon destroyers, extended the production of mass destruction as early as 2013.3 of the next aircraft carrier from four One hundred thousand Ameri- years to five, killed the MPF-A large- can troops are currently struggling to deck aviation ship and its mobile land- accomplish an ill-defined mission in

100 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Dangers of Defunding Defense

Afghanistan. Pakistani cooperation ship ballistic missile with a maneu- against the Taliban remains uncer- verable warhead and range of more tain, and the Karzai government is than 1,500 kilometers.) an increasingly unreliable partner in the effort. Success is possible in Defense spending is falling by Afghanistan—assuming success is defined as stabilizing the country every metric: as a percentage and creating a government which can of the federal budget, as a contribute materially to its own secu- percentage of the overall rity. But even the Obama administra- tion is tacitly admitting that this will economy (or Gross Domestic take a number of years to achieve and Product), and in real terms. will require a substantial number of Yet even with the dizzying pace American troops on the ground for a of defense reductions of late, long time. It is clear that the Chinese are policymakers are increasing their deliberately developing the capabil- demands for more defense cuts. ity to exclude the United States from freedom of operation within the west- In early 2009, there were expec- ern Pacific Ocean. Their purpose is tations that the incoming Obama to keep the United States as far as administration would achieve a possible from their economic center breakthrough with North Korea in of gravity (which is along their coast), the Six-Party Talks. But Pyongyang as well as to underscore their control quickly sent clear signals that it over the South China Sea, East China would not be any more accommodat- Sea, and Yellow Sea. ing under this presidency than it was Just prior to Secretary of Defense under the last. Pyongyang was quick Robert Gates’ recent visit to China, to prove it; over the following months, its military leaders unveiled a new it threatened to weaponize all of its stealth fighter. The test flight of this plutonium and build more nuclear advanced aircraft highlights what a weapons, abandoned all previous leaked Defense Intelligence Agency disarmament pledges, and vowed to report from a year ago found: the “never return” to the already-mori- situation in the air over the Taiwan bund Six-Party talks. The DPRK also Strait is steadily shifting against launched several missiles in viola- Taiwan.4 While the U.S. debates tion of UN resolutions, conducted a whether to sell F-16C/Ds to Taiwan, nuclear test, abrogated the Korean China’s air force is rapidly modern- War armistice and all bilateral agree- izing. The Pentagon’s latest report to ments with South Korea, threatened Congress on Chinese military power war against the United States, South notes, for example, that “China has Korea, and Japan, threatened the the most active land-based ballistic safety of civilian airliners, and closed and cruise-missile program in the its border, holding hundreds of South world,” may have already begun con- Koreans hostage. Since then, it has struction of an aircraft carrier, and engaged in even deadlier provoca- is building new attack submarines tions, conducting two unprovoked equipped with advanced weapons.5 acts of war against South Korea— (Of particular concern in this regard the March 2010 sinking of the South is China’s development of an anti- Korean naval ship Cheonan, and the

The Journal of International Security Affairs 101 Jim Talent & Mackenzie Eaglen

November 2010 artillery rocketing of and organized crime at our borders; Yeonpyeong Island. and failing states such as Yemen Iran continues to be the world’s and Somali. In short, no place in the leading sponsor of terrorism. The world is getting safer for the United Iranian regime is closely allied with States. None of America’s enduring Syria (another state sponsor of ter- national interests are more secure rorism), regularly supplies terrorist today than they were even a short groups Hamas and Hezbollah with time ago. Every category of signifi- rockets and other arms, foments cant risk is clearly growing. Our lead- instability throughout the Middle ers in Washington should reexamine East, and is hated and distrusted the nature of America’s vital interests by ITS neighbors. According to the and assess how better to develop and latest round of documents released sustain the capabilities necessary to by WikiLeaks, the Iranians have protect those interests. already acquired advanced mis- But they have not done so. siles from the North Koreans.6 We American foreign policy has been can expect Tehran’s aggressiveness drifting since the end of the Cold to increase substantially once it War. In the absence of strategic acquires nuclear weapons. clarity, budget considerations have Russia has been challenging the driven defense policy, rather than United States on numerous occasions. the other way around. In fact, Moscow is taking advantage Reasonable people can certainly of Obama’s “reset” policy to crack disagree about how to respond to down on its domestic opposition, the growing dangers. But one thing jailing (or extending the sentences is certain: a budget-driven policy, of) Kremlin opponents like Boris occurring in a vacuum, with no con- Nemtsov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky. sideration of history or understand- Internationally, meanwhile, Moscow ing of strategic context, is likely to is increasingly behaving badly. It is lead to disaster for the United States. known to have provided ballistic mis- sile technology and advanced weap- How did we get here? onry to countries like Iran, Syria, The current situation is hardly and Venezuela. Russia’s intelligence unique in recent American history. operations, including sleeper cells, In the late 1970s, President Jimmy against the United States are as Carter similarly slashed defense robust as during the peak of the Cold spending following a decade of war. War. Encroachments into the Arctic In lieu of repairing the equipment on and an active military modernization hand or buying more modern weap- program, including nuclear modern- ons systems, the Carter administra- ization, are likewise a concern as tion invested mostly in research and Russia strengthens its power projec- development. America’s military tion capability. ended up a “hollow force,” without A host of additional threats have the capabilities necessary to protect the potential to grow more severe, America’s interests and commit- including drug-related violence in ments abroad. northern Mexico; Venezuela’s mili- President Ronald Reagan tary buildup (being carried out with assumed office in 1981, inheriting a the support of Iran and Russia); struggling economy and a nation suf- piracy on the high seas; drug cartels fering from low morale. But Reagan

102 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Dangers of Defunding Defense understood the basic equation of missions—grew deeper. The cost world leadership: force plus resolve of maintaining an ever-aging force equals power. And despite the large structure ballooned while the Admin- budget deficits of that era, he man- istration postponed investment in aged to secure two double-digit new systems that would have helped increases in the defense budget fol- relieve the financial and practical lowed by additional increases for sev- burden of maintaining the inventory. eral years following. The defense-industrial base hem- Readiness, confidence, and orrhaged and lost critical skill sets training all improved within the U.S. essential to maintaining America’s military. The armed forces were able military superiority. And the cost of to buy a new generation of techno- maintaining the all-volunteer force logically-sophisticated equipment. increased to compensate for the Meanwhile, the aging leaders of the stress of asking a limited number of Soviet Union realized that they were personnel to do so much for so long. in a competition which they could The military that has been not win. Throughout the rest of the responding with amazing resilience 1980s, growing American power since 9/11 in two theaters is skeletal increasingly forced the Soviets into compared to the force that started the a corner until they simply gave up. 1990s. Between the fall of the Berlin And the same military that Reagan Wall and 9/11, the active duty Army built during the Cold War over- was cut from eighteen divisions to whelmingly defeated Saddam Hus- ten. The Navy, which counted 568 sein and made possible the peace ships in the late 1980s, struggles and prosperity that America enjoyed today to sustain a fleet of only 280. throughout the 1990s. And the number of tactical air wings Upon assuming office, however, in the Air Force was reduced from President Bill Clinton cut the size of thirty-seven at the time of Desert the force by a full one-third. He did Storm to twenty by the mid-1990s. so even though military operations around the world picked up nearly The costs of underfunding three-fold. Military modernization hard power budgets also were cut substantially America’s leaders have never during the Clinton years, and pro- redefined the global role of the curement budgets were reduced United States since the fall of the much further than the cuts in force Berlin Wall. In the absence of stra- size and structure warranted. These tegic clarity, and given the pressure reductions in the planned purchases to reduce the deficit while protecting of new equipment caused the age of domestic programs, our leaders have the inventory to rise, maintenance repeatedly adopted unrealistically costs to climb steadily, and readiness rosy assumptions about the existing levels to drop accordingly. threats to America’s vital interests. The dramatically-reduced force (The last strategic plan issued by the of the 1990s was the one tasked to Pentagon mentioned climate change respond to major combat operations more often than China, Russia, and in Iraq and Afghanistan for the past Iran combined.)7 But America does decade. Under the Bush adminis- have vital interests, and threats to tration, the strategy-resource mis- them do exist. Faced with that reality, match—the gap between dollars and

The Journal of International Security Affairs 103 Jim Talent & Mackenzie Eaglen

America’s presidents have deployed a ing vehicles. The military must also shrinking and aging force at a rate restore select missile defense cuts of far higher than was ever necessary recent years, bolster sea-based mis- during the Cold War. sile defense capabilities, and rapidly In short, America’s leaders have build space, satellite, and cyber war- consistently underfunded defense fare capabilities. procurement for short-term political Given the sweeping defense and budgetary reasons, knowing that cuts over the past two years, defense what they are spending will not buy spending and priorities have become the programs they say they need— a zero-sum proposition. For example, but knowing also that the effect will unless funding is increased, it is inev- probably not be felt until their term itable that the Navy will be too small is over. It is very tempting to rob the to fully support its growing ballistic future to pay for the present, espe- missile defense missions. A shrink- cially when the future will be some- ing carrier fleet (the Navy is sup- one else’s responsibility. posed to have 11 carriers but will be down to nine eventually) will reduce As military capabilities atrophy, America’s ability to project power. The Army will find it more difficult to the United States will be unable seize and hold territory against orga- to contain China, deter Russian nized ground forces with yet another ambitions, dissuade North Korea generation of Army modernization on the chopping block. The Air Force from aggression, and protect will lose the global air dominance against the Iranian missile and that not only renders opposing air potential nuclear threats. forces incapable of effective interfer- ence during conflict but also neutral- The chickens are now coming izes enemy air defenses and ensures home to roost as the military faces ground force safety in combat. an unavoidable modernization crisis. Thanks to air superiority, no sol- The capabilities most in need of sup- dier or U.S. Marine has come under port over the next five years include attack from enemy air forces since the Navy’s surface fleet, submarine the Korean War. That is changing. fleet, aircraft carriers, and Littoral “Some foreign-built fighters can Combat Ships. The Air Force needs now match or best the F-15 in aerial to fully replace its legacy fighter fleet combat,” journalist Mark Bowden with F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. Con- wrote in last March’s issue of The sideration will be required for addi- Atlantic. “America is choosing to tional upgraded F-15s as the Joint give up some of the edge we’ve long Strike Fighter continues to slip in pro- enjoyed, rather than pay the price to duction timelines, creating a bigger preserve it” by building enough F-22 shortfall in the Air Force fighter fifth-generation fighters.8 inventory. The Air Force must also Indeed, China and Russia are acquire additional precision strike operating 12 fighter and bomber capability, a next-generation bomber, production lines today. The United additional lift and more cargo capac- States only has one. Russia is expand- ity. After skipping two generations of ing its fighter forces and fields the modernization, the U.S. Army needs Su-34 Fullback strike aircraft, which a new generation of combat fight- can carry supersonic anti-ship cruise

104 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Dangers of Defunding Defense missiles and short-range air-to-air ining America’s enduring national missiles. China has ordered an esti- interests, thinking strategically, and mated 76 Su-30MKK Flanker-Gs and assessing the adequacy of defense can produce an additional 250 under planning based on that context. Last license. China can easily modernize year, Congress created an Indepen- 171 of its jets and build 105 new ones, dent Panel of distinguished defense which means it would have roughly and foreign policy experts to do 626 multirole fighters available for exactly that. The Commission was air superiority missions. That would led jointly by President Clinton’s Sec- place China in the same league as the retary of Defense, William J. Perry, United States, which has 522 F-15s and President George W. Bush’s (of various classes), 217 F-15Es, and National Security Adviser, Stephen J. 187 F-22s. Hadley. The other 18 members were As military capabilities atrophy, appointed from across the political the United States will be unable to spectrum. The Commission first contain China, deter Russian ambi- reviewed the Pentagon’s most cur- tions, dissuade North Korea from rent strategic planning document, aggression, and protect against issued in the spring of 2010. While the Iranian missile and potential complimenting the Department’s nuclear threats. Threats to the global efforts in Afghanistan, the group system of trade (which rests on the otherwise dismissed the Pentagon’s foundation of the U.S.-led security plans as failing to come to grips with structure) will increase, and other the needs of national security. The operations like counterterrorism, Commission then undertook its own counter-piracy, humanitarian assis- review of the challenges facing the tance, homeland defense, partner United States. development and capacity building, Acting unanimously, the Com- will be compromised. mission concluded that America’s Many Americans look at the enduring national security interests spending in Iraq and Afghanistan and include defending the American find it hard to believe that the military homeland, assuring access to the needs more money. But practically sea, air, space, and cyberspace, pre- speaking, there are two defense bud- serving a favorable balance of power gets. Funding for sustained combat across Eurasia that prevents authori- operations is separate from the core tarian domination of that region, and budget for the military; war funding providing for the global “common cannot be used to sustain ongoing good” through actions such as procurement or modernization, or to humanitarian aid, development assis- support daily operations in the over tance, and disaster relief. From the 100 countries where American forces very fact that these interests are vital, are relieving flood victims, rescuing the panel noted that America must stranded cruise ships, stopping piracy, and would defend them against seri- or performing the myriad other func- ous threats: tions required to protect the global interests of the United States. There is a choice our planners do not have. As the last 20 years have shown, America does not Remedying the situation have the option of abandoning a It is not entirely true that no leadership role in support of its one in Washington has been exam- national interests. Those inter-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 105 Jim Talent & Mackenzie Eaglen

ests are vital to the security of the sion, the men and women in the U.S. United States. Failure to antici- military are “operating at maximum pate and manage the conflicts operational tempo, wearing out people that threaten those interests—to and equipment faster then expected,” thoughtfully exploit the options we have set forth above in support and “the growing stress on the force of a purposeful global strategy— means that a train wreck is coming will not make those conflicts go in the areas of personnel, acquisition, away or make America’s interests and force structure.”12 any less important. It will simply lead to an increasingly unstable and unfriendly global climate and, Getting there from here eventually, to conflicts America Over the last twenty years, there cannot ignore, which we must has been a slow but steady decline in prosecute with limited choices American power relative to the risks under unfavorable circum- confronting the United States. The stances—and with stakes that are 9 irony of that decline is that it was higher than anyone would like. completely unnecessary. To be sure, there is a price to strength, but there The Commission emphasized is also a price to weakness. The sums the importance of preparing for the necessary to sustain American pre- full spectrum of risk and of maintain- dominance were, and still are, small ing a sufficient margin of superiority compared to the money which the so as to deter threats as well as deci- government has readily spent on other sively succeed in any missions that programs and at the cost of reducing are necessary. Under the circum- America’s margin of safety. For exam- stances, the Commission concluded ple, had the Army been maintained that America’s armed forces are too at or near its size and strength after small and are relying on an inventory Operation Desert Storm and through of equipment that is old, unreliable, 9/11, the Afghan mission could have insufficient in number, and techno- been prosecuted more vigorously logically out of date. According to even when the Iraqi conflict was at its the Commission, “[I]t is unlikely that height. That would have reduced the the United States can make do with time necessary for success in Afghan- less than it needed in the early 1990s, istan, and the cost of delay there when Americans assumed the world has overwhelmed whatever savings would be much more peaceful post resulted from reducing the size of the 10 Cold War.” Army during the 1990s. The Commission members It is no longer possible to avoid agreed the Pentagon “should plan for the challenges confronting America’s a force structure that gives us a clear military. Other nations are beginning predominance of capability in any to understand and exploit the reality 11 given situation.” For example, the of American weakness. It is still pos- Commission recommended that the sible to recover the situation, but not Navy be expanded to the 346 ships if America’s leaders continue pretend- that had been identified as the mini- ing that the current downward drift mum necessary in the 1993 Bottom Up can continue without consequences Review. The report also identified the that no one can ignore. Many leaders urgent need to modernize the weap- on both sides of the aisle are unhappy ons and equipment inventory of all the with American foreign policy. They services. According to the Commis- think that the United States should

106 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Dangers of Defunding Defense downsize its commitments and its 1. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, global leadership role, and that Amer- Statement submitted to the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate, ica therefore does not need a large January 27, 2009, http://www.defense.gov/ military establishment. It is indeed speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337. past time for a thorough debate about 2. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, the role the United States should play Remarks at the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition, National Harbor, Maryland, in the modern world. Defense spend- May 3, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/ ing, however, should not be the back speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1460. door through which those leaders try 3. World at Risk: The Report of the Commis- to change foreign policy. sion on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism Since the Berlin Wall fell, Amer- (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), xv, ica has been governed by four Presi- http://www.scribd.com/doc/8574914/ dents whose views have spanned World-at-Risk-The-Report-of-the-Commis- the entirety of the political spec- sion-on-the-Prevention-of-WMD-Prolifera- tion-and-Terrorism-Full-Report. trum. None of those Presidents has 4. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intel- seriously considered abandoning ligence Agency, Taiwan Air Defense Assess- America’s traditional commitments ment, Report DIA-02-1001-028, January or the role the United States has 21, 2010, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/report/2010/taiwan-air- played since 1945 as the chief guar- defense_dia_100121.htm. antor of a liberal international order. 5. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report Rather, the consistent lesson of the to Congress: Military and Security Devel- last twenty years is that cutting the opments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, 1, http://www.defense.gov/ size or modernization budgets of pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf. the armed forces will not reduce the 6. Duncan Gardham, “WikiLeaks: Iran missions which America’s military ‘obtains North Korea missiles which can must perform. In other words, Amer- strike Europe,’” Telegraph (London), November 29, 2010, http://www.telegraph. ica’s strategic habits show no sign of co.uk/news/worldnews/8166848/Wiki- changing; the question is whether Leaks-Iran-obtains-North-Korea-missiles- the United States will adequately which-can-strike-Europe.html. support the capabilities, military and 7. U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Con- gress: Quadrennial Defense Review, February civilian, which are clearly necessary 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/ to protect America’s vital interests as QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. every president since Ronald Reagan 8. Mark Bowden, “The Last Ace,” The Atlan- has defined them. tic, March 2009, http://www.theatlantic. com/magazine/archive/2009/03/the-last- If America continues to under- ace/7291/. fund the military, it will not mean a 9. Quadrennial Defense Review Independent less ambitious foreign policy. It will Panel, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting mean hollow security and treaty America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: United States commitments, greatly increased risk Institute of Peace, 2010), 28, http://www. of conflict, and substantially greater usip.org/files/qdr/qdrreport.pdf. casualties for the men and women 10. Ibid., 56. who serve in the military. Congress- 11. Ibidem. 12. Ibid., 20. man Howard “Buck” McKeon (R-CA) 13. The Honorable Howard “Buck” McKeon summed it up best at a speech at the (R-CA), Remarks delivered at The Heritage Heritage Foundation last May: a Foundation, Washington, DC, February defense budget in decline portends 4, 2010, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2010/pdf/hl1146.pdf. an America in decline.13

The Journal of International Security Affairs 107 READY FOR WHAT COMES NEXT

The Mission Matters Most

Effective warfighters are trained, equipped and able to respond to countless threats.

Alion's engineering, IT and operational experts deliver comprehensive solutions to ensure our warfighters are more than ready for any challenge. Because that's what matters. Our China Challenge

Chuck DeVore

ost discussions of Sino-American relations focus on symp- toms and symbols: China’s role in the Six-Party Talks over MNorth Korea’s nuclear program; China’s material assistance to the Iranian nuclear program; Chinese opposition to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan; U.S.-China military exchanges; Chinese cooperation on cli- mate change; human rights in China; and economic issues such as cur- rency valuations, trade and investment. When viewed in the context of these individual issues, the relative success or failure of President Barack Obama’s policies show him to be muddling through about as well as his predecessors. But, however important these issues appear, they are simply a veneer obscuring a more fundamental matter: the relative power of the People’s Republic of China as compared to that of the United States.1 Seen through this more basic prism, the shifting balance of power between Washington and Beijing should take on greater urgency.

Cruise control Sino-American relations in the modern era can be defined as having three basic periods: the early Cold War period from 1949 to 1972, when China was seen as a communist ally of the Soviet Union; the strategic counterweight

Chuck DeVore served in the California legislature from 2004 to 2010. He is a retired U.S. Army Reserve lieutenant colonel and served as a Special Assistant for Foreign Affairs in the Reagan-era Pentagon. His novel, “China Attacks,” co-authored with Steven Mosher, was translated into Chinese for sales in Taiwan in 2001. Chuck DeVore

period, from Nixon’s opening to gesting that the United States should China in 1972 to the Cold War’s end use trade sanctions against China in 1991; and 1991 to the present, as to pressure them on human rights China has modernized and U.S. poli- and democracy.2 But within a year cymakers have struggled to grasp Clinton, now President, would be the implications of a stronger China holding a summit with his Chinese and its strategic intentions. counterpart and any talk of sanctions to induce reform was abandoned. By Since the end of the Cold War, 1999, China was granted Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR), the Sino-American relationship paving the way for its entry into the has been marked by confusion World Trade Organization (WTO). and inconsistency, at least on the By the 2000 campaign, both U.S. side. Americans don’t know Vice President Al Gore and Governor George W. Bush said they wanted whether to embrace China as a engagement with China. When the strategic partner, hold it at arm’s Gore campaign asserted that Bush’s length as an economic competitor, thinking was aligned with conser- vatives who saw China as a future or view its rise with alarm as a enemy, it provoked a response from new and more dangerous foe than Bush foreign policy advisor Condo- was the Soviet Union. leezza Rice that Mr. Bush was neither a cold warrior nor an isolationist.3 Since the end of the Cold War, But, when a U.S. Navy EP-3E signals the Sino-American relationship has intelligence aircraft was rammed been marked by confusion and incon- in midair by a Chinese J-8 intercep- sistency, at least on the U.S. side. tor on April 1, 2001, the crew of 24 Americans don’t know whether to being held on Hainan Island for 11 embrace China as a strategic partner, days, it appeared that the new Bush hold it at arm’s length as an economic administration would reevaluate competitor, or view its rise with alarm relations with China, with the island as a new and more dangerous foe democracy of Taiwan being the chief than was the Soviet Union. It is this beneficiary. Some five weeks after last point that is the biggest failure, 9/11, however, President Bush was and the largest lost opportunity, of in Shanghai saying, “President Jiang the Obama administration. and the government stand side by A strategic review of America’s side with the American people as we relationship with China has been fight this evil force.”4 The remainder needed since the Chinese Commu- of President Bush’s years in office nist Party ordered the People’s Lib- marked a continuation of the status eration Army to clear the democracy quo and a steady increase in U.S.- protesters from Tiananmen Square China trade. in 1989, and the fall of the Berlin Wall By the 2008 campaign cycle, shortly thereafter. For a few months candidate Barack Obama was advis- in 1992, it appeared that this would ing President Bush to consider boy- happen, with presidential candidate cotting the opening ceremony of the Bill Clinton scoring President George Beijing Olympics to pressure China H.W. Bush for being too friendly with to help stop the genocide in Darfur, “potentates and dictators” and sug- Sudan, and improve human rights

110 The Journal of International Security Affairs Our China Challenge in Tibet.5 But the same day he did, its modern mercantilist policies. This Obama admitted, “It’s very hard to is most unlike the perpetually-broke tell your banker that he’s wrong… if Soviet empire. This cash gives Bei- we are running huge deficits and big jing leverage in ways that the Soviet national debts and we’re borrowing Politburo could only dream of. Chi- money constantly from China, that nese monetary inducements may gives us less leverage. It gives us less become the future equivalent of gun- leverage to talk about human rights.”6 boat diplomacy via the American car- In the three years since, TARP, the rier battle group. stimulus, ObamaCare and $2 trillion The second divergence is the more in Federal debt, much of it pur- PRC’s determination not to repeat chased by the Chinese, have presum- the mistakes of the USSR. In spite ably reinforced President Obama’s of its military spending, the Soviet reticence to confront his “banker.” Union was never able to achieve As of 2006, China spent 4.3 a favorable enough correlation of percent of its GDP on defense, with forces to conquer Western Europe, routine double-digit year-over-year or even to credibly threaten to do increases in spending.7 While fight- so. China’s leaders understand that ing two wars, the United States spent a strong economy leads to a strong roughly the same, four percent of military, not the reverse. As China’s its economy, on defense in 2005.8 economy grows steadily, its military But China’s defense spending is on expenditures increase—how much a steeply upward trend, both in real is the question, as it is very difficult terms and as a percentage of their to determine China’s exact military GDP, while the United States is under spending (by design, as the Chinese tremendous fiscal pressure to pull are very secretive and more suc- back on all government spending, cessful than the Soviet Union was in including spending on the military. hiding the true nature of their mili- China, combining a strong tary buildup). Conversely, America’s economy, flush currency holdings ballooning public debt and social wel- and strategic investments with a fare, pension, and health obligations growing and modernizing military, will act to hobble U.S. military and is increasingly flexing its muscles basic research investments for the in the Pacific region, most notably foreseeable future.10 against Japan over sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. How and when China tips the China, combining a strong correlation of forces enough in its economy, flush currency holdings favor to reorder the greater Pacific and strategic investments with a region remains in question. growing and modernizing military, Not the Soviets is increasingly flexing its muscles China presents three signifi- in the Pacific. cantly different strategic challenges to America than those that were What the Chinese spend their posed by the former Soviet Union. military renminbi on is just as impor- The first is China’s burgeoning tant. China appears to be prepar- economy and its $2.85 trillion in for- ing for the next conflict, rather than eign currency holdings,9 abetted by attempting to match America aircraft

The Journal of International Security Affairs 111 Chuck DeVore

carrier-for-carrier. In this, the Chi- dent on the power equation between nese present their third challenge the United States and the People’s to America and throw the traditional Republic of China. That this power calculation of a correlation of forces relationship should be approached into disarray. China has the world’s through a thoughtful and purposeful largest army, and it is modernizing it, strategic plan, rather than a series of placing special attention on a highly transient policies, should be a given. trained and well-equipped subset So, what should American policy- of the People’s Liberation Army—a makers do to extend the American subset about as large as the entire Century, assuming that that is pos- United States Army active force. sible or desirable? China is also modernizing its navy and air force. And China’s space The view from here industry launched as many orbital There are three general views of missions as the U.S. did in 2010. But the rise of China, and what America more troubling to American strate- should do about it. gic planners are China’s asymmetric One school of thought, represent- dimensions of power. For instance, ing a realpolitik viewpoint, was set China’s fascination with assaulting out by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, the the Internet is intensely unsettling, international business editor of the with WikiLeaks reporting that Chi- Daily Telegraph, in a recent commen- nese officials ordered an attack on tary.12 In it, Evans-Pritchard raised Google in December of 2009, coupled the ghosts of Wilhelmine Germany’s with a strike that rerouted much of rapid rise in the late 1800s, and their the world’s Internet traffic through overt challenge of British world lead- China for 20 minutes in April 2010.11 ership that led to the First World Rather than build a dozen aircraft car- War. He then asks, “Is China now riers, China is deploying systems to where Germany was in 1900?” citing destroy the $6 billion ships with sub- the intemperate New Year’s remarks orbital, hypersonic ballistic missiles. of Chinese Defense Minister Liang And, China is extremely interested in Guanglie that China’s armed forces directed energy and electromagnetic are “pushing forward preparations pulse (EMP) weapons designed to for military conflict in every strate- render America’s massive investment gic direction.” Then Evans-Pritchard in high-tech weaponry useless, turn- quotes an expert saying that Beijing ing it from an asset to a liability with is losing its grip on the colonels of the one flick of a switch. People’s Liberation Army, a theme repeated with increasing frequency in articles about China. China’s leaders understand that a Yet his prescription for these ills strong economy leads to a strong is more of the same: “The correct military, not the reverse. As statecraft for the West is to treat Bei- China’s economy grows steadily, its jing politely but firmly as a member of the global club, gambling that the military expenditures increase. Confucian ethic will over time incline China to a quest for global as well as Whether or not the era of Ameri- national concord.” That major U.S. can supremacy is coming to a close or corporations, closely eyeing their will continue is almost entirely depen- quarterly profits, share this view is

112 The Journal of International Security Affairs Our China Challenge one big reason why America’s China labor. The principled left, as well as policy has been immune from serious many conservatives, tend to agree revision for 20 years. that China’s human rights record At the other end of the spectrum leaves much to be desired. Tibet is is Irwin M. Stelzer, director of eco- a common concern on the left, mir- nomic policy studies at the Hudson rored by conservatives’ support for a Institute. In his extensive January 17, free Taiwan. As was the case during 2011, China policy piece in the Weekly the Cold War, organized labor has Standard, Stelzer asserts that China’s been a consistent critic of workplace trade policies are not just about eco- conditions in China and the inability nomics. Rather, Chinese President of its workers to join unions. China’s Hu Jintao sees “Trade, overseas blatant currency manipulation has investment, currency manipulation— also been a target. However, the left all, war by other means; all, about the and labor are skeptics of robust U.S. place of nations in the world, a key defense spending and the trimming part of the ‘strategic direction’ in of entitlements, leaving them only which he is taking his country.” The partial allies of Stelzer’s plan to deal United States, meanwhile, blithely with the China threat. Whether there continues its “historic policies. Free is enough common ground between trade. Reliance on the World Trade labor, the anti-China left and national Organization to settle disputes. defense conservatives to forge an Occasional public complaints about effective alliance, similar to the one China’s persistent undervaluation of represented by the Committee on the renminbi, but refusal to declare the Present Danger in the 1970s and the regime a currency manipulator. 1980s, remains to be seen. And conferences, conferences, con- ferences. All very 20th century.”13 Whether or not the era of After this bleak assessment, backed up by a litany of depressing American supremacy is coming to examples of China’s rise, Stelzer sets a close or will continue is almost out specific ideas by which to counter entirely dependent on the power China, including: stop apologizing; equation between the U.S. and the increase work visa allocations for tal- ented people; harmonize trade and People’s Republic of China. tax policies to the national interest; update trade policy to eliminate Chi- na’s currency manipulation advantage Internal challenges and propensity for intellectual prop- America remains focused on erty theft; expand technology trans- fighting bands of Islamist terrorists fer restrictions on China; prepare for and their supporters in Afghanistan the next war; “Do whatever is needed and Iraq, with a watchful eye on the to maintain superiority in the Asia- volatile instability in the Arab world, Pacific region, as our allies and poten- unrest in Pakistan, threats from the tial allies are urging us to do”; and, Islamic Republic of Iran and its Hez- stop borrowing from China by getting bollah terror proxy in Lebanon, and “our economic house in order.”14 any number of nation-states, such A third view of the Sino- as North Korea and Syria, sitting on American relationship may be found the hair trigger of chaos. Meanwhile, with the American left and organized China quietly prepares. China’s stra-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 113 Chuck DeVore

tegic planners would no doubt wel- of sycophancy and cynicism.” The come American commitments to former high-level banker also notes calm these regions at great cost in “that China has become one of the American blood, treasure, and focus. world’s most polluted countries. Dust But before China can assume super- and smog choke its cities. All of the power status, supplanting or displac- country’s major rivers are contami- ing America’s historic role in the nated,” while “[r]elentless extraction Pacific, then elsewhere, it has its own is quickly depleting China’s resource obstacles to overcome. deposits.” Then he explains what is China’s Communist Party, a likely the greatest concern of Chi- political monopoly, appears unable to nese policymakers who represent a reform itself. Corruption is still the communist party that is supposedly norm. Rule of law is spotty. Choosing on the side of the proletariat: “Income an example from among the myriad distribution has remained skewed that erode the “moral influence” in favor of the rich for too long, and that Sun Tzu thought so important15 the government has failed to provide comes a report of the son of a police decent public goods. With the con- official whose drunken driving hit- trast between the opulent lifestyles and-run killed one college student of the rich and the slow improvement while wounding another. As he was of basic living conditions for the poor detained, he dared guards to charge fomenting social tension, a serious him, shouting, “My dad is Li Gang!” backlash is brewing.”17 This rant from a son of the nomenkla- Chinese leaders are said to tura has become a catch phrase for understand that every great histori- corruption-weary Chinese.16 cal power also had a currency that was held in reserve. It may take decades for the renminbi to achieve Rather than assume that a that status, with a multi-polar inter- powerful China would benignly national currency arrangement far take its station as the world’s more likely in the interim. The United States achieved economic parity with most powerful nation, American the British home islands in 1870, but policymakers need to prepare for it wasn’t until the Federal Reserve a world with a less-than-friendly was established in 1913, combined China. with WWI, that the U.S. dollar came into international use.18 Seeing the renminbi become a reserve currency For all the supposed advantages will take much more than economic of China’s state capitalism, the Chi- growth; it is also influenced by law, nese themselves appear to under- institutions, alliances, and, most stand its limitations. In an article importantly, inertia. remarkable for its self-criticism, a The flip side of China’s desire to former senior official of China’s cen- see the renminbi become a reserve tral bank wrote that China’s “Achil- currency is the fact that China les’ heel” was its inability to innovate remains dependent on the dollar. caused by an “unholy alliance” China is very vulnerable to U.S. cur- between government and big busi- rency manipulation, with Dagong, ness, lamenting that “meritocracy China’s sovereign debt-rating has been eroded by a political culture agency, warning that the Federal

114 The Journal of International Security Affairs Our China Challenge

Reserve’s rapid printing of money tegic counterweight to China; and, under its “Quantitative Easing” it deals a hammer-blow to China’s policy may spark “a world credit unbridled mercantilist policies. Eco- war.”19 Printing dollars does two nomically, India is where China was things to China: it devalues its $2.85 about 10 years ago, with an economy trillion of foreign currency holdings, and GDP per capita a little less than most of it in dollars, and it makes the half of China’s.21 India’s population is renminbi more valuable, undercut- expected to surpass that of China in ting China’s exports. And, without 14 years.22 Meanwhile, India’s vibrant an increase in internal consumption, parliamentary democracy, efforts at a slowdown in exports has the poten- improving rule of law, and strides in tial to cause unrest among the hun- developing its human capital make dreds of millions of Chinese workers them a potentially powerful Asian who are one paycheck away from rival to China—with democracy and hunger in a nation with little in the human rights accruing an added soft way of a social safety net. Further, a power benefit to India in the region. renminbi reserve currency would act Unlike 1972’s Sino-American to increase its value, eroding one of marriage of convenience linking China’s key export advantages. two unlikely partners wary of Soviet imperialism, the foundation of an Hedging against Indo-American agreement, forged by China’s rise a mutual concern over Chinese hege- Beijing may indeed someday mony, would be strengthened by the assume its role at the world’s center, shared values of free elections and a its “Middle Kingdom.” Or, corrup- free press. tion-fueled ostentatious wealth may first wear down the patience of the Chinese people, plunging China into a convulsion of violence from its vast peasantry, as has happened dozens of 1. The ratio of U.S. to China economic power times in its long past as rulers have has slid from 5.3 to 1 in 1992 to 1.5 to 1 in exhausted their moral influence with 2010, according to economic statistics from the ruled. the “World Economic Outlook Database,” Rather than assume that a pow- October 2010, International Monetary Fund and the “World Fact Book,” Central Intelli- erful China would benignly take its gence Agency. station as the world’s most powerful 2. Thomas L. Friedman, “The 1992 CAM- nation, American policymakers need PAIGN: The Democrats; Clinton Asserts to prepare for a world with a less- Bush Is Too Eager to Befriend the World’s Dictators,” New York Times, October 2, than-friendly China. Planners should 1992. assume that China’s momentum may 3. David E. Sanger, “THE 2000 CAMPAIGN: be unstoppable. Among other things, THE TEXAS GOVERNOR; Speech Distorts the United States should look to Bush’s View of Foreign Policy, Aide Says,” New York Times, May 1, 2000 20 India as the new “China Card.” As 4. George Gedda, “Bush, China Leader Say part of this policy, U.S.-Indian trade They’re United Against Terror,” Associated and investment must increase expo- Press, October 19, 2001. nentially and at the expense of the 5. Caren Bohan, “Obama Says Bush Should Weigh Boycott of Olympic Ceremony,” Chinese. Such a policy will serve two Reuters, April 9, 2008, http://www.reuters. purposes: it builds up India as a stra- com/article/2008/04/09/us-usa-politics- obama-china-idUSN0945363820080409.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 115 Chuck DeVore

6. Maria Gavrilovic, “Obama: ‘It’s Hard To article/SB1000142405274870483270457611 Tell Your Banker That He’s Wrong,’” CBS 3873869112398.html. News, April 9, 2008, http://www.cbsnews. 17. Yu Yongding, “A Different Road Forward,” com/8301-502443_162-4004256-502443. China Daily, December 23, 2010. html. 18. From a January 20, 2011, book review in the 7. “China,” CIA World Factbook on Intelligence, Economist of Barry Eichengreen’s Exorbi- January 24, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/ tant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar library/publications/the-world-factbook/ and the Future of the International Monetary geos/ch.html. System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 8. Ibid.; “United States,” CIA World Factbook 2011). on Intelligence, January 20, 2011, https:// 19. David Piper, “China’s Dollar Concerns,” www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- Foxnews.com, January 28, 2011, http:// world-factbook/geos/us.html. liveshots.blogs.foxnews.com/2011/01/28/ 9. Keith Bradsher, “Chinese Foreign Cur- chinas-dollar-concerns. rency Reserves Swell by Record Amount,” 20. The Times of India ran an article on February New York Times, January 11, 2011, http:// 12, 2011, entitled “China Ready to Go to War www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/business/ to Safeguard National Interests,” in which global/12yuan.html. they cited an article in the Qiushi Journal, 10. During the height of the Cold War, the Soviet the official publication of the Chinese Com- Union reached an economic output equal to munist Party, which said countries such as about 55 percent of the U.S. As of 2010, the Japan, India, Vietnam, Australia, the Phil- People’s Republic of China’s economy was ippines, Indonesia, and Korea are trying 67 percent of America’s. to join an anti-China alliance because they 11. Patrick Sawer, “Top Chinese officials either had a war or a conflict of interest with Ordered Attack on Google, WikiLeaks China and that China should use its eco- Cables Claim,” Telegraph (London), Decem- nomic power and trade as a weapon to rein ber 4, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ in neighboring nations. news/worldnews/wikileaks/8181619/ 21. “India,” CIA World Factbook on Intelligence, Top-Chinese-officials-ordered-attack-on- February 14, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/ Google-WikiLeaks-cables-claim.html; Ellen library/publications/the-world-factbook/ Nakashima, “Chinese Internet Diversion geos/in.html. Was Worrisome, Report Says,” Washing- 22. “China’s Population to Peak at 1.4 Billion ton Post, November 17, 2010, http://voices. Around 2026,” U.S. Census Bureau, News washingtonpost.com/checkpoint-washing- Release, December 15, 2009, http://www. ton/2010/11/chinese_internet_diversion_ census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/ was.html. international_population/cb09-191.html. 12. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “Appeasement Is the Proper Policy Towards Confucian China,” Telegraph (London), January 22, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/com- ment/ambroseevans_pritchard/8277143/ Appeasement-is-the-proper-policy-towards- Confucian-China.html. 13. Irwin M. Stelzer, “Our Broken China Policy: Beijing Plays Chess; America Plays Tiddly- winks,” Weekly Standard, January 17, 2011, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/ our-broken-china-policy_526878.html. 14. Ibid. 15. Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, wrote: “By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and death without fear of mortal peril… When one treats people with benevolence, justice, and righteousness, and reposes confidence in them, the army will be united in mind and all will be happy to serve their leaders.” 16. Owen Fletcher, “Hit-And-Run Sentence Sparks More Outrage,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/

116 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Baker military forum

Tangled Up in the War on Terror

Maj. Gen. Sid Shachnow, USA (ret.)

ollowing the attacks of September 11, President George W. Bush declared a new war, the “War on Terror.” At the time, it was unclear what sort Fof war this would be. Was the President simply employing a rhetorical device to rally support? Or was he asking for a moral equivalent of war, such as the War on Poverty, the War on Crime, or the War on Drugs? Understand- ing that terror is a tactic begs the question: in a war on “terror,” how does one identify the enemy? The United States can only defeat an enemy that can be named, described and understood. This lack of clarity would come to haunt U.S. forces charged with prosecuting the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Soon after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the war—as fought in Afghanistan and, slightly later, in Iraq—morphed from conventional war to insurgency, civil war, ethnic strife, religious war, unconventional war and irregular war. At pres- ent, it is becoming a war on crime. American forces, for the first time, were confronted with an entirely new set of Rules of Engagement (ROE) brought about by increased scrutiny from non-governmental organizations and some European governments concerned that the laws of war (and their concomitant emphasis on the protection of civil- ians) be ever more strictly applied—but only to American and Coalition forces. They did so even as the enemy employed tactics designed specifically to put those selfsame civilians in the line of fire. For the Special Forces, SEALs, marines, soldiers and airmen tasked with confronting the terrorist insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, victory became

Maj. Gen. Sid Shachnow, USA (ret.) is a former Commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command. This article is adapted from his February 2010 speech before the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, Israel. Sid Shachnow an ephemeral notion, while the fear tion of viable evidence proving the that prosecution awaited them for hostile intent of the captured enemy. any exchange of fire that could be Failure to do so, a common result on second-guessed by the aforemen- the battlefield, sometimes results in tioned outside groups became all too the release of captured enemy com- real. The new ROE give the insur- batants. This process, so injurious to gents a perverse incentive to violate morale, is derogatorily referred to as the laws of war, because in doing so a “catch and release” program. they are more successful in combat The International Criminal against American and Coalition Court and many European courts forces, which remain bound by those operate under an ill-defined legal rules. Adding to the dilemma facing concept called “universal jurisdic- commanders and their troops is the tion,” an international law principle specter of the so-called universal that claims criminal jurisdiction over criminal courts which threaten to persons whose alleged crimes were prosecute troops for war crimes they committed outside the boundaries allege to have occurred on battle- of the prosecuting state, regardless fields thousands of miles away from of nationality, country of residence, their national jurisdiction. or any other relation with the pros- ecuting country. The risk is high that From the battlefield to universal jurisdiction will be used the courtroom in a politically-motivated manner to Military units in Afghanistan attempt to prosecute American mili- and Iraq are incorporating law tary and government personnel. If enforcement procedures into their such charges were brought, a danger- combat operations. They are asked ous legal precedent would be set. The to collect biometric data and incrim- NGOs leading these efforts, such as inating evidence, and are expected Amnesty International and Human to preserve combat objectives as a Rights Watch, consider themselves crime scene. Troops trained to kick protectors of global human rights. down doors and use lethal weapons But a review of their court filings indi- now spend time bagging and tagging cates a consistent pattern of ignoring evidence, photographing raid scenes or downplaying terrorist acts by rec- and grilling suspects. Military law- ognized terror groups while loudly yers are assigned to the lowest levels agitating for prosecution of U.S. and of command. Their input in the plan- Israeli soldiers combating those very ning, targeting and execution of same terror groups. military operations is now standard There is strong evidence that operating procedure. these practitioners may be dupes Captured enemy personnel are as well as hypocritical. In a widely no longer treated as prisoners of publicized case that captured the war. Effectively, they have become attention of American military com- criminals potentially awaiting a trial, manders, a Hamas official boasted to and are treated as such. To each, a The Times of London that his organi- defense lawyer is assigned, making zation was behind a London court’s interrogation almost impossible issue of arrest warrants for several senior Israeli leaders intending to unless there is a plea agreement. 1 Soldiers are charged with the collec- visit the UK.

118 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tangled Up in the War on Terror

The tug-of-war over war produced by the scourge of armed People throughout the world conflict. Religious legal theorists care about fundamental rules govern- first defined the notion of justice in ing the conduct of war, even if they war, and custom and international differ on the need to resort to violence treaties continue to uphold that in the first place. Nonetheless, there notion today. is profound disagreement over who Three important principles has the authority to declare, inter- govern armed conflict. The law allows pret and enforce those rules, as well “proportional” and humane force to as who and what developments in the be used only when it is “militarily so called “art of war” will shape them necessary,” and it “distinguishes” now and into the future. The idea of between combatants and noncomba- “into the future” is particularly rel- tants to mitigate unnecessary harm. evant, because laws have historically The law also guarantees the right to been developed looking back at past self-defense. experience and often fail to antici- pate technological development and The new rules of engagement give changes in warfare. Therefore, the core question becomes, “Who owns the insurgents a perverse incentive the law of war?” to violate the laws of war, because For the past 20 years, the center in doing so they are more successful of gravity in establishing, interpreting and shaping the law of war has gradu- in combat against American and ally shifted away from the military Coalition forces, which remain establishments of leading states and bound by those rules. toward activists and publicly aggres- sive NGOs (such as Amnesty Inter- national, Human Rights Watch, Red The problem with proportional- Cross, etc.). More broadly, NGOs in ity, especially when the enemy is a recent years have been promoting an terrorist organization, is threefold. ever more utopian concept of the law The theory is a) ambiguous, b) lacks of war, in keeping with their absolut- useful precedents, and c) as a prac- ist human rights ideology. In practice, tical matter is nearly impossible to this ideology is aimed at only at one interpret and enforce. side of any given conflict—the side There are those that take the that most assiduously tries to obey position that a proportional response the law. At the same time, these same means the math must add up. NGOs are indispensable in advancing Therefore, if one party to a conflict the cause of humanitarianism in war. killed two or three the other party’s Yet the pendulum shift toward them response must not be greater, and has gone further than is useful. The those killed must not be civilians. ownership of the laws of war needs to Unfortunately, in the case that the give much greater weight to the state original two or three killed were civil- practices of leading countries. Demo- ians generally escapes the notice of cratic sovereigns that actually fight human rights organizations monitor- wars should be ascendant in shaping ing the conflict. In a similar sense, the law. proportionality is expected of the The laws of war attempt to type and frequency of the weapons mitigate the cruelties and misery used in the conflict.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 119 Sid Shachnow

Until recently, terrorist organiza- 3. The last concern is about rules tions were out-gunned by the conven- that are aimed at accommodat- tional militaries that opposed them. ing guerrillas, non-state actors Israel’s experience in Operation Cast and irregular fighters. The Proto- Lead against Hamas in Gaza inverted cols grant legal combatant status the equation; in that conflict, the to those fighters who conceal terror grouped launched thousands themselves and their weapons of rockets and missiles into Israel among civilians, as long as they explicitly targeting civilians before reveal themselves to the adver- the IDF began earnest attempts to sary “preceding the launching of stop them.2 an attack”—which is to say, often shortly before attacking from Rethinking the rules among the civilians who will, The writing, then, is on the wall; inevitably, be caught in the result- the U.S. military should discard pro- ing cross fire. portionality. Taking that position would not be a violation of existing law, The purpose here is not to dissect as neither The Hague Convention3 nor the rules of war, but to argue that it is the 1949 Geneva Conventions4 spe- time to reexamine them and propose cifically refer to “proportionality.” changes to make them relevant to American military doctrine already new realities. Harvard law professor proscribes use of force that is indis- Alan Dershowitz has done just that,5 criminate, wasteful, excessive or not and his recommendations are sum- necessary to achieving military objec- marized here: tives. And neither the United States nor Israel is a contracting party or 1. Legally empower forces to attack signatory to the 1977 Geneva Proto- terrorists who conceal them- cols, which do use the term. American selves among civilians. Civilians issues with the Geneva Protocols fall who are killed while being used into three main categories: as human shields by terrorist must be deemed the victims and 1. They grant combatants rights, the responsibility of the terrorists including treatment as POWs, on who have chosen to hide among the basis of certain motives for them and put them at risk. fighting, referring specifically to those who fight against a “racist 2. A new category of prisoners regime” or “alien occupation.” should be recognized for captured terrorists and those who sup- 2. Certain provisions appear to port them. They are not POWs. restrict methods and means of Nor are they ordinary criminals. warfare that are legitimate. For These are individuals who oper- example, there are no excep- ate outside the law of war. There is tions for nuclear weapons, while a need to designate a new status, at the same time they categori- that affords them certain rights cally prohibit reprisals against but does not treat them like either civilians, including use of POWs or criminals. nuclear weapons in reprisal for a nuclear attack, which is the very 3. The law must come to realize basis of nuclear deterrence. that the traditional distinction

120 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tangled Up in the War on Terror

between combatants and noncom- tion, “When can I pull the trigger?” batants has been blurred. There The ROE may restrict or permit the is now a continuum, on one end use of force “to the full extent allow- are the innocent who do not sup- able under international law.” In some port terrorists; in the middle are military engagements, ROE are more those who applaud and encour- restrictive than the law requires in age terrorists but do not actively order to prevent the escalation of hos- facilitate them; at the guilty end tilities or serve some other strategic are those who help finance them, or political purpose. Such ROE are who make martyrs of suicide crafted to ensure that the military bombers, who help terrorists adheres to the Executive Branch’s hide among them and who fail policy for the war. to report imminent attacks that Some would argue that although they are aware of. The law should the law of war appropriately limits recognize this spectrum and hold the use of force, the current Rules of those accountable for complicity. Engagement are an unfaithful legal interpretation because they unnec- 4. The treaties against all forms of essarily restrict troops in a manner torture must recognize differ- not required by law. In order to help ences in degrees and reexam- explain ROE to the troops, command- ine the definition that defines ers or lawyers frequently issue ROE torture as any act that inflicts cards that use acronyms or mnemon- severe pain or suffering, physi- ics. For example, some soldiers are cal or mental. There needs to instructed to use force only after sat- be recognition that in extreme isfying a seven-step process: circumstances and with legal supervision countries will resort 1. You must feel a direct threat to to some forms of interrogation you or your team. that are currently prohibited. 2. You must clearly see a threat. Returning to the Rules of Engage- ment (ROE), international law 3. That threat must be identified. requires states to disseminate the law of war to their combatants, which is 4. The team leader must concur that achieved in the United States through there is an identified threat. the issuance of ROE. The Joint Chiefs of Staff created uniform Standing 5. The team leader must feel that the ROE (SROE) that apply to all U.S. situation is one of life or death. forces, but lower-level commanders may narrow and tailor the SROE to 6. There must be minimal or no col- the individual circumstances of each lateral risk. military operation and mission. The ROE issued to the soldier, however, 7. Only then can the team leader must comply both with the SROE and clear the engagement. the United States’ obligations under the law of war. This model ingrains orderly check- The Rules of Engagement link lists in the soldier’s mind in the hope the law of war to the battlefield. They that he will go through each step when answer the soldier’s timeless ques- presented with a potential threat.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 121 Sid Shachnow

It is not, however, effective in close- defend an objective that is protected quarters combat, because the delay by another uniformed armed force. caused by the model is both impracti- In those situations, the problem of cal and dangerous in insurgent war- distinguishing civilians from combat- fare, where mere seconds make the ants and insurgents is eliminated, or difference between life and death. at least lessened. The ROE should Following a checklist increases a sol- differ, however, when soldiers are dier’s response time, consequently engaged in police-type operations. endangering his life. The use of mne- These situations are intrinsically dif- monic devices and acronyms, while ferent from combat where the ene- purporting to make the ROE easy to my’s identity is obvious. remember, guarantee hesitation in The laws of war never intended the face of the threat. Furthermore, for war to be harmless; they only by delaying a soldier’s reactions, ROE strive to mitigate unnecessary cru- checklists inhibit a soldier’s ability elty. The laws never diminished the to defend himself. By requiring our right to self-defense. The current troops to follow a checklist, there is a ROE, in interpreting the principles of good probability we are diminishing the laws of war, overemphasize pro- their right to self-defense. portionality while largely ignoring and thereby inhibiting the soldier’s right to self-defense. For the past 20 years, the center of gravity in establishing, interpreting Past and future and shaping the law of war has The heavy focus on the laws gradually shifted away from the of war and the ROE has served to obscure a critical factor in the waging military establishments of leading of war – the notion of victory. states and toward activists and Victory in war may or may not publicly aggressive NGOs. have anything to do with objective criteria such as casualties or terri- tory taken or lost. What matters most Ultimately, what has occurred is the ultimate perception of the situ- is a problem of legal interpretation. ation, not the facts. Different people, As previously stated, the ROE pro- depending on their perspective, can vide incentive for an insurgent to legitimately differ in their assess- violate the law of war, because in ment. The assessment aspect com- doing so he is more successful at plicates the issue since it introduces defeating his enemies who are ham- uncontrolled variables. One may pered by that same law. The insur- legitimately ask whose assessment or gents have no regard for human life opinion takes precedence. For Ameri- and as such their victims are con- cans, in the final analysis, the opinion sidered expendable. Such unfair- that matters the most is that of the ness only frustrates those soldiers American people. who follow the ROE. The truth is that “victory” is an The current Rules of Engage- assessment, not a proven conclusion; ment have a place in modern-day the results are independent for each warfare. They can be used when side and may differ. That is, the fact nation-states engage in combat opera- that one side won does not necessar- tions where troops prepare to take or ily mean its opponent lost.

122 The Journal of International Security Affairs Tangled Up in the War on Terror

Figure 1 Defeat Lose Not Win Tie Not Lose Win Victory ----I------I------I------I------I------I------I----- “Victory,” in the final analysis, The American warriors of today is a political condition. Victory at must go into combat fearing more the highest levels is correspondingly than the enemy. They must fear that, defined in political terms. The impli- despite their best efforts to prevent cation is that tactical or operational civilian casualties by following a victory without favorable political restrictive ROE that compels them outcomes is sterile. In other words, to take risks which just a decade ago victory is heavily dependent on per- would have been described as fool- spective. In a military sense, this hardy at best, there will be a laundry translates into being sensitive to the list of NGOs and Western govern- level of war. It is possible to have a ments willing to bring them up on smashing tactical victory that does charges if there is even a hint that not produce operational or strategic excessive force was employed. The results. What counts in the end is the net effect of these dramatic changes strategic outcome. to the employment of U.S. armed The American experience in the forces has yet to be assessed, but 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam is a early indications are not encouraging. case in point. During Tet, more than 85,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacked; 45,250 were killed and U.S. and South Vietnamese troops did not lose any territory. But who achieved “victory”? 1. James Hider, “Hamas Using English Law to Finally, victory and defeat are Demand Arrest of Israeli Leaders for War Crimes,” Times of London, December 21, polar opposites. There are points along 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ this spectrum that delineate degrees of news/uk/article6963473.ece. success or failure (see Figure 1). 2. In fact, the doctrine of “proportionality” There must be continued debate requires that collateral damage, includ- ing civilian casualties, be proportionate and discussion on the topic of victory. to the military value of the target under Failure to understand the issues will attack. Professor Michael Newton of Van- only end with the Twenty-First Cen- derbilt University wrote, “So long as the tury bemoaning the inability to turn attempt is to minimize civilian damage, then even a strike that causes large amounts spectacular tactical victories into of damage - but is directed at a target with decisive strategic results. very large military value - would be lawful.” On the 21st century battlefield, As cited in William Safire, “Proportion- “victory” has become near unachiev- ality,” New York Times, August 13, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/13/ able in the conventional sense. magazine/13wwln_safire.html. Indeed, the old notions of victory are 3. For full text of the Hague Convention, see no longer put forth as the ultimate http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/ goal, especially as the enemy is all lawwar.asp. 4. For full text of the Geneva Conventions and too often a stateless insurgent fight- Additional Protocols, see http://www.icrc. ing in civilian dress and exploiting org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView. our adherence to the law of war to 5. Alan M. Dershowitz, “Rules of War Enable gain a battlefield advantage and to Terror,” Baltimore Sun, May 28, 2004, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-05- draw us into situations where civil- 28/news/0405280166_1_innocent-civilians- ians are killed and wounded. noncombatants-terrorism.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 123 Since 1976, JINSA has fulfi lled an important role in the American Jewish community by supporting a strong U.S. military and a strong U.S. defense and security relationship with Israel and other like-minded democracies. Perspective

Bridging the Divide An Interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker

[Editor’s Note: As this issue goes to press, Ambassador Crocker is set to be nominated by the Obama administration to serve as the next U.S. envoy to Afghanistan.]

mbassador Ryan C. Crocker currently serves as Dean and Exec- utive Professor at the George Bush School of Government and APublic Service at Texas A&M University. He retired from the Foreign Service in April 2009 after a career spanning 37 years during which he served as an Ambassador five times: Iraq (2007-2009), Paki- stan (2004-2007), Syria (1998-2001), Kuwait (1994-1997), and Lebanon (1990-1993). Amb. Crocker was a member of the faculty at the National War College from 2003 to 2004. From May to August 2003, he was in Baghdad as the first Director of Governance for the Coalition Pro- visional Authority. Before that, from August 2001 to May 2003, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

On February 11, 2011, Ambassador Crocker spoke with Journal Deputy Editor James Colbert about the Middle East, Western-Arab relations, and the future of freedom in that troubled region.

Recent months have seen a wave of pro-democracy and anti-regime sentiment sweep across the Middle East and North Africa. What lessons do the revolutions now taking place in Tunisia and Egypt hold for the Obama administration? Perspective

Mubarak’s resignation has moved Egypt into a new phase, and created what is clearly a challenging time for the region and for the Administration. Manag- ing what comes next in Egypt is going to be even more difficult. The ability of Egyptians to produce an orderly process is going to need to be backed by the army. It must lead to not just free and fair elections but the serious building of institutions: a new parliament; a revitalized judiciary; the rule of law outside of the emergency military law that’s governed the country for 30 years; and the organization of political parties, prepared to accept the rules of the democratic process. None of these are really in place, and all of them will be difficult to bring into being. In the meantime, you have waiting in the shadows some very, very bad actors who would love to see Egypt now move into a period of tur- bulence that would give them an opportunity to reestablish themselves. The Obama administration talked about “orderly transition” when Mubarak still retained the Egyptian presidency; that is exactly the rubric for this period, and its going to be hard to manage.

The Bush administration’s “surge” of military forces into Iraq in 2007 has been widely credited for helping turn the tide against the insurgency there. General David PetraEus, the architect of that approach, is now attempting a similar strategy in Afghanistan. How do you assess its chances? Why did the Iraqi “surge” succeed?

The enormous advantage we have in the surge in Afghanistan is that the same man is running it who ran the Iraqi surge. No one is better equipped than David Petraeus to oversee this process; he’s uniquely positioned to understand the very significant differences between Iraq and Afghanistan. The surge worked in Iraq for a variety of reasons. It wasn’t just the additional troops. It was that the troops were given a different mission; their paramount duty was the protection of the civilian population. That is what we’re trying to do in Afghanistan as well, and in more challenging circumstances, simply given the rural (rather than urban) nature of Afghanistan and Afghan society.

That leads us to a second key point: your enemy always has a vote. What we had in Iraq by the beginning of 2007 was an enemy in the form of al-Qaeda that had seriously alienated its host population, the Sunni community both in Baghdad and Anbar in the west. Al-Qaeda excesses—cutting off hands for minor infrac- tions, summary executions—had made the majority of the Sunni population more than ready to stand up against it once they knew we had their backs. The Taliban in Afghanistan has been guilty of similar excesses, but not to the same degree. I don’t think you see the same broad-based readiness yet on the part of the population to say we’re with you and against the Taliban. In part, that is complicated by concerns in Afghanistan that they’re just not sure how long we’re going to be around. The July 2011 deadline the President announced in December 2009 caught the attention of both our friends and our adversaries. It encouraged the latter and brought fear to the former. We’ve since modified that, to 2014, but doubts linger.

The third point I’d make is that, for a political process to take hold, you have to change your enemies’ calculations. It was hard to take Iraq apart with your bare hands, but if you bring a hammer down on it you open up fissures and cracks in

126 The Journal of International Security Affairs Perspective the insurgency and can then start exploiting them. None of that happened with- out a surge. I can’t guarantee it will happen in Afghanistan with one, though. We will see.

Iraq today has emerged as a stable and increasingly prosperous country—a state of affairs that was unthinkable just a few short years ago. What are the secrets of Iraq’s success, and what are the challenges to this positive trajectory in the years ahead?

Sometimes things have to get worse before they can get better. The bloody sec- tarian violence of 2006-2007 that the surge helped end, as horrific as it was, had a strong lasting impact on the Iraqis. They used the phrase “never again”; that’s not who we are, they said, we don’t do that to each other.

Historically, of course, they’re right. Sectarian violence in Iraq is exceedingly rare, and—Saddam’s rule aside—you have to go back to the beginning of the 18th century to find any significant sectarian violence. It isn’t part of Iraqi cul- ture. Iraqis were revolted by it, and that has seen them, and us, through a lot of trying times. The combination of our surge and presence and decisions by Iraqis themselves to find political ways forward after the violence were key to the progress we’ve seen. The commitment of Iraqis to a democratic process, their ability to conduct reasonably free and fair elections, their readiness to have the international community involved as both monitors and advisors for those elections, have produced both federal and provincial governments that are broadly seen as legitimate—however painful and long the process of form- ing them may have been. Coupled with the development of the Iraqi security forces, these are all key elements in the progress Iraq has sustained so far.

That, however, doesn’t guarantee long term success. Al-Qaeda may have been beaten down, but they have not been knocked out, and if they can find space they will take it. Iraqis are sick and tired of their quality of life; more than seven years since the fall of Saddam, unemployment is still high, services are lacking, schools are in poor condition, water, sanitation and electricity are severely chal- lenged, and increasingly Iraqis are demanding action and accountability. But I think Baghdad is getting the message.

In June 2009, President Obama famously delivered a speech in Cairo calling for a “new beginning” to relations between the United States and the Muslim world. How do you see the state of that effort, a year-and-a-half on?

While we’re certainly moving into an era of new relations, I’m not sure what we’ve seen in Tunisia and Egypt is how the President intended for it to come about. Overall, it was a good speech, in that it demonstrated respect for Arabs and Arab culture. We Americans tend not to be very strong on history; Arabs, on the other hand, remember theirs in their own terms. What they remember is a lot of suffering under colonial administration—the British, the French, the Italians—over many decades. This has often inclined them to see us, with all of our power and presence, not as the beacon of democracy but as simply impe- rial colonialism in a new guise. So talking the talk is important. Yet in recent

The Journal of International Security Affairs 127 Perspective months, as more and more time has elapsed, Arabs have taken to saying, “hey, nothing’s changed.” Same policies throughout the region, same actions. There’s more continuity here than change. That is true, but it’s not necessarily a bad thing. If we had a radical overhaul of foreign policy toward the Middle East every time we change administrations, we would be in even more trouble than in the past.

But the reality is that we are approaching a new beginning, one brought about not by the actions we’re taking but by the actions Arabs are taking. We talked earlier about the challenge that Egypt without Mubarak now presents to the Administration. How they manage it is going to be very, very closely watched by the entire region and will have a significant impact on how the region views the United States and this administration going forward.

In their efforts at public outreach, American officials routinely talk of the need to “win hearts and minds” in the Muslim world. Few, however, seem to know what this truly means. How do you see America’s standing in the Muslim world? How we can improve our image there? And what misconceptions still predominate in the way we interact with the Middle East?

It’s a great question because, for all of the interaction we have had, Arabs and Americans really do not understand each other terribly well. A lot of Arab attitudes toward the U.S. come about out of exposure to our movies and TV programs. A lot is colored by accounts told and retold by those who do not wish us well. These are often inaccurate, but they are accepted as fact by people who do not have another frame of reference. Americans, meanwhile, tend to look at the region and see adversaries, if not outright enemies. How do you get beyond that?

The more interaction we can manage, the better. The more young Arab men and women who have opportunities for education in U.S. institutions the better. They get to know us, and when you encounter these people in their host coun- tries later in life in positions of influence they remember with great fondness and affection their time in the States. They discover that we don’t actually have shootouts on our streets; that we are a generous and hospitable people. In other words, that all of what they feared turned out to be very different in reality. They then go back and use their educations for the benefit of their own countries, and in the process tell friends and families, “Hey, it isn’t what you think.”

That’s why the strategic framework agreement we negotiated with Iraq is so important. It literally is the framework for cooperation between our two coun- tries across the board, with a heavy emphasis on educational exchanges. Very few Iraqis came to the States for education during the Ba’ath years. Those that did basically didn’t return to Iraq. So, again, helping Iraqis understand us is a huge way of getting beyond the misconception stage, and the reverse is also true. I would like to see a much greater emphasis in our institutions of higher education on Middle Eastern studies, to include study abroad. We need to do a far better and broader job in this country of educating American young and old about the realities of the Middle East.

128 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

A Nordic Leader Marko Mihkelson

TALLINN—For Estonians, the year 2011 began in a celebratory mood. Tallinn became the cultural capital of Europe and, more importantly, Estonia joined the Euro Zone. Later this year, Estonia will mark the 20th anniversary of regaining its independence from the Soviet occupation. These victories are all the sweeter because the last couple of years have been truly difficult for Estonia. For years, the small emerging country enjoyed a consistent, and rapid, economic growth rate. Of late, however, it has struggled to weather the global financial crisis. It has not been an easy time for the coun- try’s center-right government, or for its people. But by holding the line on its conservative budget policies and by cutting public expenses, the government has managed to create solid ground for further growth. The British weekly The Economist praised all of this in the following words: “Estonia was one of only two countries in the single currency area [the Euro Zone] that actually met its debt and deficit rules. The other is Luxembourg. But if you add another filter, the willingness to meet NATO’s target for defense spending of two percent of GDP, Estonia (at 1.9 percent in 2011) beats Luxem- bourg (0.7 percent) easily. For a country that emerged battered and blinking from Soviet occupation not quite 20 years ago, being the only country to meet the main rules of the continent’s main clubs is a triumph.” If we are not hit by the economic aftershocks from the ongoing Arab revo- lutions, Estonia’s growth this year has been estimated at five percent of GDP. The need for an open economy and international competitiveness are priorities shared among all Estonian political parties.

The Honorable Marko Mihkelson is a member of the Estonian Parliament and Chairman of its EU Affairs Committee. He is the author of Russia: In the Shadow and in the Light (published in Estonian). Dispatches

From this point on, Estonia has great examples to follow. Finland, Sweden and other Nordic countries have all regularly occupied top spots in different world rankings. The European Nordic area is well known for its innovative and wealthy societies, which could serve as examples for many others. In 1939, Estonia and its northern neighbor Finland boasted similar living standards. But fifty years of Soviet occupation held us back from attaining these goals. The setback, however, was only temporary; immediately upon regaining independence in 1991, Estonia began to make its way back to the West. And after Russian troops left Estonia in 1994, we were able to look unequivocally toward the European Union and NATO. It was a much easier fit than many observers had expected when Estonia joined both in 2004. This was mostly due to Estonia’s strong performance in building an open market economy based on democratic values and principles, as well as its close proximity to the Nordic countries and their influence. Today, having recently joined the OECD (Organization for Economic Coop- eration and Development), Estonia has found itself in a completely new position: out in front of its Scandinavian mentors as the Nordic country most integrated with the West. Over the next decade, Estonia will seek to leverage this advanta- geous position on a number of fronts. One is economic. With its versatile foreign relations toolbox, Estonia will seek to enhance foreign trade and competitiveness standards in the region and beyond. Dealing with challenges such as an aging and shrinking population, Estonia will work toward a more integrated Nordic area, which could become one of the triggers for new growth in Europe. Europe’s welfare state model is today under growing pressure and needs to adjust to global changes. Energy security is also an issue of serious concern. The January 2006 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine shocked the European Union. And it happened again in 2009. Energy security was a serious topic well before these crises, but they only served to vault the dangers of reliance on too few energy sources and a lack of internal energy transportation connections to the top of the list of concerns for the Continent. Last but not least, Estonia can lead the way in regional foreign affairs. Over the past two decades, we have enjoyed fruitful relations with all of our neigh- bors, save Russia. Strained relations with Moscow are connected to Russia’s imperial past—and, since the early 1990s, its search for a new identity. It will just take time to overcome these barriers, but Estonia can be a positive actor in this regard as well.

130 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

India’s Stake In Afghanistan Shanthie Mariet D’Souza

SINGAPORE—Ten years back, India made a difficult choice in Afghanistan. Even as countries joined hands behind the U.S.-led military offensive against the Taliban, Delhi decided to concentrate its efforts on “development and recon- struction” activities in the war-ravaged country. A decade later, in the face of enormous difficulties and challenges, this “soft power” strategy has persisted. As the countdown to withdrawal from Afghanistan begins, the international community’s decade-long involvement there has come under renewed scru- tiny—and the prudence of India’s method of engagement has become increas- ingly understood. India’s policy in Afghanistan is an extension of its ideational role, pursued for decades. Maintaining “peace and stability” in Afghanistan has been a princi- pal foreign policy objective since the Cold War, which brought the great-power confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union to India’s door- step. As members of the Non-Aligned movement (NAM), both Afghanistan and India attempted to maintain neutrality amid the Cold War atmospherics. The signing of a “Friendship Treaty” in 1950 paved the way for development of friendly relations between India and the regime of Afghan king Zahir Shah, which persisted until the late 1970s. Despite the subsequent deterioration of the regional situation following the Soviet invasion, relations between India and Afghanistan—especially on trade, banking, commerce, agriculture, health, sports, education and cultural exchanges—by and large continued uninter- rupted. Contacts were only disrupted when the Taliban swept onto the Afghan political scene in September 1996. In post 9/11 Afghanistan, India’s interests have centered on three broad objectives: security concerns, economic interests and regional aspirations. India has revived its historical, traditional, socio-cultural and civilizational link- ages with the objective of a long-term stabilization of Afghanistan. As part of this effort, India has supported the nascent democratic regime, seeing in it the best hope for preventing the return of the Taliban. India is also looking beyond Afghanistan’s borders, working to revive Afghanistan’s role as a “land bridge” connecting South Asia with Central Asia and providing access to strategic energy resources. Along these lines, India has actively promoted greater trade and economic integration of Afghanistan with South Asia through the regional mechanism of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). With the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan under President Hamid Karzai in 2001, India announced that it would provide $100 million in reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Since then, India has followed a policy of high-level engagement—characterized by a range of political, humani-

Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza is Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore, and Associate Fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies & Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. The views reflected in this paper are those of the author and not of the institutes with which she is affiliated.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 131 Dispatches

tarian, cultural, economic and infrastructure projects. India today ranks overall as Afghanistan’s sixth-largest bilateral donor country, having invested heavily in a range of key sectors of the Afghan economy and pledged to do so to the tune of $1.3 billion more in the years ahead. Yet Delhi’s approach has not been without its critics. The “development only” paradigm has drawn fire for the perception of piggybacking on the mil- itary efforts of the U.S. and NATO-led forces. However, this critique misses the mark; far from being an opportunistic policy, India’s approach has comple- mented international counterinsurgency efforts and at the same time reinforced existing governance and empowered local Afghans. Unlike other international donors, who have relied on their own agencies and subcontracting (thereby cre- ating parallel structures of governance), most of India’s aid is currently chan- neled through the Afghan government and works in conjunction with local needs and priorities. Moreover, India has actively provided assistance to women’s groups through self-employment generation schemes, health and capacity-building. Such schemes, operational in Kabul and the western province of Herat, are hugely popular among local women’s groups, making them long-term stake- holders in rebuilding the country’s social and economic fabric. And this mode of aid delivery has proven effective even in difficult insurgency-prone areas. There is indeed a critical security concern to India’s involvement in Afghanistan, however—specifically, the possibility of terror emanating from the extremely volatile Pakistan-Afghanistan border and spilling over into India. A strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan would reduce the dangers of extremist violence and terrorism destabilizing the region. Since 9/11, New Delhi’s policy has broadly been in congruence with the U.S. objectives of deci- mating the Taliban and al-Qaeda and instituting a democratic regime in Kabul. Today, however, a resurgent Taliban and mounting instability have wors- ened the outlook for Afghanistan. In the coming days, India’s “aid only” policy is bound to face new challenges—and adapt to them. While Delhi resists put- ting “boots on ground,” it will need to widen its web of engagement in the rapidly-shrinking political space in Afghanistan. India must revive its tradi- tional Pushtun linkages and at the same time re-engage other ethnic groups as it attempts to strike a balance between continuing support for the Karzai government and increasing its engagement with other factions. By doing so, India will position itself to influence Afghanistan’s evolving political sphere, and serve as a serious interlocutor in the intra-Afghan and inter-regional rec- onciliation process now underway. One thing is clear. As a major regional power with global aspirations, India cannot take a backseat in the unfolding struggle over Afghanistan’s future.

132 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

Russia’s Energy Challenges Vladimir Paramonov

TASHKENT—During the 1990s, Russia’s energy ties to its so-called “near abroad” of post-Soviet Central Asia centered on one country and one country alone: Kazakhstan. The symbiosis was natural; because of the close interde- pendence of their economies, especially in the border areas between the two countries, Moscow and Astana were natural energy partners. By contrast, the interaction between Russia and the region’s other states (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), was practically nonexistent. Today, however, the situation is very different. Vladimir Putin’s assumption of the Russian presidency in the last days of 1999 coincided with a surge in world energy prices, prompting an intensification of the Kremlin’s energy cooperation with the region. More than a decade later, the web of energy partnerships built by Moscow in the region is broad—and getting broader. Yet with this new level of interaction have come new difficulties and challenges, which together have served to impact Russia’s standing in the region.

Kazakhstan After two decades of intensive interaction, the scale of cooperation in the Russian and Kazakh oil and natural gas sectors has intensified dramati- cally. But so has the interest of foreign players in tapping Kazakhstan’s energy wealth. Now Russian oil and gas companies face stiff foreign competition from Western corporate competitors, as well as from China, and their position in the Kazakh economy is increasingly tenuous—especially in terms of oil produc- tion and transportation. And while cooperation in other sectors (such as coal and electricity) is gradually improving, it is still far from the level and extent of Soviet times, when Kazakhstan was a Soviet republic. Neither is nuclear cooperation thriving. Although interaction between the two countries in that sphere began to see a revival in the latter half of the last decade, it has withered under the weight of the global economic crisis and emerging competition from China. In general, prospects for energy coopera- tion still appear quite promising. Nonetheless, if Russia does not fundamentally change the format of its energy cooperation with Kazakhstan, it faces an erosion of its status, given the competitive environment in the Kazakh energy sector.

Kyrgyzstan Russia’s energy cooperation with Kyrgyzstan is localized to the oil indus- try, and manifested mostly through the acquisition by Russian state natural gas titan Gazprom’s gobbling up of the Kyrgyz petroleum market. Cooperation in other energy sectors—including hydropower, which is critical to the Kyrgyz economy—is barely developing. Future interaction is hampered by political

Dr. Vladimir Vladimirovich Paramonov is the head of the Central Eurasia Ana- lytical Group (www.ceasia.ru), based in Tashkent. He formerly served as senior researcher and research coordinator at the Center for Economic Research of the State Advisor of the President of Uzbekistan on Social-Economic Policy.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 133 Dispatches

instability in the country, and by Russia’s own lack of attention to the political and economic health of its former satellite.

Tajikistan Russian-Tajik energy cooperation today is significant, manifested through the joint exploration of hydrocarbon deposits and the construction of the Sangtuda hydropower plant on Tajikistan’s Vakhsh River. Beyond these efforts, however, a further deepening of energy ties remains an open ques- tion. The nature and depth of any future such interaction is likely to be dic- tated by Russia’s and Tajikistan’s divergent approaches to regional problems (example: water and energy problems in Central Asia), which have made it difficult to implement joint economic projects, and has impaired political dia- logue between Moscow and Dushanbe.

Turkmenistan Cooperation between Russia and Turkmenistan remains largely at the level of the 1990s, limited strictly to the natural gas trade and the involvement of several Russian companies in the execution of orders on the Turkmen side. Although the period of 2001-2008 saw a rise in the volume of Turkmen gas supplies to Russia, the global economic crisis has constricted this trade con- siderably. Economically, meanwhile, deeper interaction is hampered by Turk- menistan’s reluctance to allow an extensive foothold in its economy for Russian businesses. Therefore, the prospects of energy cooperation remain uncertain, especially given the growing foreign competition for the export and transit of Turkmen gas.

Uzbekistan After years of exploration and development work, cooperation between Moscow and Tashkent on petroleum projects has expanded dramatically. But cooperation of other parts of the energy sector is still notional. Moreover, exist- ing energy ties between the two countries have not contributed to the mean- ingful, diversified economy in the former Soviet republic. To the contrary, Uzbekistan’s energy ties to Russia can be said to have retarded its economic (and political) evolution.

The results are telling. While the overall scope of Russia’s energy investment in the region is enormous—as of early 2010, estimated at around $4.7 billion— significant problems remain. While some derive from unresolved resource and energy issues, others relate to growing competition from Western interests and China. Most of all, however, Russia’s energy prospects in Central Asia seem to be circumscribed by a shift in the political winds, which now appear to be blow- ing away from Moscow.

134 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

Staying the Course Micah N. Levinson

Stephen Kinzer, Reset: Iran, Turkey, and Turkey, and reevaluate its his- and America’s Future (New York: toric alliances with Saudi Arabia and Times Books, 2010), 288 pp. $26.00. Israel. Yet that is precisely what histo- rian Stephen Kinzer does in his new book Reset: Iran, Turkey, and Ameri- The Islamic Republic of Iran ca’s Future. is forging ahead with its uranium Although he acknowledges enrichment in defiance of UN Secu- that America’s alliances with Saudi rity Council resolutions, even as Arabia and Israel have benefited the regime in Tehran continues to Washington in the past, Kinzer con- repress its domestic opposition. Tur- tends that these historic bonds have key’s ruling Justice and Develop- lost much of their luster. Instead, ment Party, meanwhile, has steered he argues, shared values and inter- that country on an increasingly ests could now underpin a new U.S.- anti-Western course, progressively Iranian-Turkish alliance. Reset’s abandoning its historic partnership early chapters survey the history of with America and Europe in favor of the Iranian and Turkish pro-democ- closer cooperation with Iran, Syria, racy movements, including the 1905- and Hamas. 11 Persian Constitutional Revolution, All of which makes this a curi- the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, and ous time to propound the idea that the 2009 post-election protests in the United States should prioritize Iran. From this history, Kinzer con- establishing good relations with Iran cludes that Iran and Turkey share

Micah N. Levinson is a Junior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. Book Reviews the distinction of having the longest more difficult to achieve when condi- democratic tradition in the Middle tions are right.” Accordingly, Kinzer East and that, “from their struggles, warns against alienating the current both peoples have developed an Iranian regime by making onerous understanding of democracy, and a diplomatic demands and refusing to longing for it, that makes them good rule out military action against Iran’s soul mates for Americans.” In addi- nuclear facilities. At the same time, tion, Kinzer argues that Iran and as a way of reassuring readers that Turkey can promote our primary Iran’s current political orientation interest in the Middle East, stabil- may change, Kinzer recounts Ger- ity in his reckoning, more effectively many’s transition from Nazism in the than can other countries. 1930s and 1940s to its contemporary Kinzer claims that Middle status as a trusted American ally. But Eastern stability depends on good he forgets to mention that that transi- U.S. relations with Iran, because tion would not have occurred without “pacifying Iraq, stabilizing Leba- the behavioral corrective adminis- non, ending the Israel-Palestine tered by the Second World War. stalemate, weakening Islamic fun- Kinzer’s case for a strong Turk- damentalism, crushing al-Qaeda, ish-American alliance is more com- moderating nuclear competition, and pelling. He contends, with some reducing the threat of future wars” merit, that Turkey could promote requires Iranian cooperation. He stability in the Middle East by serv- is half-right; Iran can indeed con- ing as an intermediary between the tribute handsomely to stabilizing United States and Middle Eastern the Middle East, but that is mostly states, a job Kinzer believes is neces- because it itself is responsible for so sitated by America’s lack of the “cul- much of the current instability. Iran’s tural tools necessary to navigate sponsorship of Hezbollah, Hamas, effectively through the Middle East.” and anti-American militias in Iraq He points to Turkey’s good relations and Afghanistan has set the region with Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, Leba- ablaze. Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear non, Egypt, Hamas, Hezbollah, the program could promote nuclear pro- Taliban, and Israel (at least until the liferation throughout the Middle East 2008-2009 Gaza War) to make the and might, in large part because of case that no other country could be Iranian President Mahmoud Ahma- as successful an intermediary. How- dinejad’s call to wipe Israel “off the ever, Kinzer conveniently ignores map,” ignite a regional conflict. the fact that Turkey can only serve However, Reset does not outline as a successful intermediary if it con- in detail how the United States might tinues to have the trust of Israel and prevail upon Iran to stop destabiliz- the moderate Arab states. Yet Tur- ing the Middle East and align itself key’s current Islamist-leaning gov- strategically with the country it calls ernment has strained relations with the “Great Satan.” In fact, Kinzer con- Israel by barring it from planned cedes that “it may well prove impos- military exercises, withdrawing sible for the United States to make Turkey’s ambassador to Israel in Iran a partner as long as the current response to the 2010 Gaza flotilla regime is in power.” Nevertheless, he raid, and embracing the Palestinian counsels, America should not do any- terrorist group Hamas, which Tur- thing that will “make that partnership key’s Prime Minister has character-

136 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews ized as a resistance group fighting in America’s alliances with Saudi for Palestinian land. Arabia and Israel was the willing- Turkish-Israeli relations dete- ness of both countries to fight Cold riorated further in October 2010 War battles, without rules, that the when a paper published by Turkey’s United States could not or would not. National Security Council officially However, Kinzer argues, the USSR’s designated Israel as a “central threat” collapse devalues Saudi money and while removing Iran and Syria from Israeli muscle—and makes the case the same list of threatening nations. that the United States should no These Turkish actions have under- longer conduct business as usual mined Israeli faith in Turkish good- with either country. will. Similarly, Turkey’s opposition Kinzer erroneously argues that to UN Security Council Resolution the “greatest service that Americans 1929, which imposed a fourth round could render to the cause of reform in of sanctions on Iran to convince it to Saudi Arabia would be to loosen ties suspend its uranium enrichment and between Washington and Riyadh” answer outstanding questions about because U.S. calls for reform dele- its nuclear program, has also helped gitimize Saudi reformers by “making undercut moderate Arab states’ con- them seem to be America’s pawns.” fidence in Turkey. Actually, Saudi Arabia conducted its While emphasizing the liberal most important reforms, including values Americans, Iranians, and abolishing slavery, as a result of U.S. Turks purportedly share, Kinzer pressure. And, if Washington were to takes pains to diminish Washington’s loosen ties with Riyadh, the Saudis commonalities with Jerusalem and would undoubtedly find new Russian Riyadh. He ignores Israel’s demo- and Chinese protectors who would cratic tradition, which is stronger care less about political reforms than than that of Iran and Turkey, focus- does Washington. Kinzer also fears ing instead on Israel’s support for that the United States delegitimizes right-wing dictatorships during the the Saudi leaders by “press[ing] them Cold War, Palestinian casualties, to become allies in foreign wars, and the Zionist sentiments of some especially against other Muslim American Jewish gangsters. In a countries.” Yet, historically, Saudi puerile attempt to blacken Israel’s Arabia has pressured the United name, Kinzer devotes more space States to wage foreign wars on its in his account of Israel’s founding to behalf and not the other way around. the gangster Bugsy Siegel, whose Riyadh, after all, was only too happy involvement was immeasurably mar- to pay for the Gulf War that liberated ginal, than to David Ben-Gurion, the Kuwait and removed the Iraqi threat leader of the Jewish community in to Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. More Mandatory Palestine and Israel’s first recently, documents disclosed by Prime Minister. WikiLeaks reveal that Saudi Arabia In much the same way, Kinzer has repeatedly implored the United takes pains to point out that Ameri- States to launch an attack on Iran’s cans share few values in common nuclear installations. with Saudi Arabia, “where dating is That the United States has illegal, women are forbidden to drive, been reluctant to do so makes Israeli and a royal family rules by decree.” muscle all the more valuable. Today, Indeed, to hear him tell it, the glue Israel is the only Middle Eastern

The Journal of International Security Affairs 137 Book Reviews country capable of militarily con- fronting the states that threaten our Arab allies, including Saudi Arabia. That explains why rumors persist that Riyadh authorized the Israelis to use Saudi airspace to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. And as America wearies of its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and seeks to reduce its military commitments throughout the world, the value of Israel’s military capabili- ties will only continue to rise. So, until Turkey regains the trust of Israel and the moderate Arab states, it will not be able to serve as an effec- tive intermediary between the United States and Middle Eastern countries. YOUR CRITICAL ASSETS And until Iran ceases to abandon its TAKE MANY FORMS. efforts to promote regional instability and anti-Americanism, the notion of a WE PROTECT ALL rapprochement between Washington and Tehran will remain a pipe dream. OF THEM. Under these conditions, America’s best bet isn’t to “reset” its regional alli- ances, but to double down on its invest- From the war ghter ment in those partnerships that can in the eld to the best promote its regional interests. data in cyberspace — when it’s critical, it’s QinetiQ North America.

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138 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

Toxic Tradecraft Paul Janiczek

Boris Volodarsky, The KGB’s Poison Fac- an assassination team had already tory: From Lenin to Litvinenko (Minneap- been dispatched to find the turncoat. olis: Zenith Press, 2010), 256 pp. $25.00. Such is the modus operandi of the ruthless men who run the Kremlin. To most practitioners of intelligence, On July 8, 2010, Russia and the “wetwork” (a euphemism for assassi- United States exchanged prisoners nation) is often viewed as a regrettable at the international airport in Vienna. occasional necessity—one fraught The location was logical; Austria has with major risk. Boris Volodarsky, on long been a battleground in the cloak- the other hand, presents a different and-dagger world of spy versus spy— perspective: that wetwork has served and a neutral location for competitors as a staple of Russian spycraft since to quietly swap the clandestine heroes the Russian revolution of 1917. In his of their secret services. On that day, book, The KGB’s Poison Factory, Volo- Russia sought the return of ten officers darsky chronicles a long list of mur- assigned to the “Illegals” directorate dered dissidents, journalists, ex-spies of the Russian Foreign Intelligence and inconvenient irritants to the ruling service (known as the SVR). America, elite in Moscow. in turn, secured the handover of Rus- To seasoned watchers of Russian sian experts and intelligence officers security matters, Volodarsky’s opus who had been fingered by Russian doesn’t offer many new revelations authorities as collaborators with West- regarding the conduct of KGB/SVR/ ern interests. GRU activity. What it does accomplish, These details are comparatively however, is a dispassionate, exhaus- well-known. What is less so was the tively-detailed retelling of the intrica- cryptic comment made by Russian cies of Russia’s extensive intelligence Prime Minister Vladimir Putin after apparatus. In the process, the reader meeting with the newly returned is introduced to the theme animating spies: that the illegals were arrested as the book’s title: the historic fascination the result of a betrayal. Some months with poisons to kill state enemies. later, an article in Moscow’s Kom- Not surprisingly, much of the mersant newspaper revealed that a narrative centers on the November high-level officer of the SVR director- 2006 poisoning of former FSB agent ate S—charged with the operations Alexander Litvinenko. Volodarsky of “illegals” in North America—had discusses at length how Russian defected two weeks before the net had operatives got close enough to Lit- closed on this spy ring. In the same vinenko, then hiding out in London, article, a Kremlin insider implied that to slip him the radioactive mickey.

Paul Janiczek is a former civil servant in the U.S. Department of State specializing in international security issues. He has also served as a staffer in the U.S. House of Representatives.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 139 Book Reviews

He also chronicles the relative impu- organization, will require patience. nity with which Russia operates. To But the historical narrative and prac- this day, the chief suspect in the kill- tical facts read like a compendium ing, Andrey Lugovoy, remains a free of murder thrillers. A reader of spy man, despite being wanted by Brit- fiction may also gain a number of ish authorities. Lugovoy is hardly in practical insights into the organiza- hiding; since the Litvinenko affair, tion of the Russian security services: he has become and remains a sitting a bewildering maze of offices, direc- member of the State Duma, the lower torates, “lines” and stations. To those house of Russia’s legislature. who understand the neo-imperial Volodarsky uses the Litvinenko nature of the new Russia, The KGB’s narrative as a running backdrop Poison Factory will serve to confirm to discuss the evolution of Russian suspicions, and clarify arguments. techniques and innovations in wet- These days, it has become fash- work. It also frames how, over the ionable among security practitio- decades, the Russian state has used ners in Washington to refer to all of such killings to quell external criti- the organs of Russian state security cism, to repress dissent, to make as “the KGB.” The implication is an example of traitors and reward that, regardless of what organiza- loyalists of the state. The narrative tion within the Russian government reinforces the authoritarian nature is acting, it does so at the direction of Russian politics, and details how of a small cadre close to the office the Soviet elite in its day, and now of Russian Prime Minister Vladi- a rising group of plutocrats, have mir Putin, himself a product of the seized and held power. Soviet intelligence state. Volodarsky Volodarsky should know. He him- briefly chronicles the rise of this self was an officer of the GRU (Rus- clique to power in the closing pages sian Military Intelligence), serving in of his book, while the volume itself the elite Spetsnaz (Special Purpose addresses the extremes to which forces) unit, a corps of highly-trained its members would go to retain that soldiers familiar with a range of mili- power. In the era of the U.S.-Russian tary disciplines, who specialize in “reset,” Volodarsky’s book tells a cau- sensitive missions requiring discre- tionary tale. The aims of the Kremlin tion or sometimes dramatic effects. have not changed all that much since There is no exact parallel to U.S. the October 1917 revolution. Neither units, but if there were, it would be have the means by which successive akin to a cross between the Green Russian governments preserve their Berets and elite intelligence units. standing. Western policymakers These are officers adept at blend- would do well to remember. ing into their surroundings through cultural awareness, human behav- ior, disguise, guile and deceit. The result is a cadre of killers capable of blending into any social situation at any moment in any part of the world. Volodarsky thus makes his case from a position of authority. To the casual reader, some of the detail, as well as the book’s poor

140 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

Learning to Live With the Bomb George Michael

John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: War II as commonly claimed since, Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima by August of 1945, the defeat of Japan to Al Qaeda (London: Oxford Uni- was already a foregone conclusion. versity Press, 2009), 336 pp. $27.95. Be that as it may, the image of the atomic bomb as the world’s most destructive weapon was seared into Despite substantial reductions the public consciousness at the end in both the U.S. and Russian nuclear of the war. As Mueller explains, in arsenals, the Federation of American the immediate aftermath of World Scientists estimates that over 20,000 War II, both the Americans and the nuclear warheads still remain around Japanese had an incentive to inflate the world. Moreover, in recent years, the significance of the atomic attacks the nuclear aspirations of North Korea on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For the and Iran have stoked fears among United States, as the world’s sole their neighbors and may set off one possessor of nuclear weapons, the or more waves of new regional prolif- attacks underscored American pres- eration. And in April 2010, on the eve tige and influence in the region. For of the Nuclear Security Summit in Japan, the bomb offered a conve- Washington, D.C., President Obama nient explanation that assuaged the announced that the prospect of country’s wounded pride—Japanese nuclear terrorism had emerged as the defeat could be said to have come greatest national security threat to the about not as a result of leadership United States. Yet, argues John Muel- mistakes or a lack of martial valor, ler in his book Atomic Obsession, our but rather because of an unexpected fears of the bomb are overwrought. advance in science. Mueller concedes that, if used, More recently, despite initial nuclear weapons would be devas- fears of widespread proliferation in tating. Nevertheless, he points out the nuclear age, relatively few coun- that their main effect is suddenness. tries have actually acquired the bomb. After all, destruction can also be For Mueller, there are several reasons wrought by conventional weapons— why countries eschew nuclear weap- as evidenced by the bombing raids ons. First, he sees limited military on Tokyo, Hamburg, and Dresden value in possession of such a capabil- during World War II. Indeed, argues ity. To be sure, the effects of nuclear Mueller, nuclear weapons have had weapons are devastating, but the only a modest influence on history, world-wide opprobrium against their and may not even have been deter- use and the risk of massive retaliation minative in bringing an end to World

George Michael is Associate Professor of Nuclear Counterproliferation & Deterrence Theory at the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 141 Book Reviews render them marginal as an effec- of the world community. Even Muam- tive instrument of warfare absent the mar Qaddafi finally realized that most existential threat. Moreover, nuclear weapons were not worth the the declining incidence of state-to- hassle. By foreswearing their develop- state warfare suggests their contin- ment, he was able to reintegrate Libya ued marginalization as an instrument into the global community of which it of statecraft. Thus, argues Mueller, had been shut out due to his previous there is very little strategic advan- support for international terrorism. tage for those countries that possess Not surprisingly, Mueller is nuclear arsenals. scathing in his criticism of U.S. coun- Second, developing nuclear terproliferation policies. He concedes weapons is an extremely wasteful that nuclear weapons are destructive, proposition—which explains why so but in counterintuitive ways insofar as many capable countries have decided non-proliferation and counterprolif- to forego their acquisition. The eco- eration policies can entail substantial nomic cost of nuclear weapons is enor- human costs. Most notable is the case mous: for the United States during of Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s alleged the Cold War, the estimated cost of pursuit of WMD, including nuclear developing an offensive nuclear capa- weapons, was ultimately the justifi- bility was between 5.5 and 10 trillion cation for the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, dollars. What’s more, the develop- which resulted in a protracted con- ment of nuclear arsenals leads to a flict and human suffering. The sanc- tremendous diversion of scientists, tions regime that followed the first engineers, and technicians who could Gulf War resulted in much privation, devote their talents elsewhere to more as medical supplies were prevented productive endeavors. from entering the country. In fact, Finally, in contemporary inter- the sanctions and the war resulted national affairs, Mueller sees little in more human destruction than the status accruing to nuclear aspirants. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki He cites the example of Italy, which combined. Likewise, Mueller warns boasted in 1987 that it had surpassed that saber-rattling on the Korean Pen- Britain in its gross domestic product. insula could also be potentially cata- Absent in Britain’s reply was any ref- strophic, insofar as another Korean erence to its military superiority or War could result in the deaths of as its possession of nuclear weapons. many as 1,000,000 people (including Acquiring the bomb, meanwhile, can 80,000 to 100,000 U.S. servicemen), have severe consequence for the aspi- according to a Pentagon estimate. rant, as the country could find itself The proliferation fixation, accord- diplomatically isolated. Sanctions ing to Mueller, also stymies the devel- could be imposed and neighbors may opment of nuclear power as a valuable seek to counterbalance nuclear pro- and efficient energy source. Amid liferation by strengthening regional the growing concern about global alliances arrayed against the aspirant warming, increasingly, nuclear power country. For instance, nuclear weap- is seen as an attractive and cleaner ons have not helped North Korea, alternative to burning fossil fuels to which remains isolated, backwards, generate electrical power. In fact, in and poor. Likewise, Iran, despite the the United States, about 20 percent of talk of a “Shia Revival,” remains a all electricity is generated by nuclear pariah nation in the minds of much power plants. The number of nuclear

142 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews reactors worldwide is projected to all churches, businesses, governmen- double by the end of the century. tal structures, and community groups One possible consequence of this simply evaporate?” trend, though, is the potential for the Arguably, though, this analysis is diversion of fissile material into the somewhat facile and gives short shrift custody of a rogue state or terrorist to the possibility of strategic nuclear group. However, Mueller finds this terrorism. For instance, a nuclear scenario highly unlikely, and argues device planted in a certain place (near that the hyperbole surrounding such the Capitol Building in Washington, a proposition is counterproductive. D.C.) at a certain time (the Presi- As he points out, a nuclear device dent’s State of the Union Address) fabricated by a terrorist group would could conceivably decapitate the U.S. probably have a comparatively low government. Although there is a plan yield. And the hurdles that a terror- of presidential succession, it might ist group would have to overcome to not be carried out smoothly. More- build or acquire a nuclear bomb are over, in such a scenario, if power was formidable (from safety devices and contested by different officials, would procedures to the need for highly the rest of the country recognize their competent technicians, unflinch- authority? And without a functioning ing loyalty and discipline). Using a government, would the state govern- multiplicative rule of probability for ments, which depend so much on the twenty steps necessary to carry out federal government, really be viable a nuclear attack, Mueller calculates for very long? In time of crisis, Ameri- that the probability of such an even- cans have come to assume that the tuality is one in over three billion. federal government will take the lead. The bombastic rhetoric surrounding If the federal leadership were decapi- nuclear terrorism, Mueller argues, tated, it might not be that easy to put only encourages terrorist groups to Humpty Dumpty together again. explore that option. More significantly, Mueller And even if a single nuclear seems to ignore the importance of device were detonated, it would not vigilance. The reason nuclear ter- portend the demise of an entire city, rorism remains a highly unlikely much less the economy of a country, proposition is because it is taken the government, or a civilization. so seriously. As a consequence, it Rather, Mueller believes that America is exceedingly difficult for terror- would be resilient, citing the example ists to succeed at each stage of the of Japan during World War II, which plot because various measures have sustained an intense nation-wide con- been implemented to thwart such an ventional bombing along with two occurrence. And though it is highly nuclear attacks, yet whose civil society unlikely that a state would convey a and government survived. Conced- nuclear weapon to a terrorist group, it ing that a nuclear attack could devas- is conceivable that if a regime felt par- tate a locale, Mueller still dismisses ticularly threatened it might do so. In the notion that it would extinguish such a scenario, a collapsing regime the rest of the country. As he puts it: could transfer a nuclear weapon to “Do farmers in Iowa cease plowing a terrorist group in order to exact because an atomic bomb went off in revenge against an adversary. an Eastern city? Do manufacturers Moreover, if a regime collapsed, close down their assembly lines? Do state control over nuclear weapons

The Journal of International Security Affairs 143 Book Reviews could evaporate, thus allowing a ter- rorist or criminal group to obtain weapons from the nuclear arsenal. As was the case during the early 1990s, in some of the former Soviet republics, the security at some of the nuclear sites was often less than adequate. In fact, the Russian government was not even aware of the location and amount of much fissile material due to poor accounting practices. Although Mueller’s study might be tendentious, it is well-researched and certain to provoke discussion on serious topics surrounding nuclear issues. At the very least, it provides a compelling counterpoint to the conven- tional wisdom on nuclear terrorism.

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144 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

The Next Battleground James Colbert

Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Strategists can focus on any Indian Ocean and the Future of Amer- number of crucial factors that make ican Power (New York: Random the Indian Ocean worthy of study. House, 2010), 384pp. $28.00. But, Kaplan contends, one stands above the others in importance: the Indian Ocean’s waters lap the shores One of the great chroniclers of of the richest and the poorest Mus- contemporary geopolitics, Robert D. lim-dominated states, where radical Kaplan, believes the Indian Ocean Islam’s war for supremacy rages. to be the stage upon which the great Drawn into this great struggle are a struggles of the 21st century will be diverse mix of countries lining the played out—and to which the United ocean’s edge; authoritarian Burma, States will increasingly strain to stay democratic India, emerging democ- committed. From the opening pages racies like Indonesia and failed states of his latest work, Monsoon: The Indian including Somalia. Half of the world’s Ocean and the Future of American container traffic and 70 percent of its Power, he observes: “[A]s China and petroleum products move through India compete for ports and access these troubled waters, a never-ending routes along the southern Eurasian maritime train of container ships and rimland, and with the future strength supertankers carrying all manner of the U.S. Navy uncertain, because of of finished goods and raw materials America’s own economic travails and between East and West. the diversionary cost of land wars, it Kaplan has few peers in his abil- is possible that the five-hundred-year ity to impart relevant history while chapter of Western preponderance is homing in on the salient facts nec- slowly beginning to close.” essary to understanding the forces A national correspondent for the shaping the present and the near Atlantic Monthly, Kaplan has made future. His own worldview permeates quite a career for himself covering Monsoon, providing a cold-eyed view regions of the globe largely ignored by of state-to-state interactions. Kaplan’s the mainstream media. In his typical preference for human rights and rep- (but never mundane) style, he com- resentative government, however, is bines history, interviews, anecdotes always right below the surface. and personal observations to make a A central theme of the book con- powerful case that the Indian Ocean cerns the economic and strategic/ region will be as geo-strategically military competition between demo- prominent in the 21st century as cratic India, struggling to modern- Europe was in the 20th century. ize while many of its internal states

James Colbert, Director for Policy and Communications at JINSA, is Deputy Editor of The Journal of International Security Affairs.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 145 Book Reviews fight to preserve the economic prom- the failed state that is Somalia. Here ise of socialism, and China, a global Kaplan illustrates the range of Indian economic superpower due to its gov- Ocean challenges from China’s ernment-mandated embrace of what strategic goal of creating a “string is often called a nationalist-capitalist of pearls” of friendly Indian Ocean economy. This tug-of-war is played ports to the ongoing crisis of Soma- out in Kaplan’s narrative as the book lia, which fosters piracy and serves as moves from west to east, covering in a possible sanctuary for al Qaeda and turn Oman, Pakistan, Bangladesh, other groups eager to take advantage Sri Lanka, Burma and Indonesia. of a strategically located and lawless Each chapter includes fascinating failed state. profiles and interviews with local Bringing his sprawling work to power brokers and key players. a close, Kaplan looks to the future After a tour d’horizon—what and concludes that development and Kaplan calls a “broad strategic over- investment in the littoral states of the view”—and a brief primer of the Indian Ocean will be challenged by ocean as an historic trade route, several factors. Chief among them each subsequent chapter advances are loyalties to clan, ethnic group, and Kaplan’s conviction that “it is the religious/sectarian affiliation which intermingling of challenges in each all too frequently make state borders place—religious, economic, political, irrelevant. Perhaps as a warning to environmental—rather than each China and, to a lesser degree, India, challenge in isolation, that creates Kaplan advises that any attempt to such drama.” build solid infrastructure must factor Curiously, China is the one coun- in those considerations. One exam- try that does not get its own chapter. ple is the Chinese-financed port of Its influence, goals and concerns are Gwadar, located in Pakistan’s restive relayed through each of the other Baluchistan province. Beijing may countries. Kaplan must have taken ultimately discover that Gwadar’s his book’s title seriously; China does usability may be decided by factors not possess Indian Ocean shoreline, beyond Islamabad’s control. Perhaps despite playing such a dominating unsurprisingly, Kaplan believes the role in that region’s affairs. future of the major states girding the To more fully comprehend what Indian Ocean rests on the extraction is happening, the reader must under- and transport of oil—a business that stand the key persons involved. will dominate regional and global eco- Each chapter features at least one nomic interests for at least another penetrating interview/profile of half-century. those leading their country’s charge, In Monsoon, Kaplan makes a whether it is toward further prog- convincing case for why this is so, ress and freedom, or to strife and a and why the Average Joe and policy weakening of pluralistic values. Or wonk alike should pay attention to a sometimes both. region that is likely to become a locus Highlights of Kaplan’s travels for of global conflict. Monsoon (one must wonder how many times he has made the “million-mile club” in his globe-trotting career) include a fascinating look into the nearly-closed country of Burma and

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