Inspection of the US Mission to the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Offi ce of Inspector General Report of Inspection U.S. Mission to the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Report Number ISP-I-10-65, April 2010 IMPORTANT NOTICE This report is intended solely for the offi cial use of the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Offi ce of Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies or organizations, without prior authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION This was the fi rst inspection of the U.S. Mission to the African Union, which was established in December 2006. This inspection, done concurrently with the inspection of Embassy Addis Ababa, was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, as issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Effi ciency, and the Inspector’s Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). PURPOSE The Offi ce of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980: • Policy Implementation: whether policy goals and objectives are being effective ly achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively repre sented; and whether all elements of an offi ce or mission are being adequately coordinated. • Resource Management: whether resources are being used and managed with maximum effi ciency, effectiveness, and economy and whether fi nancial transac tions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported. • Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken. METHODOLOGY In conducting this inspection, the inspectors reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its fi ndings and recommendations with offi ces, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review. TABLE OF CONTENTS KEY JUDGMENTS . 1 CONTEXT AND INTRODUCTION . 3 Nascent Organization . 4 Sharpen the Focus . 6 EXECUTIVE DIRECTION . 9 USAU Staffi ng . 10 Back to the Future? . 10 Mission Strategic Plan and Bureau Strategic Plan . 11 Telegram Signing Authority. 12 POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION . 13 Reporting and Representation . 13 Public Diplomacy . 14 Assistance to the African Union . 15 RESOURCE MANAGEMENT . 17 Management Overview . 17 Management Issues . 17 MANAGEMENT CONTROLS . 23 LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS . 25 INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS . 27 PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS . 29 ABBREVIATIONS . 31 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED KEY JUDGMENTS • After a troubled beginning, the U.S. Mission to the African Union (USAU) has repaired relations with the bilateral embassy and worked more closely with African Union (AU) leadership. This refl ects strong leadership by the Ambas sador and effective work by Department and Department of Defense offi cers. • Mission strategic goals, however, are not entirely consistent with major U.S. Government objectives, and the Department should initiate a policy review. • Mission staffi ng is well outpacing the AU’s own efforts to empower and inte grate itself as a multilateral institution. The Department and other agencies are not giving adequate scrutiny to staffi ng. The unrestrained growth is crowd ing the new embassy compound before it opens; a freeze on staff increases is needed prior to a rightsizing review. The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between January 4 and 20, 2010, and in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between February 8 and 26, 2010. (b) (6) (b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6) (b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6) OIG Report No. ISP-I-10-65, US Mission to the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April 2010 1 . SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 2 . OIG Report No. ISP-I-10-65, US Mission to the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April 2010 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED CONTEXT AND INTRODUCTION On July 9, 2002, the AU was formed among the 54 African states bent on a revi talized policy of “non-indifference.” (Morocco, however, declined to join because it opposed the membership of Western Sahara; in late 2009, Eritrea dropped out in the wake of AU and U.N. sanctions.) The AU is the successor organization to the Or ganization of African Unity dating from 1963 and began its existence as a conscious departure from the “old colonial-reactive days” of newly independent Africa. At that time, against a Cold War and Nonaligned Movement backdrop, the Organization of African Unity had favored a nonintervention policy and, to a degree, served as a vehicle for African nations to play off East against West and otherwise obscure the dictatorial and/or venal nature of many African regimes. The AU’s non-indifference policy, while imperfect in not addressing some major issues such as the situation in Zimbabwe, has presaged a signifi cant change in the ac tivity of Africa’s chief intergovernmental organization. Under AU auspices, Ethiopi an, Mozambican, and South African peacekeeping detachments deployed to Burundi in 2003. In 2005, the AU sent troops to Darfur; in 2007-08, after a low-level rebel lion, the AU sanctioned the Comoros. Ultimately, it blessed a small military interven tion in the Comoros using Tanzanian and other troops. The AU also injected itself with some success into nondemocratic transitions in Togo and Mauritania, suspend ing the latter in 2005 and 2008 in the wake of coups. The AU has usefully reinforced good behavior by member nations, praising, for example, Nigeria when a change in government was in keeping with constitutional provisions. In 2009, the AU, for the fi rst time, created a panel of eminent persons to inves tigate the Darfur issue and make recommendations for a comprehensive solution, including reconciliation, justice, and peace. That panel was chaired by former South African President Mbeki. Most recently, the AU has asked Mbeki to continue leading the implementation phases of his report’s recommendations in hopes of assisting the effort for a comprehensive peace agreement. At present, besides the crises in Somalia and Sudan, the AU is involved in find ing solutions to the unconstitutional changes of power in Guinea and Madagascar, as well as the constitutional manipulation by the ruling party in Niger. The latter situation found the AU somewhat impotent in that it did not have specifi c provisions to deal with unconstitutional developments. These are now in place. The AU has broadened its traditional disciplinary tools—sanctions and/or suspension of mis- OIG Report No. ISP-I-10-65, US Mission to the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April 2010 3 . SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED behaving members—to include asking the United Nations and select other interna tional organizations to act against the offending country. These measures, however, as yet do not include either the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, organizations with signifi cant power to effect change. While still getting its organizational feet on the ground, the AU already is suc cessful in getting the United Nations to pay attention to African political and secu rity issues. It catalyzed African reaction to the general misbehavior of the Eritrean regime and its tacit if not explicit support of Muslim insurgents attempting to topple the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia. Building on the AU’s decision to sanction Eritrea, the United Nations Security Council imposed broader sanctions including an arms embargo, freezing of assets, and a travel ban on the Eritrean lead ership. In a landmark speech before the Ghanaian parliament last July, President Obama sent a powerful message to the people of Africa: the United States will pledge sub stantial increases in foreign assistance to Africa, and the United States will partner in building the capacity for sustained development in such areas as democracy, health, the peaceful resolution of confl ict, and economic growth. NASCENT ORGANIZATION Whatever its successes in peacekeeping and security, the AU remains a nascent organization in many ways. It has yet to build signifi cantly on the African Eco nomic Community, which was fi rst established by the Organization of African Unity in 1983 but never translated into meaningful trade or economic integration. This remains distinctly a long-term work in progress, in part because the collective gross domestic product for the entire membership is less than that of California. Comparing the level of economic and political integration achieved by the AU to date with the European Union (EU) and its predecessor organizations, the OIG team fi nds that AU integration is akin to that of Europe in the 1950s. Like Europe, the AU could achieve far more over the next few decades if member states have the requisite political will. In the interim, USAU and its EU counterpart, as observers rather than members of the AU, have an inherently limited role.

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