A CANADIAN APPROACH TO POWER-SHARING

Tom Flanagan

Canadians used to complain about the dictatorial powers of majority government, but now they are unhappy with the hyperpartisanship of recent minority parliaments. A coalition government might change the situation but is unlikely to emerge. Minor institutional changes will have little effect, and major institutional change is politically unfeasible. The best prospect for change, writes Tom Flanagan, is a new political culture based on the realization that is not a brief aberration but may be here for the foreseeable future.

Après avoir longtemps dénoncé les pouvoirs tyranniques que s’arrogeaient les gouvernements majoritaires, les Canadiens déplorent aujourd’hui l’hyper- partisanerie des récents gouvernements minoritaires. Un gouvernement de coalition permettrait sans doute de débloquer la situation, mais les probabilités de ce côté sont infimes. Par ailleurs, de modestes changements institutionnels n’auraient que peu d’effets, tandis que des changements majeurs seraient politiquement inapplicables. Pour Tom Flanagan, l’évolution souhaitable réside dans une nouvelle culture politique qui accepte l’idée que les gouvernements minoritaires n’ont rien d’une aberration passagère et que, dans un avenir prévisible, ils sont là pour rester.

anadians are never satisfied with the performance of voting majority, it has to resort to all sorts of tactical expedi- Parliament, but the reasons for dissatisfaction vary ents: threatening to call an election, bundling other measures C from time to time. It may be hard to remember now, together with the budget, playing the opposition parties off but only a few years ago people were pre-occupied with the against each other or luring dissident elements within oppo- excesses of majority government. Jeffrey Simpson captured sition parties to defy their own leadership. the mood in his 2001 book, The Friendly Dictatorship. When Meanwhile the opposition parties play their own Paul Martin replaced Jean Chrétien as Liberal leader and games. The Liberals oppose almost everything, even meas- prime minister, observers expected Martin’s “juggernaut,” as ures they had previously supported when in power. Or they Susan Delacourt called it, to sweep to an unprecedented vic- support bills in the House while trying to block them in the in the next election, further enhancing the power of the Senate. Opposition parties collaborate to pass private mem- prime minister and rendering Parliament even more insignif- bers’ bills that they know will be ignored because they icant, even though Martin himself had pledged to redress infringe upon the government’s executive prerogatives; and what he termed the “democratic deficit.” they turn parliamentary committees into kangaroo courts, , however, solved that set of problems recklessly pursuing personal investigations for which they when he became leader of the Canadian Alliance, merged it have neither training nor resources. with the Progressive Conservatives and, against all previous predictions, reduced the Liberals to a minority government or a political scientist, it’s fascinating to watch. The last in 2004 before winning the 2006 election and forming his F six years of parliamentary proceedings have been more own minority government. Now everyone is concerned entertaining than anything since the fall of ’s gov- about the parliamentary problems of minority government. ernment in 1979. But citizens are turned off, and rightly so, Who says there is no progress? by the endless tactical manœuvres, threats, bluffs and bro- Indeed, the parliamentary problems of minority govern- ken deals. ment are both real and serious. The Conservative government Three avenues of change might arguably make things continues to bring in legislation but often can’t move it for- better: coalition government, institutional reform and ward in normal fashion through committee discussion and power-sharing through a change in political culture. Let us votes on the floor of the House. Instead of just marshalling a examine each in turn.

32 OPTIONS POLITIQUES SEPTEMBRE 2010 A Canadian approach to power-sharing

The 2010 coalition between the principle of “minimum connected together would have to control a Conservatives and the Liberal winning coalition.” Coalitions majority of seats to make a coalition Democrats in the United Kingdom has require expensive negotiations to feasible. This condition is unlikely to touched off another round of specula- achieve necessary compromises, and be met as long as the Conservatives tion about coalition government in the cost increases proportionally to continue to win more seats than the . A majority coalition does, the distance between the partners. Liberals; for in that case the NDP has to indeed, seem to offer a way out of our The Conservatives and NDP agree win more seats than the BQ in order to present impasse. But the facts on the occasionally on specific pieces of leg- give the red-orange coalition its major- ground are not conducive to coalition islation, but in general their posi- ity. (If C + L + N + B = 308, and if C > L, formation in Canada. tions are so far apart that then N > B if L + N > C + B.) But the The first obstacle is the Bloc maintaining a coalition would be NDP has never won more seats than Québécois. As part of the separatist extraordinarily costly. Don’t look for the BQ and seems unlikely to do so movement, it is an anti-system party, a blue-orange coalition soon or, without a major collapse of the Bloc. like the Communist parties of Cold indeed, ever. War Europe or the neo-fascist parties of In contrast, the red-orange, f course, the current political con- the present, and thus not an accept- Liberal-NDP coalition is quite feasible. O figuration is a contingent reality, able coalition partner for either the The two parties are relatively close on not a law of nature. It is bound to Conservatives or the Liberals. change sooner or later, perhaps Yet as long as the Bloc controls The Conservative government in a way that will make coali- 40 or 50 seats in Quebec, it is continues to bring in legislation but tion government more likely. very difficult for either of the often can’t move it forward in normal The Liberals may once again big parties to win a majority start to win more seats than the government. There just aren’t fashion through committee Conservatives, or the BQ may enough seats to go around. discussion and votes on the floor of renounce separatism and the House. Instead of just marshalling become an acceptable coalition hat leaves three coalition a voting majority, it has to resort to partner as a Quebec regional T possibilities: Conservative- party, or it may implode Liberal, Conservative-NDP and all sorts of tactical expedients: through a failed leadership suc- Liberal-NDP. The first can be threatening to call an election, cession after the retirement of dismissed because both the bundling other measures together . But as things Conservatives and the Liberals with the budget, playing the stand now, the one coalition see themselves as governing that could work — Liberal-NDP parties. In that sense, they are opposition parties off against each — is unlikely to be feasible. implacable rivals, even if their other or luring dissident elements The rules regarding parlia- ideologies are not that far within opposition parties to defy their mentary structure and function apart. The prospect of a own leadership. have changed repeatedly dur- Conservative-Liberal cabinet ing the 40-odd years that I have makes the famous image of two scorpi- many issues, and only the Liberals been observing Parliament. The length ons in a bottle look like a happy mar- have realistic expectations of achiev- of sessions, election of the Speaker, tel- riage. Don’t expect a blue-red coalition ing government on their own. To be in evision coverage of Question Period any time soon. a coalition with the Liberals would be and debates, private members’ bills, In more abstract terms, a a historic step forward for the NDP, mandate of committees and MPs’ com- Conservative-Liberal grand coalition which it would take with little hesita- pensation and pensions have all been would violate the game-theoretic prin- tion. Indeed, the New Democrats have addressed, some more than once. All ciple of “minimum winning coali- already propped up two minority these changes seemed like good ideas tion.” The purpose of a coalition is to Liberal governments (Pierre Trudeau, at the time, and maybe they have gain benefits for the included winners 1972-74, and Paul Martin, 2004-05) helped Parliament to run more at the expense of the excluded losers; without the additional benefits that smoothly; but neither individually nor and the larger the coalition, the more can accrue from being a formal coali- collectively have they wrought major hands are extended for a share of the tion partner. changes of the sort that are visible to spoils. In practice, parties rarely form The red-orange coalition could voters. If they had, we wouldn’t be grand coalitions unless there is a threat work, but can it be formed? The experi- having this discussion. to the system from war or revolution. ence of fall 2008 shows that it would be Maybe we need stronger medicine, A Conservative-NDP coalition is politically risky to rely on the support truly major reforms such as fixed elec- also unlikely because it violates the of the BQ, so the Liberals and NDP tion dates, proportional representation

POLICY OPTIONS 33 SEPTEMBER 2010 Tom Flanagan

or an elected Senate. But wait: we But, again, don’t hold your their political machinery, which is already have fixed election dates, cour- breath. Even after four years of trying, different in each case, but because tesy of a bill introduced by the present the government has not been able to they share the fundamentals government and supported by all par- pass term limits for senators, let alone described above. ties, and it didn’t change a thing. election as a means of selection. And Power-sharing is a central feature Given the role of the governor general even if election can be passed in of liberal democracy. Government in the Canadian Constitution, it is Parliament, there lurks the spectre of without power-sharing would be impossible to draft binding fixed-elec- opposition by the provinces and chal- autocracy, literally “rule by (one) self.” tion-date legislation. As Harper lenges in the courts. Power-sharing implies not only the showed in 2008, the prime minister The longer I observe institutional right of criticism and the legitimacy of will be able to ask for an election reforms to political machinery, the opposition, but also multilateral par- whenever he wants, because the fixed- more I realize how inconsequential ticipation in making governmental election legislation specifically states they are. Federal versus unitary, parlia- decisions. Power-sharing can be that nothing in it “affects the powers mentary versus presidential, first-past- sequential, meaning that factions take of the Governor-General, including the-post versus proportional turns in wielding the power of the the power to dissolve Parliament.” representation — none of these make state; or it can be simultaneous, with any real difference in the big picture. multiple factions cooperating to gov- roportional representation would Nations that are prosperous, peaceful ern. In practice, liberal democracies P make coalition government more and well-governed have certain funda- show aspects of both forms of power- frequent by further splintering our mentals in common: a spirit of consti- sharing, but they may differ in parties and making sure none of them tutionalism (not necessarily a written emphasis. The British tradition of could ever come close to a majority constitution), respect for the rule of majority governments based on first- again (more or less what happened in law, an impartial judiciary, representa- past-the-post electoral elections fea- New Zealand after that country went tive government with periodic elec- tures sequential alternation of parties proportional). But don’t hold your tions, a widely distributed franchise, in power, whereas the consociational breath. The movement for electoral private property rights and a market tradition most highly developed in reform has now failed in several economy. countries such as Switzerland and the provinces, including by referendum in Netherlands exemplifies simultaneous British Columbia and . And it eyond that, almost any variation power-sharing through recurring is not in the interest of either the B and combination of political coalition governments based on pro- Conservatives or the Liberals, both of institutions can be found to work portional methods of election. whom have formed governments by well. The United States is presidential, The main line of tradition in winning as little as 36 percent of the France is semi-presidential, Sweden is Canadian politics, embracing almost vote. Even though there won’t be a parliamentary. Canada has first-past- 90 percent of the years since blue-red coalition to run the country, a blue-red alliance The 2010 coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal would emerge to block pro- Democrats in the United Kingdom has touched off another portional representation. round of speculation about coalition government in Canada. An elected Senate would change our system of govern- A majority coalition does, indeed, seem to offer a way out of ment in profound but rather our present impasse. But the facts on the ground are not unpredictable ways. It would conducive to coalition formation in Canada. contain representatives of all parties, not just Liberals and the-post elections, Australia has the Confederation, has been rule by Conservatives; and it would probably be alternative ballot, New Zealand has majority government. The durability rare to see majority control by any party. the mixed-member-proportional form of this tradition has created a parlia- The government would have to negoti- of proportional representation. mentary culture of sequential power- ate multipartisan support for all legisla- Germany has a federal system, the sharing based on the alternation of tion to get it through the Senate, which United Kingdom has devolution, and Liberals and Conservatives in office. might over time make parties more the Netherlands is a unitary state. But Relatively short and infrequent peri- amenable to compromise in the House in spite of these differences, people all ods of minority government have not of Commons. It is at least conceivable over the world are lining up to get been enough to produce a different that an elected Senate could reduce the into these countries because they are culture based on simultaneous temperature of the partisan warfare in all, by world standards, wonderful power-sharing. Both government and the House that is driving everyone crazy. places to live. Why? Not because of opposition parties have seen

34 OPTIONS POLITIQUES SEPTEMBRE 2010 A Canadian approach to power-sharing minority governments as aberrations, exceptional periods in which the strategic challenge was to elect a new majority government in the next election. And indeed, that usually happened, except for the periods 1962-68 and 2004 to the present, both of which have seen a succession of three minorities in a row. However, it seems that the present period of minority government may go on much longer. As long as the Bloc Québécois dominates Quebec, it is extremely difficult for either the Conservatives or the Liberals to win a majority of seats, unless one or the other collapses even beyond what hap- pened to the Liberals in 2008 under Stéphane Dion. We thus have a mismatch between our historically rooted majoritarian political culture and a period of minority government that threatens to become a long-term reality rather than a short-term aber- ration. This mismatch, I contend, is at the root of Parliament’s perceived difficulties. The parties are still thinking of power-sharing in sequen- tial terms, whereas the objective con- figuration calls for simultaneous power-sharing. Nevertheless, in spite of the obvious mismatch, we saw two good examples of simultaneous power-sharing in spring 2010, when all parties supported an amended version of Immigration Minister ’s refugee reforms, and three parties agreed to a process for scrutinizing Afghan detainee docu- ments while protecting national security. Neither outcome came eas- ily. The Liberals broke an earlier agreement with the government on refugees, and the parties had to be guided by Speaker to CP Photo get together on Afghanistan docu- Immigration Minister Jason Kenney’s reforms to refugee determination are a good example ments. But they finally did get to of “simultaneous power-sharing,” writes Tom Flanagan. When a deal Kenney had brokered with the Liberals collapsed, he pivoted and made one with the NDP and the Bloc. the right conclusion. Lest we become too optimistic, the tation, except under the curtain of cab- forms of the Conservative Party or any Conservative government followed inet confidentiality, to change the way of its predecessor parties (Reform, these power-sharing successes with an the Canadian census is conducted. Canadian Alliance, Progressive egregious example of unilateral dicta- There was no precedent for this step in Conservatives). There was no public tion, when it decided without consul- the policy manual or campaign plat- consultation with users of census data,

POLICY OPTIONS 35 SEPTEMBER 2010 Tom Flanagan

and not even with the government- But there also has to be a Senate and House of Representatives appointed National Statistics Council. response from the other side. The simultaneously, as happened after All opposition parties were vocally other parties, particularly the Liberals the 2008 election of Barack Obama; opposed to the changes but will prob- as the Official Opposition, have to and things may well revert to nor- ably not unite to bring down the gov- realize that they have a constructive mal in the 2010 interim elections. In ernment over the issue, fearing an role to play in Parliament beyond the Pacific region, New Zealand has election, or at least an election over an manœuvring to get back in power. In coalition government, the Japanese issue that most voters will find remote a minority Parliament they are, in governing party has just lost control and abstract. effect, part of the government of the upper house, and in Australia the government almost Prime Minister Harper can be a fierce partisan, but he also has always has to deal with a substantial diplomatic skills, which he exhibited in healing the Senate where it does not wounds in the Canadian Alliance, bringing about a merger wield a majority. There are many forms with the Progressive Conservatives and, most recently, leading of simultaneous power- the G8 and G20 to support reductions in deficit spending. It sharing, of which coali- would make a big difference if Harper would promote power- tion government is only sharing by turning his diplomatic talents inward toward one, and coalition govern- ment does not seem to be Parliament. a likely prospect for Cana- This sort of secretive, unilateral because no legislation can pass with- da at this time. Nonetheless, cultur- decision-making is exactly the wrong out their support, and with power al changes in Parliament can approach to running a productive comes responsibility. produce a Canadian version of minority government. Facing a weak What would power-sharing simultaneous power-sharing. No opposition, the government may get its look like? Fewer “bolt from the institutional reforms are required. It way on this one issue, but it poisons the blue” announcements of new gov- just means recognizing that minori- well for future cooperation on other ernment policies. More quiet meet- ty government may be with us for a issues. The better path is the one the ings among leaders or their long time and acting appropriately. government took shortly afterwards delegates. Government invitations Of course, things don’t happen when Treasury Board Secretary to opposition parties to contribute in politics just because they are in announced a review of to drafting legislation. Amend- the public interest; there have to be employment equity in the federal pub- ments moved in good faith, not just electoral incentives for politicians to lic service. The opposition parties will, to obstruct. Honourable compro- change their behaviour. I believe no doubt, oppose rescinding or relaxing mises. Agreements that are actually these incentives could arise if the employment equity measures; but at kept. Legislation that is widely sup- next election confirms the minority least they, along with other interested ported. Not utopia, but better than status quo. After four straight elec- organizations, can have their say. Who what we see now. tions yielding a minority govern- knows? They may even come up with ment, it may dawn on our amendments that the government can n moving away from sequential politicians that their majoritarian accept, as happened in the refugee- I and toward simultaneous power- tactics aren’t working any longer, determination case, thus making the sharing, Canadian politicians would and that it can be in their own elec- outcome more broadly acceptable. be following a worldwide trend. The toral interest to behave more coop- United Kingdom, Germany, Italy eratively. At least one can hope. As a rime Minister Harper can be a fierce and most other European countries conservative, I am never optimistic, P partisan, but he also has substantial are now governed by coalitions. The but I am always hopeful. diplomatic skills, which he exhibited in French government is not a coali- healing the wounds in the Canadian tion because President Nicolas Tom Flanagan is professor of political Alliance, bringing about a merger with Sarkozy’s UMP is a recent merger of science at the University of Calgary the Progressive Conservatives and, previously distinct parties, but the and a former Conservative campaign most recently, leading the G8 and G20 UMP does not have a majority in the manager. He is the author of Harper’s to support reductions in deficit spend- upper house. Government in the Team: Behind the Scenes in the ing. It would make a big difference if United States almost always involves Conservative Rise to Power, as well Harper would promote power-sharing power-sharing between Democrats as Waiting for the Wave: The by turning his diplomatic talents and Republicans. It is unusual for Reform Party and the Conservative inward toward Parliament. one party to control the presidency, Movement.

36 OPTIONS POLITIQUES SEPTEMBRE 2010