
A CANADIAN APPROACH TO POWER-SHARING Tom Flanagan Canadians used to complain about the dictatorial powers of majority government, but now they are unhappy with the hyperpartisanship of recent minority parliaments. A coalition government might change the situation but is unlikely to emerge. Minor institutional changes will have little effect, and major institutional change is politically unfeasible. The best prospect for change, writes Tom Flanagan, is a new political culture based on the realization that minority government is not a brief aberration but may be here for the foreseeable future. Après avoir longtemps dénoncé les pouvoirs tyranniques que s’arrogeaient les gouvernements majoritaires, les Canadiens déplorent aujourd’hui l’hyper- partisanerie des récents gouvernements minoritaires. Un gouvernement de coalition permettrait sans doute de débloquer la situation, mais les probabilités de ce côté sont infimes. Par ailleurs, de modestes changements institutionnels n’auraient que peu d’effets, tandis que des changements majeurs seraient politiquement inapplicables. Pour Tom Flanagan, l’évolution souhaitable réside dans une nouvelle culture politique qui accepte l’idée que les gouvernements minoritaires n’ont rien d’une aberration passagère et que, dans un avenir prévisible, ils sont là pour rester. anadians are never satisfied with the performance of voting majority, it has to resort to all sorts of tactical expedi- Parliament, but the reasons for dissatisfaction vary ents: threatening to call an election, bundling other measures C from time to time. It may be hard to remember now, together with the budget, playing the opposition parties off but only a few years ago people were pre-occupied with the against each other or luring dissident elements within oppo- excesses of majority government. Jeffrey Simpson captured sition parties to defy their own leadership. the mood in his 2001 book, The Friendly Dictatorship. When Meanwhile the opposition parties play their own Paul Martin replaced Jean Chrétien as Liberal leader and games. The Liberals oppose almost everything, even meas- prime minister, observers expected Martin’s “juggernaut,” as ures they had previously supported when in power. Or they Susan Delacourt called it, to sweep to an unprecedented vic- support bills in the House while trying to block them in the tory in the next election, further enhancing the power of the Senate. Opposition parties collaborate to pass private mem- prime minister and rendering Parliament even more insignif- bers’ bills that they know will be ignored because they icant, even though Martin himself had pledged to redress infringe upon the government’s executive prerogatives; and what he termed the “democratic deficit.” they turn parliamentary committees into kangaroo courts, Stephen Harper, however, solved that set of problems recklessly pursuing personal investigations for which they when he became leader of the Canadian Alliance, merged it have neither training nor resources. with the Progressive Conservatives and, against all previous predictions, reduced the Liberals to a minority government or a political scientist, it’s fascinating to watch. The last in 2004 before winning the 2006 election and forming his F six years of parliamentary proceedings have been more own minority government. Now everyone is concerned entertaining than anything since the fall of Joe Clark’s gov- about the parliamentary problems of minority government. ernment in 1979. But citizens are turned off, and rightly so, Who says there is no progress? by the endless tactical manœuvres, threats, bluffs and bro- Indeed, the parliamentary problems of minority govern- ken deals. ment are both real and serious. The Conservative government Three avenues of change might arguably make things continues to bring in legislation but often can’t move it for- better: coalition government, institutional reform and ward in normal fashion through committee discussion and power-sharing through a change in political culture. Let us votes on the floor of the House. Instead of just marshalling a examine each in turn. 32 OPTIONS POLITIQUES SEPTEMBRE 2010 A Canadian approach to power-sharing The 2010 coalition between the principle of “minimum connected together would have to control a Conservatives and the Liberal winning coalition.” Coalitions majority of seats to make a coalition Democrats in the United Kingdom has require expensive negotiations to feasible. This condition is unlikely to touched off another round of specula- achieve necessary compromises, and be met as long as the Conservatives tion about coalition government in the cost increases proportionally to continue to win more seats than the Canada. A majority coalition does, the distance between the partners. Liberals; for in that case the NDP has to indeed, seem to offer a way out of our The Conservatives and NDP agree win more seats than the BQ in order to present impasse. But the facts on the occasionally on specific pieces of leg- give the red-orange coalition its major- ground are not conducive to coalition islation, but in general their posi- ity. (If C + L + N + B = 308, and if C > L, formation in Canada. tions are so far apart that then N > B if L + N > C + B.) But the The first obstacle is the Bloc maintaining a coalition would be NDP has never won more seats than Québécois. As part of the separatist extraordinarily costly. Don’t look for the BQ and seems unlikely to do so movement, it is an anti-system party, a blue-orange coalition soon or, without a major collapse of the Bloc. like the Communist parties of Cold indeed, ever. War Europe or the neo-fascist parties of In contrast, the red-orange, f course, the current political con- the present, and thus not an accept- Liberal-NDP coalition is quite feasible. O figuration is a contingent reality, able coalition partner for either the The two parties are relatively close on not a law of nature. It is bound to Conservatives or the Liberals. change sooner or later, perhaps Yet as long as the Bloc controls The Conservative government in a way that will make coali- 40 or 50 seats in Quebec, it is continues to bring in legislation but tion government more likely. very difficult for either of the often can’t move it forward in normal The Liberals may once again big parties to win a majority start to win more seats than the government. There just aren’t fashion through committee Conservatives, or the BQ may enough seats to go around. discussion and votes on the floor of renounce separatism and the House. Instead of just marshalling become an acceptable coalition hat leaves three coalition a voting majority, it has to resort to partner as a Quebec regional T possibilities: Conservative- party, or it may implode Liberal, Conservative-NDP and all sorts of tactical expedients: through a failed leadership suc- Liberal-NDP. The first can be threatening to call an election, cession after the retirement of dismissed because both the bundling other measures together Gilles Duceppe. But as things Conservatives and the Liberals with the budget, playing the stand now, the one coalition see themselves as governing that could work — Liberal-NDP parties. In that sense, they are opposition parties off against each — is unlikely to be feasible. implacable rivals, even if their other or luring dissident elements The rules regarding parlia- ideologies are not that far within opposition parties to defy their mentary structure and function apart. The prospect of a own leadership. have changed repeatedly dur- Conservative-Liberal cabinet ing the 40-odd years that I have makes the famous image of two scorpi- many issues, and only the Liberals been observing Parliament. The length ons in a bottle look like a happy mar- have realistic expectations of achiev- of sessions, election of the Speaker, tel- riage. Don’t expect a blue-red coalition ing government on their own. To be in evision coverage of Question Period any time soon. a coalition with the Liberals would be and debates, private members’ bills, In more abstract terms, a a historic step forward for the NDP, mandate of committees and MPs’ com- Conservative-Liberal grand coalition which it would take with little hesita- pensation and pensions have all been would violate the game-theoretic prin- tion. Indeed, the New Democrats have addressed, some more than once. All ciple of “minimum winning coali- already propped up two minority these changes seemed like good ideas tion.” The purpose of a coalition is to Liberal governments (Pierre Trudeau, at the time, and maybe they have gain benefits for the included winners 1972-74, and Paul Martin, 2004-05) helped Parliament to run more at the expense of the excluded losers; without the additional benefits that smoothly; but neither individually nor and the larger the coalition, the more can accrue from being a formal coali- collectively have they wrought major hands are extended for a share of the tion partner. changes of the sort that are visible to spoils. In practice, parties rarely form The red-orange coalition could voters. If they had, we wouldn’t be grand coalitions unless there is a threat work, but can it be formed? The experi- having this discussion. to the system from war or revolution. ence of fall 2008 shows that it would be Maybe we need stronger medicine, A Conservative-NDP coalition is politically risky to rely on the support truly major reforms such as fixed elec- also unlikely because it violates the of the BQ, so the Liberals and NDP tion dates, proportional representation POLICY OPTIONS 33 SEPTEMBER 2010 Tom Flanagan or an elected Senate. But wait: we But, again, don’t hold your their political machinery, which is already have fixed election dates, cour- breath. Even after four years of trying, different in each case, but because tesy of a bill introduced by the present the government has not been able to they share the fundamentals government and supported by all par- pass term limits for senators, let alone described above.
Details
-
File Typepdf
-
Upload Time-
-
Content LanguagesEnglish
-
Upload UserAnonymous/Not logged-in
-
File Pages6 Page
-
File Size-