Dsra Central Executive Committee Members

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Dsra Central Executive Committee Members MEMORANDUM AND ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF DEFENCE SOCIETY RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION (Updated upto 14th October 2018) DSRA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS Mr. Sharfuddin Memon Mr. Zahid Iqbal Mrs. Tahira Athar Nasim Mr. Mansoor I. Usmani Mr. MuhammadMr. Zia Naqi Najeeb President Vice President Vice President Hon General Secretary WaliHon (Hon Joint Gen. Secretary Secretary) Capt. Farooq D. Harekar PN Mr. Nasir Jahangir Rifat Mr. Aziz Suharwardy Admiral (R) Sajjad Akbar Eng. Anwar ul Haq Siddiqui Hon Treasurer Immediate Past President Ex Officio Vice President CBC Ex Officio Edu. & Welfare Trust Ex-Officio Health & Welfare Trust Cdr. ( R) Anjum Bashir Arain Mrs. Azra Siddiqui Mr. Fawad Yusuf Mrs. Fouzia Anjum Mrs. Farkhunda Ahmed CEC Member CEC Member CEC Member CEC Member CEC Member Fahim Suleman Mrs. H. Shahnaz Khalid Capt. ( R) Iftikhar Ahmed Dr. Mirza Shadab Afzal Beg Mr. Muhammad. Younus Rizvi CEC Member CEC Member CEC Member (EC Member CEC Member Mr. Muhammad Nadeem Mr. M. Pervaiz Mirza Mr. Raffat Kamal Pasha Mrs. Samina Sikander Mrs. Shamim A. Shama CEC Member CEC Member CEC Member CEC Member CEC Member CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 2017-2018 OFFICE BEARERS Mr. Sharfuddin Memon President Mr. Zahid iqbal Vice President Mrs. Tahira Athar Naseem Vice President Mr. Mansoor I. Usmani Hon. General Secretary Mr. Zia Naqi Hon. Joint Secretary Capt. (R) Farooq Dawood Herekar Hon. Treasurer EX OFFICIO MEMBERS Mr. Nasir Jahangir Rifat Immediate Past President Mr. Aziz Suharwardy Vice President CBC Admiral Sajjad Akbar Chairman, Educational & Welfare Trust Engr. Anwarul Haq Siddiqui Chairman Health &Welfare Trust MEMBERS Cdr. (R) Anjum Bashir Arain Mr. M. Younus Rizvi Mr. Azhar I. Tahir Dr. Mirza Shadab Beg Mrs. Azra Siddiqui Mr. Mohammad Nadeem Mr. Fawad Yusuf Mr. Muhammad Pervaiz Mirza Mrs. Fouzia Anjum Mr. Raffat Kamal Pasha Mrs. Hamida Shahnaz Khalid Mrs. Samina Sikander Ahmed Capt. Iftikhar Ahmed Mrs. Shamim Akhtar Shama SUB COMMITTEES CHAIRPERSON Utility Sub Committee: Capt. ( R ) Farooq Dawood Herekar 0364-4007450 Legal Sub Committee: Mr. Nasir Jahangir Rifat 0300-8244399 Complaints & Redressal Sub Committee: Capt. ( R ) Farooq Dawood Herekar 0364-4007450 Cultural Sub Committee: Mrs. Tahira Athar Nasim 0345-8259991 Security Sub Committee: Mr. Sharfuddin Memon 0333-2200555 Health/Enviornment Sub Committee: Mrs. Shama Saeed 0300-2550524 Education/Sports Sub Committee: Mr. R. K. Pasha 0300-8207609 Media & Publication Sub Committee: Mr. Zahid Iqbal 0300-8221930 Finance Sub Committee: Mr. Fawad Yousuf 0300-8233417 Water & Power Sub Committee: Mr. Sharfuddin Memon 0333-2200555 DSRA’S CHAPTERS DSRA Phase 1 Chapter: Mr. Zia Naqi 0321-2437192 DSRA Phase 2 Chapter: Mr. Zahid Iqbal 0300-8221930 DSRA Phase 4 Chapter: DSRA Phase 5 Chapeter: Mr. Nadeem Hafeez 0300-8205829 DSRA Phase 6 Chapter: Cdr. (R) Anjum Bashir 0323-2875588 DSRA Phase 7 & 7 (Ext) Chapter: Mr. M. Younus Rizvi 0300-2012464 DSRA Phase 8 Chapter: Mr. Azhar I. Tahir 0323-2848783 03 DEFENCE SOCIETY RESIDENTS’ ASSOCIATION KARACHI (REGISTRATION NO. 4902 OF 1978-79) MEMORANDUM OF THE ASSOICATION 1. NAME OF THE ASSOCIATION: “DEFENCE SOCIETY RESIDENTS’ ASSOCIATION, KARACHI”. 2. OFFICE: The Registered office of the association shall be situated at Suite No. 3 Mezzanine Floor, Western Plaza, 10-C /2, 12th Commercial Street, Phase 2 (Extn), Defence Housing Authority, Karachi-75500. Phone/Fax: 3588-0519, E-mail: [email protected]), Website: dsrakarachi.org.pk (See End Note: Amendment No.1) 3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES: The aims and objective of the Association are: 1. To improve the living conditions of the residents of the Defence Housing Society (now DHA) areas. 2. To develop civic sense in the residents of the Society (now DHA). 3. To foster voluntary participations of residents of the Society (now DHA) in solving their problems. 4. To safeguard and look after the interests of members and residents of the Society (now DHA). 5. To promote such literary, cultural and social pursuits, as the Association may decide from time to time. 6. To take steps as may be necessary and conducive to attain the above objectives through meetings, appeals, deputations or legal action. 7. To raise funds to meet the expenditure incurred in achieving the above objectives. 8. Establish phase-wise or in any other manner, the General Body may decide from time to time Chapters in Defence Housing Authority as and when deemed necessary. 9. To promote social welfare activities to alleviate the sufferings of destitute and arrange financial and material assistance and the support for poor and needy persons. (See End Note Amendment No. 6) 4. NATURE OF THE ASSOCIATION: The Association is completely non-political body and shall not be used as platform by any political body or individual for achieving any political objectives or ends. 04 DEFENCE SOCIETY RESIDENTS’ ASSOCIATION 1. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION (AMENDED UPTO 8th APRIL 2018) The Association is formed for the purposes expressed in the Memorandum of Association. 2. MEMBERSHIP OF THE ASSOCIATION: (a) Any owner of the property or resident of Defence Housing Authority Society in Karachi will be eligible for membership of the Association. (b) Any person specified in Article 2 (a) desirous of becoming a member of the Association will submit an application in the form prescribed by the Central Executive Committee (CEC), to the Honorary General Secretary of the Association. (c) Membership of the Association shall not be transferable except in case of spouse. (d) Admission of new members of all categories shall always be with the approval of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) (e) Every member shall abide by these Articles of Association and regulations thereof. 3. CLASSES OF MEMBERSHIP: The Association shall have the following classes of Membership: (a) Life Membership. (b) Honorary Membership. 4. MEMBERSHIP FEE AND ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION: (a) Life Membership: The one time entrance fee for Life Membership shall be Rs.1000/- (Rupees One Thousand Only) payable in advance. Members shall however be required to pay Annual Subscription of Rs. 500/- (Rupees Five Hundred Only)”. (See End Note. Amendment No. 7) (b) Honorary Members: The Central Executive Committee shall have the right to admit any person as an Honorary Member on such terms and conditions at it may deem fit. ( C) Contribution of Office Bearers and Members of the Central Executive Committee: All Office Bearers and Members of the Central Executive Committee shall contribute Rs. 500/- and Rs 400/- per month respectively to meet the day to 05 day expenses of the Association. However, subject to legal exception, the Central Executive Committee shall have the power to increase or reduce the contributions according to the needs and requirements of the Association. (See End Amendment Note. 7) (d) Nomination fee for candidate: Nomination fee for all the candidates for an elected position in the DSRA shall be a non- refundable fee of Rupees Five Thousand (Rs. 5000/-) only. However, subject to legal exception, the Central Executive Committee shall be authorized to increase or reduce the fee depending upon the circumstances. (See End Amendment Note. 7) 5. MANAGEMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION AND THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: The management of the Association shall vest in a committee called Central Executive Committee ((CEC) which will have a tenure of two years and shall consist of the following Office bearers and members:- (a) Office Bearers:- (I) President…………………….......1. (ii) Vice President……………………2. (1 Male & 1 Female) (iii) Honorary General Secretary…...1. (iv) Honorary Joint Secretary…….....1. (v) Honorary Treasurer……………..1. In order to devote appropriate time towards the activities of the Association, the management may appoint part time or full time, suitably designated Office Secretary or staff to assist the Honorary General Secretary and Central Executive Committee in general. (b) Members of Central Executive Committee. (SeeEnd Note Amendment No. 2). (i) Nine gentlemen and five ladies elected by the General Body. (ii) The President may, with the approval of the Central Executive Committee, co-opt two additional members to the Central Executive Committee. (iii) In case there is a short fall of candidates for election to membership of the CEC or for the position of office bearers, the President with approval of the CEC may co-opt any Life Member of DSRA to fill in such positions. (c) Ex-Officio Members of CEC: i) Chairman of respective chapters. ii) Immediate past President for one term of two years. iii) DSRA members who have been elected as Members/Office Bearers of the Clifton Cantonment Board. 06 iv) Chairman of DSRA Educational and Welfare Trust. v) Chairman of DSRA Health and Welfare Trust. Election of the Office Bearers and members of the Central Executive Committee shall be held in the Annual General Body Meeting every alternate year. 6. QUALIFICATION FOR BEING ELECTED AS OFFICE BEARER OR MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. (See End Note Amendment No. 3). (a) The Candidates for the office of the President shall qualify for election only after having been an office bearer or member of the Central Executive Committee for period of the two years (at least one term of approximately 2 years) and should be 40 years of age. (b) The Candidates for membership of the Central Executive Committee shall qualify for election or co-option only after having been enrolled as life members of a period of at least two years and have paid all arrears of contributions and outstanding dues as determined by the CEC. ( c) In case the position of President falls vacant, the Central Executive Committee will elect President out of Vice Presidents who will not cast their own votes. 7. TERM OF OFFICE BEARERS AND MEMBERS OF C.E.C: (SeeEnd Note Amendment No. 4). (a) All office bearers and members of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) except Ex Officio members, who have held office for two consecutive terms shall retire and will not be eligible for re-election until the lapse of at least one term of two years.
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