The War: A blunder or a lesson? Is it possible to do good by doing history? An interview with Mr, Fred Downey

St. Andrew's Episcopal School Instructor Alex Haight Tenth of February 2003 By Abhi Naz

OH NAZ 2003

Naz, Abhi Table of Contents Legal Restriction, signed release fonn Page 2 Statement of Puipose Page 3 Biography Page 4 Contextualization Paper on Vietnam: Page 5 The lives of millions of Americans were shattered; others lost respect for their own government; and governments and people throughout the world lost respect for America. - Joseph A. Aniter Interview Tianscription Page 23 Historical Analysis Page 45 Appendix A- US forces from 1959-1971 Page 52 Appendix B~ Comparative Strengths, 1975 Page 53 Appendix C - Demographics Page 54 Appendix D - One letter from Ho Chi Minli to Page 55 President Truman Appendix E - John Fitzgerald Kennedy - Page 56 Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C, 20 January, 1961 Appendix F - Map of Vietnam during War Page 59 Appendix G - Comparative size of Vietnam to Page 60 Eastern Appendix H-Map of Vietnam Page 61 Appendix I - Page 62 Appendix J - Ho Chi Minh Page 63 Bibliography Page 64 ST. ANDREW'S EPISCOPAL SCHOOL

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8804 Postoak Road - Potomac. Maryland 20854 • (301)983-5200 • Fax: (301) 983-4710 • hUp:/A\/ww.saes.oig Naz 3

Statement of Puipose

The primaiy goal of this oral history project is to help augment and intensify one's understanding to the tluough research of primaiy and secondaiy sources as well as an intei'view with a Vietnam Veteran. The purpose of the intei'view conducted with Mr. Fred Downey is to gain another inteipretation to the Vietnam War tlii'ough the eyes of a solider. It is intended to provide a unique and detailed explanation of the United State's involvement in the war. Naz 4

Biogi-aphy of Mr. Fred Downey

Mr. Fred Downey was bom in 1950 in a small town in Pennsylvania, with a population of about with about 700 or 800 people, He spent most of his childhood growing u)) there. Approximately 8 or 9 years were spent in the (own. It was a typical small town experience, evei yone basicaliy knew everyone else. It was a di\'ei'se area with a lot of ethics groups. Most of the people in the town worked menial jobs. They were blue collar, Coal mineis, Steel welders, there were not really pjofessionals such as doctors and lawyers. He had a fairly normally cliiidhood, Ins parents never split up, had six uncles from his dad side, had a brother and a sister, as well as friends. Most of the men were \'eterans from WoiId War II so therefore theie was a strong presence of military service. World War 11 served a huge role in his life, in the childhood. Mostly every elder gentleman had served in tliat wai- and they all joined veteran organizations.

He then went to a very small college in Lexington Virginia- the Virginia Militaiy histitute. He knew many people in iiis grade, and the grade above him. In total there were eleven liundi-ed people in his whole school. He graduated out of 160 people, and went strictly into seivice in Vietnam. In 1971-1972 he was in Vietnam, as a member of the armed Calvary. Tiiey had refurbished jeeps, and other transportation things to help ride around the environment and teirain of Vietnam. Upon reluming from Vietnam he participated in the reconstniction of the American anny, working with General Abrams, and others. He then was a member of the team that helped plan tactical operations in the

Gulf War. Presently he is mamed and has one daughter, and works under Senator

Liberman at the Hart Senate Office Building in Downtown D.C. Naz 5

Contextualization Paper on Vietnam

The Jives of millions of Americans were shattered; others lost respect for their

own government; and governments and people throughout the world lost respect for

America. -JosephA. Atnter

Vietnam - A small southeastem communist countiy, divided at the seventeenth

parallel by the Ben Hai River and the Annamite Mountain Range, bordered by ,

Cambodia, Thailand, and China, a seemingly peacefiil nation. However this "peaceful

nation" was once home to one of the most deadly conflicts ever reordered in American

histoiy, lasting a total of 16 years. This country had a turbulent Histoiy - A series of

false promises and land disputes. Clearly this event had important significance in

America. It led to mistrust of the govenmient, low moral, as well as post traumatic stress.

1

For majority of histoiy, another countiy had been in power over it.

Starting h'oni 1 BC to 967 AD Vietnam was controlled by China, but won its freedom ui the 1400s. However the success came at a cost because in 1545, it separated into two separate regions, a north and south component^. From 1545-1847, Vietnam was veiy much an isolationist nation and at peace, with two veiy different society growing^. 1847 marked the first of a series of conflicts between the Vietnamese and French. By 1861

France had captured Saigon, starting its imperial mle over Vietnam and in 1862

Vietnam's emperor - Tuo Doc signed a treaty with France agreeing about political, economic and religious concessions'^. France's influence on the southeastern countiy was growing, and the first French civilian governor was appointed 17 years later. In Naz 6

another four years (1883), France established Vietnam as its own protectorate and

Vietnam officially became a colony of France.

In 1890 one of the most influential leaders in Vietnam history was bom. Ho Chi

Minli (Appendix J) was an important figure, who led Vietnam to become a Communist

country. In 1911 Ho Chi Minli left Vietnam and joined the French conununist party in

1920'. Ho Chi Minli took what the learned fi-om the FCP and applied it to the

hidochinese Comniunist Party which was formed during the December of 1930, Ho Chi

Minli finally returned to Vietnam during 1941. In 1941 Ho Chi Minli organized the

Vietnam Independence League or more commonly refereed to as the Vietminh. The

Vietminli received aid from the OSS, a department of the US military intelligence

agency, who taught them many techniques to use in war (such as the teclmiques that later

1 0

the Vietminli would use against the United States) ". It was interesting to not a

comparison between Flo chi Minli, and Osama Bin Landing, who both received US aid

during the , however the used the techniques taught by the United States against the United States.

During World War Two, Vietnam was again taken over by another imperiahst nation, Japan. By 1941, Japan had started its invasion of the Indochina region. In March

9, 1945- Japan took over the French Administration tlii'oughout this region, and installed

Bao Dai as their puppet ruler. However, Japans mle weakened, for two reasons. In the summer of 1945 the Vietnamese had a severe famine strike, which resulted in several revolts by the peasants against Japan^. The second reason was because Japan lost World

War Two^. Because of severe fighting in Vietnam and many SALW (Small amis and hglit weapons) were still present, the Allies decide to split the countiy at the 17th parallel. Naz 7

'^ The northern part of the countiy was communist, and China demilitarized it. The south

was designated under the jurisdiction of Democracy and Britain was chiefly responsible

for demilitarization. ^ After Japan lost World War Two, the Vietminli became the itiler of

Vietnam. On September 2nd 1945 Ho Chi Minli declared Vietnam as a free countiy,

using the principles of the Declaration of Independence (in America) stating, ""AH men

are created equal. They are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights,

among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness...This immortal statement is extracted from the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776.

Understood in the broader sense this means: All people on earth are born equal. Every person has the right to live, to be happy, and free." ^ Ho Chi Minli then declared himself president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and sent 8 letters (Appendix D) to

President Truman tiying to ally Vietnam and the United States. President Truman repeatedly ignored him. ^^

111 September 22, 1945 French soldiers, held in POW camps, went on a killing rampage, killing many Vietnamese civilians. ^ hi response to the massacre- Binli Xiiyen- a South Vietnamese crime syndicate, massacred 150 French civilians. French and

Vietnamese tensions grew worse when 35,000 soldiers an'ived in , expelled the Vietminli, and restored colonial French mle. In an agreement China allowed

France to take over Northern Vietnam for French concessions in Shanghai and other important Chinese ports'^. Ho Chi Minli allowed the French to take over South Vietnam in return for recognition of the DRV, and left to Paris to tiy and win independence for

Vietnam. However he failed in securing the independence because the French created the

Republic of Chochinchina by June 1946. •^ A month before the start of the First Indochina Naz 8

war, the Vietminli were driven into the forest, and forced to reside there. ^ The war

officially started in December 19 1946 - after 30,000 Vietminli launch a full-scale attack

on France.

The Vietminli, after having failed on direct attacks, turned to gueirilla warfare- a

hit and run type tactic. ^ Under the guidance of General Giap and with the aid of

commnnist Chuia, the Vietminli won the war. '"* The last battle occurred on March 13,

1954 where the Vietminh outnumbered the French troops five-to-one. On May 7,1954-

5:30 P.M.- 10,000 soldiers suirendered at Dien Bein Phu. The French were then forced

to walk a 500 hundred-mile stretch, for approximately 60 days, to prison. Nearly half of

the POWs died in the march and in the camps. ^

The United States participated in the Vietnam War because of a series of events

that led up to it. The first an American Lieutenant, Colonel A. Peter Dewey, was killed

after being mistaken as a French officer on September 26, 1945. ^ Dewey last advice to

United States was they had "ought to clear out of South Asia."^ However United States

ignored his advice and on July 26, 1950 gave 15 million dollars of militaiy aid to the

French. The United States justified its action by stating the containment theory. The theory stated that the United States had to take it upon itself to stop the spread of coimnunism. From 1950-1954 the United States paid S3 billion toward the France govei-mnent, and by 1942 provided 80% of all war supplies used by the French. ^ The

MAAG- Militaiy Assistance Advisory Group was created on September 27,1950- to aid the French army. In 1953 Eisenliower stated an important policy that would shape the

US policy for the next decade. He stated that the if a countiy fell to , then the suiTounding counties would fall to communism like a row of dominoes. On March 13, Naz 9

1954- the last battle that the French fought- they called upon the United States for help.

There were three options to aid the French: 1) Sending American combat troops to the rescue (discredited by Eisenliower, because would result it many Americans being killed)

2) Send the B-29 bombers into Vietnam and 3) use of the atomic bomb (Britain advised

US not to do this). The United States did nothing. ^ The Geneva Accords ultimately led to the Second Indochina war-, which is more conmionly refened to as the Vietnam War. ^

The United States, Britain, China, the , France, Vietnam and Laos and all met and participated in the Geneva Accords. ^ They agreed to divide

Vietnam at 17tli parallel- Ho Chi Minli and the Vietminli controlled the north, and Bao

Dai's regime controlled the south. ^ The accords stated that in two years Vietnam would have a reunification election. Vietnam was finally to be united and independent, however, the South Vietnamese and United States would soon dismiss that notion, by not allowing the elections to occur. This was due to the fact that they both feared that the elections would result in a communist victory, which neither of them wanted." Bao Dai was eventually removed fi'om being the leader, and Diem replaced him. On July 8th 1959, two Americans militaiy advisors were the first to be killed in the Vietnam War. ^ Diem eventually became unpopular, and by December 20, 1960 the Vietcong were organized under the national liberation front, or NLF, to fight in South Vietnam. ^ May 1959 the Ho

Chi Minh trail (Appendix I) was first constiticted. During the next subsequent years, the

Ho Chi Minh trial will allow for the transportation of weapons, and allow Northem

Vietnamese to move to the South. In 1959 it took the Vietminli/Vietcong six months to cross from , tlii'ough Laos, parts of Cambodia, and to South Vietnam.

However the road conditions and efficiency of the troops increased so much, that by 1968 Naz 10

It would take only six weeks total.' It is within the context of what occurred after the first Indochina War that the Vietnam war/ Second Indochina War occuired.

Under Nikita Khrushchev words, the NLF organized, and allied its self under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. ^ By January 1961- the United States decided and prepared to wage a war against an enemy who v/on't quit no matter "...whatever the sacrifices, however long the stmggle...until Vietnam is fully independent and reunified." ^ By the end of 1961, the Vietcong influence moved to the countiy side, and was further strengthened by Diem deciding to bomb suspected communist hamlets, along with

America's stipport of it. Diem fell out of public favor because the hamlets he had bombed left a number of civilians dead. In 1963 -the Vietcong began to amass its troops in central Vietnam. ^

The United States involvement started with the inauguration of Kennedy.

Kennedy states "...we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any fi'iend, oppose any foe, to insure the survival and the success of liberty."(Appendix

E) It was obvious that American foreign policies of the time were still effected by the policy of contaimnent, and the domino theoiy. ^ Kennedy sent in the first fonnal

American troops American Green Beret Special Advisors specialized to help ARVN,

Ai'iny of the Republic of Vietnam, to fight against the Vietcong guerillas, eventually leading to formation of the CIDG or the Civilian hregular Defense Groups. However, the 400 advisors sent were not enough, and again Diem asked Kennedy for more militaiy aid. Kemiedy was advised by his advisors that, "If Vietnam goes, it will be exceedingly difficult to hold Southeast Asia," ^ and the United States must send in 8,000 military combat troops. He is also advised to send in 200,000 military combat troops, however Naz 11 made the decision not to. Instead of sending in troops. Kennedy choose to send in yet more advisors, and equipment, his reasoning being, '^..to prevent a Communist takeoA-er of Vietnam which is in accordance with a policy our government has followed since

1954.""

B\' December of 1961. United States had spent 1 million dollars a day on the war.

Kennedy \-ie\ved this war as it being "our good fortune" to defend liberty and life. The

United States mvohement in the Vietnamese Civil War was again increased, when the

United Slates created the MACA'. which allowed the United States to starting edging its way to war. By May of 1962- Kennedy and the American public were deceived by defense Secretary McNamara who stated that America is winning the war. By the end of 1962. the United States began monitoring the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and created Foieign

Assistance Act which stated that the United states will provide"...military assistance to countries which are on the rim of the Communist world and under direct attack." This was a further extension of the containment policy. ^

1963 was a year of much conspiracy and political turaioil foi- the United States and South Vietnam. The only main battle that occuired between the Vietminh and the

ARVN occuired on January 3rd 1963, where the Vietcong was \ictorious. The rest of the year was full of deceit, and by the end of the year a new government was in place. Diem had implemented the spoils system, placing many jseople who are loyal to him in key places in his coirtipt government. ^ Diem tcld the South Vietnamese anny that there main goal was not to stop the Vietminli/Vietcong but ii was to protect hiin froni any coups to occur. One important reason, which caused Diem to become more unpopular, was his policy on Buddhism \"s Catholicism. He was a Roman Catholic who persecuted the Naz 12

Buddhists, which was majority of the population. From May to August there were a numerous amounts of riots and demonstiations against Diem, where seven Buddhist burned themselves to death, to stop the ill treatment on them. ^ Also during this time was a failed coup. It was to occur on August 29 because US ambassador Lodge told the

United States that it would be impossible to win a war with Diem as the president. ^

Public opinion began questioning US involvement in the war; to stop this Kennedy stated that if US withdrew now the Domino theoiy would take effect. However, by October 5 another coup seemed to be brewing, and by November 1st it started. ' Diem and his brother, who w^as in charge of ARVN, were placed under house arrest, but escaped at night. Diem and his brother, however, are found when an important advisor betrays

Diem, and are assassinated that day. In Diems's place came General Duong Van Minh.

His goveinment becomes entirely depended on the United States, and Ho Chi Minh's

Vietminli used this to spread their influence to about 40% of the population. ^ At the end of the year Kennedy was assassinated, and LBJ takes over the Vietnam Situation. ^

1964 was the begimiing of United State's direct involvement during Vietnam

War. The war became a way to prove to the world that communism, could not win and sliow off the United States prestige. After General Minli was ousted out of power, the price of United States involvement raised to 2 million dollars day^, and the secret bombing of Ho Chi Minli's Trail, marked the climax of the war. On August 2nd USS

Maddox apparently was opened fired upon by North Vietnamese gunboats, which shot tlnee toipedoes and many machine gun round. It was only hit by one machine gun round, which does almost no damage at all. ^ On August 3rd, the USS Maddox and USS C

Turner Joy experience electronic problems due to rain, and believed that they been Naz 13 attacked by North Vietnamese torj^edoes. Both ships open fire, but hit nothing.' The US retaliated by first sending in American bombers to bomb North Vietnamese military targets^, and also leads to a very important document passed during this war." The Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which gave the president full power to do whatever he saw fit to do without the approval on congress." Even though there are reported allegations that the

USS Maddox was actually aiding the South Vietnamese gun ships on raiding attacks^, and it w as spying" , it is still passed by 98-2 votes in congress. South Vietnam began to go into chaos, as each political regime was corrupt, and mob violence soared. ' To reaffimi the public trust in him, LB.I says, "We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves." LBJ refused to send American troops into Vietnam, and by the end of the year South Vietnam has had another 2 coups, and the United States had 175 people wounded/killed. ^'

By January 27, 1965 the United States realized it has come to a crossing, in which it can choose to either get further escalated in the war, or can abandon the war. United

States than created Operation Game Warden, where it ]5atrolled the coastline of South

Vietnam. On Febmaiy 6th 1965 the United States are attacked by Vietcong at Pieiku.

The result were 8 soldiers killed, 126 wounded, and 10 aircraft's destroyed. LBJ finally retaliates, creating operation Flaming dart in which the United States began bombing strategic North Vietnam militaiy bases. ^ As a result, North Vietnam called on the USSR to give them unlimited resources to combat the United States and the Surface to Air

Missiles airive in North Vietnam relatively soon. ^ General Westmoreland asked the

United States govenmient to send more troops. ^ LBJ reluctantly agreed to send troops Naz 14 into South Vietnam, and is wamed by Ambassador Taylor, that in the jungle your allies and enemies are undistinguishable from each other.' A fifth coup in the last one-year occurred, this time placing power in the hands of Dr. Phan Huy. On March 2 Operation

Rolling Thunder began, hi this incredible fete^. Unhed States carpet bombed Northern

Vietnam and. with little success. ^ the Ho Chi Minli Trail. By the end of the War. the

United Stales dropped four limes the tonnage of bombs dropped in World War Two.' On

March 8 the first US troops airived at Vietnam. This marks the beginning of

US troop involvement in the war. Following thai. LBJ permitted the use of Napalm against North Vietnam.' This bomb, once exi^loded. would break off into hundreds of fiery pieces. In a with this and , a chemical used lo kill trees. defoliation occuired. Also Agent Orange led to many post war problems by many

United States Veterans. Another Operation passed during this time was Operation

Market Time, in wliich United States and South Vietnamese troops successfully stopped

North Vietnamese use of the bodies of water by North Vietnam. In repose to a bombing of the United States embassy in Saigon, President Jolmson allowed 20,000 more troojis to go to Vietnam, and started weeding possible Vietcong members out of South Vietnam.

His decisions were not know publicly for another two months. LBJ tried to stop US involvement with South Vietnam by stating that the United States government would aid

Hanoi's government, however it was rejected by the North Vietnamese. ^ April 17th began the first of a series of protests against the government. LBJ started to recruit for more soldiers, offering money for their services, and as a result the 173rd airborne brigade^ airived in Vietnam by May 3rd. Operation Rolling Thunder was suspended for a short while in hopes that will cooperate with the United States on a peace deal. Naz 15

However Hanoi did not comply. By June 18- The Vietnamese govenmient had changed

hands 10 times in the last 20 months. ^ On July 28 LBJ announced the need to raise the

total US troops involved to 125,000 in order to comply with General Westmoreland's

demands. On August 3rd CBS aired live fi'om the War the destrtiction of a possible

Vietcong town. This sfiired up some more antiwar sentiments. Johnson asked for more

money (1.7 billion dollars) from congress to continue the war. ^ The Vietcong strike

again, blowing up two million gallons of fuel. Operation starlight is conmienced as the

first massive ground operation. ^ Operation starlight was a success, and boasted the

morale of the soldiers. However, the United States started the phases of the antiwar demonstrations, as many people started burning draft cards and marching. November

14,15,16 marked another victoiy for the Soother Vietnamese/United states troops, suffered minimal loses compared to the NVA (North Vietnamese Ai'iiiy), however

American troops were ambushed on November 17 by NVA troo])s. ^ On November 30-

Defense Secretary McNamara silently wamed president LBJ that death tolls could raise to about 1000 a month. ^ Another attack on December 4th occurred, and on December

7th McNamara warned LBJ that the NVA "believe that the war will be a long one, that time is their ally, and that their staying power is superior to ours." United States again halted operation-rolling thunder for a month, before it continued with it again. By the end of 1965 the Vietcong controlled 50% of the countiyside. ^

LBJ in 1966 stated, "Yet, finally, war is always the same. It is young men dying in the fullness of their promise. It is trying to kill a man that you do not even know well enough to hate...therefore, to know war is to know that there is still madness in this world." In the beginning of the year - a operation- Naz 16 commenced. During the early part of the year, the president policies were criticized by many. Also during the early part of the year, Vietnamese were having social unrest problems. The civil unrest got out of hand and in June 23rd the South Vietnamese troops attacked and seized the Buddhist headquarters in Saigon to stop national Buddhist riofing.

^ By December United State troop involvement was almost at 400,000. United States refused to bomb/destroy Hanoi, for fear of possible soviet/china retaliation." Many operations were launched this year such as Operation Hastings, Operation Attleboro, and

Operation Irving^; also important was the allegafion that 40% of the money sent to South

Vietnam ended up m the black market. North Vietnam was also non-compliant to

United States demands.

In 1967, the war \vas further escalated. In the beginning of the year United States launched ^, which resulted in the United States almost destroying 50%, of

N^''A interceptors. occurred, which was the largest amassing of troops to date. In the operation the United States learned a valuable lesson. It is that the

NVA had constiricted elaborate tumiel schemes^, and also that the United States must use an "in and out" theoiy where they arrived by helicopter, secured the area and then left. ^

Congi'ess started to move against the war, as well as the people. ^ By the beginning of

Febmaiy LBJ let the public know that war may take a while to finish. ^ From Febrnaiy to

May ^, the largest attack done by the United States and South

Vietnamese occuired. The Operation was a success; it forced the main target, the Central office for the NVA in Soother Vietnam, to relocate its position. United States then approved 4.5 billion dollars for the war . accused that the antiwar protests were prolonging the war occuiring in Vietnam. Martin Luther Jr. said that LBJ was

% Naz 17 ignoring the issues at home, and was putting the black male and white male in the same position". However later that same month a march occuired with people who favored the war. At the same time, B-52 bombers were used for then" first ci\'ilian target, a harbor.

On May 11th US Marines squared off against the NVA, resuldng in 155 deaths, 425 wounded for Americans and 940 deaths for the NVA. ^ This hill was a vital component to the Americans, for it was only 10 miles away of North Vietnam, and veiy close to border of Laos. US actions in the war were not supported by the British or other

Europeans nations. CORDS^- the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development

Support- was formed to stop the chaos in South Vietnam and helped to stop the spread of the Vietcong's influence. By now the Vietcong had already spread its influence to 60%) of the population. CORDS hoped that direct relief, with food and appliances, would be able to stop and diminish the influence of the Vietcong^. The United States and South

Vietnamese prepared for another battle in May, this time across the demilitarized zone.

The results of this war were that both sides had inflicted and took heavy causalities.

After the failure of North Vietnam to not comprise for peace, the United States created the mobile riverine force . It utilized U.S. Navy 'Swift' boats and aided with the anny stopped the Vietcong usage of lakes and rives for transportation. By July LBJ had sent

520,000 troops to Vietnam. July 7th, North Vietnamese forces plamied a tliree-part offensive. The first part would be to attack remote outposts of the South Vietnamese

Army, to lure ARVN and the United States away from the big cities. The second phase would be known as the - a plan where the Vietcong, along with NVA, would strike the cities, hoping to create a general uprising among the people. The last phase would be the invasion of South Vietnam, by North Vietnam. The United States Naz 18 started to have mixed feelings tov/ards the war . An example of this is v/lien Ronald

Reagan said that it was impossible to win this war if the targets that need to be bombed were not allowed to be bombed. ^ Tensions rose when the Chinese shot down a US B-52 that accidentally crossed its teiritory . September 3rd- an election occuired in South

Vietnam where the people elected a new Prime Minister, also the North Vietnamese

Prime Minister stated that it v/ould continue to fight, and confinued the war. A skinnish lasting for one month resulted in 2000 N^A members killed. By October almost half of the United States population believed that US involvement in Vietnam was a mistake, and The United States should have not gotten involved. Another Skirmish, this time close to the border of Laos and Cambodia, where the United States and South

Vietnamese combined with infantiy and air support, killed 1644 N\^A's, and drove them back, while suffering approximately 300 losses . LBJ tried to boost moral of the people by saying, after a meeting with General Westmoreland, that US forces were giving more casualties then they were receiving. The antiwar movement grew as Defense Secretaiy

McNamara resigned from the war, and Eugene McCarthy ran for president. On

December 2nd it was reported that the Vietcong had massacred a village of innocent civilians. By the end of the year the United States involvement was 463,000 troops and the Vietcong grew to the number of 300,000.

On Januaiy 22 1968 the siege at Klie Sanli, a United States aiiport, lasted for 77 days. It was compared to many as the battle at Dien Bein Phu, the French's last battle, and vastly publicized. This was phase one of the plan that was drafted in 1967^, because on Januaiy 31 st the Tet Offensive begins. The Offensive was the turning point in the war , both for antiwar demonstrators, and the NVA. ARVN and US forces inflicted Naz 19

massive causalities on the JMVA , however ARVN and US forces also took casualties,

and was also widely publicized. The Battle for Saigon was actually the easier of the two

battles in the Tet because General Weyand had suspected that the Vietcong would strike

o

the city . However the battle for Hue was not as lucky, creating much of the causalities

in the war. The Tet offensive was controversial for two reasons. First was because a

South Vietnamese general killing a suspected Vietcong member on national TV^, and

second because of a quote that a US general said, "We had to destroy the village, in order

to save it."^ The Tet offensive was only a success indirectly, by lowering support for the

war; however, NVA troops had many causalities because they abandoned their guerrilla

like warfare. Walter Cronkite visited Vietnam and stated that the end result would be a

bloody ^. During the next several months many Marines were killed by the

results of a series liit and miis, also over the next several months, the United States

supported for the war was starting to erode fast^. March 16th the

occuired. The town of My Lai was completely obliterated when members of the Charlie

Company were told to go into My Lai. It was told to them that the civilians would have been gone to worship/work in the morning, and only the Vietcong would be present.

However the report was incoirect, and instead of killing the Vietcong, the company massacred everyone in the town . It was not to be known to the public until November

16 1969. President Johnson was advised by the 'wise men' to withdraw out of Vietnam and that they saw it as a hopeless war. March 31st President Jolmson stopped bombing of North Vietnam in hopes of stopping the war, and announced that he would not nin for presidency again. In early April the siege for Klie Saiili was finally lifted and the air base was shut down. The Vietcong take 15,000 causalities while the United States suffer Naz 20

almost 400. By May 3rd the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam is finally

halted and they do not tiy again until 1972^ when the United States has almost

completely withdrawn its troops. Also North Vietnam and US agi'ee on conditions for

preliminaiy peace talks. However the Vietcong launch 'Mini Tet' using rockets and

bombs to hui1 Saigon. On May 11 peace talks go on between the United States and North

Vietnam. They will last for an additional five years, while in 1968 are not very

successful. General Westmoreland in the replaced by General Abrams in Vietnam^. Jidy

1st the is started. The Phoenix program is established to crush the secret

Vietcong inh'asiruciure (VCI) in South Vietnam. The VCI has been blamed for teirorist

activities in banning imiocent South Vietnamese civilians. However the Phoenix

program conies under scrutiny when it is alleged to have assassinated a number of

suspected Vietcong members. ^ Tluough peace agreement Hanoi released tlu-ee POW's

and return back to the United States. The United States started to experience civil uni'est

as bad as the one that occuired before the civil war. Operation Sealord - the operation

to stop North Vietnam from receiving aid from water sources. Operation rolling thunder

(which dropped approximately 800 tons a day) ^ is finally suspended. On November 5th

Nixon is elected president, and he begins what he calls . Tliis process was the process of slowly withdrawing American troops, and allowing ARVN to take over majority of the fighting. ^ At the end of 1968 approximately 1000 soldiers a month were killed. ^

In 1969 Nixon is sworn into office, being the fifth president to deal with the

Vietnam crisis. On Januaiy 22, 1969 Operation Dewey Canyonc becomes the last major operation prefoimed by the United State Marines. During the next several months, the Naz 21

Vietcong will attack and destroy many ARVN and US troops , as well as buildings.

Operation Menu - the secret bombing of Cambodia occurs on March 17th. The peak of

US troops occurs in April, when 543,400 troops are present in Vietnam. May 10-20 a conftising battle occurs, where US troops lose 50 of their men to secure a hill, and then are told to abandon the hill. This marks the begimiing of the end foi" the United States involvement in the war^. The last of the major search and destroy missions are stopped.

Nixon creates a peace plan that would require all US troops and North Vietnamese troops to withdraw from South Vietnam at the same time, however it is rejected. From July 6th to November 1972 the gradual removal of troops occurred. Ho Chi Minh dies on

September 2nd and advises his people to fight until the United States has finally left. By the end of the year American troop involvement has fell to 474,000 troops. On

November 15th a mobilization for peace occurs . This is the antiwar movement at its peak. 1970 marks the general Vietnamization of the war, and movement towards peace.

From them until 1973 United States will slowly remove its forces, and eventually leave the war for good. ^

Historian Stanley Kaniow calls Vietnam War that nobody won. He has a very negative histography of the period saying that the dead, "represent a to a failed crusade... are the price, paid in blood and sortow, for America's awakening to maturity, to the recognition of its limitation... With the young men who died in Vietnam, died the dream of an 'American centuiy'" (Kaniow 9). The Vietnam War was an end to

American's, "absolute confidence in its moral exclusivity, its military invincibility, and its manifest destiny" (Karnow 9). It also "symbolize [d] a sacrifice to a failed cirisade"

(Kamow 9). Naz 22

Defense secretary McNamara stated that, "The thesis of this book is that the war was a tragedy for both sides, (McNamara 1) refeiring to his book Argument without end.

The Vietnam war occuired tinough a series of "missed opportunities, either for avoiding the war before it started of for tenninating it before it had mn its course" (McNamara 1).

The outcome "might have been different, might have [been]... better... if Washington and Hanoi had not repeatedly missed opportunities to avoid the war or at least teniiinate

It before the devastation reached tragic dimensions" (McNaniara373). Unlike Karnow,

McNamara blames neither side (or blames both sides) and does not place the blame onto the Aiiierican govenmient.

Historian Joseph A. Aniter, in his book Vietnam Verdict-A Citizen's Histon^ argues the lessons of the Vietnam War. The consequences of the war were, "the lives of millions of Americans were shattered; others lost respect for their own government; and goveirunents and people throughout the world lost respect for America" (Amter 331).

Howard Zimi also supports Amter's position by siting an example in his book A people's histoid of the United States. In March 1975 a catholic organization conducted a survey of American attitudes, to the following statement, "The people mmiiiig tliis countiy

(govermnent, political, church, and civic leaders) don't tell us the truth," more than

83%[of the people polled] agreed (Zinn 403). Naz 23

hitei'view Transcription Intei'viewer: Abhi Naz InteiA'iewee: Fred Downey Date and Location: Januaiy 8'" 2003 at the Hart Senate Office Building

Abhi Naz: What is your name?

Fred Downey: My Name is Fred Downey

AN: What was years did you sen'e in Vietnam?

FD: I was in Vietnam in 1971 and 1972.

AN: AHiat was your Rank?

FD: I was a captain in the United States Anny.

AN: What were you? Were you a foot solider?

FD: I was in an amiored Calvaiy troop. Which was equipped not as in standard wars.

Nonnally those days there were tanks and trek tables, but with a variety of jeeps that had been modified for Vietnams specific requirements.

AN: So you were on the land? Naz 24

FD: Yes

AN: What was your childhood like?

FD: Well I was born in western Pennsylvania. In a veiy small town. With about 700 or

800 people. Lived there for quite some time, the first 8 or 9 years of my life. It was a

typical small town experience. And it was an area with a lot of different ethics groups.

Mostly Blue collar, Coal miners. Steel welders, what ever...

AN: What were blue collars?

FD: Blue collar is a iion-professional, people that work in mine coals, and fix cars. Not

doctors and lawyers. Most of the men were vetei'ans of World War II, almost eveiybody.

There was a strong presence of militaiy sei'vice. Nomial, pretty happy childhood. Both parents, a brother and my sister, and friends.

AN: How did any War affect your child hood? World War II was huge influence on you?

FD: Yea World War Two was a big influence on me, mostly because of my father and 6 of his brothers, all sei'ved in World War Two. Almost every man that I knew as a child sei'ved some where in World War Two. They were all members of the veteran Naz 25

organizations there after the war. On all of the young people in that area of my

generation there was a strong influence of semce, resulted from World War Two.

AN: How old were you when you went into the anny?

FD: Well I was, I went strictly out of college, so I was, actually about 21 years old.

AN: What college did you go to?

FD: I graduated from Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia.

AN: So were you always geared towards the militaiy?

FD: That was a resuh of the influence of the World War II generation on my generation.

American was involved in Vietnam. I had been subject to all of the stories and influences, it just naturally foUov/ed.

AN: Who was, in your opmion, your favorite president of all fime? Why?

FD: I guess I would have to say, George Washington was the greatest. He was as, James

Lexner, his biographer, noted the one indispensable man. He would have been a remarkable man in any age. He invented the presidency. He was the one who invented Naz 26

the idea of peaceful transifion of power. Sonietliing that hadn't happened in 2000 years

since the Roman Republic.

AN: Peaceful transition of power is when you give power back to the whole people?

FD: Yeah. At the end of the revolution George Washington could have been king, he

could have been a president for life, he chose not to be. He chose the way of making the

ideals of the American Revolution, democracy real. He put the nafion on the path that it

is on. His influence is with us even 200 years later. Yeah I would have to say George

Washington was the gi'eatest.

AN: In your opinion, who was the worst president of all time? Why?

FD: Unfortunately there is more competition for the worst than the best. I guess Warren

G. Harding, was probably the worst. An enigma. Why he would have ever been president is a mysteiy to me. He exiiibited all the character flaws that George

Washington didn't have. He was a failure ineffective, he embairassed the office and the nation. He set the stage for the depression that followed. I guess I don't like him as president.

AN: Who was your favorite president of the Vietnam War? Wliy? Naz 27

FD: I guess it depends on how you characterize the Vietnam War. So lets just say Jolm

Keimedy. John Kemiedy was very influential on my generation. He motivated many of us to commit to the nation, to sei've for the nation. In a lot of ways, that is why a lot of us end up sen'iiig in Vietnam, and while a lot of tis sfill semiig in government today.

AN: Who was your least favorite president of the Vietnam War? Why?

FD: Richard Nixon was the worst. Dishonesty and deception and deceit.

AN: What do you mean?

FD: Nixon was many ways brilliant in foreign poficy, but veiy much a failure as a person. Plis Watergate— and many of the principles that were so important to America and I always hold him in contempt for that.

AN: What is your inteipretation and validity of the following statement? "We had to destroy the village in order to save it."

FD: Well, It was an unfortunate quote. Or at least it was reported to be a quote, never been sure it was invented. It became very much a comment that was used as an anti war message, to tiy and prove the ftitility of war, and the failure of American strategy and action in Vietnam. It also, unfortunately did represent some of the attitudes, of some of Naz 28

the people, who prosecuted the war. It didn't really represent what I saw, nor the

attitudes and motivation of most of the peoples I knew that fought in Vietnam.

AN: Wliat is the validity/interoperation of the following statement? "We got in more

trouble for killing water buffaloes then we did for killing people."

FD: That's an interesting one. I guess what some would attem])t to portray with that quote is that life became overly cheap. Those priorities became confiised. I think there is a certain amount of validity, if that inteipretation is correct, there is a certain amount of validity to it. Life does become cheaper, at least the experience. War changes things. It changes things in a lot of ways. One of the ways it changes for the worst is that people become desensitized to suffering and death and always cynical about it. At some times during the war, at least the sentiment that were expressed, was probably more accurate than not.

AN: Wliat is the validity/interoperation of the following statement? "Vietnam is a militaiy problem. Vietnam is a political problem; and as the war goes on it has become more clearly a moral problem."

FD: I agree with the quote. It was a militaiy problem. It was one that we, as America, never really solved. It was a political problem, which our govei'miient never solved. It was a morale problem, which we grappled with. In some ways, the dispute of that part of it is still with us today. But so were the first two paits. All tlu*ee parts to that roll Naz 29

together, sort of encapsulates what many people called the Vietnam syndrome. It

affected how, when and why we got engaged in the world after Vietnam.

AN: Wliat were yon point of view of killing children and women?

FD: My view of killing of the innocent women and children at My Lai for example, was that it was beyond appall un-American, immoral, criminal, and the punishment weeded out to the peipetrators was appropriate.

AN: What happened to the ]Deipetrators?

FD: They went to prison. Persecuted and went to prison. Lieutenant Calley, Captain

Madian, and others, I happen to know people who were in the unit, the American division, that when it occuired. One of my early coimiianders had been there. It was a breakdown in militaiy ethic and discipline. It can be traced back to poor leadership, and in many ways to immoral failure, on the part of the senior commanders. And as somebody once said. It some way's it was than a crime, it was a blunder. It was a blunder because it's the kind of thing that frustrated the goals that Vietnam was fought for because Vietnam was fimdamentally, abotit the minds of the people. But there were also instances when Women and children died, not as a result of deliberate to access of staff

That*s always regrettable, but unfortunately in war its always unavoidable. Another reason, it's one of the reasons, not the only reason, which we should be veiy, very... We should take the question of war veiy seriously. Once we embark on it that will happen. Naz 30

AN: Discuss the validity of the following quote: "You biow, if I thought of a child

dying, that's the way it was. That's war. Children die. You kill them, they kill you.

Women kill you, you kill them. That's it. There's no Geneva Convention. There's no rules. There's nothing.

FD: It's one of those things- I can sympathize with the sentiment. From one whose enmeshed in that kid of ugly war on the ground, who is accosted by people who are tiying to kill him, many of them if they weren't women and cliildren, and in some ways, some Vietnamese as well, as other Orientals, look particularly young when they are older.

And in fact, in my view, and as a student of histoiy and militaiy histoiy, that's a fairly common attitude on what you could call the common foot solider. It's one of things that the chain of commands, and the leaders, have to control. And by and large did control pretty effecfively. There were regrettable instances where they failed, such as My Lai, but for the most part at least most of the war, it was kept within the ethics and laws of the

American.

AN: How did the war affect your previous friendships?

FD: Well, I suspect that you'd get a different answer to that question if you were talking to somebody, who wasn't from the kind of place I was from, whose... Many of the kids that I grew up with served, voluntarily. Large number of the people that I knew in college, the year directly ahead of me, and in my class, immediately went into the sei'vice Naz 31

and sei'ved in Vietnam, and they were killed. Probably, since my class was closer to the

end, that the begimiing or the middle, it may have effected us a little but less. For

example, my college is a small college- there was only about eleven hundred people in

the entire school. My class, graduating class, was about 160. Out of the 160,1 suspect

that half of lis sei'ved in Vietnam. 6 were killed there. A number were wounded. The

class of 1966, that was 3 years behind us, was slightly smaller, but had almost 3 times the

number killed. You can't have the happen, You can't have people that were fiiends for a

long time, as Tom Blair was, who was in my weeding was killed. Classmates who were

missing for decades, whose remains were finally recovered only in 1995 and we were

finally able to have a funeral for Jack, 25 years later. Those things effect you mostly it

doesn't turn people crazy, but it tempers how you look at the world, how you look at war,

and how seriously ou can take it.

AN: What was your reaction to the Tet Offensive? And to My Lai?

FD: My reaction to the Tet Offensive was that it was one of the most curious events in

liistoiy and militaiy histoiy. The reality, of what happened became different than the

myth that evolved around it. The Tet offensive in my opinion was a desperate throw of

the dice by the North Vietnamese. They were losing militarily, they were facing a grave

crisis in moral and they rolled the dice. They were singularly and spectacularly

unsuccessful militarily. The losses v.'ere enomious. Largely because of a battlefield report by one reporter, Walter Cronkite, the myth in America was that it was a huge defeat for the United States, if for no other reason, than it could occur. It was then used Naz 32 as evidence of futility of continuing. I think that is was veiy unfortunate it colored a lot of the politics in Vietnam. It led, in my opinion, ultimately to one of the worst outcomes for our nation, and that was abandoning a lot of people to suffering and death.

AN: What do you mean?

FD: For good or ill, many of the South Vietnamese coniniitted themselves to us and us to them. Tet began the unraveling of the American will to honor that commitment, and ultimately led to the congressional action which mandated American resolve from

Vietnam. Leaving the South Vietnamese to their fate and in the case of many of them, that fate was ugly, when the North Vietnamese conquered the south. My Lai, I think, we already talked about. It was despicable, and there is no way to explain, alibi it, or to say anything than it was a criminal act, the only good was that we had the morale courage to prosecute those who were involved, once it did come to light, and tlii'ov/ them in jail.

AN: Wliat was your most hoirific ordeal?

FD: This may sound strange, by the most hoirific ordeal was one of the realities of war that people never think about, and that was the crashing boredom. For most of the time, and just the ovenvhelming sense of waste. Watching, day in and day out, a society that is reduced to, almost a primitive level. By comparison, for me at least, the battle experience were a lot less traumafic in that sense. If you are looking for one of the most traumatic battles, then it was the Easter 1972 North Vietnamese offensive, which stalled near the Naz 33

end of my tour in Vietnam. It was quite a devastating offensive— American forces for the

previous year and a half had been drawn down. There were marked by that time, there

were a veiy small number of American forces outside of Saigon, anymore. We were in

Pieiku and the central high lands, A water aviation battalion, my gi-ound Calvary Troop,

AN: What is an aviation battalion?

FD: Helicopter, Gun ships, those types of things. Altogether, we represented all the

American presence, pretty much most of the American presence there. There were probably not more than 3,000 thousand of us. At that point, some reinforcements later fi'om the 1^' Calvaiy division, which was then located down in Beiioit, near Saigon. The

North Vietnamese attacked on all fi'onts. They oveiran most of the South Vietnamese units and positions along the Demilitarized Zone...

AN: Was this a town of a field?

FD: Countrywide. Pieiku (Appendeix F) was the city. Our bases were near the city. By the end of the first week of the offensive, the Noith Vietnamese had conquered almost eveiything, except for the city and surrounding area that we were in- the city of Kontum that was a few miles north. We were suirounded and cut off and under attack by North

Vietnamese Artilleiy and tanks, in the end the South Vietnamese held. We employed a lot of American air power, which broke the back of the offensive, in our area anyway. It Naz 34

was a tense time. We lost a number of our people. Mostly flying their combat missions,

in helicopters.

AN: In your opinion what was the main reason for you that the United States went to war with the Vietnam War.

FD: I guess I subscribe to the conclusion that Vietnam was really about the global confrontation with communism. But I also believe that It was a partially a response to the idealism that was engendered by the Kemiedy administration. Vietnamese were doing their best to develop freedom and democracy, and they were assaulted by authoritarians, and America had the duty to come to the aid of people So I think there was a certain amount of cynical politics behind it. But there was great amount of idealism on the part of many people that went into the stew that became Vietnam. The idealism, a lot of dissipated as the years went on, but not all of it.

AN: By idealism you mean....?

FD: We should help people who are under attack by those who would take their freedom.

That's how many, many Americans, many of us who were fighting over there, saw what was happening in Vietnam was despite the coiniption and venality of some of the south

Vietnamese ruling class that the people themselves were under assault by those who would snuff out what fi'eedoms and democracy-so power polices. The global battle against communism, but idealism as well. Naz 35

AN; Did you agree with the policies of Contentment and Domino Theoiy? Why or why

not?

FD: I believed hi the polices of Contaimnent but I never did subscribe to the Domino

Theoiy. It was a... Containment certainly did make sense, and in llistorically retrospect did work. Many of us saw no option except to confront aggression, when it threatened.

And hope that time would result in the demise of the dictatorships- which is what happened. The domino theoiy was fought and started the idea that responding in ever instances was necessaiy or it v/ould start an inevitable process, was kind of nutty, fi'ankly.

It worked against the necessity to focus on what's really important, as opposed to what isn't necessarily important.

AN: What was really important?

FD: Well, probably fi'om that standpoint, in teniis of power politics and containment,

Vietnam wasn't really important. Berlin would have been. For example. But to treat

Vietnam as equal importance in that game with Berlin, for example, was an eiror. But the idea was it wasn't because Vietnam was as important, if it fell it would be the 1^^ domino that would inevitably result in others falling, and than the important ones would fall too. That was not right.

AN: Wiy did you participate in the War? Naz 36

FD: Let's go back to the early questions, The ethic of sei'vice to countiy. And the example of that by the... my parents generation was veiy, veiy strong. The idealism that was brought to bear by Jolin Kennedy. These days it may not be easy to understand why his inaugural address so was so powerful. He said, "ask not what you countiy can do for you, but what you can do for you countiy."(see Appendix E). Was a powerftil challenge to me. I know to many of my friends. I know that America needed my parents when aggi'ession broke out in the 40s and it needed me when aggression broke out in the sixties.

AN: How does this war compare to the World wars, and Korean War?

FD: Well it's kind of hard to compares war. It was, by some measures, America's longest war. It effected America no less than World War Two, in a different way. It wasn't as bloody as World War Two. Although 58,000 dead Americans aren't trivial, especially a lot of them are your friend. It was ugly in a way that World War Two wasn't ugly. So I wasn't World War Two, I wasn't in , I was in Vietnam. I guess you can say it was my war, the one war I can relate to. It wasn't a glorious adventure, but in many respects neither was World War Two for my parents generation. But I suspect that overall they all bare many similarities.

AN: Do you think this was the most deadly war of all? Naz 37

FD: The deadliest is clearly World War Two, it's probably the most deadly war in human

liistoiy. Nobody knows how many people died. Some estimate that 20 million Russians

died. For Americans, a quarter of a million were killed in World War Two. A million

wounded or injured. It was global war. It was clearly, in tenns of blood and treasure, the

most costly in human history. I certainly hope that nothing like it happens again.

AN: Did you have any interaction with the Vietnamese people?

FD: Yea. It Vietnam you couldn't help, but to have interactions. The Vietnamese provided all the services on our base, for example. You spent a lot of time in the city moving in the countryside. Eveiy day there was a lot of interaction.

AN: How did it damage the morale of you and your friends when the people you are tiying to save, during the day were nice, but at night, they tried to kill you.

FD: Well most of them didn't. I guess most of us viewed the Vietnamese at the end, as people do eveiywhere, they didn't want anything to do v/ith the damn thing. Either way.

I guess most of us never really saw that situation. It wasn't the way you described it.

Yea you had the VC, NVA, you knew that some of the people you saw had these sentiments. But you also knew that most of them didn't.

AN: Why would soldiers call the Vietnamese gooks and other hateful expressions? Naz 38

FD: Well in my opinion there is one understandable reason and one not so

understandable reason. The not so understandable is, that unfortunately, that there was an

element of racism. But probably a more common reason. It's kind of normal when you in

battle, it's easier to do, if you can some how dehumanize the opponent. I don't believe

that most men, by nature, are killers. So if you think about the opponent as a person like you with a family, and they probably don't want to be their either it's a lot harder to kill them. It's easier if he becomes a gook.

AN: What was your view on Ho Chi Miiili?

FD: In retrospect an effective leader of his people. I think we made many mistakes, one of, which was when Ho Chi Minli attempted to engage America at the end of world war two for a variety of reasons. We stubbed him. I think that was a vast en'or. Looking back over the years I admire his detennination and fortitude. Even at the time... you asked about the temi gook. Some people used the tei'm without even meaning it in derogatoiy inamier. But a lot of people who fought had a much higher opinion of the north Vietnamese soldiers, that instead of calling them Charlie. It was not iincoimnon to call them Sir Charles.

AN: Chadie? Naz 39

FD: Victoiy Charlie, VC. Charlie was another tei'm like gook. George gave it away, but a lot of the solider who fought the North Vietnamese had great respect for them. In that way, I guess you can say I have respect for Ho Chi Minli, as a leader of his people.

AN: What do you think of the usage of Napalm and Agent Orange?

FD: I guess I didn't have any objections for them being implemented in the war. There are not particularly nice, but most weapons aren't. 1 never personally understood the distinction between killing someone with a bullet or killing someone with napalm. All of them could be used badly and improperly, and I don't suggest that we go back to them now, but it never bother me then, and doesn't bothei- my looking backward.

AN: How would you like the Vietnam War to be portrayed?

FD: Good question. I guess I'd like it to be portrayed as a part of our histoiy and a part of who we were. Not glorified, demonized. It was a war that was mostly fought honorably, by most of the people who fought it- on the part of many for good reasons that were consistent with American values. It was not worse, in my opinion, that other wars that we fought. It didn't have the clarity that many ascribe to World War Two, for example, but it was represented of the age that it was fought. It was a different age than when World War Two was fought, for example. I guess that if you could pick the war you fought in liistoiy would be nice to pick the one you thought was more rational, I guess if I were to pick one, would it be the one I fought in, Vietnam? Or another? No it Naz 40

would have been the civil war. The reasons for the civil war, in retrospect, were

honorable. But you can't pick.

AN: Which one do you think is more honorable, the civil war or American Revolution?

FD: The American Revolution, or the revolutionaiy war, which are not necessarily the

same thing, The American Revolution was more honorable to me in the sense that it was

less avoidable. The Civil War was an avoidable war. But at least for those on the side of

the union, I think, fought for the right reasons. They were important reasons for mankind. I think many people fought, it was the same thing for Vietnam, but it probably

wasn't, but I tliuik you have to look at Vietnam as a part of our history, and it's part of who we are now.

AN: John Mur, a Vietnam Veteran states that, "They don't even tell recmits about it today. Marines don't talk about Vietnam. We lost. They never talk about losing. So it just wiped out, all of that's off the slate, it doesn't count. It makes you a little bitter"

Discuss the meaning of what this quote means to you.

FD: Well sure, some where. Most of the people, most of my friends in Vietnam aren't, they have moved on. They have come lo terms with it. It's part of who they have become, but it is not who they are. That's the difference. I feel sorry for those who feel the way that quote describes, I know there are many like that. It's probably more understandable for those who paid a higher price like. Max Kleben, who left both legs Naz 41 and an amiy in Vietnam. It is probably easier for me to say what I said because I came back home intact, and unskaved. And was able to move on in life. I think most Vietnam

Veterans moved on, moved into society and became veiy productive members of that society. Just as most of the veterans of Korean, World War Two, and Civil War did.

Some in each case came to think that quote describes. But in my opinion, it was a minority.

AN: What was your view towards the government during and after the war?

FD: My view of the goveinment changed over time. More particularly to the people in the goveniment. Not just as a result of the war. I became more worldly. A lot of the myths and illusions of younger age went away. It would have happened in any event.

Hard to remember now, especially what I thought of the govermnent. I guess if look at it ft-om where I sit now, I would say it like this, We got the worst government that we can have, except for eveiy other one. Another way to say it is we have an imperfect govemnient, for an imperfect people, but it's the best it's ever been. Even with those eiTors.

AN: How did the war change your life the most?

FD: It aKvays changes you when your fiiends don't come back. I guess what changed the most, was not the actual war it self When I left my oldest daughter was 2 months old.

And when I came back, she was over a year old. I lost a year, I couldn't recover then, Naz 42

and could never recover. That's probably the thing that effected the most. More than

anything. Other than a deteimination, there were lessons how not to fight a war. I came

away determined that if I had an opportunity. I would not do that. It's happened that I did have the ability to do that. I was on the amiy staff, dtiring the planning and execution of desert stoiin. Along with a lot of others during my generation we were able to use the experiences of Vietnam, I like to tliink we avoided a lot of those eirors...

AN; Wliat eirors?

FD: How to command and discipline forces. How to employ violence on a battlefield to effect the right outcome. How to insist on certain satisfaction and sup])ort from the government. To do our best, to prevent the thing from going on over a decade.

AN: Did you suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder?

FD: Well there are probably people around who said I did and I do. I don't think so, well look, your experiences in life effect you, but for me and for most my fi'iends and acquaintances who were there, we were probably no nuttier than we would be other wise in the end. I think most people adapt and adjust, but I am probably a different person than I would have been, than if I hadn't been there. If I did, it wasn't obvious.

AN: How do you feel towards the war in general? Naz 43

FD: Vietnam... ])retty sad that it wasted so many lives, tore America apart, for at least a generation, I don't regret having gone, and I don't regi'et the things I did while I was there. But I don't inflate the war in my life. I don't spend a whole lot of time refighting the war with Veterans groups and things like that. I know some people do, but it was an important event in my life, an important learning event. It was an important lesson in life, it was an important historical event, but it was not the defining event for either

Ajiierica, or me.

AN: In you opuiion, if we had continued with war, would we have won?

FD: Hell I'm not even sure with victoiy would have consisted of at this point.

Militarily? Yea, I mean- we probably had the capacity to do that. Would South East Asia look different today? Maybe not. So maybe in that sense we did win. The winds of democracy are blowing a little bit stronger. Jolin McKane, regularly leads delegations back to Vietnam and we just signed a trade agreement with them. So we won and we lost.

AN: Why weren't we more successful in Vietnam?

FD: Why weren't we? Lack of flexibility, lack of imagination, and a good dose of aiTogance.

AN: What do you mean lack of flexibility, and lack of imagination? Naz 44

FD: We were creatures of power, war experiences especially World War Two. Vietnam was effected by World War Two. The people, who ran, learned the trade, had their attitudes fonned in World War Two. Which was a far different kind of war. And were not able to adapt, and kept tiying to fight Vietnam, as it was World War Two, which it wasn't. Lacked the imagination, to visualize it differently. Canied a good deal of airogance with us, because we had been so phenomenally successful over the previous couple of decades.

AN: I understand Mr. Bonvillian that you helped to rebuild the annies moral and capability.

FD: After the war the army wasn't in good shape. Discipline had fell- no one was enforcing it, moral was veiy low among troops, and many abused drugs and alcohol.

AN; Do you have any wai' stories?

FD: The last day of the Easter Offensive, I remember seeing the south Vietnamese marching into Pieiku, and I remember seeing them later that day all iiinniiig back. Out of order and in chaos, and remember thinking that this could be the United States anny.

That is one of the war stories that sticks in my mind. Naz 45

Historical Analysis

Stalin said the following quote to , a Chinese communist during US

involvement in Korea:

No, Americans don't know how to fight. After the Korean War, in particular,

they have lost the capability to wage a large-scale war. They are pinning their

hopes on the atom bomb and air power. But one cannot win a war with that. One

needs infantiy, and they don't have much infantry; the infantry they do have is

weak. They are fighting little Korea, and already people are weeping in the USA.

What will happen if they start a large-scale war? Then, perhaps, everyone will

weep. (Stalin to Enlai, August 20, 1952)

Clearly countries around the world saw the United States role as a super power diminishing and that the countiy could no longer sustain another war against communism. This conuiient gives insight to the next war that the United States would fight, the Vietnam War, telling America its errors in its previous war, and what it needed to correct. The Vietnam War or the "American war" (as called by the Vietnamese) is an unportant part to the United States history. Histoiy shows past mistakes and also gives insight to the future, making it a powerful tool in society. One of the most important types of liistoiy is oral history. Historians such as A.J.P. Taylor state that oral histoiy is,

"old men drooling about their youth" and view it as iirelevant. They prefer a more colorblind approach, stating that textbooks are fine. Contraiy to this believe Oral history is an important aid in getting a complete and valid inteipretation of the time period, however, it is necessary to use other sources of information to get the "complete picture".

Therefore as well as reviewing primary and secondaiy documents pertinent to time, other Naz 46

oral historians must be taken. A^r. Fred Downey gives a unique inteipretation of the

Vietnam War slating the reasons of United States involvement in the war, the condition of the post war army, as well as the illogical use/justification of the domino theory,

Mr. Fred Downey gave a very interesting and in-depth interview on the

Vietnamese era. The intei'view with Mr. Downey was pohtical due to the fact that he works at the Hait Senate Office building. The intei'view started with Mr. Downey discussing his early childhood. He grew up in a small westem Pemisylvania town where most of the older men participated in World War II. The World War II stories and the feeling that liis nation needed him for sen'ice in the army always surrounded him.

Thereupon, Mr. Downey started talking about his involvement a"id inteipretations of the war. One of the most interesting parts of the inten'iew was Mr. Downey's impression of

John F. Kennedy. He praised President Kennedy, stating that he and his administration mofivated the American public to move towards war. He also commented on the validity of the Containment theory, preached by President Hany Truman and the Domino Theoz'y, preached by President Eisenliower and used by President Kennedy during the Vietnam

War. Mr. Downey stated that the Contaimnent theoiy was valid, however he believed that the Domino theory was invalid. Soon aftenvard Mr. Downey responded to several quotations to the war. His response for one of them was veiy interesting. Mr. Downey was asked to comment on the following quote "We had to destroy the village in order to save it." His response was that it was an unfortunate quote, and it was made up by the

American Antiwar movement, to stop the United States involvement in Vietnam (Naz

26). He continued talking about his involvement during the war and at the end of the intei'view he talked about his post war life. Perhaps the most interesting part of the Naz 47

interview was the fact that Mr. Fred Downey participated in rebuilding United States

army. He finished talking on his actual experiences with his fellow soldiers. The

interview with Mr. Downey offered new and apptirtenant information contributing to a

complete study of the Vietnam War.

Mr. Downey offered many different inteipretations in respect to the Vietnam War,

contributing to the historical value of this inten'iew. He concentrated the last part of the

intei'view on the American Army after the Vietnam Wai'. Morale had disappeared,

discipline was gone, drtigs were rampant, and the amiy was deteriorating. As stated in an

official govenmient document, "The perfonnance of the Ai'med Forces has shown a

marked improvement since its low point in the post-Vietnam era." And "The year 1975

marked a low point for both America's influence on the intemational scene and the

instimtional position of the Army". The Training and Doctrine Command was the major

ninovation for post-Vietnam War reorganization. Mr. Downey said he remembered

seeing the south Vietnamese going into battle earlier that day, and coming back later all

in disorder and chaos and thought that this could be the army of United States some day

(Naz 43).

Another important inteipretation that Mr. Fred Downey had was liis view on the

Domino Theoiy. He felt that the Domino Theoiy was pointless, and it took away from

the momentousness of the situation:

1 believed in the policy of Contaimnent but I never did subscribe to the Domino

Theory. It was a... Containment certainly did make sense, and in historically

retrospect did work... The domino theory was fought and started the idea that

responding in ever instance was necessaiy oi' it would start an inevitable process. Naz 48

was kind of nutty, frankly. It worked against the necessity to focus what is really

important, as opposed to what isn't necessarily important.... Vietnam wasn't

really important. Berlin would have been. For example. But to treat Vietnam as

equal importance in that game with Berlin, for example, was an eiror. But the idea

was it wasn't because Vietnam was as important, if it fell it would be the T'

domino that would inevitably result in others falling, and than the important ones

would fall too. That was not right. (Naz 32)

Another individual who commented on the Domino Theory was General Giap of the

Vietnamese, who told Historian McNamara in his book, Ai'gument without end, that "this theoiy [the domino theoiy] was an illusion. Whatever happened in Vietnam had nothing to do with what happened in Laos, to say nothing of Indonesia.,.. I am amazed that even the brightest people—people like yourself— could have believed it"

(McNamara 16). A'IcNamara; however disagreed stating, "We believed that if the South

Vietnamese domino fell, then all of Southeast Asia... coidd be at risk. Therefore the vital interests of the West would be in jeopardy" (McNamara 22). While McNamara's point made sense in theoiy it failed in reality. It was trtie that the Domino Theoiy was meant to look out for the interests of the United States; however, it is important to consider what

General Giap said- each Indonesian country was independent of one another. Therefore it is illogical to conclude that if Vietnam fell to communism, then all of South East Asia would fall to it, proving that interests of the United States were not at hanii, thus proving that Mr. Downey's inteipretation on the theoiy is substantial.

An additional rendition that Mr. Downey had towards the Vietnam War was the reasons that the United States got involved. The main reason the United States went to Naz 49

war was because of containment (Naz 33). However, an addition reason was that the

American ])ublic was motivated by President John F. Kemiedy and his administration to

go to war. "He motivated many of us to commit to the nation, to serve for the nation. In a

lot of ways, that is why a lot of us end up serving in Vietnam..." (Naz 25). Also parallels

were made between the Vietnam War and the American Revolution, because the

Vietnamese were "doing their best to develop freedom and democracy, and they were

being assaulted by authoritarian, and America had the duty to come to the aid of people"

(Naz 33).

He finally concluded by stating;

... It may not be easy to understand why his inaugural address so was so

powerftil. He said, "ask not what you countiy can do for you, but what you can

do for you countiy." Was a powerftil challenge to me. I know to many of my

friends. I know that America needed my parents when aggression broke out in

the 40s. And it needed me when aggression broke out in the sixfies (Naz 34-35).

Kissinger also commented on the Kemiedy's administrafion motivation. He stated the following on the subject, "The sweeping global comniitment was not related to any specific national-sectirity and exempted no countiy or region of the world. Kemiedy's eloquent peroration was the reversal of Palmerston's dictum, that Great Britain had no friends, only interests. America, in the pursuit of liberty, had no interests, only friends"

(McNamara 26). Kissinger and Mi'. Downey both believed that Kemiedy motivated the public into believing that the United States involvement in Vietnam was purely to help an oppressed people fighting for liberty against an authoritarian. However this was not trae, because the United States entered the war because of threats to its interests (McNamara Naz 50

22). This reaffirms the position of Mr. Downey that the United States entered the war

])artially because President Kennedy's speech making abilities, and his portrayal of the

war.

Many historians have discussed why the United States lost the Vietnam War, and the lessons fi'om the war. The personal inteipretation of Mr. Fred DoAvney regarding the war was the United States lost because of, "Lack of flexibility, lack of imagination, and a good deal of airogance" (Naz 42). He expanded on this by stating;

We were creatures of power, war experiences, Es|)ecially World War Two.

Vietnam was effected by World War Two. The people, who ran, learned the

trade, had their attitudes fonned in World War Two. Which was a far different

kind of war. And were not able to adapt, and kept tiying to fight Vietnam, as it

was World War Two, wliich it wasn't. Lacked the imagination, to visualize it

differently. Carried a good deal of arrogance with us, because we had been so

phenomenally successful over the previous couple of decades (Naz 42).

Historian Stanley Kaniow stated that the Vietnam War, "represent [ed] a sacrifice to a failed cmsade... are the price, paid in blood and sorrow, for America's awakening to maturity, to the recognition of its limitation" (Kamow 9). Both Karnow and Mr. Downey state that the United States lost the Vietnam War because of airogance. The United

States tried to fight tliis war politically, not militarily. Both Mr. Downey and Kamow stated that United States came to the realization that the countiy was not invulnerable.

I learned a lot from this process. First was how hard it is to find an intemewee.

For my first intei'view it took me approximately one and half months to find the intei'viewee. When I did finally get to the interview, he would not talk on tape, he told Naz 51

me some stories after the intei'view was done, but the taped inteiview it self lasted 20

mimites. After that occurred, it was hard to find a second Vietnam Veteran, however

tluough perseverance and aid of a fi'iend, I was able to find Mr. Fred Downey. The most

time consuming of all things in the project was the contextualization paper. It was hard

to amass all the sources necessary to create a good contextualization paper. For example

I went to AU and spent 6 hours there, and was only able to in and out microfilm,

and view it. This project also showed me the importance of history, and how difficult it

is to be a historian. Finally to the question is it possible to do good by doing histoiy? To

that I would say yes it is. Through this hoirible predicament in United States histoiy, we

have changed and evolved from the war. This can be seen tlii'ough the United States role

in the Gulf War, pointed out by Mr. Fred Downey. Histoiy is a necessaiy tool to prevent future mistakes. Tluough Vietnam, many lessons have been leanit. Overall I am glad I did this project, it has changed my life, and given me many inteipretations to a confusing incident. Naz 52

Appendix A

US forces from 1959-1971.

South Vietnam United states 1959 279,200 650 1960 243,000 900 1961 240,000+ 3200 1962 240,000+ 11.300 1963 300,000+ 16,300 1964 514,000 23,3000 1965 500,000+ 184,000 (Dec) 1966 500,000+ 485,300 1967 643,000 485,600 1968 820,000 526,100 1969 897,000 474,400 (Dec) 1970 968,000 335,800 1971 1,048,000 250,900 (June) mz. 'vi Appendix B^ Comparative Strengths, 1975 North Vietnam South Vietnam Total military manpower 375,000 662,600 Tanks and APCs 600 1230 Aircraft 342 1673 Naval Craft 39 1507

lH,"il,J,4»^,.lli_|il(JUI!.Bii» Naz 54

Appendix C - Demographics*^

Vietnam statistics are as follows; US fatafifies were a total of 58,202, 47,359 being hostile deaths, and 10,797 being accident deaths. The total amount of US wounded were

303,704 (153,329 Requiring a period ofhospitalizafion) and the severally disabled was a total of 75,000. Of those 23,214 were totally disabled, 5,383 suffered one limb amputation, and 1,081 suffered mulfiple amputations. Total MIA (in 1973) was 3309, and the total POWs were 766. Draftees made up 25% of the total amount of US's forces, and they accounted for 30.4% of the total deaths. The total amounts of draftees were

1,728,344 and 38% of them sei-ved in Vietnam. Racial composifion of the US mihtaiy personnel in Vietnam was 8S.4%» Caucasian, 10.6%. African American and l%o "other".

86.3% of the deaths were Caucasians while 12.5% of the deaths were African Americans.

The total amount of Hispanics in sei'vice was 170,000. Socioeconomic status of U.S. military persomiel ion Vietnam was: 76%. from lower middle/working class families,

50%o from mid-range income levels, 23% had fathers in professional employment, and

79% were high school educated. The total South Vietnamese Forces and Vietnam-based Naz 55

Appendix D - One letter from Ho Clii Minh to President Truman I wish to invite attention of your Excellency for strictly hiunanitarian reasons to follov-'ing matter. Two million Vietnamese died of stai-vation during winter of 1944 and spring 1945 because of stan'ation policy of French who seized and stored until it rotted ail available rice.... Tlu'ee-fourths of cultivated land was flooded in summer 1945, which was followed by a severe drought; of normal harvest five-sixths was lost.... Many people are stan'ing.... Unless great world powers and international relief organizations bring us immediate assistance we face imminent catastrophe....

) t

I

) \ Naz 56

Appendix E -Jolin Fitzgerald Kennedy - Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C, 20 January, 1961''

We observe today not a victory of party but a celebration of freedom -symbolizing an end as well as a beginning-signifying renewal as well as change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oatli our forebears prescribed nearly a century and tlu'ee-quarters ago. The world is veiy different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all fonns of human poverty and all fomis of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which oui' forebears fought are still at issue around the globe—the belief that the rights of man come not fi'om the generosity of the state btit fiom the hand of God. We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from ihis time and place, to friend and toe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans-born in this centuiy, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage-and unwilling to witness or pemiit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world. Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty. This much we pledge-and more. To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we j)ledge the loyalty of faithftil friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of co-operative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do —for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder. To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one fomi of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyraimy. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedoni-and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside. To those people in the liiits and villages of half the globe stmggling to break the bonds of mass miseiy, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required-not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society eamiot help the many who are poor, if cannot save die few who are rich. To our sister republics south of the border, we offer a special pledge -to convert our good words into good deeds-in a new alliance for progi'ess—to assist free men and free govenuiients in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolufion of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in tJie Americas. And let eveiy other power know that this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house. To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instrtiments of war have far outpaced the instmments of peace, we renew our pledge of support-to prevent it fi'om becoming merely a foiiiin for invective—to Naz 57 strengthen its shield of the new and the weak-and to enlarge the area in which its writ may nin. Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversaiy, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark poweis of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction. We dare not tempt them v/ith weakness. For only when our amis are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed. But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course—both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of ten'or that stays the hand of mankind's final war. So let us begin anew—remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate. Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide us. Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms-and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations. Let both sides seek lo invoke the wonders of science instead of its teirors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths, and encourage the arts and commerce. Let both sides unite to heed in all comers of the earth the command of Isaiah-to "undo the heavy burdens . . . [and] let the oppressed go free." And if a beacliliead of co-operation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in creating a new endeavor, not a new balance of power, but a new world of lav/, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace presei'ved. All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days. Nor will it be finished in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of this administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But let us begin- In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course. Since this countiy was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to sei'vice surround the globe. Now the trtimpet summons us again-not as a call to bear anns, though arms we need,— not as a call to battle, though embattled we are—but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, "rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation"—a stmggle against the common enemies of man: tyramiy, poverty, disease, and war itself Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance. North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fmitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort? In the long histoiy of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility—I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would places with any other people or any other generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we Naz 58 bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it—and the glow from that fire can tmly light the world. And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your countiy can do for you -ask what you can do for your countiy. My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man. Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you. With a good conscience our only sure reward, with histoiy the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own. Naz 59

Appendix F - Map of Vietnam during War

HAWOr^: NORTH i iVlETNAMi Go/f i^Thanh*/ C't Hoal. ., J.or.kr HAINAM IS UNO (China) IVInh ^i^^^^ T 1) t DM?: H * L r

A ^i'^fclHut^^-. . •••

A yba N3ng\ 5ct f^ N ^ Lhii D I ^

•TanCanh ^^^^^'^'^^ • Kontum •pleiku c CAMBODIA Meixi/ig ^/J'e^ y 'SOUTH y^ Vl£TNAM

SAIGON

•^ Naz 60

Appendix G - Comparative size of Vietnam to Eastem United States

COMPARATIVE SIZES UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAM Naz 61

Appendix H - Map of Vietnam

VIETNAM Dong CHINA * ap0ng Long Son* llaloui^ Omn Bien. • Bay' Phil Hanoi ^"^ Haiphong* •Cat aa . • National P«fk LAOS Cue Phtiong Wstioiifil Park Gulfof Hainan Tonkin •JL Vientiane:**^- %

•••% * Vmh Moc

THAILAND •^ Danang •

VIETNAM ^MT

CAMBODIA ,-. , , Higliiands #Mna TrgnQ •Dninj PhnomPentiG MocSai S.mMounmm • , HO Chi '•'^^«^"* Afeko»f; ^Sl'^i^ Guif^f ^^'/'^ ^^^^^^"' 0 _ - zoom ^^^'^^'"^ 0 ^IToml © Lonely Pteoet Naz 62 Appendix I - Ho Chi Minli Trail

5VH.. *»*» ANt»>.

'^JlVajli

-; 11-1.^ Naz 63

Appendix j - Ho Chi Minli Naz 64

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