UML-MAOIST MERGER

Two of the three largest political parties, CPN-UML and CPN-MC merged to form Communist Party (NCP) on May 17 and were approved by the Elec- tion Commission on June 6, 2018.

bunch of leaders, in a guerilla style, brought the seven-point unification (document) and announced the decision, not a proposal, for unification with UML. That decision was brought into an informal meeting where a task force was meeting to distribute electoral tickets...I have never read about an example of humiliation of such a huge proportion in any com- munist

Ajaya Bhadra Khanal [email protected] Merger of CPN-UML and the CPN (Maoist): Implications for Nepal's Democracy [1]

Ajaya Bhadra Khanal

While the rest of the country had quietened down for the holidays in October 2017, the two major leftist forces made a surprise announcement they were going to merge after the series of local and parliamentary elections for the three levels of the government.[2] The move created a huge political ripple in Nepal and abroad. The announcement came after three days of intensive discussions between K P Oli and . Initially, the two party leaders had been talking about such a possibility, and now the proposal has reached a stage of alliance and party Maoist leader Narayan Kaji Shrestha says.[3] In order to complete the unification process, the parties announced a seven-point plan[4].

After seven months of intense negotiations, the two largest communist parties formally merged on May 17, 2018. Until the 2017 elections at the local, provincial, and federal levels, the -United Marxists Leninists and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center) had largely played second fiddle to the .[5] But with the electoral alliance, the UML and the Maoists collectively received a resounding electoral victory at all levels of the government. The UML and Maoists received 174 seats in the 275-member federal House of Representatives, and, with the completion of the merger in May 2018, became the largest party. The merger of the two communist parties is a significant event in Nepal's political history. It has the potential to determine evolution of Nepal's democracy while shaping Nepal's relations in the global arena.

But how and why did such a merger take place and what implications did it have for the new party as well as Nepal's democracy? This article first describes the context of the merger and analyses some of the factors that led to the unification process. In the next section, it looks into how the merger reshaped distribution and organization of power, generated new trends, shaped internal party policies, and affected internal party democracy. In the third section, this article looks into the international dimensions of the merger, particularly the way in which the new party's relations with and evolved and affected Nepal's foreign policy dynamics. In the fourth section, this article analyses the impact of the new party on Nepal's political course within the broader context of political settlements in the country and the new political party. It also discusses the implications of the merger for Nepal's political future, especially as they related to questions about democracy, inclusion, federalism, and foreign relations.

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1. Context and rationale of merger

History of the communist movement and evolution of communist parties

The merger of UML and the Maoists is more significant than the series of mergers and splits of communist parties in the past because it has brought together two major streams of Nepal's com- munist movement. Communist movement in Nepal developed from the rebellion against the Ranas in Kathmandu and were influenced by socialist movements in Europe as well as the novelty of Mao Zedong's revolution in China. Soon, the movement diverged in multiple directions. One stream, associated with the former Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxists and Leninists (CPN-UML), traces its direct heritage to Pushpa Lal Shrestha, one of the founders of the . Another stream, associated with , is linked to peasant movements in western Nepal and represents the more radical Maoist movement in Nepal modeled after China.1

The communists had maintained a working partnership through the era. As a result, many of them came together under the umbrella of the United Left Front in 1990 to carry out a political movement against the monarchy.[6] After the success of the movement, the Marxists and Leninists in the alliance came together in the spring of 1991 to form CPN (Unified Marxists and Leninists).[7] The Maoist stream of the United Left Front remained strong in Nepal even after the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990. The communists actively supported the 1990 move- ment and in the subsequent 1991 general election, they obtained about 38 per cent of the national votes. While the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxists and Leninists) became the second largest party after Nepali Congress, more radical communists also did well. Nepali Maoists con- tinued their links with the Peruvian Maoists, and, even at that time, researchers pointed out that special attention should be paid to the Maoist movement.[8]

1 Singh was later seen as deviating from the idea of an armed revolt. See Benoit Cailmail. 2008. European Bulletin of Himalayan Research 33-34, pp. 11-38. http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/ebhr/pdf/EBHR_33&34_02.pdf

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Ideological affinity

Given the history of the communist movement in Nepal, the CPN (UML) and the Maoists share a common communist legacy. However, such historical legacy was not enough to bring them to- gether. Until recently, the UML believed that the Maoists could not become a stable political force without transforming into a peaceful party, while the Nepali Congress was seen as a temporary partner because of its affinity to status-quo politics and liberalism. There was, therefore, no alter- native than to strengthen the party.[9] In February 2014, during its eighth national congress, the UML outlined its five historical tasks: drafting a democratic constitution, concluding the peace process, restructuring the state, carrying out socio-economic transformation while ending feudal- ism, and protecting national sovereignty. The party described the Maoists as leaders socialized in the Mohan Bikram Singh school of thought and attracted to radical communism. While the UML perceived the Maoists as sharing their five historical tasks, it also ascribed three major flaws to the Maoists: distorted ideology; unsound analysis of the current political situation which saw NC as the primary enemy; and destructive tendencies.[10] The Maoists, on the other hand, saw clear ide- ological differences with the UML, particularly regarding , Marxism, and Leninism. Their key difference was UML's acceptance of multi-party democracy as a means of political revolution, while the Maoists were refusing to accept that.[11]

The Maoists, on the other hand, have always viewed the UML stream as a deviation from Marxism and Maoism. The UML was formed by two groups that had discarded Maoist ideas and were bargaining with the Panchayat system. The notion of Multiparty espoused by the UML was viewed by the Maoists as an attempt to work through the capitalist system. According to Bishwabhakta Dulal, Aahuti, a respected Maoist thinker, the UML was using the tag communist only as a trademark and its only dream was to overthrow the Panchayat system. After the restoration of democracy in 1990, its main objective was to get to power by using what- ever means necessary, he says, adding that the main characteristic of the UML leadership has always remained hardcore Hindu feudalistic .[12]

Maoists shift towards the right from an extreme left position from where they were waging a vio- lent was a gradual process, carried out in steps. The first major shift was the 12- point agreement signed in New Delhi. Prior to the peace process, Pushpa Kamal Dahal had made

3 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger a promise (to Indian interlocutors) that he would adopt multiparty democracy and peaceful poli- tics. He said such a shift could not be achieved at once and required a gradual weakening and management of extreme left ideologues. Dahal promised (to Shyam Sharan) that he would strengthen his peace-oriented constituency first with a merger with Narayan Kaji Shrestha (Pra- kash). The merger with Shrestha's group (Unity Center) can, therefore, be considered to be the second major step in weakening orthodox Maoists and entering peaceful politics.

The next steps were the congress and the 16-point agreement reached between the Mao- ists, the UML, and the NC in early 2015 regarding their position on the new constitution. The seventh general convention of the Maoist party held after 21 years in Hetauda in February 2013 became renowned for muddling political and policy issues for the sake of organizational issues and tussle between Dahal and .[13] This seventh party congress appeared to model itself after China's Deng Xiaoping, opening up the party's acceptance of the free-market and multi-party democracy while claiming a socialist identity. The Hetauda political document placed the drafting of a federal democratic constitution through the constituent assembly and a socialist democratic republic as the primary mission.[14] More radical leaders like Mohan Baidya criticized Dahal's political line for abandoning the idea of class struggle and succumbing to the comprador capitalists and feudal reactionary regime.[15]

The UML, however, saw the Maoists as being close enough to forge an alliance and lead the government. By 2017, the two parties had come much closer together politically. When they de- cided to forge an alliance leading to unification in October 2017, the two parties were primarily motivated by the desire to retain control over the government and had decided that their political agenda, although the modalities were yet to be worked out, could be subsumed under [16] The unification process was framed by leftist intellectuals as having five clear ob- jectives: playing the role of the primary pivot in Nepali politics, protecting Nepal's nationalism, institutionalizing change, driving economic growth, and creating a powerful center to hold Nepali federalism.[17]

The seven points announced as the bases for the unification of the two parties outlined ideological and political affinities between the two parties. While the third point outlined the Maoists ac- ceptance of Multiparty and peaceful competitive politics, the fourth point highlighted the UML's readiness to discuss and refine the Maoist ideologies of and

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People's Democracy in the 21st [18] However, in his interview to Nepal magazine, Dahal says that both the parties have realized that their next destination is socialism and not or communism.[19]

Post-conflict political settlement

Post-conflict political settlement started with the 12-point agreement signed in New Delhi be- tween the Maoists and the seven mainstream parties waging a struggle against the then King Gya- nendra Shah. After the 2008 elections, which saw the Maoists become the largest political force in the constituent assembly, the UML and the Maoists were on the opposite ends of the pole regarding federalism and multi-cultural policies. The Maoists had forged an alliance with different ethnic groups and Madhes, and were looking to draft a constitution that favored their position. The UML, on the other hand, was carrying the agenda of which vehemently op- posed identity-based politics.

Things changed when the first constituent assembly failed to draft a new constitution and a second round of elections were held in 2013 for a new constituent assembly. As soon as the second CA was constituted, the two largest parties in the parliament, NC and UML, formed a coalition gov- ernment and forged an agreement that went against the decisions of the first CA. This forced the Maoists to forge an alliance with their former partners Madhesis, Dalits, and Janajatis and wage a struggle for a progressive constitution that would build on the achievements of the first CA. There were even scuffles after speech in the CA in January 2014.[20] Despite these early differences, the Constituent Assembly managed to promulgate the on Sep- tember 20, 2015 after a - process, shortening or disregarding the time allocated for dis- cussions, public feedback, decision-making, and drafting.[21]

Several factors appear to have played a key role to force the Maoists to let go of their stance and side with the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML for the promulgation of the constitution. The first major factor was the Maoists' experience of the first Constituent Assembly, which failed to pro- duce a constitution as a result of the refusal by the Maoist-led alliance to become flexible on fed- eralism and forms of government. The first was the pressure to deliver a constitution and consoli- date the achievements of a violent and difficult struggle, especially when there was a risk of another failure. We were not in a position to let the second chance for drafting constitution go away as we had learnt a lesson from the failure of the first says Shakti Basnet of CPN-MC. Similar

5 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger feelings were expressed by other Maoists leaders including Narayan Kaji Shrestha and Dahal.[22] The Maoists were emotionally attached to the notion of a people-drafted constitution, for which they had waged a decade-long violent war. They realized that their continued stance on different issues would scuttle this dream.

Other factors included the perceived impossibility of addressing the Janajati and Madhesi agenda, the jolt provided by the great 2015 earthquake, the fear that India and other forces would prevent such a constitution, and encouragement from China.[23] China visit was not the major factor but that could have affected to the decision of the party to some extent. Now we have been exercising our right to self-determination on many issues including the economic blockade of In- Agni Sapkota says, China was supportive of our effort to generate peace and stability in [24] The Maoists took a U-turn and joined hands with NC and UML and finally the con- stitution was promulgated in 2015. After the deal among the major parties, Bhattarai was for mak- ing the constitution more inclusive and, therefore, the Chairman of the Political Dialogue Com- mittee, Baburam Bhattarai signed the constitution, but with reservation[25].

The drafting of the constitution was one major part of the political settlement process, and another being transitional justice, which was being handled through the Truth and Reconciliation Com- mission and the Commission for the Investigation of Disappeared Persons (CIEDP). Both com- missions were formed in February 2015 but have not been able to function properly.[26] As long as the TRC and CIEDP do not successfully carry out their work, Nepal's peace process will remain incomplete. The nervousness and reluctance of significant political players to allow smooth func- tioning of the transitional justice mechanisms has the potential to generate conflict in the future. Both the commissions were supposed to complete their work by February 18 last year, but their term was extended by one year. After they failed to perform, both the houses of the federal parlia- ment passed an amended bill extending their term by another year and incorporating some con- cerns of the victims.[27]

However, both the CIEDP and TRC have continued to suffer delays2 while the victims are de- manding implementation of the 2015 Supreme Court verdict.3

2 https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/trc-ciedp-nominations-next-month/ 3 https://kathmandupost.com/valley/2019/05/12/supreme-court-set-to-hear-review-petition-on-its- landmark-2015-ruling

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Recent cases of internal differences in the party relate to some of these fears. For example, one of the major concerns of NCP co-chair Dahal is the issue of transitional justice and the cases persist- ing from the conflict period, issues that he has been consistently raising. For example, according to a Kantipur report, Dahal met PM Oli on February 9 and put pressure on him to resolve the war-time cases as quickly as possible. Dahal raised this issue during a dialogue between the two leaders who sat down to discuss their internal differences and controversies that had surfaced in recent weeks. According to news reports, the government had been prosecuting war time crimes in recent months and Dahal has been suspicious of the motives. In a recent speech, Dahal warned that another wave of war could be triggered.[29] If we don't sincerely implement what we promised in the peace accord, what rights we granted through the constituent assembly, then another phase of conflict can emerge even if we don't want it. [30]

Internal political conditions

In the 2008 elections to the constituent assembly, the UCPN (Maoists) led by Dahal won 220 out of the 575 seats in the CA becoming the largest party. It went on to form the government in partnership with CPN (UML) and MJFN. However, although the Maoists were the largest party and the process of post-conflict settlement was moving ahead, the Maoists were undergoing an internal crisis. Despite the 12-point agreement, the relations between the Maoists and the then UML was fraught with intense rivalry, sometimes verging on violence. K P Oli, at a personal level was using youth-wings to counter the Maoists use of force.

Dahal became significantly weakened after the more radical leftist group led by Mohan Baidya split in June 2012 to form the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist. Meanwhile, UML was in in- ternal crisis in 2011. It was the third biggest force after the Maoists and Nepali Congress. At this point, it was talking about internal unity and a policy of cooperation and competition with the Maoists and the NC. In the 2013 elections, however, the Maoists could only muster 85 out of 575 seats, becoming the third largest party. In the face of stiff competition from UML and internal divisions, the Maoists were facing the possibility of dire results unless they could muster a mirac- ulous solution.

The promulgation of the constitution exacerbated differences between the leaders of the Maoist party and Janajatis and Madhesis. It significantly weakened political base. While Dahal proclaimed in a government-organized mass meeting in Tundikhel that Nepal didn't want to be

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India's - Baburam Bhattarai announced soon after that he had severed all ties with UCPN-Maoist.[31] A Janajati leader, Raj Kumar Lekhi, expressed discontent with the Maoists, accusing Dahal of becoming a lackey of PM K P Oli and an empire...forgetting those who sacrificed their lives for his [32] Since his base had significantly weakened, Dahal was fearful of taking part in the elections without an assurance of a respectable electoral performance.

Framing the merger

The leaders said the two parties had earlier reached a about unification during K P Oli's prime ministership earlier in 2016-17, but that agreement had broken down. According to media reports, both the parties had been talking about the possibility of unification since a long time, and the Maoists had taken a decision about this as far back as 2008.[33] UML leader Bishnu Paudel told media in October 2017 that they had been working on the unification process for the last 10 years.[34]

Describing the announcement of left alliance as big earthquake and that been created in the Nepali society and international Narayan Kaji Shrestha said that unification was achieved through a coming together of objective, subjective, and leadership aspects. The objective aspect, according to Shrestha, was the historical conditions and needs of a political movement, especially the need to answer people's questions about what the communist parties could give to the people. He framed the process of unification as a carefully worked out strategy to achieve communist ideological objectives. For example, speaking at a program to train and orient party workers, Narayan Kaji Shrestha said:

We have completed one phase of our historical responsibility for the country and the party, now is the time to take on new responsibility to achieve people's democracy. In order to develop the capacity of the party to complete revolution by developing and implementing a new historical working model, we need to reconsti- tute and build a new party. The decision for unification was taken in that context.[35]

Shrestha also outlined that they had subjective reasons for the unification, which was that they were together on the question of political strategy. common bases are things like protection of national sovereignty, implementation of the constitution, development, peaceful competition, and building a basis for socialism with social justice and The third major issue, accord- ing to Shrestha, was that of political leadership. if the leadership can synthesize the subjec- tive and objective aspects, or demonstrate the capacity, courage and readiness to unify them, can

8 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger the objective and subjective aspects become one...That very problem has also been resolved now...by Chairman comrade authority to take decisions in the party facilitated this process of side-switching. Over the years, Dahal has displayed an ability to take decisions and display remarkable sometimes against the wishes of party constituents and his own.[36] The fourth frame that he used was that unless there was a leadership of the com- munists, the new constitution would turn into a of and the achievements sought by the communists would not materialize.

The unification, however, was seen by many intellectuals within the Maoist party as submission. For a while, the Maoist party had been going through ideological shifts and top level leaders, motivated by personal needs, were constantly bypassing in-built systems and processes which made them unaccountable to collective concerns. Limited discussions and debates made the party lifeless while Dahal sought needed a clear Marxist political direction to fight with reactionism, but they (the leaders) were more intent on personal settlement rather than on promotion of says Bishwabhakta Dulal Aahuti. am personally not in favor of calling anyone corrupt, but the majority of leaders in the party were bogged down in a forest of financial

2. Impact of merger on internal party functioning

Current status of the merger

A day before Oli visited India to attend newly elected Indian prime minister Narendra Modi's swearing in ceremony in May 2019, Pushpa Kamal Dahal revealed to a Nepali television channel4 that there was an agreement between him and Prime Minister K P Oli to share government lead- ership. is an agreement that we should move ahead in the party through mutual agreement and should take turns in the government he said adding, document is already out in the open, and I don't deem it necessary to ask many questions about Dahal, however, indicated that K P Oli could be PM for full five years, as he was not state- ments indicated that he was using the agreement as a leverage to negotiate other interests and incentives.

4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Np4W8aLwdGI

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As a result, the unification process of the two parties faced a considerable amount of strain with leaders claiming multiple forces were trying to play on the differences within the party. For a long time, internal party differences regarding unification affected the work of the task force headed by Ram Bahadur Thapa Badal. An opposition group claimed that the close to PM Oli was delaying the process.5 They alleged that PM Oli wanted to limit to the two co-chairs the authority to complete the unification process.

The NCP is currently being run by an ad-hoc secretariat consisting of nine leaders: co-chairs K P Oli and Dahal, Madhav Kumar Nepal, Jhalanath Khanal, Bamdev Gautam, Bishnu Paudel, Ram Bahadur Thapa Badal, Narayan Kaji Shrestha, and . However, Dahal and Oli con- tinue to have a major say in the political settlement process within the party, while others are struggling to assert themselves.

Out of the 33 departments in the party, Dahal and Oli had agreed to share six major departments among the two.6 For example, after differences in the party over allocation of party school, Oli asked his supporters to keep quiet saying the two co-chairs would sit down and resolve the issue.7 The party school was later allocated to Ishwar Pokhrel. Some of the party insiders continue to insist that the party merger was a result of the two leaders' lust for power. PM Oli is currently negotiating power-sharing arrangements with party insiders after failing to run the party and the government in an autocratic manner.8

In May 2019, the parties agreed to complete the unification process within three months, but the task force was unable to complete its work. The unification process at the district, provincial, and national levels was difficult and complicated. A circular issued by the two co-chairs authorized provincial authorities to carry out the unification process, which included merging assets, merging balance sheets and accounting system, and merging and updating party membership.9

A task forces was formed under the leadership of Ram Bahadur Thapa Badal to prepare a proposal for the unification process. The task force, which included Barshaman Pun, Shankar Pokhrel, and , was unable to complete the task, which led to the co-chairs taking up the

5 https://www.onlinekhabar.com/2019/02/743868 6 Among the six, Prachanda had asked for economic and communications departments, while Oli had taken international relations, party school, policy, and organization departments. 7 https://nagariknews.nagariknetwork.com/news/87008/ 8 https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2019/08/15/after-a-brief-respite-ruling-party-sees-turmoil-again 9 http://annapurnapost.com/news/118981

10 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger issue on February 18. The secretariat of the newly formed NCP met in February to discuss the report prepared by a task force on merger. The meeting said the report submitted by the task force was incomplete, which then became a basis for the issue to be left to the discretion of the top two leaders.

Differences at the top

One of the major factors generating differences between Oli and Dahal was a secret meeting of five senior leaders of the party in Jhamsikhel on January 24 while PM Oli was away on a trip to Davos, Switzerland. The meeting was hosted by Narayan Kaji Shrestha. The leaders who took part in the meeting were dissatisfied with Oli's working style and had collectively boycotted secre- tariat meetings in the past.

The Jhamsikhel meet excluded three secretariat members including Deputy Prime Minister Ishwar Pokhrel and Home Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa Badal for being close to Oli and General Sec- retary Bishnu Paudel for being a member of the party unification task force. According to a Nepali online media,[37] the meeting was organized to discuss poor government functioning and party unification process, issues directly linked to Prime Minister Oli's performance. The participants of the meeting felt that Oli was frequently bypassing other party leaders while taking decisions about government and party functioning. The meeting decided that they should intervene to quickly conclude the party unification process as it could lead to misfortune for the party.

After returning from Davos, PM Oli held a meeting with his close aides briefing them that the Jhamsikhel meeting conspiring to remove him as the leader of the parliamentary party. PM Oli and Dahal met in Baluwatar and agreed to give the message of unity. However, resolving differ- ences was much easier said than done. One of the leaders, Ishwar Pokhrel wrote a Facebook post criticizing Dahal: who are recognized, established, and accepted among the people are and should be the leaders of the communist party. What is more, (people) who want to act or enjoy on the basis of whims and emotions should never be placed in such a position. That will only be a

[38]

Under pressure, Oli attempted to consolidate his power by creating strategic allies. One of them was Bam Dev Gautam. On July 13, 2019 Oli celebrated Bamdev Gautam's birthday in the PM's office. Relations between the two began to improve. Soon Gautam left Dahal camp, and switched side towards Oli. A week later, the party allocated portfolios; Gautam received the position of vice-

11 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger chairperson current party statute does not provide for the position and head of the party or- ganization department.10 Gautam then initiated moves to consolidate support for Oli under the ideological umbrella of people's multiparty democracy as the rift between the former UML and the former Maoists escalated.11

Party organization and values

In addition to these issues that emanate from the top leaders, there are other deep-seated concerns and trends that are affecting the ordinary party workers. Interviews with many party workers re- vealed that they are primarily concerned by the self-centered working style of PM K P Oli as well as Dahal, which has terrorized the minority groups and ordinary party workers. According to them, Oli and Dahal have come to rely more on money and resources than on ideas to motivate and convince their supporters. They are used to allocating finances, state resources, party positions, or appointments to obtain loyalty. If that does not work, then they can also use threat.[39]

The operating style of the top level leadership is directly linked to questions of political ideology and party organization. Already, political leaders have raised serious concerns about party func- tioning and the unification process, which will have a direct impact on internal party democracy. While the UML has been practicing internal democracy during decision-making processes and elections for political bodies, this has come under strain after the merger. UML members are nor- mally elected from lower ranks to higher ranks depending on certain qualifications. However, the Maoist cadres and leaders were largely handpicked in the party committee by a handful of leaders, and at one, their central committee numbered about 4,000. It is, therefore, a big challenge for the new party to manage the party leaders and cadres from two different schools.

The interviews reveal that this issue is also directly linked to the challenge of managing the aspi- rations and ambitions of the party workers. After the merger and formation of a majority govern- ment, party workers are looking for ways to fulfill their ambitions, which in turn is putting intense pressure on the top level leadership. The number of aspiring leaders is high. The central committee currently number 441 and many of them expect to attain attractive portfolios in the government. Another concern of the party workers is the growing influence of capitalist traits and attraction to

10 https://www.kantipurdaily.com/news/2019/07/19/1563546973841119.html 11 https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2019/08/15/after-a-brief-respite-ruling-party-sees-turmoil-again

12 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger money. They believe that the leaders are transforming from communists to capitalists. Party work- ers don't believe that the new party can work for the people as the political leadership has lost its political characteristics, says Aahuti. The leadership have become capitalists because they've be- come shareholders of industries, colleges, hospitals, and he adds.[40]

Dynamics of power

The merger of two of the three largest parties, has created new dynamics of power balance in the new party. Network analysis[41] of the top level of the party organization (central committee level and above) shows that the merger of the two parties has led to the presence of about eight modular groups at the highest level of the party (See Figure 3). The most powerful group revolves around Prime Minister K P Oli and his close advisors, including President Bidya Bhandari. The second grouping consists of Dahal, Madhav Kumar Nepal and Narayan Kaji Shrestha. The third grouping revolves around Bishnu Paudel, the fourth around Bhim Rawal and Subhas Nembang, the fifth around Jhalanath Khanal, the sixth around Bamdev Gautam, the seventh around Ghanashyam Bhusal and Yogesh Bhattarai, and the eighth around Ram Bahadur Thapa Badal and Laxmi Dutta Joshi. However, party insiders say the process of alliance formations and modularities are dynamic and are undergoing continuous shifts.

Despite the sub-groupings, when it comes to influence in the party, as measured by eigenvector centrality, K P Sharma Oli is the most influential, followed by individuals like Bishnu Paudel, Bishnu Rimal, Ishwar Pokhrel, Bidya Bhandari, Shankar Pokhrel, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Pradeep Gyawali, and Prithvi Subba Gurung. Recent developments mean that Bam Dev Gautam has emerged as a new force.

The Maoist party constituted of four different types of Maoists the first generation Maoists around Dahal, the second generation who led during the Maoist People's War the third gener- ation cadres who fought in the violent movement, and the fourth generation who joined the Maoist party from outside after the peace agreement. All of these groups have distinctly different fears, interests, and needs. Their primary fear is that the merger will lead to disavowal of the people's war, being left behind by the more politically experienced UML cadres, and crisis of meaning generated by questions about sense of purpose.[42] Data indicates that this is already happening.

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In the new decision-making political network, the Maoists number less than 28 per cent while the UML members number more than 72 per cent, showing that the new party's network and influ- ence at the top level is heavily skewed in favor of the former UML when it comes to decision- making. One of the most interesting feature of the merger is the significance of Bishnu Paudel, who seems to have become one of the most significant nodes that connects the two former parties and leaders together.12

3. International dimensions

The relations of CPN-UML and Maoists with China and India have shaped the political parties' political trajectory as well as Nepal's political course. As Nepal has swung back and forth between India and China, the two leaders responsible were Dahal and K P Oli.

Dahal, in particular, has found it difficult to balance China and India. As soon as Dahal was re- elected as president of the UCPN (Maoist) after the Hetauda congress, he met Chinese leader Xi Jinping in April 2013. At that time, Baburam Bhattarai had given way to Khila Raj Regmi as the prime minister. During his visit, Dahal would often mention the importance of Chinese dream, a phrase coined by Xi Jinping. He said while the Chinese dream represented the dream of the people who wanted peace and stability in the globe, American dream was based on capitalist ideology.[43] Later that month, he visited India, trying to rebuild trust that had fallen to a low ebb, and called for trilateral partnership involving India and China. Xinhua carried a news analysis saying India visit demonstrated that he had abandoned his earlier stances in order to appease India.[44]

Dahal again visited China in March 2015[45] at the invitation of the Chinese Communist Party, and when he came back, expressed support for the promulgation of the constitution signing a 16- point agreement on June 12, 2018 along with three other parties Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (Democratic). The agreement resolved contentious issues regard- ing the new constitution.[46]

Political protests in Madhes worsened leading to a situation of border blockade immediately after the promulgation of the constitution in September 2015. India was not happy with the arrange- ments and its foreign secretary, S Jaishankar made a last ditch attempt to convince senior Nepali

12 How Paudel managed to put himself at the center of the network needs further analysis.

14 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger leaders in Kathmandu on September 18. After promulgating the constitution, Dahal announced in Tundikhel on September 23 that Nepal does not want to be India's yes man.

India's opposition to the new constitution generated unprecedented political and humanitarian crises in Nepal[47]. After the constitution was promulgated on September 20, 2015 India imposed an unofficial blockade from September 23, coinciding with Madhes movement. The Madhesh- based political parties disowned the process and started a political movement from August 2015. The movement took a violent turn on September 24 when seven policemen and a child were killed in Kailali. The movement, which grew after the promulgation of the constitution, obstructed transit points along the Nepal-India border, deepened the divide between the Madheshi people and the people originating from the hills, and delayed focus on other issues like disaster relief and rehabilitation. In the midst of crisis, PM paved the way for UML's KP Oli to be- come the PM on 11 October 2015.

In addition to the Madhes issue, India was equally worried about the inroads that China was mak- ing into Nepal during KP Oli's tenure[48]. India refused to believe that China's inroads were purely economic, and views them as having strategic significance. India blamed China for -book and realized that it could not compete with China on that front. A report by National Security Advisor of the Indian Prime Minister said that India did not believe in the Chinese clar- ifications that BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) projects have mere economic objectives, and believes the economic initiatives have strategic and security dimensions.[49]

Soon after the promulgation of the constitution, the Nepali Congress and the Maoists began to inch closer to India, promising constitutional amendment to accommodate demands of Madhes, while the UML began to develop close relations with China. In December 2015, the government announced that PM K P Oli will visit China first and K P Oli also gave the message that he may visit China first if the blockade continued.[50] China, meanwhile, agreed to provide 1.4 million litres of fuel worth 10 million Yuan to Nepal to meet its emergency needs. Oli visited China in March and among others, signed a loan agreement worth USD 215.96 million for the International Airport. President Xi Jinping called on the two governments to make the two nations a community of common destiny [51] Within two months, China pipped India from the top 5 donor list.[52]

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Despite China's pressure on the Maoists to relent and not isolate Oli,[53] the Maoists announced in May that they would withdraw support to Oli and formed an alliance with the Nepali Congress. The UML perceived that India had actively undermined the legitimacy of the government and led to its demise.[54] As Oli resigned on July 14, 2016, ahead of a no-confidence vote in parliament, he said Nepal was becoming a laboratory [55]

second stint in power from 4 August 2016 was seen as a low ebb in Nepal-China relation- ship; it was widely believed that India had schemed to topple Oli from power.[56] Dahal held talks with a splinter faction led by Mohan Baidya and a large number of them abandoned Baidya and join UCPN (Maoist). While woes over transitional justice continued he had to cancel Australia visit over fears he may be arrested for war crimes[57] his relations with India surged. Indian media reported that Oli's fall was good news for India.[58] For example, the Hindustan Times said that Oli's departure marked an Indian comeback[59] and added that Dahal believed that China's main concern in Nepal wasn't India, it was western powers.[60]

As India sought to re-craft its ties with Nepal,[61] China exhorted Nepal's parties to unite for sta- bility[62] and reached out to Bhutan as part of a new South Asia policy.[63] Then the Chinese ambassador to Nepal announced that Xi Jinping had scrapped his planned next month's visit to Nepal with the media speculating that it was an expression of disappointment over Oli's ouster.[64] While Dahal continued to appease India saying Modiji and I think in similar ways, we have chemistry [65] Chinese media were warning Nepali against getting too close to India saying it would hurt development.[66]

Reports said China was displeased with the lack of preparations for Xi's visit as well as commit- ment to implement China's Silk Road plan as well as agreements reached by former K P Sharma Oli government to step up road and rail links connecting Nepal with Tibet to reduce landlocked Nepal's dependence on [67] rapprochement of sorts with Xi came in Goa on 16 Oc- tober 2016, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Nepal PM PK Dahal held an unplanned trilateral meeting at the Brics summit.

At this time, the US Pacific Command continued its military cooperation with Nepal, organizing a military exercise.[68] The relations between India and China were getting worse, with the Chinese media exhorting India not to meddle in Nepal and Sri Lanka.[69] Two days after the US General left Kathmandu, the Chinese defence minister met Dahal and announced that he would attend

16 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger the Boao Forum for Asia annual conference to be held in China's southern Hainan province.[70] When meeting with visiting Chinese Defense Minister and State Councilor Chang Wanquan on 23 March 2017, Nepali Prime Minister Dahal highly appreciated China's neighborhood diplo- macy featuring amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness.[71] Then in March 2017, Prime Minister Dahal met Xi Jinping in Beijing where Nepal and China announced agreement to expand cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative and promote free trade arrangements. On Febru- ary, Dahal vowed to continue projects under the BRI.[72] Xinhua published a commentary saying China's circle of friends (including Nepal) was increasing. However, other Chinese media contin- ued to express skepticism, saying China was still uncertain whether commitment to BRI was rhetoric or reality.[73] Then after Nepal held a military exercise with China, the Chinese media further reported that Nepal had scaled down military drill with China held on April 16 after Dahal sought to improve relations with India.[74] In May, Nepal and China signed deals under the Belt and Road Initiative in Kathmandu. Xinhua celebrated the agreement and described various coop- eration deals including the railway network. On May 24, 2017, Dahal announced his resignation saying his party would continue the alliance with NC. The day before he announced his resigna- tion, Dahal awarded 1200-MW Budhi Gandaki contract worth USD 2.5 billion to Chinese com- pany, Gezhouba. Energy Minister Janardan Sharma and a representative from the Chinese com- pany signed the agreement paper at the PM's residence.[75]

However, as soon as Dahal left the government, the Budhi Gandaki project came under contro- versy.[76] In August, Prime Minister Deuba flew to India. Four months later, on 26 September 2018, a joint meeting of the Agriculture and Water Resources Committee and Finance Committee of Parliament directed the government to scrap the decision.[77] Only three weeks before, China had listed the project as one of the components of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[78]

Things dramatically changed after Deuba took over. By the end of September 2017, as elections under the new constitution approached, Dahal was holding dialogue with the UML for possible electoral alliance leading to party unification. Dahal was reported by the media as saying that the formation of the leftist alliance had pleased China and displeased Indian leaders. are devel- oping an independent personality, and we don't like your preparation to merge with the Dahal had quoted Indian officials as saying.[79] The first response to the tremor, expectedly, was felt in writes Yubaraj Ghimire in The Indian Express. When Dahal ditched Deuba and joined ranks with Oli, it marked the failure of Nepal policy, yet again. This is, arguably,

17 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger

New biggest diplomatic failure since it brought the Maoists to the centre stage of Nepali politics....Two months ago, during state visit, Modi had heaped praise on the maturity of Deuba and Dahal, ostensibly for pursuing the political equation that India had helped to construct and pulling the rug off s [80]

On 17 October 2017, the Maoists exited Deuba's government. In November, the Deuba govern- ment scrapped the USD 2.5 billion Budhi Gandaki deal with China Gezhouba Group Corpora- tion, citing lapses in the award process.[81] Kamal Thapa announced the cancellation through a tweet. K P Oli, however, insisted that the next government would overturn the de- cision to scrap the deal to build Budhi Gandaki Hydropower Project.[82]

In March 2018, China welcomed Nepal's independent foreign policy saying it supported Nepal's efforts to develop friendly cooperation relationships with surrounding countries. Spokesperson Lu Kang made the remarks at a daily press briefing when asked about Nepali Prime Minister K P Sharma Oli's remarks about the foreign policy at a recent meeting. Kang was responding to a recent meeting where Prime Minister Oli informed ambassadors and officials of international dip- lomatic missions based in Kathmandu about the government's new development cooperation and foreign policy.[83]

PM Oli's speech during a meeting with diplomatic representatives on March 28, 2018, set the tone of the government regarding development cooperation policy. He emphasized and national interest while fulfilling international obligations; unity in diversity regarding social justice; and donor support through government mechanisms rather than NGOs. Such policy deeply distrusts the work of donors and INGOs in soft areas (democracy, human rights, social justice, and transitional justice), the potential for politics of identity, and foreign interference in politics.[84]

In June 2018, Prime Minister Oli visited China, which he said was instrumental to enhancing bilateral cooperation between the two countries in wide-ranging areas including cross-border rail- road [85] China Daily reported that China would build a railway connecting the west- ern region of Tibet with Nepal.[86]

While Nepal appeared to be growing closer to China, relations with India and the US worsened when Nepal pulled out of the BIMSTEC military drill at the eleventh hour. Dahal scuttled back

18 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger and forth between India and China. Nepali media reported that Dahal was unlikely to meet Pres- ident Xi Jinping this time, while in India, he had held talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, External Affairs Minister Late Sushma Swaraj, Home Minister Rajnath Singh, and Na- tional Security Advisor Ajit Doval.[87] TKP also reported that some of the Chinese construction companies and business groups interested in doing business in Nepal were vying to meet with Then on 28 September 2018, Nepal restored the USD 2.5 billion hydropower plant con- tract to Gezhouba.

The case of Venezuela

A statement issued by Nepal Communist Party regarding recent developments in Venezuela trig- gered a series of incidents that have exposed the strains inside the newly merged party and Nepal's struggles to balance international relations. Issuing a press statement on January 25, Dahal ex- pressed solidarity with the people of Venezuela and President Nicolas Maduro while denouncing the US intervention as an unacceptable intrusion in internal affairs and an attempt of imperialist coup [88]

Concerned about the statement, the US sought clarification from the ambassador to Nepal in the US. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was forced to issue a clarifying statement on January 29, which continued the thrust of statement while toning down allegations against the US. After returning from Davos, PM Oli met US ambassador Randy Berry in his residence in Balu- watar and said that Prachanda had - while giving the statement. Dahal, undeterred, strongly criticized Oli and claimed that the secretariat has spoken, an individual is insignifi- cant [89]

One of the authors of the statement issued by Dahal was Balaram Baskota, a former UML politi- cian with close ties to Venezuela who had just returned from a visit to the South American state.[90] Baskota said a political party can use political language while giving a statement and the govern- ment has to use diplomatic language. He said there was no contradiction between the two state- ments. Sapkota said that Nepal supports China, Xi Jinping, and Venezuela while it opposes inter- national capitalists like those who'd gathered in Davos.

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4. Analysis and Conclusion

Analysis and Conclusion

The merger of the two of the largest political party has had direct impact on Nepal's politics at three levels. As discussed in the previous sections, at the level of Nepal's international relations and geo-strategic location, the merger is likely to determine Nepal's role in the international balance of power, which in turn is likely to shape Nepal's democratic evolution and economic development. With a communist party ruling Nepal, many question democracy and freedom of the press and its loyalties to China. As Nepal seeks to balance competing geo-strategic interests, its inter- national relations can either be shaped by a policy based on hedging or give-and-take which would require a high level of expertise and experience or a policy based on transparency, com- munications, and mutual trust. Given the intrinsic features of the communist government, Nepal, so far, has been unable to earn the trust of its close neighbors and powerful actors. What it has gained so far, is by playing one against the other, which is not a sustainable model.

The party merger process is directly linked to the question of political settlement, of how the po- litical elites in the party contest distribution and organization of power in the party, which then facilitates their access to rents and accumulation of power in the running of the state. This internal competition is directly linked to interests and incentives of external actors, especially the private sector actors and foreign interests.

At the level of internal party organization, it has implications for evolution of Nepal's communist movement, internal party democracy, and representation of specific constituents with whom the left movement has had close affinity. At the level of Nepal's democratic evolution, the merger is likely to shape the course of Nepal's democracy, evolution of the Nepali state and the political landscape in which political competition takes place.

The merger has raised significant questions about the new party's internal democratic processes. A general composition of the party functioning at the highest level shows domination of one set of ethnic group, near absence of women and minorities, and a very centralized decision-making structure. This will have significant impact on the Maoists. Although they have a close to two- thirds majority in the federal parliaments, the Nepal Communist Party will need to facilitate par-

20 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger ticipation and representation of the ordinary people as well as the marginalized people in a mean- ingful way. If such internal party democracy and inclusiveness does not occur, then the unrepre- sented groups will seek new platforms and alternatives, weakening the party.

For example, while top level leaders have tried to frame the unification as a logical response to objective political reality, Maoist party workers have framed it as a formal organizational dissolu- tion that curtails the rights of marginalized groups and communities. For example, during the elections, the two parties gave tickets to only six women and three Dalits out of the 165 total seats. For party workers, the decision about unification was sudden and humiliating. Many of them have expressed concern about the way in which the proposal for unification was introduced to the party workers. For example, Bishwabhakta Dulal Aahuti says:

A bunch of leaders, in a guerilla style, brought the seven-point unification (document) and announced the decision, not a proposal, for unification with UML. That decision was brought into an informal meeting where a task force was meeting to distribute electoral tickets...I have never read about an example of humiliation of such a huge proportion in any communist

Fears, interests, and needs of party leaders will continue to drive the party's policies and practices. In particular, the Maoists have been beset by fear of prosecution over war crimes during the Peo- ple's War and International Criminal Court in Hague to maintain tight control over the party,[28] and top level political leaders have expressed genuine concerns about the possibility of foreign countries using global human rights jurisdiction to prosecute individuals implicated in war crimes in the absence of transitional justice in Nepal. Such concerns will continue to determine the process of unification, policies, and potential alliances in the future.

Differences will likely persist as the process of political settlement is an ongoing process. For ex- ample, on August 17, 2019 Dahal said he sometimes regrets unifying the party, because a viable alternative communist party would have otherwise remained.13 He, however, said he expected Oli to abide by the past agreements. A day later, PM K P Oli addressed the parliament warning mon- archists, defending the government's performance, and saying he would lead the government until the next election.

13 http://annapurnapost.com/news/134934

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Another major issue is that while the new party appears more or less settled at the highest level, party organizations are yet to merge into a cohesive whole at the provincial and local levels. It is even more challenging for individuals socialized in two different political cultures to blend emo- tionally and work together. Interviews reveal that political workers are finding it difficult to let go of their previous identity as UML or Maoists. It is yet to be seen how the merger affects and assimilates these identities.

Landscape of Nepali politics and evolution of the state

After the merger, candidates with the Maoist party tick- ets won 53 seats out of the 275 seats to the federal parlia- ment, only 10 seats behind the Nepali Congress. The Maoists had, however, contested only in 59 of the 165 FPTP seats out of which they won 36. The UML dis- tributed tickets for 103 seats, out of which they won 80 seats.[91]

Out of about 9.5 million votes cast in the proportional ballot[92], the UML received 33.3 per cent votes, while the Nepali Congress received 32.8 per cent. The Maoists, on the other hand, received 13.7 per cent votes.[93] This shows that while Nepal's political landscape has not shifted that much, the UML has become a little more popular than the Nepali Congress, and the alliance between UML and the Maoists has transformed the poll scape in Nepali politics.

Earlier in the 2013 elections, for another constituent assembly, the Nepali Congress had emerged as the largest party with 25.6 per cent votes in the PR ballots. The UML had come second with 23.7 per cent and the UCPN (Maoist) third with 15.2 per cent.

In the 2008 elections, the Maoists had received an overwhelming 29.3 per cent votes in the PR ballots, while the Nepali Congress had received 21.1 and the UML 20.3.[94]

Electoral data from the last three general elections indicate that while the Maoist party has slowly lost its political base, the UML is gaining popular support. The Nepali Congress, despite losing a considerable amount of seats in the 2017 elections, has slowly increased its political base. The combined UML and Maoist base, similarly, was about 50.4 per cent in 2008, 38.9 per cent in 2013

22 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger and 47 per cent in 2017. We can, therefore, argue that increase in UML's strength was a result of Maoist sympathizers turning to UML rather than the UML eating into NC's base. The three largest parties are supported by about 80 per cent of the voters of cast their votes in 2017.

Many fringe left parties, which are taking part in the parliamentary process, remain outside the newly merged party. They are MB Singh led CPN (Masal), Narayan Man Bijukchhe Rohit led Nepal Majadur Kisan Party, Rishi Kattel led CPN, and Mohan Baidya alias Kiran led CPN (Rev- olutionary Maoist). Netra Bikram Chand alias Biplab led CPN is currently seen very far from the merger. Biplab led Communist Party of Nepal boycotted the local and national elections claiming that the party would not accept parliamentary system and will carry the legacy of People's War (PW).

The centralization of decision-making in the NCP has direct impact on Nepal's overall democratic practices as the party dominates all levels of the government (i.e., federal, provincial, and local). While the country is going through a process of decentralization politically, there is a reverse pro- cess of centralization taking place through bureaucratic structures, dilution of the powers of the provincial levels, national security structures, and organization of political parties. This conflict between the tendency to centralize and demand for decentralization can spill over to the social arena generating social and political conflict. Interviews with party workers also reveal that after the merger of the two left parties, the minority groups have expressed concern over the future of inclusion and federalism. The main reason is that the former UML was one of the main forces resisting inclusion and federalism, and it is still intent on diluting federalism. The party workers also believe that the current set of political leaders have singular idea about infrastructure and prosperity which may exclude the ordinary people. At the same time, the communist insistence on modernity could also unleash stability and prosperity if it is informed by sound policies, good gov- ernance, and balanced international relations.

[1] Two of the three largest political parties, CPN-UML and CPN-MC merged to form Nepal Communist Party (NCP) on May 17 and were approved by the Election Commission on June 6, 2018.

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[2] http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-10-03/cpn-uml-maoist-centre-naya-shakti- announcing-electoral-alliance.html

[3] http://annapurnapost.com/news/81255

[4] See Annex I for the seven-point plan.

[5]https://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-05-18/communist-unity-heralds-new- era.html

[6] The United Left Front constituted of CPN (ML), CPN (Marxists), Nepal Workers and Peas- ants party (NMKP), and other smaller fringe groups.

[7] http://cpnuml.org/content/the-united-left-front.html

[8] See Nickson (1992) and Ogura (2008) for a study of the Maoist movement in Nepal.

[9] http://www.ishwarpokhrel.com/ishwor-pokharel-article#.XE1Lbc8zZdg

[10] http://cpnuml.org/content/8th-national-congress.html

[11] Speech given by Narayan Kaji Shrestha, Prakash to party workers on October 7, 2017. For details, see https://emulyankan.com/prachanda-step-revolutionary-narayankaji/

[12] https://ratopati.com/story/27137#

[13] http://archive.himalkhabar.com/54182

[14] Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda. नेपाली क्रान्तिको नयााँ सं�लेषण: एक ऐतिहाससक आव�यकिा (p. 57)

[15] https://moolbato.com/2016/06/253/

[16] http://annapurnapost.com/news/81255

[17] Karki, Borna Bahadur. "एमाले माओवादी एकिा ककन ? यी हुन ्५ कारण." OnlineKhabar. January 14, 2018. https://www.onlinekhabar.com/2018/01/652616

[18] http://cpnuml.org/content/newsdetails/748.html

[19] According to Mohan Baidya, who still retains his radical Maoist line, the key proponent of the idea of "The Socialism of the 21st Century" is Heinz Dieterich, whose ideas about "participatory

24 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger democracy" were adopted by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. See https://moolbato.com/2016/06/253/

[20] Interview with Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. January 27, 2018

[21] https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/nepal-embarks-on-journey-towards-federal-destiny/

[22] For example, see Prachanda's speech in the parliament on 13 August 2015 https://youtu.be/6cPiTjt34e8

[23] Interview with Shakti Basnet and Agni Sapkota.

[24] Interview with Agni Sapkota

[25] Interview with Dr. Baburam Bhattarai.

[26] https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/upper-house-endorses-truth-and-reconciliation-bill/

[27] http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2019-02-06/house-endorses-amendment-bill-on- transitional-justice-act.html

[28] http://www.kanakmanidixit.com/हेट㄂डादेखि-हेगस륍म/

[29] https://www.kantipurdaily.com/news/2019/02/11/154985058656123724.html

[30] https://sambahak.com/2019/02/08/अको-माओवादी-जतमन-स啍छ/

[31] https://thehimalayantimes.com/kathmandu/breaking-baburam-bhattarai-severe-ties-with- ucpn-maoist-announces-he-will-resign-from-parliament-also/

[32] http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2015-11-01/lekhi-warns-of-forging-alliance- with-madhesi-morcha.html

[33] http://annapurnapost.com/news/81255

[34] http://english.onlinekhabar.com/we-were-trying-to-unify-uml-and-maoist-for-last-10-years- bishnu-paudel.html

[35] Speech given by Narayan Kaji Shrestha, Prakash to party workers on October 7, 2017. For details, see https://emulyankan.com/prachanda-step-revolutionary-narayankaji/

[36] Interview with Suresh Ale Magar, January 18, 2018.

[37] https://nepalkhabar.com/np/news/politics/55390/

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[38] https://nepalkhabar.com/np/news/politics/55227/

[39] Bhusal, Thira L., personal communication.

[40] https://ratopati.com/story/27137#modal

[41] For the social network analysis of the newly merged party, 12 individuals from the list of central committee members were randomly selected and asked to name six people who they would consult for any significant political or strategic issue related to the party. The individuals named by the first 12 were similarly asked the same question, and when not available, their close aides were requested to provide the information.

A total of 35 people were thus interviewed in January 2019.

[42] https://www.recordnepal.com/category-explainers/what-will-happen-to-the-maoists-after- merger-with-uml/

[43] http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785117.shtml

[44] http://en.people.cn/90777/8229312.html

[45] China, at this point, appears to be courting a lot of politicians urging them to unite for a new constitution. See https://www.bbc.com/nepali/news/2015/03/150323_prachanda_china_visit

[46] http://archive.nepalitimes.com/blogs/thebrief/2015/06/08/constitution-deal-inked/

[47] NHRC. (2015, November). Monitoring report : Human rights situation during the agitation before and after the promulgation of constitution of Nepal. http://www.nhrcnepal.org/nhrc_new/doc/newsletter/NHRC_Nepal_Madhesh_Terai_Pro- test_Human_Rights_Monitoring_Report_English.pdf

[48] Sutirtho Patranobis. "Rising Hindu nationalism has hijacked India's China policy: Chinese media." The Hindustan Times. July 21, 2017.

[49] Arun S. "PMO, NSA tracking impact of Chinese FDI in South Asia." The Hindu. July 08, 2017.

[50]https://www.livemint.com/Politics/0V89cdg8lMWjiTySYze4rL/Nepal-PM-may-visit- China-ahead-of-India-if-blockade-remains.html

[51] http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-03/22/content_24002664.htm

26 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger

[52] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-pips-India-in-aid-to-Nepal-Delhi-out-of- top-five-donors-list/articleshow/52180744.cms

[53] https://scroll.in/article/819705/its-complicated-the-china-factor-in-india-nepal-relationship

[54] Interview with Rajan Bhattarai, UML MP and member of EPG.

[55]https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/prime-minister-oli-s-departure-marks-indian- comeback-in-nepal/story-SlfKmL3xkCWZDHO0IPDPwI.html

[56] quite some time, Prachanda, PM of Nepal and chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center), had been friendly toward China. However, since assuming office for the second time as prime minister on August 3, 2016, he has visited India twice and warmly welcomed Indian President Pranab Mukherjee in Kathmandu last November.Given Prachanda's pro-India foreign policy, the Sino-Nepalese relationship has fallen into low Zhang Shubin, director of the Nepal Study Center at Hebei University of Economics & Business, wrote. See http://www.global- times.cn/content/1038667.shtml

[57]http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/fearing-arrest-prachanda-cancels-australia- visit_1899652.html

[58]https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/Olis-fall-is-good-news-for-India-Prachanda- likely-to-be-next-PM/articleshow/53370448.cms

[59]https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/prime-minister-oli-s-departure-marks-indian- comeback-in-nepal/story-SlfKmL3xkCWZDHO0IPDPwI.html

[60] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-s-main-concern-in-nepal-isn-t-india-it- is-western-powers-prachanda/story-P2MX8x84LIg8fZjncjs2dK.html

[61] https://www.livemint.com/Politics/X6O6Yz6XuqPoGBbwPJO2yN/Nepals-Prachanda-and- India-A-lovehate-relationship.html

[62] https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/china-wang-yi-calls-nepals-factions-unite-stability/

[63]https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/China-reaching-out-to-Bhutan-as-part-of- new-South-Asia-policy/article14572880.ece

[64]https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/next-door-nepal-red-versus-rest-4881033/

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[65] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/modiji-and-i-think-in-similar-ways-we-have- chemistry-nepal-s-new-pm-prachanda/story-jb0kAMn5TST9ED0elMz3QM.html

[66] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Chinas-media-warns-Nepal-against-getting-close- to-India/articleshow/54424185.cms

[67]//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/55548710.cms?utm_source=contentofinter- est&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

[68] http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-03/19/c_136140673.htm

[69] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/dont-meddle-in-nepal-sri-lanka-china-me- dia-warns-india/articleshow/57762891.cms

[70] http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-03/23/c_136152631.htm

[71] http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-03/25/c_136157205.htm

[72] http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-02/28/c_136091319.htm

[73] http://china.org.cn/opinion/2017-04/09/content_40578053.htm

[74] https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/nepal-scaled-down-drills-with-china-due-to- india-chinese-media/636684/

[75] http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-06-04/govt-signs-agreement-with-chinese- company-for-budhi-gandaki-construction.html

[76] https://thehimalayantimes.com/business/cggc-contract-budhigandaki-controversy/

[77] http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-09-26/govt-asked-to-scrap-budhi-gandaki- deal-with-chinese-firm.html

[78] http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-09-05/budhi-gandaki-listed-as-component- of-bri.html

[79] http://annapurnapost.com/news/81254

[80]https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/next-door-nepal-red-versus-rest-4881033/

[81] https://www.reuters.com/article/nepal-china-hydropower/nepal-scraps-2-5-bln-hydropower- plant-deal-with-chinese-company-idUSL3N1NJ3HD

28 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger

[82]http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-11-20/govt-decision-to-scrap-budhi- gandaki-project-will-be-overturned-oli.html

[83] http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/29/WS5abcd06ea3105cdcf6515261.html

[84]http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-03-28/pm-briefs-international-commu- nity.html

[85] http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201806/24/WS5b2f629ba3103349141de6fb.html

[86] http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201806/22/WS5b2c3553a3103349141dda6f.html

[87] http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/printedition/news/2018-09-16/dahal-unlikely-to-meet- top-chinese-leaders.html

[88]http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2019-01-27/venezuela-quietly-lobbied-the-rul- ing-party-to-release-a-strong-statement-condemning-the-us-and-its-allies-sources-say.html

[89] http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2019-02-08/fault-lines-in-ruling-party-exposed- as-oli-dahal-spar-over-venezuela.html

[90] https://www.onlinekhabar.com/2019/01/738264

[91] http://result.election.gov.np/PartyWiseElectedSummary.aspx

[92] In the 2013 elections, about 10.74 million had cast their votes in PR ballots.

[93] http://result.election.gov.np/ElectionResultCentralPR.aspx

[94] http://www.election.gov.np/election/np/ca-election-2008-136.html

29 CESIF/ABK/2019/UML-Maoist-Merger