Iran and Romania Reveal New Weapons Missiles Available Illegally

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Iran and Romania Reveal New Weapons Missiles Available Illegally Iran and Missiles Romania available reveal new illegally by Alan Malcher weapons British-built Blowpipe, Javelin, and Rapier surface-to-air by Eric Beech missiles, as well as US Stinger in Ankara and Soviet SA-7 weapons, have At the International Defence, all been offered for sale illegally Electronics, and Avionics over the past two years by inter­ (IDEA '89) exhibition in national arms dealers. Ankara, the Romanians The missiles are included in a displayed four missiles manu­ disturbing list of sophisticated factured under Soviet licences. military equipment which has The Romanians claim to been available on the black produce 90 per cent of the market, Flight understands. missiles' components, includ­ The list includes seven C-130 ing the motors. Hercules transports, plus spares, one Canberra bomber, three A- State marketing organisation 4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers, two Rom Tehnica would not rule Puma helicopters, four Strike- out the possibility of export Romania's A911 air-to-air missile is an infrared-homing version of the Soviet master armed trainers, and sales, but stressed that the inert radar-guided AA-7 Apex. The Soviet infrared-homing AA-2 Atoll (behind) is three MiG-21 fighters. missiles were primarily to show built under licence as the A91 while the radar guided AA-3 Anab (right) is Weapons for sale include Romanian industrial expertise. produced as the A90. Also displayed was the A921 radio-command air-to- both Stinger and improved The missiles displayed were surface missile (Soviet AS-7 Kerry) Stinger POST man-portable Romanian-built examples of the surface-to-air missiles, and Soviet infrared-homing AA-2 European-built Milan anti-tank Atoll and AA-7 Apex, and missiles (minimum quantity radar-guided AA-3 Anab, air-to- 100). The list of arms available air missiles. Anab arms the v '.n .',m, even includes 50 new Leopard MiG-19, Atoll the MiG-21, and r 'IWWSRfiTlpWBi main battle tanks. Apex the MiG-23. II With all these items, an end- Also displayed was a licence- «ili:tiiif user certificate was offered for built example of the radio- an additional 2 per cent of command AS-7 Kerry air-to- purchase price. surface missile which is known The list reflects a swing by to arm the Sukhoi Su-17 Fitter. arms dealers away from All are older missiles. handling Soviet- and Chinese- A model of Romania's first manufactured weapons to offer­ flight simulator, the SIAR-99, ing equipment made in the designed to train pilots on the West. IAR-99 jet trainer, was also Rumours that Stinger displayed. The simulator has six missiles were available illegally first surfaced in 1987, when degrees of freedom. The !*JTjj(J»^-' Romanians plan to build a civil reports suggested that a large simulator soon. consignment from the US The Iranians displayed a Central Intelligence Agency, n 's unguided rockets were two propeller-driven remotely destined for the Afghan diverse range of artillery rockets ibove) with twin-boom pusher layout and two different remotely mujahideen via Pakistan, failed piloted vehicles (RPVs). Two to reach its destination. versions of the Shahin 2 rocket The rumours were confirmed were on display, each appar­ in 1988, when Stingers were ently having a range of 20km, a recovered from an Iranian warhead weight of 180kg, and a gunboat crippled in a clash with thrust of 220kN. the US Navy in the Persian Gulf. Illegal-arms dealers were Two longer-range artillery inundated with requests for rockets were shown. The Stingers, Flight understands, Oghab was described as having with would-be purchasers will­ a range of 45km, a motor deliv­ ing to pay up to 11 times the ering 75kN, and a warhead manufacturer's price. weight of 70kg. The Nazeat was Unable to supply Stingers, claimed to have a 150kg dealers offered alternatives, warhead, a thrust of 1 lOkN, and including British Blowpipe, a maximum range of 90km. mmm Javelin, and Rapier surface-to- The two propeller-driven air missiles, and Soviet SA-7s. RPVs did not appear to carry By February this year, any payloads. One, named however, several dealers were Shahin, had a twin-boom cautiously offering the elusive pusher configuration. Stinger missile. 16 FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 20 May 1989 .
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