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Npr 5.3: Lessons of Iranian Missile Programs for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

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Npr 5.3: Lessons of Iranian Missile Programs for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Aaron Karp LESSONS OF IRANIAN MISSILE PROGRAMS FOR U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY by Aaron Karp Aaron Karp is Senior Faculty Associate with the Graduate Programs in International Studies at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia. He is the author of Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Oxford University Press, 1996) and numerous articles that have appeared in such journals as International Security, Survival, and International Studies Quarterly. ecent disclosures about tina, South Korea and Ukraine are Madeleine Albright, both Iran and Irans long-range ballistic less effective with remaining prolif- the United States have powerful ad- R 1 But flexibility missile program have dra- erators like North Korea, India and vocates of dialogue. matically reoriented debates over Pakistan. The second group has not is constrained by many factors, of how to deal with missile prolifera- responded to the same combination which Irans ballistic missile pro- tion threats. How this new challenge of export controls, sanctions, eco- gram is the most visible. Recent rev- is addressed depends partially on nomic incentives, and security assur- elations of the Shahab missiles technical assessments of Iranian ca- ances that worked so well with the hardly could have come at a worse pability. Even more salient are the first. These countries are more de- moment, just as Irans relations with political factors governing Irans termined and less amenable to out- the West are beginning to improve ability to acquire that technology. side influence. Irans proliferation after 19 years of confrontation. The immediate priority for counter- challenge is another one seemingly While Washington and Tehran take ing Iranian proliferation is finding immune to old nonproliferation for- tentative steps toward rapproche- ways to deal with exports from mulas. Additional sanctionslike ment, neither can expect the other China, Russia, and, to a lesser de- those in the 1998 Iran Missile Pro- to budge on essential premises of gree, North Korea. liferation Sanctions Act, may slow national policy. America will not In addition to the specific prob- Iran down somewhat, but by no more dilute its commitment to nonprolif- lem of Irans strategic ambitions, its than a few years eration and Iran will not compromise programs raise two general chal- Secondly, Iran raises the delicate on its strategic interests. lenges for U.S. foreign policy. First, issue of how to build better relations Iranian weapons proliferation is how should the United States handle in general with important regional all but guaranteed to constrain and the most intractable regional prolif- actors who refuse to cooperate on maybe prevent meaningful rap- erators? The mechanisms that key issues. In President Muhammad prochement. The problem is similar worked with countries like Argen- Khatami and Secretary of State to that faced by the United States in The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1998 17 Aaron Karp its efforts to improve relations with IRANS NEW SALIENCE Agni, with a new version currently countries like India and Pakistan Americas previous debate over being prepared for flight test, now where proliferation issues top the missile proliferation surrounded the clearly intended to carry nuclear 8 bilateral agenda. Despite its reputa- National Intelligence Estimate NIE- warheads. Pakistan has renewed its tion for revolutionary fervor, though, 95-19 Emerging Threats to North own long-stymied missile program Iran may be the most flexible of all America During the Next 15 Years, through the 1,500-km Ghauri, test- 9 of these countries. In both nonpro- issued in November 1995. Although fired on April 6, 1998. liferation and regional foreign this document dealt with global Missile proliferation is a global policy, Iran is emerging as a test threats, the debate it catalyzed fo- problem, but the focus on Iran is jus- case for developing new ap- cused almost entirely on the missile tified and useful nevertheless. Al- proaches to deal with these funda- projects of one countryNorth Ko- though we are accustomed to mental problems of American and rea.3 Since then, North Koreas treating Iran as a revolutionary state, Western regional relations. In the projects have slowed, losing their an exception in every way, its mis- long run, there may be no alterna- erstwhile urgency. sile projects are typical in some re- tive to dealing directly with Iran it- spects of the technical and political self. Todays debate over missile pro- liferation and missile defense is be- problems of regional long-range This article analyzes Irans mis- ing propelled instead by revelations rocketry in the late-1990s, illustrat- sile programs from the context of ing many key general issues for the over Iran.4 Once again, a regional U.S. nonproliferation policy. It be- rocketry program has become an in- future of missile proliferation. gins by discussing the increased sa- tellectual prism, diffracting issues lience of the Iranian threat on the that go far beyond immediate tech- INDIGENOUS CAPABILITIES U.S. nonproliferation agenda. It then nical matters. Of central importance Irans long-range rocketry and traces in detail the technical evolu- are broader questions regarding non- ballistic missile program has long tion of various missiles in the Ira- proliferation objectives, missile de- been one of the great enigmas in the nian arsenal, as well as their fense, and Middle East strategy. spectrum of global proliferation con- limitations. The article next consid- Equally salient are foreign policy cerns. Detailed information is spotty ers the importantyet often over- questions about relations with Iran, and general understanding weak. lookedfactor of soft technology, engagement of difficult regional ac- What can be concluded is that Irans the human and organizational ob- tors, in general, and the prospects for ballistic missile program appears to stacles that have constrained Irans policies based on sanctions and ex- be roughly comparable to that of missile programs to date. Finally, port controls. Pakistan, but less advanced than the analysis turns to external factors North Korea and well behind India. and conditions within Irans poten- Missile programs elsewhere are Although Iran has been trying to ac- tial suppliers, particularly China and no less provocative. Iraq has aban- quire long-range missiles since the Russia, where new conditions of doned none of its long-range rock- mid-1970s, its efforts have met with growing pluralism are rendering old- etry ambitions, including plans for unprecedented frustration. No other style nonproliferation controls inef- a 3,000-km weapon, sufficient to country has tried so hard and fective. The article concludes by reach Paris.5 Saddam is only wait- achieved so little. providing guidelines for a new U.S. ing for a second chance to scour the nonproliferation strategy regarding international market for useful ma- Since starting under Shah Iran. Like other intractable actors, terials. North Koreas Taepo-dong Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Iran has Iran must be addressed through more projects may have subsided, but it created a broad missile development than new sanctions alone. Ulti- appears to have gone back to con- infrastructure.10 Its efforts can be mately, there may be no alternative centrate on the Nodong series.6 divided into four basic programs: a to creating a more balanced politi- Egypt appears to be receiving new solid fuel effort that led only to ar- cal relationship, leading to a tailored installments of technical assistance tillery rockets, a stillborn Scud- packaged deal combining new from North Korea, probably support- based program, a cruise missile nonproliferation instruments with ing improved Scuds.7 India contin- program, and most recently a re- economic and political initiatives.2 ues development of its 2,500-km newed intermediate-range ballistic 18 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1998 Aaron Karp missile (IRBM) program. doubtedly has tried to scale-up its many enigmas of Iranian rocketry is Even after some 25 years of work, solid motors, but without visible re- its failure to use this Scud produc- Irans greatest strength is manufac- sult. Although the general recipes for tion capability. The most likely ex- turing small-diameter solid motors, advanced solid fuels are well known, planation is that North Korea cannot best suited for use in unguided artil- the manufacture of large fuel grains supply essential manufacturing ma- lery rockets. It has been extremely requires considerable chemical and terials. difficult for Iranian engineers and manufacturing finesse. The Soviet At one time, Iran was interested chemists to move beyond primitive Union required 25 years to master in the North Korean Nodong, usu- double-based fuels to the more mod- this technology, and China took even ally described as a 1,000- to 1,300- ern composite fuels better suited for longer. Iran will require substantial km weapon based on Scud larger weapons. Solid motor experi- foreign assistance to make faster technology. Iranian officials were ence may be based on Chinese as- progress. present for the first flight of the sistance, but the Chinese role appears Nodong in May 1993. Development to have been exaggerated in many THE SCUD DIVERSION of the Nodong slowed to a crawl accounts. Although China obviously Irans efforts to develop liquid thereafter, roughly coinciding with is the source of Irans cruise missile propulsion have been no more suc- negotiation of the October 1994 capability, none of its large artillery cessful, limited until recently by the Agreed Framework, which halted rockets closely resemble any known weaknesses of its leading technical Pyongyangs nuclear program. It Chinese counterpart. A major ques- ally, North Korea. After modest also was at this time that North tion is whether Chinese firms have transfers from Syria, Scud missiles Koreas much more ambitious helped Iran move beyond their frus- and manufacturing wherewithal Taepo-dong missile project was dis- trations with double-based propel- from North Korea began flowing covered, raising the possibility that lants. into the country in 1985.
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