The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2007 Iraqi Kurdistan: The Internal Dynamics and Statecraft of a Semistate1 Matan Chorev The semistate possesses many of the features The third section will emphasize how this commonly associated with the modern nation- experience impacts and shapes the worldview state but remains unrecognized as a sovereign and strategic calculus of the Kurdish leadership. entity. Semistates (such as Abkhazia, Nagorno- The third section will emphasize how this Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Iraqi experience impacts and shapes the worldview Kurdistan) inhabit the central conflict fault-lines and strategic calculus of the Kurdish leadership. of Southwest Asia’s strategic landscape at the dawn of the twenty-first century. In order to The Logic of Semistates concoct effective conflict management approaches, Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 directed policymakers must develop a framework for attention to the failed state of Afghanistan, the comprehending internal dynamics and statecraft dangers that weak and failing states present to of these entities. How do they function in the international security have been well absence of international recognition? What impact documented. However, the preoccupation, did the dynamics of conflict and political among policymakers and academics alike, with development under such conditions have on the the stark bipolarity of “strong” and “weak” states nature of the semistate? What is the entity’s has obscured the fact that the modern nation-state resultant worldview and statecraft? comes in innumerable forms. Article I of the 1933 Knowledge of the factors that contributed to Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties the ambiguous status of Iraqi Kurdistan in the of States outlines the four basic elements of aftermath of the first Gulf War statehood: 1) a permanent is imperative to analyzing the The relevance and future population; 2) a defined territory; behavior of the Kurdistan of the state to 3) a government; and 4) a Regional Government (KRG) in international politics capacity to enter into relations the post-Saddam era. After a with other states. Yet already in cursory introduction to the came under increased 1981, before it became concept of the semistate, this scrutiny as the pace of fashionable to proclaim the fading paper will explain what “globalization” hastened of the state as the central actor in sustained Iraqi Kurdistan’s international relations, political ambiguous status throughout at the end of the theorist David Easton, the 1990s and the impact it had twentieth century. highlighted the multiple on Kurdish politics. conceptions of the term by identifying over 140 definitions.2 The relevance and future of the state to international politics came under increased scrutiny as the pace of “globalization” hastened Matan Chorev (MALD ’07) is a Researcher at the 3 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, at the end of the twentieth century. The Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. octogenarian protagonist in this narrative, James Rosenau, argued that “the dynamics of © The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 Al Nakhlah globalization, taken together, contend that the at the same time making key interest new, post-Cold War arrangements have lessened groups in both camps worse off. Even if the role of the state, that a central feature of the a settlement is reached, it is unlikely to arrangements is a continuing disaggregation of do more than recognize the basic logic authority in all parts of the world and all walks of and its attendant benefits.10 life.”4 The defining tension, he suggests, is between “worldwide forces pressing for Pål Kolstø argues that five factors contribute integration and those fostering fragmentation,” a to the viability of unrecognized states in the phenomenon he coined as “fragmegration.”5 absence of strong state structures.11 First is the Rather than decrying the passing of the successful nation-building that these semistates nation-state, however, it is instructive to recall have undertaken, which is premised on the J.P. Nettl’s view of “the state” as a conceptual common experience of conflict with the state from variable, as opposed to a generic unit of analysis. which they are trying to secede, the existence of a This view allows for analysis that is more common enemy, and the relative homogenous discriminating and sees the state as being more population that exists within the separatist entity. or less “state-like” along a continuum of Second, semistates are militarized societies. The “stateness.”6 To demonstrate, it is certainly the armed forces play a crucial role in deterring the case that some states fall short of virtually all parent state and, as a result, military leaders performance-based criteria of internal legitimacy, have become political and economic figures as yet retain their international recognition, or well, often with a keen interest in maintaining “juridical statehood” as equal sovereigns. These their positions of privilege. Third, the parent “quasi-states,” or what today one calls failed state – be it Iraq, Somalia, or Georgia – is states, hold on to their legal protections from typically a weak state unable to retake the intervention and interference but lack the separatist state or to attract the breakaway capacity or will to provide the services and population to return to its domain. Fourth, resources their citizens demand of them.7 external patrons provide a vital lifeline for the Contrast this with the semistate (or the more semistate. Finally, the “international community” accepted, but problematic, de facto state) that plays a crucial role, for as long as it facilitates an fulfills the four features of the Montevideo treaty ongoing and frequently stalled negotiation but lacks the international personality of quasi- process between the breakaway region and the states. Scott Pegg explains: “The quasi-state is parent state, it is complicit in the prolonged legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. existence of the semistate. Conversely, the de facto state is illegitimate no The semistate’s “economic pathologies” are matter how effective it is.”8 an important product and driver of the benefits of Absent legitimacy, the semistate still stalemate equation.12 Most semistates fail to displays “impressive longevity.”9 Although the develop self-sufficient economies due to several particularities of each individual entity are factors: the destruction wrought by the protracted influenced by the state from which it is seceding, insurgency and conflict with the metropolitan scholars have identified commonalities of internal state, the inability to construct a favorable and external dynamics that contribute to investment climate due to an uncertain legal protraction of ambiguity. Charles King contends climate (what Pegg refers to as the “economic cost that a key factor is the benefits that both the of non-recognition”), and the presence of a parent and the separatist states accrue from substantial illicit economy and its linkages with stalemate: the ruling elite, all of which are exacerbated by the absence of international monitoring and It is a dark version of Pareto efficiency: accountability.”13 Before analyzing the case of the general welfare cannot be improved Iraqi Kurdistan, it is instructive to place it in its – by reaching a genuine peace accord appropriate historical context. allowing for real reintegration – without © The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University Fall 2007 3 Kurdayetî and the Challenges to Kurdish by the Turks.” The installation of Shaikh Mahmud Nation-Building Barzinji as governor of Sulaimaniyah by the British was premised on the belief that British The segmented nature of Kurdish society recognition of his status would grant him and the intra-group dynamics in Iraqi Kurdistan sufficient authority to govern over Kurdistan. consistently combined to undermine Kurdayetî When the disastrous 1920 Arab Revolt shifted the (Kurdish national identity) and the political focus of the colonial administration from nation- objectives of their decades-long struggle. The building to exit, the British concluded that the Kurds were historically divided among three “clannish” Kurds would be unable to construct a ethnically defined communities (Arab, Persian, single Southern Kurdish state and thus and Turkish) and lived on the fringes of powerful discouraged the colonial administration from empires (The Ottoman to the west, and the taking any risks in supporting their autonomy. Safavid and Qajar to the east). After World War I, Intra-Kurdish strife bolstered those voices in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman advocating for disengagement and consolidation Empire, the Kurdish population soon found itself of Sunni Arab rule. spread across four new regional Resultantly, the British nation-states - Syria, Turkey, Intra-Kurdish strife experience in Iraq—not unlike Iraq and Iran. The nature of bolstered those voices the present American political space in each country advocating for experience—was one of grand created differing narratives of ambitions subdued. The British group history and status that in disengagement and state-building aspiration for turn impacted the opportunities consolidation of Sunni Iraq, devolved to the for political action for Kurdish 14 Arab rule. Resultantly, the construction of