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Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus

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Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus CaUCaSUS aNALYTiCAL DIGEST No. 27, 27 May 2011 5 Azerbaijan and the north Caucasus: A Pragmatic relationship By Anar Valiyev, Baku Abstract This article provides an overview of relations between Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus. After describing the development of ties since independence, the article examines the main areas of interest that the countries share. Two key factors shape these relations—security concerns and economic ties. The author argues that after years of mutual misunderstanding and suspicions, both Azerbaijan and Russia recognized the impor- tance of the other in providing security in the volatile Caucasus region. Neither Russia nor Azerbaijan can solve the endemic problems of the Caucasus alone and thus they strive to find an appropriate model bene- fiting both sides. Developments since 1991 uous view of the war that started in 1994. Although the Relations between Azerbaijan and the Northern Cau- Azerbaijani government officially endorsed Russia’s cam- casus traditionally have been good, friendly, and even paign against the Chechen separatists, public opinion and brotherly. Sharing a common religion, traditions, cul- sympathies were on the Chechen side. Various NGOs ture, and history under Tsarist and Soviet rule allowed and private citizens helped the Chechen cause. Among the nations and ethnic groups populating this region— the Azerbaijani public, the war also reanimated myths of usually referred to as kavkaztsy by Russia—to share a Imam Shamil’s resistance to the Russian conquest during common identity. Among all Northern Caucasus repub- the 19th century.2 Azerbaijani hospitals treated wounded lics, Azerbaijan traditionally had the tightest contacts Chechen resistance fighters. Even the late President Hey- and cooperation with Dagestan due to its proximity just dar Aliyev acknowledged that Baku hospitals were pro- across the border. Meanwhile, the presence of an Azerbai- viding aid to the rebels, but denied that his country was jani minority in Dagestan, and Lezgin and Avar minor- involved in terrorist activities. The public support for ities in Azerbaijan, combined with close trade relations, the Chechen cause came from the fear that if the Rus- made ties with Dagestan much more substantial than sian army destroyed the Chechen resistance quickly, then with any other North Caucasian republic. Azerbaijan could be the next target for the Russian mil- The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 severed itary machine. Azerbaijan’s contacts and relations with the republics of Azerbaijan was a key destination for Chechen refu- the Northern Caucasus, particularly Dagestan. The early gees seeking to avoid the atrocities and persecution taking years of independence for Azerbaijan were marred by the place in their homeland. Up to 3,000 Chechens, mostly threat of separatism coming from its Lezgin minority liv- women and children, found refuge in the country during ing in the northern part of the country. Several national- 1994–1996. In the course of the second Russo–Chechen istic organizations, including Sadval, freely operating on war, the number of refugees reached almost 10,000. Azer- the territory of Russia, instigated this separatism.1 Mean- baijan’s tacit non-military support to the Chechen cause while, part of the Russian establishment played the sep- was justified since the country feared that a successful aratism card in order to gain political leverage vis-à-vis Russian military operation in the North Caucasus would Azerbaijan. Moreover, the terrorist attack in the Baku sub- embolden Russian military circles to exert heavy pressure way carried out by Sadval members in 1994 antagonized on Azerbaijan to stop its cooperation with the West and relations between Azerbaijan and Dagestan in particular. halt projects such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. The Russian–Chechen War was another factor that Relations with the Russian Northern Caucasus have played a negative role in Azerbaijan’s contacts with the significantly improved during the presidency of Vladi- Northern Caucasus. The Azerbaijani public had an ambig- mir Putin. Having understood that stability in the North Caucasus can not be achieved without Azerbaijan’s coop- 1 Sadval was primarily concerned with the secession of Lezgin peo- eration, the Russian establishment started actively to seek ple along the newly internationalized border between Russia and ways to involve Azerbaijan into the stability process in the Azerbaijan. This border separated the Lezgin into two unequal Caucasus. Leaders of the Northern Caucasus republics parts. During the early years of independence even some circles of the Lezgin intelligentsia in Dagestan and Azerbaijan initially conceived of a combination of all Lezgin territory into a Repub- lic of Lezgistan. Later on, with the beginning of the Chechen 2 Despite the fact that Imam Shamil’s war was primarily fought war, the Russian authorities understood the danger of playing between the Northern Caucasus and Russia, the conflict had the separatist card against Azerbaijan since it later was turned a huge impact on Azerbaijanis’ perceptions of Russia. Imam against the Russians themselves. Shamil and his resistance were positively portrayed in Azerbaijan. CaUCaSUS aNALYTiCAL DIGEST No. 27, 27 May 2011 6 became frequent guests in Baku. At the same time, cross- ground, could easily be used by external or internal forces border trade and cooperation significantly intensified. to destabilize the situation in Azerbaijan. Baku was wor- Azerbaijan looks at relations with the Northern Cau- ried about the Chechen community’s active recruitment casus through the prism of security and economics. In of young local Azerbaijanis to fight in Chechnya, which the following sections, we consider the impact of each they feared could have a detrimental effect for their own of these factors. country. Azerbaijanis who went to fight in Chechnya could return home with radical ideas combined with the Security Concerns: The Chechen Factor zeal to change the country’s regime. Their situation was Baku recognizes that any instability in the Northern Cau- reminiscent of the situation of the Saudi mujahedeen who casus would immediately provoke problems in Azerbai- came back from fighting in Afghanistan at the end of the jan’s north because of the flood of refugees, infiltration 1980s and were eager to change the regime in Riyadh. of guerrillas, emergence of religious radicals and even- Despite its sympathies for the Chechen people, the tually the spread of conflict into Azerbaijan. The coun- Azerbaijani government came around to the view that try has already experienced these problems during the Russia played an overall positive role in the Caucasus, second Chechen war. Although the majority of refugees even though it caused hardship for the population at the crossing the border during that conflict did not present time. The perception was that a weakening of Russia in any danger, some of them were followers of Salafi Islam the region would not necessarily benefit Azerbaijan. To (often referred to as “Wahhabis,” which, however, is not the contrary, Baku feared that a Russian withdrawal from an accurate description) and were targets of persecution Chechnya and Dagestan would immediately unleash a in Chechnya at that time. civil war between the different ethnic groups in the North The firstSalafi missionaries arrived in Azerbaijan from Caucasus that could eventually spill over to Azerbaijan. the northern Caucasus in the mid-1990s. The majority In that case, Azerbaijan would face revived Avar or Lez- of them came from Chechnya and Dagestan where the gin separatism. It was against this background that the Salafis had some influence, in large measure due to the Azerbaijani ruling establishment came to the view that Russian–Chechen wars. For a short while, Salafis made a Russian success in Chechnya was necessary in order to some inroads in Chechnya and were even able to create maintain peace in Dagestan, and Baku thus would need their own self-ruled area in the Dagestani villages of Kara- to do everything possible to help Russia in this process. makhi and Chobanmakhi. However, Salafisdid not stop Despite the fact that Russian-backed Chechen Pres- in Chechnya and Dagestan, but extended their activities ident Ramzan Kadyrov faces heavy criticism in Europe into Azerbaijan. Initially, they did not gain wide support and the U.S. for abusing human rights and repressing among Azerbaijanis, as nationalism and pan-Turkism opposition to his rule, the Azerbaijani establishment were much more popular than Islam. However, later on, has been helping Kadyrov to establish himself and win the number of Salafis began to grow. The government legitimization. The Azerbaijan government invited the of Azerbaijan became concerned with the expansion of a Chechen president to Azerbaijan several times and Kady- non-traditional sect of Islam as well as with the growing rov visited Baku and met with its president in Novem- number of Chechen and Dagestani Salafis in the country ber 2009. He was recently invited to return to Baku in who were fleeing Russia. In 2001 Azerbaijani authorities the near future. Allahshukur Pashazade, Sheikh ul-Islam started to crack down on Salafi cells. Since the majority and Grand Mufti of the Caucasus, who is based in Baku, of the Salafis in the country were Chechens, the purge is also officially backing the current Chechen president, hit Chechens the hardest. At the same time, Azerbaijani providing crucial support for legitimizing Kadyrov’s rule. officials launched a covert campaign against Chechens, forcing them to leave the country. Some of them were The Georgian and russian Factors extradited to Russia as terrorists and guerrillas. In May Another security concern high on the list is Georgia, and 2001, Aslan Maskhadov, the unrecognized president of the recent war between Russia and Georgia. Despite the the Chechen Republic, called on Chechens to leave Azer- fact that Azerbaijan supported Georgia during and after baijan due to the danger they were experiencing there. As the war, this position did not impact the country’s rela- a result, up to 5,000 Chechens left the country.
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