Global Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 Global Taiwan Brief Vol 4. Issue1 14 Fortnightly Review Russell Hsiao Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Law Protests and their Reverberation in Taiwan By: I-wei Jennifer ’s Missile Tests in the South China Sea: Implications for Taiwan By: J. Michael Cole Advancements in US-Taiwan Relations Counter “Bargaining Chip” Theory By: Michael Mazza Weighing the Effects of Taiwan-China Competition in Latin America and the Caribbean By: Margaret Myers and Isabel Bernhard

Fortnightly Review The Global Taiwan Brief is a By: Russell Hsiao bi-weekly publication released ev- ery other Wednesday and provides Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) andedi- insight into the latest news on tor-in-chief of the Global Taiwan Brief. Taiwan.

Taiwan President Reinforces Call for Strengthening a Community of Democracies in Editor-in-Chief Stopover US Speech Russell Hsiao Associate Editor Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) transited through the United States on her way Marzia Borsoi-Kelly to several of the country’s nine diplomatic allies in the Latin America and Caribbean -re Staff Editor gion. The transit comes amid Beijing’s aggressive poaching of the island-nation’s diplo- Katherine Schultz matic allies—five since May 2016—which is part of an unrelenting pressure campaign intended to isolate the Tsai administration. In an uncharacteristically long stopover in The views and opinions expressed from July 11 to 13, which was twice as long as the Taiwanese president routine in these articles are those of the transits through the United States, Tsai made several public appearances that included authors and do not necessarily events with lawmakers, representatives from its diplomatic allies, business community, reflect the official policy or position expatriates, and scholars, as well as private meetings with senior and former officials. of the Global Taiwan Institute. Besides the pageantry, which is welcomed by many of the relationship’s supporters for To view web sources cited in the its departure from self-imposed protocols, remarks that she gave in a public speech at published papers (underlined in Columbia University stood out for its substance. printed text), visit http://globaltai- In remarks at the Ivy League university on July 12, President Tsai highlighted the com- wan.org/2019/07/vol-4-issue-14/ petition between democracy and rising authoritarianism. The president of the only Chi- Global Taiwan Institute nese-speaking democracy in the world underscored how the existence of Taiwan’s robust 1836 Jefferson Place NW, democracy served as the antithesis to the belief that China’s rise will inevitably subsume DC 20036 Taiwan, or that democracy is incompatible with values. As a case in point for the [email protected] threat of rising authoritarianism on freedom, she pointed to the unfolding political crisis on Hong Kong. “We are seeing this threat in action right now in Hong Kong. Faced with To subscribe, visit no channel to make their voices heard, young people are taking to the streets to fight http://globaltaiwan.org/sub- for their democratic freedoms. And the people of Taiwan stand with them,” President scribe/. Tsai declared. She added “Hong Kong’s experience under ‘one country, two systems’ has shown the world once and for all that authoritarianism and democracy cannot coexist.” © 2019 · Global Taiwan Institute Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 2

Tsai’s Columbia speech echoes the symbolic precedent “History tells us that democracies are strongest when set by her August 2018 transit through and united, and weakest when divided. Without Taiwan, remarks that she made at the Reagan Library in front the international coalition of like-minded countries will of a Berlin Wall exhibit. In that short speech to the lose a crucial link in working to ensure our values are press corps, Tsai extolled President Reagan’s lifelong passed on to the next generation.” The focus of Pres- commitment to the values of freedom and democra- ident Tsai’s speech is consistent with the overall shift cy, which she described as having inspired the wave of undergoing in the United States in its policy towards democracy that brought down the Berlin Wall and pre- China. While disagreements in the approach remain, saged the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. there is a greater convergence of views that great pow- Specifically, President Tsai stated in that speech: er competition with China is the mainstay of the new era. “… the values of freedom and democracy are important to Taiwan, as a country to that stands In closing her Columbia speech, President Tsai point- behind its commitment, Taiwan is willing to work ed out that “Taiwan’s survival is about more than just with other countries— in line with its nation- cross-Strait relations. We are a vital bastion of democ- al interests, as well as the principles of freedom racy in the Indo-Pacific, and the entire world is closely and democracy—to spur regional stability and watching the precedent we will set for the future of peace. We will keep this uppermost commitment democracy.” Indeed, the incremental upgrade in dip- in mind. President Reagan once sad something lomatic protocol afforded to Tsai’s transits over the well worth reflecting on-’everything [was] nego- years and also her Columbia speech reflect the desire tiable except two things: our freedom and our in Washington to provide reassurance to Taiwan as it future.’ I believe this is how the people of Taiwan faces growing pressure from China, as well as growing feel today.” trust between the two governments and alignment in their policy agendas. The most recent New York transit, which will be fol- lowed by a stopover in Colorado on her return leg, The main point: President Tsai’s transits through New follows a steady upgrade in the strict diplomatic pro- York and also her speech calling for the strengthening tocols that have traditionally constrained these tran- of the community of democracies reflect growing trust sits. It may be worth remembering that in addition to between the governments of the United States and speaking with the press corps at the Reagan Library, Taiwan, greater alignment in their respective policy President Tsai also engaged with expatriate communi- agendas, and Washington’s desire to provide further ties of Taiwanese- and was permitted to visit reassurance as Taiwan faces growing pressure from a federal-agency. China. Over Beijing’s repeated objections, Washington not only approved these stopovers but appears to be gradually elevating the form of these transits made by Kaohsiung Mayor Decisively Wins KMT Primary Taiwan’s leaders. As Beijing squeezes Taiwan’s inter- With only six months to go before presidential and leg- national space ever more tightly, the US government islative elections are to be held in the island-democra- seems to be incrementally normalizing these transits cy, the two major political parties in Taiwan have finally to become more visit-like for this democratic ally. After decided on their candidates for the top political office. her Colorado transit, President Tsai will have made 10 A month after the ruling-Democratic Progressive Par- transits [1] through the United States since becoming ty (DPP) decided to elect the incumbent president the president of Taiwan in May 2016. as their candidate, the largest-opposition party, the Nationalist Party (, or KMT), completed While calling for a coalition of democracies to promote its presidential primary. The hotly contested and un- shared values, President Tsai refuted the culturally-de- characteristically open primary race was determined terministic argument generally proffered by Beijing, entirely by five public opinion polls using only landline stating “Ours is a story of why values do still matter. calls. Commissioned by Party headquarters and con- The cultural and political differences across the Taiwan ducted by TVBS, Shih Hsin University (世新大學), All Strait only grow wider by the day; and each day that Dimension Survey & Research（全方位市場調查有限 Taiwan chooses freedom of speech, human rights, the 公司), Taiwan Real Survey (全國公信力), United Daily rule of law, is a day that we drift farther from the in- News Group (聯合報系), the clear victor that emerged fluences of authoritarianism.” Furthermore, shestated was the incumbent first-term Kaohsiung Mayor Han Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 3

Kuo-yu (韓國瑜, b. 1957). his lagging approval ratings from earlier in the year as indication of his candidacy’s short shelf life. However, The primary result, which was released on July 15, such a temporal analysis largely overlooks the struc- was based on a weighted average of the aforemen- ture of his support base, which may be broader and tioned five polls conducted over the period from July deeper than most analysis have taken into account. 8 through July 14. The polls, which asked respondents Since according to the political commentators, despite to choose between five possible contenders and also his lack of political experience he still commands -ex in a match up against the other political party, the tensive factional support due to his family ties. Accord- first-term mayor of Kaohsiung decisively won.- May ing to the political commentary blog Frozen Garlic: or Han received the highest support rate with 44.80 percent and business tycoon Terry Guo (郭台銘) was “He is a mainlander who came up through the in a distant second place at 27.73 percent. The KMT’s KMT Huang Fu-hsing (military) party branch, so former presidential candidate and clear establishment maybe it isn’t all that surprising that they love favorite, Eric Chu (朱立倫), lagged far behind coming him so much […]. We often think of him as a in third place at 17.9 percent, whereas another estab- populist, throwing bombs from the outside. He lishment candidate, former Taipei County Magistrate has offended some KMT insiders, such -as for Chou Hsi-wei (周錫瑋), mustered only 6.02 percent, mer president Ma, but his offenses are stylistic and the principal of the Sun Yat-Sen School, Chang Ya- rather than ideological. On policy, his views fit chung (張亞中), received only 3.54 percent support. in quite comfortably with standard KMT views. Economically, he wants to develop by integrating Han’s primary victory continues the trend of the KMT Taiwan’s economy into China […] Han also isn’t establishment-wing’s marginalization. Indeed, the par- really challenging the 92 Consensus, though he ty has been experiencing a swinging pendulum effect doesn’t always phrase his ideas in those terms.” since 2014 after the KMT’s defeat in the local elections, defeat in the presidential and legislative elections in It is perhaps worth pointing out that the primary poll 2016, and apparent resurgence in the 2018 local elec- results cannot be seen as necessarily reflective of tions. KMT members’ preference since they were conducted through a random sampling of the entire population The party flirted with a conservative lurch in the and not specifically of party members. Also, restricting botched candidacy of former Chairwoman Hung Hsiu- the respondents to only those with a landline seems to chu (洪秀柱). The establishment wing seemed to have limit the sample of younger voters and would presum- recovered its control over the party after Wu Den-yih（ ably favor those more ideologically inclined since they 吳敦義）took over as party chairman in August 2017. would have the incentive to stay at home in order to Moreover, Wu ostensibly guided the party back with receive and answer the polling call. Nevertheless, the its sweeping victory in the 2018 local elections and contested primary within both the ruling party, which should have been able to take credit for the return of ran its primary on a similar system, and opposition the establishment wing of the party. However, a deep- parties seem to suggest a greater division among the er analysis about the results of the 2018 election may voting public about the direction that parties and the have missed the key variable of the 2018 elections, country should take. which was not the return of the establishment camp but the victory of the populist candidates represented Consistent with polling data from earlier in the year, by Han Kuo-yu in Kaohsiung. the most recent weekly poll conducted by Apple Dai- ly released on July 16 showed Han with a comfortable The fluid and increasingly unpredictable preferences of 10 percent lead standing at around 36 percent in a voters was on further display in KMT’s primary. Han’s prospective three-way race against President Tsai and victory in the KMT primary seems to indicate a contin- Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je. To be sure, voter preferences uation of that trend. Indeed, rather than an indication are very fluid and it remains to be seen whether the of the preference of supporters of the political party, two primary results will have a consolidating effect on both polls seem to indicate a national sampling of the voter preference when it comes time to vote. And it is preferred candidate. important to remember that polling preference does To be sure, while most public opinion polls showed Han not necessarily follow voter mobilization and whether as the favorite to win the KMT’s primary, there was still people will actually come out to vote on election day. skepticisms among informed observers about his via- Notably absent in the press conference announcing bility prior to his primary victory. Some have pointed to the KMT’s primary poll results are the two other front Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 4 runners: Terry Guo and Eric Chu. That said, as the pres- legal system over the territory and sending Hong Kong idential candidate for the KMT, Han must be taken se- residents to China (反送中) for prosecution, which riously. Most of the chips of the 2020 election are now they believe could pave the way for further intrusions on the table, the next to bet will be Mayor Ko. by Beijing on its Western-style legal and political insti- tutions. Underlying that fear is the existential threat The KMT primary poll result has been submitted to the from China on Hong Kong’s unique identity and sta- KMT Central Standing Committee and a final and -offi tus as the only democratic stronghold under Beijing’s cial announcement is expected to be made on July 28. current administrative control. Hong Kong protestors The main point: Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu emerged paint the extradition bill as “the final battle” (最後一 as the clear victor in the KMT primary and may por- 役) against Beijing to protect Hong Kong’s cherished tend the further marginalization of the party’s estab- democratic freedoms that its people have long regard- lishment wing. ed as the core of their identity. [1] June-July 2016 (Miami, Los Angeles), January 2017 Thus, a record number of people have flooded the (, San Francisco), October-November 2017 streets of Hong Kong that are reminiscent of the large (Hawaii, Guam), August 2018 (Los Angeles, Houston). demonstrations in 2003 and the 2014 Umbrella Move- ment. Large protests and violent clashes with Hong Kong police continued into July, even after Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced on June 15 the Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Law Pro- indefinite suspension of the extradition bill. Hundreds tests and their Reverberation in Taiwan of protesters stormed the Hong Kong Legislative Coun- cil Chamber during the annual march on July 1 com- By: I-wei Jennifer Chang memorating the territory’s handover to China, and as many as 2 million people converged on Hong Kong’s I-wei Jennifer Chang is a research fellow at the Global streets on June 16, calling for Ms. Lam to step down. Taiwan Institute. Since June, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has issued Hong Kong protesters, who have taken to the streets in statements of support for Hong Kong demonstrators recent weeks to protest the proposed extradition bill, on social media. “Hong Kong Endures, Taiwan Holds have a message for Taiwan: cherish and protect your On” (香港撐住,台灣守住) has become Tsai’s rallying democracy and existing freedoms. They point to creep- call for Hong Kong protesters to keep their spirits up ing Chinese control over Hong Kong under the People’s against the odds and her message that Taiwan will pro- Republic of China’s “one country, two systems” frame- tect itself from Chinese encroachment. On June 12, work adopted since the former British colony returned Tsai tweeted, “Taiwan stands with all freedom-loving to China in 1997. In fact, Hong Kong has become a people in Hong Kong,” after Hong Kong police fired glaring lesson to Taiwan about the pitfalls of accepting rubber bullets at protesters. China’s “one country, two systems” proposal for unifi- cation. Indeed, many , who see a common struggle against China, have rallied behind Hong Kong After sporadic marches in March and April, the recent protesters by offering messages of support on social string of Hong Kong protests began in early June over media. “Cheng” (撐), or endure, has become a ubiqui- the Hong Kong government’s proposed Fugitive -Of tous slogan symbolizing that Taiwan stands behind the 逃犯條例 fenders Ordinance amendment bill ( ) that Hong Kong people. “Cheng” is also the title of a song would extradite Hong Kong residents to trial in China. by Taiwan and Hong Kong music artists to express soli- The proposed bill was sparked by an incident last year darity for the protests. when a Hong Kong man, Chan Tong-kai, was suspect- ed of killing his pregnant girlfriend while on a trip in Hong Kong netizens have expressed gratitude on Pres- Taipei and then fled back to Hong Kong. Because Tai- ident Tsai’s Facebook page for the encouragement and wan and Hong Kong do not have an extradition treaty, sympathy from President Tsai and Taiwan netizens. De- Chan could not be prosecuted for the alleged crime in spite the record number of protesters in attendance at Taiwan or Hong Kong, though he was later tried and these marches, there is a general sense of despair and sentenced by a Hong Kong judge for a separate crime helplessness about Hong Kong’s future that recognizes of money laundering. the structural asymmetry between Hong Kong protest- ers and China’s authoritarian government backed by a Hong Kong protesters oppose China’s imposition of its Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 5 powerful military. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) The Hong Kong protests have emerged in the debates troops are stationed in Hong Kong and, if the Chinese for Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January Communist Party leadership wanted to, could crack 2020. It was during the wave of Hong Kong protests down on protesters and end the street protests in a that Tsai was formally nominated as the Democratic repeat of Tiananmen Square. Yet, Hong Kong activists Progressive Party’s (DPP) presidential candidate on still have not given up, despite knowing that their ac- June 19, after defeating her challenger, former Premier tions may not ultimately change their political future. Lai Ching-te (賴淸德), in the DPP primary. Tsai’s sup- porters argue that she is the only presidential candi- Taiwan’s people have deep personal and emotion- date that can defend Taiwan and ensure that the island al connections to the ongoing developments in Hong is not “given” to China. On social media, one netizen Kong. Bound by geographic proximity, cultural, and so- replied on Tsai’s Facebook page, “Vote for Tsai Ing-wen cial ties, as well as a shared democratic legacy, Hong [so that] Taiwan does not become Hong Kong.” Kong and Taiwan are seen by Beijing as the outliers— and thus prime targets—of the Chinese government’s Other presidential hopefuls have also voiced dissatis- strategy to consolidate its sovereign and authoritarian faction with “one country, two systems” and promised control over contested territories. Taiwan’s media and to safeguard Taiwan’s future amid the developments society have closely followed the cycle of Hong Kong in Hong Kong. Kaohsiung Mayor and now presidential civil protests and police crackdown because the is- candidate Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) of the opposition Kuo- land faces a similar challenge: reigning in Chinese in- mintang issued a statement saying that the majority terference in Taiwan’s politics and media, a cause that of Taiwanese people think “one country, two systems” brought tens of thousands of protesters on Taipei’s does not apply to Taiwan. Han expressed his “unques- streets to lambast the “red media” on June 23. tionable determination to defend the Republic of Chi- na, Taiwan’s democratic system, and its lifestyle.” Hong Kong and Taiwan are intertwined by a common struggle to preserve their democratic spirit and local As the international community is watching the events and national identities—factors that distinguish both unfold in Hong Kong, Taiwan also seeks to put greater of them from China. The theme “Today Hong Kong, international attention on China’s increasing threats tomorrow Taiwan” (今天香港，明天台灣) became towards Taiwan. If Hong Kong falls, Taiwan is next. And prevalent during Taiwan’s anti-China trade “Sunflower “if Taiwan falls, who is next?” wrote Taiwan’s Foreign Movement” in 2014 and continues to bring attention Minister Jaushieh Joseph Wu in a recent article, point- to Taiwan’s need to resist Chinese efforts to turn it into ing to China’s militarization of the South China Sea, Hong Kong. Taiwan netizens have utilized the slogan debt trap diplomacy in the developing world, Uyghur for anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong (反送中) to internment camps, and other human rights violations. express that the island also cannot be “sent” to China. Chinese President Xi Jinping wants to use Hong Kong as During a crackdown on the protests by Hong Kong po- a model for governing Taiwan over the long run. In his lice in June, some Hong Kong netizens wrote that they January 2, 2019, speech on Taiwan, Xi said, “The prin- had “tried their best” and evoked imagery of stand- ciples of ‘peaceful reunification’ and ‘one country, two ing on the “frontlines” of the political battle against systems’ are the best approach to realizing national Beijing. If Hong Kong falls, Taiwan will be the Chinese reunification.” However, the events in Hong Kong and government’s next target. They tell Taiwan’s people to their reverberation in Taiwan’s politics complicate Chi- cherish and protect their democratic rights and free- na’s respective relations with both Kong Hong and Tai- doms now. wan. Certainly, “one country, two systems” has lost its attraction and confidence among Hong Kong residents, President Tsai also took the occasion of the anti-extra- not to mention Taiwan. Hong Kong demonstrations are dition protests in Hong Kong to further buttress her testing the viability and credibility of “one country, two stance that Beijing’s “one country, two systems” mod- systems,” and provide lessons for China and Taiwan to el for unification cannot work for Taiwan. “What Tai- rethink the framework for cross-Strait relations. wanese feel most deeply about this is that ‘one coun- try, two systems’ is not viable and not acceptable for The unexpected consequence of Hong Kong’s mass a democratic Taiwan,” Tsai told reporters on June 13. demonstrations, which have garnered international Tsai pledged that as long as she is president, she will sympathy and concern, is that they might make it more never accept “one country, two systems” and vowed to difficult for China to militarily suppress the protesters. protect Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy. Beijing is already at odds with the United States over Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 6 bilateral trade issues and faces intense criticism and authorities shortened the navigation warning by24 scrutiny from Western countries over its mass intern- hours. ment of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region. The Chinese At the time of this writing, the type(s) of missile(s) sus- government may not want to further tarnish its inter- pected of having been fired during the exercise has yet national image by violently cracking down on Hong to be confirmed, although it is believed to involve the Kong protesters. Dong Feng-21D (“East Wind,” 東風-21D) or the DF-26 Amid rising tensions between China and Western coun- (東風-26), both ballistic missiles. Known as the “carri- tries, President Tsai has sought to raise international er killer,” the DF-21D maneuverable anti-ship ballistic support for Taiwan by evoking the democracy band- missile (ASBM) has an estimated range of about 1,500 wagon—namely, the group of like-minded democratic km (approximately 932 miles). The DF-26, which can nations around the world. Thus, by supporting Hong carry both conventional and nuclear warheads and can Kong’s democratic aspirations, Taiwan can not only win reportedly be used against targets on land and at sea, the hearts and minds of the Hong Kong people, but has a range of up to 4,000 km (approximately 2,485 also elicit Western support to help safeguard Taiwan’s miles). Following deployment in the region, both mis- democracy and freedoms from China’s authoritarian siles would have the ability to target Taiwanese navy government. vessels and other assets in the South China Sea, and to threaten commercial shipping during an embargo The main point: Hong Kong and Taiwan find common contingency against Taiwan. As one of the claimants to cause in Beijing’s encroachment on their free and dem- the South China Sea, Taiwan controls Itu Aba (Taiping ocratic societies, and the Hong Kong demonstrations Island), on which it has built and extended a military have raised issues about the credibility of China’s “one airstrip and bolstered its military presence in the past country, two systems” model for Taiwan. decade. Should China decide to seize the strategically located island, the addition of the DF-21D and DF-26 would severely complicate Taipei’s ability to defend its China’s Missile Tests in the South China assets. Sea: Implications for Taiwan The US Department of Defense “was aware of the Chi- nese missile launch from […] man-made structures in By: J. Michael Cole the South China Sea near the Spratly Islands,” Lt. Col. J. Michael Cole is a senior non-resident fellow at the Eastburn said, adding that “What’s truly disturbing Global Taiwan Institute. about this act is that it’s in direct contradiction to Pres- ident Xi Jinping’s (習近平) statement”—made in the The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF, 中 Rose Garden in 2015—“that he would not militarize 國人民解放軍火箭軍) is believed to have test-fired those man-made outposts.” According to the Penta- as many as six ballistic missiles into disputed waters in gon spokesman, the missile launch occurred near the the South China Sea during exercises from June 29 to Spratly Islands, approximately 1,000 kilometers, or 621 July 3, sparking strong criticism from the United States, miles, south of Hainan. Australia, and other claimants in the contested area. Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Dave Eastburn described It now appears that the reference to the missile firing the exercise, which reportedly involved anti-ship bal- from man-made structures in the South China Sea may listic missiles fired into the disputed area, as “coercive have been erroneous and may in fact have occurred on acts meant to intimidate other South China Sea claim- the Chinese mainland or, as some analysts now specu- ants.” The continued militarization of the South China late, at a new PLARF facility 10 km west (approximate- Sea by Beijing, and the escalation implied by the use of ly six miles) of the city of Danzhou on Hainan Island, advanced missile systems in the contested area, repre- which abuts the South China Sea. The base is believed sent a direct threat to Taiwan, a claimant in the area. to have become operational since 2018 and is regard- ed as a prime candidate for the deployment of the Prior to the exercise, China’s maritime safety authori- DF-21D and DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile ties in Sansha (三沙市), on Yongxing Island (永興島), (IRBM) on road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers issued a navigation warning in a designated area north (TEL). of the Spratly Islands (南沙群島), between the Spratly and Paracel Islands (西沙群島). Possibly in response Describing the foreign alarm as overreaction and “con- to US complaints about the missile launch(es), Sansha trary to the facts,” China’s Ministry of National Defense Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 7

(MND) said the live-fire exercises by the Southern The- “The ultimate backing for diplomatic effort is absolute atre Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) power, military might. In the case of the US, that’s their were part of an annual drill in waters in proximity to 11 aircraft carrier strike groups,” Ni Lexiong (倪樂雄), a Hainan Province. An unnamed source in the Chinese Shanghai-based military scholar told the Global Times. military told the Global Times, a Chinese Communist “The DF-21D is something that could pose a threat to Party (CCP) mouthpiece, that the live-fire drills were that.” not held in waters near disputed island territory in the South China Sea. On June 2, the PLA Navy also conducted a test-launch of what is suspected to have been a Ju Lang-3 (JL-3, The location of the facility from which the ballistic mis- 巨浪-3) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) siles were fired does make a difference. If they indeed during naval exercise in the Bohai Sea and Bohai Strait occurred from man-made platforms in the South China between the Liaodong and Shandong Peninsulas. The Sea, such a move would constitute grave and incontro- PLA did not confirm the nature of the missile involved. vertible escalation in China’s ongoing militarization of The JL-3 SLBM, which is currently under development, the disputed sea expanse (China denies it is engaged in has an operational range estimated at 14,000 km militarization). Conversely, the launch of ballistic mis- (around 869 miles) and may be equipped with as many siles from inland locations makes their interception by as 10 independent guided nuclear warheads. The mis- the targeted country much more complex, given the sile, which was first test-launched in November 2018, extremely high speeds involved during re-entry (the is expected to enter service on the Type 096 nuclear longer the range of a ballistic missile, the higher it ballistic submarine over the next decade. The launch must climb to reach its target; and the higher it climbs, coincided with the closing day of the 2019 Shangri-La the more time it takes for it to fall to the ground, giv- Dialogue in Singapore and on the day PLA General Wei ing gravity more time to accelerate the descent of the Fenghe (魏鳳和), State Councilor and Minister of Na- warhead, at a rate of about 9.8 m per second squared tional Defense,delivered his assertive plenary talk. 21.92 mi/(h.s). In January 2019, Chinese media reported that the DF- What is less debatable is the fact that the inclusion of 26 had been “mobilized to Northwest China’s plateau ASMBs and IRBMs in live-fire exercises conducted by and desert areas,” after a “US warship trespassed into the PLA’s Southern Theatre Command in or near the China’s territorial waters [sic] off the Xisha [Paracel] Is- South China Sea constitutes escalation and sends a lands in the South China Sea.” threatening signal to the US and other countries which in recent months have conducted freedom of naviga- Consequences and Opportunities For Taiwan tion patrols (FONOP) in the South China Sea as well as Taiwan’s defense ministry has not commented public- free passages in the Taiwan Strait. Should such testing ly on the suspected launches. The Youth Daily News, become regular—and we can expect Beijing will seek published by the ministry, ran a short article on July 6 to normalize those, as it has done in other spheres aggregating foreign news reports on the matter. over the years—the PLA’s ability to improve the accu- racy and performance of its ASBM systems, not just in While there may be a dispute over the origin of the the South China Sea but in the Taiwan Strait and within launches, military forces within the region have the the entire “firsts island chain,” will increase, and with radar- and satellite-tracking capability to differentiate that, its ability to coerce its opponents and reinforce between the firing of regular artillery and that involv- the effectiveness of its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) ing medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. capability. This, no doubt, will complicate the efforts of One of the key regional assets is the long-range ear- the US Navy and regional allies in the South China Sea ly-warning radar (EWR) atop Leshan (樂山) in Hsinchu and beyond. County, Taiwan. While the Chinese Ministry of National Defense sought Located 1,600 km from Taiwan’s southernmost point, to downplay the importance of the drills, Chinese Taiwan-controlled Taiping Island is the largest natural military commentators, often coming across as more feature in the South China Sea. The island features a hawkish than the MND, saw things differently and re- pier and a 1,200-meter runway. The island’s defense garded the move as a means to put pressure on Wash- relies on a combination of 40 mm anti-aircraft artillery ington ahead of negotiations in an escalating trade and 120 mm mortar, AT-4 anti-armor rockets and oth- war, as well as for its leading role in the South China er light weapons. Upgrades to its pier have permitted Sea and continued support for Taiwan. visits by larger-displacement Coast Guard and Navy Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 8 vessels. Advancements in US-Taiwan Relations Arguably the most powerful EWR in the entire region, Counter “Bargaining Chip” Theory the system, which went operational in 2013, has an area of coverage of nearly 360 degrees and a surveil- By: Michael Mazza lance distance as far as 3,000 nautical miles (approx- Michael Mazza is a senior non-resident fellow at GTI. imately 5,000 km). The approximately USD $1.4 bil- He is also a visiting fellow in foreign and defense pol- lion radar has a “comprehensive surveillance” of any icy studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), air-breathing target from the Korean Peninsula in the where he analyzes US defense policy in the Asia-Pacific north to the South China Sea in the south. According region. to the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) Lt. Gen. Wu Wan-chiao (吳萬教), the EWR “provides [Taiwan] with In a June 17 story about a supposed split over Taiwan more than 6 minutes’ warning in preparation for any arms sales within the Trump administration, the Wall surprise attacks” by China. Leshan also was able tode - Street Journal reported, “It took some convincing, but tect a missile launch by North Korea in December 2012 Mr. Trump came around … and he now sees the value a few minutes ahead of Japan, which is located much in using Taiwan as a bargaining chip in his talks with closer to the launch site, Taiwan’s Ministry of National China.” It was a devastating sentence for Taiwan’s lead- Defense said at the time. ers and for supporters of the US-Taiwan relationship to read. Taipei has been worried about being conceived Quantitative and qualitative improvements in the of as a “bargaining chip” since the early days of Don- PLARF’s arsenal, and the deployment of new systems ald Trump’s presidency, when he backed off his earli- along coastal areas of the People’s Republic of China er questioning of the “one China policy” and instead (PRC), pose a substantial threat to Taiwan, the target committed to it in order, ostensibly, to secure a phone of an estimated 1,600 ballistic missiles from China, as call with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Early excitement well as US forces based in the region (Okinawa, Guam), following President Tsai Ing-wen’s own congratulatory and any country that seeks to involve itself in a Tai- phone call with President-elect Trump quickly shifted wan Strait military contingency. The growing threat of to a feeling of nervousness and potential foreboding. IRBMs and ASBMs to the entire region therefore cre- ates an opportunity for Taiwan to put the EWR’s capa- Nerves calmed as worst fears did not come to fruition, bilities at the disposal of its security partners through with a number of Taiwan-friendly officials taking po- early warning and intelligence sharing (Taiwan would sitions at the National Security Council, State Depart- not confirm it was sharing data collected from the EWR ment, and Defense Department, with the president with the US, but there is every reason to believe that signing bills designed to improve US-Taiwan relations, exchanges do occur regularly). As Kevin Cheng (鄭繼 and with the administration seeming to move to a 文), chief editor of Asia-Pacific Defense Magazine, ob- regular arms sales process. Over the past two years, served in 2013, “Through the sharing with the United senior administration officials including Vice President States of the information it collects from the radar sys- Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, National tem, Taiwan becomes a critical link in the US strategic Security Advisor John Bolton, former Permanent Rep- defense network in the region.” resentative to the United Nations Nikki Haley, Ambas- sador at Large for International Religious Freedom Sam Once again, Chinese assertiveness and its willingness Brownback, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for In- to challenge established rules is creating incentives for do-Pacific Security Affairs Randall Schriver have spoken the US and the region to further engage Taiwan on se- publicly about Taiwan in positive terms. Indeed, it has curity matters. become common to describe US-Taiwan relations as The main point: The reported test-launch of anti-ship the best they have been in many years, perhaps since ballistic missiles by the PLA Rocket Force near or into the severing of formal relations in 1979. Yet concerns contested areas of the South China Sea during exercis- have lingered about the president’s own views of the es in late June and early July escalates tensions in the island, which remain unclear. region and puts a premium on Taiwan’s ability to share The Wall Street Journal story dropped with US-China intelligence on missile launches with its allies. trade negotiations in a prolonged stalemate. The G20 summit was approaching and Xi Jinping had not yet agreed to a sidelines sit-down with President Trump in Osaka. According to the Journal, there were grow- Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 9 ing concerns within the administration that Xi might ping in on her way to Haiti, St. Vincent use the potential sale of new tanks and other arms “as and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, and St. Christopher and one more excuse not to meet.” The real concern, of Nevis. While in New York, she hosted a reception for the course, was not that President Trump would trade an United Nations representatives of Taiwan’s diplomatic arms sale for a meeting, but that he would do so as allies, met with business leaders, strolled through Cen- part of a trade deal. Although the G20 seemed unlike- tral Park with young expats from Taiwan, delivered an ly to significantly affect Taiwan’s status in Washington, address at Columbia University, and spoke by phone the possibility could not be ruled out. with Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi. Increasing Trade Ties Washington’s accommodation of Tsai’s travels is as Any concerns that US-Taiwan relations would take a good a sign as any that the US-Taiwan relationship re- hit in the summit’s aftermath have thus far proven un- mains on firm footing. Beijing always raises stern ob- founded. Indeed, there was a glut of good news in the jections to presidential transits of the United States days immediately preceding and following the Osaka as such transits are seen as conferring legitimacy on meetings. the so-called “Taiwan authorities.” That the Trump ad- Just before the G20, it was reported that American pork ministration is welcoming and indeed facilitating two exports to Taiwan “are surging in 2019.” Compared to (relatively) extended stays over the course of eleven the same period last year, pork exports through April days suggests that the administration does not see its 2019 grew by 80 percent in metric tons and by 55 per- relationship with Taiwan as leverage to put to use vis- cent in dollar value. The same report noted that in à-vis Beijing. 2018, US beef exports to Taiwan exceeded $500 mil- Arms Sales lion for the first time, and “nearly doubled in volume and more than doubled in value over a period of just Need more evidence? Just last week, following approv- five years.” al from the Department of State, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of two impend- Taiwan’s restrictions on the import of American beef ing arms sales to Taiwan. The sales are substantial. The and especially pork have long been a thorn in the side first package is to include 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks of US-Taiwan trade relations. This new data supports and associated equipment, support, and training for a the contention that such restrictions are not the salient cost of approximately $2 billion. The second package hindrance to US exports and thus to deeper trade ties is a $224 million sale of Stinger missiles and related that they once were (as Dan Blumenthal and I argued equipment and support. These arms will better enable in a paper earlier this year for the Project 2049 Insti- Taiwan to defend its airspace, counter an invasion, and tute). A bilateral free trade agreement has long been thus deter Chinese aggression. a top priority for the Tsai administration. President Tsai can wield this news to contrast Taiwan favorably On cue, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng with China, which has cut agricultural imports from the Shuang claimed the sale “flagrantly interferes in Chi- United States, and to make the case that a free trade na’s domestic affairs and harms China’s sovereignty agreement would further benefit American farmers. and security interests,” and called on the United States to “cancel this arms sale immediately and stop mil- Visit-like Transits itary ties with Taiwan to prevent further damage to And now, President Tsai can make that case to Amer- China-US relations and peace and stability across the icans directly. On July 1, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Taiwan Strait.” China signaled its displeasure at the po- Affairs announced that President Tsai would soon vis- tential sale prior to the notification as well. It is even it four diplomatic allies in the Caribbean, a trip to be possible that Xi raised it directly with President Trump punctuated by two “transit” stops in the United States. during their meeting in Japan. However Chinese objec- Each US visit would be a two-night stay, allowing plen- tions were raised, those objections were not persua- ty of time for engagement with government, business, sive to leaders in Washington. and civil society leaders. (Typically, Taiwan’s presidents In short, the US-Taiwan relationship does not appear spend only one night in the United States on a “transit” to be for sale. Of course, even given positive develop- stop.) ments over the last two years, there is no guarantee of Last week, President Tsai made her first transit, stop- future progress in the relationship, especially as Bei- jing continues to pressure the Trump administration to Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 10 distance itself from Taipei and with President Trump’s Weighing the Effects of Taiwan-China personal commitment to the relationship remaining a question mark. What’s more, aside from ongoing Competition in Latin America and the negotiations over the sale of F-16s, it is unclear what Caribbean comes next for Washington and Taipei, with the presi- dential transits and finalization of the recently notified By: Margaret Myers and Isabel Bernhard arms sales soon to be in the rearview mirror. Margaret Myers is director of the Asia and Latin Amer- Moving Towards a Bilateral Agenda ica program in Washington, DC. Isabel Bernhard is an intern with the Asia and Latin America program and a In order to give impetus to continuing advances in student at Harvard University. US-Taiwan relations (and thus to make it even more valuable to the United States, making it all the more Since 2017, three countries in Latin America and the difficult for anyone to bargain away), the two govern- Caribbean (LAC)—the Dominican Republic, Panama, ments should agree to a shared agenda—a succinct and El Salvador—have shifted diplomatic recognition but wide-ranging public plan to deepen ties that both from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), sides can use to measure progress and to hold each marking an end to a decade-long unofficial diplomat- other accountable. Such an agenda could be negotiat- ic truce between China and Taiwan in LAC and other ed by the director of American Institute in Taiwan and regions. As Taiwan grapples with its shifting diplo- his counterparts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in matic outlook, Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen has Taipei before approval by senior leaders. It should be embarked on a trip to the United States and several specific enough to necessitate genuine action to meet Caribbean nations to reaffirm Taiwan’s commitment to goals described, but vague enough to allow flexibility in remaining allies. what those actions should be (e.g., the agenda should Beijing’s most recent diplomatic gains in the region are not specify the provision of specific defense articles). at least in part the result of enhanced diplomatic activ- The Trump and Tsai administrations both deserve praise ity in the region, and among Taiwan’s remaining allies. for advancing the bilateral relationship, but there is no The May 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen and clear, agreed-upon roadmap for the relationship’s fu- concerns in China about her perceived pro-indepen- ture direction. Setting forth such a roadmap or agenda dence agenda has reignited diplomatic competition will help to inure the relationship against forces that between China and Taiwan in the LAC region. Chinese might seek to push the United States and Taiwan apart. officials have been increasingly active in promoting It would also help to prevent leaders in either capital diplomatic ties with the mainland. from sitting on their laurels after a significant accom- China’s most recent diplomatic overtures in LAC also plishment, such as a major arms sale, as there would correspond with the global expansion of its Belt and remain yet more to accomplish. Under the Trump and Road Initiative (BRI, originally “One Belt, One Road”), Tsai administrations, the US-Taiwan relationship has which promises infrastructure and other forms of con- reached new heights. There is no reason it cannot soar nectivity. Xi’s signature foreign policy platform was -of even higher. ficially extended to the LAC region during the January The main point: The past two years have seen contin- CELAC Ministerial Forum in January 2018 after much ued advances in US-Taiwan relations, despite fears that lobbying by Latin American ambassadors and other of- the Trump administration would use Taiwan as - bar ficials. gaining chip in US-China relations. A joint agenda for Though not well understood in Latin America, and sub- the relationship would help ensure that bilateral ties ject to varying definitions even in China, the BRI and continue to deepen in the years ahead. the investment opportunities it purports have been attractive to China’s and Taiwan’s diplomatic allies alike. The decisions by Dominican, Panamanian, and Salvadoran governments to establish diplomatic ties with China were based in large part on the prospect of large-scale infrastructure and other investment in their countries. As former president of Panama Juan Carlos Varela indicated in a speech in Hong Kong in 2019, the BRI is “all about connectivity and Panama is Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 11 one of the most connected countries in the region.” in their diplomatic support for Taiwan. In May, three He added that his country saw a “big opportunity” in US senators reintroduced the draft Taiwan Allies Inter- the BRI. Panama, which broke ties with Taiwan in 2017, national Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act to was the first country in the region to lsign a bilateral engage with governments in the world that support Belt and Road Cooperation Agreement with China. The Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition. US leverage over -de Dominican Republic since signed a similar agreement cision-making in the Northern Triangle region of Cen- with China after establishing relations with Beijing and tral America (comprising El Salvador, Guatemala, and El Salvador reportedly inked several Belt and Road-re- Honduras) has arguably decreased, however, since the lated MOUs in after its decision to break ties with Tai- Trump administration threatened to cut funding to pei. To date, sixteen other LAC nations have also signed those countries in April 2019. bilateral BRI agreements with China. Whatever Taiwan’s remaining allies decide to act, they China has delivered on at least some of its BRI-relat- should monitor outcomes in those countries that have ed messaging. China-backed infrastructure deals are decided to break their diplomatic ties with Taiwan in the works throughout the region, including in the in recent years, noting thatthe extensive variation in three LAC countries that recently established ties with outcomes on a country-by-country basis. Panama has Beijing. China bid on and won a number of construc- seen a boom in Chinese activity, with Chinese enti- tion contracts in Panama over the past year and a half, ties involved in at least nine confirmed infrastructure and has also discussed a possible China-backed rail- projects, but Chinese companies were active in Pan- way with Panamanian officials, which would run from ama many years before the country chose to cut ties Panama City to the border of Costa Rica. The railway, with Taiwan. The Central American country has been which has already progressed past an initial feasibility of strategic interest to Chinese investors for more than study, was among the first ventures in the region to be a decade. Though a Taiwan ally at the time, Panama officially affiliated with the BRI. featured in the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 2010 going-out guide for companies seeking to invest in Lat- China reportedly offered the Dominican Republic a in America. package worth $3 billion in exchange for diplomatic recognition, over half of which was destined forin- By comparison, Chinese engagement with Costa Rica frastructure projects. The Dominican Republic is also is exceedingly limited, even though Costa Rica estab- in the process of securing a $600 million loan from lished ties with China over a decade ago. At that time, China’s Export-Import Bank to upgrade its power dis- China promised a stadium, a refinery, and the expan- tribution systems, and President Medina has flagged sion of a critical roadway, but only the stadium and an additional projects for possible Chinese support, in- initial road authorization have materialized—the latter cluding the modernization of the Port of Arroyo Barril. after about a decade of debate in Costa Rica. The Re- El Salvador’s former ruling Farabundo Martí National cope refinery project is now in litigation at the Interna- Liberation Front (FMLN) tentativelynegotiated at least tional Chamber of Commerce amidst accusations that two major projects with China—renovation of the the Chinese partner firm in the joint venture attempted La Union Port and a possible special economic zone, to downplay environmental implications of the project which would account for about 14 percent of Salvador- when developing pre-construction impact studies. In an territory and much of the country’s coastline—be- comparison to elsewhere in LAC, deal-making in Costa fore siding diplomatically with Beijing Rica has seemingly been limited by the country’s ex- tensive environmental regulations. As the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama navigate their new ties with Beijing, Taiwan’s remaining Public perception of Chinese investment also varies allies in the LAC region—Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, considerably in these countries. Whereas everyday Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Panamanians are largely optimistic about continued Vincent and the Grenadines—are no doubt weighing prospects for cooperation with China, the debate their options. Some, such as Guatemala, appear con- about Chinese engagement in El Salvador is largely con- tent with their current diplomatic arrangements. Gua- fined to the political class. Costa Ricans have expressed temala’s president reiterated his support for Taiwan in mixed feelings about economic partnership with Chi- April, during a visit to Taipei. Others may fear that cut- na, and especially about the stadium they were gifted. ting ties with Taiwan would lead to retaliation from the It was a generous gesture on the one hand, but limited US. The US government has indicated a strong prefer- public funding for stadium upkeep has been problem- ence that Guatemala and Honduras remain steadfast atic, and inconsistencies between the stadium’s elec- Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 4, Issue 14 12 trical infrastructure and Costa Rica’s electricity grid re- sulted in some costly reconfigurations. Across the board, LAC countries can certainly bene- fit from enhanced economic ties with China, but the extent and quality of these benefits may vary, as un- derscored by neighboring Panama and Costa Rica. The ways in which other nations derive advantages from their new relations with China will depend on the types of deals they strike, on the state of their regula- tory environments, and their capacity to ensure com- pliance with existing regulations and standards. China may have dealt a considerable blow to Taiwanese di- plomacy in the region over the past year and half, but it is still navigating the differences between successfully creating and cultivating alliances. The main point: China’s economic outreach in LAC has eroded Taiwan’s diplomatic presence in the region, but mixed investment results and divided public reception will complicate China’s attempts to cultivate its new -re lations.