DOCSLIB.ORG

Katerina Vardalaki (RIEAS Senior Analyst & Security Expert)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Katerina Vardalaki (RIEAS Senior Analyst & Security Expert) A long-term discussion for ransomware as an intelligence threat Katerina Vardalaki (RIEAS Senior Analyst & Security Expert) Copyright: Research Institute for European and American Studies (www.rieas.gr) Publication date: 24 January 2021 Note: The article reflects the opinion of the author and not necessarily the views of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) Ransomware is a type of infectious malware that uses encryption methods to deny access to files (Glasberg, 2016) but that definition is simple and does not include many details (Azad, 2017). It is enduring, prevalent and has been a valid concern since its first appearance in 1989. Considering that cyber crime is in its entirety human related (Penuel et al., 2013), ransomware provides a viable business model (Cartwright & Cartwright, 2019). This issue has been ignored and profusely underestimated (Funke, 2016). Consequently, it is legislated within the legal precedence of both the United States and Greece with different approaches and measures. Legislation can provide insight about the way specific countries adapt to changes. The American and Greek realities have different views about cyber matters. In US governmental situations, serious investigations are launched after such threats occur and security-based systems are improved preemptively. The US provide a plethora of ransomware incidents (GCI, 2018; Malwarebytes, 2019) and tactics on how the state responded through legislation or other means. The US signed the Budapest Convention in 2006 and implemented the changes in 2007. Greece, on the other hand, ratified the proposed Convention in 2016 (Papantoniou, 2017) thus, making it the last EU member state to follow the convention’s directions. Moreover, Greece provides a vague and non-clarified term of cyber-crime (Spathi, 2016) without even mentioning ransomware. In the US, all 50 states have specific cyber-crime divisions or their own law enforcement, which is also responsible for cyber-crimes (Morgan, 1 2019). This is due to the lack of an overarching federal legislation covering ransomware attacks. Due to the absence of federal guidelines, states are called upon to cover the legal lacuna which remains. Although not all of them possess specific laws which touch up on ransomware, the ones that have the term mentioned in their Penal Codes are: California, Connecticut, Michigan, Texas, and Wyoming. Local governments have been the target for extortion attacks from foreign sources, such as the Iranian attack that the Department of Justice1 claimed caused 30 million dollars in losses (DOJ, 2018). This aspect of ransomware means that it can be used and exploited by state actors and not just criminal groups or regular hackers. Previously Iran’s own oil industry was targeted by the “Wiper” attack, and in the now-leaked National Security Agency (NSA) document2, it is stated that Iran might have learned the way to use malicious code for the same reason as it was used on them: disruption of government, facilities and monetary gain. Similarly, other attacks targeting the US originated from Russian hackers like Yakubets who is accused of leading “Evil Corp”, a cyber-criminal network which created an attack called Dridex. Kshetri (Kshetri, 2006) reports a case where the FBI arrested two Russian hackers by downloading incriminating files from their original computers in Russia. Two years later, Russia filed hacking charges against the FBI, claiming that it is illegal to download files from systems located in Russia. In other cases, Kshetri states, the US has requested help from Russia with regards to cyber criminals and received no response. Furthermore, the National Secret Services of Uzbekistan (Zetter, 2019; Lyngaas, 2019) bought and later created their own malware to use it against its citizens and other countries. Uzbekistan is not the only state actor who attempted to use malware, spyware and exploits. The case of “Phineas Fisher” and the hack against the Italian “Hacking Team” company brought into light the economy behind creating malware as a political tool. The “Hacking Team” company sold spyware and hacking services to intelligence agencies and police forces internationally (Franceschi- Bicchierai, 2016). 1 The two Iranian hackers attacked computers in 10 US states and Canada. Full report can be found here : https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-iranian-men-indicted-deploying-ransomware-extort- hospitals-municipalities-and-public 2 Can be found here : https://theintercept.com/document/2015/02/10/iran-current-topics- interaction-gchq/ 2 Moreover, due to the difficulty of tracing the criminals (Palmer, 2019), either because of jurisdictional issues and national boundaries (Kshetri, 2006) or the use of anonymous (Baggili, Rogers, et al., 2009) Bitcoincs, criminals remain at large. Evidently, the legislative framework exists and may cover the necessary clauses for criminals, however, it is difficult to impose it. Additional law will not help if there is no way to enforce it (Neuhauser, 2018). Ransomware is hard to trace for a multitude of reasons, and the concerns for investigations are usually jurisdictional, since the perpetrators may have deployed it from a different country. If criminals are caught, the chances of their original country extraditing them to be prosecuted in the victim country are few (Palmer, 2019). Concerns are also raised as to which activities should law consider, how to legislate them and how often. All the aforementioned reasons create doubts about the necessity of another broad, one-sided and unenforceable law. The long-term approach would need a delicate legislative hand. First comes the matter of cooperation and then the matter of forensics and information. Dixon suggests two steps that should be followed: 1) Establish dialogue and a shared vision (Dixon, 2019). The solution comes from a cooperation under a common knowledge, firstly in the European level and then globally. 2) Decide on global principles for public and private partnership (Dixon, 2019). The telecommunication companies, the internet service providers and valuable private actors can cooperate with government law enforcement agencies and provide them with information to locate the perpetrators. The issue needs a global cyber-crime framework, which would cover many cyber-crimes and offenses, and will be agreed upon from every (cooperative) country. Secondly, the establishment of a global Cyber Crime Division, that would be responsible, as law enforcement, to gather all information from all countries and industries, alongside a global Cyber Crime Court of Justice that would be manned exclusively with legal experts on cyber matters. This idea is ambitious and challenging, for which a research much more extensive than the present one is necessary. However, realizing the limitations of this proposal, I would suggest for legal experts and security experts to combine forces and take the necessary steps to reach a consensus against a global threat which will not subside with the legal approach that is now being used. 3 References Azad A.(2017). Ransomware: a research and a personal case study of dealing with this nasty malware. Issues in Informing Science & Information Technology, vol. 14, 2017, p. 87+. Baggili, I., & Rogers, M. (2009). Self-Reported Cyber Crime: An Analysis on the Effects of Anonymity and Pre-Employment Integrity. International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 3(2):550-565. Cartwright, Anna, & Cartwright, Edward. (2019). Ransomware and Reputation. Games, 10(2), Games, Jun 2019, Vol.10(2). Department of Justice. (2018, November 28). Two Iranian Men Indicted for Deploying Ransomware to Extort Hospitals, Municipalities, and Public Institutions, Causing Over $30 Million in Losses. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-iranian-men-indicted-deploying-ransomware- extort-hospitals-municipalities-an d-public Dixon, W. (2019, February 19). Fighting cybercrime – what happens to the law when the law cannot be enforced? World Economic Forum. Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/02/fighting-cybercrime-what-happens-to-the- law-when-the-law-cannot-be-enforced/ Franceschi-Bicchierai, L., (2016, November 12). Hacker ‘Phineas Fisher’ speaks on camera for the first time- through a puppet. Vice Motherboard. Retrieved from https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/78kwke/hacker-phineas-fisher-hacking-team- puppet Funke, G. (2016). Training Challenges in Cyber Security. Addressing Human Factors Gaps in Cyber Defense. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting. 60. 770-773. 10.1177/1541931213601176. Glassberg, J. (2016). Defending against the ransom ware threat. POWERGRID International, 21(8), 22-24 Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI), (2018). Global Cybersecurity Index 2018. ITU Publications. Retrieved from https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR- GCI.01-2018-PDF-E.pdf Kshetri, N. (2006). The simple economics of cybercrimes. IEEE Security & Privacy, 4(1), 33-39. Lyngaas, S.(2019, October 3). How Uzbekistan's security service (allegedly) began developing its own malware. Cyberscoop. Retrieved from https://www.cyberscoop.com/uzbekistan-sandcat-kaspersky/ Malwarebytes. (2019). Cybercrime tactics and techniques: Ransomware Retrospective. (CTNT Report 2019). Retrieved from https://resources.malwarebytes.com/files/2019/08/CTNT-2019- Ransomware_August_FINAL.pdf Morgan, S., (2019, September 22). Directory of U.S. State and local cybercrime law enforcement. Cybercrime Magazine. Retrieved from 4 https://cybersecurityventures.com/directory-of-u-s-state-and-local-cybercrime-law- enforcement/ Palmer, D. (2019, November 29). Ransomware: Big paydays and little chance of getting caught means boom time for crooks. ZDNet. Retrieved from https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-big-paydays-and-little-chance-of-getting- caught-means-boom-time-for-crooks/ Papantoniou, K. (2017). How Cybercrime is Punished. Broker’s Time 49(15), Retrieved from: https://www.bahagram.com/wp- content/uploads/2017/07/%CE%A0%CE%A9%CE%A3-%CE%A4%CE%99%CE%9 C%CE%A9%CE%A1%CE%95%CE%99%CE%A4%CE%91%CE%99-%CE%A4% CE%9F-%CE%9A%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%9D%CE%9F%CE%95%CE%93%CE %9A%CE%9B%CE%97%CE%9C%CE%91.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0UW0IgwzCeI79xOz zx33sci Penuel, K.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Sector 17 1 TABLE of CONTENTS
    BlueVoyant | Sector 17 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 3 Key Findings 4 Part 1: Industry Overview 5 Part 2: Threat Landscape 7 Section 1: Criminal Pursuit of Sensitive Financial Information 7 Section 2: Extortion (Non-Ransomware) 9 Section 3: Ransomware 10 Section 4: Criminal Pursuit of PII 11 Section 5: Third-Party Risks 12 Section 6: Password Breaches and Leaks 14 Section 7: Hacktivism 16 Part 3: Dark Web Overview 18 Part 4: Industry Cybersecurity Review 24 Section 1: Legal Sector Overview – Global 24 Section 2: Legal Sector Overview – In Depth 25 Conclusion - Sector 17 28 Citations and Endnotes 29 Recommendations 30 BlueVoyant | Sector 17 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security defined 16 sectors critical to securing national infrastructure, resources, and resiliency1. BlueVoyant, a company made up of seasoned cybersecurity experts, including former leaders in our intelligence and law enforcement communities, has identified one more: the legal sector. The integrity of U.S. and international law firms is indispensable ot the functioning of our economies and key public and private institutions. The legal sector ensures justice and order, as well as providing mechanisms that encourage and safeguard innovation and economic growth. The lawyers who help interpret, apply, and enforce the law necessarily become trusted advisors to individuals and corporations. Like healthcare institutions, law firms hold troves of personally identifiable information (PII); they also hold critical intellectual property (IP) and sensitive data for clients. Like banks and credit unions, law firms are critical to the proper functioning of our economy. And like no other sector, except perhaps government, law firms act as a major arbiter and safekeeper of public trust.
    [Show full text]
  • A DIY Guide to Rob Banks by Subcowmandante Marcos
    _ _ _ ____ _ _ | | | | __ _ ___| | __ | __ ) __ _ ___| | _| | | |_| |/ _` |/ __| |/ / | _ \ / _` |/ __| |/ / | | _ | (_| | (__| < | |_) | (_| | (__| <|_| |_| |_|\__,_|\___|_|\_\ |____/ \__,_|\___|_|\_(_) A DIY guide to rob banks ^__^ (oo)\_______ ( (__)\ )\/\ _) / ||----w | (.)/ || || `' Formatted and distributed by ftp://distro "Live Communism, Spread Anarchy!" ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ by Subcowmandante Blog: Marcos https://ftpdistro.noblogs.org Instagram: https://instagram.com/ftp.distro Store: https://ftpdistro.github.io Translation of Phineas Fishers Cayman Bank Hack Communique No Copyright 2020© Set in Source Code Pro (24pt, 10pt) and Garamond (12pt) ******************************* We were born at night. We live in it, we hack in it. Here we are, we are the rebel dignity, the forgotten heart of the Интернет. Translation notes: Our fight is for memory and justice, Bulk of translation done by Google Translate (which and the bad government is filled with criminals and did a remarkably good job outside of slang and computer terms!), with edits for clarity and murderers. formatting by @laudecay. I got the Spanish version from the bottom of this article, it’s in the leak: Our fight is for fair and decent work, https://unicornriot.ninja/2019/massive-hack-strikes- and bad government and corporations buy and sell zero offshore-cayman-national-bank-and-trust/ days. The UR article also has a lot of info about the history of Phineas’s hacks and resources she’s provided to the community in the past, and Crimethinc For all tomorrow. has some interviews with her.
    [Show full text]
  • Reporting, and General Mentions Seem to Be in Decline
    CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Return to Normalcy: False Flags and the Decline of International Hacktivism By Insikt Group® CTA-2019-0821 CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Groups with the trappings of hacktivism have recently dumped Russian and Iranian state security organization records online, although neither have proclaimed themselves to be hacktivists. In addition, hacktivism has taken a back seat in news reporting, and general mentions seem to be in decline. Insikt Group utilized the Recorded FutureⓇ Platform and reports of historical hacktivism events to analyze the shifting targets and players in the hacktivism space. The target audience of this research includes security practitioners whose enterprises may be targets for hacktivism. Executive Summary Hacktivism often brings to mind a loose collective of individuals globally that band together to achieve a common goal. However, Insikt Group research demonstrates that this is a misleading assumption; the hacktivist landscape has consistently included actors reacting to regional events, and has also involved states operating under the guise of hacktivism to achieve geopolitical goals. In the last 10 years, the number of large-scale, international hacking operations most commonly associated with hacktivism has risen astronomically, only to fall off just as dramatically after 2015 and 2016. This constitutes a return to normalcy, in which hacktivist groups are usually small sets of regional actors targeting specific organizations to protest regional events, or nation-state groups operating under the guise of hacktivism. Attack vectors used by hacktivist groups have remained largely consistent from 2010 to 2019, and tooling has assisted actors to conduct larger-scale attacks. However, company defenses have also become significantly better in the last decade, which has likely contributed to the decline in successful hacktivist operations.
    [Show full text]
  • 2016 CYBERTHREATS and TRENDS REPORT Verisign Idefense® Security Intelligence Services CONTENTS
    2016 CYBERTHREATS AND TRENDS REPORT Verisign iDefense® Security Intelligence Services CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 CYBERCRIME 6 Criminal Migration to the Darknet 6 Ransomware-as-a-Service 6 The Rise of DD4BC 7 Downloader Architecture Evolves 8 VULNERABILITIES 10 Increased Adobe Flash Exploitation 10 Proliferation of Exploit Kits 11 Hacking Team Hacked; Zero-Days Leaked 12 HACKTIVISM 14 Ideological Hacktivism in International Decline 14 Increase in Hacktivist OPSEC 15 Shift to Criminal and Notoriety Hacktivism 15 Increasing Size, Complexity of DDoS Attacks 16 CONCLUSION 18 ABOUT VERISIGN 18 2 Verisign Public | 2016 Cyberthreats and Trends INTRODUCTION The Verisign iDefense 2016 Cyberthreats and Trends Report provides an overview of the key cybersecurity trends of the previous year and insight into how Verisign believes those trends will evolve over the coming year. The objective of this report is to assist in informing cybersecurity and business The Verisign iDefense 2016 operations teams of the critical cyberthreats and trends impacting their Cyberthreats and Trends enterprises, helping them anticipate key cybersecurity developments and more Report provides an overview effectively triage attacks and allocate increasingly limited resources. of the key cybersecurity trends of the previous year This report features conclusions drawn from Verisign iDefense Security and insight into how Verisign Intelligence Services research and analysis covering cybercrime, hacktivism believes those trends will and vulnerabilities. These areas of coverage include public and zero-day evolve over the coming year. vulnerabilities, threat tactics, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, threat actors, threats to key infrastructure, strategic intent, malware tools, and threat and vulnerability management, mitigation and countermeasures.
    [Show full text]
  • A Cybersecurity Threat Model for a Combined Cyberattack Against Hospitals and Terrorist Attack in Spain
    A Cybersecurity Threat Model for a Combined Cyberattack against Hospitals and Terrorist Attack in Spain Oxford University - Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Project Report CONSULTANTS: Lucas Kello (Principal Consultant) Ivan Martinovic Martin Strohmeier Florian Egloff Academic Coordinator (UAM): Raquel Galindo Dorado A Cybersecurity Threat Model for a Combined Cyberattack against Hospitals and Terrorist Attack in Spain 1. INTRODUCTION This report is structured as follows: Section 2 will provide the necessary background on cybersecurity in the healthcare Hospital cybersecurity is a global concern. According sector. Section 3 discusses the capabilities and motivations to an investigation by Pulse magazine, health record of different threat actors while Section 4 presents the analysis security breaches in the United Kingdom’s at National of potential vulnerabilities in the reviewed hospitals in Health Service rose 20 percent in the last year. Data from Madrid. Section 5 compares the different IT infrastructure 55 hospitals indicated breaches included records dumped paradigms in terms of security and risk. In Section 6, a in public places, records given to the wrong patient and case study on large medical devices discusses the patching patient data given to relatives without permission. In 2015 process. Finally, Section 7 provides recommendations and alone, more than 94 million U.S. health records were concludes this report. compromised, costing affected institutions approximately $46 billion. According to Experian’s 2014 Data Breach Industry Forecast, the healthcare industry will be among 2. BACKGROUND the most susceptible industries to publicly disclosed and This section will discuss the current cybersecurity widely scrutinized data breaches.1 The October 2013 environment in the healthcare sector.
    [Show full text]
  • Epilogo Anonymous Oggi Sono Arrivato Ad Apprezzare La
    Epilogo Anonymous oggi Sono arrivato ad apprezzare la segretezza. Mi sembra l’unica cosa capace di rendere misteriosa o meravigliosa la vita moderna. La cosa più mondana diventa deliziosa quando gli altri la ignorano. –Oscar Wilde I tecnici apolitici hanno un’educazione politica straordinaria. –Julian Assange Quanto descritto fin qui potrebbe sembrare a molti il periodo di maggior splendore per le attività di Anonymous: il ruolo di sostegno ai vari movimenti coinvolti nella Primavera Araba; l’attenzione mediatica di alto profilo conquistata dagli spavaldi hack di LulzSec e AntiSec; il crescente impegno a sostegno della giustizia sociale negli Stati Uniti, oltre alla concreta opposizione alla cultura dello stupro e alla brutalità della polizia. Ovviamente questa nutrita ondata di proteste è andata scontrandosi con la repressione, parimenti copiosa, delle forze dell’ordine. Complessivamente, tra Europa, Asia, Australia e Americhe, sono stati arrestati oltre un centinaio di attivisti legati ad Anonymous – compresi alcuni già menzionati nelle pagine precedenti, tra cui Jeremy Hammond e John Borell negli Stati Uniti, Ryan Ackroyd e Mustafa Al-Bassam nel Regno Unito. Altri geek vennero arrestati semplicemente per aver prestato una piccola porzione dei loro computer alle campagne DDoS organizzate dal collettivo nel tentativo di colpire collettivamente gli istituti finanziari come PayPal, quando cedettero alle pressioni del governo Usa bloccando tutti i loro servizi a WikiLeaks, già sotto assedio su vari fronti. Rispetto a ogni altra nazione del mondo occidentale, gli Stati Uniti sono stati i più aggressivi nel perseguire penalmente gli hacktivisti di Anonymous, con condanne ben più lunghe accompagnate da multe astronomiche. Non solo gli attivisti, tra cui Jeremy Hammond, ma anche i collaboratori esterni, come Barrett Brown, hanno ricevuto pene severe a seguito del caso Stratfor (maggiori dettagli più avanti).
    [Show full text]
  • From Bozkurt to Buhtrap
    From Bozkurt to Buhtrap Cyber threats affecting financial institutions in 1H 2016 1 Table of Contents Executive Summary ............................................................... ...............................3 Hacktivism........................................................................................................... ..4 OpIcarus............................................................................................................... ..4 OpAfrica................................................................................................................ ..5 Phineas Fisher........................................................................................................5 Cybercrime ............................................................................................................6 DDoS-based extortion activity................................................................................6 Data breaches...................................................................................................... ..8 Business email compromise .............................................................................. ..9 Malware campaigns............................................................................................. 10 Targeted attacks..................................................................................................12 Mossack Fonseca..................................................................................................12 Attacks on the SWIFT network in 2016................................................................12
    [Show full text]
  • Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy the Many Faces of Anonymous
    hacker, hoaxer, whistleblower, spy the many faces of anonymous Gabriella Coleman London • New York Hacker Hoaxer Whistleblower 2015 PB 13-08-15.indd 3 8/13/2015 3:44:42 PM Epilogue: The State of Anonymous “I have grown to love secrecy. It seems to be the one thing that can make modern life mysterious or marvelous to us. The commonest thing is delightful if only one hides it.” Oscar Wilde “The political education of apolitical technical people is extra ordinary.” Julian Assange he period described in this book may seem to many to represent the pinnacle of Anonymous activity: their Tsupport role in the various movements that constituted the Arab Spring; the high-profile media attention garnered by the gutsy LulzSec and AntiSec hacks; the ever growing com- mitment to domestic social justice issues seen in engagements against rape culture and police brutality. Unsurprisingly, this impressive flurry of protest activity was met with similarly impressive law enforcement crackdowns. Throughout Europe, Asia, Australia, and the Americas, law enforcement officials detained over one hundred Anonymous activists—including many of the figures profiled in this book: Jeremy Hammond and John Borell in the United States, and Ryan Ackroyd and Mustafa Al-Bassam in the United Hacker Hoaxer Whistleblower 2015 PB 13-08-15.indd 401 8/13/2015 3:44:54 PM 402 hacker, hoaxer, whistleblower, spy Kingdom. Others arrested were geeky activists whose “crime” had been to simply channel a small portion of their computer resources toward DDoS campaigns organized by Anonymous in an effort to collectively shame financial organizations, such as PayPal when they caved to government pressure and terminated all services to the embattled whistleblowing organ- ization WikiLeaks.
    [Show full text]
  • The Terrorist – Hacker Hacktivist Distinction
    This is an accepted manuscript version for a book chapter published in Terrorists' Use of the Internet. Please cite as: Tanczer, L.M. (2017). The Terrorist – Hacker/Hacktivist Distinction: An Investigation of Self-Identified Hackers and Hacktivists. In M. Conway, L. Jarvis, O. Lehane, S. Macdonald & L. Nouri (Eds.), Terrorists' Use of the Internet. (pp. 77-92). Amsterdam: IOS Press. The final publication is available at IOS Press through http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-765-8-77. The copyright belongs to the author. www.iospress.nl Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998202 The Terrorist – Hacker/Hacktivist Distinction: An Investigation of Self-Identified Hackers and Hacktivists Leonie Maria TANCZERa,1 aUniversity College London Abstract. The academic literature on terrorism is filled with references to online activities and the equation of hacking and hacktivism (i.e., politically motivated hacking) with cyberterrorism. This perspective ignores differences in capacities, scope, and motives in hackers/hacktivists. Besides, scholarly research is lacking examinations of those being perceived as alleged ‘security threats’. The present paper therefore uses interviews with self-identified hackers and hacktivists (N = 35) to address this gap. It examines the distinction between hacking, hacktivism, and cyberterrorism and studies the discourses and practices of hackers and hacktivists. Building upon the theoretical concept of (in)securitisation and the method of thematic analysis, the findings provide insights into the perceived (a) external assessment of hackers and hacktivists by external actors and their (b) self-assessment that stands in contrast to the viewpoints expressed earlier. The results highlight interviewees’ objection to the translation of hacking and hacktivism into violent acts of any nature, with participants articulating that the connection of these concept poses threats to civil liberties and political rights online.
    [Show full text]
  • Hack Back a DIY Guide to Robbing Banks
    The Anarchist Library (Mirror) Anti-Copyright Hack Back A DIY guide to robbing banks Subcowmandante Marcos, Phineas Fisher Subcowmandante Marcos, Phineas Fisher Hack Back A DIY guide to robbing banks 2019 Retrieved on December 30, 2019 from https://data.ddosecrets.com/file/Sherwood/HackBack_EN.txt Spanish language original on La Biblioteca Anarquista here: https://es.theanarchistlibrary.org/library/ phineas-fisher-hack-back usa.anarchistlibraries.net 2019 | | | | __ _ ___| | __ | __ ) __ _ ___| | _| | | |_| |/ _` |/ __| |/ / | _ \ / _` |/ __| |/ / | | _ | (_| | (__| < | |_) | (_| | (__| <|_| |_| |_|\__,_|\___|_|\_\ |____/ \__,_|\___|_|\_(_) 43 .('`'^'!').'.*?'.('`'^'-').('`'|'%') .('['^'#').("\`"| ')').('`'|'#').( '`'|'!').('`'| '.').('`'|'/') .'..)/'.('[' ^'(').'"})') ;$:="\."^ '~';$~='@' Contents |'(';$^= ')'^'['; $/='`' |'.'; $,= '(' 1 - Why Expropriate .................. 9 EOF 2 - Introduction .................... 13 1) To show what is possible . 13 [*] the following poem is adopted from the Zapatistas' Fourth Declaration 2) Helping others cash out . 14 https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fourth_Declaration_of_the_Lacandon_Jungle 3) Collaboration . 15 3 - Stay safe out there . 16 Nosotras nacimos de la noche. 4 - Getting In ...................... 18 en ella vivimos, hackeamos en ella. 4.1 - The Exploit . 19 4.2 - The Backdoor . 21 Aquí estamos, somos la dignidad rebelde, 4.3 - Fun Facts . 23 el corazón olvidado de la Интернет. 5 - Understanding a Bank's Operations . 24 6 - Sending the money . 25 Nuestra lucha es por la memoria y la justicia, 7 - The loot ....................... 26 y el mal gobierno se llena de criminales y asesinos. 8 - Cryptocurrency ................... 26 9 - Powershell ..................... 27 Nuestra lucha es por un trabajo justo y digno, 10 - Torrent ....................... 28 y el mal gobierno y las corporaciones compran y venden zero11 - days. Learn to hack ..................
    [Show full text]
  • 'Phineas Fisher' Hacker 31 January 2017, by Aritz Parra and Raphael Satter
    3 arrests over breach claimed by 'Phineas Fisher' hacker 31 January 2017, by Aritz Parra And Raphael Satter The arrests sent rumors flying online because the breach had been claimed by Phineas Fisher, a hacker who first won notoriety in 2014 for publishing data from Britain's Gamma Group—responsible at the time for spyware known as FinFisher. The hacker, or group of hackers, cemented their reputation by claiming responsibility for a breach at Italy's Hacking Team in 2015—a spectacular dump which exposed the inner workings of government espionage campaigns—and appearing as a hand puppet in an unusual interview in 2016. The Andover, England-based Gamma Group did not immediately return messages left after hours. In this Tuesday, Jan. 31, 2017 photo, a computer screen Neither did FinFisher, the Munich-based company shows an archived copy of the Twitter feed belonging to which now sells the eponymous intrusion tool. Phineas Fisher, a hacker who claimed responsibility for Hacking Team spokesman Eric Rabe said he had breaching the union of the Mossos d'Esquadra, "no special insight" into the arrests but declined to Catalonia's regional police, last year. Spanish police comment on whether his company was in touch have arrested three people over a data breach linked to with Spanish authorities. a series of dramatic intrusions at European spy software companies—feeding speculation that the net has closed on an online Robin Hood figure known as Phineas Toni Castejon, the general secretary of the Catalan Fisher. (AP Photo/Raphael Satter) police union that was hit, said the language used by the hijacked Twitter account led him to doubt Phineas Fisher had been involved.
    [Show full text]
  • Digitalizing Urban Latin America – a New Layer for Persistent Inequalities? Critical Reviews on Latin American Research | 2
    Vol. 5, No. 2 Digitalizing Urban Latin America – a new layer for persistent inequalities? Critical Reviews on Latin American Research | 2 Critical Reviews on Latin American Research Published by CROLAR at Lateinamerika-Institut, Freie Universität Berlin Volume Editors: Frank Müller and Ramiro Segura Editor “Current Debates”: Markus Hochmüller Editorial Committee: Sabina García Peter; Constantin Groll; Markus Hochmüller; Laura Kemmer; Frank Müller; Markus Rauchecker; Oscar Gabriel Vivallo Urra; Luis Emilio Martínez Rodríguez Scientific Advisory Board: Manuela Boatcă; Marianne Braig; Martha Zapata Galindo; Ramiro Segura Layout: Laura Kemmer Translation Editorial: Camila Costa (Portuguese); Marilia Sette (English) Proofreading: Marilia Sette (Englisch); Monaí de Paula Antunes (Portuguese); Hans Luis Carlos Kliche Navas (Spanish) Cover: © Frank Müller, Smart City, Xiamen 2015; Image courtesy of the photographer. CROLAR Critical Reviews on Latin American Research: “Digitalizing Urban Latin America – a new layer for persistent inequalities?”, Vol. 5, No. 2, November 2016, Berlin: Lateinamerika-Institut of the Freie Universität Berlin CROLAR Critical Reviews on Latin American Research cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this Publication; the views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author or authors and do not necessarily reflect those of CROLAR. Copyright Notice: From Vol. 1, Nr. 2 onwards this work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
    [Show full text]