ISSUE BRIEF No

ISSUE BRIEF No. 3597 | MAY 8, 2012 Bo Xilai’s Fall Is Not Going to Lead to Reform in China Dean Cheng efore Chen Guangcheng’s dra- the need for maintaining consistent some conducted in conjunction with Bmatic arrival at the U.S. embassy, policies. Wang Lijun. But he was also accused the drama involving Bo Xilai, with The Fall of Bo Xilai. Officially, of being as corrupt as those he was near-daily revelations of titillating Bo Xilai, the son of longtime senior investigating and arresting. details and ever more outrageous Chinese leader Bo Yibo, is charged Beijing would like to present this conspiracies, had made China’s lead- with “serious disciplinary infrac- entire situation as a tawdry affair ership appear to be more an Asian tions.” Bo and his wife were appar- of greed and ambition gone awry. version of Dallas or Dynasty than ently involved in a range of corrup- The current Chinese emphasis that sober-minded, colorless technocrats tion schemes and even a murder Bo’s fall reflects the “rule of law” in focusing on economic expansion. conspiracy. The sudden appearance modern China further reinforces Yet the TMZ-ization of these events of Wang Lijun, top police official in the impression that this is a matter reflects a serious gap between many Chongqing and longtime Bo counter- of one individual, albeit quite senior, Western perceptions of Chinese poli- part, at the American consulate in going too far. tics (and an emphasis on individuals) Chengdu on February 6 apparently But the attacks on Bo’s son and and the much larger issues at stake. triggered a senior leadership decision wife suggest that more is at work. The Bo scandal is at least as much to remove Bo, who was already under Other Chinese senior Chinese lead- about the implicit threat of populism investigation. Of special note is ers have fallen from power—just last to the consensus-oriented leadership that Bo’s brother has been forced to year, the Chinese Railway Minister policies of the Chinese Communist resign from his position with China Liu Zhijun was charged with massive Party (CCP) as it is the tale of one Everbright Bank, and his college- corruption and forced to resign. But exceedingly ambitious politician. It age son has reportedly also been not since the Cultural Revolution reflects the importance of better ensnared in these investigations. have attacks been aimed at entire American understanding of China’s Bo had already attracted signifi- families; even former premier Zhao leadership structure and reinforces cant attention to himself over the Ziyang’s children were not target- course of his 30-year career. Rising ed, although Zhao remained under from mayor of Dalian to governor house arrest from 1989 until his This paper, in its entirety, can be found at of Liaoning Province and even- death in 2005. Moreover, the willing- http://report.heritage.org/ib3597 tually minister of commerce, Bo ness to call attention to Bo Guagua’s Produced by the Asian Studies Center often behaved more like a politi- luxury cars and flamboyant lifestyle The Heritage Foundation cian than a technocrat, including jeopardizes the CCP’s overall image, 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 open campaigning for ever higher as he is not unique. It also suggests (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org office—something not done in the higher stakes are in play. Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily Chinese system. Projecting a popu- Discouraging the Bo Approach. reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill list image, he was associated with a Bo Xilai’s policies, as practiced in before Congress. number of anti-corruption efforts, Dalian, Liaoning, and Chongqing, ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3597 MAY 8, 2012 consistently involve enlisting popu- With the ongoing political transition What the US Should Do. list themes on behalf of personal in the PRC, it is not enough to frus- political gain. Bo pushed anti-cor- trate Bo; it is essential that anyone ■■ Expect More Mixed Signals ruption measures knowing that else who might think of following the from Beijing. If China’s leader- that this is a key source of popular Bo line be dissuaded. ship is unable to forge a consensus, discontent. Indeed, many “mass inci- Attacking Bo’s family effectively it is likely that the various factions dents,” including the recent ejection casts his entire reputation into ques- will pursue policies and issue of Communist cadre from Wenzhou tion. More importantly, it signals statements in an uncoordinated village in Guangzhou, are rooted potential Bo imitators that they risk fashion. There may therefore be in frustration with corruption. not only themselves but their fami- conciliatory and hard-line policy Similarly, Bo’s massive public hous- lies. Challenges to the CCP leader- pronouncements emerging near ing program in Chongqing addressed ship’s consensus will not be tolerated. simultaneously; the Chinese may unaffordable housing, which is also This response bodes ill for any also seek concessions in order infuriating many Chinese. Most prospect of political reform. After all, to mollify or weaken supposed intriguingly, Bo may have also how would one differentiate a policy “hard-liners.” exploited regional disparities in of anti-corruption measures, popular his pursuit of personal power. In a economic steps, and regional empha- At the same time, it is likely that meeting with foreign visitors in May sis grounded in genuine concern for Beijing will be unable to initi- 2011, Bo stated that Chongqing was the people from one rooted in per- ate new policies for some time. not being treated as a genuine equal sonal ambition? More to the point, Washington should therefore use to the other provincial-level cities it suggests that reform will occur this strategic breathing space to of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin: only if a clear consensus for it can be reinforce its position in the west- Previous investment had all been built—a daunting prospect in the face ern Pacific. This should include focused on the Chinese coast, and it of factional differences and with no strengthening not only military was now the inland provinces’ turn. ultimate authority to lend credibility but diplomatic and economic Bo was prepared to pursue openly or even adjudication. cooperation with both formal populist lines in order to build his In this context, economic modi- allies and friends. power base. In this light, Bo’s oft- fications might occur if there is suf- cited emphasis on Mao-era ideology ficientinternal pressure from flaws Among other things, the U.S. should be seen more as a reference in the development model; there is should expand joint military to the egalitarianism and relative some evidence that at least some cooperation with India, do all it lack of corruption of that period PRC leaders recognize the need for a can to position the Philippines than a genuine nostalgia for Mao’s renewed commitment to economic for effective external defense, and policies. More disturbingly for the reform. Moreover, any such changes explore the legal basis for deep- top Chinese leadership, it may also can be justified under the rubric of ening military interactions with have constituted an implicit threat Deng Xiaoping’s policies of “Reform other Southeast Asian states. of popular reaction should Bo not be and Opening.” elevated. But there seems little chance for ■■ Plan for Internal Chinese With the passing of the revolu- political reform (e.g., greater democra- Unrest. The worst outcome tionary-era leaders (primarily Deng tization). In a divided leadership, each may be a China that is unable to Xiaoping), there is no leader with faction would fear disproportion- implement economic or politi- the authority and credibility to ate loss of power and benefits in any cal reforms, leading to substan- firmly reject Bo’s efforts. Instead, the reform program. Moreover, anyone tially more unrest. The number current leadership cohort, divided who advocated substantive reforms, of “mass incidents” is already on between princelings (including Bo especially democratic measures, the rise, fueled by ethnic ten- himself) and “self-made bureaucrats” could easily be accused of pursuing sion, frustration with corruption, of the Hu Jintao faction, seems to populist policies. Bo’s fall may there- and victims of environmental have been unable to bring him to heel, fore have delayed any possible politi- degradation. except through drastic measures. cal liberalization for a decade or more. 2 ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3597 MAY 8, 2012 American policymakers need to take into account the potential of more asylum seekers, especially if there are violent crackdowns on dissidents. Similarly, a common policy is needed on how to investi- gate Chinese claims against émi- grés and defectors of corruption or criminality in order to filter out criminals. Finally, the U.S. should have clear internal guidance about how to handle potential Chinese defectors who may be unsavory but who possess vital information on Chinese internal developments. Expect the Unexpected. For the U.S., the implications of Bo Xilai’s fall mean preparing for a period of greater uncertainty in Sino–American relations, as China’s own leadership situation is likely to remain murky. The U.S. should expect and prepare for this uncertainty. —Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. 3.

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