. ' Secret Soviet-American Cooperation I ~ in the War AgainstJapan

By Richard A. Russell . ,.,. .. "The visit9rs in~lude

No.4

The U.S. Navy in the Modern World Series

Series Editor GaryE. Weir Head, Contemporary History Branch

Naval Historical Center Departm.ent of the Navy 1997 Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History Dr. David Alan Rosenberg, Chair CDR Wesley A. Brown, CEC, USN (Ret.) Dr. Frank G. Burke Mr. J. Revell Carr VADM Robert F. Dunn, USN (Ret.) VADM George W Emery, USN (Ret.) Dr. Jose-Marie Griffiths Dr. Beverly Schreiber Jacoby Mr. David E. Kendall Mr. Harry C. McPherson, Jr. The Honorable G.V Montgomery Dr. James R. Reckner Dr. William N. Still, Jr. ADM William 0. Studeman, USN (Ret.) Ms. Virginia S. Wood

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Russell, Richard A., 1957- Project HULA : secret Soviet-American naval cooperation in the war against Japan I by Richard A. Russell. p. em. - (The U.S. Navy in the modern world series ; no. 4) ISBN 0-945274-35-1 (alk. paper) 1. World War, 1939-1945-Naval operations, American. 2. Military assistance, American-. 3. ­ Military relations-Soviet Union. 4. Soviet Union-Military rela­ tions-United States. I. Tide. II. Series. D773.R87 1997 940.54'5973-dc21 97-7022

@) The paper used in this publication meets the requirements for permanence established by the American National Standard for Information Sciences "Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials" (ANSI Z39.48-1984).

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 ISBN 0-16-049376-5 (966I-~f6I) !U!JvlVJV f ounvtg 'rnVJ-U!-vtJqJvj {w Jo tCvtomJw U! puv 'J!vlVJV vl0d E{.t.JJ ;6;1~, I' ... .. t ...... ~.~ ' - Navy Art Collection, Naval Historical Center

On the cover, "Ice Floes, Kodiak" (undated), an oil painting by Lieutenant Edward T. Grigware, USNR. The stark, frozen landscape of an Alaskan winter is beautifully illustrated in this painting. Grigware completed this piece during the war, probably after 1943. Fore-word

his study is the fourth in the Naval Historical naval archives and to introduce their materials into the Center's series, "The U.S. Navy in the Modern writing of recent American history will revise how his­ T World," that aims to acquaint naval officers, torians approach working on the naval aspects of the sailors, and other readers with the U.S. Navy's unique Soviet-American alliance in World War II and the contribution to national security, economic prosperity, at sea. and global presence in the contemporary period. In addition to Mr. Russell's efforts, I am pleased to Starting in the Second World War, the United acknowledge those individuals who contributed to this States assumed the leadership of major multinational publication, including Dr. Edward J. Marolda, our politico-military coalitions, first to destroy fascism and Senior Historian and founder of the series; Dr. Gary later to thwart the spread of communism. Military E. Weir, head of the Contemporary History Branch assistance programs, in which the American armed ser­ and editor of the series; many of the professional staff vices helped their foreign counterparts to help defend of the Naval Historical Center, especially the members themselves, served a vital if unheralded role in the of the Naval Aviation News Branch; and the other common defense. Such programs, so familiar today, scholars and professionals at institutions in the United originated with the timely creation of the lend-lease States and the Russian Federation. Finally, I am grate­ program ofWorld War II. ful to the U.S. Navy's World War II Commemorative This booklet, based on original materials culled Committee for their help in producing this publica­ from archives in the United States and in the Russian tion. Federation, treats a little known aspect of lend-lease The views expressed are those of Richard A. Russell and of Soviet-American relations at the end of the alone and not necessarily those of the Department of Second World War. The author, Richard A. Russell, the Navy or any other agency of the U.S. government. has cultivated singularly productive relations with prominent historians, archivists, and naval officers in WilliamS. Dudley . His tireless efforts to obtain access to Russian Director of Naval History Introduction

n the 1930s, the potential for which prompted Great Britain and This situation prevailed until cooperation between the to declare war on Germany, 1945, with a regular ebb and flow I United States and the Soviet igniting World War II. of hope and frustration on the Union to restrain Japan-one of The Soviet Union and United U.S. side, which sought basing the unspoken objects behind States stayed out of the growing rights for heavy bombers in Washington's decision to recognize conflict until June and December and suffered concern for the secu­ the regime in 1933-did 1941, respectively, when Germany rity of the lend-lease route. At the not evolve into any concrete strate­ attacked the Soviet Union and in February gy beyond wistful ideas and a few Japan attacked the United States. 1945, however, the United States hollow gestures. By the end of the When Germany and Italy then secured Soviet entry into the war decade, both countries adopted declared war on the United States, against Japan by pledging to pro­ independent policies toward the alliance between the U.S. and vide military support and several Japanese aggression in Asia. the USSR, which appeared important territorial considera­ In 1939, Soviet forces won a improbable only months before, tions, including turning over the bloody border war against Japan. was forged. In Asia, however, Japan to the Soviet Union. Japanese attention then turned and the Soviet Union managed to In the spring and summer of toward the Asian possessions of the preserve, in the words of historian 1945, a special detachment of the colonial powers. At the same time, George Alexander Lensen, their trained some in , the Soviet Union and "strange neutrality." By December 12,000 Russian officers and men in the Western democracies failed to 1941, the staggering success of the the handling of naval vessels sched­ reach an agreement on how to deal German attack in European Russia uled for transfer to the Soviet with Germany's threat to the left Stalin with little means and no Pacific Ocean Fleet under the lend­ peace. To the dismay of the West, desire to open the two-front war lease program. Project HULA Soviet leader Josef Stalin and against Japan sought by President required American and Russian German dictator Adolf Hider Franklin D. Roosevelt. Japan's sub­ sailors to work side by side in the completed the infamous Nazi­ sequent acquiescence to the move­ largest and most ambitious transfer Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which ment of vital lend-lease supplies to program ofWorld War II. Its included a scheme to divide the Soviet Far East via the North unique purpose was to equip and Poland between them. Within a Pacific ensured Soviet neutrality in train Soviet amphibious forces for week, Germany attacked Poland, Asia while the European war raged. the climactic fight against Japan. The map to the right shows the location of the Kuril Islands and the in relation to the Pacific. The close-up of the Aleutian Islands below shows the location of Cold Bay, in the upper right. The U.S. agreed to Soviet control of the Kuril Islands as a condition to that country's entry into the war against Japan.

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p A C F c 0 C E A N Russia, Japan, and the United States:, A Strategic Triangle

ince 1905, when Japan Russian-American politico-military the 1930s, contributed to the Navy emerged victorious in the cooperation. At the same time the Department's wariness in dealing SRusso-Japanese War, observers Soviet Union had improved its with the Soviet Union. in both the United States and international standing by not only Moscow also pressed Russia had envisioned cooperation signing non-aggression pacts with Washington for a warship visit to against Japan. Leon Trotsky, a Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland the Soviet Far East. In late July principal leader of the Bolshevik and France in 1932 bur in its 1937, Harry E. Yarnell, Revolution in 1917 and founder of industrialization program and commander-in-chief of the Asiatic the , saw Russia and apparent imperviousness to the Fleet, took his flagship, the heavy America as "two arms of a nut­ Depression. Thus, in spite of the cruiser Augusta (CA 31), and four cracker," able to crush Japan if Kremlin's disturbing ideology, its destroyers to , the main their ideological antipathy could enhanced prestige and the rise of Soviet naval base in the Pacific, for be overcome. In the United States, Japanese militarism afforded an official visit. If either party armchair strategists believed the President Franklin Roosevelt the to this traditional gesture of soli­ proximity of Russian and opportunity to extend diplomatic darity wished to impress the American territory in the North recognition to the communists in Japanese, however, the timing Pacific made those icy waters a log­ 1933, his first year in office. could not have been worse. Several ical theater for future cooperation As a result, the chilly political weeks before Yarnell's arrival, against Japan. President Woodrow climate seemed to warm. In 1936, Japanese border forces had dealt a Wilson and successive Republican Stalin opened negotiations with stinging blow to Soviet prestige administrations of the 1920s, how­ American firms for the design of a when they bested the Red Army in ever, refused to establish relations new class of , with a pro­ a major border clash at Kanchatzu with the Bolshevik regime. V I. totype vessel to be built in an Island on the Arnur River. Shortly Lenin-the leading figure in the American yard. To ensure official after that episode, on 7 July, Communist Parry and head of the support for the deal, Stalin offered Japanese and Chinese troops skir­ Soviet government until his death to station one of the in mished near the Marco Polo in 1924-and his cohorts advocated the Soviet Far East. Nothing came Bridge outside of Peking, precipi­ the overthrow of the western capi­ of the negotiations, which dragged tating the Sino-Japanese War of talist democracies and supported on for three years, because key offi­ 1937-1945. activities meant to achieve that cers within the Navy Department, The Soviet Union and the end. Therefore in the eyes of many including Chief of Naval United States both sympathized Americans the Soviet Union did Operations (CNO) Admiral with , but Roosevelt proved not merit the moral support William D. Leahy, opposed the unwilling to articulate publicly his implied by diplomatic recognition. transaction. It is probably fair to desire for greater cooperation with Japan's bold military thrust into conclude that the Soviet Union's Stalin's regime. In December, in 1931, which placed extensive campaign of espionage in Japanese aircraft sank the U.S. Japanese and Soviet armed forces the U.S. (including attempts to gunboat Panay (PR 5) on the on opposite sides of a common acquire plans for major combat Yangtze River. Though Japan border, prompted renewed think­ ships and other industrial secrets), proved increasingly hostile, neither ing in Moscow and Washington which kept the Office of Naval the United States nor the Soviet about the practical benefits of Intelligence (ONI) very busy in Union seemed prepared to con-

3 front Japan, either as partners or improve its international position won official and public admiration unilaterally. by reaching a settlement with the in Great Britain and the United During 1938 and 1939, antago­ Soviet Union. The Asian adver­ States. nism between the Soviet Union saries signed a neutrality pact on A month after Roosevelt's decla­ and Japan escalated into major 13 April 1941. ration, the Red Army fought a des­ armed confrontations. Reasoning Although the United States and perate battle for Moscow. Fresh that it might be drawn into the the Soviet Union remained neutral troops arriving by train from the 's fight in the growing conflagration until Far East made subway connections with the Soviet Union, the 1941, they were fated to be drawn into the city's western outskirts, in 1938 into the fighting. On 22 June where they met the German spear­ drafted contingency plans for a 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet heads and stopped them cold. On carrier strike on Vladivostok. Union. Under the leadership of 7 December, Japan tossed aside Meanwhile, the Red Army fortified Prime Minister Winston S. America's neutrality by attacking Vladivostok and the Soviet navy Churchill, the British began con­ the United States Pacific Fleet at imported a substantial fleet of voying supplies to the Soviet Pearl Harbor. Within days, both small submarines to Vladivostok Union in August. On 7 November, the United States and Chinese gov­ via the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In the 24th anniversary of the ernments sought to enlist the the summer of 1939, Soviet and Bolshevik Revolution, Roosevelt Soviet Union's help in the war Japanese armies fought a bloody announced, "I have today found against Japan. Yet the immensity of war on the border between the defense of the Union of Soviet Germany's military success in the Moscow's protectorate, Outer Socialist Republics vital to the east prevented a Soviet second Mongolia, and Tokyo's puppet defense of the United States." He front in Asia. On 11 December, regime in Manchuria, . ordered the Office of Lend-Lease Ambassador Maxim Litvinov The Red Army, however, won this Administration to make every informed Secretary of State Cordell bloody bout-the Battle of effort to provide military and eco­ Hull that the USSR was in no Nomonhan-and deflected nomic aid to the Soviet Union in position to cooperate with the Japanese ambition southward, in its war against . United States against Japan. Hull the direction desired by the Going even further, Roosevelt reported to President Roosevelt Imperial Navy. authorized the immediate alloca­ that "Russia was fighting on a Within days of the victory at tion of $1 billion from funds huge scale against Germany and Nomonhan, Stalin concluded a already appropriated for lend-lease. could not risk an attack by Japan." non-aggression pact with German Thus, despite nearly a quarter of a Attempts to include the Soviet dictator Adolf Hitler. A secret pro­ century of antagonism and dis­ government in strategic planning tocol provided for the partition of trust, Roosevelt made the momen­ for the Far East also failed. Because Poland between them. On 1 tous decision to support Germany's of concerns that hostilities might September, German forces invaded new enemy. Roosevelt's fear of a break out at any time between Poland, which caused Great Britain German victory or a Soviet­ Japan and the USSR, however, and France to declare war on German peace that would leave Roosevelt directed planners to Germany, igniting the Second Hitler in control of the Eurasian develop studies of possible joint World War. The outbreak of war land mass and facilitate a German­ action. in Europe convinced the Soviet Japanese juncture outweighed his In December 1941, during the Union of the need to reach a simi­ animosity toward Moscow and any Arcadia conference in lar agreement with Japan. domestic political liabilities such a Washington, at which the British Meanwhile, as it became bogged rapprochement would create. and American Combined Chiefs down in China and its relations Besides, the Russians were killing of Staff (CCS) met for the first with the United States deteriorat­ more Germans than any other time to discuss Anglo-American ed, Japan seemed more inclined to nation at war. Their valor quickly military objectives, the chiefs

4 Gregory G. Gagarin

During the war, Soviet navy personnel received training on American lend-lease vessels, aircraft, and equipment at U.S. Navy facilities in the United States. In Project ZEBRA (1944-1945), the U.S. Navy trained Soviet naval aviators on the Catalina at Elizabeth City Naval Air Station, N.C. The Soviet navy received some 200 Catalinas under this program, several of which took part in the August-September 1945 campaign against Japanese forces. In this photograph from June 1944, Soviet naval aviation personnel and their American hosts line up in front of a Catalina. determined that the Soviet United States to undertake active and Chief of Naval Operations Maritime Province had to be held. operations in Siberia," the Joint Admiral Ernest J. King noted how The question of Soviet participa­ Chiefs advised, "until after its mil­ difficult it was for American mili­ tion in the war against Japan con­ itary officials were in possession of tary authorities to obtain suffi­ tinued to be raised in Washington complete information as to Soviet cient data on the Soviet armed during 1942, both because of the strengths and plans, and unless forces. Indeed, this problem con­ possibility that Japan might attack the validity of this information tinued to plague American plan­ the Soviet Far East and because of had been confirmed by a careful ners throughout the war. Marshall the hope of establishing American and exhaustive examination, by and King urged the president to heavy bomber bases in Siberia. United States officers, of Soviet promote collaboration more No detailed planning for Soviet forces and facilities in the Siberian actively. participation in the theater." In a memorandum to Japan's occupation of Attu and could be done, however, without Roosevelt on the subject, Army Kiska in the Aleutian Islands information on Soviet military Chief of Staff General George C. chain in early 1942 again drew capabilities and plans in the Far Marshall and Commander in attention to possible Soviet­ East. "It would be unwise for the Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) American cooperation in the

5 North Pacific. On 17 June, received only minor attention strategic concept does not con­ Roosevelt dispatched a message to during the four major Allied con­ template further amphibious Stalin in which he indicated that ferences held in 1943. At the first, operations west of the Aleutians. the North Pacific situation was the January Casablanca Our forces there will assume a developing "to where tangible evi­ Conference, the British and defensive role until conditions are dence is presented that favorable to operations in the Japanese possibly are support of Russia in the getting ready to conduct Kamchatka operations against the Japan's occupation of Attu and Peninsula-Siberian area." Soviet Union Maritime Kiska in the Aleutian Islands chain Roosevelt and Churchill Provinces." In the event agreed to the concept. of such an attack, the in early 1942 again drew attention Accordingly, that May and president pledged U .S. to possible Soviet-American cooper­ August Allied forces recap­ military assistance in the tured Attu and Kiska form of air power, "pro- ation in the North Pacific. islands. At the third Allied viding there are available conference of 1943, held in Siberia landing fields in Quebec in August, which are adequate." He also rec­ American military chiefs focused Roosevelt and Churchill reaf­ ommended the initiation of secret on strategy for defeating firmed the overall strategic con­ staff conversations between Germany. The U.S. Joint Chiefs cept. American and Soviet navy, army, of Staff QCS), however, decided The JCS estimate on a poten­ and air force representatives. that the Aleutian chain should be tial Soviet-Japanese war prepared When Stalin did not immedi­ made as secure as possible, both for the conference presaged the ately reply, the President sent a to check Japanese expansion and coming event: second message on 23 June. In to serve as an advance staging area this dispatch Roosevelt proposed for Soviet-American operations. There exists between Russia an Alaskan-Siberian ferry route. In a message to Stalin summariz­ and Japan a basic conflict of He also stressed the importance of ing the results of the conference, interest. Japan cannot enjoy allowing Americans to enter Roosevelt and Churchill empha­ complete strategic security Russian territory for the purpose sized the appropriateness of their without gaining control of of surveying potential airfield sites policy of focusing on Germany the eastern region of Siberia. and to improve aids to navigation. first, but pointed out the Allied Russia is determined to hold Soon after the Pearl Harbor need to retain the initiative in the that region, the strategic attack, therefore, the American Pacific and Far East, sustain security of which requires side had laid out its chief aims China, and "prevent the Japanese the ultimate expulsion of with regard to the Soviet Union: from extending their aggression to Japan from the mainland of continued lend-lease support; other theaters such as your Asia and from southern strategic coordination; and joint Maritime Province." . For the present, participation in the war against At the Washington conference however, both Russia and Japan, which would include the in May, British and American mil­ Japan desire to avoid war use of Siberia for American air­ itary leaders met again. Their with each other in order to craft. Stalin, however, steadfastly restatement of Allied strategy be free to direct their efforts resisted all efforts to involve the noted the desirability of Soviet against their respective ene­ Soviet Union in the Pacific War participation in the war against mies. Russia is likely to while the defeat of Germany still Japan. The Allied chiefs agreed to intervene in the war against lay far in the future. the expulsion of Japanese forces Japan at some stage, but not The subject of Soviet participa­ from the Aleutian Islands, but before the German threat to _tion in the war against Japan considered that "our present her has been removed. After

6 that, she will make her deci­ agenda proposed by the Anglo­ logistical and geographical charac­ sion in the light of her own American Combined Chiefs of teristics of such pons; and 5) to interests and will intervene Staff, the role of the USSR in the learn what air bases, if any, only when she reckons that Pacific War figured in five of their American air forces could use for Japan can be defeated at a discussion points. The CCS want­ operations against Japan. small cost to her. ed 1) Soviet intelligence informa­ As it turned out, the Anglo­ tion on Japan; 2) to know if American staff did not discuss the In October 1943, Moscow Stalin considered it desirable to war against Japan during their hosted a meeting of the Allied begin preparations for basing meeting at Teheran with their foreign ministers. Secretary of Soviet Pacific Fleet submarines on Soviet counterparts. The CCS State Cordell Hull led the American territory; 3) to learn merely reaffirmed the strategic American delegation, which what direct or indirect assistance concept approved at the included W. Averell Harriman, the Soviet Union would provide if Washington Conference of May the new U .S. ambassador to the the United States decided to 1943. Soviet Union, and Major General attack the northern Kuril Islands; An American intelligence esti­ John R. Deane, U.S. Army, who 4) to know what Soviet the mate on Russo-Japanese relations stayed on to head the newly creat­ U.S. Navy could use and the done at that time predicted con- ed U.S. Military Mission in Moscow. Discussion necessarily revolved around European politi­ cal and military issues, including the establishment of a second front in Europe. The Soviet par­ ticipants informally indicated that their government was moving closer to participation in the Pacific War. According to Secretary Hull, Stalin "clearly and unequivocally" stated "that, when the Allies succeeded in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union would then join in defeating Japan." This commitment, however, did not appear in the conference pro­ tocols. In their point paper, the JCS pointed out in no uncertain terms the "great importance to the United States of Russia's full par­ ticipation in the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany." They saw this as "essential to the prompt and crushing defeat of Japan at far less cost to the United States and Great Britain." Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin z Vl met for the first time at Teheran, :J Iran, in late 1943. Though Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945), 32nd President of the United States. European affairs dominated the

7 tinued neutrality, because the Soviet government still feared the Stockpiling Equipment: consequences of a premature break with Japan, and the Japanese could not afford another MILEPOST enemy. On 28 November 1943, Stalin replied to Roosevelt's review of the Pacific War: n October 1944, when dered the original MILEPOST list, Churchill, Ambassador Admiral V A. Alafusov, Chief of We Soviets welcome your I Harriman, and Major General the Soviet Main Naval Staff, pre­ successes in the Pacific. Deane met with Stalin in Moscow, sented to Clarence Unfortunately we have not the Soviet leader revived hopes for E. Olsen, Head of the Navy so far been able to help military collaboration against Division of the U.S. Military because we require too much Japan with a pledge to commence Mission in Moscow, a second list of our forces on the Western offensive operations three months of ships and material necessary to Front and are unable to after the defeat of Germany. Stalin equip the Soviet Pacific Fleet for launch any operations also stipulated that the Allies must war. Alafusov wanted the new list against Japan at this time. build up a reserve of supplies and to supersede the naval require­ Our forces now in the East equipment prior to Soviet entry ments outlined in MiLEPOST. To are more or less satisfactory into the war. This being a wise pre­ establish priorities and allay confu­ for defense. However, they caution, given the belief in Japan's sion, Olsen insisted that they rec­ must be increased about ability to disrupt the flow of troops oncile both lists and submit one three-fold for purposes of and supplies arriving in the Far final request to Washington. On offensive operations. This East via the Trans-Siberian 20 December, Olsen and Alafusov condition will not take place Railway, the Allies wasted little agreed to a single list of vessels, air­ until Germany has been time in fulfilling Stalin's condition. craft, and equipment. The revised forced to capitulate. Then by Deane took personal charge of request identified some two dozen our common front we shall this project. Accordingly, Soviet types of ships and aircraft, from Will. representatives presented him with escort vessels and to a list of needed supplies. They flying boats and torpedo-carrying The next day, Roosevelt pre­ wanted this list to be considered A-26 light bombers, as well as a sented Stalin with the five discus­ separately from the supplies variety of port equipment and elec­ sion points, stressing his belief in already allocated to them under tronic components. the imperative need to begin joint the annual lend-lease agreement. While Alafusov and Olsen nego­ planning for eventual Soviet par­ Deane treated the requisition as a tiated Soviet requirements, Deane ticipation in the Pacific War at military project, working through reported to Washington that Olsen once. Stalin promised to study the JCS rather than the lend-lease also "considers it urgent that a pro­ the questions relating to the Far program's Soviet Protocol gram for training of personnel and East following his return to Committee. The Joint Logistics for delivery of some of each type of Moscow. About a month later, Committee QLC) of the JCS ship should be set up at once" to Soviet Foreign Minister approved the request, now code­ instruct the Soviet crews in the Vyacheslav M. Molotov informed named MILEPOST, with the proviso operation of U.S. ships. Although Ambassador Harriman that the that its fulfillment not adversely Deane and Olsen agreed that Soviet Union would provide affect the existing or anticipated Soviet needs were worthwhile, they information about the Japanese, operations in either Europe or the also believed that it was undesir­ but that the other questions Pacific. able "to withdraw any ships from could not be immediately On 5 December 1944, even as a active combat longer than required resolved. subcommittee of the JLC pon- for turnover."

8 I do not consider feasible because 2500 personnel will crowd Navy housing and messing facili­ ties. Overflow must use vacant Army quarters incon­ veniently located. Ships involved will congest harbor. Very limited protected waters available for shake down v Iz training. Technical training facilities non existent. != ~ i5 Fletcher instead recommended Leaders of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow, 1943-1945. Major General Cold Bay, with Kodiak and Dutch John R. Deane (I) led the mission. Rear Admiral Clarence E. Olsen (r), head of Harbor as his second and third the Navy section, served as Deane's deputy. choices, respectively. He reported

In early January 1945, Fleet Fleet Admiral Nikolai Gerasimovich Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, People's Kuznetsov (1904-1974 ). People's Commissar for the Soviet navy (its Commissar and Commander in Chief of the Navy of the USSR from commander in chief), inquired 1939-1946. Named Hero of the into the feasibility of receiving the Soviet Union in 1945. Though MILEPOST ships in the Aleutian demoted after the war, Kuznetsov Islands, perhaps at Dutch Harbor, returned in 1951 to the upper ranks of government, serving concurrently 3 "in order to better preserve [the] 8 as the Naval Minister, a First Deputy ::;:~ security of turnover." Mi nister of Defense, and Navy Dutch Harbor on Unalaska -~ Commander in Chief. In 1956, he ~ Island seemed a sensible choice, was again relieved and demoted. ~ With the Soviet Union's collapse in given its existing facilities and ~ familiarity to the Soviet navy and 1991 , he was rehabilitated. To honor 0 him, in 1992 the ~ merchant marine, especially the changed the name of Tblisi, its new g latter, whose vessels regularly heavy aircraft carrier, to Admiral of d called there and at nearby Akutan. the Fleet of the Soviet Union Ji = On 18 January 1945, Fleet Kuznetsov. ," Admiral King informed Vice "' Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, Commander of the North Pacific housing, messing, shakedown and that Cold Bay (the location of the Force, of his intention to transfer technical training facilities at Army's Fort Randall and, until about 250 naval vessels and craft Dutch Harbor. King indicated recently, a Navy air auxiliary facili­ to the Soviet Union during the that "during no month will per­ ty) had ample, conveniently locat­ period between April and sonnel requirements exceed about ed housing and messing facilities. December 1945. Given the large 2500, and that turn over time will Cold Bay also had the best protect­ number of ships and men not exceed two weeks." Fletcher ed waters in the area under involved, King asked Fletcher to responded on 29 January, rejecting Fletcher's control and no civilian comment on the feasibility of the Dutch Harbor as the proposed population to complicate security. operation in regard to the available s1te: While Kodiak had sufficient hous-

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ing and messing facilities, it lacked Snow-covered U.S. Navy Catalina Conference officially established protection from heavy seas. seaplane of Patrol Wing 4 in front of the transfer program. On 15 Fletcher recommended further that a nose hangar at Naval Section February, he ordered Fletcher to Base, Cold Bay, November 1942. In repair facilities be provided at the February 1943 the Navy reclassified proceed with the rehabilitation of location selected and that inter­ the base as an air auxiliary facility. the Army barracks at Cold Bay. As preters be furnished. He reported promised, an in charge of that the commanding general of There was good reason for wish­ training and his staff would report the U.S. Army's Alaskan ing to use Cold Bay: Kuznetsov had by 24 March. The Soviet personnel Department concurred with his already agreed to it. On 8 February, would arrive in increments-2,300 views. On 6 February, King while King and the other chiefs by 1 April, an additional 550 by 1 informed Deane of the selection of were in the Crimea with Roosevelt May, and 2,000 more by 1 June. Cold Bay "as the most suitable for the Yalta Conference, the topic The program had evolved into its transfer point" for turning over the of the transfer base came up. At the final form, with the staff of the proposed vessels to the Soviet navy. outset, Kuznetsov stated that Chief of Naval Operations, the When Fletcher reported on the Kodiak was the Soviet government's staffs of Nimitz and Fletcher, and difficulties that allocating person­ second preference for a transfer site American personnel in Moscow nel to rehabilitate the barracks and after Dutch Harbor. King then coordinating the details both with other facilities at Cold Bay would informed him that he had chosen each other and with Soviet officials. create, King sent a message on 8 Cold Bay. Though unfamiliar with Soviet and American representa­ February asking if he wished to the base, Kuznetsov found it on the tives in Moscow resolved the ques­ change his recommendation. In map and immediately approved. tion of how the Soviet sailors would the same dispatch, however, King Five days later, Fletcher responded arrive in . At Yalta, Kuznetsov encouraged Fletcher to stick with to King's dispatch, stating that Cold had proposed transporting Soviet Cold Bay by offering to send a Bay remained his first choice. sailors across the Atlantic Ocean training team to run the transfer A directive issued by King about and the continental United States. program. one week after the end of the Yalta Soviet crews could travel in empty

10 ships on their return leg to Alaska. This request implied Soviet merchant vessels headed North America, King had suggest­ Moscow's willingness to consider back to the Soviet Far East. In ed, but the poor shipping situation use of the North Pacific route. regard to transferring three Liberty in the Pacific would present great American planners sought ways ships to the Soviet merchant fleet difficulties in moving the crews of reducing the number of Soviet for use in transporting Russian from the U.S. West Coast to sailors who required transportation personnel to Cold Bay, Edwards Alaska. T he Soviet admiral had not to United States ports. On 24 wrote that the request was still offered to transport them in Soviet February, Vice Admiral Richard S. under consideration, but "in the vessels, so the two naval chiefs Edwards, Deputy COMINCH, meantime, it is suggested that you deferred the matter. informed Admiral Yakimov that make all use practicable for this In Washington, on the day after motor torpedo boats planned for purpose of transport space in ves­ the Yalta Conference, Admiral transfer would be shipped on sels already available to you." A. A. Yakimov, Deputy Chairman board Soviet merchant vessels as The Soviet government later of the Soviet Government deck cargo, probably from , dropped its request for additional Purchasing Commission, rook a Washington. It would not be nec­ merchant vessels and decided to different approach. H e requested essary to send crews for them to deliver their sailors on Soviet mer­ that the United States transfer Cold Bay or elsewhere. The same chant ships destined for the three Liberty ships or similar ves­ held true for two self-propelled, American West Coast on the regu­ sels to Soviet registry-a practice twin-motor pontoon of 250 lar lend-lease run from the Soviet the United States heretofore had tons capacity, which reserved for the Pacific Theater­ would be shipped to transport Soviet sailors to unassembled as cargo in :::.I ~ ~ < .§ Below, the Big Three wartime leaders, seated left to right: u: British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, American 1 j President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Soviet Generalissimo 0.. Josef V. Stalin met at Yalta in the Crimea in early February ""£ 1945. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King is standing to the rear of d. Churchill. Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy is standing behind J3 the President, obscuring General of the Army George C. c Marshall. ] u r z Above, Soviet Fleet Admiral [ N. G. Kuznetsov and American 0:: Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King ~ upon the latter's arrival at Yalta for the Crimean Conference in February 1945.

11 Far East. Each ship could carry about 600 men. The first five ships "A Mission of Higher were scheduled to arrive in late March or early April, depending on ice conditions. Information on Classification'' vessel names, departure dates, and total numbers of personnel would be provided later. A Soviet staff, including 45-50 interpreters and probably headed by a rear admiral, would arrive on board the first ship. In addition to a permanent staff of 23 officers, the Soviet navy planned to send five substaffs of about 8 to 14 officers and 3 petty officers each, about 163 persons in all. Three of these substaffs would arrive in the first ship. Alafusov agreed to instruct the Soviet administrative staff "that they come under U.S. officer in charge of station and accede to [U.S.] orders without question to avoid unpleasantness understood to have occurred at other stations." The sparse development of Cold Bay/Fort Randall stands out in this aerial The considerable commitment photograph from April1943. In May, ships, including three old battleships, in time and resources necessary to practicing for the invasion of filled the harbor. train 15,000 Soviet naval person­ nel to handle American naval ves­ emote Cold Bay, lying at WilliamS. Maxwell, who had sels distinguished this transfer from the extreme southwest tip arrived in the city in early all others. Under the original Rof the Alaskan Peninsula December following duty as engi­ scheme, the Navy planned to and in the rear of the forward neering officer on board the new transfer 180 vessels before 1 operating areas, satisfied the Soviet battleship Missouri (BB 63), had November 1945. The roster and American desire for secrecy. scarcely settled into his new job as included 30 (PF), 24 Neither government wished to head of the Battleship minesweepers (AM), 36 wooden­ compromise Soviet neutrality with Maintenance Division in the hulled motor minesweepers Japan at that stage in the Pacific (BUSHIPS) when (YMS) , 56 submarine chasers War. They feared that if provoked, he received orders to take charge of (hereafter, subchasers) (SC), 30 Japan might strike a preemptive Project HuLA. He reported to the large infantry blow at the Maritime Province, CNO's office on 7 March. During (LCI[L]), and four floating work­ seize Vladivostok and sever the this short visit, he learned more shops (YR). After completion of lend-lease pipeline. Planners in about HULA, obtained "some the training program, the vessels Washington also believed the exist­ information on similar projects," would be transferred to Soviet cus­ ing military facilities at Fort met 1st Rank Boris V tody, with the ships steaming in Randall/Cold Bay could be quickly Nikitin of the Soviet Government convoy, part way under American rehabilitated to provide adequate Purchasing Commission, and escort, to their prospective home housing and support. received orders to depart soon for ports, usually via Petropavlovsk. In Washington, Commander Alaska to take command of Navy

12 Detachment 3294, the unit created specifically for HULA. Four days later, in a letter to Rear Admiral Ralph F. Wood, commandant of the 17th Naval District, Maxwell provided a rough outline of a pre­ liminary training plan for the admiral's consideration. Maxwell grasped the major dif­ ficulties immediately. Maxwell noted that "The Russian-speaking interpreters assigned, I believe, ~ should be increased in number." ~::J Moreover, he stressed the necessi­ i_ ty of bringing the ships' equip­ ~ ment allowance lists up to date I

0 ..c before their departures for the .2. .; transfer point. "This point cannot a. be too strongly emphasized, as it v is understood that the foreign The training staff, probably near the end of the program. Top row, left to power is very particular in this right: Lieutenant T. E. Fitzgerald, Lieutenant J. H. Brigleb, Commander John respect. This will greatly assist in J. Hutson, Jr., USCG, Lieutenant Commander George V. Stepanotf, USCG, and Lieutenant F. A. Levy. Middle row, left to right: Lieutenant Andrew expediting the transfer." The pro­ Gagarin, Lieutenant T. L. Hickey, Lieutenant F. D. Abbott, Lieutenant C. D. gram eventually followed Chockluk, and Lieutenant (j.g.) W. P. Moller, Jr. Bottom row, left to right: Y1c Maxwell's outline. D. Reske, S1c C. W. Smith, Y1c J. Kazanjian, and MoMM3c W. E. Smith. Maxwell, newly promoted to Several members were missing when this photograph was taken. captain, arrived at Cold Bay on 19 March and assumed command of the base the next day. Contrary Moreover, the miserable weather Stadium provided a bare mod­ to what he had learned in (over 40 inches of rain annually, icum of luxury and recreation. Washington, the base needed con­ heavy fog, and 16 cloudy days An advance party, led by then­ siderable work before it could each month) and poor physical Lieutenant Commander John]. receive Soviet trainees. In view of layout of the facilities (buildings Hutson, USCG, had established the large housing and messing lay situated, Maxwell said, "in the Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) facilities required, Maxwell agreed typical Army fashion" across seven Department prior to Maxwell's to move his command into the miles of mud, connected by gravel arrival. The captain quickly select­ Army's quarters at Fort Randall, roads) slowed the rehabilitation ed instructors for radio, , . . . which could accommodate 10,000 effort. Maxwell feared these prob­ engmeenng, gunnery, mme sweep- men. Most of the problems that lems would also slow down the ing, damage control, and landing arose concerned reconstituting daily training routine if not cor­ craft training duties. In addition essential services. For example, rected. Fortunately, a to personnel provided by Fletcher, with the decommissioning of the Construction Battalion (CB) unit Maxwell used the officers from the base in November 1944, the med­ hauled Quonset huts into the ships being transferred. Members ical stores and the lone ambulance training area "in record time," of the Liaison Department, who had been transferred to Kodiak. A and set up classrooms. A radio coordinated project business with fire inspector from Kodiak also station, several crude movie the­ the Soviet contingent at Cold Bay, pointed out numerous deficiencies aters, and a "small, very muddy often performed double duty as in many of the buildings. softball field" dubbed Yankee tramers. continued on page 16 13 William Stewart Maxwell (1900-1989)

ontemporaries likened 1930s, he received a commenda­ ties sent from the old Brooklyn CMaxwell to the popular char­ tion from BUSHIPS for designing (Armored Cruiser No. 3) into acters found in Horatio Alger's high-speed minesweeping gear. Siberia during the American inter­ rags to riches novels. He was born Maxwell preferred engineering vention in the Russian Revolution in Warsaw in 1900, when Poland duty. Indeed, he excelled in it. in 1918; as a member of the was part of the , Time and again, however, he Aleutian Islands Survey with a surname of Dzwoniecki. At received special assignments Expedition in 1933; and as a approximately age 13, he entered because of his countespionage agent working the German navy or merchant skills. Maxwell never claimed to with the Federal Bureau of marine (the record is unclear) only have more than average ability in Investigation and the Office of to jump ship, arriving in New Naval Intelligence to crack a York City alone and unable to Soviet spy operation in Los speak English. The youth came to Angeles in 1938-1939. the attention of George Maxwell, Sailors often remember one a recruiter for the U.S. Navy who ship with greater affection than formally adopted him, gave him a the others in which they served. new name, and in 1916 helped Maxwell always felt a special him enlist in the Navy. Except for attachment to the battleship North a few months spent in professional Carolina (BB 55). During several boxing in 1920, Maxwell stayed in years as ship's engineering superin­ the service for some 33 years and tendent, he supervised her con­ advanced in rank from apprentice struction and fitting out. When seaman to rear admiral. the ship was commissioned in Maxwell thrived on the oppor­ April 1941, he became her assis­ tunities within the Navy for self­ tant engineering officer. In the development, particularly in edu­ waters around Guadalcanal in cation and leadership, and August 1942, when the battleship advanced rapidly through the went into combat for the first ranks. In 1923, he made warrant time, he served as the engineering machinist, and received an ensign's Robert W. Maxwel l officer, with his eldest son, commission four years later. Captain William Stewart Maxwell, William Jr., an enlisted shipmate. Maxwell overcame a penchant for USN, circa 1946. While he was on board North hazardous duty-he was an expe­ Carolina, Maxwell earned several rienced submariner and had once of the combat awards on which requested flight training in dirigi­ the Navy later based his advance­ bles-to concentrate on engineer­ the language; a junior officer, uni­ ment to rear admiral at retirement. ing assignments, perhaps out of versity-trained in Russian, who In fact, Maxwell received much regard for his wife, Ethyl, and observed him in Alaska in 1945, of the credit for the battleship's children, William Jr., Colleen, and said Maxwell spoke "a most pecu­ exceptional performance in the Robert. During his career, he held liar Russian, a combination of Battle of the Eastern Solomons on engineering billets on board four Polish, Russian and Byelorussian." 24 August. Since the summer of battleships. While engineering Nonetheless, prior to his assign­ 1941, North Carolina had fol­ officer and later executive officer ment to Cold Bay, Maxwell served lowed a demanding schedule in of Lamberton (DD 119) in the as an interpreter with landing par- the Atlantic Ocean with little

14 opportunity to perform essential speed, which included the maxi­ ing more than a good joke." repairs and upkeep. The opera­ mum 27 knots at the height of the Maxwell's son Robert, who gradu­ tional tempo only increased with engagement, Maxwell donned an ated from the Naval Academy in her transfer to the Pacific in June asbestos suit, entered the firebox 1949 and spent a midshipman's 1942. In late July, she formed part of a recently secured boiler, and, summer cruise on board North of the screening force for the carri­ exposed to the intense heat, per­ Carolina, recalled the grand treat­ er Enterprise (CV 6) in Operation sonally directed emergency boiler ment he received from chiefs still WATCHTOWER, the seizure of repairs. He entered heated boilers on board the battleship who Tulagi and Guadalcanal scheduled four times during the operation, remembered his father fondly. to begin on 7 August. Because for which he received a bronze star Maxwell held city and state North Carolina's best speed (27 for heroism. government posts in New York knots) could not match that of the Maxwell remained on board throughout the 1950s. As deputy carrier and the other escorts, the North Carolina until 1943. In director of the Smoke Control battleship operated at full power 1944, he helped place the new Bureau of New York City, he 75 percent of the time and spent battleship Missouri (BB 63) into proved incorruptible in his aggres­ the other 25 percent in prepara­ commission and, in December, sive and highly controversial pur­ tion to go to full power on short took over the BUSHIPS' engineer­ suit of polluters. In 1955, New notice. As a result, the ship's com­ ing desk for battleships. Maxwell York Governor W. Averell plement had to effect engineering had occupied that billet for only Harriman appointed him chair­ repairs, such as those required by two months when he received the man of the Board of Standards the boilers, without slowing the HuLA assignment. and Appeals in the State Labor ship. In late August, operating In 1946, he served as officer in Department, a position which he near the Solomon Islands, North charge of the BUSHIPS' machin­ held for six years. In 1961, Rear Carolina became the first of the ery unit during the atomic tests of Admiral Maxwell took "com­ new fast battleships to escort a car­ Operation CROSSROADS. Ironically, mand" of North Carolina, which rier in battle. the only duty connected with the the state of North Carolina had In the battle of 24 August, Russians he ever sought-his acquired, to help turn her into a Japanese carrier aircraft concen­ application for duty as naval museum ship. trated on Enterprise and North attache in Moscow-was rejected. In retirement, Maxwell shied Carolina, requiring both ships to In his final assignment, he served away from public view. He reject­ maneuver radically at maximum as assistant naval attache for petro­ ed attempts to involve him as a speed to evade bombs and torpe­ leum in Egypt. Upon retirement candidate in party politics and does. Although the enemy planes for medical reasons in 1949, shunned the attention of journal­ made seven near misses, they Maxwell advanced in rank to rear ists who expressed more than a scored no hits on North Carolina admiral on the basis of his combat superficial interest in his life story. during an eight minute attack. awards. Moreover, he turned a deaf ear to The only casualty was one man, During his 1'-lavy career the suggestion that he write an killed by a strafer. The battleship Maxwell earned a reputation as a autobiography and rejected a film­ claimed seven enemy aircraft shot friend of the enlisted man. "[He] maker's desire to produce a movie down and a hand in destroying reminds you of one of the friendly about him. He left neither person­ seven others. bears in a Walt Disney cartoon," al papers nor an oral history. To In his action report, Captain wrote a yeoman at Cold Bay. "The the end, even Maxwell's family George H. Fort, North Carolina's Captain is gruff, constantly growls found the admiral reticent to dis­ commanding officer, singled out jokingly at his subordinates, ... cuss his life and career. He died on Maxwell and the gunnery officer calls his orderly, Marine Corporal 10 July 1989 and lies buried in for special recognition. To keep Randall Booth, of Cincinnati, Arlington National Cemetery the battleship operating at high Ohio, 'General,' and enjoys noth- beside his adoptive parents.

15 sels. But representatives of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, led by Captain 1st Rank Nikitin, who arrived on 23 March, took a differ­ ent view. They felt that too much time would be spent on shore-based training. To reach an accommoda­ tion, both sides conferred day and night over the next week designing a program for the first training cycle. These conferences, presided over by Hutson, finally produced an acceptable plan, which served as a model for all training cycles. Beginning on 10 April, a Soviet merchant ship carrying nearly 500 men arrived at Cold Bay each day for five days. Rear Admiral Boris D. Popov, commander of the 5th Independent Detachment of Soviet Navy Ships, the official unit desig­ nation of the Soviet naval contin­ gent at Cold Bay, arrived in Sevastopol on 11 April. By 14 April, 2,358 men had disembarked. These trainees comprised the prospective crews for the 16th Mine Sweeper Division (twelve Admirable-class and six YMS-type ships) and the 2nd Subchaser Division (twenty vessels). They joined almost 1,350 American personnel already present at Fort Randall/Cold Bay. At this U.S. Marine Corps honor guard marches with the national colors of the early stage, Maxwell had on hand United States and the Soviet Union during ceremonies welcoming Rear 49 officers and 317 Navy enlisted Admiral Boris D. Popov to Dutch Harbor, April 1945. men, 6 officers and 322 enlisted Seabees, 2 officers and 45 enlisted men of the Marine Detachment, Maxwell and Hutson, who was Striking the proper balance and 39 officers and 566 enlisted both training officer and second in between time spent ashore and time men from the Army. While the command, worked tirelessly to spent on board ship became an number of Americans at Cold Bay gather the necessary radios, , early bone of contention between remained rather constant at about . . mmesweepmg gear, gyrocompasses, the American and Russian training 1,500, over time the number of engines, movie projectors, training staffs. Maxwell believed that thor­ naval personnel was increased and films and various educational tools. ough classroom training on equip­ the Army personnel were trans­ Because the ships would have only ment and procedures would prevent ferred out. short shakedown periods, such later shipboard casualties among the Training began on 16 April. The items proved invaluable. Soviet crews and damage to the ves- final reports of both Maxwell and 16 Popov each reflected the difficulties specialists had to familiarize them­ resentatives from the Soviet experienced by the first Soviet selves quickly in the use of the Purchasing Commission, all of training group. The 220 officers "new apparatus" on board these whom proved extremely coopera­ and 1,895 men who began the first American warships. Maxwell tive with the American staff, even­ shore-based training program knew observed that the lack of Russian­ tually produced their own Russian­ almost nothing about radar and language training materials, espe­ language manuals. , and very little about work­ cially for "the use and operation of Maxwell divided Soviet person­ ing the engineering plants. Popov mechanisms and apparatus found nel by ship types and then by recognized that his sailors needed on the ships," slowed the process. prospective crews for individual intensive training and that even his The 5th Detachment staff and rep- ships in the training program.

Boris Dmitrievich Popov (1908-1984)

opov was born in 1908 to a Pfamily of teachers at Derevyansk, a little village by the Vychegda River, some 170 miles eas t of the Ural Mountains in northern Russia. H e completed his secondary education and entered the prestigious Frunze Higher Naval School in Leningrad in 1926. Upon his graduation in 1930, Popov joined the crew of the old dispatch boat Vorovskii in the Flotilla. While serving in the Pacific Ocean Fleet (formally established in January 1935), Popov served as navigator, executive officer, and commanding officer in escort Left to right, Rear Admiral Boris D. Popov; Captain 1st Rank Boris V. Nikitin ships and destroyers, as the chief of the Soviet Purchasing Commission; Captain Vladimir V. Khrivoshchekov, of staff of a destroyer brigade, Popov's translator; Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, Commander, North Pacific Force; and Rear Admiral Ralph Wood, 17th Naval District Commander, that same brigade's commander, confer at Fletcher's headquarters at Naval Operating Base Adak. and as a fleet staff officer. In November 1944, at age 36, he became a rear admiral. Maxwell attributed Project H uLA's November 1949, the navy trans­ In 1945, Popov commanded success, in part, to Popov's friendly ferred Popov from active duty to the Fifth Independent and cooperative attitude. the reserves for medical reasons. Detachment of Soviet Navy Ships After the war, Popov served on Among his numerous awards and at Cold Bay, Alaska. Americans the staffs of the Pacific Ocean medals, he received two Orders of found the admiral nervous and Fleet, naval headquarters in the Red Banner and the medals careworn in appearance, but like­ Moscow, and the Northern Fleet. for victories over Germany and able, easygoing and an ardent fan He also held a seagoing command Japan. Popov retired to Odessa, of American movies. Captain in the Black Sea Fleet. In where he died on 2 June 1984.

17 American instructors identified a nucleus of sailors in each crew familiar with basic ship handling, but even these men required instruction with regard to the spe­ cial characteristics of their ship type. "From the seriousness with which the visiting crews are taking this training it appears that they are most interested and sincere in learning all they can," Maxwell reported. As the program pro­ gressed, outstanding Russian per­ sonnel-trained by their American counterparts-served as instructors. Before leaving Washington for Alaska, Maxwell had pointed out the need to reconcile all equipment

allowances before the ships for !\ ..... --- ' HULA arrived at Cold Bay. ,'f-·:/ :· BUSHIPS did not heed this early \ warning, and delays installing or removing equipment from the transfer vessels disrupted the initial schedule. Six minesweepers, for example, arrived at Cold Bay out­ fitted with electronic equipment that was not authorized for transfer to the Soviet navy, while in some vessels technicians had removed authorized equipment. ''All transfer vessels have from 200 to 900 shortage items each," A Soviet naval officer relaxes with Look magazine. Apart from the sus­ Maxwell reported to Fletcher. pected intelligence officers, U.S. naval officers reported that many of BUSHIPS flew in thousands of their counterparts knew some English. pounds of equipment (such as combat helmets) daily, while their on-site representatives helped ame­ damage from the rough seas. Yet, gram conducted at Cold Bay con­ liorate these unfortunate circum­ only the facilities at Dutch Harbor cerned the transfer of thirty large stances by exercising their authori­ could perform adequate repair infantry landing craft in two train­ ty to revise the equipment lists. work. Nine subchasers and one ing cycles. Training for the first fif­ Delays in training caused by motor made the teen-ship LCI(L) group began on ship damage became another issue. nearly 400-mile round trip to 7 May and lasted 15 days. In addi­ Once the program got under way, Dutch Harbor for major repairs; tion to the officers, American the wooden-hulled vessels, such as the subchaser program was delayed enlisted men from each craft the motor minesweepers and sub­ by eight days. served as instructors. During this chasers, frequently suffered hull The most efficient training pro- phase, HULA instructors trained

18 Landing Craft, Infantry (Large)

avy planners recognized that at 12 knots with a cruising radius ages. The initial concept for the N the procedure of disembark­ of some 8,000 nautical miles. The vessel's use actually called for irs ing assault troops from transports main armament consisted of five construction in sections and lying offshore and landing them 20mm antiaircraft machine guns. assembly in a forward area. This on an invasion beach in small In addition to a crew of 8 officers process, in fact, proved unneces­ davit-carried craft would often and 32 enlisted, the LCI(L) could sary. The landing craft far exceed­ prove impractical. As a result, the accommodate 188 men and sus­ ed expectations for seaworthiness Navy procured a variery of landing tain them for about 48 hours. As and durability. During extensive craft and amphibious ship rypes a cargo carrier, it could haul 75 service in Europe and the Pacific, during the war. The LCI(L) filled tons. this type performed a multitude of rhe specific need for a seagoing Navy planners didn't envision combat tasks well. Indeed, by troop carrier capable of moving a rhe LCI(L) undertaking long voy- 1944 the Navy had converted large number of troops directly more rhan 200 LCI(L)s into a from a staging area to a hostile gunboat version equipped to pro­ shore. LCI(L) 551 underway, May 1945. The vide close-in fire support during The LCI(L)s transferred at colors are at half-mast in honor of amphibious landings. The Navy Cold Bay measured 159 feet in President Roosevelt, who died on built some 1,100 LCI(L) variants length and 23 feet, 8 inches at the 12 April. As DS-48, this landing craft during the war. In addition to the participated in the Kuril Island oper­ beam. They displaced 387 tons ations. The Soviet government U.S. and Soviet navies, American­ (full load). Diesel engines and returned it to American custody built LCI(L)s saw wartime service twin propellers drove rhe LCI(L) some ten years later. in the British .

ati onal Archives

19 Wearing camouflage, LCI(L)s 585 and 591 await transfer to the Soviet navy at Cold Bay in spring 1945. As DS-45 and DS-35, respectively, they took part in Soviet opera­ tions against Japanese forces in northern . The Soviet navy returned LCI(L) 585 to the U.S. Navy in 1955. DS-35 was scrapped.

Na[ional Archives

100 Soviet naval officers and 800 landing craft was cut to nine days. Petropavlovsk convoys had sailed, enlisted men in general ship opera­ These sailors completed their on 28 May (three minesweepers tion and amphibious warfare, par­ training one week ahead of sched­ and five motor minesweepers), 30 ticularly attack formations and ule and headed home at the end of May (three minesweepers and six beaching. Based on the experience July 1945. subchasers, with one dropping out in the first phase, the shakedown In the meantime, the period for the second group of first three Cold Bay-to-

Below, Admiral Popov cuts a cake decorated in his honor on Memorial Day, 1945. Receptions, parties, and holiday military parades, which often took place at Dutch Harbor, provided a respite from the rigorous training schedule kept at Cold Bay. Lieutenant George Heiskanen, USN, once a cadet in the Imperial Russian Navy, looks over Popov's shoulder, as Captain Sylvius Gazze, Dutch Harbor's commander, and Maxwell observe. Right, Popov and his translator fishing.

for repairs at Adak), and 7 June (three minesweepers and seven subchasers), all under U.S. Navy escort. The routing plan called for vessels such as the subchasers that could not make a non-stop passage to Petropavlovsk to proceed through Unimak Pass and coast­ wise along the northern side of the Aleutian Chain to Adak for servic­ ing. Northwest of Attu the U.S. Navy escort departed, and the con­ voy proceeded independently north of the Komandorskii Islands to pick up their Soviet escorts for

20 the final leg to the Petropavlovsk On 20 May 1945, in foreboding Cold Bay on board the steamer Naval Base. A fourth convoy, com­ weather, Soviet and American Felix Dzerzhinskii. They barely had prising two minesweepers, six sub­ sailors of this Admirable-class time to get settled in before their minesweeper stood by as Rear chasers, and four LCI(L)s, depart­ Admiral Popov addressed them dur­ shore-based training started. ed Cold Bay on 11 June. ing the transfer ceremony. Classroom instruction for prospec­ In terms of size, armament and tive commanding, executive, navi­ financial investment, the Tacoma gation and gunnery officers, as well (PF 3)-class frigates represented the as radiomen, began just two days most valuable vessels transferred at 40mm antiaircraft guns, and an later. That same day nine of the Cold Bay. Each ship measured 304 assortment of ASW weapons. ten frigates scheduled for transfer feet in length, displaced 2, 100 The ships and men for the first during this cycle arrived from tons, and possessed a design speed training program assembled Kodiak after receiving overhauls in of approximately 20 knots. In at Cold Bay in mid-June. On 12 Seattle. On 15 June, the steamer most cases, they mounted three 3- June, 572 officers and men for the Chaikovskii delivered 570 more inch dual purpose guns, two twin lOth Frigate Division arrived at men of the 1Oth Frigate Division. continu•d on pag• 24 21 Tacoma (PF 3)-Class Frigates

his class owed its creation as Kaiser Cargo of Oakland, from passing through the Sault St. T much to the desperate need , received a contract to Marie locks; consequently, the for convoy escorts as to the avail­ prepare detailed ship's specifica­ ships had to be floated on pon­ ability of building ways at ship­ tions and to manage procurement. toons (to reduce their draft) down yards on the Great Lakes. In On 8 December 1942, the the Mississippi River for outfitting 1942, the success of German U­ Maritime Commission contracted at either New Orleans, La., or boats in the war on Allied ship­ for 69 ships. The Navy dropped Houston, Texas, which often dou­ ping and the lack of escort vessels the British term "corvette" in bled the time needed to finish to protect it persuaded President favor of the gunboat (PG) desig­ them. As a result, only twelve Roosevelt of the need to engage nation and named them after entered service in 1943, by which the shipbuilders under the juris­ small cities. Kaiser Cargo received time the Navy no longer consid­ diction of the Maritime orders for twelve ships, and the ered them essential, and had Commission in the mass produc­ Commission ordered 18 from the passed responsibility for manning tion of small warships. In Consolidated Steel Company in them to the U.S. Coast Guard. response, the commission pro­ Wilmington, California. Five Vexed by a variety of produc­ posed to build a ship derived Great Lakes involved in tion delays, shipyards responded from the British River-class the program accounted for anoth­ to the to complete corvette. The latter had originat­ er 39. One Great Lakes firm, frigates by delivering them, ed as a mercantile design and was Ohio's American Shipbuilding according to naval historian being built in British shipyards Company, later added six more, Samuel Eliot Morison, in "shock­ accustomed to such work. making 75 in all. Walsh-Kaiser of ingly incomplete condition." As a The contracts would go to Providence, Rhode Island, built result, shakedown cruises and shipbuilders on the Great Lakes 21 for Great Britain, which post-shakedown availability, because they had similar expertise became the Colony class, bring­ which in many cases took months and their prewar contracts were ing the grand total to 96 ships. to complete, insured that no nearing completion. Commission The production of these ves­ frigate was ready for service administrators believed that the sels-redesignated as frigates (PF) before 1944. Kaiser-built ships uncomplicated design of the in April 1943-immediately fell (PFs 3-14) proved notorious in corvette and its proven opera­ far behind schedule. Ironically, the this regard. The Navy, for exam­ tional utility would suit both the centralization of all design, work­ ple, commissioned the class builders, who didn't have to alter ing procedures, and procurement leader, Tacoma, in November their construction methods, and functions under Kaiser Cargo 1943; however, the ship spent the Navy officials, some of whom sometimes failed to take into next ten months correcting its doubted the ability of these yards account the peculiarities of the many defects. While attributable to produce a rugged combat ship. Great Lakes yards, whose availabil­ in part to a shortage of skilled The prominent naval architecture ity had spurred the frigate's cre­ labor in the Bay firm of Gibbs & Cox modified ation in the first place. area, design defects such as bilge the River-class corvette to satisfY Prefabrication procedures devised keels that tended to crack in American purposes. In November in California, for example, had to rough seas and cold weather, fail­ 1942, the Commission tasked its be reworked to suit the smaller ures in the welds connecting the West Coast Regional Office with erecting cranes in use at the Great deckhouse to the deck, and inad­ coordinating the corvette's con­ Lakes shipyards. In addition, win­ equate ventilation affected the struction between yards on the ter and spring ice prevented entire class. Chronic problems West Coast and the Great Lakes. frigates built on the Great Lakes with their triple-expansion recip-

22 rocating engines also impinged on readiness. Of the original 69 ships ordered, the Navy placed the last, Alexandria (PF 18), in commission only in March 1945. With their defects corrected, though, the frigates demonstrated good seakeeping quali­ ties. All 18 frigates built by Consolidated Steel, which generally outper­ formed the rest of the class, escorted convoys and supported amphibi­ ous operations in the " southwest Pacific with the Seventh Fleet. Rockford (PF 48) even teamed with the minesweeper Ardent (AM 340) to sink the Japanese submarine I-12 in November 1944. With a much larger number of the more effective destroyer types available and a dimin­ National Archives ishing Axis submarine The Kaiser-built frigate Hoquiam (PF 5) at Mare Island Navy Yard, San Francisco, Calif., threat, however, the 14 June 1944. The Navy accepted the ship after numerous delays, placing her in com­ Navy relegated the mission in May 1944, eleven months after launching. Two more months passed before frigates to local escort, Hoquiam departed on her first assignment. training, and weather patrol duty. Consolidated) and 7 of the least 35), which had nearly sunk in a By late 1944, the surplus of reliable ships (those built by storm off Petropavlovsk in 1948, more capable escorts permitted Kaiser) of the class. Though the was damaged beyond economical the Navy to commit 30 frigates latter included Tacoma and the repair. The Navy reactivated thir­ to Project HULA for delivery to equally problem-plagued Pasco teen of these ships for duty in the the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the (PF 6), extensive yard work cor­ . Tacoma-class frigates summer of 1945. Of the 28 rected their defects prior to deliv­ later served in the navies of sever­ turned over, the Soviet navy ery. In 1949, the Soviet govern­ al foreign countries, including the received 12 of the most reliable ment returned 27 frigates, report­ Republic of Korea, , and ships (those frigates built by ing that the ex-USS Belfast (PF Japan.

23 Left, lowering of the American flag on board LCI(l)s, 9 June 1945. These craft took part in operations against Japanese forces in northern Korea. Below, another view of the LCI(L) transfer ceremony on 9 June 1945. In this photograph, sailors raise the Soviet naval ensign.

Following a material inspection by overhaul of her main engines and "were most helpful in pointing our American and Soviet personnel, boilers, incorporated numerous descrepancies [sic] and in helping the Soviet crews boarded their alterations and "changed the elec­ iron out details." Escort Division ships. trical equipment and armament to 25, comprising Long Beach (PF 34) The transfer of the frigate conform with the new allowance." (flagship), Ogden (PF 39), San Coronado (PF 38) typified that of This meant that equipment that Pedro (PF 37), Glendale (PF 36), the other frigates. Mter a tour of had been installed only the previ­ Belfast (PF 35), and Coronado, got duty in the southwest Pacific, ous month was removed. On underway for Seattle via the Canal Coronado put in at Boston, 26-28 March, representatives of Zone on 28 March. Massachusetts, on 24 January Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Coronado spent 30 April and the 1945. There, the ship received an Fleet, inspected Coronado, and first sixteen days of May moored at

24 of May and the first few days of June the ship ran tests, reloaded ammunition and depth charges, reconciled the allowance lists, and sent ashore all excess gear. On 7 June, Escort Division 25 off-loaded smoke generators and got underway for Kodiak. Immediately Ogden had to break formation to return to Seattle because of a salt water leak in the fresh water tank. Four days later the five remaining frigates arrived at Women's Bay, Kodiak, where they fueled. Charlottesville (PF 25), Allentown (PF 52), Machias (PF 53), and Sandusky (PF 54) subse­ quently joined them. On the after­ noon of 13 June, the nine frigates got underway and proceeded in column by the inland route to Genuinely amiable relations existed between the Soviet and American com­ mands at Cold Bay. In this photograph, Captain 3rd Rank Pavel A. Chicherin, Cold Bay. They arrived the next who had been injured in a automobile accident, presents Captain Maxwell day and were turned over to with an ornamental Soviet navy dagger at a transfer party, held in the Maxwell's jurisdiction. Russian mess hall, 9 June 1945. Coronado had incrementally the Lake Union Lumber Company Pier in Seattle, where contractors from the Pacific Electric Company completed post-voyage repairs and maintenance. Workers reinstalled the attack plotter and sonar range recorder, and painted the entire ship above the waterline. With repairs completed, attention again turned to the "arduous task of correcting new allowance list to conform with installed equipment. Inventories revealed much minor excess gear and also a large shortage of many items. Requisitioning and invoicing involved many NacionaJ Archives hours of work and remained Gallup (PF 47) wearing camouflage at San Pedro, Calif., on 30 May 1944. BUSHIPS incomplete at the end of the conceived this scheme (which involved dull black, ocean gray, light gray, and deck month." During the last week blue paint) specifically for the frigate.

25 Under the Soviet naval ensign, Coronado became EK-8. Three days later, the first ten frigates stood out of Cold Bay, formed the sixth USSR-bound con­ voy, and set course for Petropavlovsk on the . ~ In the meantime, H ULA <.:! ~ turned over three of the four ::> ~ floating workshops, which "0 Soviet steamers took in tow on ]

~ their way home to the Soviet 0 Far East from the U.S. West Coast. Maxwell's team also transferred a American and Soviet commanding officers of the first ten frigates trans­ second increment of minesweepers ferred at Cold Bay. Commander John J. Hutson, Jr., USCG, the senior train­ ing officer, is seated, second from the left. Lieutenant E. H. Burt, USCGR, ahead of schedule, so that by the commanding Coronado (PF 38) is seated, second from the right. Below left, end of]uly 100 vessels out of the starboard view of the floating workshop YR 74, which was identical to the original 180 were in Soviet hands. four YRs transferred to the Soviet navy at Cold Bay in 1945.

The trouble-plagued sub­ arrange for 13th Naval District chaser program, however, subchasers to substitute for the threatened to upset the 1 unsatisfactory vessels to keep the October transfer deadline. program on schedule. However, Shoddy repair work and unbeknownst to Maxwell or Popov, supply shortages in Seattle momentous events in the Pacific caused major difficulties. War would soon create an even Maxwell was able to greater sense of urgency.

\. j"·:-:.~,_,. ' ~·r.. ~~ ! ' ~t Commissioning photo­ . 1 graph of the SC 1011 underway off Terminal Island, Calif., July 1943. Because of a shortage of 3"/23 cal. guns, the typical main battery, the builder, Fellows & Stewart, mounted a 40mm Bofors machine gun. Single 20mm Oerlikons also replaced the usual arrangement of two .50 cal . machine guns. This craft carried the "Mousetrap" antisubmarine rocket launcher forward and a pair of tracks on the stern.

28 The End of the Pacific War

t 1700 on 8 August (Moscow time), two days A after the U.S. detonated the first atomic bomb over Japan and a day before the use of the second, Stalin made good his commi trnent to enter the Pacific War when Molotov informed Japanese ambassador Naotake Sa to that a state of war would exist between their countries as of 0001 on the 9th. Within min­ utes of the time that war was declared, the Red Army launched a multipronged attack on Builder's photograph of motor minesweeper YMS 143, February 1943. As T- Japanese forces in Manchuria. 522, this ship saw action against Japanese forces on southern Sakhalin Island, 11-25 August 1945. Serving until July 1956, she was stricken from the O n 10 August, the government Soviet navy list and dismantled for spare parts. This type mounted a single in Tokyo expressed a willingness 3"/50 cal. gun and two 20mm machine guns, and could make 12 knots. to accept Allied surrender terms. O n the 14th, Japan transmitted down, halted altogether on 15 The Soviet navy supported its acceptance of the terms. August. Fighting between Soviet Soviet ground forces in opera­ Anglo-American offensive opera­ and Japanese forces continued tions against enemy outposts in tions, which had begun to wind unabated. southern Sakhalin Island, the Kuril Islands, and northern Korea. Joint army, navy, and air operations against southern Sakhalin- Russia already pos­ sessing the northern half of the island- began on 11 August and lasted one week. Some 30,000 Japanese defenders put up a spirited fight. About 3,300 offi­ cers and men surrendered to Soviet forces in the northern areas on the 18th, but Japanese troops in the south resisted fiercely, fighting for a last chance at evacuation to . On 15 August, Marshal A. M. ~ "" Vasilevsky, Commander in Chief -~ =~==== c3 0'U--~toJOU.Anr;JM" '- • __ ,._ a ____ _. of the Soviet troops in the Far 0 ·--- ...... _ 1::­ ::: ---·--·-"""--- East, ordered the occupation of ..0 _ -:::._- - .== ~ :J '- ~· ·:_ ~:...._- -~- the northern Kuril Islands. Southeastern Siberia continued on page 32 29 Attack on

n the night of 15 August (14 requested and received, all troops, Lopatka, just 12 kilometers from 0 August in Moscow) 1945, equipment, and supplies had been Shumshu across the First Kuril Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, supreme loaded by 1800 hours on 16 Strait, at the peninsula's southern commander of Soviet armed forces August. The landing force used tip. The ability of the force's small in the Far East, ordered General the extra time to improve their ships to keep station and to supply M. A. Purkayev, commander of interservice communications. fire support while battling strong the Red Army's Second Far Three hours later Ponomarev's 64 currents in the First Kuril Strait Eastern Front and Admiral Ivan S. ships took up their assigned sta­ and enemy shore batteries on Yumashev, commander of the tions in Avacha Bay. Shumshu remained in doubt. Pacific Ocean Fleet, to occupy the Gnechko commanded a modest The operation began at 0500 northern Kuril Islands of assault force of two reinforced rifle hours on 17 August. Twenty-one Shumshu and . The regiments and a naval infantry bat­ hours later, the strike force entered responsibility for carrying out the talion, a total of 8,824 officers and the First Kuril Strait and took up occupation fell to the respective men. He expected to encounter, positions off Capes Kokutan and army and navy on according to Soviet intelligence, as Kotomari. The first wave, consist­ the Kamchatka Peninsula, Major many as 8,500 Japanese of the 9lst ing of the naval infantry battalion General A. R. Gnechko of the Infantry Division on Shumshu, of some 1,000 men, waded ashore Kamchatka Defense Zone and with as many as 15,000 reinforce­ at approximately 0430 hours on Captain 1st Rank Dmitri G. ments on nearby Paramushir. 18 August, completely surprising Ponomarev of the Petropavlovsk Intelligence estimates suggested the Japanese. Even though Naval Base. that Japan's announced intention Japanese resistance was disorga­ Gnechko, the overall comman­ to surrender had left its ground nized, the attackers revealed their der, and Ponomarev faced formi­ forces in the Kuril Islands demoral­ lack of tactical combat experience dable obstacles. Their orders ized, small consolation given an and amphibious training as small required them to assemble an enemy troop advantage of 3 to 1. units made uncoordinated assault force from the units based Furthermore, the Japanese could advances inland rather than secur­ on the peninsula and land it on call upon 77 tanks and the Soviets ing the beach. Within the first Shumshu within 48 hours. The none. Even worse, the Russian hour, Japanese machine-gunners, commanders estimated that keep­ advantage in artillery and mortars well emplaced in pillboxes and ing an assault force intact between would be useless until the troops foxholes, began to inflict heavy the staging area at Petropavlovsk had established a beachhead. Poor casualties. In addition, belated and the objective, a distance of weather limited Soviet aerial recon­ Soviet attempts to destroy enemy some 170 miles in the world's fog­ naissance and ground support shore batteries met fierce resis­ giest waters, and executing an operations. tance, and Japanese guns soon attack at the correct hour would The small size of Gnechko's found the range of the ships off­ by itself be a considerable achieve­ assault force and the lack of heavy shore. ment if completed in 24 hours. naval guns for fire support mis­ As Gnechko feared, naval gun­ That meant they had just 24 sions required a concentrated fire support proved ineffective, in hours to organize their troops, ori­ attack at one landing area. The part because of an almost total ent them to the objective, and minesweeper Okhotsk (3,200 lack of radio communication with load them onto a motley collec­ tons), Ponomarev's largest ship, the troops ashore. As a result, tion of landing ships, transports, which mounted only three enemy shore batteries wreaked and self-propelled barges. 130mm and two 76.2mm guns, havoc on the amphibious force Notwithstanding a 24-hour post­ provided fire support along with when it approached at 0530. By ponement which Gnechko four 130mm guns on Cape 0900, this force, spearheaded by

30 "The Death of Petty Officer 1st Class Nikolai Aleksandrovich Vilkov on 18 August 1945" by Gleb lvanovich Barabanshikov, from 1951. The original work is guache on paper, 45x60cm. Petty Officer Vilkov silenced an enemy machine-gun posi­ tion during the attack on Shumshu Island, but was killed, earn­ ~ ing him a posthu­ ~ ~ mous award of the a= Hero of the Soviet "' Union. ~ i ~--:~:!~ g d

16 American-built LCI(L)s recem­ enemy, who coumerattacked Heavy artillery carne ashore on ly acquired at Cold Bay, hastily repeatedly. Although badly need­ the morning of the 19th. Small unloaded the second wave, minus ing reinforcemems and resupply, pockets of Japanese, meanwhile, most of its radios and all of its the naval infantrymen held out. had already begun to surrender. At artillery and mortars. Japanese The afternoon's good weather 0900, an envoy represeming the shore batteries destroyed five of brought Soviet air support, and 91st Division said that, according the vulnerable LCI(L)s. attacks on Paramushir's naval base to orders from a higher command, At 0600 hours, units of the first halted the flow of Japanese rein­ Japanese forces would cease hostil­ wave tried to knock out the shore forcements to Shumshu. Because ities at 1600. The garrisons batteries on Cape Kokutan, but of good coordination between the defending Shumshu, Paramushir proved too few in number to attackers, the support ships, and and nearby Island breach the well defended heights. covering aircraft, the counterat­ signed an unconditional surrender In fact, while pinned down on low tacking Japanese suffered heavy agreement at 1800 on the 19th, ground, the Japanese coumerat­ losses. By the first night, Soviet but sporadic fighting continued tacked with infamry and 20 tanks. forces (finally reinforced by until 23 August, when the last The attack failed to eradicate the artillery and mortars) held the Japanese finally gave up the fight. naval infantrymen, who destroyed western slopes of both major Soviet losses arnoumed to 15 tanks and charged up the heights and a beachhead 4 kilome­ 1,567, including 516 killed. heights, only to be repulsed just ters long and 5-6 kilometers deep. Japanese casualties numbered before reaching the top. In a series of night attacks, they 1,0 18, the only instance in August At 0910, Soviet units on wiped out most of the Japanese 1945 when their losses fell below Shumshu finally established com­ who defended the shore batteries. the Soviet total. With Shumshu munications with the assault ships Gnechko planned to eliminate all and Pararnushir secure, Soviet and . The latter's Japanese resistance on Shumshu forces occupied the rest of the accurate fire flushed out the the next day. archipelago easily.

31 Below right, Senior He planned to occupy Shumshu Lieutenant Aleksei K. \ u. s.s. RJ Metelov, prospective and then Paramushir, the most __ ,.~:{' ..._, Soviet commanding rr ~"'" heavily fortified islands and the 1 (I <> officer of Augury ~-,__,., two closest to Kamchatka, using (AM 149), received .'i £' .-1 0 F' ~;~~~ the existing naval infantry and this invitation to a ~ .. ~~,- ~·G'-"1)9'1~· ~~.... :~ OI(JIOT!:iA army units on Kamchatka. With party for 14 July. A ..,...,., ' . •.J these objectives secured, the month later, his ves­ lightly defended archipelago sel, designated T- ....,o;;;t ... •.. ~o 334, would be Major would fall. General A. R...... ,~.,.: .... ~ ,,.,.,.. c . .:•• With success on Sakhalin Gnechko's headquar­ --r-- ~ ...... -·~ assured, Soviet planners turned ters ship for the Kuril Island operation. their attention to Hokkaido. In •JtL-..,.n:.,.,.ra Below left, Metelov '&_t,· l,....,..•m• P ..tciFlfC late June, at a meeting on the S"'".J$"''<.1'0 and Lieutenant . ~ r...., l'l'l JI'IDd 0 C H .4\S military preparations of the Red Commander J. E. rTMkda.:u..s.u...... __...... Army in the Far East, the Stonington, CO of r-." ·r::•uPP;)..tr>

Politburo had discussed the sub­ Augury. Fifty years ·~- later, Metelov trav­ ject of occupying Hokkaido. KURIL ISLANDS , a Politburo eled to the Kuril Islands (map, right) member since 1939 and wartime to participate in a commissar with the rank of lieu­ commemorative tenant-general, supported reenactment of the Marshal K. A. Meretskov's sugges­ attack on Shumshu Island. ~ tion to occupy the island. Others, "" including Marshal Zhukov and d 'o ~ 't I ..... Foreign Minister Molotov, f • • ... ,., ... JZtary ot Ccmgre opposed the idea. :J The prospect of exposing the army to a fierce Japanese defense deterred some, while Molotov said such an act would be viewed as a blatant viola­ ~~ tion of the Yalta agreements. The Soviet General Staff and Navy General Staff, however, had Meanwhile, in Alaska, train­ already prepared estimates on the ing of Soviet navy crews contin­ forces that would be required. ued. According to Maxwell, Stalin seemed keen on the idea. when the Soviet contingent Merchant ships had begun to received the news that the Soviet embark troops and supplies for a Union had finally joined the landing on Hokkaido. Finally, on war, they seemed genuinely 22 August, Stalin halted further pleased with their new status as preparations. allies of America. Reporters

32 the Allied surrender demand affected the program, Maxwell reported, "except to give a most agreeable tone to our relations with the visitors, and to make us work harder than ever. " Indeed, the Soviet-American team at Cold Bay accelerated its efforts to transfer the remaining vessels. In the difficult period of tran­ sition from belligerency to occu­ pying power, it would be only natural for the Soviets to request that Maxwell turn over as many vessels as possible until Japan was finally subdued. In late August and early September, Maxwell limited training to the minimum needed by the Soviet crews to Photograph of American officers of Augury (AM 149) presented to Senior navigate their ships home. Navy Lieutenant Aleksei K. Metelov as a memento. Detachment 3294 completed the final shore-based training of 3,700 Soviet officers and enlisted rushed to register stories on the would be lifted. men on 25 August, raising the operation, wrongly assuming either the Soviet Union's total of Soviet naval personnel that with Soviet entry into the active belligerence nor news of trained at Cold Bay to 12,000, war the tight veil of censorship Japan's intention to comply with including some 750 officers. The

EK-22, the ex-Gallup (PF 47), inboard of the Soviet ::;:I Type 7 destroyer ~ Razyashchy, probably at "' :.c ~ Petropavlovsk. The E American-built ship arrived Ii: ~ at Petropavlovsk on 5 0 September 1945, too late to c:0 participate in operations g against Japan. ~ j 0 J

33 Right, Soviet minesweeper T- 275, the ex-USS Measure (AM 263), at Vladivostok in 1945, following operations against Japanese forces in northern Korea. This ship served in the navy and later with the fish­ ing fleet, and was scrapped in 1960. Below, veteran motor minesweepers of the Soviet Pacific Fleet's operations against Japan celebrate the ::<~ end of the war, probably in ~ Avacha Bay, Petropavlovsk. ~ < Under Soviet colors, the E li: wooden-hulled YMSs per­ "'C .0 formed a variety of combat, 8 0 auxiliary, and scientific tasks. 0: But they had short service "]! lives, and all were decommis­ ~ sioned by the mid-1950s. ~ 0 J

forces completed the occupation of ~ t "· the southern Kuril Islands, includ­ ...__"j--.+ ing the islands known as the ~ i- 0 Northern Territories. Hours later Maxwell received this information ::