The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinkingon military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Ar- ticles in this edition may be reproduced in w hole or in part without permission.

, y iio n n u c D >w \rvrru\ JOURNAL AIR POWER JOURNAL, SUMMER 1987 AFRP 50 2

A Message from the Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch, USAF 2 A Theater-Level View of Air Power Gen Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., USAF (Ret) 3 American Air Power and Grand Tactics Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF 9 A Challenge to Our Air Force Brig Gen John C. Fryer, Jr., USAF 15 Use and Misuse of Conventional Tactical Air Power Lt Col William P. Stroud III, USAF 16 Fighting the Air War: A Wing CommandeFs Perspective Col Clifford R. Krieger, USAF 21

Fighting From the Air Base Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF 32

Scores of Pilots, Clouds of Planes Warren A. Trest 42

An Airman’s Quintet Col Alan L. Gropman, USAF (Ret) 55

The Need for Battle Managers in the Tactical Air Control System Maj Thomas H. Buchanan, USAF 60

Ricochets 7 2 Commentary on Previous Issues Net Assessment 7 4 Reviews of Current Literalure Notams 85 Notices of Interest Contributors 87 Airpower Journal A Message from the Chief of Staff

G en Larry D. W el ch

AM PLEASED to introduce the initial is- sion, or pride—extremely important. As sue of Airpower Journal. This year marks George Patton observed, “Wars are fought Ithe fortieth anniversary of the LIS Air with weapons, but they are won by men.” Force and of the publication of our profes- But the other element of the warrior per­ sional journal. The Air University Quar- spective—the “brain work” that General terly Review vvas fírst published in the LeMav referred to—is also vital. Particu- spring of 1947 to stimulate reading, writ- larly in this age of deterrence, warfare ex- ing, and reflection on the part of Air Force ists as an intellectual as well as a physical members. In 1963 Air Force Chief of Staff and moral contest. The Great Captains of Curtis E. LeMay reemphasized the need the past were those who could outthink, for “brain work" in the professional officer not outnumber their opponents. And with corps and directed increased availability our adversaries holding a quantitative of the magazine, resulting in the bi- edge on most potential battlefields, the monthly Air University Review. American warrior must continually polish The Revieiv’s successor will continue in his arms by cultivating his mind. this tradition, bringing a changed format Airpower Journal will aid this process and a revised focus to meet the challenges bv speaking less of management and more facing the Air Force in the 1980s and be- of leadership. Concentration will be on the yond. The Airpower Journal is a natural warfighting nature of our profession rather extension of initiatives the Air Force has than on system acquisition and resource alreadv taken to stress professionalism. In allocation. Professional development the late 1970s, we became concerned that thrives best through the exchange of infor- Air Force people vvere beginning to view mation. ideas, and perspectives as op- our profession as just another job. Our posed to passive reading or solitary commitment to excellence and the unique thought. The process of thinking, discuss- sense of dedication reflected by military ing, and writing about our profession of Service in defense of the nation requires arms enhances our perspective and in- continued total dedication to professional creases the range of Solutions to the chal­ vaiues. Along with continued emphasis lenges we face. One of the kev objectives of on our professional values, there is a need the Airpower Journal will be to fill the for increased appreciation vvithin the Air need vvithin the Air Force to hear from and Force of our basic organizational objec- encourage the warrior-scholar. The place tives and concepts of aerial vvarfare. for his thoughts are within the pages of Five years ago, we initiated Project War- this journal. rior to emphasize the Air Force vvarfight- Like Project Warrior, Airpower Journal ing perspective and to increase our challenges us to expand our professional understanding of the application of air perspective and warfighting knowledge. It power in combat. Properly, most of those reminds us that, when called on, our task efforts vvere decentralized to the base or is to fight and win. Write to vour fellow unit levei and stressed the “heart” of the airmen in this journal and tell us how to warrior—the warfighting spirit. Ciearly do it better. I look forward to reading the demands and stresses of modem war- your contributions to our professional fare make motivation—call it spirit, cohe- development. Headquarters United States Air Force 2 A THEATER-LEVEL VIEWOF AIR POWER

Gen Charles L. Donnelly, J r .. USAF, Ret ir ed

WOULD like to present some of mv There has been a push in the last few thoughts on the use of air power in a years to study the operational art of war theater-level war.* I have three items (i.e., the study of warfare at the levei be- to discuss: the operational view of war- tween strategy and tactics—or how to con- fareI emphasizing air superiority: follow- duct overall theater campaigns). The on forces attack (FOFA); and last, a chal- majority of our sênior military leaders lenge for all of us. have never had wartime experience com- manding forces from a theater levei. Be- cause this is true, the operational art of *This art ide has been extradeci from lhe texl of a speech •hal General Donnelly presented on 19 May 1986 to lhe Na­ modem war deserves our attention. This tional YVarCollege. theater-level perspective of warfighting

3 4 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 must pervade all our thinking, military Many elements influence the theater planning, training, and equipping. I want perspective. A major element is alliances. to talk about employing air power at that This is especially true in Europe. Allied levei. Command Europe comprises the North­ I vvill start by saying air power is a thea- ern, Southern, and Central regions. ter-level concept. Air forces conduct cam- Focusing on Central Europe, the size of paigns of their own as well as support and opposing forces and importance of this re- jointly prosecute surface campaigns. Air, gion make it a “theater" for this discus- land, and naval component commanders sion. As you know, we have an eight-corps translate theater objectives into joint cam­ front in the Central Region. with the dif- paigns aimed at theater goals. ferent countries’ land forces having some- Air campaigns are theater-level cam­ what different capabilities and equipment. paigns. all parts of air power’s operational These corps are arranged into two army art. US and NATO doctrine holds that air groups—Northern Army Group (NOR- power works best under the concept of THAG) and Central Armv Group centralized control and decentralized ex- (CENTAG). ecution. These words, I am sure, are famil­ As the commander, Allied Air Forces iar to all of vou. They have been standard Central Europe (COMAAFCE), I command vernacular since the end of World War II, an air force composed of aircraft from six and even earlier at the Kasserine Pass in allied nations. I present air power employ- 1943. As you remember, in North África in ment options to the commander of the World War II, air was parceled out under Central Region (CINCENT), a German the control of several subtheater com­ army four-star general. My recommen- manders. Our parcels of Allied air were of dations are based on his overall theater little use against German air. which was guidance and on the needs of my two sub- employed as an entity, attacking en masse ordinate Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) virtually unopposed. commanders (British and German). In Air power is now Consolidated under a turn, the ATAFs base their campaign plans central commander. We recognized the on coordination with their respective need for unity of effort when using limited army group commanders. Missions in- assets; and as a result, our limited air as- clude defensive and offensive counterair, sets now have tremendous combat power. interdiction, close air support, and recon- We can exploit the advantages of airplanes naissance. Aircraft include many different (i.e., speed. range, and flexibility) in a kinds and nationalities (e.g., Dutch F-16s; comprehensively coordinated fashion in German F-4s; British Tornados; US F-15s, direct support of theater objectives. F-llls, F-16s, F-4s, and A-lOs; Canadian Specificglly, the operational challenge F-18s; and NATO E-3s). for employing air is at the levei of appor- tionment and allotment. Here we deter­ So, you see that my “operational art" re- mine how many and what kind of aircraft quires fulfilling many different require- should be used for what air missions to ments using diverse multinational aircraft best meet the theater commanders’ overall serving numerous mission areas, all in objectives. Since there are just not enough support of Central Region objectives. That aircraft to go around, as we saw in North is a mouthful, but it is important to under- África, we strive to concentrate firepower stand this to understand the operational at the right times and places to meet over­ art of war for air power in Europe. all campaign objectives. By “the right time CINCENT, with advice from his compo­ and places" I mean the prioritized times nent commanders, develops campaign and places and the prioritized missions to strategy and objectives for all his land and meet campaign objectives for the theater. air forces. Air power, in concert with land A THEATEfí-LEVEL VIEW OE AIR POWER 5

campaigns. supports his objectives. art must come out as a war unfolds. Prewar There are several air operations I must planning cannot totally compensate for conduct as the air component commander the fog of war. Decisions on campaigns to accomplish the objectives of CIN- and force management depend on the CENTs campaigns. I will brieflv discuss situation. two of the prime ones: air superiority and Changing from air-to-air to ground at­ air-land operations. tack and designating the weights of effort First and foremost is air superiority. applied to various mission areas are thea- Gaining freedom of action in the air allows ter-level decisions. We know roughly how us to accomplish all our air missions the decisions would go for a full-scale war whether they be counterair, close air sup- in Europe. We know our force’s strengths port, interdiction, airlift, or reconnais- and weaknesses. We base our planning on sance. Denying that same freedom to these and on what we know of the threat enemy air protects. in great depth, all and the enemy’s potential objectives. But friendly forces—air, land, and sea. we cannot know these well until a war Air superiority is fundamental to mod­ starts and our objectives become clearer. em warfare, and, though termed an oper- ation, it can well be thought of as a theater- Regardless, the fírst consideration is air level campaign in and of itself. Air supe­ superiority—gaining and maintaining riority requires the conduct of several si- freedom of action in the air and also free­ multaneous missions. It requires dom from enemy air attack. Counterair is a integrated air defenses, jointly employed high priority. If we do not protect our air- in the Central Region. SAMs and guns fields, munitions storage areas, reinforce- from allied armies and air forces provide a ments, and command and control centers, large measure of attrition of enemy aircraft as well as our own troops fíghting at the attacking on our side of the border. They front, I do not think we can come close to complement air-to-air fighters from sev­ winning a war in Europe. We must use eral nations that are rapidly employed every asset available to us to provide gen­ over wide areas to provide area defense eral air superiority over friendly territory and to plug gaps in our surface defenses. and selected, timely air superiority over We therefore exploit the readiness of sur­ enemy territory. This provides freedom of face defenses and the concentration of action for our other air missions and pro- force made possible by the speed and tection from air attack for the allied range of aircraft. This defense in-depth is a armies. formidable array of forces ready to react to This brings us to a second operation for enemy air attack. But reaction to attack is air pow'er, air-land combat, that would be not enough. We must also attack enemy air conducted simultaneously with the fight forces in enemy territory to reduce their to establish appropriate air superiority. ability to generate sorties against us. Air-land combat operations support land Forces we use to conduct counterair battles through direct application of air­ missions are the same ones we use for craft fírepower. The missions are familiar other missions. For instance, deep-attack, to you all (close air support, air interdic­ air-interdiction aircraft such as F -llls , B- tion, and battlefield air interdiction). Joint 52s, and Tornados are the same ones we planning in the combined alliance arena, will use for counterair in attacking air- at the component commander levei, is the fields. Many of our ground-attack aircraft, key to success in these missions. The plan­ such as F-16s, are also suited for air-to-air, ning must take into account the threat, our and we need them in both roles. own air and land capabilities, and the When, where, and how much to use are campaign objectives for the region—“con- questions of operational art. Much of this cepts of employment,” if you will. The 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SÜMMER 1987 structure of these concepts is established ing the enemy at the front are complemen- in peacetime planning. The timely altera- tarv missions. Both are needed in Central tion of them throughout a confiict to meet Europe. Deciding leveis of effort to be ap- the current situation and to influence fu­ plied at the front, and to be applied deep ture events is more theater operational art. behind the front, depends on the unfold- We need the widest range of options pos- ing situation. sible. If we have many different campaigns Attacking unengaged forces during war and concepts available, we can keep the applies to more than enemy armies; it ap- enemv guessing. In my discussion of fol­ plies to air, land, and sea operations as io w-on forces attack, I will focus on one of well. Air power is the primary means a these air-land combat concepts and relate theater commander has to attack any fol­ it to the operational levei of war. low-on forces. He must use the same forces FOFA lias gained widespread attention against a variety of targets, balancing the in recent years, especially in Europe. Em- attack of engaged forces against the attack phasis on the need for FÓFA has made us of unengaged ones. look at our current capabilities to carry it For counterair, if we were to attack air- out. The development of emerging tech- fields and reduce the enemy’s ability to nologies increases our capability. FOFA is generate aircraft sorties against friendly the epitome of a concept at the operational forces or territory, we would not stop them levei. It is a new term, but the concept is all from coming. We do not have enough not new. At least it is not new since mud- assets. But we can reduce the number of and oil-spattered aviators wearing white enemy sorties to the point that our air de- scarves and goggles first dropped hand- fenses may be able to cope. held bombs on enemy troops. FOFA is and Similarly, if we interdict second-eche- has been largely accommodated by the air- lon ground forces following the frontline interdiction mission. The concept has divisions into battle, we control or meter caused considerable debate on what it is, the tlow of the enemy troops, hopefully to how it is to be done, and how much is nec- the point where our frontline armies can essary. But the concept is simple. Let me cope. And if we interdict sea lines of com- cut through the debate and put FOFA in an munication or attack ports, we can help operational perspective. Emphasizing slow or. to some degree, control the flow of FOFA is merely emphasizing a need to at­ seaborne forces into battle. These are joint tack enemy forces before they can be efforts, prioritized at the theater or region brought to bear in battle—to attack unen- levei so that our limited ability to attack gaged enemy forces, nothing more. deep targets is most effectivelv used. The purpose is also simple: keep the en- As 1 said, the term FOFA has been used emy-to-friendl.V force ratios manageable at primarilv in the context of land battles: the points of contact, slow or stop the fiow slow the second-echelon armies. Indeed. of unengaged enemv forces moving to bat­ in Europe we have verv rightly focused on tle. and allow our engaged forces to seize establishing increased capabilities to con­ the initiative. Most current developmental trol the arrival of enemy troops and equip- discussions center on what is needed to ment at the front. Now is the right time and enhance our capabilities: deep attack. this is the right emphasis for developing standoff weaponry, deep-look reconnais- the needed technologies, subconcepts. sance, intelligence fusion, and so on. But command and control, and so on, to be when and how to use these capabilities as able to conduct FOFA against enemy land the war rages on are the operational art forces in Europe for the future. We must do questions for theater or regional this research, this planning. and this de­ commanders. velopment to have sufficient capabilities Interdicting follow-on forces and attack- to prosecute a war in Europe. A THEATEfí-LEVEL VIEW OF A1H POWER 7

But the operational art requires that we much can commanders rely on their intel­ knovv how to use the forces and the con- ligence? How quickly can we establish cepts during wartime. For instance. at joint campaigns? What is the enemy’s what point vvill we need to use deep-attack scheme of maneuver? What are his weak aircraft for air interdiction of follow-on points? What are our capabilities. and how land forces, and at what point will we have these been reduced during fíghting? need to use these same aircraft to attack What are the enemy’s objectives? Can we airfields or ports? Or when must we devote afford to use forces against the unengaged most effort to direct support at the front enemy, or must we directly attack front- lines to the exclusion of attacking unen- line enemy divisions, and for how long? gaged enemv forces? How much can we rely on current Com­ The enemy in wartime may not look or munications and what impact will C3 behave like we have guessed in our peace- losses have on joint campaigns? How pre- time planning. We must have flexible ca- pared are our commanders to execute their pabilities, flexible control, and flexible wartime leadership functions? commanders to best use all our theater This last question brings me to my final forces as the war unfolds. point—a challenge for all of us. How well Flexibility. again, is an inherent advan- can our theater/operational commanders tage of air power and must be exploited in handle their wartime leadership posi- war. The aircraft we use in the morning to tions? I have centered on air power, but my attack an airfield can be used later to attack points concern all our Services in conduct- railheads where follow-on forces are gath- ing a war. We need to think, train, and ered. The aircraft we use this morning to leam about war. This is a challenge for our shoot down air threats with air-to-air mis- military in general, a special concern for siles can be used later to attack tank col- all of you. You need to think at the opera­ umns or chokepoints in support of the tional levei, write on theater perspectives maneuver of a division. The use of air of warfare, and meld different Service ca­ must be viewed first and foremost at the pabilities into joint operational warfight- theater levei. What are the theater objec- ing concepts. tives and the regional campaigns? We face challenges today not greatly dif­ Interdicting unengaged enemy forces ferent from ancient warfighters, but we before they can be brought to bear is a con- have added some new wrinkles. As tech- cept at the operational levei. It is accom- nologv has improved, distances and time modated by various air power missions have shrunk. The tempo of warfighting has prosecuted jointly, requiring many deci- increased over the last several decades; sions in multiple areas, using a vast num- and the range, accuracy, and kinds of ber of inputs. These decisions must be weaponry have greatly improved. But well thought out, but many inputs needed some challenges will never change. Com­ for decision making will probably not be manders at all leveis need to understand available until the war is being fought. All the enemy, to know their own forces, to es­ details cannot be known before the fact. tablish warfighting goals and objectives, Operational art sets the framework for and to lead men and manage battles while finding and assessing those details for suffering the fog and friction of war. theater campaigns. But the true essence of As commanders in peacetime, it is easy the art is found where commanders act to get caught up in day-to-day duties. Ex- and lead as a coherent theaterwide team. pand yourselves! Force your thinking to A vast array of questions must be ad- higher leveis. Communicate your ideas. dressed during the prosecution of a war. I know all of you were selected for sên­ What intelligence information is available ior service school primarily because you to land, sea, and air commanders? How can think, communicate, and lead on 8 A/RPOVVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 higher planes. For the next few years you your decisions. We need that kind of vvill be working on operational or plan- thinking to keep all the parts coherent and ningstaffs in research and development or viable so sênior commanders can use them commanding forces. You will be develop- as part of their operational art. ing bits and pieces of our total military 1 have given you my thoughts on the op­ power. erational art of theater air war. I challenge Your challenge vvill be to think and com- you to think about the intricacies of how municate warfighting as a priority in your you would prosecute a war, improvising lives as you perform your peacetime du- as situations develop. By doing so, you ties. Moreover, you especially need to will more effectively command and lead project your warfighting thoughts to the forces in a future war if called to do so. theater levei and higher—“what-ifing” and analyzing potential consequences of Arlington. Virgínia AMERICAN AIR POWER AND GRAND TACTICS

Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer

F DETERRING conflict is the founda- aggressor’s fear that the conflict will be tion of US militarv strategy, then air lost. But if such deterrence fails, American povver is essential. In fact, air power Author’s note: I vvish to thurik Barry Smernoll; Ools Kiank vvill prevent many future confiicts Black. Sam Gardiner. Alan Gropman: and numerous ntliers from1 ever starting because of a potential vvhose suggestions and comments vyere oí considerable hfllp in lhe preparation of Ihis artit.le. 10 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

air power can then be the key that unlocks we exercise at this levei (since bigger is the control of battle for our operational more expensive), and we tend to work on commanders on future battlefields. Con- the integration of supporting forces at this sidering the leverage of air power, no won- levei. However, the greatest payoffs for ef- der each military Service has its own “air fective air power will come through the force.” manner in which air power plays on a Of course, 1 need not dwell on the ob- larger scale—the combat plan or grand tac­ vious, underlying point: no single element tics designed and used by operational of our national military power can do the commanders whose forces include land, job alone. There are criticai roles for land, sea, and air elements, and almost certainly sea, and air forces in most plausible scen- the forces of allied nations. arios, but in this discussion we are consid- ering the air forces. The spectrum of contlict ranges from all- How Do We Get There? out nuclear war to low-intensity conflict The arena of large-scale combat is ever (L1C) and counterterrorism, and air power widening, and if we airmen are to earn our has significance across this spectrum. This professional stature in the future, we need discussion, however, focuses on what air to pay close attention to four key points. power can do for conflicts falling beíween the use of nuclear weapons and LIC. • We need to firmly grasp the lessons of the past that really count. • We need to think about air power Constructing the Best Overall from the perspective of the operational commander in chief (CINC). We must un- Combat Plan derstand our boss’s problem in order to In what follows, let me draw your atten- work it. tion to the scale of conflict on which Air • We must better focus on new capabil- Force tactics, exercises, and practice need ities coming down the road. How will we to focus. The heart and soul of our profes- integrate them for full effect?—a difficult sion is how to organize war—our special exercise and an expensive one to practice, variety being war in or from the air—to especially on the scale of an entire theater. achieve the national objectives of the • We need to get the dialogue heated up United States. over our ideas about tomorrow’s air As a Service, we mav need to do that bet- power, testing those that are testable and ter. We tend to narrow our focus on how to subjecting the rest to hot, honest, and carry out a given combat plan, and we are professional discussions. (When an issue very good aj it. We also focus on how to cannot be settled by trial and error, often spread limited resources over many plans, the best test is the opinion of other profes­ and we are good at that, too. However, the sional airmen. Of .course, it can be hard first obligation of military professionals to work to explain and defend an idea, and it the nation is to conceive and construct the can take courage to display new ideas be- best overall combat plans—ones that pro- fore peers. It may require even more to duce victories when deterrence fails. In voice them to the bosses. But that the world of general-purpose forces, air- shouldn’t slow you down.) Our predeces- men have too often left that fundamental sors in the 1930s prepared for the awe- responsibility to others. some challenges that they had the Vision to We airmen conceive and construct ex- foresee, and they did it by testing ideas— cellent plans at the levei of flight-lead, where they could—to see what worked strike-lead, and quick-contingency action. and by using energetic debate when actual Our tactical air schools focus at this levei, trials were not possihle. AMERICAN AIR POWER/CRAND TACTICS 11

Study Lessons of the Past Since future military operations will occur under the shadow of large nuclear arsenais In vvorking future air power issues, we held both by the Soviets and by us, we can need to understand the lessons of the expect political restraint in conventional past—from the earlv days of air combat war. We must plan and apply air power right on through the most recent opera- with careful consideration given to the tions. Reinventing wheels is a terrible risks of escalation. waste of the intellect, and reinventing By ‘‘grand tactics” I mean the concep- wheels in a crisis almost certainly invites tion, planning, and highly integrated exe- disaster. We do not need to reinvent the cution of joint or combined military ideas of those airmen who have gone be- operations across wide battle zones and fore us. Their ideas are there in great and for a whole campaign—whether maritime, fascinating numbers for our instruction continental, or a combination of both. To and use. For instance, Gen William iníluence the enemy’s mind and actions, "Billy” Mitchell taught us to try out new and to win, leaders with “winning” ideas ideas and to be willing to go where the an- must plan and steer effective grand tactics. swer takes us. Doctrine follows ideas, and Sun Tzu’s emphasis on the initiative and equipment follows doctrine. During the significance of deception and Liddell World War II, Gen George C. Kennev “left Hart’s concept of the "indirect approach” airmen gasping” with his imaginative are good examples of winning ideas that ideas for establishing advanced air bases apply to nearly any military circum- and for integrating his efforts with those of stance.3 Effective grand tactics are tactical Navy forces to cut off sea movements by cunning on a theater or global scale. isolated Japanese forces.1 Kenney vvas To my mind, the entire military profes- close enough to Gen Douglas MacArthur sion in recent decades has neglected grand that he could help mold MacArthur’s cam- tactics in its pursuit of victory on the bat- paigns to take full advantage of fresh ideas. tlefield. As I suggested earlier, we airmen The result was a successful Pacific cam- are particularly guilty. The Joint Chiefs of paign. Contrarily, as we saw in Vietnam, Staff agreed a few vears ago to turn this sit- fragmentation of air power inevitably re- uation around, and it is turning, but we duces its value to an operational com- still have a long wav to go. Some early mander. Disunity of effort devalues air bright spots do exist; USAFE’s Warrior power. Prep Center is an example. Another is PA- Key lessons about air power abound. CAF’s recent work to build a theater cam­ Airmen who aspire to take a hand in plan- paign plan keyed to the most effective use ning the deterrence of, or victory in. future of air power. conflicts need to know them. If you want a The step-by-step execution of thought- place to start, try Kenney’s General Ken­ ful grand tactics and campaigns—lever- ney Reports and Gen William Momyer's aged with smart uses of advanced Air Power in Three Wars.2 technology, keen awareness of the princi­ pies of war, and generous doses of good leadership—is the key to victory when de­ Think Big terrence fails. Such steps toward victory Appropriate points of departure for dis- are what operational art is all about—the cussions of air power’s role in our military actual direction and execution of combat future are national security policy, grand tasks by an operational commander, the tactics, and joint operational art. National move-and-countermove dynamics with objectives are achieved, in part, by influ- the opposing commander, including visi- encing the minds and actions of our op- ble moves by which strengths and inten- ponents through national security policy. tions may be signaled or screened. 12 AIRPOWER IOURNAL Sl/MMER 1987

Who are the actual operational com- • Develop an intelligence system to manders responsible for carrying out na- read the enemy’s actions and intent. tional security policy by developing • Use logistics to weight the campaign appropriate schemes (grand tactics) and in his favor. executing them (operational art)? They in- • Destroy the enemy’s will and, if nec- clude unified commanders—USCINCPAC essary, his capacity to fíght. (Pacific Command), USCINCSOUTH But what happened to close air support? (Southern Command), USCINCENT (Cen­ Interdiction? Offensive and defensive tral Command), USCINCSPACE (Space counterair? They are the missions around Command), USCINCSOC (Special Opera- which we airmen rally, organize, and ap- tions Command)—subunified command­ ply air power. However, the overall or op­ ers such as CINCUSJAPAN (US Forces, erational commander does not focus on Japan); joint task force commanders; and a the battle in this way. He needs to think in couple of combined commanders—SA- terms of manipulating an enemy—getting CEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Eu- him overextended, tricking him into de- rope) and USC1NCCFC (Combined Forces fending or attacking at a great disadvan- Command). tage. The operational commander Important roles are included for CINC- integrates the tasks listed above to control MAC (Military Airlift Command) as well. his opponenfs actions and mind-set. That Without theater resupply and intratheater control is the goal of the operational movements of forces and equipment. the commander. other combatants might as well have Can modern air power contribute? Of stayed at home. And CINCSAC (Strategic course it can, and massively. Airlift is just Air Command) is a heavy player, too, with another word for the rapid maneuver of missions including air refueling and the criticai forces. So is close air support and provision of bomber aircraft with conven- interdiction, which are the epitome of rap- tional weapons. (Remember, for our pur- idly maneuvering forces as well as fire- poses we are focusing on nonnuclear power. Such maneuvering provides the conflict.) Conceivably, there could also be most powerful operational fírepower a commander—now undesignated—oper- available short of nuclear weapons. And ating at the global levei if ever required. In our modern-day ability to shift air fire- any case, the arena in which these “over- power to where it’s needed—to be directed all” commanders vie for control of the and controlled with fínesse—is unsur- battle is where combat air power really passed, which is whv the inherent speed, pavs off. range, and flexibility of air power make it If air power is successful in unlocking such a dominating force on the battlefield. control of the battle, it will be through Feints and misdirections are easily helping the operational commander fulfill achieved in modern air operations. More- and integrate his fundamental tasks: over, aerospace’s vantage point is superb • Maneuver forces and fírepower to for gathering timely information and for threaten, to control criticai geography, and communicating. to deny the opponent access to areas criti­ But to bring air powers unique capabil- cai to his interests. ities to bear effectively on a conflict. our • Concentrate the fírepower of land, air commander must help to mold the op­ sea, and air forces to produce leverage. erational commander’s scheme of attack • Deceive and confuse the opponent to and combat plan—to shape that opera­ multiply the value of assigned forces. tional art. The air commander must under- • Establish Communications to hear stand the joint/combined operational from subordinates and to orchestrate the concepts and campaign plans of his boss conflict. so clearly that he can then design and im- AMERICAN AIR POWER/GRAND TACTICS 13

plement those plans as if he were the op- new technology will not be used to its best erational commander himself. The genius effect if we go to war. of Kenney in the Pacific and Gen Carl In the future, it will be more important Spaatz in África and in Europe is that they and harder to test, integrate. and practice helped their operational bosses, Mac- with the revolutionary equipment we see Arthur and Eisenhower, alter the cam- on the horizon—survivable, low-observa- paign to take advantage of air povver’s great ble platforms such as the advanced tech­ intrinsic strengths. nology bomber and the advanced tactical The essential lesson for future air power fighter, proliferated and cheap antiradia- is that the air commander mu st m old the tion missiles, and such. We must be able to theater grand tactics so that his doctrine, find and destroy enemy air targets and tactics, and equipment can put the maxi- high-value vehicles and to rupture the ra­ mum muscJe into it. and because the air dar nets of the Soviet air defenses quickly. commander does this on a large scale, that But practicing with the new equipment on is the scale our thinking, exercises, tactical the scale needed may be impossible. So we doctrine, and simulations must move to- will need to simulate the employment and ward. Redirecting ourselves in this fash- integration of emerging capabilities, ion will allow future air commanders to which may demand simulation and mod- shape the future campaigns for maximum eling beyond what we know how to handle impact. today. In other words, the theater air com­ mander needs to know what works best on Integrate and Test New a large scale. Exercise and practice at that scale is hard to do now, and it will be Capabilities harder as new technology is fielded. Sim­ Just as the best theaterwide combat plan ulation and modeling may be a substitute, takes maximum advantage of air power’s but we do not know how to do that yet dominating force on modern battlefields, either! the best air plan takes maximum advan­ tage of the fruits of advanced technology. Our Service is built on innovation—trying Debate the Issues things out to see if they work and how they Can air power make the difference in de- can be improved to work better. terring or winning future conflicts? Sure it But constant innovation and new magic can—when we apply past air power les- in the field can be tough on the air com­ sons to future military problems, use air mander. He needs operational confidence power to achieve the larger objectives our in order to apply doctrine, tactics, and boss has defined, and assure that new ca­ equipment to the basic game plan his boss pabilities are tested, integrated, and prac- and he designed together. What I mean is ticed on the right scale. that the air commander must be reasona- The future will be different—perhaps bly certain that his equipment and plans radically different. We will not be able to work in the ‘‘fog and friction” of war—bad answer all the questions with tests and weather, fatigue, garbled or missing mes- practice—questions such as when can air sages, imperfect logistics, and bad luck. power substitute for ground maneuver New technology and tactical practices to forces? Or should unit air commanders be match must be developed and tested, and able to carry out mission orders, like their users need hands-on practice under near- Army and Navy counterparts, as well as realistic conditions such as the Team detailed frag orders? Or to what extent can Spirit and Red Flag exercises in order to ground forces contribute to air superior- build operational confidence. Otherwise, ity? We must eram the pages of Airpower 14 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

Journal vvith insightful and provocative eve of the bicentennial of the US Consti- ideas about the matters outlined here, both tution and the fortieth anniversary of the within and beyond our ability to test by ac- US Air Force. Our strength as a nation and tual trial. VVe must debate nevv issues and our strength as a military Service have old ones vvith candor and must resolve been our ability as citizens and airmen to problems thoughtfully to cope vvith our fu­ adapt to our own growth and changing ca- ture challenges. pabilities. We are about to be tested again. VVe are launching this Airpovver Journal And again. at an auspicious time—on the concurrent Have at it, airmen! Washington. D.C.

Notes ciation. 1978). 1. Gen Haywood S. Hansell. Jr., The Strutegic Air VVor :t. Sun Tzu. The Art of U’ar. trans. Samuel B. Griífith (New Agciinst Germqny and Japun: A Memoir | Washington. D.C.: York: Oxford University Press. 1982), 53, 66. Liddell Harfs Office of Air Force History, 1986). 148. views about the "indirec! approach” are captured by his 2. Gen George C. Kennev. General Kenney Reports (New slatement that "the indirect approach is as fundamental to York: Duell, Sloan. and Pearce. 1949); Gen William W. Mo- the realm of poiitics as to the realm of sex." B. H. Liddell myer. Air Power in Three Wars, ed. Lt Gol A. |. C. Lavalle and Hart, Slrategy. 2d ed. (New York: New American Librarv. Maj James C. Gaston (Washington. D.C.: US Air Force Asso- 1967), 18. A Challenge to Our Air Force

Brig Gen John C. Fryer, ] r .

E AT THE Air University Center for time operations as well. Air wars cannot Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and be fought alone, as air operations cannot WEducation (AUCADRE) are proud to be be discussed without consideringall of the ushering in our nevv professional publica- people, disciplines, and capabilities that tion, the Airpoiver Journal. We believe support, supply. maintain, and train our we have tbe right editorial and publishing forces. The Airpoiver Journal should be a talent for this significant endeavor, but publication for all Air Force people, not “the right stuff' must come from you. You just for the “ops folks." are. of course, our audience. More impor- We challenge you to help us put meat on tantlv, you are our contributors. This jour- this philosophical skeleton. First, we en- nal will be vvhat you make it. courage you to contribute by writing arti­ As the Chief points out (p. 2), the focus cles. What you have learned over the years of the Airpoiver Journal is the operational in your wide-ranging specialties makes art of vvar. We are not looking for discus- you uniquely qualified to offer thoughts sions of tactics or ethereal debates about for improvement. Second, we ask you to geopolitics. Manv other fine publications read the Journal each quarter and think deal with those subjects quite adequately. about what you have read. Talk with your We vvant to talk about campaign planning friends and associates about the ideas pre- and hovv we will orchestrate tactical sented and let us know what you think. If events to produce victory; how our poten- an author has really “wound your clock,” tial enemies think about war and vvhat we whv not write a feature article of your need to do to capitalize on their weak- own? Write to our editors with your opin- nesses and work around their strengths; ions, pro and con, about our articles. We where we are going wrong in our planning, are willing to take the ílak or the laurels. personnel policies, leadership training, This is your professional journal. Do not vvargaming, and exercising as they relate shy away from it. If we are going to grow in to warfighting; what is needed to make us our professional knowledge. we need to better team players with our allies and sis- develop, exchange, and debate ideas. We ter Services; and how we can do a better job need to think about how to fight to win. As of matching doctrine, force structure, and Sir William Francis Butler said, “The na- war plans. tion that will insist on drawing a broad This is the “stuff” of our profession, and line of demarcation between the fighting it is the intended thrust of the Airpoiver man and the thinking rnan is liable to find Journal. This does not mean that we plan its fighting done bv fools and its thinking to ignore grand strategy or tactics. It does done by cowards.” The Airpoiver Journal mean that our articles will concentrate on is your chance to express the thoughts of improving our ability to fight and think as fighting men and women in today's Air a team across the spectrum of conflict from Force. counterterrorism to the execution of the single integrated operational plan (SIOP). Comma nder It also means that, while we will have a Center for Aerospace Doctrine. heavy emphasis on air warfare, you can ex- Research, and Education pect to see articles on ground and mari- Maxwell AFB, Alabama

15 USE AND MISUSE OF CONVENTIONAL TACTICAL AIR POWER

Lt Col W illiam P. S troud III

N THE early hours of an April morning nology also allowed us the latitude to ex- in 1986, fighter-bombers of the US Air pand exponentially the means used to Force, streaking from their bases in the fíght. We fly great distances at great speeds United Kingdom, reaffírmed an idea and deliver tons of ordnance with an effi- Iespoused by Gen Billy Mitchell almost 60 ciency that Billy Mitchell would not ha ve years earlier: bombs dropped from aircraft dreamed of, although what is novv reality can take out specific targets. The results in is certainly an extension of his dream. In the 1920s and in 1986 were the same, but the end, we accomplish what he did with the circumstances and hardware changed biplanes at 120 knots: we destroy a target. considerably. This is air power, and the essence of air Technology has taken us from clear- power’s strength is the abilitv to destroy an weather, by-guess-and-by-golly, to all- enemy’s physical means to resist by de- weather, day-or-night, pinpoint-accuracy stroying selected targets. bombing, providing the destructive force Air power also provides the flexibi I itv to of a 500-pound bomb or an area weapon achieve objectives that range from the lim- meets your definition of pinpoint. Tech­ ited to the broad. The achievement of a 16 broad objective, however. is really an why the bridge was struck at all, we must amalgam of limited objectives. Putting look not to air power but to the broader ob­ bombs on target is therefore closelv allied jectives and into the political decision to with the choice of targets and tactical plan- employ armed force. ning, which in tum are based on the scope In light of the rapid development of air of objectives chosen and on the decision to power and its embodiment as the answer employ armed force. In the limited sense, to all problems of surface-bound conflict, if we say that air power failed in a certain it is not surprising that distinctions have instance. we should mean that the bombs been blurred and that tactical air has been did not hit the target. An example is the held accountable for glaring deficiencies Thanh Hoa bridge in North Vietnam. in related but separate areas. Amid the eu- When F-105 aircraft could not destroy the phoric atmosphere associated with going bridge in the mid-1960s, it could be said in one generation from World War I sur- that. in the limited sense. air power failed plus aircraft to jet bombers, the idea of air and that when the bridge fell in 1972, air power’s omnipotence crept in. “We can go power succeeded. If the question is asked anywhere and do anything" became the 17 Vieiv from an F-l 11 approaching its largei of IL-76 either needs to come out or it does not. In transporls a! the airport in Tripoli. April 1986. as Libya, for example, a broad objective for seen by the Pave Tack Jaser-guided delivery system. the use of tactical air could have been the destruction of Muammar QadhafTs abili- ties to harass US naval operations in the commonly accepted opinion. If the de- Gulf of Sidra. To assign to air power struction of Libyan targets says anything, sweeping responsibilities outside the it echoes that sentiment, but it does so in realm of destruction of targets. such as total disregard of all other factors influenc- changing QadhafTs mind about support- ing air power's effective use. Moreover, ing terrorism or creating sufficient internai omnipotence has a political corollary that turmoil to cause his overthrow. is a fallacy. uses ‘‘influence” in the place of “destroy.” These. or similar reasons, illustrate the This corollary says that by influencing A, greatest signifícance of the Billiard Effect, B vviil be influenced and C will be influ- which is to drive the round, practical uses enced by B. This may be simply stated as of air power straight into the square hole of the Billiard Effect. conjecture. The Billiard Effect avoids clear-cut ob- The theory was tested in World War II jectives on which the effective use of tac- and Korea but reallv carne into its own tical air power is based. It is as if a surgeon during the Vietnam contlict. In World War were asked to "i n flu en ce ” a ruptured ap- II, the German Blitz of London and the Al- pendix. With both surgery and air power. lied bombing of Berlin were directed at you either take it out or you do not, and it hearts and minds. They were the wrong

18 USE/M1SUSE OF CONVENTIONAL TAC A1H 19

tools for the psychological job, and they power should not be held accountable for missed the objective. As long as weapons a failure of policy. could be manufactured and shipped to the The US Air Force may also share some troops, the war continued; hovvever, vvith of the blame for distorting the appropriate the advent of better and faster aircraft car- applications of tactical air. Under any cir- rying bigger pavloads. the lesson of the cumstances, we “can do.” Blowing your London Blitz lay lost in the rubble. In Viet- own horn is fine for morale, but it leads to nam, the targets. the theater of operations. gross distortions when John Q. Public and the surges and pauses were supposed comes to accept boast and a positive "can- to influence the behavior of the aggressor, do" attitude as fact. It surprises him with air povver as the cue bali. Of course, greatly when a stick of 500-pound bombs, this experiment in behavior modification dropped on a military target in an urban played hell with fundamentais. Intangi- environment in a "surgical” strike, dam- bles, such as surprise and selective target- ages surrounding buildings and kills peo- ing of appropriate military objectives— ple on a nearby Street. He begins to think which had the potential to render the en- that he does not want any of those "sur- emy defenseless—were cast ruthlessly geons” putting a pacemaker in his chest. aside. In the end, the United States with- He is also astounded that one bombing drew amid mumblings of “Where did we mission does not accomplish impossible go wrong?” In some circles, the answer goals. was that air power failed, disregarding the Modern tactical air power can take out a fact that the crews put the bombs on target target. If that target is a bridge, the span and those targets were destroyed. Under will surely drop; it it is a building, then the Billiard Effect, arrogant assumptions those that are still among the living after had pushed pragmatic application of air the walls fali down need to look for a new power out of the picture. It became appar- place to work. What the destruction of a ent that the fundamentais had been disre- bridge or a building cannot do is to pre- garded when the results of applied tactical cisely influence how the leaders or the air in the jet age did not meet expectations. people of any society view the world or Introspection is a curious State of mind their relation to it. This bleak thought in that. in the case of the post-Vietnam US turn leads to the assessment that limited Air Force, led to a fever pitch of hardware application of tactical air power is there- development accompanied shortly there- fore useless. That is not so. but its limits after by a renewal of realistic training must be realized. There are times when it methods. Previous shortcomings were is in the national interest to kill enemy sol- seen as the lack of sufficient destructive diers, destroy a munitions factory, or ac­ power, accuracy, and tactics. The answer complish other limited goals. Air power was to move smartly to increase the means can do these things very effectivelv. Cases to destroy targets. None of this was bad in in point are the Israeli strike against the and of itself. The raid on Libya clearly Iraqi reactor or any of the strikes against showed how effective improved weap- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) onry. well-trained crews, and superb tac­ camps. These were conducted in the na­ tics could be. Hopefully, the raid on Libya tional interest, without expectations of a also signals a turn away from the Billiard dramatic victory. Although successful. the Effect and back toward realistic, specifíc purposes were limited and the results objectives. When national intentions are were limited. If you want more complete indistinct, the piecemeal use of aircraft in results, the broad objective must be clear one brief strike should not be held culpa- and the means must match the desired ble for what would amount to a failure to outcome. set distinct limited or broad objectives. Air Air power is an application of force and 20 AJRPOWER JOURNAL Sl/MMER 1987 shares that broad definition with land and gests that knowing the right targets to hit sea power. The use of any of these is sub- but not hitting them does not awaken the ject to similar limitations. For example, sleeping lamb of reason in a determined witness the Soviet reactions to unrest in foe, quiet world opinion, or set the stage Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia in for letting bygones be bygones. And more 1968. Those rebellions were crushed be- to the point, it is not the purpose of air cause the means and tactical applications power to do any of these. There is no doubt used were more than enough to accom- that air power can and does play a decisive plish the specific goal. Contrast this with role in warfare, yet the scope is narrow and Soviet actions in Afghanistan, where the practical. For this reason, there is a place goal is less distinct and the force is there- for land, air, and sea forces, as well as fore insufficient or misapplied. politics. Anything short of destroying the means To understand the basic purpose of air to wage war cannot guarantee that the war power is to realize that it is not omnipo- will not continue. There are no shortcuts tent, nor is it an influence. It is, purely and around this elementary fact. Evidence sug- simply, a means to knock down the bridge. Madrid.Spain FIGHTING THE AIR WAR: A Wing Commanders Perspective

COL CüFFORD R. KRIEGER

HE WING commander is in an inter- forces. He is expected to fly combat mis- esting position in terms of fighting sions and at times to lead those missions. the air war. At the tactical levei of The wing commander must be leading and vvar. his role is straightforward. His managing across the spectrum of his or- Tprimary effort is focused on generating ganization. If he does not. he risks failure combat sorties in the numbers and at the of the wing. times required. The wing commander is At the operational levei of war, the wing fully responsible for the tactical employ- commander ensures that his wing is al- ment of his aircraft to achieve tactical. op- ways prepared for shifts in the air cam- erational. or strategic aims. At the same paign. These shifts can be in role or in time, he occupies a position at the bottom weight of effort.2 The wing commander fringe of the operational levei of war—a needs to understand his own command­ levei as yet undefined in official US Air ers concept for conducting the war, which Force doctrine.' means that he must understand the weight At the tactical levei, the wing com­ of effort being given to each campaign. It mander must ensure that he has a secure also means that the wing commander must base from which to fight and that he is get- advise his commander as to the ability of ting the best from the available logistic the wing to support each of the ongoing or support in executing his tasking. He must expected air campaigns. At times the wing orchestrate the execution of the wing's commander will be forced by circumstan- tasking and he must be a leader and com­ ces to make decisions that will impact the mander for both his flying and support weight of effort given to each campaign. In

21 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

any vvar the communication lines may be • The status of his supply support, par- saturated and the ability of a wing com- ticularly the ability to sustain combat op- mander to discuss the details of his oper- erations. This includes munitions. ations vvith his superior may be limited. • The status of his personnel in terms of He may be on his ovvn from time to time. numbers, health, and well-being, includ­ At such times, his understanding of his ing their ability to operate in a Chemical, commander’s objectives vvill be criticai to biological, or nuclear environment. success. both for his wing and for the air Although sustaining the base of opera- war as a whole. tions is a national responsibility, it is not exclusively the responsibility of the wing commander and his parent Service. In the Setting Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (FOUR- Some of the problems that concern a ATAF) area of Central Europe, it also in­ wing commander in wartime are univer­ volves the US Army, German forces sal. They applv whether the war is being provided under Wartime Host Nation Sup­ fought on home territory or in a foreign port (WHNS), and German reserve forces land. Thev applv to both US Air Force and of the German Territorial Southern Com­ Soviet air force wing commanders. Other mand (GTSC). things are unique to a specific location and set of circumstances. This article is based upon an overseas fighter wing with one Protecting the Base squadron under the command and control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization The commander of the Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (COMAAFCE), who pro- (NATO) and another assigned to NATO. vides the air component for NATO's Cen­ with two more dual-based squadrons as­ tral Region, is planning on living 3,000 signed under the US commitment to Ger- sorties a day in wartime.3 The Warsaw Pact manv and to our other NATO allies. It will attempt to counter this effort. The en- discusses some unique circumstances, but emy vvill be particularly eager to attack given the range of US national commit- command and control points and what he ments. similar circumstances could apply believes to be nuclear-capable assets. The to any wing commander at any time. 3.000 sorties a day will have to be gener- ated by less than COMAAFCE’s full force of aircraft. The first step in flying those The Wing Commanders 3.000 sorties is to ensure that each base is Attention as well protected as possible. Base protec- tion falis into four major categories: air de­ A wing commander must divide his fense, ground defense, passive defense, time between sustaining his base of oper- and recuperation—sometimes referred to ations and flying the air task order. Before as BRAAT (base recoverv after attack). he even reads the tasking messages. he The air defense of a base involves the in- needs to know: tegration of intelligence and earlv-warning • The status of the defense of the base information. Intelligence should be able to against both indigenous and Warsaw Pact provide warning of the impending launch threats. Warsaw Pact threats include both of Warsaw Pact air attacks. We are also attacking aircraft and special purpose well warned about kev targets because forces (SPETSNAZ). there can be little doubt that the enemy • The status of his aircraft, including will come for our kev command and con­ the ability to rapidly turn aircraft to meet trol nodes and our nuclear capability. follow-on tasking. Wing commanders supplement airborne FIGHTING THE A1H W/\H 23

early warning (AEW) and ground-con- possible, sortie-producing personnel must trolíed intercept (GCI) information vvith be relieved of their Chemical defense approach control and airfield surveillance masks, hoods, and gloves. Minimal time in radars. All information is fed to the vving’s fu 11 Chemical gear will result in more ord- mission director, who makes the decision nance on target and with better accuracy to give air defense artillerv (ADA) units and fewer losses. free fire. The vving commander may also Chemical attack is not the only major launch base combat air patrols (base problem; bomb damage needs to be CAPs). If Communications are severed, he quickly assessed and unexploded ord- may elect to both CAP his base and at- nance found. An essential part of the re­ tempt to establish Communications bv covery process is determining a workable launching one or more elements of ready runway, or minimum operating surface, fighters. He must temper his action based and necessary taxi routes. Besides aircraft upon the overall situation. The air defense operating surfaces, criticai Utilities and fa- sector operations center is fíghting the de- cilities need to be restored. The spring fensive counterair part of the campaign, 1985 air base survival demonstration and any aircraft the wing commander (Salty Demo) at Spangdahlem AB, Ger- launches on his ovvn are sorties not im- manv, greatly added to our knowledge of mediately available to his superiors for these vital operations.5 other missions. The defense of the base against ground threats is, in existing theater doctrine. Maintaining the Logistics Base shared betvveen the chief of Security Po- Although it is not the most glamorous of lice and the host nation, notwithstanding the wing commander’s duties, maintain­ US Air Force/Army agreements. The GTSC ing the logistics base is perhaps the most is responsible for all defensive actions out- criticai. In a war in Central Europe, the side the base proper. YVhoever has the mis­ ability to stop the Warsaw Pact land forces sion, the vving commander will still be at or near the inter-German and Czechoslo- ultimately responsible for the decision to vakian borders is only part of the equation. uncover his aircraft and people. The pres- That effort must be sustained by logistics. ence in the area of a SPETSNAZ unit, The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe whose primary mission will likely be in- (SACEÜR) has on more than one occasion telligence collection, will have to be con- stated that the lack of a sustainable con- sidered by the wing commander. He will ventional capability will result in his re- be as hesitant to expose his aircraft outside quest for the release of nuclear weapons their semihardened aircraft shelters "fairly quickly.”b No wing commander (HASs) when there is danger of attack by wants to accelerate the slide toward the sappers or mortar units as he will be for an employment of nuclear weapons, even on air raid. a limited basis. After any attack. recovery is the order of Supply. The United States has a system the day. Our potential enemy’s Chemical for maintaining supplies at a base for 30 capability and our lack of a credible retal- days of combat. However, the bins are usu- iatory capability to deter Chemical use ally not full. making support from the force the wing commander to consider that United States criticai. Another criticai fac- each attack on his base will include Chem­ tor will be the movement of supplies icals until proven otherwise.4 Thus, the within the theater. In United States Air enemy gains a measurable advantage from Forces in Europe (USAFE), the European the outset in that base personnel suffer de- Distribution System (EDS), a computer- graded performance from wearing Chemi­ based network for knowing what parts are cal protection clothing. As soon as where, will help. EDS movement is by 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 overland transportation, normal Military can be achieved soon after starting Airlift Command (MAC) operations, and buildup. If the production line is inter- the dispersed operations of the C-23 air- rupted to introduce a new munition or craft of the lOth Military Airlift Squadron. fuze, up to two hours might be required to The concept is universal in application, provide a usable number of the new and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) is devel- munition. oping its own version. Maintenance. Those bases open and op- But supply is more than just moving erating will have to make up the shortfall parts around. It also includes obtaining in sorties from those bases closed by en- them. Interoperability allows the sharing emy action. Maintenance can generate a of parts among allies and within air forces. large number of aircraft for mass launch Air National Guard F-4Ds in Europe are as and then regenerate those aircraft several likely to obtain a spare part from the Ger- hours after recovery for a second launch, man air force as from the United States. or it can generate an even larger number of The F-16C uses certain parts in common sorties over a long period of time, working with the F - in . Exploitation of these var- at an efficient production rate. Mainte­ ious sources of supply will be criticai. nance cannot efficiently do both kinds of Sustaining the force also includes the launches at the same time in a single air­ smart use of cannibalization to sustain the craft maintenance unit (AMU), although maximum number of combat-ready air- mixed operations on a single base are pos- craft such as the F-15 and F-16. For some sible using different AMUs. While the aircraft, the cannibalization rate may be as massing of air power is less efficient in high as 12 to 15 items per 100 flying hours. terms of maintenance production, it will Knovving the smart use of cannibalization be absolutely mandatory until a favorable will be criticai. Although cannibalization air situation can be achieved. Once air su- is not encouraged in peacetime. it needs to periority is achieved, the air commander be practiced now so that maintenance can determine which method of emplov- managers will know what they can canni- ment best meets his objectives—mass balize and what they cannot. For the wing launches or a smooth and continuous flow commander, his most important actions in of aircraft sorties. this regard are in peacetime. when he en- When aircraft must be generated for courages the maintenance leadership to mass launches, and 20 aircraft per AMU is develop initiative and a can-do spirit and not an unreasonable number for the first when he ensures that the flying schedule is such mass launch, aircraft will have to re- as much a logistics training tool as it is an main dispersed and sheltered as long as operations training tool. possible for protection. This means that Munitiyns. The munitions motto maintenance operations will be spread "Ammo makes the mission" is not far off out. Command and control of the mainte­ the mark. Target destruction starts in the nance force will become more difficult and munitions storage area. Our stocks of pre- can easily break down if rádios and HAS ferred munitions. particularly missiles, telephones both go out. Supervisors will are limited, but there are a large number of have to be constantlv on the move. Air- iron bombs available for use. Our more craft-dedicated crew chiefs will have to be modem aircraft actuallv make these older given specifíc plans, with timelines and munitions quite effective. The trick is to goals. Status reporting will be verv impor­ know when to use what munition. At pres- tant, as generation times will provide little ent, from a cold start it takes four hours to allowance for problems. A delay in report­ prepare and deliver a specifíc munition ing will result in unnecessary manage- from the conventional ammunition stor­ ment actions being taken. thus increasing age area. A healthy reserve of munitions ineffíciency. FIGHTING THE A1H WAR 25

The production of sorties requires a ceives high priority. Units are tasked with force dedicated to turning aircraft as having the ability to provide either "gas quickly as possible. When a smooth-flow and go” or fui 1 combat turn capability for program is being used, returning aircrews specific aircraft, including allied aircraft. report their maintenance status and are di- The dedication of personnel to this pro­ rected to the area where they can be im- gram will yield maximum benefits in war- mediately turned to flv another mission, or time. A full program must include sent to an area where repairs can be operations personnel for intelligence de- quickly made, or sent to a “hard-broken" briefing and retasking. Besides turning area for extensive maintenance. Such a fighter aircraft, the base must be prepared sortie-production program allows maxi- to handle visits from MAC aircraft. Those mum benefit to be gained from the easy aircraft must be recovered, unloaded or cannibalization of aircraft such as the F- loaded expeditiously, and relaunched im- 16. The quick replacement of a line re- mediately. Large aircraft on the ground placeable unit (LRU)—often in less than can attract attention in that they are soft an hour—will allow an aircraft to fly sev- targets and, if damaged, can pose a major eral sorties a day. Those aircraft that are base recovery problem. hard broken will provide a ready source of A final area of note is the renewed inter- parts for those that are quickly repairable. est being shown in repair of aircraft that The turning of combat aircraft can be have been battle damaged. Aircraft battle speeded by ensuring that what is needed is damage repair (ABDR) has recently come in place before the aircraft arrives. The key into its own. The development of tech- factors are fuel and munitions. niques to assess damage and kits to pro­ Today fuel is available only from fuel vide the expedient repair of damage from trucks or from hot-pit refueling. Although sheet metal to aircraft canopies is moving hot-pit refueling is more efficient in terms along smartly. Development of an effective of fuel, manpower, and trucks, it does ex- ABDR program is one more step by the pose the aircraft to attack for up to 10 min­ wing commander to ensure that he can utes during the refueling process. On mass sustain the conventional war. launches and recoveries, only a few air­ craft can be refueled on the hot pits. While Sustaining People those aircraft are using the pits, some 30 to Without people the Air Force does not 40 aircraft may be recovered; these will fight, and only by getting the maximum have to be sent to their HASs for protection productivity out of those available will the and then be refueled by truck. Until re­ wing commander sustain the fight. A first fueling is available within individual step in getting the maximum from our peo­ HASs, fuel trucks will still be vital to gen- ple will be to ensure they are not worried erating fighter aircraft. about their dependents. This means safe The other key factor in the turning of air­ and efficient noncombatant evacuation. craft is munitions. At present, USAFE Once he has his men and women focused wings are working toward providing at on the task at hand by conducting a suc- least two sorties’ worth of munitions cessful noncombatant evacuation order within each aircraft shelter. Although (NEO), the wing commander must ensure problems with explosive quantity and dis- that his people can survive repeated en- tance are being dealt with, the siting of emy attacks and still operate. Survival hardstands and HASs 20 or more years ago must include survival in a Chemical or ra- has left commanders with problems that diological environment. A key step to base are too expensive to solve.7 recovery after attack will be to determine Within NATO the recovery and combat when personnel can remove their hoods, turning of aircraft from other bases re- masks, and gloves. 26 AJRPOVVEH JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

The War in the Air ther allot their forces. Within FOURATAF three different message types are used to This article has been a long time getting provide direction to the wings. The first is around to the war in the air. However, an ATAF message to allied tactical opera­ flying and fighting come only after the tions centers (ATOCs), sector operations home base is secure and able to logistically centers (SOCs), and wings that provides support air operations. guidance for the upcoming day and gen­ eral guidance out to 96 hours. This ATAF The Commander's Objectives initial planning message, which is re- The wing commander needs to know what leased early in the evening, lists, when his superiors in the chain of command possible, targets by reference to a desired have as their objectives. When that is mean points of impact (DMPI) catalog. The knovvn, he can best contribute to the DMPI catalog is a recent innovation and a achievement of those objectives. Com- step forward in planning. It allows FOUR­ manders are avvare that their subordinate ATAF to identify a desired outcome by ref­ commanders need to know the objectives erence to a DMPI catalog number. This and that there is also the reciprocai need number lists a target, the desired point of for balanced information on wingcapabil- placement of ordnance. and the required ities to flow upward. The commander of ordnance and number of sorties to achieve FOURATAF is very specific on this point the desired probability of damage. Several when talking to his wing commanders. On hours after the ATAF message, the ATOCs his visits to each of his subordinate com­ release their air task orders (ATOs) for the manders. he makes a point of encouraging next day. These are evolved from the pro- them to keep him abreast of their individ­ posed program given the previous day.tak- ual unit capabilities. He wants the assess- ing into consideration changed ment of the wing commanders with regard circumstances such as aircraft losses. Fi- to the ability of their wings to change roles. nallv, about three hours later the first of He wants to know what limitations they the air task messages (ATMs) arrive from face that might influence future tasking. the ATOCs. The ATMs contain the DMPIs, along with times on target and the final de- cision as to the number of aircraft to com- mit. Although the DMPI catalog is a major The Planning Cycle step forward in ordering attacks against The air planning cycle consists of appor- known and fixed targets, mobile targets tionment of air effort. allocation of air as- still require individual and timely treat- sets, and the tasking of units to achieve the ment. For mobile targets, the ATMs mav commander’s objectives. In NATO's Cen­ arrive at anv time. tral Region the planning cycle starts with Timeliness is the key to successfullv ex- commander in chief of Allied Forces Cen­ ecuting the air plan. To ensure timely ex- tral Europe (CINCENT) formulating his ecution of the initial phases of the theater strategic objectives. which are then counterair and air interdiction campaigns, translated into objectives for his air and DMPI assignments are provided in peace- land component commanders. The air time through specific plans. Thus, to exe­ component commander, COMAAFCE. cute a given option. a unit need only be supports those objectives by providing di- told the execution time and what externai rection to each of his Allied Tactical Air support will be provided. Target folders Force (ATAF) commanders and by his are predrawn and all that needs to be done daily force allotments. is to load the aircraft, to brief the aircrews, Once the direction from COMAAFCE is and to review the target folders. As cam­ received. the ATAFs apportion and fur- paigns evolve and intelligence provides FIGHTING THE AIH WAH 27

status updates, there is a need for more ad wing commander as to what, if anything, hoc planning. This adds time to the plan- can be done to meet the tasking objective. ning cycle. The person must give rhythm to the frag The wing commander hopes to receive shop and ensure that results are produced his ATOC tasking message by midnight for quickly and accurately. an early start on the mission dav. For im- mediate tasking, he hopes to receive the Intelligence ATM three hours before the required take- off time. If Communications are up and the A key factor in fighting the war will be in­ headquarters staffs are not bogged down telligence. Major advances in the fusion of with last minute changes. timely receipt intelligence have occurred over the last should be no problem. If Communications decade. In Europe a prototype real-time fu­ are down, the tasking must be obtained in sion capability, the Limited Operational other ways. For bases dose to an ATOC, Capability Europe (LOCE) system, has the use of a runner in a staff car is in order. been running for four years.8 The wing Another option is the use of an aero club commander can hope to receive the results aircraft. In any event, the day’s tasking of TR-1, E-3A, E-8A, fighter reconnais- must be in the hands of the wing planners, sance, Electronic Security Command the “frag shop," bv 0300 local. The limit- (ESC), and national collection systems ing factor here is not the production of air­ fused and delivered in ready-to-use form. craft sorties but the planning of the While the quality of hard-copv photogra- mission and the loading of the correct phy has not improved in the last 15 years, munition. the overall ability to provide clues to air- crews has. However, the capabilities of air­ craft are pushing the limits of some target Mission Planning and materiais.9 Mission Integration At the same time intelligence products With the ATM in hand, the mission plan­ are improving by leaps and bounds, intel­ ners get to work, operating in parallel at ligence is a weak link at wing levei, partic- the wing operations center (WOC) and the ularly in fighter wings. The personnel squadron operations centers. This redun- Corning out of technical school are not as dancy in planning allows errors to be well prepared for their work as this wing caught and it also provides continuity commander would like. The computeri- should enemv attacks damage the opera­ zation and centralization of intelligence tions center of either the wing or the functions does not improve the inunediate squadron. While less efficient in terms of preparation of aircrews. We must develop manpower and equipment, this redun- intelligence people who can help the air­ dancy increases the probability of launch- crews. The individual operational and tar­ ing aircraft soon after an attack. get intelligence officer will have to be the The key person in mission planning is one to make the difference. He or she will the head of the frag shop. It can be some- have to convince someone a grade or two one from intelligence, from plans, or from sênior, 3 to lü years older. and 5 to 50 mis- the weapons shop. It has to be someone sions more experienced that what is being who thinks fast, knows the plans, and feels briefed is of value. free to tell the wing commander that there Once the war starts, the wing com­ is a better way. The selected individual mander must ensure that aircrews provide must bring the different disciplines to- thorough debriefings, both among them- gether to ensure that the tasking is met. selves and to intelligence. There is a tre- When the tasking cannot be met, this in­ mendous amount we do not know about dividual must provide sound advice to the the enemy’s capabilities and tactics and 28 AJRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 about our own capabilities. Each wing particularly the issue of proportionality. must go to school at the end of the first day While individual aircrews are not exoner- of combat. Tactics must be adapted to ex- ated from responsibility for their actions, ploit enemy vveaknesses and friendly they will be extremely busy and will likely strengths. No matter hovv good our tactics not have time to fully focus on all the po- are today, we will be able to improve them tential consequences of their mission. between day 1, vvave 1, and day 2, wave 1. When considering targets, the wing com­ Intelligence should be a major player in mander—aided by his intelligence, weap­ that improvement. ons, and legal personnel—must decide if the attack is both necessary and propor- tional.1* An example of a dilemma of pro­ Legal and Moral Issues portionality is a target where the selected weight of ordnance offers only a small A wing commander who believes he con- probability of achieving the desired ef- ducts his operations in a legal and a moral fects; however, expected civilian casual- vacuum is mistaken. The American fight- ties are relatively high. If an increase in ing man is not prone to the excessive use of ordnance will produce a meaningful prob­ violence. Some may comment that our so- ability of damage with only a minor in­ cietv is violent. but the American military crease in already high expected civilian does not have a tradition of killing for the casualties, the wing commander should sake of killing.10 In leading our airmen in make that point to his tasking agency. To this area, we naturally turn to military law expend sorties for little likelihood of pay- but find it contains few examples of the ap- back and to incur high civilian casualties plication of the law of armed conflict to while doing so makes no sense in terms of aerial warfare. Some issues are straightfor- warfighting or international law or ward. The wing commander is not justi- morality. fied in ordering his aircrews to attack other aircrews in parachutes, hospitais, or for- bidden targets: and civilians are not delib- eratelv attacked.11 It is when we get into Putting It All Together issues of proportionality that the path is If the US Air Force is to have a warfight­ not well marked. We are told by AFP 110- ing shibboleth, it should be this: “Employ 31 that aerospace power as an indivisible entity those who plan or decide upon an attack based upon objectives, threats and oppor- must, in the selection of both the place to be tunities.”w There are two key thoughts attacked and in their choice of weapons or contained in the quoted phrase. One is that methods of attack, take all feasible precau- air power must be employed as an indivi­ tions to avoid or minimize incidental injury sible entity. The other is that when we em­ to civilians or damage to civilian objectives. ploy air power we must consider the They must refrain from launching an attack if objective, the enemy threat, and the op- injury or damage would be excessive or dis- portunities available or not available. proportionate compared with the military Employing air power as an indivisible advantage anticipated.u entity means that it should not be commit- The pamphlet then goes on to recommend ted to the fight in “penny packets."15 The that we follow traditional military air component commander runs the air doctrines. war, and the wing commander contributes The wing commander is the last author- by ensuring that he is able to provide ity with the time and information to make massed air power when called upon. The informed judgments about the compliance term indivisible entity also means that no of tasking with the rules of armed conflict. single wing or no single tvpe of aircraft FIGHT1NG THE AIH WAH 29

will win the war. The commanders of var- participate in Red Flag or Maple Flag on a ious wings will have to cooperate. routine basis.17 On the other hand, taking a four-ship flight onto a European bombing range that is barely workable develops the Objectives, Threats, and skills and judgment that will be important if war must be fought in Central Europe Opportunities under the same weather conditions. Day- Employing air power in terms of objec­ to-day flying provides a demanding scen- tives means that objectives need to be clear ario, with low-level navigation routes and that the means of achieving those ob­ planned through one or more of the Ger­ jectives must be left at the lowest possible man low-fly areas, where fighter units levei of air command. Objectives need to hone their low-altitude intercept skills by be presented in terms of results to be ob- attacking any fast-moving target picked up tained, not targets to be attacked. The visually or on radar. The GCI sites in the threat must always be considered. In area participate by providing vectors to the USAFE today we are beginning to explore air defense fighters. Not only is visual the given that low-level penetration is the lookout enhanced but so is navigation. only way to overcome enemy defenses. More and more large-scale live-fly exer- Every weakness in the enemy’s defenses cises are being developed for Central Re­ must be explored and exploited. We must gion units. The US Third Air Force's look for opportunities to act; and when an “Hammer” series has built the skill of opening is noted, we need to move. For ex- planners and aircrews to develop and ex­ ample, when we can achieve part of our ecute large-package attacks and has built objective by the psychological impact of the skill of air defense participants to de- our attacks, we need to do that. The wing fend against such actions. commander may be in the best position to No training is as realistic as war itself. determine how to integrate objectives, One thing that is always missing is the un- threats, and opportunities. The US Army, certainty of weather, weapons effects, and having learned from the German army, can enemy action. This uncertainty will never give us some pointers on delegating re- be completely duplicated. The job of the sponsibility for mission accomplishment wing commander is to provide training sit- to the appropriate levei. The concept of uations that will duplicate as closely as mission-type orders is that the subordi- possible combat and the stresses therein. nate is entrusted with a mission and the On the other hand, realistic training must assets needed to accomplish that mission. not be so costly that it prices itself out of Within constraints, the method of accom- existence. During the Korean War, the US plishing the mission is left to the subordi- Air Force was losing more F-86s in train­ nate. This delegation results in the ing at Nellis AFE than it was to MiG-15s freedom to make the best use of the people over North Korea. Were the results worth and equipment available.16 The Army’s the cost? Today, with aircraft production concept of mission-type orders fits neatly some vears showing only a small gain in into our concept of objectives, threats, and fighter aircraft inventory due to mishaps, opportunities. training must be both realistic and safe. The wing commander sets the tone by what he demands of himselí and what he Building Upon Realistic allows himself. A wing commander who indulges himself while flying, or doing Training anything else. encourages the same ac­ Units stationed in the Central Region of tions on the part of those who work for Allied Command Europe do not normally him. The wing commander must know his 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

limits and live by them. He must also members of the wing staff and individual knovv the regulations and abide by them; squadron commanders need to be pre- and vvhen he does not know the regula­ pared to respond to situations in a manner tions. he must set the example and ask that supports the overall plan of their wing what the rules are. Most of us with time in commander, who in turn is supporting his the Service know of at least one colonel commander. The mind of the wing com­ who believed himself to be above the mander is improved by exercises and by rules. We also know the impact such an at- discussion. Often a better understanding titude had on those who worked for him, can be obtained during the latter. especially vvhen his unspoken motto was "Do as I sav, not as 1 do." Part of realistic training is to know that a Conclusion lot of realistic training does not require live flying through live defenses. The Ger- Ultimately the wing commander is re- man term Kriegsspiel, or war games, does sponsible for understanding the opera­ not just mean putting large forces on the tional concepts and the tasking of his terrain and letting them go at each other. In commander. He must understand his com­ the original concept. it included such ac- mander^ approach so well that he can tions as command post exercises and even continue to function even when Commu­ roundtable talks. Although none of us like nications temporarily break down. For the command post exercises, they are neces- wing commander, the mission assigned to sarv and they train the wing battle staff him must be sacred. He must devote his without idling several thousand hard- whole mind and body to achieving it. If the working airmen. Roundtable discussions wing commander takes this approach, his also have a place. An hour taken "what-ií- commander is free to delegate to him the ing" a portion of a scenario vvill pay divi- maximum freedom of action. This delega- dends vvhen it is encountered in a local tion. in turn. will result in the most effec- exercise, higher headquarters inspection, tive employment of air power in the or actual combat. It will also ensure that all Central Region of Allied Command Eu- know the mind of the commander. The rope or anywhere. Washington, D.C.

Notes receives at the beginning of a flight briefing. For the intelli- 1 The concept of lhe operational levei of war is one that gence. targeting. and mission-planning personnel of a wing it has been imported into the United States by the US Army, is the big picture into which they are trying to fit their part. which picked it up from theGerman militarv. It is also a con­ For the airman. and for thesoldierand sailor. the kev air cam­ cept fully used by lhe Soviet Union. The operational levei of paign is the counterair campaign. Until air superioritv (free­ war falis between the strategic and tactical leveis and is most dom to operate with acceptable losses) is achieved. the air easily understood in terms of land units. The strategic levei interdiction campaign and those other actions that can be is that of the theater land component commander and his su­ grouped as campaigns—including providing air support to perior. the theater commander in chief (CINC). The tactical the surface forces, providing logistic support to all theater levei is division and below, although sometimes a corps will forces, and other actions suc h as special operations—cannot operate at the tactical levei. The operational levei is the ac- beaccomplished. norcan surface forces benefit from freedom tions of corps and army groups. For the airman, lhe easiest of maneuver. way to think about it is to equate the strategic levei to the air 2. VVithin NATO. roles for fighter aircraft are designed to component commander and his overall objectives in support help planners deal with various national commitment agree- of the theater CINCs objectives. The tactical levei is the air- ments. Examples are lhe all-weather interceptor (AWX) for craft accomplishing lheir assigned missions. What comes off radar and radar missile-equipped aircraft (F-15), clear- the dailv frag order is the tactical levei. The operational levei weather interceptor (CWI) for fighters with a radar but no ra­ is the campaign levei. Viewed another way. it is the brnad dar missile (F-1B), and fighter-bomber attac.k (FBA) for fighl- plans for achieving theater objectives upon which the dailv ers with a conventional air-to-surface capability (A-10). tasking is based For the average aircrew, the operational Several fighters are committed Io NATO in more than one levei of war is lhe quick overview of what is going on that it role. FIGHTINC, THE AIH WAH 31

3. Speech bv Gen Charles L. DonneIJy. Jr .COMAAFCE, tu were quite Irank about their views. They did not like the idea the Air Force Institute of Technology. 1 Augusl 1985. of bombing a village. even if it was in North Vietnam and 4. Gen Bernard Rogers has stated "I have always believed even if the intelligence personnel assured them that it con­ that all we need to do is slart rnanufact uring the binary Chem­ tained lhe very same supplies they spend every night lookmg ical weapons in the United States and stockpiie thein there. to destroy. There is no need to deploy binary weapons to Europe. Begin- 11. Aside from AFP 110-31, International Low— TheCon- ning production would send two messages Io the Soviels ducl of Armed Con/Jict and AirOperalions.and AFP 110-34. One. that we are serious about being prepared to retaliate Communder‘s Hondbook on lhe Ltiw of Arrned Con/lict. three with reliable weapons systems. which helps our deterrence. other items of interest in this area come to mind. AFP 200-17, Additionallv. it gives us greater strength at the negotiating ta- An Introduction to Air Force Torgeling, dated 11 October b|e.“ Robert Hutchinson. "NATO Ministers ’Can'l abdicate 1978. provides a reasonablv good laymans discussion of the CVV Decision' Says SACEUR." interview with Gen Bernard issue. Al a higher levei of abstraction are William V 0 ‘Brien, Rogers in Junes Defence WeekJy. 27 April 1985. The Conducl of fusl and Limited War (New York. Praeger, 5 The Salty Demo exercise has been exhaustively docu- 1981). and Ronald Schaffer. Wings of /udgment: American mented. Current OPRs include USAFE EUROPSTDÉSP (Lt Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Col George Solli) and AFSC's AD/YQ. Press. 1985). 6. From modified excerpts of responses bv Gen Bernard 12. AFP 110-31. 5-10. para 5-3c(2)|b|. VV Rogers. Supreme Allied Commander Europe. in the inter­ 13. AFP 110-31.6-1. para 6-3a. view with Mr Robert Hutchinson cited above. and in Ace 14. AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United Output. luly 1985. published bv the PubliL Information Of­ States A ir Force, Department of the Air Force. 16 March fice. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. In a 1984.2-10. speech to the SHAPE Staff on 5 October 1984. General Rogers 15. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. RAF. made pop­ stated: "I am charged by my political authorities with re- ular the phrase regarding cominitting air in "Penny Packets” questing the release of nuclear weapons before we lose the during his early days as AOCINC in North África and the cohesiveness of our defense—cohesiveness defined as deep Middle East during the early days of World War 11. As an in- penetrations on a broad scale. Under current conditions, I dependent air commander. he had to meet the needs ol his have to make that request under that guidance fairlv opposite numbers in both naval and land forces, each ol quickly—in days." General Rogers then went on to lalk about which wanted units committed full-time for their operations. contributing factors. but he said that "lack of sustainability is Tedders successful resistance ensured the effectiveness of the main one." the RAF in the Mediterranean Theaterand provided lhe basis 7. As units change aircraft and roles, they find that they upon which the air war was subsequently foughl after lhe cannot comply with current safetv regulations and meet war- United States entered the war. time tasking. Waivers are required and work-arounds are 16. The concept of mission-type orders stems from Ger- necessary to ensure munitions are as close as possible to the man military tradition as far backas Helinut von Moltke. The point where they will be loaded on aircraft. Quantitv and dis- concept is designed to give the greatesl freedotn to the person tance restrictions will not applv in wartime. In fact. the dan- who best knows the situation. A premium is placed upon in- ger of losing more than one aircraft to an expiosives mishap itiative at the lowest levei. This concept takes advantage of will increase. This is not to sav the wing commander should what the LfS military prides itself on—the initiative of the in­ be unwilling to accept risk. What he needs to do is under- dividual soldier. sailor. or airman. The following general cri- stand the risk and accept it intelligently. Whenever possible, teria apply to mission-oriented command and control at all safeguards must be found. and when risk is accepted for a leveis. time and a iocation. the risk should not extend. bv an explo- 1. T h e Sup erior sive train. throughout the flight line. 8. The LOCE system combines, correlates, and displays • determines the objectives to be achieved and to this end multisource intelligence information. including such real- assigns a clearly defined mission. time sensors as those contained in the TR-1. Information • ensures that the forces, resources, and the authorilv re­ from LOCE is available to both air and land commanders. quired to accomplish the mission are available to lhe both in US national and NATO channels. subordinate. 9. At this time. lhe standard aircrew maps (TPC/ • lays down details only Io the exlent necessary for coor- 1:500.000. JOG-AT:250,000 and 1:50,000) used for training dination within a broad scope. These details usually apply to on and near Bardennas Realis Bombing Range in Spain are the interaction with such forces and resources not subordi­ not sufficient to allow high confidence in picking off coor- nate Io the person executing the mission or not immediately dinates. Aircrews using the F-16 loft mode of delivery, after available to him. obtaining a rough range and bearing from the visual identi- 2. The Subordinate fication point to the target. refine those numbers off actual • has extensive latitude in the way he executes the mis­ bomb plots. This lack of accuracy will be a major límitation sion. He can use his own initiative to develop his operation if it also applies to target materiais in potential war zones. plan and determine the necessary details. He has full discre- 10. An incident during the Vietnam War will illustrate. In tion and freedom of action. late 1966 and early 1967, 366th TFW intelligence personnel • remains, whatever he may do, committed to the sub- noled that the enemy appeared to be storing supplies in the slance of his mission and the concept of operations of the village on the south side of the Mui Lav ferrv in North Viet­ higher levei of command. In carrying out his operation, he nam. One evening lhe village was given as thealternate target never forgets the goals his superior is trving to attain. The for the night air interdiction missions. It was not until after Germans would say. “The mission is sacred to him." midnigh! that a flight leader was willing to take lhe village as • combines obedience with thinking in broader terms and an altemate target. When the village was attacked. it pro- a willingness to assume responsibililv. dur ed secondary explosions well into the daylight hours. While the intelligence personnel were correct. the aircrews 17. US Air Force and Canadian live-fly training exercises.

INCE THE 1960s. Soviet military doctrine has focused on the abilitv to win a theater war at the nonnu- clear levei.' The Soviets believe thisS goal is feasible if their theater offen- sive has surprise. speed. concentrated ef- fort, aggressiveness. cooperation of arms and Services, and depth.-' One of the most important components of such an offen- sive is vvhat the Soviets call the air operation. The air operation derives its importance from respect that the Soviets have for our technology and particularlv for our air ca- pabilities. They realize hovv much our ground forces depend on protection and support provided bv air power. Similarly, they are well aware that Soviet ground forces also depend heavilv on support pro­ vided by air power to attain and maintain a high-tempo advance. As a result. the So­ viets realize that their abilitv to conduct a successful theater offensive depends on whether their air operation is able to neu­ tralize quickly our theater-based air capa- bilities.1 Now it appears that Soviet military leaders are increasingly confídent that a successful air operation is possihle. Their confidence is due largely to recent technological developments, particularlv in surface-to-surface missiles. which these leaders believe have "revolutionized” warfare.-1 If a theater war occurs with lhe Soviets, it is very likely that they would attempt to achieve surprise hy providing us with as few clear warning indicators as |)ossible ol a pending attack. One way they might try to do this is by beginning their air opera­ tion suddenly with a barrage of suriace-to- surface missiles delivering itnproved con-

33 34 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL SUMMEfí 1987 ventional munitions (some possibilities War II we first became concerned with de- are mines, bomblets, incendiaries, and fending the air base when we saw how the fuel-air explosives) and Chemical muni­ Germans and Japanese made air bases a tions against our time-critical air defense key objective in their surprisingly success- capabilities. These missile attacks would ful offensives. As a result, our early war be required to disrupt our air defenses plans called for 296 air base security bat- only long enough to prevent us from gen- talions, but by 1943 the threat had failed to erating and controlling the sorties needed materialize (except in China in 1944-45). to defend effectively against the waves of So we began to inactivate units already Soviet aircraft that would begin attacking formed. At the end of the war, the little air vvithin hours after the first missile base defense capability we had was lost.6 impacts. When the Air Force became a separate At the same time that they would begin Service, air base defense remained an area launching missiles. the Soviets would also of concern; but because of the lack of firm begin the more overt actions needed to guidance regarding Service responsibility, generate large numbers of sorties for their we continued to have little capability until follow-on wave air attacks. Accompanied the Korean War. During that war, the Air by electronic jamming, their wave air at­ Force developed a doctrine and limited tacks would be the main method for deliv- defense capability by organizing and ering intense blows to our air bases and equipping airmen not directly involved in other vital theater air installations. How- flight operations like infantrymen, using ever. the Soviets’ air operation would also the Air Police as a cadre. However, as in include attacks by special purpose forces World War II, our air bases were not seri- (SPETSNAZ). as well as airborne, airmo- ously threatened. And so, with a reduced bile, and even amphibious assault forces postwar budget, the Air Force was espe- against air bases. Communications nodes, cially hard-pressed to justify why it radars, and headquarters. The Soviets be- needed more manpower to defend our in­ lieve that the use of this wide variety of stallations than the other Services needed methods in their air operation also in- to defend theirs. The result was a decrease creases their chances of confusing and ul- in manpower and a lower priority for air timately overwhelming our defenses, base defense.7 preventing us from regaining the initiative Events in Vietnam again restored atten- in the air.s tion to the need to defend the air base. Gen As this review shows, rather than trying Hunter Harris, commander in chief of the to beat us in the air, the Soviets think that Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF) in 1965, the key to defeating our Air Force is to take noted that US air bases in Vietnam lacked the fight to our air bases and other theater reasonable protection and that there was a installation’s. By preventing us from gen- reduced likeliliood of dedicated Armv erating large numbers of timelv and effec- protection. He recommended that the Air tive sorties, they will ensure that we have Force adopt an approach similar to that of little opportunity to use our superior train- the British Roval Air Force, where all air­ ing and technologv to fight in the air. It is men had defense duties under the training because of this possibi 1 itv’s immense dan- and leadership of a cadre—the Roval Air gers that we must reassess our current ca- Force Regiment. Although his recommen- pability to fight from the air base, dation was not accepted, the Air Force was specifically to defend the base while con- forced to assume responsibility for inter­ tinuing flving operations despite enemy nai air base defense when our Armv units attacks. were used offensively instead of being tied We begin our reassessment bv briefly re- down in passive air base defense duties. viewing where we have been. In World To meet this responsibility, we expanded Personnel and equipnwnt per/orming rapid postattack repciirs o/ rumvays present a vulnerable target for a surprise attack by missi/es. aircrafI, or SPETSNAZ.

The protective equipmenl needed to survive in a chemically contaminated area adds to individual fatigae. degrading per/ormance. 36 A/RPOVVEH JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 our security police authorizations. Despite factors for both air and ground defense. It this action, our ability to fight from our makes the wing commander or equivalent air bases remained marred throughout the responsible for local ground defense and war by poor training policies, as well as by puts forces of other Services assigned to lo­ gaps in our doctrine that allowed new cal ground defense duties under his con- bases in Vietnam to be sited and con- trol. To reduce the ability of an enemy to structed without consideration for making identify desired targets and to minimize the air base more defensible.8 damage from enemy attacks, the regula­ After Vietnam our emphasis on fíghting tion requires the implementation of a va- from the air base did not decrease as it had riety of passive defense measures, after World War II and Korea. This was be- including hardening, dispersai, redun- cause the successful Israeli attacks in 1967 dancy, camouflage, concealment, decep- on Egyptian air bases, Warsaw Pact meas- tion, and nuclear, biological, Chemical ures to harden their own air bases, and the (NBC) defense. After an attack, it wdll be grovving Soviet threat all showed us the vital to assess and repair damage rapidly importance of making our air bases more in order to return the air base to maximum survivable. Initially vve devoted much of operational status as quickly as possible. our energy to building aircraft shelters, but Under base recovery, the regulation estab­ over time our effort was broadened. Now lishes the organization and policy needed we have reached agreements with our al- to accomplish these tasks. lies and the Army that clarify responsibil- Yet. despite the great progress we have ities for air base defense. The Royal Air made in planning and programming to im­ Force Regiment will provide air defense prove our ability to fight from the air base, protection for US bases in Britain, and a much more still needs to be done. We can- similar agreement with the Federal Repub- not afford to wait until after we develop lic of Germany will apply to our bases and procure the aircraft that fly from the there.9 Elsewhere the Army has begun air base to begin thinking about the re- identifying forces that will be dedicated to quirements for fíghting from that air base. providing ground and point air defense Instead, we must recognize that a complex protection for our air bases.1'1 In still an- interrelationship exists between aircraft other important action, the Air Force con- and air base design and that the character- ducted a comprehensive exercise to istics of one often greatly influence the demonstrate the air base survivability ca- combat capability of the other. Full recog- pability of a generic Air Force tactical nition of this interrelationship would re- fíghter wing. This exercise, called Salty sult in air base operability considerations Demo, took place in the spring of 1985 at receiving the same degree of attention as Spangdahlpm Air Base, Germany. in-flight performance when we design our Profiting from this exercise and other ac- aircraft. tivities, in December 1986 the Air Force The requirement for the advanced tacti­ published Air Force Regulation 360-1. Air cal fíghter to have short takeoff and land- Base Operability Planning and Opera- ing (STOL) and rough/soft field tions. This regulation summarizes our cur- capabilities is evidence that the Air Force rent program for fíghting from the air base. is now aware of the need to address air It outlines required organizational struc- base operability considerations during an tures, assigns basewide responsibilities for aircraffs design phase. Unfortunatelv, the planning and training, and provides guid- low priority the Air Force currentlv as­ ance for carrying out the air base operabil­ signs to developing aircraft with short ity program. takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) ca­ In the category of active defense meas- pabilities is cause for concern. given the ures, the regulation establishes planning growing possibilitv that Soviet air base at- FíGHTING FROM THE A/R BASE 37

Concrete and earth provide necessary protection for people and equipment at to d a y 's theaterair base.

tacks would include the use of Chemicals uncontaminated area to generate sorties. and mines. If either of these are used. par- Compared to STOL, STOVL technology ticularly in combination with immediate- makes such movement far more feasible effect munitions. it is very likely that the because of greatly decreased operating only way to recover and reestablish effec- surface requirements. STOVL technology tive, high-sortie-rate operations will be to would also significantly enhance our abil- change operating locations. moving to an ity to use mobility, concealment. and de- 38 AIRROWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 ception measures, which in turn would make it much more diificult for an enemy to find an operating location. And even if an enemy is able to find such a location, the increased dispersion that STOVL tech- nology makes possible could make the op­ erating location a much less lucrative target.11 Since we must be able to fight from our air bases in a theater war vvith the Soviets, vve need to design and build all overseas theater bases as field fortifications, thereby making combat effectiveness, not peace- time operating efficiency, the only accept- able criterion. Furthermore, this criterion must apply not onlv to facilities directly supporting fiight operations but also to mess and medicai facilities and quarters. Besides giving attention to hardening, dis­ persai. camouflage, and concealment, we also need to design our buildings so they can be easily defended by including weapon positions that are sited to assure mutually supporting fields of fire. Training is the area where we need to FIGHTING FROM THH AIR BASE 39

make our greatest effort. While we can hope the Army or host-nation forces will be available to defend our air bases, we cannot aíford to depend on them. As we saw in Vietnam, theater commanders in wartime may become reluctant to tie down combat troops in defensive roles. Nor can we afford to field our own army of security police whose sole duty is air base defense. Instead, we need to follow Winston ChurchilFs advice and make the theater air base the ‘‘stronghold of fighting air- ground men, and not the abode of uni- formed civilians in the prime of life pro- tected by detachments of soldiers.”1- This means that, like lhe Army and Ma- rine Corps, we must demand that everyone in the Air Force who serves or could serve in a theater position. officer and enlisted alike. achieve competence in the use of weapons, medicai aid, and field craft. Re- quiring competence in these traditional military skills not only will significantly improve our ability to fight from the air base, it will also make an important con- tribution to esprit de corps by removingall doubts some may have as to whether the Air Force is a combat organization or a nine-to-five “blue suit” business. Given the nature of the threat, we should not limit weapons training to small arms but also must require that some personnel be capable of using heavier weapons like antiaircraft and antiarmor weapons and mortars. Assignment of specific weapons in a theater would be based upon individ­ ual and unit roles in the air base’s defense plan. By arming everyone in uniform, in- stallation commanders would be able to make more effective use of their limited number of security police. Besides serving as cadre, these highly trained personnel Wartime operations ai a lhealer air base will be very could also be used for more demanding ac­ similar to Army operations. These people laying mats and repairing cables require the same skills tive defense roles such as patrolling and and courage as Army combat engineers. counterattacks. We must recognize that fighting from an air base that is attacked by missiles and large numbers of aircraft. let alone SPETS- NAZ and airborne forces, will result in casualties and in some cases very heavy 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 casualties. For example, a sudden Soviet prepared to reconstitute those units that missile reattack might catch many person- experience heavy casualties. This means nel in the open as they perform rapid run- we must determine ahead of time what way repair activities. In such a situation, losses require what kind of actions. We we cannot count on there being enough need to decide whether we will replace in­ specially trained medicai personnel read- dividuais or units and then make appro- ily available to treat all the wounded im- priate plans. mediatelv. Therefore, if we are to avoid Currently most Air Force personnel at having many of our wounded die unneces- an air base rely on others for food and shel- sarily, everyone must be required to know ter. However, the destruction that will oc- basic first aid so they can care for them- cur while fíghting from the air base will selves or others until medicai personnel result in many of these Services being in- are available. terrupted or even terminated. Restoring Not all casualties will involve physical these Services will not have as high a prior- wounds. Many will be psychiatric casual­ ity as assuring tlight operations. Therefore, ties of what we more commonly call battle Air Force personnel must be trained in fatigue. According to Army experience, in- field craft and be appropriately equipped tense combat, indirect fíre, inadequate so that even if fíghting deprives them of sleep, and surprise (conditions that are heated shelters with running water, elec- likely to be present during fíghting from tricity, food, and other amenities that we the air base) all lead to psychiatric casual­ are accustomed to in peacetime, their ties. In 1973 the Israeli military experi- fíghting performance will not be unneces- enced 30 psychiatric casualties for every sarily impaired. 100 who had physical wounds. They also Clearly, preparing to fight from the air found that if these psychiatric casualties base requires changes that will not be pop­ are not correctly treated, they will not be ular with some. They will argue that able to return to combat and will often be money is better spent in other areas or that chronically disabled.13 Given this threat, we cannot afford to make more demands we need to take the same professional ap- on our already limited amounts of training proach to the unique psychiatric dangers time. We must realize that these views are of war that we now take. through physio- shortsighted because they are a product of logical training. to the dangers associated our past experience when we needed little with flying. Therefore, to reduce the num- capability to fight from our air bases in or- ber and severity of psychiatric casualties, der to fight in the air. Unfortunately, the all commissioned and noncommissioned threat we face today is dangerously differ- officers in leadership positions, as well as ent. As a result, success in a future theater all medicai personnel, need to be trained war, particularly one with the Soviets, is to know what causes battle fatigue, what likely to depend on whether we can make its symptoms are, how to prevent it, and significant changes in our priorities by how to treat it.14 putting fíghting from the air base on an In addition, like the Army we must be equal plane with fíghting in the air. Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Notes tion,” Conflicl Quarterly. Summer 1986. 39-58. 1. For a detailed discussion of this development, see John 2. C. N. Donnelly, "The Development of Soviet Military G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Truiock III, "Soviet Doctrine," International De/ense Revieiv, December 1981. Military Theory from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO." 1596. Washington Quarterly, Fali 1986, 81-137: and Mary C. Fitz- 3. Phillip A. Petersen and Maj John R. Clark, “Soviet Air gerald. "Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theater Opera- and Antiair Operations," Air Úniversity Revieiv. March- F1GHTINC FHOM THE AIR BASE 41

April 1985. 36-54. Survey. 1987." Air Force Magazine, January 1987, 58-59; Lt 4. Brigjohn Hemsley. "The influenceof Technology upon Col Price T. Bingham. "Air Base Survivability; An Essential Soviet Operational Doctrine." fil/SÍ. June 1986. 25; and Den- Eleinent of Theater Air Power." Air Force Journal of Logis- nis M. Gormley. “A New Dimension to Soviet Theater Strat- tics, Winter 1987. 2-5: "Air Base Survivability and V/STOL egv." Orbis. Fali 1985. 537-69. Aircraft: A Gap in Air Force Doctrine?" Air l/niversity Jte- 5 Petersen and Clark. 42-49. view. lanuary-February 1986, 51-57; and "Improving Force 6. Roger P Fox. Air Base De/ense in the flepublic of Viet- Flexibility Through V/STOL,” Air Universily Revieiv. Janu- nam. 1961-1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force His- ary-February 1985. 72-87. tory. 1979). 2-4. 12. Winston S. Churchill. The Second World War. vol. 3. 7 Ibid.. 4—7. The Grond AJIiance (Boston: Houghlon Mifflin Co.. 1950). 8. Ibid.. 8-9. 25-28, 63. 776-77. 9. Giovanni de Briganti. "The Defense of NATO's Air- 13. Lt Col Gregory Lucas Belensky, USA: Ll Col Shabtai bases." Armed Forces Journal International, June 1985, 144. Noy. Israeli Defense Force: and Maj. Zahava Solomon. Israeli 10. Col Charles D. Cooper. "Joint Force Development— Defense Force, "Battle Stress: The Israeli Experience." MiJi- Wave of the Future?" The Retired Officer. October 1986. 19. tary Revievv, July 1985. 29-30. 11. For further discussion of STOVL technology and air 14. Maj Greg Lande, "Emotional First Aid." Infantry, No­ base survivability. see John W R. Taylor, “Janes Aerospace vena ber-December 1986.40—11. ROM THE heights of todav’s aero- SCORES OF space industry, it is almost hum- bling to look back just 70 vears ago to when American pilots vvere fighting PILOTS, CLOUDS Ftheir first air battles in the open cockpits of borrowed planes. Unweaned when we en- tered the First World War in 1917. the US OF PLANES Army’s tledgling air arm had only a hand- ful of assorted tlying craft, none of which vvas vvorthy of combat. Until US industrial W arren A. T rest furnaces were cooking at wartime heat. the newly formed American Air Service vvas forced to borrow combat planes and knovv- buw Irom our Allie •— lhe Brltitlt, Prem.h and th* Ifaluni f *' 1h» ?»f Aifu lurin# (tu* Wh«, *•/ .ama tofcurope m 1914. 4 i i f>*I |r^4i ni J « rf*M «>t fhi *1 IM \f*fH United Staln Snf «Irmdv fai Uni irom Stytirir t i >Lh i*i pow M ilh ffi«»if |*rr*tk< h Uilll pinnadv of ktll I»ear11 Htll. w htrv im st i titrmfl »n f rtirv n tf III Wnght brutfian hail Ural Buataml p «red ll»nhi tothai km i d iK f i military Wnjtht H vw untíl th»* whi ■llliiarv a n nnau tta Vi tü»n íisvl * " ! t r i i » « U r t f i l U»«* I United S l a l w h n d o n l y —_ é L ^ Hff«m intR§ t íiit fi ¥# (NN) for mililary avmtlon Tln* wa* pH>nwf VUi Im n Beainmin D. Fw Ioh far l<.w»-r IfMd lh** am ounU kjwiiI liv Olhar trtbuted tt u m p ir to Ihf Iik Il cr cnni nuior imfiitlrml |mw*-ri. evitn aliithtly l«*a •tonal fundinR From lhe Arm Ihan tome m inor onct lik«* Uul artautim • >'» iu Sftain and Hna»l *

43 44 AlfíPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

The underlying reason for this neglect was the failure by both civilian and mili­ tary leaders to grasp the potential of mili- tary aviation. A typical congressional reaction in 1908 to “all this fuss” about buying military planes was “I thought we already had one." Three years later, in Oc- tober 1911, the air arm retired its first ob- solete aircraft when “Aeroplane No. 1” was “so far gone” that it became a museum piece at the Smithsonian Institution.4 The War Departmenfs attitude was no better. The Army set up a few primitive flying schools before the war, but the mis- adventures of the lst Aero Squadron in support of the punitive expedition against the Mexican outlaw Pancho Villa in 1916 showed just how backward American aviation really was. Mack Sennett might have written the script for this comic ex- perience, which even had the squadron commander, Captain Foulois, being ar- rested and jailed by Mexican police. Al- though this debacle helped publicize the sad state of Army aviation, it did little to change the general lack of appreciation for the airplane’s potential. The lack of funds and interest by the Army brass continued long after the Great War. One veteran pilot Captain Foulois flyingover Ft. Sam Houslon. Taxas. observed that interest in aviation did not “turn the corner” in the War Department until “we finally convinced them that air- outcry was quieted by War Department planes were more than just substitutes for assurances that no more than mobiliza- carrier pigeons.”4 tion planning for national defense was Even after the war threatened American involved.5 interests, there was an uphill battle to On the eve of America’s entrv into the overcome the déficit in aviation technol- war, Foulois was called to Washington to ogy and production. Congress sought to oversee the drafting of a program to ex- improve the situation in 1915 by establish- pand the air arm. Years later. Foulois said ing an independent scientific group (the that he thought this program. which Con­ National Advisory Committee for Aero- gress passed two naonths after President nautics) to foster aviation progress, but Wilson declared war, was his greatest con- few inroads were made because of the neu- tribution to military aviation. At a cost of trality that had been ordered by President $640 million. the approved legislation Woodrow Wilson. President Wilson and called for producing 22,625 planes. 6.210 the American public are said to have been trained pilots, 45,000 aircraft engines, and appalled to read newspaper headlines in a large store of spare parts. Although this 1916 that the armed forces were engaged laid a solid foundation for postwar needs, in contingency planning for possible it proved to be much too ambitious for the American involvement in the war. The time left in the war.'1 American manu/acturers contracfed to produce the British-designed de Havilland DH-4 reconnaissance bomber (abovej ín quantity. The American version vvas potvered by the m ass-produced Liberty engine. Brigadier General FouJois (far rightj. commandcr o/ all air forces in the AEF. visits with rnembers of the 135th Aero Squudron in Ourches. Fmnce. August 1918

Impetus for projecting such a high levei of production came from the Allies, who requested the United States to assist in the campaign of 1918 with an air force pow- erful enough to enable them “to win su- premacy of the air.’’ The Allies were relying heavily on fresh American troops to turn the tide against the kaiser's army, but they also needed the great industrial capacity of the United States to close the production gap resulting from three years of attrition on the battlefield. Unfortu- nately. the clouds of American planes that 46 AIRPOXVER IOURNAL SUMMER 1987

the Allies hoped would darken the skies facturers of automobiles in the world could over Europe never materialized.7 have turned out tanks with the greatest facil- By all accounts, the response by US in- ity and in the largest numbers, but not a sin­ dustry to the emergency was abysmal. gle tank of American manufacture ever rolled Only our development and mass produc- into action in the W ar."1 tion of the Liberty engine could be cited as The wartime buildup in manpower was a noteworthv industrial contribution to an equally frustrating experience. There the air vvar. VVithout suitable American de- was no dearth of volunteers for the flying signs, aircraft manufacturers were moved training programs, for stories of the air war to concentrate on building British de Hav- in Europe had fired the imagination of illand (DH-4) biplanes. By the signing of America’s youth. But having to expand the the Armistice in November 1918, more existing programs to accommodate the than 1.200 American-made DH-4s had massive influx of people was an almost in- been shipped to combat units, but not a surmountable problem. In 18 months the single plane of US design had gone to war. air arm burgeoned from a force of less than Until Air Service squadrons began operat- 1,400 officers and enlisted men to one of ingat the front in the spring of 1918, Amer­ almost 200,000 people. At the outset, there ican pilots fought with British and French were only two active flying fields avail- units. using their planes. Even after Amer­ able to the Army to accommodate this ican DH-4s began arriving in quantity in expansion." the summer of 1918, many US pilots con- Leading educational institutions across tinued to fly Nieuports, de Havillands, and the nation were called on to handle the other borrovved aircraft.8 ground-school phase of the air training Admittedly, the problem of developing program; and by the end of the war, they the approved air program was unique. It had graduated more than 17,500 flying ca- was recognized by the War Department as dets. The number of Army flying fields had being “one of the great problems of the expanded to 27 in the United States and 16 war." The United States had built war- in Europe, but much of the wartime flying ships and had fielded ground armies, but and technical training had been carried there was no aviation industry in America out at French and British airfields and fac- and there were virtually no professionally tories. Although there were problems with trained aeronautical engineers or design­ the quality and the responsiveness of the ers. Given the State of the nation’s unpre- training pipeline, this combined wartime paredness, it might even be considered an complex got the job done. At the close of achievement that the United States pro- the war, there were 58,000 officers and duced nearlv 12,000 airplanes—roughly men in the Air Service in France, and half what Congress had funded—and thousands more were on their way.12 30,000 aviation engines bv war's end.9 So. the Allies got their seores of Ameri­ Criticism of the wartime production re- can pilots, thoifgh not their clouds of cord was not just a phenomenon of avia­ planes. Despite our shortcomings in mo- tion, however, for the Allies had some bilizing for the war. the extra muscle of unkind words for our total industrial per­ American military power at the front, with formance. In his War Memoirs, British the promise of more to come. spelled vic- Prime Minister Lloyd George’s observa- tory for the Allies. As Gen Carl Spaatz re- tions about the American industrial con­ called years later, aviation in its primitive tribution bordered on the contemptuous: state "made but slight contribution to the No field guns of Am erican pattern or manu- ultimate decision."18 Yet American avia- facture fired a shot in the War. The same ap- tors could be justifiablv proud of their plies to tanks. Here one would have thought combat record in the war. The destruction that the nation who were the greatest m anu­ of 756 enemy airplanes was in itsell a mir- Gen Carl A. Spaatz (abovej in his earlier flying days. The plane is a Boeing P-12B. The Jower picture shoivs an LB-5 (foreground) and un 0-2 during maneuvers over Fl. Bmgg, Norih Carolina, 1927. ror of their magnifícent performance in this baptism of aerial warfare." The Air Service’s brief activity at the front in World War 1 remained the only American experience of aerial warfare for more than two decades. Such a lengthy hiatus between world wars was enough time for the aviation industry to redeem it- self, but there were still obstacles to over- come. Perhaps the greatest encumbrance was the political anathema that continued to houncí peacetime militarv preparedness for much of the interwar period. For Billy Mitchell and other proponents of air power, their greatest disappointment must have been the obstruction from their own superiors, the die-hard traditionalists in the War and Navy departments. Other set- backs carne with the Great Depression fol- lowing the stock market crash of 1929. The problems the Army Air Corps had in the airmail fiasco of 1934 highlighted the ex­ treme neglect of military aviation and helped to educate the Congress and the public on the need for improvements.15 This last episode coincided with the be-

47

ginning of Franklin D. Roosevelts presi- nual production capacity. He did not pro- dency and his New Deal programs that pose to build up just the American air started the American economy, including power but wanted to strengthen the British the aviation industrv, on the road toward and other Allied air forces as well. This national recovery. Five years later, the was later spelled out in the Lend-Lease Act world was at war. American neutrality of 1941.16 was even more short-lived than it had been On the eve of America’s entry into the in World War I. Alarmed by the Wehr- war, the Army Air Forces' mobilization re- machfs blitzkrieg victories in Europe and quirements were defined more exactlv in a Japanese aggressions in Asia and the Pa­ hastily prepared Air War Plans Division cific, Americans rallied behind their document, AWPD-1. To meet the global president’s directives for rearmament in demands of simultaneous war against Ger- 1940 and 1.941. Well before Pearl Harbor, many and Japan, this plan envisioned the Roosevelt called for an air force of 50,000 buildup to a peak of just under 63,500 air- planes, supported by a 50,000-plane an- craft, a projection that was not far off the A formation of P-26s [left)from the 20th Pursuil Group over San Díego. The /orerunner of the B-l 7 was the XB-15. shotvn above u ith u P-2fí.

mark. At its peak the Army Air Forces d o n e , 18 a n d t h e A m e r i c a n p e o p l e r e - never possessed more than 80,000 planes. sponded. For Americans on the home During the course of the war, the air mo- front. the ration card became a badge of bilization requirements in AWPD-1 and honor that was almost the equivalent of subsequent plans became the blueprint for the “fifty-mission cap” and the “Ruptured one of the truly remarkable industrial suc- Duck” to those who served. From the fac- cess stories of the twentieth century.17 tories, “ Rosie the Riveter” became a Conditioned by the hardships of the household name as well known, although Great Depression and fired by images of a not nearly as loved, as “Willie and Joe.” ruthless and hated enemy, the will of the After Pearl Harbor, the whole nation went American people was mobilized along to war. with our vast reservoir of natural re- Mobilization reached its zenith in sources, manpower, and industrial ma- World War II. The wartime industrial out- chinery. President Roosevelt gave the War put became the heartbeat of America, with Production Board the power to get the job the aviation industry succeeding even be-

49 5U AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

Prospective flying cadets (belovv) report for preflight schooi ut Maxwell Field, Aiabama. The buildings in (he background are novv family housing. Preflight cadets (bottom pholo) march inlo the cadet mess hall at Maxwell Field. This building. novv Broivn Hall. is the headquarters for the Air Force s ROTC program. A liv ing instructor and student (rightj in their PT-17 during the primarv phase of pilot training. President FrankJin D. Roosevelt and his enlouruge labovel inspect theflying training facilities at Maxwell Fie/d. Augusl 1943. yond the wildest dreams of the Billv Mitchells two decades earlier. Clouds of American-designed and American-made bombers (Mitchells, Fortresses, and Su- perfortresses), fighters (Warhawks, Mus- tangs, and Thunderbolts), and transports (the indomitable Gooney Birds) filled the skies, not just over Europe but around lhe globe. For the industrial birth of this global air force, the government spent $45 bil- lion. It received in return nearlv 300.OUü military aircraft for the Army. Navy, and Allies. By V-) Day, the Army Air Forces had accepted 158,880 aircraft. including 51,221 bombers and 47,050 fighters. By war’s end. the annual production rate was almost 110,000 planes. The wartime buildup in manpower was just as incredible. From an elite corps of 20,000 regulars in mid-1938, the air arm grew to a peak force of more than 300,000 officers and 2,000,000 enlisted men before

Link Irainers lleflj p r o v i d e f l i g h l simulalian for ground Iraining.

51 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

Gens H. H. Arnold and Omar Bradley at Lavvson Field. Ft. Benning, Geórgia. 1941. The photo on the facing page shovvs B-24 Liberators on the assembly line in Ft. Worlh. Texas, 1942. the war was over. Unlike the industrial ex- pansion, “the task of training thousands of young men in highly specialized skills re- quired for military aviation . . . was borne entirely by the limited resources of the [service] itself.”20 Hundreds of new bases and schools were opened around the country to handle this crash effort, but the War Department had much to learn about managing them. Before consolidating all of the training programs under a single command in the summer of 1943, the Army Air Forces was roundly criticized for its fragmented man- agement of these activities. One general of- ficer believed “the flak” was deserved, explaining that Wholesale waste had re- sulted early in the war from shuttling men back and forth across the nation to train them and send them on to new assign- ments. The newspapers had accused the service of moving six million men around, the general said, when in fact “we have moved one million men six times.”21 Scientific and technological skills like those that helped shape the Army Air range research and development program. Forces into the mighty force it became Hap Arnold knew from his own experi- were infinitely more valuable than they ence of air power that “the weapons of to- had been in earlier wars. Even contribu- day” were becoming with frightening tions that were less decisive than the frequency “ the museum pieces of atomic bomb oftentimes bordered on wiz- tomorrow.”23 ardry. Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower said in Hap Arnold also sought assurance that his postwar salute to scientists and inven- the postwar air force would be ready to tors that they literally “transformed the carry out the global responsibilities that f a c e o f t h e w a r . ” 22 E i s e n h o w e r w a s a h e a d had been thrust upon the American people of his peers in recognizing that “the ex- bv victory in World War II. The Scientific traordinary and growing influence of the Advisory Group's report, New Horizons. airplane in the waging of war” was “fore- which was published in December 1945, most among the military lessons” to be charted the Air Force's future research and learned from World War II. development requirements for meeting Gen Henry H. Arnold recognized in No- these responsibilities.24 In remarks made vember 1944 that scientific advancement at Harvard University on 6 September was inextricable from the decisiveness of 1943, Prime Minister Winston ChurchilPs air power when he established the AAF allusion to America’s part in the Grand Al- Scientific Advisory Group to create a long- liance and its new role in the world was more than just a placebo for the bitter pill factor of no consequence in the movement of we had to svvallow from Lloyd George’s their w'orId, they might have remained for- memoirs two decades earlier. Churchill gotten and undisturbed beyond their protect- said: ing oceans: but one cannot rise to be in many v\'ays the leading community in the civilized The price of greatness is responsibility. If the world wilhout being involved in its prob- people of the United States had continued in lems, without being convulsed by its agonies a medíocre station, struggling vvith the w ii- and inspired by its causes.24 derness. absorbed in their ovvn affairs, and a MaxivelIAFB, Alabama

Notes History. 9 December 1965), 28-29, United States Air Force 1. fames) Hudson. Hosfiie Skies ;A Comhat History of the Histórica) Research Center (USAFHRC) K239.0512-766; AAF- American Air Service in World War I (Syracuse, N.Y.: Svra- Historical Studv No. 50. Materiel Research and Development cuse Universitv Press. 1968). 2-3; AKred Goldberg et ai.. A in lhe Armv Air Arm. 1914-1945 (Washington, D.C.: AAF Hístory of the United States Air Force, 1907-1957 (Prince- Historical Office. 1946). 12. USAFHRC 101-50. At the two ton. N |. D Van Nostrand. 1957). 15-16 Hudson's book is a ends of the spending curve, Germaiiv spenl $26.000.000 and highly readable ar.count of lhe Air Service'* experience in Brazil $500.000 on military aeronautics during the five years World War I. prior to 1914. 2. Oral historv interview of Maj Gen Benjamin D. Foulois 3. Goldberg. A History of the United States A ir Force, 5, 6. bv Dr Alfred Goldberg (Washington. D.C Office of Air Force 4. Ibid.. 10; Robert F"rank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts. Doc-

53 54 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SÜMMER 1987

Irine. A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Studies Institute, 1969). 2. This study is the official record of Force, 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1974), aerial victories;otheraccounts vary. Forinstance,Goldbergs 9; Oral history interview of Lt Gen Kenneth Wolfe by Robert history (p. 27) cites confirmed claims of 781 enemy planes, Piper. Space Systems Division History Office, June 1966, 5. while a brief history prepared by the Air Corps Tactical USAFHRC K239.0512-788. Some so-called flyingschools be- School in 1927 (USAFHRC 248.211-612) credits the destruc- fore 1914 had only one airplane. tion of 491 enemy planes confirmed and 354 unconfirmed. a 5. Goldberg, A History of the United States Air Force, 13. total of 845. This is but another vvarp to the myth that morn- 6. Hudson, 5; )ohn F. Shiner. Foulois and the U.S. Army ing reports might have better served the preservation of sta- AirCorps. 1931-1935 (Washington, D.C.; Office of Air Force tistical history than have computers. History, 1983), 8. 15. For the history of the Air Corps between the wars, see 7. Hudson, 4-7: 1. B. Holley, |r.. Ideas and Weapons: Ex- John F. Shiner and a forthcoming book by Maurer Maurer, ploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939. scheduled to be pub- W orld W ar II. A Study in the Belationship of Technological lished by the Office of Air Force History in 1987. Advance. Military Doctrine, and the Development of W eap­ 16. Goldberg, A History of the United States Air Force. 47, ons (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953; reprint, Wash­ 48. ington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History. 1983). 43-44. 17. Ibid., 49. For a full discussion of AWPD-1 and subse- Professor Holley's classic history of the development of quent planning, see The Strategic Air War Against Cermany World War 1 weapons cites discrepancies in the French re- and lapan, a memoir by Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., published quest for assistance. by the Office of Air Force History' in 1986. 8. Hudson, 17. 18. Ibid.. 91. 9. United States Army Aircra/t Production Facts (Wash­ 19. Ibid. For study of the mobilization of aircraft indus­ ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1919), 4-10, tries by all belligerents in World War II. see R. ). Overy. The USAFHRC 168.6502-5. Air War, 1939-1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), 191- 10. Lloyd George. WarMemoirs (London: Odhams, 1936), 231. This does not mean the aviation program was without 1830-33, as cited in )ohn Terraine, To Win a War (Garden problems. The Truman Committee took the "chaotic" war City. N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981), 5. Lloyd George chided Amer- production effort to task for its "red tape and bureaucratic icans for their arrogance and slowness to learn from the Brit- waste." See Yjar of Decisions, volume 1 of Harrv S. Tru- ish and French experience in the war. American man's Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), 174- industrialists regarded themselves as ‘‘masters of all the 81. manufacturing arts," and at first "would have none of our 20. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds.. The aeroplanes nor of our cannon.” On the other side, the British Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 6, Men and Planes and French have been criticized for their reluctance to share (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 427-28. their secrets with the United States. 21. Lloyd H. Cornett, Jr., Air Training Command Organi- 11. United States Arm y Aircra/t Production Facts. 4-10, zation. 1943-1974 (Randolph AFB. Tex.: History and Re­ USAFHRC 167.601-lD: Hudson, 26. 27. Professor Hudson's search Division. 1974), 4. 5. book says there were only three pilot training schools in the 22. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden country, one of which was used to train national guard units. City. N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), 452-53. 12. Hudson. 24—43; Goldberg, A History of the United 23. Ibid.; Herman S. Wolk. Planning and Organizing the States Air Force, 22. 23. Postwar Air Force. 1943-1947 (Washington. D.C.: Office of 13. Gen Carl Spaatz, "Evolution of Air Power," Military Air Force History. 1984), 40. Affairs. Spring 1947, 4. 24. Ibid. 14. USAF Historical Study No. 133, U.S. Air Service Vic- 25. Robert E. Sherwood. Roosevelt and Hopkins. An Inti- tory Credits. World War 1 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Aerospace mate History. rev. ed. (New York: Harper, 1950), 749-50. AN AIRMAN’S QUINTET

Dr Alan L. Gropman

JM IRPOWER JOURNAL asked me to fully supports him, that “war is only a recommend a quintet of essential branch of political activity that . . . is in no books for earlv and midcareer Air sense autonomous .... Policy is the guid- M .MlForce officers. Easier asked than ing intelligence and war only the instru- accomplished, I found out. Many conver- ment, not vice versa. No other possibility sations about this task with other opera- exists, then, than to subordinate the mili- tors, planners, and historians led to no tary point of view to the political.The general agreement. There are tens of thou- disastrous results for States that turned sands of midcareer officers with dozens of this principie on its head—Germany in specialties. thus the difficultv in finding World War I, Japan in the 1930s and 194ÜS, broadly gauged books. and numerous Central and South Ameri­ Three criteria carne to mind. First, the can countries in this and the last century— US Air Force is a professional fighting or- prove Clausewitz’s point. ganization; therefore, the quintet should Clausewitz, veteran of numerous bloody not stray far from the combat ethos. Sec- campaigns and a serious military histo­ ond, despite the diversity in officer spe­ riam also understood the nature of war. He cialties, all five books must appeal wrote, “Essentially war is fighting, for professionally to the great majority of offi­ fighting is the only effective principie in cers. Third, all the books must be avail- the manifold activities generally desig- able. This last criterion ruled out such nated as war. Fighting, in turn, is a trial of first-class entries as Robert Frank FutrelFs moral and physical forces through the mé­ Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of dium of the latter.”4 Clausewitz here used Basic Thinking in the United States Air “moral” in the eighteenth-century sense, Force, 1907-1964 because there is little not relating it to principies of right or sense in suggesting books people cannot wrong but rather to principies of character. readily find.1 Futrell has revised his ad- He argued that “moral values cannot be ig- mirable study, and we all eagerly await its nored in war" and that “militarv activity is publication. Enough prologue. Utility and never directed against material force breadth of subject for warriors being the alone; it is always aimed at the moral aims, the chosen books were in the mili- forces which give it life, and the two can­ tary philosophy, strategv, doctrine, and not be separated.”5 history genre. Also regarding the nature of war, he The one book nearly all my colleagues wrote that “danger, physical exertion, in­ agreed upon is the great philosophical telligence, and friction (are] the elements classic On War, by Carl von Clausewitz.2 that coalesce to form the atmosphere of No book better prepares Air Force officers war, and turn it into a médium that for their profession of arms than On War, impedes activity.”6 The concept of fric- because Clausewitz best expresses the crit­ tion, which Clausewitz said made “action icai relationship between policy and war in war . . . like movement in a resistant ele- (and the essential subordination of the lat- ment,” is his great gift to the operator and ter to the former), best articulates the real planner. Friction, he argued, is the “only nature of war, and best understands the re- concept that more or less corresponds to quirements for leadership. the factors that distinguish real war from Clausewitz maintained, and history war on paper.”7 Awareness of friction is

55 56 AíRPOWEfí JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 the element that prevents wise operators force. He asserts, furthermore, that mili­ and planners from expecting precision in tary planners have to ensure this surviva- military operations. bility regardless of the mind and mood of Clausewitz believed that a military force the government: “ A military planner overcomes friction through experience ought not to rely for the security of his and hard training, certainly, but mainly forces on governmental decisions and ac- through effective leadership. He knew the tions over which he has no real control.”9 necessary ingredients of military genius. Brodie argues in words he italicizes for To Clausewitz. high intelligence is an es- emphasis: sential prerequisite for military leader­ Known ability to defend our retaliatory force ship, but not the sole one. “War,” he said, constitutes the only unilaterally attainable "is the realm of danger; therefore courage situation that provides potentially a perfect is the soldier’s first requirement.” Clause­ defense of our homeland. Conversely, a con- witz feared that without “ fortitude of spicuous inability or unreadiness to defend mind and character,” "the mass" would our retaliatory force must tend to provoke “drag” the commander down "to the bru- the opponent to destroy it; in other words, it tish world where danger is shirked and tempts him to an aggression he might not shame is unknown.” He knew too that otherwise contemplate.10 strength of character meant more than Brodie recognizes that the Soviet Union strong emotions; it meant "maintaining would not tolerate for long the existence of one’s balance in spite of them.” Clause­ US strategic missiie and bomber forces if witz knew that "there is no activity like the Politburo believed it could destroy war to rob men of confidence in them- them with impunity. selves and in others, and to divert them He recognizes, moreover, that "warning from their original course of action.”8 is the key to the entire defense prob- Clausewitz's On War forms a solid foun- lem . . . . If we could count with high con- dation for airmen for the aforementioned fidence on having two or three hours’ reasons and also because the author wrote warning of an impending strategic attack. brilliantly on the subject of strategy (the and if the enemy knew that we had that use of the tools of power to achieve objec- confidence and that it was justifíed. we tives). On that subject, however, late twen- should practically have eliminated the tieth-century officers would probablv find possibility that he would attack.”11 Bernard Brodie's Strategy in the Missiie Equally important is the fact that warning Age more germane. Brodie, a lifetime stu- must be both “reliable and unequivocal” dent of Clausewitz, provides readers an if it is to be acted upon. An unequivocal admirable historical précis of the founda- warning "measured in hours or even quar- tion for modern national and military ter-hours is far more valuable than equiv­ strategy. His most meaningful material, ocai indication received much earlier."12 however, is his excellent treatment of the Brodie, often called the father of deter­ realities of the nuclear age. rence strategy, also writes that deterrence Nuclear weapons have dominated na­ could fail and that it is essential to develop tional and military strategy since the sum- war-winning strategies too—more so in mer of 1945, and Brodie’s major the nuclear age than in previous eras. "So contribution to thinking in our era is his long as there is a finite chance of war. we formulation of deterrence strategy. Rejec- have to be interested in outcomes: and al- tion of “preventive war," he argues, forces though all outcomes would be bad. some planners to accept a strategy of deterrence. would be much worse than others."13 In Deterrence. he writes, is based on the ab- other words, if deterrence fails, plan and solute invulnerability, despite the costs in fight to win. dollars, of an overwhelming retaliatory Throughout his important volume, Bro- AN AIRMANS QUINTET 57 die writes understandingly of the indis- versatility, fiexibility, and value even pensable role of doctrine in shaping though the British, French, and Germans military capabilities. An officer must were exploiting the aviation state of the art know doctrine—basic. operational, and before their eyes. tactical—if he or she is to affect tactics and So blind were the Americans to the po- strategy meaningfully. However, officers tential of offensive air that had the war should know more than just the official continued into 1919, the United States doctrine; they must also know the domi- planned for reconnaissance aircraft to con- nant role it píays in operations and also in stitute 50 percent and bombers only 20 weapons procurement. Bad doctrine is a percent of total air strength (as compared killer, as it was with the French (and oth- to 10 percent and 54 percent, respectively, ers) on the Western Front in World War I for the British). No fighting power bought and during the unescorted bomber raids as few bombers or more reconnaissance into Germany in World War II. Inadequate aircraft in 1918 as the United States, and doctrine will also cause poor weapon Sys­ nobody planned to buy fewer bombers or tems development as it retarded the devel- more reconnaissance aircraft in 1919 than opment of escort fighters in the late 1930s this country. Why? Because United States and verv early 1940s in the United States. Army official written doctrine said explic- No military historian has written more in- itly that airplanes were strictly reconnais­ cisively of the central nexus between doc­ sance vehicles. If the doctrine does not trine and force structure than I. B. Holley, specify a role for bombers, few can be Jr.. in his Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation built. Holley correctly argues that the “sys- ofthe Aerial Weapon by the United States tematic formulation of doctrine . . . |is| es- during World War I: A Study in the Rela- sential to successful development of air tionship of Technological Advance, Mili­ weapons.”16 tary' Doctrine, and the Development of Clausewitz, Brodie, and Holley all rely Weapons. heavily on military history to make their Holley tells us that wars “are governed points. Clausewitz, although he recog­ not by the development of weapons but by nized the extreme value of combat experi- such fractions of that development as have ence and understood the merits of rigorous been recognized and incorporated into ap- training, believed evervthing an officer proved military doctrine.”14 He elaborates: needed to know could be taught through It has probably more often happened that military history. Napoleon, in fact, said new weapons have been adopted and even military history is the only school for the used to a certain extent. but that their full po- soldier. In that vein, I am reconnnending tential has remained unexploited because two military histories to round out the higher policy making echelons have failed to quintet, one to familiarize American offi­ modify prevailing doctrine to embrace the cers with their heritage and the other to innovations. New weapons when not accom- dissect key aspects of fighting a major air panied by correspondingly new adjustments war. in doctrine are just so many accretions on the the Comrnon body of an army.15 Regarding the former. For Defense: A Military History of the United Holley has numerous examples of such States of America, by Allan R. Millett and idea failures, such as the bow and arrow Peter Maslowski, is an admirable entry. and the machine gun; but most germane to The authors give proper weight to all ofthe Air Force officers is his demonstration of crucial elements—domestic and Interna­ the way the development of the airplane tional politics, strategy, tactics, logistics, was delayed in the United States in World and mobilization—and they organize their War I because the officers who managed book around the constant themes that have the Air Service could not see the airplane's animated United States military history; 58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

• “Rational military considerations The authors carry the story through the have rarely shaped [US| military policy Vietnam War, forcing readers to come to and programs.”17 Fighting two land wars grips with the consequences of defeat: in Asia in the past 40 years bears out this “The United States failed to win its polit- thought. ical objectives in Vietnam, and it paid • “American defense policy has tradi- such a high cost that it mortgaged its will tionallv been built upon pluralistic mili­ and ability to use military force anywhere tary institutions, most notably a mixed else in the world.’’22 The war inflicted force of professional soldiers, citizen-sol- enormous fiscal and moral losses, reduc- diers, and anti-military and pacifístic citi- ing the capability of the United States to zens.”1B The complexion of US fighting defend itself and its allies. We live in more forces in all wars, especially before the perilous times in the 1980s than in the 1960s; the hostility of many citizens to all 1960s because we squandered our re- wars in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen- sources and will in Southeast Asia for turies; and the Korean and Vietnam wars more than a decade. The authors are in this century support Milletfs and Mas- equallv trenchant regarding all of our lowski’s thesis. wars. • “T h e armed forces have become pro- In addition to United States military his- gressively nationalized and professional- tory. Air Force officers need to understand ized .... Although civilians ultimately air warfare. A superb history, one that control military policy. the professionali- deals with much more than tactical and zation of officership has had important strategic operations, is R. J. Overy’s The consequences for the conduct of military Air War, 1939-1945. Overy not only affairs, since career officers . . . have pro- writes about “the few” who fought so gressively monopolized high command bravely in the Battle of Britain and the positions."14 Observant midcareer officers bomber crews who fought their way into will have no difficulty seeing this truth. deepest Germany in 1943 without fighter escort. but he also examines all the eco- • “Industrialization has shaped the nomic and technical factors that made vic­ way the nation has fought. In particular, tory possible. the United States has used increasingly so- phisticated technology to overcome logis- Success in the air war and in the wider con- test was in a very real sense a test of “m od- tical limitations . . . and to match enemy ernity." What was tested was not simplv the numbers with firepower.”20 The victory of Service itself and the strategv of its leaders the United States in World War II and the but also industrial potential: the fiexibi 1 itv of way we fought in Vietnam bear out this the social structure: the competence of the idea. administrative machinery; and the degree of • “Policymakers have done remarkably integration of scientific life into military and well in preserving the nation’s security. governmental affairs.23 For most of American historv, thev wisely Overy also covers the criticai role "accu- realized that geographic distance from rate intelligence” plaved in the Allied air dangerous adversaries, the European bal­ victory during World War II. Furthermore, ance of power and growing material and the author illuminates the problems the manpower mobilization potential were Japanese caused for themselves bv their powerful assets .... However, mobilizing utter failure to force their ground, naval, simultaneously with wars outbreak has and air forces to fight jointly. extracted high costs in terms of speed and Overy explores each of these themes and ease of each new mobilization.”21 On this comes to wise conclusions based on seri- point the past speaks clearly, but the fu­ ous treatment of the evidence. He con- ture looms dangerously. trasts the narrow approach taken by Axis AN AIRMAN'S QU1NTET 59 countries regarding their air power and the and support officers. general approach taken by the United Such is my airman’s quintet. Of course, States and the United Kingdom. A general no one would want to stop with these five air strategy required air forces coequal works, all of which, especially the last with other Services and an industrial and two, come complete with suggested read- scientific commitment commensurate ings. Readers disappointed that no Viet- with this status. Because of the American/ nam War books appear on the list will British approach and the economic and realize that a comprehensive volume on technical energies these two peoples were the air war that rivais Overy’s book on able to muster, the Allied air forces were World War II has yet to be written. I rec- able to gain air superioritv over the Euro- ognize that my quintet is weighted with pean continent. shatter the enemy war- “idea” books that demand thought, but making capacitv, help win the Battle of the that w'as done consciously because the Atlantic, and provide criticai support for profession of arms is a thinking person’s the advance of the land armies. Overy pro- life. vides profound insights for both aviators Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. Robert Frank Futrell. Ideas. Concepts. Doctnne: A His- 14. 1. B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and W eapons: Exploitalion of tory of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force. 1907- the AeriaJ Weapon by the United States during World War I; 1964 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University. 1971), A Study in the fleiationship of Technological Advance, Mil- 2. Carl von Clausewitz. On War. ed. and trans. Michael itary Doctrine, and the Deveiopment of W eapons (New Ha- Howard and Peter Paret. with a commentary by Bernard Bro- ven: Yale University Press. 1953: reprint. Washington, D.C.: die (Princeton. N'.| Princeton University Press. 1976). Office of Air Force History, 1983), 18. 3. Ibid , 605-07 15. Ibid.. 14. 4 Ibtd .. 127 16. Ibid . 177. 5 Ibid., 137 17. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski. For lhe Com- 6. Ibid . 122. mon Defense: A Military History of the United States of 7 Ibid . 119-20 America (New York: The Free Press, 1984), xi. 8. Ibid.. 104-5. 108. 18. !bid..xii. 9. Bernard Brodie. Strategy in lhe M issile A g e (Princeton, 19. Ibid N.|.. Princeton University Press. 1959). 183. 20. Ibid. 10. Ibid . 185. 21. Ibid. 11. Ibid.. 184-85. 22. Ibid , 542. 12. Ibid.. 185-86 23. R .). Overy, The Air War. 1939-1945 (New York: Stein 13. Ibid . 278 and Day, 1980), 4. THE NEED FOR BATTLE MANAGER5 IN THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

M a | Thomas H. B uchanan HE TACTICAL air control system (TACS) has been evolving since World War II in a rather benign en- vironment. The United States has Thad both air and ground superiority, and the enemy has used relatively few meas- ures to counter or destroy it. But the TACS can no longer be expected to operate in such a benign environment. Current and evolving Soviet doctrine places great em- phasis on degrading our command and control system either through electronic means or by direct ground or air attacks ex- ecuted vvith surprise and speed. There- fore, it is extremely unrealistic to assume that all elements of the TACS would be op- erational or in communication with each other the first few days, or even hours, after the outbreak of hostilities with the Soviets. This different environment, cou- pled with the concepts of fog and friction in war, will have a great impact on the suc- cessful operation of the TACS. The question is. what happens to the TACS if, for example, its nerve center—the tactical air control center (TACC)—is de- stroyed or the air component commander (ACC) loses Communications with subor- dinate TACS units? This article examines that question by looking at the validity of the centralized control concept in the TACS. It then suggests that the United States consider training battle managers below the TACC levei to make the impor- tant decisions in a degraded wartime environment.

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Centralized Control The concept of centralized control/decen- tralized execution is the basic premise around which the TACS is structured, and it offers some obvious advantages. The main advantage is that the air component commander has the ability to allocate and reallocate his limited resources as he sees

61 fit to support the objectives of the joint mation on which action in war must be force commander. But the effects of fog based; and the inevitable obstacles to ac­ and friction in war will probably require tion that arise from the plav of chance and some decisions now made at the air com- the enemy’s unpredictabilitv.- These four ponent cojnmander levei and in the TACC elements, according to Clausewitz, form to be delegated to lower leveis.1 the “atmosphere of war." Sometimes th is atmosphere of war is so intense that the effects of uncertainty and Fog and Friction chance are greatlv increased and can make The concepts of fog and friction were de- simple tasks impossible. Therefore, no veloped by Carl von Clausewitz in his matter how much one prepares and plans book, Vom Kriege (On VVarJ, p u b l i s h e d in for war. things will never go as expected. 1832. Clausewitz defíned four sources of and there is no conceivable wav to build friction in war: the paralyzing, visceral im- enough safeguards into war plans to cover pact of danger in war; the extraordinary every situation. Even if there were, the demands for exertion that combat im- plan would be too cumbersome and com- poses; the irreducible distortions and plex to execute. uncertainties inherent in the diverse infor- Fog in war is normallv associated with

62 Interior o f a tactical a ir control center.

the idea that many things on the battlefíeld in a relatively short period of time. An ob- are unknovvn and wiil remain unknovvn. server might assume that all these activi- Therefore, decisions will never be based ties are related when, in reality, they may on perfect information and commanders or may not be. Information describing all will have to cope with much uncertainty the activities going on will be available to during war. the commander, but it may arrive in such An Air Force Institute of Technology volume that its usefulness is impaired. (AFIT) paper titled “Training Tomorrow's Additionally, the information will go Commanders to Manage the Fog of War” through a filtering process as it traveis up outlined very well vvhat the decision en- the chain from the various sensors to the vironment in future battles will be like and commander. How much information and hovv fog and friction will come into play. It what kind of information the commander projected that the future battlefield will gets will therefore depend on the structure be characterized bv great turbulence and and procedures of the organization. It will much activity. Some of the many events also depend on the environment and on that will be going on will be preplanned. the internai procedures for processing the but most will not be. The tempo of activity information. (Another danger that the pa­ will be high, with many things happening per did not mention is that much of the

63 64 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 information could be wrong—both inten- nent commander, far removed from the tionally and unintentionally.) Getting the battle area, may not be the best qualified information from the area of battle to the person to exercise detailed control of unit decision maker could be delayed or, in the employment. He would probably be more vvorst case. impossible. Alternate Commu­ effective in monitoring the overall situa- nications channels will become saturated tion, planning future courses of action, as the primary channels are destroyed or and assigning general tasks and resources degraded. This could result in too much to subordinates.5 information from some areas of the battle- Additionally, the evolution of electronic field, none from others. Additionally, the warfare leads one to be skeptical about the transmission of instructions will be af- new “secure” and “jam-resistant” tech- fected by the loss or degradation of nologies that are supposed to provide in- Communications. Because of all this, de- stantaneous and continuous pictures of cisions will need to be made at lower lev­ events in the air and on the battlefield. eis. “This de facto decentralization will Command and control technologies of the put increased demands on lower levei future may well be effective in the short- commanders who will be forced to make term, but a wav to counter them will al- decisions without guidance from higher most certainly be developed; and even if leveis and with only those resources that not. the asset will be a high-priority item are currently available.”3 on the enemy’s target list. In general, then, the commander may Perhaps the biggest problem with cen- prove to be ineffective in decision making tralized control is the danger that the due to either the delav, overload, or lack of TACS is vulnerable at the apexes of con­ information. This will be especially detri- trol. Because the air component com­ mental in the effort to provide air support mander and other agencies within the to the ground commanders, whose units TACC must make many decisions, the loss will be constantly moving. of this element alone could cause chãos in the TACS.6 We must therefore make sure that we take every step necessary to ensure Other Disadvantages of Centralization that the TACS degrades gracefully, not Another factor that cannot be ignored is with a Bang! that with improvements in technology and the deployment of more advanced command and control equipment and Communications, the ACC will often have What to Do instant access to lower elements in the Given the nature of the Soviet threat. it TACS. Asa result, the ACC and other high- would appear that the disadvantages of level commanders will face the temptation centralized control in the TACS outweigh to “ micromanage" the activities and its advantages. The concept, as articulated responsibilities of commanders at lower in Air Force TACS doctrine, has some se- leveis. This micromanagement will en- rious tlaws that need immediate attention. courage lower-level commanders to "seek The way to correct these flaws is to decen- guidance,” some of which may be time tralize control lower in the TACS chain. criticai, in order to “cover their butts.” The One advantage of such a measure is that it overall result, then, will be rigidity in com­ gives a commander more time to study and mand and control, something that has analvze “the big picture." It also allows his been criticized as a weakness in the Soviet subordinates to act quicklv in certain cases command and control system.4 because they are not delayed in taking ac­ Another possible problem is the effect of tion while waiting for the information to friction on span of control. An air compo- get to the commander, for him to make the NEED FOR BATTLE MANAGERS IN THE TACS H5

decision. and for the decision to get back has outlined his thoughts on correcting the dovvn to the subordinates. The subordi- Army's deficiencies in the way it thinks nates vvould also have enough flexibility to about and trains for combat. The recom- act according to how they judge the situa- mendations he makes can easily be ap- tion. Morale would increase ("The com- plied to the Air Force and the TACS. The mander must have confidence in me”), first step is to make sure the commander's as would initiative and determination. intent is known. This is necessary for plan- Lastly, decentralization would prepare ning how to support effectively that intent subordinates for higher leveis of responsi- and how to take advantage of unforeseen bility in the future.7 opportunities when they present them- The specific tasks that need to be decen- selves. A two-sentence commanders in­ tralized, and how this decentralization tent section should be included in all will be accomplished, must be determined operations and fragmentary orders to tell in each respective TACS structure before the lower echelons what the commander the outbreak of hostilities, and must be wants to accomplish in the long-term.1" practiced in peacetime. For example. if the Second, subordinates should receive TACC is destroyed, it may be necessary for training in when to violate specific in- the battle managers in the control and re- structions in order to accomplish the porting centers (CRCs) to develop the air unit’s mission and support the command- tasking order for specific aircraft units. er’s intent. However, superiors must be (This was the way the TACS operated kept informed of intended actions. If the prior to the World War II fiasco in Tunisia intentions cannot be communicated, then at the Kasserine Pass, and it may become a an after-the-fact report must be made as necessity again. Given proper training, soon as possible. After all, the commander however, battle managers should not make is not granting lower-level commanders li- the same mistakes made in World War II.) cense to run around the battlefield "like an More attention must also be paid to de- undisciplined mob.”n veloping independent decision-making and command judgment ability in our of- Units must also be conditioned to ex- ficer corps. For in the Air Force as a whole, pect the unexpected. General Downing ar- our highly developed technical systems gues that canned scenarios are acceptable will most certainly be degraded or ren- in the early stages of training but cannot be dered inoperative in a war.B The Armv has carried forward to advanced training. Ad- already taken steps to correct similar prob- ditionally, perfect intelligence about the lems in this regard. The Army now be- enemv must be avoided in training be- lieves that. despite technological cause, as General Downing notes, there is advances, the only way to adapt quickly to one thing we cannot control—the enemv.12 battlefield uncertainty is to decentralize Although the United States Air Force decision-making authority. However. to tries to get the most out of its training dol- avoid creating confusion, these decisions lar by including everyone and everything must be made within a specific opera- during exercises, it is unrealistic to believe tional framework. Therefore, decentral- we will have the luxury of all necessary ized decisions are made based upon how equipment and units, operational and in well they support the operational levei one piece, at our disposal. Therefore. objectives. This means that those making "monkey wrenches" (scenarios designed tactical decisions must be thoroughly fa­ to increase fog and friction) should be miliar with the operational objective and thrown into exercises and operational must share the same way of thinking about readiness inspections to train people to how to attain that objective.'' come up with alternatives to get the Brig Gen Wayne A. Downing, US Army, mission done. Although these "monkey 66 AIR POWER JOURNAL Sl/MMER 1987 wrenches” are put into exercise scenarios mistakes. In this way, a frank and open in- to some extent now, they should be given terchange can take place during a review much more emphasis. And because there of what happened in training. is no right answer in dealing with these Last, problem solving, not Solutions, “monkey wrenches,” they should not be must be taught. “One of the greatest mis­ considered when calculating the unit’s takes we can make in training is to teach performance rating in an exercise or in- our subordinates what to think as opposed spection. In other words, was the mission to how to think.”16 accomplished in spite of the “wrenches”? Air Force officers, especially in the TACS, must be trained in making deci- Selection and sions and in the art and Science of war. “To be true masters of our trade,” Training of Battle Managers says General Downing, “we must be both Because of the problems inherent in, skilled craftsmen (the Science) and crafty centralized control in the TACS, there is a artisans—and we must pass on this same need for battle managers below the TACC division of skills to our subordinates, to in- levei. Let us now define battle manage­ clude our NCOs."13 ment and take a look at battle manager se­ We must also learn to live with chãos lection and training. and disorder on the battlefíeld. General Downing argues that it is far better to ac- cept chãos and disorder in battle than to Battle Management create a management System that pipes Battle management at the joint force and all information into a central decision- air component commander leveis can be making point for analysis and decision. He defíned as the process of planning, argues that commanders must develop tasking, deploying, directing, or con- “nerves of Steel” and must let subordi­ trolling combat. reconnaissance. and nates fight the battle. All must continue on support forces. Simply put, it is force with the mission in the face of great uncer- employment.17 tainty. In other words, the commander TACR 55-45 defines battle management. must trust the System he works in and the for the purpose of the TACC. as those de- subordinates and superiors he works cisions and actions taken in direct re­ with.14 sponse to the activities of enemv forces.,B Additionally, we must learn intelligent This tvpe of battle management is needed risk-taking. below the TACC levei as well. The respon- Risk is rewarded in grand style only when sibilities of the joint force commander and you aro correct. Risk has a converse effect the air component commanders are far too when you are wrong as it heavily penalizes broad to delegate below the TACC. These the taker for a mistake. A group of aggressive commanders are concerned wdth an ex- leaders prowling the battlefield who will take tremely large picture, whereas units below everv seeming opportunity presented will be the TÁCC are dealing with the war as it a disaster. T h e kev is the experience to feel happens. Battle managers below the TACC and read the situation and act accordingly— levei must make decisions quickly to what Carl von Clausewitz calls a "talent for adapt plans to counter enemv actions. judgment.”15 They must cope with fog and friction We must also learn to accept mistakes. while supporting the overall objective Iaid We need nonthreatening feedback from out by higher authoritv. sênior leaders to junior leaders. Sênior Essential to this battle management function leaders must also be able to accept criti- is the abilitv of the T A C C to accurately per- cism from a subordinate. They, too, make ceive and understand the current tactical The E-3 Sentry (abovej and the OV-10A Bronco (right) can support a variety of tactical air support missions.

situation and to make timely and effective decisions for the employment of tactical air assets. The battle management function is the most criticai activity in the TACC and mav ultirnately decide the success or failure of the theater forces to achieve their assigned objectives.” This is equallv as true when the term TACC in the preceding passage is replaced with TACS, or with any element of the tac- íical air control system.

Communications, and intelligence capa­ What Does Today's Battle Manager bilities of all the Services: how the Services Need to Know? can interoperate; how to make decisions: Battle managers at TACC levei and below strategy; tactical deception; the art and Sci­ need to have a vvealth of knowledge in ence of war (Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, for many areas: enemy and friendly doctrine, example); airspace management; how to force capabilities, and tactics; radar the- deal with stress; risk-taking; and how to ory: electronic warfare: development of cope with uncertainty. This is only a par­ jATOs; Army AirLand Battle concepts; tia! list, of course. The point to be made is maritime operations; command, control, that a battle manager has a fu11 plate of 67 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 things to know—and to know extremely cal procedures and local airspace well. restrictions. Let us examine how the Air Force cur- With the exception of the airborne bat- rently trains one important segment of the tlefield command and control center TACS officer corps—the weapons direc- (ABCCC) controllers, the academic time tor—to see what changes in training are devoted to battle management areas of needed, if any, to produce the battle man- knowledge is limited in the initial training agers needed for the radar units in the of weapons directors. Lectures devoted to TACS. such areas are very general in nature and short in duration and are intended to only familiarize the student with the subject. Current Weapons Director Training Table 1 lists the courses and hours devoted Weapons director training courses, with a to what can be considered battle manage­ few exceptions, devote a great deal of time ment areas at the Basic Automated Sys­ to honing the aircraft control skills of tems Qualification Course. Only 30 of the weapons directors and to familiarizing 294 course hours are devoted to these them with the various systems they will be areas. The rest concentrate on control of working with in their next assignment. aircraft and automated console familiar- The fundamentais course, conducted at ization. This is not to condemn this partic­ Tyndall AFB. Florida, is the first exposure ular course or, for that matter, the lack of all new weapons directors get to the career hours devoted to battle management. field. Designed to provide background These courses were designed to train training for entry-level weapons directors, weapons directors to do scope work and to it includes studying air mass problems, air integrate quickly into their new units with defense and tactical missions, aircraft con­ a minimum of training time; and they do a trol and warning activities, and other air- good job. craft-controlling agencies, as well as working with other aircraft control and Table 1. Battle Management Courses Taught at the warning personnel (officer and enlisted).20 Basic Automated Systems Qualification Course Although students are introduced to com- mand and control and battle management, Electronic Combat 6 75 percent of the training day is spent in Adversary Tactics 6 the laboratory performing simulated and Intelligence 4 Air Defense Exercise Briefing 4 live air-to-air intercepts and simulated re- Weapon Systems 10 fueling missions.21 The next school attended depends on Total Hours 30 the type of system to which the new weap­ ons director is assigned. Controllers being assigned to manual systems, such as a for- The Exceptions ward air control post (FACP), will go di- The ABCCC courses do not deal with radar rectly to their units for upgrade training. control of aircraft. ABCCC is not a radar Controllers going to an automated system platform but an airborne command post. will attend one of the automated systems Therefore, ABCCC training covers more in courses. These courses concentrate almost the command and control arena. A vast entirely on operating the systems and con- majority of ABCCC training is devoted to trolling aircraft with them. Upon gradua- subjects a battle manager needs to know. tion, the controllers are sent to functional ABCCC courses, therefore, are a good units. They will be certified mission-ready source of information for developing a bat­ after demonstrating their ability to control tle management training program. and their knowledge of such things as lo­ There are other weapons director NEED FOR BATTLE MANACKHS IN THE TACS 69

Jourses that devote time to battle manage- ing, assessment and dissemination of jnent areas, but thev come later. These are information, the systems and procedures e Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, used to control forces, and the formulation e Counterair Tactics Awareness Train- of options to provide the most effective use g Course, the Adversary Tactics Control­ of tactical forces in joint operations.21 ar Course, and the Staff Officer Course. The Combined Air Warfare Department ifvhile the first three are heavy in honing of the Air University Center for Aerospace liontroller techniques, they do devote Doctrine, Research, and Education nore hours to vvhat a battle manager needs (AUCADRE) at Maxwell AFB. Alabama, *o know. For example, of the 241.5 class- offers a Combined Air Warfare Course oom hours at the Fighter Weapons School (CAWC) that could also be verv useíul in nstructor Course. all but 83 are devoted to battle manager training. The aim of the attle management-related areas of knovvl- four-week CAWC is to increase the eífec- dge (e.g.. friendly and enemv aircraft and tiveness of offícers serving on battle and aunitions capabilities, the TACS. enemv support staffs throughout the Air Force. It efenses, and penetration aids). The utilizes a computer-assisted war game lounterair Tactics Course has onlv 40 called Theater War Experience to familiar­ ours of classroom work. but over half are ize students with the decision-making evoted to battle management areas of in- process of employing air power at the thea­ erest. The adversary tactics course that ter levei. rains aggressor controllers includes 88.5 There is also a new initiative being de- ours of class work. a good majority of veloped at the Air Force Human Resources ¥hich is devoted to Soviet aircraft and tac- Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, ics. The Staff Officer Course also devotes which could prove very useful in battle ome time to these areas. manager training. The project, called WARNET, will use tlight simulators to simulate small- and large-scale air battles. Other Training Available WARNET will use local and satellite Com­ Chere are other opportunities in the Air munications networks to tie all the simu­ (•'orce for a weapons director or other lators together. The plan calls for nodes in TACS offícers to gain battle manager WARNET to represent bases with tactical .nowledge. One such opportunity is the aircraft and weapons directors. Each of Air Force Institute of Technology, which these nodes would have a four-aircraft •»ffers a graduate program in strategic and simulator, and some nodes would also Lactical Sciences. This program is designed contain a ground-controlled intercept o provide offícers with analytical and de- (GCI) capability.24 WARNET, wargaming, íision-making skills and, among other and other forms of simulation could prove íings. is designed to confront future com- to be invaluable aids in battle management íanders with the various tvpes of uncer- training. ;ainty that future wars could present and o challenge the student to minimize such íncertainty.22 The Battle Management Course | Another good source of battle manage- In summary, current weapons director nent training is the Air Force Air Ground training does a fine job in preparing con­ Operations SchooFs (USAFAGOS) Battle trollers to work their equipment and con­ dtaff Course at Hurlburt Field, Florida, trol aircraft. It seriouslv lacks emphasis in irhis three-week course places considera- any of the battle management areas of )le emphasis on the employment of joint knowledge mentioned earlier, and what is «ir and land forces, including the infor- provided is piecemeal in nature. The nation required to support decision mak- building blocks for developing an exten- 70 AJRPOWEFI JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

sive, and necessary, course to train battle agers will need the same talents, skills, managers are available in the existing and character that previous commanders 17XX training program and in other had. They will also need a firm back- agencies such as AFIT, AUCADRE, and ground in intellectual, technical, and ana- USAFAGOS. Rated personnel who are as- lytical skills. signed to the TACS face the same short- The complexity of future wars will severely falls in their training because they may not challenge those with normal intellectual, have the extensive command and control technical and analytical skills. Clausewitz, and other expertise required of a battle in discussing military genius, advises that se- manager. Therefore, a battle management curity of the nation should be entrusted to course is needed to pull all the pieces to- “the inquiring rather than the Creative mind, gether and train the battle managers of the the comprehensive rather than the special- TACS. ized approach, the calm rather than the ex- To make this proposal for a battle man­ citable head." Further, he argues, “war, agement course cost-effective, an existing though it may appear uncomplicated, cannot be waged with distinction except by men of course will probably need to be deleted or outstanding intellect."25 revamped. Current training courses will need to be rank-ordered in importance, If we are to have battle managers in the and the one that falis out the bottom of the TACS with “outstanding intellect,” as list would be designated as the one for the Clausewitz puts it, then there may be a trade-off. Once this is done, it would be need to look at developing stringent selec­ beneficiai to have the battle management tion criteria for these positions. We must school collocated with the Fighter Weap- ensure that our future battle managers ons School (FVVS) at Nellis AFB, Nevada, have the “smarts” and “coolness” to make because the instructors who teach much of decisions quickly under pressure. the battle management areas of interest at the FVVS could be incorporated into the TACS battle manager course. The exact lo- cation of the course, and the one-for-one The Need to Act swap that would need to be made in order If implemented, the recommendations to meet monetary constraints, would have made in this article will help burn through to be determined by a working group the fog and reduce the friction within the called together for the purpose of setting TACS that will certainly be encountered up and developing the course. in a large-scale conflict. These recommen­ It also would be beneficiai if this were a dations would prepare TACS personnel to joint-service school as well. Although bat­ cope with chãos, and they would train bat­ tle managers in the sister Services may re- tle managers at positions below the TACC quire expertise in areas outside the scope levei to take over the air battle without of that for Air Force battle managers, there hesitation shouLd contact with the TACC is still a lot of commonality in areas of re­ or higher echelons be lost. quired expertise. Additionally, such an These recommendations would be easv environment would help battle managers to implement. All that is required is a learn what the capabilities are of the other change in thinking. There can and must be Services and how the respective command a much better and more thorough training and control systems can be interconnected program for our TACS officer corps. Keep during joint operations. in mind that although the TACS has been evolving since World War II, it has never been put to the test where things could “go Battle Manager Selection to hell in a hand-basket" very quickly. Let It is safe to assume that future battle man­ us take these simple steps now to prepare NEED FOR BATTLE MANAGERS IN THE TACS 71

TACS personnel for the next conflict, hop- and Its Implications for the US Armed Forces" (Unpublished paper. Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Educa­ ing all the vvhile that the TACS will never tion (CADRE), Maxwell AFB. Ala.). 6. have to face that big test. 10. BrigGen Wayne A. Downing. "Training to Fight," Mil- ilarv Review, May 1986, 21. MaxwellAFB, Alabama 11. Ibid . 22. 12. Ibid . 22-23. 13. Ibid., 24 14. Ibid . 25. 15. Ibid . 24-26. 16. Ibid Notes 17. Col Kenneth A. Kirkpatrick. “Thoughtson Battle Man­ 1 Lt Col Price T. Bingham. "Battlefield Air lnterdiclion agement Training and Evaluation" (Paper presented to the and the Evolution of Doctrine" (Unpublished paper. Center Symposium on Information Processing and Decision Making for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education |CADRE). for Battle Management, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 11-12 Maxwell AFB. Ala.). 6. March 1980). 322. 2 Carl von Clausewitz. On War. ed. and trans. Michael 18. TACR 55-45. Tactical Air Force Headquarters and the Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer- Tactical Air Control Center. 26 October 1984, 4-1. sity Press. 1976). 103-38. 19. Ibid. 3. Col Michael f. 0 -Connell and Maj Jantes R. Coakly, 20. "Evaluation of Air Weapons Control Fundamentais "Training Tomorrow's Commanders to Manage the Fog of CourseE30BP1741Xl 001.” training evaluation report (Kees- War" (Paper presented to the HQ USAF Long Range Planning ler AFB. Miss.: 3300 Technical Training Wing. january Conference on Command and Leadership in the 21 st Century 1986). i. Air War, Maxwell AFB. Ala.. October 1984), 300-1. 21. Ibid., 3. 4. Lt Col Hany R. Borowski. "Leadership to Match Our 22. 0 ’Connell and Coakly. 309. Technology." Air l/niversity Review, May-June 1984. 33. 23. Workbook, Battle Staff Course. USAFAGOS. Hurlburt 5. Bingham. "Battlefield Air Interdiction." 8. Field. Fia.. October 1986. 6. Maj Howard L. Dixon. "The Impact of Technology on 24. Russell M. Genet and 2Lt Roger W. Basl, "WARNET— the Future Taclical Air Control System" (ACSC study. Max­ A Multilevel Tactical Combal Training System" (Unpub­ well AFB. Ala.. 1973), 23 lished paper prepared for the Air Force Human Resources 7. Bingham. "Battlefield Air Interdiction." 9-10. Laboratory Operations Training Division. Williams AFB, 8. Borowski. 33. Ariz.). 7. 9. Lt Col Pnce T. Bingham. "Operational Levei Warfare 25. 0'Connell and Coakly, 307-8. ricochets

ON SPEAKING OUT

The September-üctober 1986 Air University Air Staff reviewers. They will continue to do Review contained a letter criticai of Air Force so. policy revievv. The author stated that we appar- Brig Gen Michael P. Mcfíaney. USAF ently do not approve of our officers airing views Director of Public Affairs that differ from established positionsand that it Washington, D.C. should be acceptable for a writer to disagree with Air Force policy as long as it is stated correctly. OFF THE MARK is almost right on track with this head- He I would like to comment on the critique of The quarters' views governing information pro- Wild Blue: The Novel of the U.S. Air Force by posed for public: release. We do not object to Maj. Alan j. Parrington in the November-De- differing views. In fact. current Air Force pol­ cember 1986 edition of the Review. Major Par­ icy is to foster. not nonconformist ideas quell, rington in his first sentence says, “The Wild for strategy, tactics. and concepts. Blue is a fictional account." He then seems to Further. D O D s position on personnel pub- forget that it is just that, fiction. I had read the licly expressing their views— an individual is novel a month or so before I read the critique. free to debate policy so long as it is not m isrep- Had I read the critique first, I might not have resented— was stated in a February 1985 O A SD been tempted by the title to check the book out (PA) letter to the com m ander. A ir University. of the librarv. I enjoyed the book for what it and other Service counterparts. A s an example, was, a novel. it is acceptable for an individual to State. “The At first the book was a little confusing as it official US or NATO policy is .... but I disa­ tried to put the people in place, but I thor- gree. Let me expiai n why. ..." It is not accept­ oughly enjoyed the novel once that little chore able for an individual to misstate policy and was done. I did not feel that the book was too then attack or defend that misrepresentation. long or that it rambled on. I spent nine and one- The Air Force security and policy review ob- half years in Asia from 1969 to 1979 in both the jective is to clear for public release m axim um Marines and the Air Force. Although the book information with minimum delay. To help, we is fiction. most of the situations in the book in­ have delegated clearance authority to the low- volve real-life actions. The book was written for est levei of competence with HQ LJSAF review entertainment, not as a historv of the US Air required onlv on subjects that must be cleared Force. by O A S D fPA). I recommend this book to people who would 1 have looked at our security and policy re­ enjoy a good novel and not expect a “real Air view process and believe the objective is being Force” story. met. O n lv 1.4 percent (32) of the 2,177 non- SMSgt Iselectee/ Davi d W. Hall. U SA F congressional inputs received at this headquar- 4th Weather Wing ters in calendar year 1986 were denied Peterson AFB, Colorado clearance for policy reasons. Twenty-four were denied by O A SD ; eight bv Air Force. In each case. our written denials provided an explana- ON TARGET tion and also reminded the submitter of appeal In his November-December Air University Re­ procedures. view article, The Human Factor: The United Security and policy review officials on this States Versus The Soviet Fighter Pilot. Col staff have madea conscious effort forsome time Mike Press is on the right track but challenges to guard against capriciousness by Secretariat/ only the tip of the iceberg. “Renewed high-

72 RICOCHETS 73

levei interest and a moderate infusion of Review concerning our perceptions of the So- m oney" w ill do little to change the levei of viets (“The Danger of Mirror-Imaging”), I combat effectiveness of our fighter units. If we would like to add a note about his comments are serious about optim izing our fighter forces, concerning the Aztecs. we will have to make some very serious, verv The Spanish would have indeed had a more difficult decisions about our basic written and difficult time gaining a foothold in this hemi- unwritten Air Force philosophy. sphere had the Aztecs been aware of what mo- First, we will have to vigorously dispel the tivated the European invaders. Of course, at the notion that every new second lieutenant is a time it was impossible to have such intelli- potential general officer. It sim ply is not true. gence. But pestilence was one ally the invaders There will have to be a leveling vvithin the pro- had that is often overlooked. Smallpox was a motion system. one that promotes on experi- powerful allv, as much (if not more) responsi- ence, performance, and leadership— not on ble than horses and firearms for Cortes’s re- position or familial ties. Early promotion must markable victory against the Aztec empire. be abolished as it only serves to perpetuate this Natives by the millions died as the result of notion and denies advancement to others. smallpox in New Spain (México) as well as in Second. we will have to recognize, as Colo- the Inca empire, which became the viceroyalty nel Press does. that the days of the "universal of Peru. Spaniards had either had the disease or m an" are long gone. M any aircrew personnel were immune to it. have no desire to advance beyond the grade Thus, in the course of fifteen years, two great that will sustain their standard of living and are Amerindian societies were devastatingly as- more interested in flying than serving on a staff saulted by a relative handful of Spanish adven- at a M A J C O M . W e w ill have to make provisions turers. These appalling events were the most for a professional aircrew force much the same incredible of the sixteenth century—and surely way the RAF does. Our continuation program among the most incredible in world history. does this now, but a formal program w ill be Capt William C. Rynecki. USAF needed to show Air Force commitment to this Howard AFB. Panama philosophical change. Third. assignments of aircrew will. by neces- sity, have to be made within weapon systems for lo n g e r p e r io d s o f tim e — 12 to 14 y e a rs longer for those who opt for professional aircrew. Fourth, it will cost. Military pay will have to increase. Increments for years of Service will have to be greater but should be more than off- set by increased aircrew retention and de- creases in undergraduate aircrew training. Flight pay would have to remain constant once the maximum is reached regardless of years of officer Service. There is much more to the “iceberg” than a letter can cover. The question to be answered is how much (of the iceberg] w ill the sênior Air Force leadership recognize and act on.

Lt CoI Potrick Caldwell. USAF National Cuard Bureau Washington. D.C.

DISEASE AS AN ALLY With reference to Col Lloyd T. Moore's fine piece in the November-December issue of the net assessment

Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Se- tiveness of intelligence collection. Yet, he is curity by William E. Burrows. New York: highly criticai of the current systenTs "perva- Random House. 1987, 401 pages. $19.95. siveness and often arbitrary nature.” His point that "to classifv almost everything is to classify Allhough lhe tiile is quite apt, the subtitle almost nothing’’ is proved by the seeming ease mav lead some to dismiss this book as just one with which he penetrates the supposedly more self-styled “exposé" in a seemingly end- opaque cloak of secrecy covering strategic re­ less parade of attempts to capitalize on the in- connaissance programs. Much of the informa­ evitable aura of mystery that surrounds the tion deduced from unclassified sources is high-tech world of space-borne reconnaissance remarkably accurate, but it is not the type of in­ systems. One hopes that the size of any audi- formation that seems likely to compromise re­ ence thus lost is small. because this work de- connaissance effectiveness. Of course, the serves both a wide readership and criticai argument can always be made that every piece acclaim. Put simply, William E. Burrows has of information revealed contributes to the com- produced a highly readable book that success- pletion of the full picture, and thus is poten- fullv traces the evolution of the US strategic re­ tially damaging. In any event, Burrows’s connaissance program from an earlv post- information is not invariably accurate. The er- World War II reliance on bomber and cargo air- rors that do exist, however, are not significant craít fitted with special sensor systems to to- to the overall picture of the reconnaissance pro­ day’s heavy reliance on space-based systems. gram, and therefore do not degrade the integrity The book is not about "espionage” or of the work. “spying," as the title would imply. Although it Nevertheless. the book is subject to valid crit- is not uncommon for the popular media to refer icism on another account. In his preface, the to reconnaissance satellites and aircraft as "spy author States that the US reconnaissance Sys­ satellites" or "spv planes,” the correct term is tem “virtually eliminates the possibility of a ‘'reconnaissance," an activity recognized as le- surprise attack by the Soviet Union." This is an gitimate and one conducted, for the most part, opinion apparently stronglv held by Burrows, in strict conformity with the rules of interna- but it is not supported by the objective evi- tional law. On the other hand, “spying" or "es­ dence presented in his work. Even if one ac- pionage" is an extralegal activity and may cepts totally his assertions about the involve the deliberate violation of national sov- effectiveness of the reconnaissance-collection ereignty or other acts that would earn the per- system, his sanguine conclusion about the pos­ petrator rightful approbation among the sibility of surprise attack is unwarranted in international community. view of the historical record. This record shows To his credit. Burrows accurately character- that surprise can usually be achieved despite izes the US collection of intelligence informa- near-perfect intelligence information. In fact, tion by space satellite and aircraft as perfection for the system is not claimed by the reconnaissance or surveillance rather than “es­ author, and he concedes that “great quantities pionage." Onlv the title is inaccurate in this re- [of data| have to be stored without analvsis" spect. a minor deficiency that must be ascribed. simply because the sheer volume of informa­ I suppose. to the publisher’s desire to stimulate tion collected exceeds the analytical capacitv sales. of the system. Material for the book is drawn entirely from However, Burrows's primarv point in ad­ unclassified sources, no mean task when one dressing the issue seems to be to argue that the considers the degree of classification character- United States possesses an adequate technical istic of the field. In addressing the issue of se- capability to verifv arms control agreements, a curity classification, the author recognizes a position at odds with the current administra- legitimate need for protecting from disclosure tion's insistence on the necessity of on-site in- information that could compromise the effec- spection. His case for this proposition is

74 NET ASSESSMENT 75

somewhat better, but certainly not unassaila- corresponding vices. If anything, Blumenson is ble. He does present a relatively balanced view too familiar with his subject. This closeness of the issue in the body of the book. using twin may have contributed to the omission of any interviews with former C IA director W illiam formal docuinentation of sources. which is a Colbv and Maj Gen George Keegan (USAF. Re- great pity for the development of a future schol- tired). who have opposing vievvs. arship. A more serious flaw is Blum ensons Although he apparently does not fully un- lack of detachment regarding Patton. We are derstand the inherent limitations of intelli- too often given accounts of significant and con- gence collection and analysis in preventing or troversial events in Patton's life from only his limiting strategic or tactical surprise, the author point of view. Blumenson, for example, over- has accomplished his stated purpose. This is a emphasizes the role of dyslexia in Patton's highly credible, very readable account of US post-1916 career. On the other hand. he lails to strategic reconnaissance programs in the at- appreciate sufficientlv the effect of Pattons mospheric and space environments. Notwith- (and his wife's) wealth in the development of standing the author's tendentiousness his independent, idiosyncratic behavior and regarding the verification of arms control agree- unquenchable professional ambition. One of ments. the book is highly recommended as a the richest men in the Arm y, Patton could so­ basic survev of strategic reconnaissance Sys­ cialize with the highest echelons of his supe- tems. their capabilities and limitations. riors and regard his career with a degree of detachment (and even risk) that was beyond an Lt Col Harvey J. Crawford Maxwell AFB, Alabama Eisenhower or a Bradlev. Perhaps Patton s sin- gle-minded militarv victories vvould not have occurred if relative penury had previously forced him to conform more to protect his ca­ Patton. The M a n b ehind the Legend, 1885- reer. Or maybe Patton’s somewhat unpredicta- 1945 bv Martin Blumenson. New York: YVil- liam Morrow and Company. Inc., 1985, 320 ble personality and comfortable style of life caused more distrust and estrangement from pages, S17.95. his colleagues than just being “too d— mili- Gen George S. (“Old Blood and Guts") Patton tary," as he put it. There are also a number oí is unquestionably one of the most fascinating minor but irritating errors throughout the book: vet enigmatic characters of the US Army. Like Bavaria is in Southern (not northern) Germany George Armstrong Custer (whom he resembles (p. 269); the picture on page 51 is of Patton's in manv wavs). George Patton and his career are aunt (not his sister); the picture on page 205 is a never-ending source of interest and debate. of Patton attending a briefing in France or Ger­ Martin Blumenson's new work has done much many (not Sicily); finally, the index has some to illuminate and clarify many obscure and dif- inaccurate references. ficult points in Patton’s life and its attendant Hopefully, someone will undertake a thor- legend. His unrivaled knowledge of the Patton ough "life and times" examination of Patton Papers and other personal sources, as well as and his career. Until then, Blumenson's work his incisive literary stvle. have succeeded in will stand as the most complete and perceptive producing the best biographical treatment of character study of one of the most complex, Patton to date. Particularly valuable is the sen- flamboyant, and highly successful leaders of sitive account of Patton's youth, the crucial role our Army. of his parents and wife, his unobtrusive yet un- Dr Ri chard E. Morse relenting reading and study, and his vital (but Maxwell AFfí, Alabama often neglected) pre-1939 militarv career. The judicious use bv the author of Patton's exten- sive diaries and personal correspondence viv- A Shorí History of Air Power by James L. Sto- idly creates a painfully clear view of a stormy, kesbury. New York: W illiam Morrow and sometime fatalistic, inner life. which goes far to Com pany, Inc.. 1986, 313 pages with index, explain the complexities of a turbulent public $18.95. ' career. Blumenson's writing is also well paced and lucid. barring an occasional wordy and A Short History of Air Pow er by James L. Sto- woolly sentence. kesbury is a fine addition to his growing list of Yet such virtues unfortunately have their military history surveys. Readable and brief, 76 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SUMMER 1987

this volume highlights the major events of mil- lands encounter, Stokesbury will make airi itarv aviation from 1903 to 1982. More impor- power enthusiasts happier. Continuing a theme tant. it effectively argues its thesis; namely, that picked up earlier in the book, the author sug­ air power has never quite fulfilled the promises gests that tactical. and not strategic, air power made by its legendary advocates. Frequently has indeed become the decisive element in viewed as an inexpensive alternative to the combined-arms ground warfare. One of its senseless and futile slaughter going on in twen- more interesting impacts is to speed battlefield tieth-century land vvarfare. air power built an events. making them look like “an old movie illusory reputation for sei f-contai ned when the film runs at the wrong speed and decisiveness. things happen faster than they are supposed Stokesbury documents the ultimate failure of to.” air power to deliver on its primary “war-win- None of Stokesbury’s book should be viewed ning” goal, while suggesting that air war, like as particularly contentious. Long-time students land warfare, became a bloody struggle of of air power will find little new. Not footnoted attrition: itself, the book has a bibliographic essay that contains most of the standard works in the It was supremely ironic that Douhefs alter­ fíeld. Stokesbury’s efforts will be useful as a native to the endless endurance of warfare on quick and handy background reference. It the ground had now become the same sort of endurance in the air. (p. 228) should find its way to undergraduate courses on air power. Stokesbury’s narrative moves along swiftly. Maj Mark K. Wells Even so. his analvsis is sound. Beginning with Maxivell AFB. Alabama an overview of World War I, he surveys the early years of aircraft development. World War 1 was significant not only for laving the corner- stones for fíghter and bomber technical prog- Herbicidal Warfare: The Ranch Hand Project in ress but also as the breeding ground for future Vietnam by Paul Frederick Cecil. New York: visions of air power. Despite relatively slow Praeger, 1986. 289 pages. $29.95. technological progress during the interwar years. this was the time that the doctrinal shape Between 1961 and 1971. the U S A ir Force op- of air power was truly formulated. Stokesbury eration code-named Ranch Hand tlew seems to agree that there have been few funda­ hundreds of missions and dropped 11 million mental changes to Douhetan theory since that gallons of chemical herbicides over m illions of time. acres of South Vietnam and to a lesser extent in In the lengthy section on World War II, for Laos and Cam bodia. A total of 1,206 A ir Force example, the author suggests that airmen of al- volunteers serviced and tlew the spray planes most all the major belligerents went to war during the nine-year history of this little- thinking thev possessed the best weapons to known and later controversial operation. shorten it. This was true despite the nationally Flving unarmed, obsolescent C-123 aircraft at unique doctrines and structures of the world's slow speed and treetop levei, the crews were air forces in the 1930s and 1940s. Even in the subject to ground fire. One estimate lists that face of determined enemv resistance, crippling Ranch Hand aircraft took more than 7,000 losses, and the failure to destroy the enem y’s rounds of ground fire. one celebrated plane tak- will, many airmen left W orld W ar II confident ing more than 600 rounds. This made the spiav- that prewar promises had been fulfilled. ers the most fired-upon A ir Force unit in the Subsequent air operations clearly make this Vietnam War; yet onlv nine aircraft were shot conclusion questionable. For a variety of rea- d ow n and 26 lives were lost. B y the late 1960s, sons, air power did not become the decisive herbicidal warfare was under severe attack by weapon in cold-war confrontations in Korea academic, private, and governmental studies; and especially in Southeast Asia. Stokesbury and one of the Chemicals, Agent Orange, had adequately describes the almost impossible re- become very controversial. Agent Orange was strictions levied on the use of US air power in banned in 1970, and all Ranch Hand activity both wars. was terminated in 1971. In 1975. President Ger- Ending his analysis with a description of the ald Ford renounced American first use of her- Arab-Israeli confrontations and the 1982 Falk- bicides in war. If this policy stands, then the N ET ASSESSMENT 77

Ranch Hand experience will be a unique one in tifies this usage as nothing more than an American military history. Americanization of the Russian term obshche- Lt Col Paul Cecil. U SA F (Retired). flew more voiskovoi (combined arms) and portrays this as than 1.000 combat missions in Vietnam. many the heart of the Soviet way of war. Baxter’s em- in the Ranch Hand program. He traces the his­ phasis on combined arms seems well taken. tory of the project in an interesting book that re- Baxter repeatedly invokes Sun Tzu's admoni- sulted from his doctoral dissertation at Texas tion that victory in war belongs to the side that A& M University. After a brief introduction that knows itself and its adversary. Whv, then, bur- treats “indirect" vvarfare in previous wars and den Soviet tactics with American nomencla- some discussion of insect and foliage control ture? One suspects the answer lies in Baxter's during World War II. Cecil svstematically ad- intended audience, US military officers. who dresses the stages of development of the Ranch are now trying to come to grips with AirLand Hand program. His final tvvo chapters deal with Battle doctrine themselves. the critics of herbicidal vvarfare and the Agent Baxter has set for himselí the task of describ- Orange controversv. Cecil is obviouslv favora- ing "how the Soviet Army thinks about itself, ble tovvard Ranch Hand, but he is fair with the and how it intends to perform on the battle- critics. field." (p. 1) The author freely admits the diffi- Based upon extensive questionnaire. oral in- culties of addressing so broad. complex. and terview, and correspondence material from formidable a theme. He advocates a more real- Ranch Hand personnel. and a thorough com- istic assessment of its military capabilities than mand of government sources and the extant lit- templated models of Soviet tactics provide. erature on the program, the book is a fine piece Unfortunately. Baxter's chapters on Marxist- of research. It is also most readable in explain- Leninist laws of war, military personnel, staff ing a very technical subject to the general au- and command. oífense, defense. supportingop- dience. The work has one glaring oversight. erations, artillery, and logistics are of uneven Despite its exhaustive bibliography, no men- quality and not well integrated. tion is made of William A. Buckingham, Jr.’s Several weak spots undermine the volume’s Operation Ranch Hand: Herbicides in South- utilitv for its independent audience. Although east Asia. 1961-1971 (1982), an excellent vol­ Baxter does strive to provide a sociopolitical ume in the Air Force history project. Since and cultural context to the Soviet Army. the Cecil extensively employed Air Force mate­ books format and lack of historical depth de- riais. he could not help but have been aware of feat the intent. The roots of modem Soviet tac­ Buckinghams pioneering work. The failure to tics and operational art can be traced through cite Buckingham is curious. and it raises seri- the evolution of Soviet military art from the ous questions in the knowledgeable readers theory of deep battle and successive deep op- mind. erations of the 1930s, through the practice of Still, Cecil has written a very good book that the Great Patriotic War. down to the current I recommend highlv. concept of the theater-strategic operation. Such Dr Joe P. Dunn historical ties are not developed here. lt is Spartanburg, South Carolina svmptomatic of the volume that the author mentions Victor Suvorov but ignores General- issimo Prince Alexander Vasilievich Suvorov, incorrectly attributing his famous dictum Soviet AirLand Battle Tactics by William Bax­ "Train hard, fight easy" to Marshal Mikhail I. ter. Novato. Califórnia: Presidio. 1986. 269 60) pages. $18.95. Kutuzov. (p. Although the final chapter is titled "Prognosis and Predictions," readers will Lt Col William Baxter. US Army (Retired), be disappointed if they expect a treatment of has written a provocative book with a contro- such pressing questions as a Soviet conven- versial title and a challenging thesis. Some tional offensive option in Furope, the impact of readers will still quarrel with the use of those precision guided munitions (PGMs), recon- buzz words "AirLand Battle," because it risks a strike complexes, and other emerging technol- mirror-imaging of US and Soviet tactics and op- ogies on Soviet tactics and operational art. erational art. Baxter admits that AirLand Battle These are salient issues for a work addressing is not a Soviet term but one derived from cur- Soviet military art in the context of AirLand rent doctrinal ferment in the US Army. He jus- Battle. The author does not discuss the growing 78 AIRPOWER fOURNAL SL/MMER 1987

volume of literature ori AirLand Battle to be ticing crisis management will only make indi­ found in Soviet militarv periodicals. vidual leaders more aware of how limited their options really are. It would be like givinga pilot Dr Jacob VV. Kipp Ft Leavemvorth, Kansas an emergency for which there was no solution. Crisis management practice and study might only serve to point out that such emergencies exist. That w ould only undermine the ability of Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous II- political leaders to deal with crisis and make lusion bv Richard Ned Lebow. Ithaca, New them more subject to stress. York: Cornell U niversity Press, 1987, 226 1 do recommend the book. The problems Le­ pages, $24.95. bow describes are real and should be a prime focus of the national security debate. As an in- Richard Lebow introduces yet another im- troduction to the problems of crisis manage­ portant area of consideration for strategic ana- ment, it is excellent. As an attempt to solve lysts who are concerned witli crisis those problems— well, let us say that it leaves management. His book focuses on what hecalls us with a lot to think about. "the single most important component of crisis Lt C o l Fre d ). R eule management," the human factor. His basic Maxiveli AFB. Alabama premise is that our political leaders are not pre- pared to cope with the demands that our stra­ tegic force structures. supporting C'I Systems, and employment strategies will make on them The Challenge of Commcind by Roger H. Nve. in a crisis situation. Wayne, New Jersev: Averv, 1986, 187 pages, The book does an excellent job of laying out $9.95. the dilemmas of crisis management. Of partic­ ular interest is Lebow's use of history to show This is not the classical textbook for which how world leaders of the past have reacted to commanders and potential commanders have their moments of crisis. Events of both World been searching for years. It will not teach vou War 1 and World War II are used to show how how' to be a com m ander in eight easy lessons the natural defense mechanisms the human and an epilogue. It will, however, provide a psvche uses to cope with stress caused the po­ solid structure for officers to prepare them- litical leaders of those eras to react to their selves for command at any levei— 5. 10, or 20 crises in ways that w ould lead to a total break- years into the future. down of present-day strategies. Roger H. Nye has taken his 40 vears of expe- Although 1 do recommend Nuclear Crisis rience and study, first as an armor and infantry Management. I cannot endorse the recommen- officer and later as professor of history at the US dations Lebow offers as Solutions to the prob- Militarv Academv, and has developed a verv lems he describes. Thev do not seem to be well usable bibliographv of works relating to com­ thought out. The problems he describes are in- mand of troops. herent in the vulnerabilities of present-day His book lists 250 references, biographies, force structures and will not go away until our autobiographies, history, command perspec­ force structures are made less vulnerable. For tives, organizational skills. leadership. deci- example. Lebow suggests that current leaders sion making, training. and many other militarv- would be under less stress in anv particular sit­ related subjects. One might say, "O kay, vou can uation if they devoted more time to practicing obtain such a bihliography at the end of any crisis management and became more aware of militarv book. But what the professional offi­ the dilemmas it entails. He likens this to pilots cer, who has limited reading time available, practicing emergency procedures and points really needs is a road map to provide a focus for out that kn ow in g how to cope with an em er­ his or her reading." gency makes the emergency less stressful. What Nye gives us just that. He structures his book he does not consider is that if crisis manage­ around eight primary areas relating to com­ ment is a true dilemma, its success depends on mand: military self-image: a com m anders factors beyond the control of individual leaders challenges; the com pany commander: concepts and there is no emergency procedure that will of duty: and the commander as tactician, vvar- always solve the problem. Studving and prac­ rior. moral arbiter, and strategist. His epilogue, NET ASSESSME’NT 79

"The Commander as Mentor," sums it all up which Mikhail S. Gorbachev and his allies can nicely. sustain the pace of reforin. The theme of each chapter is more than ade- Not so well know n is the fact that most of quately supported by specific references to these trends have counterparts in the Soviet books listed in the bibliography, replete with military sector. Thus, replacements in the top asterisks to indicate the books that are recom- echelons of the defense establishment have mended for priority in personal study or for use been occurring at a rate unprecedented since in officer professional development seminars. the Second W orld War. They include the ouster In discussing mentors' responsibilities to ex- of Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov as chief of the pose subordinates to a career reading program, General Staff in 1984; the nam ing of a new de­ Nye observes that "the core of the mentor's cur- fense minister, Marshal Sergei Sokolov. to suc- riculum lies in these 250 books. . . Here ceed Dmitrii F. Ustinov (who died in 1984); and again, the realization that a junior officer’s time the death (also in 1984) of Chief M arshal of is limited comes forth: and Nye solves this for Aviation Pavel S. Kutakhov, commander in us by providing a listing of "first books for of- chief of the USSR Air Forces (W S) since 1969. ficers who are to become readers,” relating to At the same time, the Soviet armed forces have the general outline of his book. been placing greater emphasis on technological We should issue this book to our Officer improvements and have developed and fielded Training School, Reserve Officers Training new weapon systems; many of these incorpo- Corps, and Air Force Academy cadets as they rate advances that reduce the qualitative edge begin their individual, professional reading that N A T O has enjoyed and that has to some programs. It vvill last them a career and. if used degree offset Soviet numerical advantages. The properly, will enhance not only their potential new generation of fighter aircraft and their as- forcommand positions but their leadership. of- sociated air-to-air missiles are examples of ficership. and professional skills as well. these innovations that present serious chal- Nye provides a great deal of cognitive mate­ lenges to the West. The question of further tech­ rial here. There is something for everyone, from nological progress in Soviet weaponry is tied the newly commissioned officer who is just be- closely to the need to spur growth and effi- gin n in g to develop a reading program to the ciency in the civilian economy and to keep the sênior officer looking for supplementarv read­ burden of defense expenditures under control. ing. It should be the first book on a profession- The higher cost of producing and m aintaining al's shelf— and the most dog-eared. more sophisticated equipment forces the Sovi- ets now to make tough guns-versus-butter de- Maj Gary C. Lagassey cisions. Finally, the important restructuring of Ramstein AB. Germany Soviet military commands continues, as the theaters of m ilitary operations (T V D s) are aligned into new theaters of war (TVs). The rapidity and scope of events in the So­ Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, Volume 9 edited by David R. Jones. G ulf Breeze, Flor­ viet military in recent years have been so dra- ida: Academ ic International Press, 1986, 313 matic as to make it difficult to keep abreast of pages. $47.00. developments. This reason makes a book such as the Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual val- Even the casual observer will appreciate that uable. Like earlier editions in the series, this the last three years, the present, and the near fu­ latest volume includes review articles covering ture are extraordinarilv important times in the the organization, equipment, and disposition Soviet Union. In a comparatively brief period, of all branches of the Soviet military. An Over­ we have witnessed an almost complete change View chapter by the editor, a bibliography of ar­ in the national political leadership. numerous ticles and books on the Soviet m ilitary personnel shifts in the government bureau- published in 1984-85, a chronologv of military cracy, sweeping new economic policies (espe- activities, and a com pendium of statistical data cially calls for technological advances), and a on Soviet military strength are very helpful. reiaxation of Controls over the media, arts, and Additionally, the 1984-85 bibliography con- literature. The im plications of such changes for tains articles on Soviet naval theater forces, the the U S S R in com ing years are potentially pro- naval officer corps, the economy, Soviet foreign found, depending m ainly on the extent to policy in the Far East, and the space program. 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

The articles in this volume are generally well sional controversies but also the flying and Ser­ written, thoroughly researched, and backed up vice aneedotes. When the occasional hint of by numerous statistics and other facts; exten- personal friendship and bias pokes through, it sive use is also made of Russian language only humanizes both biographer and subject. sources. The book is to be recommended as a This volume is well written, abundantly il- reference work for the specialist and layman lustrated, and carefully crafted into an excel- alike. lent and enjoyable book. It is well worth reading. It reminds one of DeWitt Copp’s two Dr Ralph S. Ciem books of this period (Forged in Fire and A Few Miami, Florida Great Captains), and like them, this volume will repose on the reference shelves of Air Force people as a primary source on the origins of that Service. It is highly recommended not “Air Force Spoken Here": General Ira Eaker only as professional reading but also for sheer and the Command of the Air by James Par- enjoyment. ton. Bethesda, Maryland: Adler & Adler, Col H. L. Elman, USAFR 1986, 557 pages, $24.95 cloth. Port Jefferson Station, New York

Not only was Gen Ira Eaker one of W orld W ar li s finer commanders and a major figure in the technological development of aviation in the twenties and thirties, but he is one of the Ernie’s War: The Best ofErnie Pyle’s World War handful of policymakers who merit description II Dispatches edited with a biographical es- as a major architect of the U S Air Force. He has say by David Nichols. New York: Random often been a central figure in the better histories House, Inc., 1986, 432 pages, $19.95. and biographies of the development of Am eri­ can air power. When one examines the devel­ “Ernie Pyle covered World War II,” writes opment of aerial refueling, long-range military David Nichols, “the way the infantry soldier aviation, or precision-bombing doctrine, one fought it: on the ground and on the move, sub­ stumbles into Ira Eaker. lt is hard to find an in- ject to fear. filth and the capricious fates that novation of importance to the birth of the US dealt death to one man, life to another.” He tells Air Force that is not somehow connected with us that “Pyle was a novelty as a war corre- his career. Yet until now there has been no ad- spondent. Only rarely did he write about the equate biography of Eaker available. He merits so-called ‘big picture.’ Rather, Pyle focused on a lot more than passing mention in the biogra­ the individual combatant— how he lived. en- phies of Arnold, Marshall, or Eisenhower. dured by turns battle and boredom, and some- Furthermore, after Eaker’s retirement from times how he died, far from home in a war active dutv, he served as the conscience of m il­ whose origins he only vaguely understood." (p. itary aviation, often writing and speaking with xiii) an impact that few other retired generais have Ernie Pyle was at once the most popular and had. For this reason, an understanding of Gen­ widely read of the correspondents covering the eral Eaker’s career is of interest not just as a Second World War. His columns, appearing in “period piece” from World War II, but as a way hundreds of newspapers coast-to-coast, of understanding the origins and rationale of brought the events of the w orlds most awe- manv of today’s defense precedents and some conflict to the hometowns and doorsteps policies. of America. M any of his columns were given It is a tribute to the character of General Eaker prominent play in major metropolitan dailies; that his biography was finally written with some were given front-page treatment. deep respect and admiration by his former aide His writing was as popular in the trenches as and long-time staff officer, Col James Parton. it was at home, where Pyle was considered Parton is much better remembered for his later something of a hero himself. His heroes. career as founder and publisher of American though, were not the men planning and run- Heritage. In keeping w ith the tradition of ning the war: they were not generais or states- American Heritage for historie accuracy and men. In fact, Pyle rarely wrote about anyone balance, Parton included not only the profes- above the rank of captain. His heroes were in- NET ASSESSMENT H1

fantrvmen who suffered the adversity and hor­ establishment— especially the men at the lower ror of war in an extraordinary way. and he rungs of the ladder. In an era of suspicion, dis- spent the vast majority of his time living and trust, and often outright hostility between the vvorking among them. military and the news media, Nichols's book According to Nichols, Pvle “admitted that serves as a tribute to men whose vision was un- his admiration for the infantry was obsessive clouded by self-interest and personal gain. A and that to him all the war of the world has periodic trip through Pyle's writings should be seemed to be borne by the fevv thousand front- a required exercise for budding journalists and line soldiers here, destined merely by chance to incipient military leaders alike. They could suffer and die for the rest of us.‘ ” (p. 22) Pvle's glean much from the words of a man whose vvriting was not elegant or pretentious, just priorities were so uncomplicated. poignant and well informed. No man who had Lt Col (ames S. O Rourke IV not lived among the revetments of Norm andy. Maxwell AFB. Alobama the beachheads at Anzio, or in the searing heat and constant danger of North África could write so knowingly about those young boys re- centlv become men. It was admiration for their sacrifice that made his homespun style of jour- Nuclear Arms: Two Views on World Peace by nalism so appealing to so many readers. Myron S. Augsburger and Dean C. Curry. This collection of Pyle’s writing, complete Waco, Texas: W ord Books, 1987, 186 pages, with his Pulitzer Prize-winning column about $14.95 cloth. the death of Capt Henry Waskow, who had been killed in the mountain fighting near San Two ethical positions on the acquisition and Pietro, is as fascinating as it is moving. It is cer- possible use of nuclear weapons are forcefully tainly a different view from the one presented presented in a debate format by the authors. in the books, movies, magazines, and televised Anyone who wishes to discuss the ethics of nu­ accounts we have grown up with. clear weapons should read this book. It is su- "H is unobtrusive style of reporting," says N i­ perbly written and is an excellent inaugural chols. ‘‘m ingling, listening, rarely taking volume for a new series from Word Books notes— ingratiated him with nearly everyone called "Issues of Christian Conscience.” he encountered. He shared in the soldiers’ Both authors are well qualified. While teach- tight-knit company, endured the same priva- ing at Eastern Mennonite College and pastor- tions, subjected himself to the same dangers, ing, Myron Augsburger, ThD, has written and thus began his most significant bodv of widely on war and the Christian’s responsibil- work— describing for those at home the daily ity. Dean Curry is a director of the National As- lives of the infantrymen who fought the war at sociation of Evangelicals’ Peace, Freedom. and its dirtiest levei." (p. 16) Security Studies Program. A prolific author on Nichols, himself a journalist from Indiana, Christians and politics, he chairs the history seems fascinated with Ernie Pyle. both as a department at Messiah College and holds a PhD writer and as a spokesman for a bvgone era of in international politics. patriotism, self-sacrifice. and total involvement Augsburger relies on the traditional Chris­ in the national defense. Pyle had no intention tian pacifist position, which opposes all use of of becoming a spokesman for the combat infan- force by Christians, to argue that nuclear weap­ trvman— yet it is clear that Nichols sees him as ons are immoral. He adds to that critique by ad- such. Pyle viewed himself as a newspaperman, vocating the use of government monies for a Scripps-Howard feature writer who hap- humanitarian purposes rather than for military pened to be covering a mighty big story, noth- ones. Curry, on the other hand. comes from the ing more. But N ic h o ls and m illio n s of Just War tradition and contends that nuclear Americans who read and were moved by Pyle’s weapons can have moral uses. particularly as writings from 1940 until his death by a sniper’s deterrents to worse evils. That )ust War posi­ bullet in 1945 have accorded him a special tion says that since God has established govern- place in American history. ments for the maintenance of peace and welfare Never before, and perhaps never again, has a of the governed, those governments can legiti- journalist been as widely admired for his rela- mately use necessary, proportional force in tionship with the men of this nation's military self-defense. The point-counterpoint of Augs- 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 burger and Curry presents all of the important their lives for a great end. The choice should theological arguments on war and nuclear not be between being “Red and dead"; both vveapons. A s a result, Ihis book is a fine priiner should be opposed. Therefore, Western govern- for a class on the Christian ethics of war. ments must oppose totalitarianism, hopefully Unfortunatelv. the debate is not a balanced without provoking a nuclear conflict. He does one. Augsburger’s logic is often confused. His State that a nuclear contlict will probably not church advocates Christian separation from result in the end of civilization. Nuclear weap­ any governmental force, be it police or military, ons have become more accurate and smaller, and sees the primary duty for Christians as they are under close control, and there is no being in the area of evangelism and relief of hu- particular reason to suspect that a nuclear ex- man suífering. Augsburger presents these tra- change w ould become total. ditional pacifist arguments superbly but Put this book on your “must-read” list if you unfortunatelv identifies the possession of nu­ are concerned about the possession or use of clear or other vveapons vvith the desire to attack nuclear weapons. To understand how a Chris­ and dominate others vvho are weaker. That has tian can participate in the military, read Curry’s not been the practice of the United States or its article. Western ailies. His arguments are further Chaplain (Maj) Edvvard T. Brogan, U SA F eroded by his atteinpts to blend his pacifist po- AirCommand and Staff College sition with a Just W ar position that has presup- Maxwell AFB, Aiabama positions that undercut a pacifist position. For instance, he advocates conventional arms buildups, and possibly wars, to replace nuclear weapons because nuclear weapons are. by def- National Security: Enduring Problems of U.S. inition. disproportional to any threat and are Defense Policy by Donald M. Snow. New incapable of lim iting collateral damage or non- York: St. M artin’s Press, 1987, 272 pages, combatant casualties. But the use of conven­ $35.00. tional vveapons may result in very sim ilar cost, inhumanity, and suffering. He thus appears to If “we achieve in proportion to what we at- approve of one kind of suffering while being tempt,” Donald M. Snow has accomplished against another. In his favor, he never calls for much with National Security, the latest work unilateral disarmament. He advocates arbitra- from this productive political scholar. Snow of- tion, forvvard conventional defense. and an " In ­ fers a concise overview of major defense issues, ternational Peace Institute." He also argues setting them into historie context and outlining powerfully for social justice but never indicates their transformation over time. Am ong the how a society can achieve it or preserve it in the main subjects are the potential for nuclear war. face of a totalitarian threat. whether global or theater; the emergence of nu­ Curry argues vvith claritv and a wealth of sup- clear arms and the effort to elim inate or to man- port. His presentation of the )ust War position age them; the intertwining concerns about is classic. The book is worth the price for this conventional forces and concepts for their em- understanding alone. While presenting his ar­ ployment: the diversity of problems in “pe- guments more clearly than Augsburger. Curry ripheral” areas of the world and their ties superbly responds to pacifist objections to the to the superpowers: the debate over defense maintenance and possible use of nuclear weap­ spending; and the impact of the American mil­ ons. For instance, he notes that G od’s shalom, itary ethos and the nations special “way of or peace, is not just the absence of war but in- w ar." Th is is a very tall order, indeed, but Snow cludes justice and righteousness. He believes fills it remarkably well. that such a standard cannot be expected of hu- This book can prove useful. even for the spe- man society before God’s resolution of history. cialist. as a brief “refresher” course and a re- His central argument is that Western society minder of what specialists often take for faces an unrelenting threat from the hum anis- granted in their discourse with others. Also val- tic, totalitarian. Com m unist regimes. Freedom, uable is Snow ’s underlying view that one's democracy, and faith are such important ele- stance on defense issues necessarilv draws on ments of American (Western) life that they are cultural and historical factors and does not worth defending to the end. He points out that grow in a totally “value free," "culture free." C.hristians have never been reluctant to give “scientificallv neutral" fashion. Indeed, NET ASSESSMENT 83

Snow s discussion of the development of such glin g" basis. The governmental role grew in weapon systems as nuclear weapons, intercon­ both areas. Also, may we really style the War of tinental missiles, long-range bombers. and the 1812 and the Korean W ar as “lon g"? (p. 36) Can elements for a strategic defense svstem shows one really say that the Am erican W ar for Inde- that hum an choice is as important as techno- pendence could have been sustained over logical necessity. many years because Americans were united for National Securitv translates “defense Eng- total political aims when only a distinct minor- lish” into a language that any reader can un- ity supported separation from the Crown? (p. derstand. Terminology about national securitv 36) The National Security Act of 1947 created changes rapidly, and the same terms may reap- the National Military Establishment and an Of­ pear vears after their fírst use. Snow helps keep fice of the Secretary of Defense but not the De­ track of such terms, m aking their meanings partment of Defense, w hich was form ally more readily understandable. Concerning nu­ founded under the terms of the amendment to clear strategy, for example, Snow enables even the Act of 1947, w hich w as passed in 1949. (p. nonspecialists to comprehend declaratory 49) Perhaps not even the Reagan administra- strategy, employment strategy, fractionation, tion would be comfortable with Sn o w s calling the strategic integrated operational plan arms control a "staple of the liberal Democratic (SIOP). mutual assured destruction, limited agenda" (p. 228), especially since Snow often nuclear options, countervailing strategy, and distinguishes between arms control and disar- many other concepts. This demystification of mament. Overall, however, such questions are the vocabulary concerning national security is- small compared to the book's many important sues strips away needless abstraction and clut- merits. ter from problems that are com plex enough on Snow’s National Security is a worthy addi- their own. tion to a valuable series of “prim ers" on Am er­ Snow judiciously describes the views of suc- ica^ place in world affairs— a series that cessive presidents and their appointees sub- includes such established works as John G. stantially in their own terms. For example, his Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War; and first reference to the Strategic Defense Initiative Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf. (SDI) does not include the more colloquial term American Foreign Policy. Snow’s reach is am- "Star W ars." (p. 69) Tw o more references to SD I bitious. His grasp is impressive. His book is come before Snow uses the term “Star W ars," worth reading. noting that it is “a designation the president Donald J. Mrozek strongly dislikes as suggesting frivolity.” (p. Department of Hisfory 186) Only once in eleven later references does Kansas State l/niversity Snow use the term "Star Wars,” even there us- ing quotation marks and pairing it with the of- ficial term. He also avoids undue political Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nu- characterization of the positions espoused by clear Strategy by Morton H. Halperin. Cam- the leaders of other countries. Again, Sn ow acts bridge. Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing not as judge of w hich policy is best but as a re- Com pany, 1987, 173 pages. $19.95. liable guide to what the various positions have been. Given the heated environment in which Since the Soviet Union obtained the ability defense issues are often discussed, Snow may to strike the Am erican homeland, there lias come in for criticism in some quarters on such been an ongoing debate about the military util- matters. But it w ill not be deserved. ity of nuclear weapons, particularly in Europe. The book is not flawless, and some of Snow's In Nuclear Fallacy, Morton Halperin contends observations are debatable. Of the Am erican re- that the threat to use nuclear weapons has not luctance to keep a standing army, Snow asserts played a central role in resolving any of the in­ that it meant “more attention to the so-called tercontinental crises since 1945, if it has played social net of benefit program s that began to ap- any role at all. The author proposes several pear during the 1930s New Deal." (p. 33) The changes that the United States could make uni- problem lies in what Snow leaves out, since the laterally in its nuclear posture that w ould de- New Deal era also served as herald of a standing crease the chance of accidental nuclear war armed force and of an enduring involvement of and, at the same time, increase the security of the United States in world affairs on an “entan- the West. 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987

According to Halperin, US nuclear strategy command solely dedicated to nuclear strategy, lias changed very little in the past 40 years. At with its own staff and answerable only to the first, nuclear weapons were treated as “regular president. weapons” and integrated into all military plan- Halperin believes that there are two main ning. Under Ihis strategy, nuclear devices were dangers in the present nuclear situation. First, “sim ply better weapons that may be used as a both sides fear a surprise attack, but each side matter of course in any m ilitary contlict." is acquiring first-strike weapons. Second, un­ When the Kennedy administration took office, der present N A T O nuclear strategy, presiden- it rejected the “regular weapons” model as es- tial control of nuclear weapons during a poused by the doctrine of massive retaliation. European crisis would be strained. Thus. the “special weapons" model (the first To reduce the threat of a first strike, Halperin use of nuclear weapons should be carefully reiterates several old arms control proposals: a considered) was formulated and remains the nuclear freeze, a com prehensive test ban, and centerpiece of American nuclear strategy reduced reliance on missiles with multiple today. warheads. Halperin’s own proposals— intru- Briefly critiquing nearly 20 international sive on-site inspections, stationing submarines crises from Iran in 1946 to the Persian G ulf at far away from the other side’s homeland, and the end of the Carter administration, Halperin agreements not to target command and control coneludes that resolutions were possible be- capabilities— are problematical. and even Hal­ cause of “the nature of the security interests at perin himself is skeptical of the Soviet stake. the balance of conventional military response. weapons. and skillful diplom acy accompanied The adoption of the “explosive devices” by a willingness to compromise— not the nu­ model has several advantages as far as presi- clear threat.” Several of these international dential control is concerned. First, if this new crises are too complex— Vietnam, for exam- attitude is adopted, very few nuclear weapons ple— for Halperin’s broad generalizations. The w ould be stored in Europe and in less-vulner- inclusion of the Pueblo incident even as a fleet- able positions, restoring a measure of control to ing nuclear crisis is dubious at best. The ulti­ the president during a crisis. Second. a ma t e reason for the steady erosion of the changed nuclear policy frees forces from pro- nuclear threat is the great reluctance by presi- tecting nuclear storage sites, and dual-capable dents to use nuclear weapons, which suggests aircraft would not be withheld during the ini- that the "special weapons” model has always tial attack; N A T O could use all the resources operated throughout the nuclear age. available to fight the Soviet offensive instead of If the nuclear threat has played only a periph- hedging in order to protect nuclear weapons. eral role in contlict resolution, Halperin sug­ Third. NATO commanders would be released gests the adoption of a third model in order to "to do what thev know how to do; equip. train, prevent accidental nuclear war and uncontroll- and deploy their forces for sustained conven­ able escalation. Nuclear weapons should be tional operations." With this reduced reliance treated as "explosive devices," w hich w ould on nuclear weapons and increased emphasis call for “the weapons to be used in very ex­ on conventional strengths. “it would be easier treme circumstances in order to demonstrate for the A lliance to make the decision to use national resolve, but never as weapons to fight force” and “it could effectively deter acts other wars." The military would plan its warfighting than large-scale overt Soviet military strategy as if nuclear weapons did not exist; nu­ aggression." clear weapons would be “stigmatized.” To Halperin realizes that his proposals might in- reinforce this new attitude, there w ould be a crease the possibility of a conventional war, but strict separation between conventional and nu­ in his eyes the alternative is the status quo of clear strategies. If the individual m ilitary basing the security of Western Europe on "a branches cannot perform this task on their doomsdav machine linked to a roulette wheel." own. Halperin suggests creating a new nuclear Steplien M. Sobieck Keck Center Claremont, Califórnia notams

Militarv History Symposium The Department of History of the US Air Force 1. T h e Me n of Company K: The Autobiography Academy has announced that its Thirteenth of a World War II Rifle Company by Harold P. Militarv' History Symposium will be held 12-14 Leinbaugh and John D. Campbell. New York: October 1988. The topic w ill focus on the role W. Morrow, 1985, 318 pages. of intelligence in militarv operations. For fur- 2. Ir on Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General ther information, write to: Executive Director. Curtis LeMay by Thomas M. Coffey. New York: Thirteenth Militarv Historv Symposium. HQ Crow n Publishers, 1986, 474 pages. USAFADFH. USAF Academy CO 80840-5701. 3. The Challenge of Command: Reading for H. USAF Historical Research Center Grants Military Excellence by Roger Nye. Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, 1986, 187 pages. The U SAF Historical Research Center has an­ 4. ‘‘A i r Force Spoken Here”: General Ira Eaker nounced that it will make available several and the Command of the Air by James Parton. grants for FY 1988 for the study of the history of Bethesda, Md.: Adler and Adler, 1986. 557 air power at the Historical Research Center. pages. Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Applicants must have a graduate degree in history or a related field 5. R o c e to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First and a background in aeronautics. astronautics, Century Warfare by Richard Simpkin. Elms- or other militarv-related subjects. A broad ford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press. 1985. 376 pages. range of militarv subjects may be researched 6. O n c e a Warrior King: Memoirs of an Officer with an emphasis on performing research using in Vietnam by David Donovan. New York: primary resource material of the U SAF Histor­ M cG raw -H ill, 1985, 323 pages. ical Research Center. For application and fur- 7. Crossroods of Modem Warfare by Drew ther information, write to: Director, U SA F Middleton. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubíeday & Historical Research Center, Maxwell A FB A L Co., 1983, 320 pages. 36112-6678. Application deadline is 28 Febru- ary 1988. 8. A Genius/or War: The German Army, 1807- 1945 by Trevor N. Dupuy. Englewood Cliffs, Colorado Air Guard History N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1977. Reprint. Fairfax. Va.: Hero Books, 1984. 400 pages. The Colorado Air National Guard has an­ nounced that it will be com piling a commem- 9. Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle by John orative history of the organization. The sponsor Keegan and Richard Holmes. New York: Vi- king. 1986, 288 pages. is looking for material, including photographs, articles, and other reference material. The 10. Fighting Back: Winning the War against book. entitled Colorado Pride. will be sold only Terrorism edited by Neil C. Livingstone and on an order basis for $30. For an extra $5, the Terrell E. Arnold. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington sponsor will emboss your name on the leather Books, 1985, 268 pages. cover. To contribute material or to order Colo­ These books are available at all Air Force li- rado Pride, contact: Maj Charles Whitley, Col­ braries and will be sent to units with an active orado Pride Coordinator. 140 TFW /PÁ , Bldg Project Warrior program. Tliey are also avail­ 27. Buckley A N G Base. Aurora CO 80011-9599. able in commercial bookstores. All are good ad- ditions to the military professionaFs library. Project Warrior Top Ten The Air Staff has announced the Project W ar­ Project Recall Seeks Information rior Ten professional reading list for 1987. This Project Recall. a Flight Safety Foundation effort list is a yearly feature of the Project Warrior to help make flying safer. is seeking experi- program to encourage study in the military ences, anecdotes. and articles that contribute to profession of arms. This year's list includes: making flying safer. If you know of such mate­

85 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1987 rial. contact: Project Recall. Flight Safety Foun­ Force officers in the grade of first lieutenant. dation. 5510 Columbia Pike, Arlington V A One copy for each US Air Force or Air Reserve 22204-3194. Forces office of public affairs.

VVondering how to receive official copies of Tbree copies for each Air Reserve Forces unit Airpower Journal? Official distribution down to squadron levei. tbrough government administrative channels is available on the basis shovvn below. Three copies for each air attaché or advisory group function.

One copy for each non-US Air Force, US gov­ Journal Airpower ernment organization. Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2 Basis Of Official Issue One copv for each US Air Force or US govern­ ment library facility. Authorized Recipient A ll organizations must take steps to request au­ One copv for each general officer on duty with thorized distribution through their adm inistra­ the US Air Force and Air Reserve Forces. tive support function. For Air Force activities, One copy for every five active duty US Air this means com pletion of A ir Force Form 764a Force otficers in grades colonel through and submission to the publications distribu­ captain. tion system. For other U S government activi­ ties. the request should be addressed to normal One copy for every fifteen active duty US Air administrative support Systems for action. contributors

lhe Deputy Chiei ul Stalf. Plans and Opera­ niatlc Clearutice Btuucli. |USMO MAAG. tions; as commander of lhe Technical Train- Madrid. Sp.no He is a master navigator and ing Center at Sheppard AFB. Texas, the has served as a fliglil comuiander in an 1 4 United States Air Fones. |apun, and the squadron and as a homhardmenl navigator Fifth Air Force. Yokoto AB. |apan General instructor in F B -Itls. Assignments have Oonnelly is a graduate of Squodron Olticer been in Vietnam. Spain. Germany. and at Schuol. AirCouunaud and Staff College. Air HQ USAFE Colunei Stroud ix a graduate ol War College. and the Ruyul College ol Def- Squadron Officer School. Air Comniand and ence Studies in Londoti. Staff College. and Air War College

Gen Larry 0. YVelth IBA. Universily of Maryland; MS, George Washington Univer- sitvl is chiei of staff of the US Air Force. Washington. D C Mis previous assignments have íncluiled tomniander in chief. Stra- legic Air Comniand. and director. |oint Slra- legit Target Planning Staff, Offutt AFB. Nebraska: vice chiei of staff. US Air Force: deputy chief of staff. programs and re- sources. HQ USAF: commander. lsITaclical Fighler Wing, Langley AFB. Virgínia, and Ninth Air Force. Shaw AFB. South Carolina: Lt Gen Bradlev C. Hosmer (USAFA: MA. deputy chief of staff for plans. deputy chiei Oxford University) is president. National Col Clifford R. Krieger (USAFA; MA. Uni­ of staff operations. and inspector general. Defense University, Washington. D,C. His versity of Southern Califórnia) is coin- Tactical Air Comniand General VVelch is a previous positions include vice director, mander. 86th Tai tical Fighler Wing. HQ graduate of lhe Armed Forces Staff College joint Staff. Office of the loint Chiefs of Staff; USAFE. His previous assignments have in- and National YVar College commander of 831s! Air Division. George cluded Thirteenth Air Force. HQ USAF, and AFB. Califórnia. 374th Tactical Fighler Germany. Colonel Krieger is a graduate of Wing. Moody AFB. Geórgia, and 4 7911] Tac­ the Royal Air Force Staff College. Armv W'ar tical Training Wing. Holloman AFB. New College. Air Command and Staff College. México; and vice commander. 479th Tacti­ and Air War College. cal Training Wing at Holloman. General Hosmer has had assignments in the Repub- licof Vietnamasair liaison officer for the lst Brigade of the lst Air Cavalrv Division and as a war plans officer at HQ Seventh Air Force. Tan Son Nhut Air Base. and with HQ Pacific Air Forces. Hickam AFB. Hawaii. as deputy chief of staff for plans He is a grad­ uate of Squadron Officer School. Naval War College. and National War College.

Gen Charles L. Donnellv, |r.. USAF. Retired IBA. Ollerbein College: MPA. George Wash­ ington U niversity). ivas com m ander in chief. United States Air Forces in Europe, and commander. Allied Air Forces Central Lt Col Price T. Bingham (USAFA) is the Europe. Kamstein AB. Germanv. A com- chief of the Airpower Doctrine Division. mand pilol ivith more than 8 .0(10 flying Airpower Research Institute. Center for Aer- hours in 38 differenl aircraft. he has also ospace Doctrine. Research, and Education. served as a iet pilot instructor and assistant Maxwell AFB. Alabama. Prcviouslv he operations officer at Lowrv AFB. Colo.; aide- served in the Doctrine and Concepts Divi­ de-cemp Io the commander. Air Training sion. HQ USAF He has flown fighlers in Command. Randolph AFB. Texas: at Head- TAC. USAFE. and Soulheast Asia. He also quarters USAF as special assistant Io the served asa fighterand tanker dutvcontroller deputy chief of staff for plans and opera­ in the MACV USSAG tactical air control tions. deputy director of plans and policy. Ll Col William P. Stroud III (USAFA; MPA, center He was a frequent contrihutor to the and deputy director of plans in lhe office of University of Oklahomaj is chief, Diplo- Air University Hevieiv.

87 Alan L. Gropman (PhD, Tufts Universitv) is a principal analyst lor the SYSCON Corpo­ ration. Washington. D.C. Dr Gropman re- tired as an Air Force colonel wilh twenty- Warren A.Trest IBS. Universitv ofSouthern seven ycarsof commissioned Service. He has Mississippi) is sênior hislorian

Air Force Chlef of Staff Gen Larrv D. Welcli

Commander, Air llni' Lt Gen Truman Spa

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrlne, Research, and Education Brig Gen )ohn C. Frver. Jr.

Professional Staff

Editor Col Keith W. Geiger

Assodate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland

Contrlbuting Personnel Hugh O. Richardson. Associate Editor John A. Westcott. Art Director and Production Manager Steven C. Garst, Ari Editor and Illustrator

Address inanuscripts tu Editur, Airpower /ournal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, Alubama 3131 12-5532. lournal lelwphone listings aro A U TO V O N 875- 5322 and comniert.ial 205-293-5322. Manuscripts should be typed, double-spaoed, and submitled in duplícato. Aulbors should enclose a short bio- graphical sketcb indicating current and previous assigmnents, academk and professional rnililary education, and nther particulars. Printed by Government Printing Office. Por sale by the Superintendent ol Documents, US Govern­ ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2. ISSN: 0002- 2594. w SPECIAL FOURTH CLASS MAIL /imrvnrui CALCULATED POSTAGE JOURNAL PERMIT G-1 USAF- ECI MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112 GUNTER AFB. AL 36118 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300 RETURN POSTAGE GUARANTEED

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