IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019 50 Nationalism, Populism and Sovereignism Keys sense Europe:peoplesriseup.” and bankers” undertheslogan“Towards acommon The newalliancerejected“bureaucrats,do-gooders context oftheEuropeanelections26May2019. separating progressives from nationalists.” https://en-marche/articles/discours/deuxieme-discours-Macron-congres 2 1 all thesovereigntistandEurosceptic of PeoplesandNations,” intendedtobringtogether vini announcedthecreationof“EuropeanAlliance On 5April2019,ItalianInteriorMinisterMatteoSal- Administration, Politics andSociety(CERAPS), Lille Researcher attheCentreforEuropeanResearch on Lecturer inPolitical Science Cécile Leconte Movements Populist and Europe Nationalism, Populism and Sovereignism. Return The of the Strong Men 7 6 5 4 3 zation basedontheopposition,expressedinmoral “populism” referstoatypeofdiscourse andmobili- egory firstcoinedinthefieldofpolitics,academia, of aphenomenon,namely, “populism.” Agenericcat- Salvini’s remarks, they, too, illustrate the importance side andEuropeanist “progressives” ontheother. ing oneyearearlier,“demagogic” “nationalists” onone words ofFrenchPresidentEmmanuelMacronspeak seems toforeshadowavoteprimarilybetween,inthe European issue illustrates thepotentiallydestabilizingimpactof ofamuchmorecomplexreality,cation itnevertheless a politicalstrategyandconsiderableoversimplifi- Whilst thatframingoftheEuropeanelectionsisboth press this hostility in speakable terms. speakable in ex to them allows hostility this Europe) press intergovernmental astrictly advocating doctrine (the sovereignism to Adherence peoples. of of union and integration of societies alogic towards hostility aprincipled in rooted is EU the towards position their eurozone, the or EU the leaving advocate itly, “Patriotic Europeans against Islamization of the West,” an Islamophobic organization one of whose slogans is: “We are the people.” people.” the are “We is: slogans whose of one organization Islamophobic an West,” the of quotes. Islamization in placed against be will Europeans adjective the “Patriotic article, this of purposes the for serve, can “populist” aparty labelling that ends political the of light In EU. the by embodied Europe institutional the of sense the in understood narrowly is here “Europe” one the is today Europe crossing border real 2018: 9 July “The of gathering congressional special the at Parliament, addressing was He Cited explic not do or not, do etc.) (AfD), Germany for Alternative (RN), Rally National French the League, (Italy’s parties these of most Although note). 2019 (editor’s April in written was article This in “Européennes: M. Salvini lance un appel pour une alliance des souverainistes,” L’Express, 19. 8 April souverainistes,” des alliance une pour appel un lance Salvini M. “Européennes: in 1 5 for national party systems. As for Mr fornationalpartysystems.AsMr 3 This announcement Thisannouncement 2 forces in the forcesinthe 4 -

organizations (e.g.Pegida movement (on thefarright,onanti-capitalistleft), lump together,underasinglelabel,politicalforces is stronglydisqualifyingandsometimesusedto dynamics, dependingonthecontext(especially, the European populismshaveverydifferenttimelinesand actually quiteheterogeneous. in theirsharedrejectionof“elites” andtheEUbutare in France)thatmightatfirstglanceseemtobeunited southern Europe,the“giletsjaunes,” or“yellowvests,” movements (the“indignados,” or“indignantones,” in etc.). Consequently, inEurope,theterm“populist” etc.). that operatebymeansofexclusion(ofminorities,elites, sociated withanti-democraticformsofmobilization political game,inEuropepopulismismostoftenas- citating populationsthathavebeendominatedinthe also refer to a means of mobilization aimed at resus- and peoples. Unlike in Latin America, where it can feeding offthedirectrelationshipbetweenleaders termediate bodies as just another parasitic element sive language and behaviour, and the rejection of in- of authoritarian leaders, the cultivation of transgres- to encompasstheelectionormaintenanceinpower Across theworld,phenomenonasawholeseems leader aloneclaimstobeablespeak. posedly homogeneouspeople,forwhomthepopulist lectual, financial, etc.) and an inherently virtuous, sup- terms, betweenallegedlycorruptelites(political,intel- 7 in Germany) and social inGermany)andsocial . 6 - - resentation in the French national parliament from 1988 to 2012. to 1988 from parliament national French the in resentation 10 10 etc.) orthefarright(theGermanAfD,CzechSPD, (We Can)inSpain,Aufstehen parties, whether on the anti-capitalist left (Podemos “populist” per se, can at least be considered protest ulist” partiesandthecreationofnewonesthat,ifnot the continent,bybothrevitalizationofexisting“pop- one millionrefugees)havebeenaccompanied,across 2015, inGermany, withtheacceptance of morethan tries (apressurethat culminated, inthesummerof creased migratorypressurefacedbyseveralEUcoun- to weakentheeurozonein2010,and,finally, thein- financial crisis,thesovereigndebtcrisisthatbegan However,the2008economicand munist Europe). different pathsfollowedbyWestern andpost-Com- 9 8 London: Verso, 2013, p. 199-142. two typesoffactorsrelatedtotheexistencepop- since theearly1990s,generallybeenattributedto At thegloballevel,emergenceofpopulismhas, Issues European Depoliticizing of aStrategy of Limits The Demand: Political and Technocratic Governance Between against mainstreampro-Europeanpoliticalforces. a transnationaldividethatpitssovereigntistpopulists witnessing anoverallrepositioningofthelatteraround helped todeeplytransformnationalparties,wearenot tion, overthelastthirtyyears,ofEuropeanissueshas litical systems.Nevertheless,althoughthepoliticiza- zations throughitseffectsonnationalsocietiesandpo- it involvesindirectlyfanstheflamesofpopulistmobili- weakly parliamentaryprocess,thedeepintegrationthat principle of popular legitimacy in favour of an elitist, “risk” ofpopulism.However,becauseitbypassesthe nity mayoriginallyhavebeencreatedtostaveoffthe of theconstructionEurope.TheEuropeanCommu- temporality andsetofdynamicsspecifictothecontext the aforementionedworldwidetrend,alsofallwithina to whatextentdoEuropeanpopulisms,whilstpartof Beyond thetimelineofthis“multi-crisis,” thequestionis Cinque Stelle,orFive-Star,movementinItaly). blur thedistinctionbetweenleftandright(e.g. Thereareevensomeparties thatdeliberately etc.). See: Svoboda One notable example is the French RN, which has been continuously represented in the European Parliament since 1984, but had no rep no had but 1984, since Parliament European the in represented continuously been has which RN, French the is example notable One

M ou ap ff e ř , ímá demokracie C. C. L’illusion du consensus : Freedom and Direct Democracy. (Stand Up)inGermany, . Paris: Albin Michel, 2014; and Michel, Albin Paris: 8

successfully, inthenationalelectoral arena. whichtheytheninvest,sometimes nancial, political), Parliament toaccumulateanumberofresources(fi- national levelbutarerepresentedintheEuropean parties thatlackparliamentaryrepresentationatthe have madeitpossibleforseveral“populist” political terms ofelectoralbehaviourandvotingmethods,they in national polls(legislativeorpresidentialelections), different rulesfromthosegoverningthe“front-line” because Europeanelectionsfunctionaccordingto number of resources number topolitical accumulate parties a forit possible several “populist” voting methods, they have made termsIn of electoral behaviour and some ing ofintermediatebodies.Botharetrendsinwhich tributes totheerosionofpoliticsorevenweaken- practice” backedbytechnocraticlegitimacy, itcon- thechoices made in the name of a “best depoliticizing litical) causedbyglobalization.Atthesametime, redistribution ofresources(economic,financial,po- impacts bothfactors.Foronething,itexacerbatesthe However, inmanyways,theconstructionofEurope monopoly onrepresentingthevoiceofpeople. a popularandcharismaticleaderclaimingtohave san, highlypersonalized,andcentredonthefigureof establishment of lasting organizations, usually parti- alternatives. Second,populistmobilizationsentailthe longer representingtwoclearlyidentifiablecompeting parties, whichareregardedasallthesameandno dissatisfaction withthepoliticalofferofmainstream and growing globalization (economic, cultural), ties), cline ofthegreatmobilizingideologies,classidenti- option. These include the postmodern condition (de or situationsfuelthedemandfora“populist” political ulist “demand” and“supply.” First,anumber of trends M ai r 9 , Ruling the void: The hollowing of Western democracy Western of hollowing The void: the Ruling P. see the main causes of populism. For another, seethemaincausesofpopulism.Foranother, 10

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IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019 51 Nationalism, Populism and Sovereignism Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019 52 Nationalism, Populism and Sovereignism Keys rights. politicized subjects,suchasimmigrationorminority closely correlated withtheirpositionsonhighly ly tions ontheconstructionofEuropeareincreasing- issue. Second,politicalparties’ andpeople’sposi- States, makingitdifficultnottomakeanelection ly affecttheredistributivelogicwithinitsMember EU becameanorganizationwhosedecisionsdirect- nomic andMonetaryUnionintheearly1990s, the three trends. First, with the establishment of the Eco- egy ofdepoliticizationwasgraduallydefeatedby fraining frommakingthemelectionissues, exacerbating differences amongst their voters) by re European issues(whichcauseriftswithinthemwhilst themselves fromthepotentiallycorrosiveeffectsof Kingdom) mainstreampartiesmanagedtoprotect for severaldecades(withtheexceptionofUnited thirty years,aspoliticalandelectionissues.Although selves havegraduallybeenreclassified,overthelast the morepowerfulbecauseEuropeanissuesthem- struction of Europe on national party systems is all In thisregard,thedestabilizingimpactofcon- 14 13 12 11 British Journal 1-23, 2008. p. of Political 39, Science, No. main goal is to get their country out of the EU, from tion is also embraced by single-issue parties, whose sovereign debtcrisisintheeurozone.Thispoliticiza- the CDUandliberalFDPparty, inresponsetothe AfD, createdin2013,mostlybyformermembersof following asplitwiththeFrenchUMP, orGermany’s which emergedin2008 France (StandUpFrance), clude, forexample,thesovereigntistpartyDebout in themainstreamparties.Suchformationswould- ropean “populist” formationsresultingfromschisms particularly trueofthesovereigntistorevenanti-Eu- issues, mostofteninanilliberalway. Thishasbeen political partieshavesoughttopoliticizeEuropean It isthusinthenameofpeoplethatanumber course thatabsolutizesthelatter. devoid ofpeople,itisthemaintargetatypedis- solidarity would be practiced. As an “empty place” istence ofaEuropeanpeopleinwhosenamethat theEUcannotbasethatchangeonex- issues), lective solidarity(onfinancial,migratoryandenergy ultimately entailsredrawingtheboundaries of col- inar paper, 1999. 1999. paper, inar M B See: See: In the sense that the latter would favour either maintaining the institutional status quo within the EU or deepening the integration dynamic. dynamic. integration the deepening or EU the within quo status institutional the maintaining either favour would latter the that sense the In a ai r r tolini , H P. “The limited impact of European integration on national party systems.” West European Politics systems.” party national on integration European of impact P. limited “The 12 oo Third,ifdeepeningthelogicofintegration , gh The consequences S. of European integration for national political representation e , L. and and L. M a r ks , G., “A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus.” 11 thisstrat- la - lini pean elections,thepoliticalscientistStefanoBarto- Twenty yearsbeforeMacron’s framingoftheEuro- Divide? vs “Europeanists” “Populists” the around Alignments of Towards aRepositioning mobilizations underlyingdynamics populist construction exacerbates the tensionThe of Europe’s at the heart and, ontheother,politicalforcesthathereferred one hand, globally pro-European mainstream parties at theEUlevelaroundanoppositionbetween,on of political alignments within the Member States and against mainstream“Europeanist” parties. shuffling ofalignmentspittingEuroscepticpopulists nas hasnotled,initscurrentstate,toageneralre- cization ofEuropeanissuesinnationalelectoralare- the Member States. Nevertheless, the gradual politi- es (betweenemployees,betweenterritories)within far as it strongly impacts the distribution of resourc- an integrationprocessthatiseminentlypolitical,inso- tivates theillusionofbeingapolitical,evenasitdrives dominantly technocraticformofgovernmentthatcul- populist mobilizations,namely, theexistenceofapre- construction exacerbatesthedynamicsunderlying As wehaveseen,thetensionatheartofEurope’s erenda onEuropeanissues. parties’ voters,inparticularbycallingforregularref- democracy isfunctioningamongstthemainstream nevertheless give voice to a dissatisfaction with how they immigration andculturalsocietalpluralism), tion of theEU goes hand in handwith rejection of pean issuesinanessentiallyilliberalway(here,rejec- these partiescontributetothepoliticizationofEuro Although for Democracy (FvD) (founded in 2016). the BritishUKIP(createdin1993)toDutchForum 14 outlinedthescenarioofaglobalrepositioning . Florence: European University Institute, sem , vol. 23, p. 27-51, p. 23, , vol. 2000. 13

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policy, orLa stehen party, whichfavours arestrictivemigratory since 2018,hashadtocompetewiththenewAuf- case of Die nevertheless affected by migratory issues.That is the left doesnotsharethefarright’sxenophobia,itis ing theUnion.Likewise,althoughanti-capitalist pean treaties,” albeitwithoutexplicitly advocatingleav- liance callfor“castingofftheshacklesofEuro left comprising the “Now, the people!” the EUandeuro,partiesonanti-capitalist abandoned theirprincipledandexplicitoppositionto Hungary (Jobbik) party have, for electoral reasons, RN, theAustrianFPÖorMovementforaBetter certain ambiguityinthisregard.Thus,whilsttheFrench membership onprinciple,theynevertheless retain a most ofthepartiesconcernednolongerobjecttoEU cially trueoftheirrelationshipwiththeEU.Although the farrightdoseemtobeemerging.Thisisespe- of convergencebetweentheanti-capitalistleftand In termsoftheirpositions,atfirstglance,somepoints ly tobeovercome. ences between their constituencies that are unlike- these political“families” andtheexistenceofdiffer- rently impossibleduetothedivisionswithineachof with far-right“populists,” sucharealignmentiscur- gree ofconvergence,onalimitednumberissues, in Europe’santi-capitalistleftmightpointtoade- ever, aswewillsee,whilstcertainevolutionswith- How- position ontheleftisclearlyopentodebate). Cinque the lition governmentincludingboththeLeagueand the EUand“elites,” inthemodelofItaliancoa- political “families,” at least intheirsharedhatredof anists” wouldthusbringtogetherthevotersofboth on the struggle between “populists” and “Europe- right. Aglobalrepositioningofalignmentsbased far spectrum, namely, theanti-capitalistleftand actually situatedatoppositeendsofthepolitical seem similarintheiroppositiontotheEUbutare sible to(wrongly)equateforcesthatatfirstglance As noted,theuseofterm“populist” makesitpos- has actuallycomeofthisrepositioning? alternatives tothecurrentEUanditspolicies.What to as “anti-establishment” at the time, advocating 17 17 16 15 European United Left: group encompassing the parties on the anti-capitalist left. anti-capitalist the on parties the encompassing group Left: United European Europe of Nations and Freedom: the group encompassing far-right parties. Namely, Podemos, La France Insoumise (LFI), Portugal’s Bloco de Esquerda and the Nordic socialist left parties. left socialist Nordic the and Esquerda de Bloco Portugal’s (LFI), Insoumise France La Podemos, Namely, Linke (the Left Party) in Germany, which, Stelle movement(althoughthelatter’s France Insoumise (France Unbowedor 15 electoral al- - being foundinsimilarvotesbytheENF port forsomeofVladimirPutin’sactionssometimes geopolitical issueofEU-Russiarelations,withsup- capitalist leftandthefarrightoverlaponcrucial whichisdividedontheissue.Finally, the anti- LFI), nexation of Crimea). nexation ofCrimea). of thesanctionsadoptedbyEUfollowingan- groups intheEuropeanParliament(e.g.onissue of the political spectrum actually situated at opposite ends their opposition to the EU but are that at glance seem similar first in makes to it possible equate forces use ofThe the term “populist” or the German AfD). or theGermanAfD). more neo-liberalformationssuch astheAustrianFPÖ pousing moreprotectionistviewsthaneconomically be totherestofworld(withFrenchRNes- especially, onhowopenthecommon marketshould found differencesonsocio-economicissuesand, Itisfurtherhinderedbypro- ed withtheFrenchRN). for example,wantstoavoidanyriskofbeingequat- that setsomepartiesagainstothers(thePolish PiS, amongst otherthings,bythedemarcationstrategies culturalism and societal liberalism, is compromised, right parties,unitedbyasharedrejectionofmulti- bringing togethernationalistconservative and far- ilarly, theestablishmentofasovereigntistalliance tinues toraisethepossibilityofleavingEU.Sim- position oftheLFI,which,unlikeitspartners,con- weight Die the people!” suffersfromtheabsenceofheavy- remains weak.Withintheanti-capitalistleft,“Now, whose abilitytotransnationalizetheiractionthus versity ofpositionswithineachthese“families,” of theEUismadeunlikely, first,bytheextremedi- ends ofnationalpoliticalspacesinasharedhatred that wouldbringtogether“populists” fromopposite Nevertheless, thescenarioofaglobalrepositioning Linke party, aswellfromtheunique 16 andEUL 17

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019 53 Nationalism, Populism and Sovereignism Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019 54 Nationalism, Populism and Sovereignism Keys a candidate’s commitment to greater cooperation between EU countries would increase their likelihood of voting for him or her, unlike AfD AfD unlike her, ( or him voters for voting of likelihood their increase would countries EU between cooperation greater to commitment a candidate’s Enquête January 2000. tween conservativeandfar-rightforcesatboththe fied bytheexistenceofcoalitionsoragreementsbe- ni andViktorOrbánon28August2018,isexempli- eloquently symbolizedbythemeetingbetweenSalvi- servative right,thesovereigntistrightandfar mer, theblurringofdistinctionbetweencon- Withinthefor- the PartyofEuropeanSocialists(PES). ied mainlybytheEuropeanPeople’sParty(EPP) and stream partieswithinthelargepartyfamiliesembod- ring oftheboundarybetween“populism” andmain- the author’sview, amoreseriousriskliesintheblur- of politicaldiscoursethanempiricalobservation,in threat theyposetotheEU’ssurvival,ismoreamatter the same “populist” label, due to the allegedly similar If lumpingthefarrightandanti-capitalistleftunder rope onprinciple. part, supportingtheideaofconstructionEu- ralism, concernedbyxenophobiaand,forthemost with theformerbeingmostlyinfavourofreligiousplu- and evenmembershipintheEUeurozone, on theissuesofmigration,relationshipwithIslam far righthavequiteclearlydistinguishablepositions perpower, thevotersofanti-capitalistleftand balization andacertainhostilitytowardstheUSsu- sentative democracy, fearsregardingeconomicglo- shared dissatisfactionwiththefunctioningofrepre- LFI andDie German AfD,ononehand,andthoseoftheFrench in a comparison of the voters of the French RN and different worldviews.Thiscanbeseen,forexample, and scepticismtowardstheEUcoexistwithvastly left showsthatthecommonhostilitytowards“elites” between votersofthefarrightandanti-capitalist Furthermore, theexistenceofprofounddifferences 19 18 M Some 89% of LFI voters say that they are broadly supportive of the European construction project versus 40% of RN voters (CEVIPOF, (CEVIPOF, voters RN of 40% versus project construction European the of supportive broadly are they that say voters LFI of 89% Some ai r , Populismusbarometer Populist democracy, party democracy and the Blair paradox Blair the and democracy party democracy, Populist P. électorale Linke, ontheother:otherthanadeep française 2019 ; 18 , Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin und Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 15). p. Stiftung, Bertelsmann und Berlin 2018 , Wissenschaftszentrum https//sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/rapport_ipsos_fevrier_2019 . Florence: European University Institute, Workshop on populism, 14-15 populism, on Workshop Institute, University European . Florence: ship), asthepopulismof “extremes.” ship), correlated withscepticismregardingEUmember- seen inmanyEUcountries(anattitudeitselfstrongly functioning ofrepresentativedemocracy, ascanbe cial toall,isjustaslikelyfueldissatisfactionwiththe tice” thatwassupposedlyneutralandequallybenefi- vide, viewedasoutdated,inthenameofa“bestprac- intermediary bodiesanddismissingtheleft/rightdi- vour ofahighlypersonalizedleadership,disregarding which short-circuited intra-partisan democracy in fa- ernment offormerBritishPrimeMinisterTony Blair, scientist Peter Mair perfectly “euro-compatible” populism that the political capitalist-left “populism.” Fromthispointofview, the than in the inaccurate equating of far-right and anti- cal familiesoftheso-calledmainstreamparties,rather The populist“risk” thusliesprimarilywithinthepoliti- state ofBurgenlandsince2015. tria’s SPÖ,anFPÖcoalitionpartnerintheAustrian 2006 to2010,thenagainfrom20162018,orAus- Slovak National Party (SNS) coalition partner from Prime MinisterRobertFico’sSMER-SD,whichwasa nationalist orfar-rightparties,beittheformerSlovak that have entered into governmental alliances with the PES, it has not sanctioned the member parties exercise ofsovereigntyattheEuropeanlevel.Asfor ited byeithertheconstitutionalcourtsorshared will, embodiedsolelybymajorityrule,cannotbelim- (PiS) right-wing governments, for whom the people’s certain conservative(FIDESZ)and/orsovereigntist Itisfurtherillustratedbytheauthoritariandriftof sia). between thePeople’sParty(PP)andVox inAndalu- tion inAustria)andtheregionallevel(e.g.agreement national level(e.g.theÖVP/FPÖgovernmentcoali- Die Germany, In ). 19 saw at workin the mode of gov- Linke voters consider that that consider voters Linke