Operation Paperclip and the Contrasting Fates of Wernher Von Braun and Arthur Rudolph

Home , Arthur Rudolph, Eberhard Rees, Eli Rosenbaum, Hanna Reitsch, Heinz Haber, Hermann Oberth

VEIL OF PROTECTION: OPERATION PAPERCLIP AND THE CONTRASTING FATES OF WERNHER VON BRAUN AND ARTHUR RUDOLPH

Allison Eldridge-Nelson

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

December 2017

Committee:

Walter Grunden, Advisor

Benjamin Greene

Allison Eldridge-Nelson

Walter Grunden, Advisor

Toward the end of World War II, the United States government initiated

Operation Paperclip which set out to secretly secure the top rocket scientists from Nazi

Germany. To accomplish this, officials manipulated policy procedures, covered their tracks, and years later misrepresented their knowledge of the project’s details. The resulting problematic immigration policy enabled the government to allow former Nazi scientists to travel to the U.S. and be employed by the military well ahead of executive approval, and amidst strong dissent.

This thesis will take these arguments a step further by contextualizing it within two personal narratives of participants of Operation Paperclip.

The two examined scientists, Wernher von Braun and his colleague Arthur L. Rudolph, became highly regarded in their field and were bestowed with public praise, titles, and awards, yet their fates were drastically different. As this thesis tracks the constantly shifting immigration policy that was shaped by America’s national interests in the immediate post-WWII era, it will explain the unchecked and unstable procedures that resulted in skewed perceptions of von Braun and Rudolph. Although von Braun worked alongside Rudolph, and held powerful positions of authority, his prominence and importance to the U.S. space program allowed for his Nazi past to be rehabilitated. Moreover, while he remained alive this protection also extended to those close to him, including Rudolph. When he passed, however, this veil of protection was lifted, exposing his colleagues to a different fate.

This thesis does not question the contributions that von Braun and Rudolph made to the

U.S. space program and development of NASA. Instead, it calls to question how much officials manipulated policy to grant von Braun, and subsequently Rudolph and his team, wide ranging iv liberties after escorting them out of Nazi Germany. This immigration policy is what first began the crafting of von Braun’s “veil of protection,” and the mindset to let it continue. The disjointed immigration policy, formed by the circumstances and without a timely evaluation, set the guidelines for future congruent policy procedures until a monumental shift in the sociopolitical environment made it possible to revisit this structure.

To my family and my husband, Jacob Nelson. Thank you for your wonderful support and endless patience.

vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project was influenced by so many knowledgeable and hard-working individuals. It really began when I first worked under Dr. Walter Grunden’s guidance on my undergraduate senior capstone thesis. The intimidation of Dr. Grunden’s intelligence and high standards turned to determination to produce a paper that I was proud of. When we had our first graduate thesis meeting that same determination was still there, and I was in for an extremely valuable and demanding experience. I am indebted to Dr. Grunden, for the numerous two-hour long conversations we had during which I learned more about policy history, but also how to become a better researcher, writer, and advocate for my own work. I am so thankful for the wealth of knowledge he shared with me, for pushing me, and expecting my personal best. It was evident that Dr. Grunden had my future endeavors in mind, not just the end of this thesis.

I am also very grateful to have worked with Dr. Benjamin Greene. His career background brought a lot to the table, which was very beneficial to my research. Dr. Greene was a calm presence during the thesis process, and this is a trait that I hope to master. I appreciated not only our conversations and Dr. Greene’s advice, but also the interesting and unique resources that I was only able to access because of his graciousness.

I would also like to thank the faculty in the history department for their kindness and interest in my success. At the close of my graduate school career I left with a mission to continue strengthening my writing voice, and to be confident in my research skills. I was also blessed to enter the program with a unique and supportive cohort. Thank you to each of my colleagues, for your encouragement, listening ear, and laughs. I want to especially thank Lindsey Bauman and

Michael Horton. We formed a small study group that began as a way to maintain accountability for assignments, and it grew into supportive and long-lasting friendships. Michael and Lindsey vii have accomplished amazing feats already, and I am honored to walk alongside them as they continue to reach new achievements.

I want to thank my family for their unwavering support and confidence in my abilities, which kept me steady amidst the waves of graduate school. I would also like to thank my husband for his love, encouragement, and level-headedness, without you I would have folded long ago. I was blessed to be surrounded by so many wise and kind individuals, and at the top of this list is my husband, family, and friends who never turned me away when I wanted to talk for hours about history.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 1

Literature Review ...... 5

Data Mining Results ...... 13

CHAPTER II. “NOMINAL PARTICIPANTS:” VON BRAUN AND RUDOLPH DURING

THE WAR YEARS ...... 17

Von Braun ...... 17

Rudolph ...... 32

Colleagues to Confidants and Operation Paperclip Initiation ...... 27

Operation Paperclip ...... 36

CHAPTER III. OPERATION PAPERCLIP: A DISJOINTED POLICY…………………… 39

U.S. Science Policy During the Immediate Post-War Era…………………………… 40

Expendable Values …………………………………………………………………... 48

A Second Take on Paperclip’s Immigration Policy ...... 52

Terminiation? ...... 57

CHAPTER IV. HOW TO SUCCESSFULLY BECOME AN AMERICAN ...... 60

Disney Darling: Von Braun’s Post-War Career ...... 60

The [Not] So Mad Scientist: Portrayals in American Popular Culture ...... 66

“Eight Lost Years:” The Post-Sputnik Push for Space Exploration ...... 68

The Debate Over Von Braun’s Legacy ...... 71

The Road to Becoming a Nazi War Criminal: Rudolph’s Post-War Career ...... 72

The Investigation ...... 75 vii

CHAPTER V. OPERATION PAPERCLIP: A CONTROVERSIAL MISSION AND

FLAWED IMMIGRATION POLICY ...... 82

Nazi Hunting Resurgence ...... 84

The State Department Finally Responds ...... 95

Conclusion and Application ...... 97

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 103

CHPATER I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Toward the end of WWII, the United States government set out to secretly secure the top rocket scientists from Nazi Germany. To accomplish this, officials manipulated policy procedures, covered their tracks, and years later misrepresented their knowledge of the project’s details. What remained was a rushed and contingent-based immigration policy that initiated a slew of foreign relations and bureaucratic issues for decades to come. Amidst strong dissent, this problematic policy enabled the government to allow former Nazi scientists to immigrate to the

U.S. and be employed by the military well ahead of executive approval. This thesis will take these arguments a step further by contextualizing it within two personal narratives of participants of the operation. Despite these two stories being similarly influenced by this immigration policy, their endings could not have been more different.

On 1 October 1945, the War Department’s Bureau of Public Relations issued an internal memorandum for immediate release, entitled: “Outstanding German Scientists Being Brought To

U.S.”1 Operation Paperclip, a program supervised by the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, assembled the top scientists and technicians from Germany, and granted them employment in the

U.S. pending background investigations. This program gathered information of advanced technology to ensure America’s victory over the Japanese, and then was also used to maintain the lead over the Soviets in a race for coveted scientific expertise. At first, the German scientists were brought into the U.S. with the intention of granting only a temporary stay. These individuals, who were found absent of previous association with the German National Socialist

1 National Archives- College Park, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, 1860-1952, File Unit: Public Relations Bureau, War Department, “Outstanding German Scientists Being Brought To U.S.,” 1 October 1945, NACP ID: 2988852, RG 165.

Party, were allowed to remain in the country, contingent upon their loyalty to the U.S. and the value of their work. Two of these scientists, the renowned Wernher von Braun and his colleague

Arthur L. Rudolph, became highly regarded in their field and were bestowed with public praise, titles, and awards. Despite both men being very influential in the German V-2 and American

Saturn V moon rocket programs, von Braun lived out his life maintaining a respected reputation in the U.S, while Rudolph, after von Braun’s passing, experienced a reinvestigation into his Nazi past and expulsion from America. Von Braun’s pivotal role in the U.S. space program provided protection, created by expertise and publicity, for those in his inner circle, and specifically for

Rudolph. This “veil of protection” that von Braun transferred to his close colleagues elevated their importance to the rocket program, thus guarding them from Justice Department examinations. Once von Braun passed, this veil of protection lifted, which left the German experts susceptible to the government’s investigations of alleged Nazi war criminals living in the

United States.

A comparative history of these two scientists reveals the innumerable similarities between their private lives and careers, extending from Germany to the United States. Beginning in the mid-1970s, and culminating in 1980, an intern at the Office of Special Investigations of the

Department of Justice (OSI), Eli Rosenbaum, investigated Rudolph’s past. Rosenbaum’s father, who was a former Army Intelligence Officer, shared with him that he was sent to Dachau concentration camp during the war. This was Rosenbaum’s inspiration to begin investigations into former Nazi war criminals. His father never talked about his internment again, but this single emotional instance spurred Rosenbaum on for years to come. During his year-long internship, Rosenbaum examined several texts on concentration camp war crimes and U.S. government programs involving German scientists. His attention was drawn to an excerpt from a

3 book illustrating slave laborers transporting rocket parts. The statement described Rudolph as being perturbed by having to leave a New Year’s Eve party to oversee the moving of these rocket parts. Rosenbaum was aware that the Geneva Convention “forbids having prisoners of war work on munitions.”2 It took time for Rosenbaum to collect evidence against Rudolph, but once he did, a further inquiry of the scientist’s past was officially launched. Rosenbaum called the Rudolph case, “an extraordinarily complicated evidentiary jigsaw puzzle.”3 After reexamining past interrogations and additional interviews, the OSI concluded that Rudolph should be denaturalized. Rudolph agreed to renounce his citizenship and leave the U.S. to avoid prosecution.4 He returned to Germany in 1984, speaking out against the charges that were brought against him by the OSI.

As stated in the Prosecution Memorandum of Rudolph’s case, the OSI “did not want to give Rudolph a ‘triable issue’ as to whether the government was aware, prior to his entry, of his wartime activities.”5 The OSI’s investigation stopped short. Their revelation of having concealed information concerning scientists involved in Operation Paperclip should have been enough to reopen the cases of numerous individuals. But only Rudolph was single out. This thesis challenges the accepted narrative: that von Braun’s role in the Third Reich was not severe enough to consider, which allowed for his praiseworthy public image to take center stage. Von

Braun was always a controversial figure, but the press played a key role in rehabilitating the scientist’s image after he entered the U.S. This thesis examines more closely the correlating facts between the lives and actions of Rudolph and von Braun in order to illustrate how this “veil of

2 Judy Feigin, The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust, ed. Mark M. Richard (Washington: United States Department of Justice, 2008), 333. 3 Julia M. Klein, “In Pursuit of Justice,” The Pennsylvania Gazette, 22 February 2017, accessed 3 March 2017, http://thepenngazette.com/in-pursuit-of-justice/. 4 Feigin, ed. Richard, Striving for Accountability, 335. 5 Ibid., 339.

4 protection” was initially created, how it was preserved, and what led to its inevitable demise.

Also, their stark differences in personality and outward presence help to demonstrate that von

Braun carried Rudolph to safety, but eventually he was no longer able to provide protection.

This thesis tracks von Braun and Rudolph’s experiences and the literature about

Operation Paperclip chronologically. Exceptions to this are found in segments that draw from previously mentioned facts and events to illustrate how the scientists’ lives and the operation’s immigration policy changed during the decades following its initiation. The first chapter provides a brief introduction of the broader narrative concerning Operation Paperclip and the investigation into Rudolph’s past. This chapter also presents a historiographical review of the topics discussed, as well as results from a concise data mining of the literature that explains how the passage of time has changed the way von Braun and Rudolph are written about. The second chapter moves to biographies of both scientists which show how their careers were influenced by different upbringings. This chapter also describes the beginning of von Braun and Rudolph’s close friendship and the beginning of their move to the U.S. via Operation Paperclip. Chapter 2 ends with the initiation of Paperclip, Chapter 3 continues by addressing the quickly constructed immigration policy that allowed for the German scientists to enter the United States. The third chapter will guide the reader through the policy process that U.S. military and government officials took to implement Paperclip and what was left out of that process, including a full evaluation.

Once the scientists were in America, their lives took very different paths. These differences will be addressed in Chapter 4. I will refer back to the men’s upbringings and Nazi ties to illustrate how von Braun’s past was whitewashed, while Rudolph’s protection could only last as long as von Braun’s. Chapter 5 continues the conversation about Rudolph’s investigation

5 and the broader context of U.S. foreign policy during the 1970s that allowed for a Nazi hunting resurgence. The final chapter will direct the argument back to the importance of the immigration policy procedures taken by U.S. officials in 1945, and how they were made to answer for those decisions 30 years later. This final section ends with a brief conclusion, and ties the arguments to discussions about the vetting that takes place in current immigration policy.

To conduct the research needed to make these assertions I visited the National Archives at College Park, and also utilized their online database. I examined the online databases of the

U.S. Congress, U.S. Embassy, NASA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security

Archives, and the Central Intelligence Agency. I also found newspaper articles to be exceptional in describing the reactions of the public to Paperclip and its participants. I also viewed microfilm transcripts and videos relating to the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials as well as original animations produced by Disney. Lastly, I visited the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in Ann

Arbor, Michigan where I focused my research on the Medal of Freedom files.

Literature Review

To begin a literature review of Paperclip it is crucial to address two of the earliest and most recognized experts on this subject: Linda Hunt and Clarence Lasby. Both authors have published groundbreaking works on Operation Paperclip, specifically arguing that the project’s immigration procedures were highly unethical. Hunt argues that Cold War imperatives dictated the State Department’s unethical involvement in Paperclip. She claims that this mindset led to

“deceiving and undercutting” fellow colleagues within the department and was only a portion of the “almost limitless means justified by the grand goal of containing communism.”6 Reaffirming

Hunt’s view, Lasby believes that Paperclip was constantly evolving, rather than a clear,

6 Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 110.

6 centralized decision. Author and professor of political science, John J. Carter also addresses

Paperclip’s initial policymaking process. In agreement with an early sub-argument of this thesis,

Carter writes that the decision to locate, immigrate, and employ former Nazis was not an executive ruling, but instead a messy conglomeration of ideas that was neither inherently rational nor strategically “unitary.”7

One of the most groundbreaking and well-researched sources among these is arguably

Hunt’s monograph, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project

Paperclip, 1945 to 1990. She contends that an ongoing transformation of Paperclip occurred to meet the national interests of the United States. Because of the evolving nature of Paperclip and the rocket program, the treatment of the scientists also transformed on an ad hoc basis.8 Hunt’s purpose of this article was to uncover the deceit and manipulation that occurred during

Paperclip’s implementation, specifically the changing of the scientists’ dossiers during entry into the United States. Utilizing some of the same resources as Hunt, this thesis instead focuses on the fact that von Braun continued to be portrayed in a positive public light even after he retired from working for the U.S. military in 1972. Rudolph, however, was only brought into the public sphere when called upon by his colleague and friend.

Somewhat both complementary but also contrary to Hunt’s claims are the arguments in

Unmasking Administrative Evil by authors Guy Adams and Danny Balfour, who blame the State

Department’s interference with the program for the messy policy process. However, both authors agree with Hunt and Lasby that Paperclip policy’s self-bred secrecy was a defense mechanism because officials did not want to confront a difficult evaluation of the policy. John Gimbel, in his

7 Clarence J. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (New York: Atheneum, 1971); John J. Carter, American Intelligence’s Employment of Former Nazis During the Early Cold War (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2009), 57-58. 8 Linda Hunt, “U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, no. 4 (April 1985): 16-24.

7 monograph Science, Technology, and Reparations, also suggests a very jumbled formation of

Paperclip policy that is evident in the resulting weak immigration legislation that followed.

Likewise, journalist Annie Jacobson, author of Operation Paperclip, argues that national security interests trumped morals in the forming of Paperclip policy.9

Operation Paperclip has been described as dramatic, secretive, and fascinating, but while extensive scholarship exists on Paperclip, a discussion of the specific policy course that this project underwent has not been examined in much detail. Certain authors, such as Bruce Smith, adopt an external perspective by exploring the foundations of science policy during the immediate post-WWII era. Smith, author of American Science Policy Since WWII, argues that science and technology policy has experienced three phases, the first being of the highest concern for this analysis. The initial phase, according to Smith, did not begin until after

Paperclip’s creation and lasted from 1950 to 1966 when a new structure for science policy in the

U.S. was implemented. This first phase represented a new relationship between society and the need for science, wherein, “Defense, space, and atomic energy issues dominated...”10 Smith goes on to describe the scientists’ role in policymaking at the time, arguing that “Judgments on the merit of scientists, the value of research proposals within a well-established field of basic research, and tactical questions regarding how projects are to be carried out are best left to scientists themselves.”11 Smith and Carter describe the environment during Paperclip as a

“perpetual crisis.”12 This thesis argues that an environment of “perpetual crisis” lasted and was

9 Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour, Unmasking Administrative Evil (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004); John Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). For detailed information on Gimbel’s thoughts concerning Paperclip and its subsequent statutes, see the section, “The Postwar Programs” in Gimbel’s monograph.; Annie Jacobson, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program That Brought Nazi Scientists to America (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2014). 10 Bruce Smith, American Science Policy Since WWII (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 3. 11 Ibid., 11. 12 Smith, American Science Policy, 11; Carter, American Intelligence’s Employment of Former Nazis, 58.

8 used well into the 1980s, which gave von Braun a platform to be the voice and face of rocket technology in the U.S. without the questioning of his merit. This all relates back to the overly fast paced and disconnected immigration policy that was set in 1945, and lasted throughout

Paperclip’s existence.

The last two chapters of this thesis follow von Braun and Rudolph’s lives in America and how they benefitted from the immigration policy that came with Paperclip in 1945. As a sub- argument of these two chapters, many authors have also argued in favor of a more thorough reexamination of the immigration of the scientists involved in Operation Paperclip, and specifically von Braun. Historian Tom Bower’s work is influenced by his personal stance that the prosecution of Nazi war criminals should not have a time limit. Bower is clearly displeased with the shortcomings of the U.S. government’s investigations, claiming that the scientists’ value took priority over the lack of integrity experienced during Paperclip.13 Michael J. Neufeld,

Senior Curator at the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, is another outspoken revisionist in this field. He has written numerous essays arguing that other scientists from Paperclip, specifically naming von Braun, are guilty of war crimes. In Operation Paperclip, Jacobson cites

Neufeld on multiple occasions and echoes his core arguments. Jacobson clearly depicts the circumstances in which von Braun attended meetings concerning the use of slave labor and vividly illustrates the limelight-friendly characteristics of von Braun that helped catapult him to immense popularity.14 This growing camp of revisionist scholars call for a more critical reexamination of the resources available on von Braun and other Paperclip participants. The last

13 Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1987). 14 Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (New York: The Free Press, 1995); Michael J. Neufeld, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War (New York: Vintage Books, 2007).

9 chapter of this thesis also argues that these resources were not handled properly, and frames this within the context of the disjointed immigration policy that was necessary for Paperclip’s initiation to occur before any other policy procedures.

The historiography on the luminary of Paperclip, von Braun, is heavy with glossy depictions of the scientist. In William Breuer’s, Race to the Moon: America’s Duel with the

Soviets, he describes young von Braun as “tall, sturdily built, and a handsome bachelor” with a

“well-developed sense of humor and a flashing smile that sent many feminine hearts aflutter.”15

The author writes with a compassionate tone when describing von Braun’s difficult first few hours in the United States. He also writes about U.S. newspapers that shamed von Braun for being a German who took an American’s job.16 In the fourth chapter von Braun’s relationship with the media will be explicated, and this relationship along with literature such as Breuer’s have worked in tandem to enrich von Braun’s image well beyond his retirement from NASA.

This thesis argues that shortly after von Braun’s retirement there was a Nazi hunting resurgence caused by a changing sociopolitical climate after the Vietnam War. Historian Zachary

Kaufman supplements this idea. He argues that the “Communist scare” and the overly dramatized Cold War environment diverted attention away from prosecuting war criminals, and it was only after 1968 that there was a shift in this mindset.17 U.S. government officials relied on the American public’s fear of a possible Soviet attack to extend their employment of former Nazi scientists, thus negating concerns about morality in policy formation and implementation.

Missing from much of the earlier literature on German rocketry were first-hand accounts of the slave labor at Dora-Nordhausen. Andre Sellier, a former Dora concentration camp prisoner

15 William B. Breuer, Race to the Moon: America’s Duel with the Soviets (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 9. 16 Ibid., 108, 122. 17 Zachary D. Kaufman, United States Law and Policy on Transitional Justice: Principles, Politics, and Pragmatics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

10 and accomplished historian, wrote an account of the concentration camp’s innerworkings. Part of this detailed narrative tells of Sellier’s day to day interactions with both Rudolph and von Braun, as well as his perception of them after the war. Sellier also discusses the fact that von Braun was a media darling in the United States. He argues that stories from von Braun’s Nazi past were hidden and manipulated to improve his image for the American public. Many of von Braun’s and

German Army Major-General Walter Dornberger’s own accounts were unable to be corroborated by any other witnesses which allowed the men to control the narratives of their own pasts.18

Sellier also writes on the interactions between von Braun and a French prisoner, Jean Michel, which has often been used to bolster von Braun’s reputation by illustrating that von Braun tried to help bring Michel out of the camp and into better conditions at the work site. Michel wrote his own memoir of his experiences at Dora that conflicted with the little information from von

Braun’s own accounts of his time at Mittelwerk.19 These documented experiences and the War

Crimes Trial transcripts guide the reader back to the moral component of this thesis as the essay explores how von Braun and Rudolph’s Nazi pasts were rehabilitated once they arrived in the

United States.

Despite the evidence against Rudolph, and the mounting evidence against von Braun, there are several scholars who remain orthodox in their opinions that neither man is a war criminal, including: Thomas Franklin, Michael White, Andrew Dunar, and Stephen Waring.

Franklin, author of An American in Exile: The Story of Arthur Rudolph, has written one of the few monographs on Rudolph, about whom the literature remains remarkably sparse. Franklin

18 Andre Sellier, A History of the Dora Camp: The Untold Story of the Nazi Slave Labor Camp That Secretly Manufactured V-2 Rockets (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 98. 19 See: Jean Michel with Louis Nucera, Dora: In the Hell of the Concentration Camp Where the Nazi Scientists Prepared for the Conquest of Space. which was published first in 1975, but only translated to English in 1979, two years after von Braun’s death.

11 argues that Rudolph’s case was handled incorrectly, and he uses personal correspondence and details of the scientist’s life to humanize Rudolph instead of criminalizing him.20 The only available academic review of Franklin’s biography is written by Holocaust denier, Robert H.

Countess. Countess’ review of An American in Exile included a live interview with Franklin in which Countess noted that all calls from viewers were positive, except for one “naïve” man who did not agree that Rudolph was treated unjustly by the U.S. government. In his review Countess recalled his time in Huntsville, including memories about his German girlfriend, to try and portray objectivity, but he clearly sympathizes with Rudolph. Countess, just as Franklin did, interviewed the Rudolphs at their home in Germany. He begins his apologist review of

Franklin’s book by stating that, the OSI “targeted an octogenarian with a bad heart and few resources.”21 Michael White, author, editor, and previous director of scientific studies at d’Overbroeck’s college, Oxford, presents a similarly structured argument, but in favor of von

Braun. White states that the moral criticism of von Braun is misplaced, and labels him a

“scientist first and a weapons designer second.”22 Like Franklin’s biography of Rudolph, White’s monograph reads as an apologia for von Braun, arguing that the scientist was doing his part to help his country win the war, just as any soldier would. White’s assertion, that von Braun had to make missiles in order to work in rocketry at all, is explored further in chapter 2 by analyzing the scientists’ early careers in Germany.

In direct opposition to Franklin, White, and Countess’ views is Alan Rosenbaum, a philosophy professor and author of numerous monographs on the Holocaust. Rosenbaum

20 “Biography of Wernher von Braun,” Marshall Space Flight Center, accessed 1 March 2016, http://history.msfc.nasa.gov/vonbraun/excerpts.html; Thomas Franklin, An American in Exile: The Story of Arthur Rudolph (Huntsville: Christopher Kaylor Company, 1987). 21 Robert H. Countess, review of An American in Exile: The Story of Arthur Rudolph, written by Thomas Franklin, The Journal of Historical Review 8, no. 2 (1988): 224-231. 22 Michael White, Acid Tongues and Tranquil Dreamers: Tales of Bitter Rivalry that Fueled the Advancement of Science and Technology (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 305.

12 published Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals a decade after Franklin’s biography on Rudolph was released. He calls the mission to locate and investigate these individuals an “urgent moral imperative” and that failure to do so violates “the values and principles that bring an ideal standard and meaning to our lives as morally autonomous social beings.”23 He places responsibility on those who are capable and have the means to execute such investigations, namely those in government. Rosenbaum, like Neufeld, also criticizes the often-employed excuses of lack of time and resources as well as the dying off of remaining suspects. He also states that for future use, these assertions are crucial to respecting the principles of justice.24 The present study will build upon the research conducted on Rudolph’s case, specifically to investigate why von Braun remained untouched by the U.S. government, even protected from investigation, though his life was in many ways comparable to those of his allegedly guilty colleagues.

Data Mining Results

Clearly, the literature written on von Braun excessively outnumbers that written about

Rudolph. Supplemental to this fact, the texts that include analyses of both scientists still illustrate the great difference between the focus on von Braun versus that of Rudolph. It is only in very select and mostly recent literature that von Braun is associated with Nazi war crimes. Straight from the belly of the beast a 1961 National Aeronautics and Space Administration published text, Aeronautics and Astronauts, von Braun is cited seven times to Rudolph’s zero. The majority of von Braun’s mentions are nods to his leadership of the rocket team from Germany and awards bestowed upon the scientist. In fellow scientist, Dieter K. Huzel’s autobiographical account, From Peenemünde to Canaveral, von Braun is cited 28 times, and Rudolph is only

23 Alan S. Rosenbaum, Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 1-2. 24 Ibid.

13 discussed once. It should also be noted that von Braun provided an introduction for Huzel’s book. Likewise, in von Braun and Frederick I. Ordway’s 1966 jointly authored text, History of

Rocketry and Space Travel, Rudolph is never mentioned, despite his years of close work with his colleague; interestingly, Dornberger is cited 11 times.

Moving into the early 1990s, Hunt’s Secret Agenda gives both scientists the same amount of ink, citing each 46 times. This was the first time such an occurrence had taken place, by putting both scientists in a negative light, rather than Rudolph painted as the sole criminal. That same year Rip Buckeley’s The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy was published, and was reminiscent of the earlier monographs that cultivated the gap between the two German scientists. In Buckeley’s monograph, von Braun is referred to 39 times, while

Rudolph is not mentioned at all. Similarly, in Blueprint for Space, a text partially edited by

Ordway, Rudolph is never mentioned while von Braun is discussed on 42 separate occasions.

The book also includes an entire chapter devoted to von Braun’s involvement with the Disney rocketry television programming and Collier’s articles. Perhaps one of the most obvious gaps is seen in 1993’s Race to the Moon by Breuer. Von Braun is mentioned 89 times to Rudolph’s one.

The Epilogue of this text is also a well-adorned paean to von Braun. Likewise, in Dennis

Piszkiewicz’s book, The Nazi Rocketeers: Dreams of Space and Crimes of War, published only two years after Race to the Moon, von Braun is mentioned 155 times, while Rudolph is only discussed on 18 occasions.

In Unmasking Administrative Evil, published in 1998, the authors begin to provide a more level framework for comparing the two German scientists. Von Braun is referred to 11 times, and Rudolph is mentioned on eight occasions. In Eric Lichtbau’s book, The Nazis Next

Door, he logically focuses his attention on war criminals comfortably living in American society.

Von Braun is more fairly mentioned 18 times, and Rudolph surpasses him, being discussed 34 times. The Nazis Next Door is still somewhat of an exoneration for von Braun. It should come as no surprise that two of the most balanced analyses available that include both von Braun and

Rudolph are written by Neufeld and Hunt. Both historians have committed much of their careers to revealing less desirable truths about von Braun’s German past, as well as others close to him.

And, even though Neufeld’s title carries von Braun’s name, he still discusses Rudolph on numerous occasions, documenting the well-known relationship between the two rocket experts.

Recent texts written about Operation Paperclip and rocketry in the U.S. lessen the gap a bit between the two scientists, but the separation is still clear. In Jacobson’s 2014 book, Operation

Paperclip, Rudolph is given a reasonable 34 mentions, but von Braun is still mentioned 64 times.

The gap only closes when the subject turns to the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, rather than focusing on praise of the German-American rocket experts.

These numbers suggest that in early Paperclip and rocketry historiography von Braun’s name carried with it a certain weight that did not decrease until only very recently. It is clear to see, in examining the literature chronologically, that von Braun’s popularity with the press began almost immediately after his arrival, and those that critically wrote about his Nazi past are still the minority. In contrast, Rudolph was a crucial role to von Braun’s success, yet he never achieved the same attention until, ironically, he was reinvestigated. Still, with so little written about Rudolph it is difficult to produce an accurate comparison between the two scientists.

Although this trend suggests von Braun is being examined under a more critical lens, it is also imperative to continue including other scientists, like Rudolph, in the master narrative in order to obtain a more complete representation of the ramifications from the associating immigration policy. By understanding the foundation of Paperclip’s policy procedures, information on

German experts that came to the U.S. under questionable circumstances will be examined under a new perspective.

As this thesis tracks the constantly shifting immigration policy that was shaped by

America’s national interests in the immediate post-WWII era, it will explain the unchecked and unstable procedures that resulted in skewed perceptions of von Braun and Rudolph. Tracing the scientists’ movement from Germany to the U.S. and von Braun’s major representation in

American media compared to Rudolph’s miniscule participation will illustrate a clear distinction between the two: von Braun held immense power facilitated by the U.S. government and media which allowed him to remain clear of his Nazi past. Moreover, while he remained alive this protection also extended to those close to him, including Rudolph. When he passed, however, this veil of protection was lifted, exposing his colleagues to a different fate.

The program that brought both von Braun and Rudolph to America, Operation Paperclip, established the precedent that obtaining these men’s expertise was far more important than legal proceedings, proper policy implementation, and moral concerns. Paperclip’s associating policy system was not linear and jumped from stage to stage. U.S. officials in charge of Paperclip dissuaded logical policy procedures so that they could move the scientists quickly into America.

As it will be explored later, Paperclip began under rushed secrecy, including the mishandling of the scientists’ dossiers beginning in 1945. Because Paperclip lacked a central management, later, in the 1970s, the State Department asserted that crucial information needed for the investigations of former Nazis in the U.S. had not been available. The urgency to secure the German rocket scientists did not allow Operation Paperclip to progress in the conventional order of policy stages. Rather, these stages were addressed in an ad hoc fashion in response to circumstances as

16 they arose. This early precedent is what makes a biographical examination of the two German scientists even more relevant.

CHAPTER II. NOMINAL PARTICIPANTS: VON BRAUN AND RUDOLPH DURING THE WAR YEARS

Arthur Rudolph and Wernher von Braun’s careers paralleled in many ways, but their upbringings were very different, and this resulted in important distinctions between their personalities. Analysis of each scientists’ background provides a precedent on which to evaluate them during their later years. Very early on von Braun became used to an upper middle-class status, while Rudolph grew up on a family farm and sold his inheritance to work in rocketry.

These different upbringings built the personality traits that proved to be a blessing for von Braun, and subsequently, Rudolph.

Von Braun

Wernher Magnus Maximilian Freiherr von Braun was born in 1912 in Wirsitz, into a well to do family with a royal pedigree. His father, Magnus von Braun, worked in banking and was involved in “high politics,” which provided von Braun and his brothers with a privileged life.

These standards existed alongside a nationalistic political leaning, of which von Braun’s father showed a “distaste for social equality and democracy,” and instilled in von Braun aristocratic expectations and a patrician world view.25 Growing up in a world of privilege enabled von Braun a surplus of opportunities to enrich his education. At age thirteen he was gifted his first telescope, inspiring his passion for space. In the same year, Wernher was sent to Ettersburg school, near Weimar, where his fascination with Hermann Oberth, author of The Rocket into

Interplanetary Space, grew. This led to his first rocket experiments during the years 1926-27.

Von Braun’s passion for rocketry prompted him to write a manuscript that painted a detailed and fanciful picture of space travel. The manuscript was left unfinished, and it was not until his teenage years that he became more focused in his enthusiasm for rocketry. Von Braun was so

25 Michael J. Neufeld, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 7.

18 enthralled with current experiments and scientists such as Max Valier, that, according to

Neufeld, “He developed a single-mindedness about rocketry and spaceflight, a fanaticism that could lead to blindness about the importance of anything else.”26 Shortly after this turning point, von Braun joined the fledgling rocket group, Verein für Raumschiffarht (VfR). The group was heavily influenced by Oberth, and Valier was a founding member.27 Valier’s initial fame was a result of the first successful German rocket launch using liquid fuel in 1930, and this technology was later improved by his apprentice, Arthur Rudolph.28

Soon after, von Braun picked up work with his “idol,” Oberth, as well as Rudolf Nebel,

Rolf Engel, and Klaus Riedel. Later, Engel commented on his distaste for von Braun’s role as a central member of the VfR, claiming it was partly due to the young scientist’s privileged upbringing, and supported by a monthly allowance given to von Braun by his father. Neufeld goes on to reveal that although this resentment existed, von Braun was extremely well liked and was selected to speak to visiting groups because of his “talent for persuasion.”29 These early interactions provided von Braun with a zest for leadership, his confidence continually growing.

The scientist also used these experiences to master the art of captivating public speaking. Young von Braun continued to assert his place in German rocketry with the publication of an article in

1932, entitled, “The Secret of the Liquid-Fuel Rocket.” Soon after, he obtained his pilot’s license in Silesia, procuring a close friend in fellow student Hanna Reitsch. Reitsch and von Braun remained friends later in life, even extending through her association with various Nazi leaders

26 Neufeld, Von Braun, 10-30. 27 “The Highway to Space,” NASA, accessed 17 April 2016, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP- 4201/ch1- 3.htm. 28 Thomas Franklin, An American in Exile: The Story of Arthur Rudolph (Huntsville: Christopher Kaylor Company, 1987), 17-18. 29 Neufeld, Von Braun, 39-40.

19 and as a devotee of Adolf Hitler.30 After the war Reitsch was villainized for her involvement with Hitler and the Nazi regime. Unlike her friend, von Braun, she was not of any real value to other nations after the war, and so the former pilot was not protected from judgment for her past actions. According to Sophie Jackson’s biography of Reitsch, von Braun had “reshaped” himself

“to fit the new world,”31 his image was recreated to be associated with the Americans rather than the Nazis of his past. In Reitsch’s own memoirs von Braun is not even mentioned. Perhaps this was out of bitterness, since the two friends parted ways, with Reitsch facing capture and imprisonment post-war, while von Braun became an American celebrity despite his previous employment under the Third Reich. Like Rudolph, Reitsch did not find the popularity or fame that von Braun did, nor did she work with him again after the war. Because of this, the once praised female test pilot could not even find refuge within von Braun’s illustrious shadow, as did his scientist colleagues.

In 1932, von Braun’s relationship with the German military and government began when he was approached by Colonel Karl Becker and then Captain Walter Dornberger. Becker,

Dornberger, and their associates were focused on solid-fuel rockets, but were also not discounting improvement of the nascent liquid-fuel technology. In 1931 Becker contacted the

Heylandt plant, which produced equipment relating to the manufacturing and movement of oxygen, and requested to purchase their “liquid-fuel rocket engine.”32 Among those that were commissioned to work on the new designs was Rudolph who had previously assisted Valier in constructing a rocket car.33 Because of the economic depression in Germany, these

30 Ibid., 48. 31 Sophie Jackson, Hitler’s Heroine: Hanna Reitsch (Stroud, United Kingdom: The History Press, 2014), 200. 32 Neufeld, Von Braun, 51. 33 Franklin, An American in Exile, 27, 40. See pages 41-42 for more detailed information on Rudolph’s early work for the German army.

20 interconnecting rocket groups were eager to obtain resources to fuel their research and experiments. Von Braun, Klaus Riedel, and Nebel took it upon themselves to demonstrate a, subsequently unimpressive, liquid-fuel launch. This failed launch did not hinder von Braun’s success though, as Dornberger was captivated by the young scientist’s charisma. Although the

VfR lacked professionalism, von Braun’s knowledge, outgoing personality, and leadership among the group stood out. Dornberger was attracted to the young scientist’s “energy and shrewdness with which this tall, fair student with the broad massive chin went to work and with his astonishing theoretical knowledge.”34

In 1932 Becker offered von Braun a position with the army, telling him, “My condition is that you work behind the fence of an Army post.”35 Neufeld writes that von Braun’s version of the conversation was a bit different. The scientist asked if his colleagues could join him and

Becker and Dornberger agreed. Dornberger only permitted this request in order to secure the employment of von Braun himself, and thus began the scientist’s role as a protector for his devoted colleagues. Von Braun later admitted that he did not know the amount of money it took to build a liquid-fuel rocket at that time, or the necessary technology to improve upon it, stating that, “To me, the Army’s money was the only hope for big progress toward space travel.”36

Around this same time von Braun’s father, Magnus von Braun Sr. was elected to Reich minister, further attaching the young scientist to the Third Reich. The opportunity to work under the army was not a difficult offer for von Braun to accept, Neufeld argues, stating that “his inherited

34 Michael White, Acid Tongues and Tranquil Dreamers: Tales of Bitter Rivalry that Fueled the Advancement of Science and Technology (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 304. 35 Neufeld, Von Braun, 53-55. 36 Ibid.

21 values and politics” overlapped with his passion for rocketry, and the only way his research could become a reality was if it was funded by the military.37

Von Braun’s feelings towards the Nazis’ rise to power in Germany is described by some historians, including Neufeld, as “indifferent.”38 From early on in his career he was used to being around officers of the Third Reich and working with their associates. Elie Wiesel, Holocaust survivor and well-recognized author, has clearly stated his opinion on von Braun’s alleged indifference, stating, “The opposite of love is not hate, it’s indifference. The opposite of art is not ugliness, it's indifference. The opposite of faith is not heresy, it’s indifference. And the opposite of life is not death, it’s indifference.”39 Von Braun’s indifference carried on into his later years and became the subject of interviewers’ and authors’ inquiries. This indifference did not hinder him from joining the SS-horseback riding school in 1933, where he experienced some sort of

“ideological indoctrination,” and later that year he applied to the SS for membership.40 These decisions were made in the name of his career, and for two years von Braun worked on A-2 technology, and in 1934 helped launch two rockets, Max and Mortiz. Afterwards, von Braun stated the two rockets were “entirely my own work.” This highly celebrated accomplishment was only possible because of von Braun’s relationship with and support from the Nazi Regime.41

37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., 61. 39 Elie Wiesel, “The Perils of Indifference” (speech, The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Washington D.C., 12 April 1999). 40 Neufeld, Von Braun, 63. 41 Ibid., 73. A-2 technology was the second step in the development of the missile, followed by the A3 and A5. The VfR focused its attention on increasing the kilogram-force (kgf) of the experimental rocket motors. The scientists used pressure-fed water-cooled combustion chambers, but were only generating 60 kgf at an impulse of 173 seconds. After 28 months of research, von Braun and the rocket group produced a small A-2 rocket that generated 300 kgf. The A-3 rocket enhanced this technology by increasing the thrust to 1500 kgf, still using the same basic cooling method as the A2. See: Walter Dornberger, V2 (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1954); Walter Grunden, Secret Weapons and World War II: Japan in the Shadow of Big Science (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005); Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 43.

Rudolph

Arthur Louis Hugo Rudolph was born in 1906 in Stepfershausen to much more humble surroundings than von Braun’s posh urban dwelling. Rudolph hailed from a long line of farmers, but his interest in mechanics began at a very early age. He reminisced to biographer, Thomas

Franklin, that he used to “tinker” with his mother’s spinning wheels and other equipment found in the small farming town where they lived. But, he emphasized, “I never wanted to be a farmer.”42 Rudolph was noted to be a good student, attending class regularly and receiving high marks. He took a special interest in the subjects of physics and geography, and years later sold his share of the farm so that he could pursue a science degree in mechanical engineering from the

College of Berlin.43 Soon after graduation Rudolph began working at the Heylandt plant in

Berlin where he had his first personal encounter with the engineer, Max Valier, and his assistant,

Walter Riedel. Rudolph had heard rumors that there were rocket experiments occurring at

Heylandt and, on 2 May 1930, he witnessed his first one.44 Valier was already well-known among German rocket scientists, and this interaction with the two experts solidified Rudolph’s decision to make this his life’s work. Rudolph and Valier also had a common intellectual idol in

Oberth. In 1924 Valier read Oberth’s book, The Rocket Into Interplanetary Space. Valier took the book literally and made it his mission to produce technology that would allow for man to journey to the planets. Rudolph began officially working with engineer only six months after

Valier began experimenting with rocket motors. Valier’s ultimate dream, one which Rudolph

42 Franklin, An American in Exile, 7, 9. 43 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Freedom of Information Act, 1949-1983, Arthur Louis Hugo Rudolph, Part 1 of 1 BUFILE: 105-11507, 14, https://vault.fbi.gov/Arthur%20Rudolph%20/Arthur%20Rudolph%20Part%201%20of%201/view. 44 Franklin, An American in Exile, 13. For more information and a biography of Valier see: I. Essers, Max Valier: A Pioneer of Space Travel, available through and translated by NASA.

23 shared, was space travel. The men began running tests immediately after Rudolph arrived at the

Heylandt plant where he gained experience but earned no salary.45

Later that same month Rudolph’s confidence in his rocketry work was shaken by a tragic event. On Saturday, May 17th, Rudolph and Riedel met Valier at the plant. Working on the weekend at Heylandt was ideal because there were fewer workers present, and the men could begin their experiments early in the morning without interruption. The scientists conducted launch after launch, aiming to reach 100 kilograms of thrust, but to no avail. Rudolph tried to convince Valier to end their work for the day and return to it on Monday, but his tenacious collaborator was determined to keep pushing. Valier directed the men to continue increasing pressure until the rocket exploded. Rudolph and Riedel were thrown back, but Valier was struck with a piece of shrapnel and bled out quickly. At this point, only two weeks into this new profession, Rudolph lost a fellow scientist and someone he admired, came close to losing his own life, and was still without an income. Despite these adversities, he continued to pursue rocketry.

Oberth, an idol of von Braun, also helped sustain Rudolph’s passion for rocketry after

Valier’s demise. Oberth, like the two young German scientists, became fascinated with space exploration from an early age. He stated that it was after reading Jules Verne’s From the Earth to the Moon, that his passion for rocketry really began. While serving in a medical unit during

World War I, Oberth continued his rocket experiments, and he believed that the only way to end the war was to catch the British off guard by sending a rocket across the channel to London. He began secretly designing a liquid oxygen and alcohol fueled rocket, measuring 82 feet long and

16 feet in diameter. Oberth’s superior officer found the secret plans and helped the scientist bring

45 Franklin, An American in Exile, 16-17.

24 them to headquarters in Berlin. Authorities in Berlin found the plans to be too farfetched for the time and rejected the idea, and the war ended only months later. Oberth returned to university where he eventually turned his thesis manuscript into the classic work, The Rocket Into

Interplanetary Space. The crucial lesson that Rudolph and von Braun took from Oberth’s work was that the future of space exploration lay in the further development of rockets. Rudolph and von Braun also found Oberth’s calculations of the mathematical principles of space flight to be extremely valuable. The scientist’s name became synonymous with German rocketry, and he later became the president of the VfR.46

Shortly after the incident at Heylandt, Rudolph viewed the film Frau im Mond (“Woman on the Moon”) whose technical director was Oberth. Frau im Mond, a silent film produced in

1929 and directed by Fritz Lang, is a science fiction story about rocket travel, and it has been credited with greatly influencing modern day rocketry. Inspired by the film, and having collaborated with Valier in making his own rockets, Rudolph became completely infatuated with improving rocket technology. Rudolph could not stop analyzing the disaster that had killed his colleague, stating “I spent a lot of time thinking about it and there were several reasons.”47 As

Rudolph inspected Valier’s original design he deduced that the parts were too loose causing them to shift during ignition and the injection system was problematic. After investigating flow patterns of the kerosene and oxygen, Rudolph determined that the injection system was the main issue. The scientist continued his research at Heylandt until the owner of the plant, Dr. Paul

Heylandt, forbade any further rocket testing there due to Valier’s accident. Despite this setback,

Rudolph was still intent on redesigning the rocket engine that had exploded, so he worked in an abandoned laboratory on the Heylandt premises. He was discovered once by his boss and was

46 Ibid., 21-23. 47 Ibid., 18, 23.

25 threatened that if he did not stop he would lose his job, but Rudolph kept working. He eventually discovered that the main cause of the accident involved the injection system and created an improved model of the engine which was later debuted as the “Heylandt Rocket Car.”48 After creating a new model of Valier’s rocket car Rudolph brought the design to Heylandt’s works manager, Alfons Pietsch. Rudolph’s tenacious attitude, and refusal to let anything hinder his progress paid off. After word got out about Rudolph’s new designs, he and Pietsch were invited to view launch attempts by a local rocket group. Just as von Braun realized early on, Rudolph understood that to be able to work in rocketry, he must also work with the military.

The local rocket group, the VfR, excited Rudolph but did not completely impress him.

Failed attempt after failed attempt led Rudolph to approach one of the other scientists, a much younger looking man, and question him about measurements of the thrust and volume of fuel used. The young man’s response was curt and took Rudolph by surprise, leading him to ask

Pietsch who that “whippersnapper” was. Pietsch replied, “That is Wernher von Braun, the brains of this group.”49 The young scientist was already gaining a reputation of unrelenting confidence.

Von Braun’s group was not the only rocket club that was affected by disappointing experiments and lack of equipment. Germany’s depression had taken a toll on the scientific community as a whole, and Rudolph stated that this, along with pressure from friends and colleagues, was the reason he joined the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NA) in

1931. Although financial pressure was a common reason that citizens like Rudolph gave to rationalize joining the NA, it does not completely account for his very early entrance into the party since pressure to join was not yet strictly enforced. The next year Rudolph lost his job at the Heylandt plant, which subsequently led to another encounter with his former boss, Pietsch,

48 Ibid., 24-26. 49 Ibid., 28-29.

26 and eventually a contract drawn up by Dornberger with the Army Ordnance Department. This project, which was focused on a rocket that was able to sustain high thrust power, was inspected by Rudolph’s fellow scientist and soon to be friend, von Braun.50

The contract between the Ordnance Department and Pietsch was made specifically to produce a fully automatic liquid-propellant motor, but after Pietsch and Rudolph were given the funds and materials to construct the motor, the former Heylandt manager disappeared with the money. Dornberger recounts this event in his autobiographical account, Peenemünde: die

Geschichte der V-Waffen (Peenemünde: The History of V-Weapons), describing Rudolph as “a slim, starved-looking, red-blond engineer” who “turned out to be the real inventor of the motor.”51 From the beginning, Rudolph paid more attention to his work than his physical appearance. After Dornberger and his colleagues viewed and inspected the scientist’s designs they decided his expertise was valuable enough to make him a part of their organization, stating that he became “one of our top experts.”52 Rudolph, without another job, accepted the offer and began his civilian position with the German army. Although von Braun may have been more recognized at this early point in his career, both he and Rudolph were marked as valuable assets to the German rocketry program and war effort.

The rocket group at Kummersdorf worked together day in and day out for the Ordnance

Department, and von Braun and Rudolph found themselves spending more and more time together. Both scientists were making a meager living by working on rockets for the German military, but they were more interested in space exploration technology. At the time though, in their minds, the only way to work with rocket technology was to be funded by the government.

50 FBI, Rudolph, 15-16; Franklin, An American in Exile, 38-39, 41. 51 Walter Dornberger, Peenemünde: die Geschichte der V-Waffen (Berlin: Ullstein, 1989), 41. 52 Franklin, An American in Exile, 41-42.

Von Braun and Rudolph rationalized their military work as necessary to continue making rockets. At night they excitedly discussed how man would someday travel to the Moon or Mars.

Von Braun developed the equations while Rudolph worked with a slide rule and logarithm tables. Despite developing these ideas and equations together and having them published in

Colliers after the war, only von Braun ended up in front of the camera, not Rudolph.53

Colleagues to Confidants and Operation Paperclip Initiation

Dornberger often paired the two scientists, von Braun and Rudolph, together as the chief liquid fuel rocket engineers. Von Braun was already well established within the German Army rocketry group when Rudolph accepted his position and came aboard as his “right-hand man.”54

Rudolph and von Braun’s friendship grew, and they shared similar ideas on the future of their careers. The scientists’ work on the A-1 and A-2 rockets culminated in the launch of Max and

Moritz in 1934, and both Rudolph and von Braun were present for the successful test.55 In 1935, the Luftwaffe offered von Braun and Rudolph “five million of Luftwaffe money” for rocket testing and research. When this opportunity was delivered to their superiors at the Ordnance

Department there was a disagreement over the air force stealing away the scientists and their knowledge. But, both Rudolph and von Braun were becoming fast admirers of the Luftwaffe.56

More funding equaled more equipment, and more equipment meant more rockets. As a result, the scientists did not have to think long before accepting this new position.

Von Braun quickly set out to locate a new testing and launch site, and found Peenemünde the best suited for their needs. Von Braun was determined to keep momentum after scouting the

53 Ibid., 44. 54 Neufeld, Von Braun, 76. 55 Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 52.; Franklin, An American in Exile, 43. 56 Franklin, An American in Exile, 79-80.

28 location, and during his discussions with the Luftwaffe his bold attitude was evident to those around him. Rudolph described his colleague, stating that, “He wasn’t very controllable...”57

According to Rudolph, Peenemünde was constructed as a pleasant, livable work space with a community feel and, in 1937, the scientists started arriving at the new grounds.58 The socially adept von Braun had no issues recruiting a large staff for the new location. On two occasions his initial staff of 350 workers tripled in size by the early years of WWII.59 Shortly after

Peenemünde became active, von Braun realized the necessity of the Reich’s participation in his rocketry work and officially joined the Nazi Party on November 12, 1937. The scientist claimed that he was “demanded to join the National Socialist Party,” and that his refusal to join “would have meant that I would have had to abandon the work of my life.”60 Later, in an article published for American Magazine in 1952, von Braun shared his thoughts on Hitler’s rise to power, and that the scientist “fared relatively rather well under totalitarianism.” Neufeld offers another interpretation of von Braun’s feelings when he met Hitler in 1939 and 1941, stating that the scientist was “moved” by the leader’s “astounding intellectual capabilities.”61 Hitler first visited the rocket group in 1939, at Kummersdorf, which resulted in a bland reaction from the dictator and a loss of support from the party. During the visit, Dornberger, von Braun, and the other engineers could not illicit any reaction from Hitler. The Führer, according to the men, was

57 Neufeld, Von Braun, 94; Franklin, An American in Exile, 47. Dornberger later described von Braun in the exact same way while working at Pennemünde. 58 Franklin, An American in Exile, 50-51, 54: Peenemünde was planned by an architect hired by von Braun. As pleasant as the compound was, daily routines revolved around its main purpose, rocketry. Rudolph is quoted as saying that they only socialized as a group “but once a year, or maybe twice a year…But our work filled us completely.” His sentiment continued to stay positive, referring to the long work hours as “enjoyable.” Pennemünde became famous for paving the way for the V-2 rocket, and after a successful launch in October 1942, Dornberger made a speech that insisted the group’s most important task was, during wartime, “the rapid perfecting of the rocket as a weapon.” 59 Neufeld, Von Braun, 89. 60 “Affidavit of Membership in NSDAP of Prof. Dr. Wernher von Braun,” 18.6. 1947, NACP, RG330, Accession 70A4398. 61 Neufeld, Von Braun, 97.

29 distracted during the launches, his mind elsewhere. Hitler barely asked any questions while visiting Kummersdorf, and left von Braun and Dornberger baffled; the scientists later marked the unimpressive reaction from Hitler as a “lack of vision” in the future of rockets. Von Braun and

Dornberger were both present and participated in this initial meeting with Hitler, and it was von

Braun’s first personal interaction with the leader.62

By 1940, Peenemünde was reeling from the shortages of men and funding, and the facility was in danger of being labeled as non-vital for war production. Not coincidentally, that same year, the Schutzstaffel (SS) approached von Braun to become an Untersturmfuehrer

(lieutenant), and he asked for Dornberger’s advice. Dornberger’s response was to the point: his career depended upon whether or not he joined the SS. On 1 May 1940, von Braun was readmitted into the SS.63 Neufeld addresses von Braun’s non-committal attitude to the party, but also points out that positive reports regarding von Braun’s behavior were repeatedly sent to

Himmler as the scientist was promoted within the SS three times. In 1943, von Braun was appointed professor by his new, enthusiastic supporter, Hitler. And in 1944, Albert Speer personally suggested and endorsed von Braun to receive the Knight’s Cross of the War Service

Cross, an extension of the War Merit Cross award proposed by Speer himself.64

In 1943 Dornberger and von Braun were called to another meeting with Hitler. This time the meeting was to be held at the dictator’s headquarters, at the Wolfsschanze (Wolf’s Lair). The men showed Hitler and his associates a film promoting Peenemünde, most likely narrated by von

Braun. This meeting went very differently than the initial rendezvous with Hitler two years prior;

62 Neufeld, Von Braun, 110; Franklin, An American in Exile, 59; Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers, 54. 63 Neufeld, Von Braun, 120-121. Von Braun was readmitted due to his previous membership in the Reitersturm during the years 1933-34; See: Neufeld, “Wernher von Braun, the SS, and Concentration Camp Labor: Questions of Moral, Political, and Criminal Responsibility,” in German Studies Review 25 (1), 2002: 61. 64 Neufeld, Von Braun, 151, 187-188. In Germany, it is possible for an expert in a field to be bestowed “professor” by the government without any academic employment.

30 the men brought with them more eye-catching evidence of the rockets’ success in the form of charts, graphs, and models, and von Braun brought with him a matured self-assuredness. Hitler was impressed by the research presented and felt that rocketry was an integral part of the party’s success in the war. Pennemünde was granted the funding it needed, and was officially a part of the dictator’s strategy to win the war.65

Because production quotas were increased exponentially, the need for labor also rose quickly. By 1943 Peenemünde began using slave labor from nearby concentration camps, as endorsed by Rudolph and known by von Braun. Neufeld writes extensively on the research that shows the scientists’ involvement in slave labor, and he discusses the meeting that Rudolph had with his supervisor and an SS officer to accept the proposition to exploit concentration camp inmates at Peenemunde. Neufeld also states that von Braun was not ignorant to the fact that concentration camp labor was being used at the facility, but chose to ignore it.66 The ambitions that the men shared were not possible without the support of the Nazi party, and so they did not protest these propositions.

Unfortunately, for von Braun, Dornberger, Rudolph, and their colleagues, Hitler had a nightmare. The Nazi leader dreamt that no A-4 rocket ever reached London, and changed his opinion on the future of rocketry. Speer brought the news to von Braun and Dornberger in March

1943. Without Hitler’s belief in the program’s success, the whole operation was at risk of being shut down. The men had Speer to thank for momentarily saving the program.67 Dornberger and von Braun had to act quickly, and another key A-4 presentation to Hitler was scheduled in July

65 Ibid., 127-28, 141. Dornberger and Rudolph were in favor of SS involvement with the A-4 program and in December 1942 Himmler visited Pennemünde to view an A-4 launch. 66 Ibid., 143-45; See: Franklin, An American in Exile, 65, where Rudolph comments on the scientists’ disappointment when different projects separated the two close friends for a short time. 67 David A. Johnson, “Germany’s Deadly V-2 Rockets,” Warfare History Network, 8 December 2015, accessed 3 March 2016, http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/germanys-deadly-v-2-rockets/.

1943, at the Wolf’s Lair. Von Braun was purposefully chosen to give the presentation because of his charisma and impressive art of persuasion. Hitler was optimistic about von Braun and his team’s vision, and approved moving forward with a more aggressive missile program. There was also discussion initiated by Hitler, who wanted all labor at the A-4 plant at Peenemünde to be

German workers, but Dornberger and the others present at the meeting knew that this could not happen, and slave labor needed to be used to sustain production.68 Soon after this meeting took place, Peenemünde saw its last days of experiments.

The Allies were not aware of the work being conducted at Peenemünde until 1943, when reconnaissance missions revealed V-2 production at the site. In the late hours of 17 August 1943, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) bombed Peenemünde. It was reported that approximately 600 heavy bombers carrying 1,800 tons of bombs were released on the worksite. The first wave of bombers targeted the living quarters, but many missed their objective and instead hit the

Trassenheide camp where the forced laborers lived. Neufeld states that 600 workers were killed when they were trapped behind barbed wire fencing without any refuge during the attack. He goes onto explain the second target, the production plant, and the third target, the development works, were not hit as hard as the RAF had planned. By 2:00 a.m. the raid ended, and von Braun,

Oberth, and others rushed to save as many documents as possible. Both Von Braun and Oberth later received the War Service Cross, First Class with Swords, for their efforts to save important research materials during the bombings. Witnesses also alleged that Rudolph assisted his neighbors extinguish fires after the bombings ceased, but unlike his counterpart, the scientist was never officially recognized for these efforts.69

68 Neufeld, Rocket and the Reich, 195; Neufeld, VonBraun, 152. 69 Neufeld, Von Braun, 153-155; Franklin, An American in Exile, 67. For Rudolph’s personal account of the bombings see pages 69-73. Von Braun held rank as an officer at this time, but just as Rudolph, Oberth did not, yet he still received an award for his actions during the bombings.

The production facility at Peenemünde was too badly damaged from the bombing raids, and work was moved to a new location underground called Mittelwerk (“Middle Work”). The

Himmler-approved cavernous facility was a construction of two main tunnels, each longer than a mile, connecting with 47 smaller tunnels. In order to deliver the quantity of rockets that Hitler desired, slave labor was increased, and V-2 production was given priority.70 SS Brigadier

General Hans Kammler took command over the facility. Prisoners from the concentration camp

Buchenwald were brought over to construct the worksite which was near Nordhausen, and the slave laborers’ quarters were called “Dora.”71 Early on in Mittelwerk’s production both Rudolph and Von Braun were aware of the slave laborers at Mittelwerk and the deplorable conditions in which they were living. Von Braun had previously attended a meeting held at Peenemünde where the use of SS prisoners at the new underground site was discussed, and according to

Neufeld, in 1976, von Braun told a reporter, “The working conditions there were absolutely horrible. I saw the Mittelwerk several times, once while these prisoners were blasting new tunnels in there and it was a pretty hellish environment. I’d never been in a mine before, but it was clearly worse than a mine.”72 Rudolph and von Braun were both guilty of accepting and even encouraging the decision to use forced slave labor.

The 1943 meeting produced the first surviving documentation that von Braun was aware of and participated in using forced slave labor at the worksite. By the end of August, over 100 concentration camp prisoners were brought into the worksite’s sub-camp, Dora.73 This meeting was followed by a November discussion at Peenemünde attended by Rudolph. Around the time

70 Franklin, An American in Exile, 75. 71 Michael J. Neufeld, “Wernher von Braun, the SS, and Concentration Camp Labor,” German Studies Review 25, no. 1 (February 2002): 64. 72 Ibid., 65. 73 Neufeld, Von Braun, 157.

33 of this second meeting von Braun wrote down his personal thoughts on the potential success of increasing slave labor.74 This is yet another instance where the two scientists not only crossed paths physically, but were both involved in an identifiable war crime. Although Himmer played an extremely central role in facilitating forced slave labor at numerous worksites, the management at Mittelwerk knew and operated the day to day functions and decision making.

That same year Rudolph wrote to a superior that the use of slave labor at Peenemünde was proving to be more successful than using foreign workers.75 Both Rudolph and von Braun’s involvement and cognizance indicts them of being guilty of more than just indifference.

Rudolph commented multiple times to his biographer, Franklin, that he knew of the poor conditions, and that some civilian workers had died after becoming ill. He stated that many prisoners most likely shared the same fate, but that he did not know for sure as they were under the guard of the SS.76 Immediately after this statement, Rudolph also avowed that the conditions improved after the spring of 1944. According to the United States Army Investigation and Trial

Records of War Criminals’ archives on the trial surrounding the Nordhausen complex, between

15,000 and 20,000 prisoners died at the camp and worksite.77 Von Braun visited Nordhausen and

Mittelwerk on several occasions; the 1944 trips were documented as were at least ten visits in

1945. In May 1944, von Braun and Rudolph were both present at a meeting held by the

74 Ibid., 157, 163. The referenced document can be found in the National Air and Space Museum archives under “WvB? Protokoll,” August 8, 1943, FE732 75 Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich, 187; Neufeld writes that von Braun and some of his colleagues maintained that Himmler was the force behind the program to use forced slave labor “following the first large-scale air raid on Peenemünde.” But, in an April 1943 document Rudolph writes that the system of using concentration camp prisoners was working well and has proved more successful than the previous use of foreign workers. 76 Franklin, An American in Exile, 77. 77 Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), 27 April 1945-11 June 1958, United States Army Investigation and Trial Records of War Criminals: United States of America v. Kurt Andrae et al. (and Related Cases), Record Group 153 and Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1942- Record Group 338 microfilm, 2, https://www.archives.gov/files/research/captured-german-records/microfilm/m1079.pdf (hereafter cited as “U.S.A. v Andrae et al. microfilm).

Mittelwerk general manager, Georg Rickhey. The goal of the meeting was to facilitate the procurement of additional slave labor. The decision was made to move 1800 more French prisoners to Dora, and neither man objected.78 These two men were together at meetings with

Nazi leadership and were participatory witnesses to the worksite’s environment. The production achieved at Mittelwerk could not have taken place without the implemented forced labor. Von

Braun and Rudolph chose to suppress information concerning the slave labor component of their work, but accepted the accolades for the production made possible by these prisoners. In fact, von Braun was given a promotion not long after the Mittelwerk facility opened, becoming head of the Mittelbau-Dora Planning Office, which was a department under Himmler’s SS. He lived only miles from Nordhausen in a home that previously belonged to a Jewish factory owner.79

This short distance is the only barrier that separated von Braun from his friend and colleague,

Rudolph, and the facility where thousands of prisoners were dying from starvation, disease, and overwork.

Later in April 1945, when U.S. Army troops liberated Nordhausen and Mittelwerk, a phone list naming the management of the facility was located. At the top of the page was

Rudolph’s name, listed as deputy production manager.80 From early on the American military knew of the environment in which von Braun and Rudolph were working and whom they were working for. During the facility’s liberation U.S. forces spent two days treating innumerable cases of disease and starvation, and those who could not be helped on site were sent to Allied hospitals. U.S. soldiers reported seeing emaciated bodies, sleeping conditions confined to hard

78 Jacobson, Operation Paperclip, 16. 79 Ibid., 31. 80 Ibid., 48. At this time von Braun held the title of Technical Director of a factory site at the Peenemunde Army Research Center, with the staff of this plant and Mittelwerk’s overlapping.

35 floors, and roughly 2,500 unburied bodies on the grounds.81 As these prisoners fought for survival, after years of criminal treatment, von Braun and some of his high-ranking colleagues were enjoying gourmet food and posh surroundings in a Bavarian Alpine Ski Resort.82

As the war was coming to an end, the scientists, especially von Braun and Dornberger, were concerned, not just with their survival, but also the future of their careers. The two men’s attitudes towards the approaching Allied troops is well documented. Von Braun was the initiator; he approached Dornberger and expressed that they needed to quickly make a deal with the

Americans. Dornberger instantly agreed with von Braun. The men then took refuge at Haus

Ingeburg, near the German-Austrian border, awaiting their liberators.83 Von Braun did not want to waste any more time in making a deal with the U.S. military, and so Magnus von Braun, his younger brother, was sent down the mountain to contact the Americans and bring them to the scientist. When the Allied troops arrived at the Germans’ hideaway, they were immediately greeted with von Braun’s desire to bargain with them and were introduced to a negotiating team organized by von Braun and Dornberger. The scientist’s self-assuredness was very apparent, as he later remarked, “The V-2 was something we had and you didn’t have. Naturally you wanted to know all about it.” Photos were taken of the scientists, and von Braun took credit for the creation of the V-2 rocket, claiming that he was “its founder and guiding spirit.”84

Rudolph’s initial interactions with the Americans played out much differently. He was quiet, and only enjoyed his incarceration in the Alps for a short time until his desire to work

81 The Nazi Concentration Camps – Prosecution Exhibit #230, directed by E.R. Kellogg, George C. Stevens, and James B. Donovan (United States Army Signal Corps., 1945), film ID 2272, RG-60.2439, NARA 238.2 reel 4, accessed 14 April 2016, https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn1001630. 82 Neufeld, Von Braun, 198. 83 Neufeld, Von Braun, 198; Annie Jacobson, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program That Brought Nazi Scientists to America (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2014), 67. 84 Jacobson, Operation Paperclip, 68-69.

36 caused him to become restless. His interrogator judged him differently, commenting that he might be an ideal candidate for denazification and investigation for war crimes.85 The two scientists’ early exchanges with U.S. military personnel could not have been more contradictory.

For example, von Braun had already labeled himself as vital to the Americans and spoke with confidence and charisma, while on the other hand, Rudolph knew his worth, but kept his words to a minimum. Neither spoke of their past experiences, they were more focused on their future with the American military.

Operation Paperclip

U.S. military personnel scrambled to gather the scientists and their resources, quickly constructing a makeshift policy in order to bring them to the U.S. The fourth guideline listed in the initial memo describing the program stated that any man with former Nazi ties, including the

SS, should only be accepted if they are “vital to the conduct of operations,” or be removed from the program.86 The two scientists, at the time, were considered indispensable “to the successful accomplishment of the most vital research program,” and were accepted into Operation Paperclip and into the U.S. Rudolph and von Braun passed the same requirements to join the program and arrived in the U.S. in the fall of 1945.87 Von Braun enjoyed higher pay as well as the preservation of his leadership role that he possessed in Germany. In fact, when von Braun first entered the U.S. he was quickly taken to the Pentagon, alone, to meet with top officials. He was also able to choose the members of his team, including Rudolph, just as he did in Germany.88

85 Ibid., 96. 86 National Security Archives, 27 June 1947, Recommendations drawn up at request of Gen. Chamberlin for the attention of Gen. Walsh, accessed 2 March 2016, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/. 87 Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1987), 126. 88 Andre Sellier, A History of the Dora Camp: The Untold Story of the Nazi Slave Labor Camp That Secretly Manufactured V-2 Rockets (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 417, 420.

Von Braun’s authority in the former Nazi state, and in the U.S., was not questioned. As the scientists arrived, first traveling to Fort Bliss, Texas, they were interviewed by Joint

Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) officers. These interviews were what technically qualified the German men for U.S. immigration, even though they were already living in the U.S.

They were also used to fend off critics of the project. Lieutenant Colonel Montie Cone assisted in supervising Operation Paperclip for over ten years and helped lead a revision of the project’s security measures. In one of his reports Cone noted that more in-depth investigations needed to take place concerning the persons involved in Operation Paperclip, except von Braun. Von

Braun was listed, explicitly, as already “fully justified.”89 As his value to American officials grew, this veil of protection that von Braun experienced when he first entered the U.S. soon extended to his colleagues.

The initiation of Operation Paperclip was of the utmost importance to U.S. national security, according to military officials. The issue of the checkered moral pasts of the German participants became a point of contention within and outside of the military domain. There were few dissenters to how Paperclip was being handled, and even less spoke out against it. Sam

Klaus of the State Department was part of this small minority and proved to be an obstacle to this

“conspiracy.” Klaus’ opinion of any former Nazi residing in the U.S., let alone working for the military, was that they were an undeniable threat.90 The Office of the Military Government,

United States (OMGUS) issued security reports that were reviewed by the JIOA. Rudolph’s dossier contained a statement made by the initial interviewer that he was a possible candidate for denazification, and von Braun’s OMGUS report was completely withheld at the time, stating that

89 Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 56. 90 Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy, 187; Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988), 36.

38 he was wanted for a denazification hearing related to his SS participation.91 Linda Hunt’s research revealed that a memorandum sent 18 November 1947, shows JIOA Deputy Director,

Walter Rozamus, dictating that dossiers containing “incriminating information” were to be withheld, including von Braun’s. Shortly after, Klaus was dismissed from the screening board of

Operation Paperclip.92 Both original reports of von Braun and Rudolph contained notes stating that their threat to U.S. security was in question and should be investigated further. Both scientists’ dossiers were altered to say that neither man was seen as a threat, or an ardent Nazi, and possibly just as an opportunist or nominal participant.93 Although incriminating evidence surfaced in both von Braun’s and Rudolph’s entrance investigations, there was little time to be concerned with such matters, and the men were rushed to the U.S. as the Soviet threat emerged.

91 Simpson, Blowback, 37. 92 Linda Hunt, “U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, no. 4 (April 1985): 18. 93 Ibid., 19-20.

CHAPTER III. OPERATION PAPERCLIP: A DISJOINTED POLICY

Operation Paperclip began as a mission with a hastily conceived notion of a policy directive to import scientists out of Germany and to the United States. The rushed implementation of Paperclip formed an extraordinary immigration policy tailored to meet the concerns raised by granting American citizenship to former Nazis. To better deconstruct this policy, a six-part “Policy Cycle” model posited by political scientists, Garry Brewer and Peter deLeon, will be applied. The six stages to Brewer and deLeon’s policy wheel are as follows: agenda setting or initiation, estimation, selection, implementation, evaluation, and the possibility of termination. To determine the various disorganized steps that led to Paperclip, each policy stage must first be defined. The first stage, agenda setting, is the identification of the context surrounding an issue, as well as the determination of goals and objectives, and possible alternatives. Agenda setting is essentially a list of concerns or problems that government officials and individuals outside of the government sector are dedicated to evaluating at any given time.94

According to Brewer and deLeon, the estimation stage carries on work accomplished during agenda setting. The determination of all likely costs and benefits of the decisions made are meant to “reduce uncertainties about possible choices to the greatest extent possible.”95

During the selection stage a policy choice is selected amongst alternatives that have already been evaluated. Significant weight is placed on the implementation stage, and the authors argue that weak policy implementation could very well invalidate the previous stages, which would exacerbate the original issue. Evaluation, a second analytical stage, produces analyses of the program or operations to determine if they are producing the desired results. Finally, the

94 Garry D. Brewer and Peter DeLeon, The Foundations of Policy Analysis (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1983), 33; “Public Policy Theory” (lecture, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, Summer 2014), 4-11, accessed 4 April 2017, http://www.unf.edu/~g.candler/PAD5384/03.pdf. 95 “Public Policy Theory,” UNF, 3.

40 termination stage of the policy cycle is set aside for the possible adjustment of policies and programs that “have become dysfunctional, redundant, outmoded, unnecessary, or even counterproductive.”96 Termination is not necessarily the end of a program, but instead a reevaluation of the policy to determine if it should be replaced by new and improved principles.

Paperclip’s nonlinear and decentralized immigration policy carried through each stage of the policy process, resulting in the neglect of moral implications. Science policy is not and cannot be a value-free inquiry, but in some specific cases policymakers purposefully manipulate these standards to obtain certain desired outcomes. One such case is the policy that led to and initiated

Operation Paperclip.

U.S. Science Policy During the Immediate Post-War Era

Before World War II science and technology was not the center of the U.S. government’s concern, and it was purely supplemental. But, the procurement of the German rocket technicians paved the way for a new era in U.S. science policy.97 Originally designated, “Project Overcast,”

Project Paperclip was the brainchild of U.S. Army Major Robert Staver, who from the beginning, disregarded the morality inherent in immigrating former Nazi scientists to America. Upon encountering disagreement from other government officials, he replied, “future scientific importance outweighs their present war guilt.”98 Staver proposed Paperclip as a temporary mission to accelerate ending the war in the Pacific with Japan and then to maintain supremacy over Soviet rocket technology. Once the war was over, Cold War imperatives caused U.S. military and national security priorities to shift from defeating Japan to defeating the Soviets.

Two years after Paperclip’s initiation these Cold War imperatives were still offered as

96 Brewer and deLeon, Foundations of Policy Analysis, 385. 97 Bruce Smith, American Science Policy Since WWII (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990), 2. 98 Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1987), 113, 120-121.

41 justification for the operation, and in a memorandum submitted by Director of Intelligence

Robert L. Walsh, the participants were described as having a “common interest” with their

American collaborators to resist “Soviet or Communism aggression.”99 The issue of the checkered moral pasts of the German participants became a problem within and outside of military circles and caused delays in the initiation of the program’s immigration policy. To avoid failure of the operation, however, the policy’s moral principles were continually compromised throughout. Paperclip’s immigration policy was not devised in a linear fashion, nor were morals considered until much later. Instead, immigration procedures moved back and forth between policy stages making for an unethical and weak foundation.

This weak foundation began as the U.S. deemed war with Japan as adequate cause for the quick procurement of the German scientists. An October 1944 State Department memorandum stated, “Certain enemy war material” was “required for use in the war against Japan.”100 This was a portion of the immediate rationale used for what later became Operation Paperclip.

Paperclip’s predecessor, Operation Overcast, was created with the sole objective to “increase our war making capacity against Japan and aid our postwar military research.” President Harry S.

Truman did not initially approve the Joint Chiefs of Staff backed program, and only executed the inception of Operation Paperclip after the Soviet threat had been established.101 Towards the end of the war both the Soviet Union and the U.S. planned to secure German technology and scientists. American officials paid serious attention to the movements of the Stalin regime, and in

September 1945, Foreign Service Officer, George Kennan warned that, “there is nothing—I

99 National Security Archives (NSA), 27 June 1947, “Recommendations drawn up at request of Gen. Chamberlin for the attention of Gen. Walsh,” accessed 2 March 2016, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/. 100 The National Archives- College Park (NARA), “Terminating War 1943-1944,” MR370.1, 28, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27578755. 101 John Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 37.

42 repeat nothing—in the history of the Soviet regime which would justify us in assuming that the men who are now in power in Russia…would hesitate for a moment to apply this power against us,” with Russia ultimately proving itself to be an “implacable antagonist” to the U.S.102

Just before the end of WWII Paperclip began when government officials agreed that safeguarding U.S. national security was the highest priority. In this agenda setting stage of the policy process it is common to set both a public and institutional objective, but this was not the case for those involved in the early planning stages of Paperclip. In the Brewer and deLeon policy model the public agenda includes issues that the general population believe to be most important, and the institutional agenda is constructed from the proposals that make it through the initial planning stage.103 For Operation Paperclip policy these two agendas were one in the same.

This is the first instance that Paperclip policy developed too quickly in its planning thus making it necessary to regress later in its implementation. The initiation of Operation Overcast had already determined that transferring German technological reparations in the form of scientists was worth the risk of going against the legally binding London Protocol by exploiting Soviet- controlled territory. Overcast was originally initiated to obtain information from the German scientists, but once the American military realized the value of the technicians, Operation

Paperclip was necessary for their immigration to the U.S.104

Along with ending the war and surpassing Soviet technology, the U.S. military also made denying the Soviets this knowledge a top priority. The weight placed on deniability caused the

Paperclip immigration policy to be rushed from the start. The U.S. military had to make a deal with the German scientists and plan their immigration before Soviet troops arrived at their

102 Clarence J. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 297. 103 Brewer & deLeon, The Foundations of Policy Analysis, 33. 104 James McGovern, Crossbow and Overcast, (New York: Paperback Library, 1966), 100.

43 occupation zone. The War Department created a committee to develop a more tangible policy for exploiting the German scientists. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) created a temporary plan, resembling a loose policy, to bring the individuals to the U.S., but it was denied by the State-

War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) due to lack of specifics on the future exploitation of the scientists.105 Plans were still in place for “long range policies and procedures,” at this point, still without President Truman’s approval. Head of the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development, Vannevar Bush discussed his concerns with President Truman that American technicians were at risk of losing their own prestige or positions in the scientific community if

Germans experts were brought into the workforce. These concerns were not heeded, and the project moved forward.

In April 1945 JCS 1067 set a precedent for the treatment of postwar Germany and its citizens, part of which stated that further production and development of arms, ammunition, and all other implements of war were to be prohibited. The U.S. military was to “seize…all facilities used in the production of any of the items mentioned…and dispose of them as follows: remove all those required for reparation.”106 Ideally, U.S. troops would secure all beneficial items relating to German rocketry, including both written notes and rocket parts, leaving nothing of value for the Soviets. U.S. forces were also directed to shut down all laboratories and research institutions in Germany. Additionally, if the work being done was of interest to the U.S., then the associated personnel should be detained, and their research removed.107 Truman’s administration was already aware of the immense advantage that German scientists brought in coming to the

U.S., but the president still needed convincing that the benefits outweighed potential security

105 Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations, 39. 106 The United States Embassy, April 1945, JCS 1067, Section 30, accessed 27 November 2016, http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga3-450426.pdf. 107 Ibid., Section 31.

44 risks. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace wrote to Truman that the information that these men possessed “would advance the frontiers of scientific knowledge for national benefit.”108

The sixth paragraph of the JCS directive states that participants in the program who were members of the Nazi party and proved to be more than “nominal participants” were not permitted to participate in public office, or other positions of authority. Those considered active participants in Nazism included individuals who were active in their party membership at any level, were involved in Nazi crimes, including racial persecution and discrimination, belief in

Nazi principles, or provided ethical or material aid to the Nazi Party or its officials. Any individual who showed signs of violating these guidelines was prohibited from holding employment, as listed above, in the United States.109 The JCS 1067 directive was an early initiative to create an immigration policy allowing the German technicians into the U.S, but more importantly it allowed the U.S. to remove the scientists and their materials from the Soviet occupied zone.

To maintain quick momentum of the German scientists’ immigration to the U.S.,

SWNCC passed the 257/5 directive on 4 March 1946. This report stated that SWNCC “directed its Subcommittee for Europe to prepare a paper on the exploitation of German scientists and technicians as a matter of urgency and to collaborate with the Joint Intelligence Committee

(JIC).”110 The document was completed within a month and warned of British, and more threatening, Soviet attempts to secure German technicians. The efforts were declared to be in the name of national interest or “for reasons of national security.”111

108 Annie Jacobson, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program That Brought Nazi Scientists to America (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2014), 202. 109 U.S. Embassy, JCS 1067, Paragraph 6, Section c. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 42. Also see: Larry A. Valero, “The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947,” Central Intelligence Agency, last modified 14 April 14 2007, accessed 26 November 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-

The rush to secure an immigration policy for Operation Paperclip led to a tangle of subcommittees, critics, and disorganized information, and although President Truman approved

SWNCC 257/5, it faced numerous issues and had trouble with its implementation. Under

Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, a proponent of the program, was the recipient of more internal protests that argued for the German technicians to only enter the U.S. as prisoners of war and to deny them immigrant status. SWNCC 257/5 had been executed by Truman in a cabinet meeting in March 1946, but the directive was delayed, somewhat internally due to moral-based concerns.112 In August 1946 the JCS presented a new directive for Operation Paperclip, SWNCC

257/22, which Truman approved on 3 September, thus increasing the total number of German scientists and their families permitted to enter the U.S. to 1,000.113 Despite the moral outcry from a minority of political officials, the political red tape, and the debates between departments,

Operation Paperclip was in motion. In the summer of 1945 the initial mission statement of

Paperclip was:

“Find out first what ‘the Germans knew about weapons, radar, synthetic rubber, torpedoes, rockets, jet engines, infrared, communications, and such other things…Secondly they were to gather information that could help shorten the war against Japan…Finally the CIOS teams were to located and detain—even intern— German scientists and technicians to interrogate them for information…and to prevent them from slipping away to seek safe haven in another country and continue their wartime research and development programs and projects.”114

studies/studies/summer00/art06.html. Valero, Director of University of Texas El Paso’s National Security Studies Institute, recounts the estimate reports published by the JIC. He states that many of these reports concerned the “military capabilities and future intentions of the USSR.” He also includes assessment of JIC 250/4 which found that eight to ten “leading German scientists in the field of guided missiles were missing and believed to be in Soviet custody,” as well as fears that the Peenemünde facility was within the Soviet occupation zone. 112 Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations, 43. Note: Samuel Klaus was part of the JIOA Governing Board. Colleagues of Klaus argued that he purposefully delayed the implementation of the program due to his strong belief that any former Nazi residing in the U.S., let alone working for the military, was a proven threat.; Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy, 187; Simpson, Blowback, 36. 113 Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations, 48. 114 Ibid., 3.

The program rapidly expanded as policy continued to shift and U.S. officials saw potential in the newly acquired German intelligence.

In August 1946 Under Secretary of State Acheson urged President Truman to act quickly on executive approval of Operation Paperclip, which was really just a continuance of the already implemented program. Authorization of this policy not only expanded the program but also allowed for the German scientists already in the U.S. to extend their contracts. Shortly after,

Truman officially approved Paperclip’s continuation, and the JIC released JCS 1696 evaluating the current Soviet threat. Words such as “apocalyptic” and “anything but humanitarian” were used to describe the Communist power’s perceived threat level.115 The catch was that War

Department officials had already acted upon the decision to employ the scientists in the U.S. and deny them to the Soviets. Once again, the policy behind this project was managed by only a small cadre of individuals rather than a larger, centralized agency. By keeping the authority of

Paperclip to a small group of decision makers the operation was not subjected to objective evaluation. At this point in Paperclip legal procedures were merely decoration rather than a means to measure the operation’s progress. A selection phase, technically, was only necessary to obtain Truman’s official approval of the project, which had already been enacted without presidential authority.

The internal debates that took place in the beginning stages of Paperclip continued and sabotaged any efforts to determine the potential impact of the project’s continuation or termination. Within the War Department, Military Director of the Manhattan Project, General

Leslie Groves, sent out a memorandum voicing his strong reservations against using German scientists in U.S. atomic energy programs. He argued, “If they are allowed to see or discuss the

115 Jacobson, Operation Paperclip, 229.

47 work of the Project the security of our information would get out of control.”116 These types of objections fell mostly on deaf ears. The main priority was to minimize the possibility of German scientists employed by the Soviets, thus minimizing the chance of Soviet espionage. Director of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA), Navy Captain Bosquet N. Wev responded,

“Nazism no longer should be a serious consideration from a viewpoint of national security when the far greater threat of Communism is now jeopardizing the entire world…To continue to treat

Nazi affiliations as significant considerations has been aptly phrased as ‘beating a dead Nazi horse.”117 This sentiment illustrates a critical turning point toward Cold War national security imperatives and how they informed Operation Paperclip. As sociologist Allen Hunter argues,

U.S. policymaking at the end of WWII was rooted in a “Theodore Rooseveltian” mentality that positioned order and control in the place of stability.118 This crafted the belief that the U.S. had to obtain these German experts, or the entire nation suffered.

It was not just internally that Operation Paperclip immigration policy was receiving criticism. Dissent from top scientists was made public through newspaper and journal articles. In a New York Times piece released on 30 December 1946 both Hans A. Bethe and Albert

Einstein’s criticisms of the program were argued on behalf of the Council Against Intolerance, a group that educated the public on America’s cultural diversity. The official protest, signed by more than forty scientists, educators, and other citizens, was sent to President Truman and

Secretary of War, Robert Patterson. The protest’s main warning was to prohibit the newly

116 NSA, 5 April 1995, Attn: Members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments from the Advisory Committee Staff. Post-World War II Recruitment of German Scientists - -Project Paperclip, Section 1, accessed 27 November 2016, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/radiation/dir/mstreet/commeet/meet13/brief13/tab_f/br13f3.txt. 117 Ibid., Section 3. 118 Allen Hunter ed., Rethinking the Cold War (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 38.

48 arrived German scientists from becoming permanent American citizens.119 Less than two months later Bethe authored a similar piece published in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. In it Bethe explains to the reader that Paperclip may have very well been necessary, but the immigration policy that jump started the program was duplicitous. His three main concerns were: citizenship of the Paperclip participants, the “preferred treatment” of the individuals, and the possibility of their permanent employment.120 He also revealed that there was little evidence that American scientists were being trained to eventually replace the German experts. Bethe warned his readers that the German scientists that were now living and working in the U.S. posed serious potential threats, including: exacerbating Cold War tensions with Russia due to Nazi Germany’s hate for the Soviet Union, and the possibility of the scientists advocating, consciously or subconsciously, their former Nazi ideologies. Bethe echoes the article from months prior, and recommends that these former Nazi scientists not be granted permanent stay, as well as screening by a civilian group that would include American scientists.

Expendable Values

For Paperclip, policy values and concerns voiced by Bethe and others were weighed early on and then taken out of the equation because they were impeding implementation of the operation. Bradley Dewey, president of the American Chemical Society, wrote to Secretary of

Commerce Henry Wallace that the necessity to obtain German research materials justified the extreme measures that had to be taken to acquire such information. In his estimation of the operation, Dewey stated that proven research already executed by someone else is invaluable to the U.S. economy and national defense, and “will pay many times over the cost of the entire

119 “Citizenship Opposed for Nazi Scientists,” New York Times, 30 December 1946, 21. 120 H.A. Bethe and H.S. Sack, “German Scientists in Army Employment: II-A Protest,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3, no. 2 (February 1947): 65-67.

49 investigation.”121 Support of the project was so overwhelming by those in the State and War

Departments that no other options on how to handle the immigration policy were seriously considered. To build a strong policy foundation, according to Brewer and deLeon, it is necessary to provide alternatives to the dominant idea proposed.122 Nowhere in the Paperclip policy cycle were other possibilities presented, therefore no thorough evaluation of consequences could take place. Instead of listening to various options, navigating the positives and negatives of the suggestions, and making a centralized decision, Paperclip policy was what could be considered a

“one and done” process.123

The actual implementation of the mission that became Operation Paperclip dates back to

1944, well before any estimation of the project occurred. Special investigative teams were ordered by the War Department to “interrogate Hitler’s scientists, locate and microfilm documents, and confiscate all useful equipment found in laboratories and factories.”124 At this point, there was not an official presidential order or policy regarding these activities for U.S. forces in Germany. The War Department’s main objective was to gather scientific knowledge to defeat Axis powers and to advance U.S. military technology for the post-war era. In fact, it was simply to gather such knowledge to be used for any potential exploitation. At this same time an operation designated “Safehaven” was created to prevent German experts from fleeing to other

121 Gimbel, Science, Technology and Reparations, 24-25. Note: Copies of Dewey’s report were also sent to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Treasury Secretary John W. Snyder, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of Navy James Forrestal, as well as other military and government personnel. 122 “Public Policy Theory,” UNF, 3. 123 NARA, 30 June 1940- 12 April 2002, Select Documents Released Under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Acts Relating to Nazi War Crimes: Operation Paperclip, DG 2of2, ID: 26156388, 12. It should be noted here that if a true estimation of Paperclip had occurred prior to its implementation there would have been moral issues that needed addressing. In this report, American forces are directed to act freely within their own zone and were given permission to procure what they deemed necessary from other occupied zones. While collecting German reparations, and initiating Overcast and Paperclip, American forces were without strict policy to guide their actions. 124 Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 7, 9.

50 countries to continue their research.125 This operation took place during President Franklin

Roosevelt’s term, who did not hide his disdain for bringing German scientists to America. On 1

December 1944 OSS Chief William Donovan requested special privileges for Germans recruited for “U.S. intelligence agencies.” Roosevelt provided Donovan with a resounding denial of the request:

I do not believe that we should offer any guarantees of protection in the post- hostilities period to Germans who are working for your organization. I think that the carrying out of any such guarantees would be difficult and probably be widely misunderstood both in this country and abroad. We may expect that the number of Germans who are anxious to save their skins and property will rapidly increase. Among them may be some who should properly be tried for war crimes or at least arrested for active participation in Nazi activities. Even with the necessary controls you mention I am not prepared to authorize the giving of guarantees.126 Roosevelt’s warnings were not heeded as Paperclip took shape; the temptation to acquire German innovations was too difficult to resist.

Brewer and deLeon argue that the act of employing a policy is what should give the agenda setting and selection stages merit. Without proper implementation procedures, they are simply

“intellectual exercises.”127 The issue at the forefront of the U.S. government’s agenda was the impending Cold War threat by the Soviet Union. This was considered the primary crisis. The previously discussed three stages of the policymaking process were completely reliant on implementation occurring first. Paperclip’s immigration policy only developed after a quick implementation, which completely negated any estimation of the program. Paperclip was so rushed that the initial group of scientists sent from Germany entered the U.S. twice, the second time leaving, and then traveling back through Ciudad, Mexico where the men received visas, and then

125 Ibid., Note: “Safehaven” planning officials were most concerned with German scientists fleeing to Latin America, but this lessened some with the start of the Cold War; this issue was replaced by the fear that the Soviets might surpass the U.S. in the war over technology. 126 Ibid., 9-10. 127 Brewer and deLeon, The Foundations of Policy Analysis, 249.

51 formally entered Texas under the Immigration and Nationality Act.128 These considerations only briefly occurred after the fact and were, therefore, no longer relevant. Once the program had been set in motion, a review of advantages or shortcomings were nil, as planning for either should have already taken place to utilize appropriate measures.

Because Operation Paperclip began before its immigration policy became an executive order, the lines between the estimation, selection, and implementation phases were muddled.

Rocket expert and star of the Paperclip program von Braun and a portion of his team were brought over to the U.S. in early autumn 1945, well before Truman signed off on the operation.129 With Germany having just surrendered, the JCS began pushing for an official policy that allowed German scientists to enter the United States. Undersecretary of War, Robert

Patterson, did not approve of the idea, and argued that the German experts were a serious security threat. The JCS passed the policy, Overcast, anyways. To appease Patterson a clause was placed in the policy that banned known or alleged war criminals from entering the U.S.130

Since Overcast was meant to be a temporary policy there was no follow-up or termination of the program, which then conveniently turned into Operation Paperclip. Executive direction of how to handle the permanent immigration of these technicians came about a year later. In June 1946, the

War Department released guidelines on the arrival of the scientists, initially specifying that immigration of these individuals was for national security reasons as well as national interests.

The basis of national security was placed under the army and navy services, with implementation directed by the JIOA. National security interests were directed under the Department of

Commerce. The former was framed by the need to deny the Soviets any German advances, while

128 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Freedom of Information Act, 1949-1983, Arthur Louis Hugo Rudolph, Part 1 of 1 BUFILE: 105-11507, 331. 129 Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy, 126. 130 Hunt, Secret Agenda, 17-18.

52 the latter was focused on the exploitation of the specialists.131 The War Department memorandum insisted that a complete overhaul of the immigration process for these technicians was needed, as it had grown complicated. Next, it stated that the scientists were to be employed for the good of the American public, therefore, their research should be transparent and most likely employment should take place under non-profit organizations.132

A Second Take on Paperclip’s Immigration Policy

The variety of individuals that were entering the U.S was complicated by the multiple categories of visa statuses required. For security purposes visas were only granted after a certain level of security clearance had been passed, and different types of immigrants were entering the country, thus necessitating different statuses of visas. Before this immigration policy was solidified, the scientists traveled from Germany to Texas via Mexico, with von Braun’s team residing in Fort Bliss. The War Department memorandum cited two previous legal actions as precedents for the guidelines set, and that the detainees should enter the U.S. through military custody versus standard immigration laws.133 The initial immigration policy for Paperclip permitted a total of 100 German and Austrian technicians to immigrate to the U.S., which was later changed and grew to around 1600. There was concern over keeping track of so many incoming German citizens, and in order to alleviate issues from “the visa people” Assistant

131 NARA, Operation Paperclip, 2. 132 Ibid., 4. Note: It is also mentioned that technicians may work for private enterprises and specific guidelines on this are explained on pages 4-6. 133 Ibid., 8-10. The two adjudications that the report references are Kaplan v. Tod 267 U.S. 228 (1925) and Section 30 of the June 28, 1940 Immigration Act which states that, “Any alien seeking to enter the United States who does not present a visa (except in emergency cases determined [sic] by the Secretary of State), a re-entry permit, or a border crossing identification card, shall be excluded from admission to the United States.” The report also states that Kaplan v. Tod established “the doctrine that excludable aliens permitted to stay here in custody conditionally could not claim to have entered the United States under the immigration laws whether as immigrants or non- immigrants.” The directive goes on to describe the German technicians as assimilating into “the category of prisoners of war.” In the Kaplan case “excludable” aliens remain in the U.S. out of physical necessity until further accommodations are made determining either expulsion or a continual stay in the country. In the case of the German technicians the report makes clear that their circumstances differ, as they are expected to work and stay in the U.S. for the duration they are needed or “wishes to stay for that purpose.”

Secretary of War, Howard Petersen, was sure to specify that “No known or alleged war criminals” were allowed into the country. By wording the policy this way many U.S. officials hoped to bring the German scientists to America before it was “too late.”134

Klaus, of the JIOA Governing Board, sent a memorandum that spelled out the issues that arose from the quick expansion of Paperclip. He stated that Colonel Ford insisted on allowing all desired German scientists to come over to the U.S., providing shortcuts for immigration. Klaus argued for the necessity of detailed background investigations of the technicians. The men settled on a decision to leave immigration transactions to the Department of Commerce, only after investigation by the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). Their point of agreement fell upon the notion that denial must happen immediately.135 Once again, the foundation for this policy was built upon the rushed desire to deny the Soviets these assets, but the details were continuously debated and altered depending on who was holding the most influence at the time.

H. Graham Morrison, former Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United

States under Truman, discussed the twenty-four-hour window in which the American military secured the immigration of von Braun. Morrison was ordered to configure the best way to obtain the remaining German scientists that the “Russians were systematically recruiting.”136 Morrison recounts the calls he made to the Air Force, Immigrations Services, the Department of the

Treasury, and Secretary of War, Patterson. He also shared the widely-held opinion that there were German technicians that the U.S. was unable to acquire because the Soviet Union moved faster, stating “There were some that we lost because this thing had not come to a head quick

134 Jacobson, Operation Paperclip, 228. 135 NARA, Operation Paperclip, 27. 136 H. Graham Morison, interview by Jerry N. Hess, 4 August 1972, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum Oral History Collection, Washington D.C., online access, https://trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/morison2.htm#transcript, 147.

54 enough for us to take action.”137 Two camps continued to emerge from the Operation Paperclip implementation: those who wanted to stall the rushed progress of the program and those who could not seem to push ahead quickly enough.

On 27 June 1947 detailed directions were sent out via Army Intelligence on the parameters of the Paperclip program and its participants. These had been loosely issued in years prior, but it was not until this memorandum that the rules were sanctioned. The main objective stated on the memo was to keep America’s reputation in the intelligence community in high regard. The third point on the list insisted that persons formerly belonging to the National

Socialist Party should be eliminated from the program unless their necessity to the mission could be clearly demonstrated. Another guideline stated that American officials were to be present at all intelligence projects developed by von Braun as well as present and aware of conversations among his team members. Also, a “strict” register of funds, supplies, and agent records were to be always readily available to American officials.138 These belated guidelines were helpful in alleviating some of Paperclip policy’s confusion, but were far too late to make much of an impact on the project’s organizational troubles.

John Gimbel writes on some of the overwhelmingly positive evaluations of the program’s outcomes. He cites a Department of Commerce official who wrote in 1947 that “German technology will save billions of dollars for American industry…and should advance our own research by several years.”139 Initially, Operation Paperclip seemed like a gleaming success to

137 Ibid., 149-150. 138 NSA, Recommendations drawn up at request of Gen. Chamberlin for the attention of Gen. Walsh; Dieter Huzel, From Peenemünde to Canaveral (London: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 222-226. In this autobiography Huzel, a German technician and participant in Operation Paperclip, recounts the process of traveling from Germany to America and it is especially important to examine his notes on the first few months in the U.S. He calls the first days in America “very pleasant” and that the treatment by American personnel was much better than the Russians, despite rumors otherwise. Huzel also claims that their backgrounds and contracts were still very secretive in 1946. Because these men did not come into the U.S. through normal immigration procedures they did not have true identification papers. 139 Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations, 148.

55 those involved. They had managed to bring German specialists to the U.S. before an official long-term policy was agreed upon, and then extended their visit to permanent employment in various government and military institutions. The total number of scientists permitted to enter the country was increased almost immediately and officials were able to protect their “reparations” from extradition during the operation’s pinnacle. Despite this, a memorandum from the OSI in

May 1950 adopts a more negative outlook. The report disparages the program’s inability to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining German technology, calling it an “almost complete failure.” It goes on to criticize the operation, pointing out that the “U.S.S.R. had…taken a number of outstanding German scientific personnel, who would be of use in atomic energy and other programs.”140 The same report stated that in 1946 there was already a call to terminate the program as it had not been as successful as officials had hoped. The main issue found to be the downfall of the program’s success was the inability to secure a resolute immigration policy throughout the stages of the operation.

The most obvious issue with program was officials’ inability to fully evaluate the policy to determine the level of desired outcomes reached and if resources should be allocated elsewhere for improved output.141 Because Paperclip relied on the immigration policy’s implementation occurring before any other stage, specifically estimation and selection, an objective evaluation of the program’s success could not be conducted. As seen in Gimbel’s recounting of this narrative, department officials who evaluated the project were more extreme in their opinions. They tended to either be in full support of what the program had accomplished,

140 NARA, Records of the CIA 1894-2002, Paperclip [PROJECT], Second Release of Subject Files Under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Acts, ID: 19068640, RG 263, 47. 141 See: Carl V. Patton and David S. Sawicki. Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993). Specifically note page 363, where the authors explore in detail the evaluation stage of the policy cycle.

56 therefore pushing for its continuation, or they felt it had not reached its potential and could have been more aggressive in its implementation.

Outside of government officials’ opinions, the public’s assessment of Paperclip was tainted due to the lack of transparency of the program. Because Operation Paperclip was kept in secret for so long, and only recently have certain documents been declassified, the public based their opinions upon very little knowledge and data, most coming from newspapers. In an article published in May 1947 out of Frankfurt, Germany, a U.S. Army official is quoted as saying that the Germans’ work has “already put the United States 10 years ahead of schedule in some fields of research and has saved millions of dollars in research costs.”142 Another article published in

1949 discussed the success of Paperclip by including mundane facts that were unrelated to the program. It begins by reassuring the public that 80% of Germany’s top scientists who agreed to immigrate to the U.S. for research will remain to work in the country. The article reveals details about the scientists’ and their families’ citizenship applications. The most politically opinionated line in the story occurs when the author calls the German brain drain a “spirited race with the

British and Russian military authorities who were bent on the same venture,” which the U.S. seems to have won.143

Another article published in 1950 illustrated the merging of government and public national security objectives with concern to Operation Paperclip’s continuation. This piece written for the El Paso Herald Post quotes government official who guarantees that they had no choice but to “outrageously” coddle the German technicians because letting them return to

Germany or any other country was highly dangerous. He goes onto say that the scientists knew

142 “350 Germans Aid U.S. Science,” Kenosha Evening News (Kenosha, WI), 17 May 1947. 143 “Alien Scientists Choose U.S. As ‘Homeland,’” Salt Lake Tribune, 4 January 1949. Note: the article was originally published in Washington D.C. on 1 January 1949.

57 more than American generals and admirals did, and their future work in the U.S. was an

“otherwise unobtainable contribution to our military effort.”144 This last quote is quickly followed by a one-line statement that no criminals were included in Paperclip’s roster. The article provides an Army estimation from 1946 that Operation Paperclip scientists saved the U.S. up to $775 million in research.145 This estimate, however, was not verified by any other government documents. In another article from 1950 Secretary of Defense George Marshall and

Undersecretary Robert Lovett called for the termination of Paperclip, citing the need to cut defense spending by $15 billion per year. The officials also argued for new staff to be employed, taking over for the principal organizers of the original operation.146

Termination?

Hunt has argued that although Paperclip lost momentum in the early to mid-1950s, the project did not fold until 1973.147 The fast-paced momentum of Paperclip did not seem to slow down until 1952 when conflict between the JIOA and the CIA erupted. Both had hands in the governance of West Germany, and German ambassadors cautioned U.S. officials that Operation

Paperclip violated NATO agreements. The JCS, obligated to follow NATO policies, began to

“lose its indominable grip on the program.”148 The CIA did not operate under NATO policy and continued to bring German scientists to the U.S. until the two branches were made to compromise, each allowed to continue working with current participants in the program. No new

German technicians were permitted to be recruited, and Operation Paperclip evolved into two

144 Jim G. Lucas, “U.S. Can’t Afford to Send German Scientists Home; Know Our Military Secrets,” El Paso Herald Post, 9 February 1950. 145 Ibid., For more information on Law No. 25 for immigration of the German technicians and definitions of “ardent Nazi” see: Allied Control Authority Germany, Jan./Feb. 1946, Enactments and Approved Papers, Vol. 2, accessed 27 November 2016, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/Volume-II.pdf. 146 Stewart Alsop, “Matter of Fact,” Sheboygan Press Telegram, 17 November 1950. This article followed the NCS- 68 report that called for tripling the defense budget; Lovett also served on the NCS Study Group Committee. 147 Hunt, Secret Agenda, 228. 148 Jacobson, Operation Paperclip, 376.

58 different programs: The Defense Scientists Immigration Program (DEFSIP) under the JIOA and a CIA operation called the National Interest Program.149

That same year an extension operation called “Project 63” was well underway. The main objective was for U.S. troops and fellow scientists to travel to West Germany and recruit additional experts for immigration, thus denying them from the Soviets. In a memorandum written on 27 February 1952, Lieutenant Colonel Gerold Crabbe, Deputy Director of the JIOA, dictated taking another group to Germany to continue recruitment for the project. From other reports on Project 63, there was evidence of more planning and organization for this mission than

Paperclip itself. Management of the operation met in March 1952, to weigh the “good points and bad points and how to implement it.”150 Although selection and evaluation were somewhat apparent in this operation’s policymaking process, it was a subsidiary of Paperclip and therefore had an already weak immigration policy foundation. Still, in 1954, rosters of Project 63 were being sent out through the CIA and continued to claim that the individuals taking part in this operation were of “high caliber” and made “extremely valuable contributions to our national defense effort.”151 But, the JIOA was disbanded in 1962 and the meager scraps of Operation

Paperclip were managed by the Research and Engineering Department at the Pentagon.152

While the U.S. military was recruiting and making deals with former Nazi scientists, they were also compelled to bring suspected war criminals to justice because they were fighting a

“world-wide demand for immediate, unhesitating, and undiscriminating vengeance.”153

149 Ibid., Also, for more information on the early 1950s governance of West Germany see: Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1997, specifically chapter 4. 150 NARA, Paperclip [PROJECT], 90. 151 Ibid., 96. 152 Jacobson, Operation Paperclip, 377. Note: Jacobson explains the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 which was created to dictate the “military’s scientific and engineering needs under a scientific director who reported to the Secretary of Defense.” She notes that this act also opened the door for the creation of ARPA (later, DARPA). 153 Zachary D. Kaufman, United States Law and Policy on Transitional Justice: Principles, Politics, and Pragmatics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 83.

Operation Paperclip began and continued as a misguided double standard. Because ethical considerations were left out of the policymaking process the German technicians were treated as valuable reparations, and reparations do not need to be denazified, demilitarized or investigated for war crimes, they are merely a means to an end.154 Various authors have argued for and against the idea that professionalism is to be “technically and rationally proficient,” but this should not and does not equate to being ethical.155 Whether or not officials agreed with the mission of Operation Paperclip, it cannot be denied that its policy process was not given the appropriate attention it needed to take shape. What remained was a broken immigration policy, without any real evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses which resulted in a policy that is still somewhat cloaked in secrecy today. This secrecy made it possible for von Braun and Rudolph to escape their Nazi pasts while working for the U.S. military, but after three decades of loyal service their legacies would look very different.

154 Matthias Judt and Burghard Ciesla ed., Technology Transfer Out of Germany After 1945 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996), 57. 155 Leo W.J.C. Huberts, Jeroen Maesschalck, and Carole L. Jurkiewicz ed., Ethics and Integrity of Governance (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2008), 87.

CHAPTER IV. HOW TO SUCCESSFULLY BECOME AN AMERICAN

Disney Darling: Von Braun’s Post-War Career

Wernher Von Braun exited the war highly sought after, by both the U.S. and Soviet

Russia. He was quickly brought to the U.S. to begin his work in rocketry, and the publicity surrounding von Braun grew during the immediate years following his arrival. Matthew

Brzezinski, author of Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries that Ignited the Space

Age, writes that the publicity surrounding von Braun and his colleagues is what clued the public in to their immigration to the U.S. In particular, complaints about living conditions were discussed in several reports. In one such article Walter Riedel spoke about American food, calling the chicken “rubberized.”156 These inconspicuous reports illustrated a general attitude of

156 Virginia Strom, “American Cooking Tasteless, Says German Rocket Scientist; Dislikes Rubberized Chicken,” El Paso Herald Post, 6 December 1946, 1.

61 disappointment in the conditions at Fort Bliss, and the dissatisfaction of the German scientists.

Von Braun shared this distaste, remarking that they had been coddled at Peenemünde, and was now reporting to a less experienced 26-year-old U.S. Army Major. At the outset it appeared that von Braun had lost some of his power and influence, but his German colleagues still addressed the scientist as Herr Professor.157 In the meantime, von Braun and his team trained military and industrial employees in rocketry and worked on the launching of numerous German V-2s. Von

Braun and the other German technicians were not allowed to leave Fort Bliss unless escorted by military personnel, but this changed when they were moved to Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville,

Alabama in 1950.158 At this point, von Braun did not have to wait long for his prominence to be fully restored.

Von Braun was already comfortable being in the public eye, and his confidence grew with each appearance. The earliest recorded printed articles on von Braun were in December

1946. In one, even at this early date, he is already quoted as saying that building a space platform

5,000 miles above the earth is “technically and theoretically possible.”159 In a piece printed for the Roswell Daily Record, an interview allowed by the army at Fort Bliss, Texas, and White

Sands, New Mexico, von Braun is solely and specifically referenced. He is “credited with being the principal inventor of the missile with which the Nazis blasted London, Antwerp and

Liege.”160 Not only does his name appear alone, but von Braun is also presented in an ironic positive light as being the mind behind Germany’s bombings of major European cities during the

157 Matthew Brzezinski, Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries that Ignited the Space Age (New York City: Holt Paperbacks, 2008), 86-90. 158 Michael J. Neufeld, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 218. 159 “German Scientist Says Platform Can Be Built in Space,” The Evening Observer (Dunkirk, NY), 4 Dec. 1946, 2. 160 Washington D.C. AP, “Germany Pays Off with Help of Scientists,” Roswell Daily Record, 4 Dec. 1946, 1.

62 final months of WWII. His past actions’ value was illustrated to be more important than the violent outcomes. The rehabilitation of von Braun’s public image had only just begun.

In the early 1950s Collier’s offered von Braun the chance to publish his thoughts on space travel. Between 1952 and 1954 the magazine printed a collection of articles on the scientist’s plans for manned space exploration. This was a crucial moment for von Braun. He was provided with the opportunity to move from a military controlled environment to a national media outlet that granted him access to the public to share his exciting ideas for manned space exploration. At the time of the publication of von Braun’s articles the magazine was experiencing a circulation of about four million readers, giving the scientist a broader audience.

But, the biggest turning point for von Braun’s public image was his relationship with Walt

Disney.

Expanding the audience even more, Disney decided to use television as the means to promote his new Southern California theme park, Disneyland. Both the media giant and the

German scientist realized the potential of this new, burgeoning technology to publicize the merger of scientific exploration and man’s imagination. Ward Kimball, then the current senior producer at Disney, was impressed by von Braun’s ability to make space exploration technology comprehensible to the masses. When Kimball approached von Braun to be a technical consultant for Disney, the scientist “pounced on the opportunity.”161 Collier’s planned an entire press campaign to promote the articles, including radio kits, photographs printed in the large news syndicates, and interviews for von Braun on nationally televised programs, including the “Man

161 Mike Wright, “The Disney-Von Braun Collaboration and Its Influence on Space Exploration” (conference paper, Southern Humanities Conference, Huntsville, AL, 12-14 February 1993).

63 in Space” series.162 Von Braun was tasked with popularizing real science, something that his fellow Paperclip colleagues were not commissioned to do.

Disney requested that the German scientist assist in turning content from the Collier’s articles into a television show. The show also served as publicity for an attraction called

Tomorrowland at Disneyland. The futuristic, space-themed section of the park was constructed with help from other scientists, including Willy Ley, who had immigrated to the U.S. almost two decades prior fleeing the rise of the National Socialists in Germany. Von Braun continued to find himself in the company of individuals, such as Ley, who helped create his all-American image, leaving his Nazi past behind him. History of science and religious studies scholar, Catherine L.

Newell, argues that Tomorrowland connected the already conquered frontier, the West, with the forthcoming “American ingenuity and gumption” that soon opened a new frontier “and offer

Americans a chance to recapture the pioneering spirit of the first frontiersmen by settling on the

Moon.”163 At this time, Disney was promoting the idea that the “destiny of every American” was to go beyond the Earth’s atmosphere and continue exploration.164 Von Braun was an important part of the publicity for Tomorrowland, and this was another way to generate his image as a true

American. Disney realized the great promotional value in bringing von Braun’s dreams for space exploration to life, but he also was a believer in the scientist’s vision and thought it to truly be a part of America’s future.165

Von Braun had already become an icon of science and space exploration, but his involvement with Disney’s Tomorrowland series and the “Man in Space” episodes elevated his

162 J.P. Telotte, “Disney in Science Fiction Land,” Journal of Popular Film and Television 33, no. 1 (2005): 15. 163 Catherine L. Newell, “The Strange Case of Dr. von Braun and Mr. Disney: Frontierland, Tomorrowland, and America’s Final Frontier,” Journal of Religion and Popular Culture 25, no. 3 (2013): 416-417. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid.

64 position as an icon in American culture. The scientist was credited with helping the American public realize that space was their next frontier.166 Ley was hired first to be a part of the

Tomorrowland T.V. show, and was a vocal proponent of also hiring von Braun, who quickly became the stand out star of the show.167 Von Braun’s evolution from spokesperson for the U.S. rocketry program to television star also coincided with his swearing in ceremony as an American citizen in April 1955.168 These two events actualized the German scientist’s transformation from former Nazi to American citizen. Von Braun, the mind behind the V-2 bombing of London in

WWII, was given an opportunity that his other Paperclip colleagues did not experience; he was able to cloud the memories of the bombings, and instead replace them with beautiful designs of space aircraft with the help of imaginative Disney animators.

The first episode of Tomorrowland premiered on 9 March 1955. Von Braun was the last of the three German scientists to be introduced, yet his words became the most memorable. The scientist also spoke the last words before an animated space launch simulation closed the episode. Von Braun looked directly into the camera and explained to his audience that the last step towards manned space flight was to build and execute ground testing of the “huge first stage, then [there] would be no more test flights. When all the sections are joined together the

166 Ibid., 418. 167 Ibid., 420. Dr. Heinz Haber, the third member of the show’s cast, was later found to have conducted high altitude and highspeed experiments on Dachau concentration camp inmates at the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut fur Physik. He did so to gather information for the German Luftwaffe Institute for Aviation Medicine. Inmates who survived the physicians’ experiments were often killed then dissected for further study. Also see: Johannes Barh, Paul Erker, and Geoffrey Giles, “The Politics of Ambiguity: Reparations, Business Relations, Denazification, and the Allied Transfer of Technology,”on the Deutsche Physik movement as the best know example of the Nazification of physics and how many German technicians joined the National Socialist party because they saw it as a lesser evil compared to the “extreme politicization” of the Deutsche Physik movement. 168 Neufeld, Von Braun, 287-290.

65 ship and its crew will be ready for man’s first flight in space.”169 Von Braun’s voice was the last thing the audience heard as they witnessed the potential for space exploration.

Although von Braun was the youngest scientist working on the show, he held an unmatched power to captivate his superiors and the public through his polished appearance, approachable mannerisms, and the trust he had built with Disney to be the one who introduced space flight as an obtainable ambition. The scientist’s effect on the public was made even more powerful by the magnitude of viewers that he was reaching. The first episode of Tomorrowland was watched by over forty-two million Americans, with the second episode, “Man and the

Moon,” bringing in an even larger audience.170 During the second installment of the

Tomorrowland series, von Braun is seen side by side with four handsome American actors portraying astronauts. The image of “square-jawed” astronauts was constructed by Disney to portray patriotism, bravery, and courage. This representation was designed to include von Braun in the same all-American image as the astronauts, with his voice as the narration.171 Just two years later the actors standing next to von Braun were replaced with the real thing. The first seven actual American astronauts employed by NASA, the Mercury Seven, became overnight celebrities and household names. They graced magazine covers, and gained the reputation of being hard workers and hard partiers. The German scientist was associated with these space celebrities, which enhanced his own connection with the American public.172 Von Braun was

169 Man in Space, directed by Ward Kimball (Disney, 1955), video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFXza9RH7-E. 170 Newell, “The Strange Case,” 421. The second episode, “Man and the Moon,” premiered on 28 December 1955. 171 Ibid., The actors even wore the German scientist’s “bottle suit” design which functioned as a space suit. The “bottle suit” was a one-man space vehicle with seven mechanical arms that were designed to work on assembly of the space station. The suit was small, measuring 250 feet in diameter, but made it possible for crew members to repair the space station. The suit was demonstrated on the T.V. series’ set by producers mimicking a meteor strike on the spaceship, and a crew member, wearing the bottle suit, emerged to repair the ship. See: Harlen Makemson, Media, NASA, and America’s Quest for the Moon, 2009, 18. 172 Michael White, Acid Tongues and Tranquil Dreamers: Tales of Bitter Rivalry that Fueled the Advancement of Science and Technology (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 319.

66 helping to create American heroes and making it possible for them to explore what was once thought to be only a dream.

The third episode, “Mars and Beyond,” premiered on 4 December 1957, and rounded out what was praised as a “perfect medium for offering access to discovery, and primed America for its new frontier.”173 This secured von Braun’s status as an American cultural symbol who had made space exploration seem an attainable reality. Disney had cultivated the American public’s fascination with rocketry into a permanent part of the culture, and von Braun’s numerous public appearances put a face to space exploration in the U.S. As such, at this point, a reinvestigation of von Braun’s German past was too great a risk for the American military. A reinvestigation of the famous scientist had the potential to discredit much of what he had already researched and shared with the American public. This risk was exacerbated for Rudolph, and other colleagues who mostly stayed out of the public eye, because they could not rely on a powerful public image.

The [Not] So Mad Scientist: Portrayals in American Popular Culture

Beginning in the early 1940s American cartoons began taking advantage of the reverse of von Braun’s image. One of the original depictions of a German mad scientist is seen in 1941’s

“The Mad Scientist,” an episode in the Superman series. Although the protagonist does not have a clearly discernable accent, it is easy to detect Germanic influence. The scientist also displayed the typical balding hairline and angular facial features that are seen in later animations. The scientist, to no surprise, kidnaps Lois Lane and roughs her up before the American hero,

Superman, swoops in and saves the girl and the world from evil.174 Rudolph, with his balding head, stout build, and plain dress resembled these mad scientists much more closely. Someone

173 Newell, “The Strange Case,” 422. 174 Superman, “The Mad Scientist,” film, directed by Dave Fleischer, (1941; New York: Fleischer Studios, distributed by Paramount Pictures.), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_frD6bGp63U.

67 with von Braun’s handsome exterior, and brilliant mind was not linked with such animated characterizations. Thus, scientists that instead resembled Rudolph were unapproachable and un-

American.

It was not just the mad scientist trope that cartoons began to reproduce. In 1961, Disney released the first animation with Ludwig von Drake, seen in the Donald Duck series. Drake was supposedly said to have hailed from Vienna, Austria, and spoke with a thick, blatant German accent. He bore the classic balding style of most animated scientists. Despite this, Drake was credited with being brilliant, and knowing everything about anything. This brilliance did not come without a cost, according to Disney. Drake was self-described as being “kooky,” and calling him eccentric would be too polite.175 Kimball, who later helped von Braun catapult into

Disney-branded popularity via the Tomorrowland television series, also worked on the Drake animations.

In other Looney Toons produced animations, such as “Birth of a Notion,” the Peter Lorre inspired mad scientist helped set another trope seen in the later Daffy Duck cartoons.176 Lorre had a recognizably unique image, one which Looney Toons used as inspiration for its mad scientist. The production company played up the actor’s features, giving the scientist bulging eyes, oversized teeth, and the all too familiar balding head.177 In later years, the German mad scientist in popular media became less eccentric and more menacing. For example, there was a direct connection between Paperclip and pop culture when the 1964 film, Dr. Strangelove, was

175 David Smith, Disney A to Z, (Glendale, CA: Disney Editions, 1998), 337. 176 Michael Newton, “Peter Lorre: Master of the Macabre,” The Guardian, last modified 12 September 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/film/2014/sep/12/peter-lorre-master-macabre-bfi. Note: Lorre was born in Hungary, but eventually moved to Germany to jumpstart his acting career. Lorre was a professed Jew, and when the Nazis came to power he fled to Paris. It is there that he met Alfred Hitchcock and began his American acting career. 177 Daffy Duck, “Birth of a Notion,” film, directed by Robert McKimson (1946; Burbank, CA: Warner Bros. Pictures, 1947.), http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1ym6dj_daffy-duck-ep-41-birth-of-a-notion_fun.

68 released. The film’s directors commented that the titular character was modeled after several scholars and scientists. One of these real-life influences for the directors was none other than von

Braun.178

The creative mind behind Strangelove, Stanley Kubrick, was well versed in the current space race and Cold War panic sweeping the nation. Kubrick even created an early working title for the film, “A Delicate Balance of Terror,” from a 1959 Foreign Affairs article by RAND

Corporation mathematician, Albert Wohlstetter. Although Kubrick decided to make a dark comedy instead, Wohlstetter’s work with nuclear arms policy and criticisms of mutual assured destruction, still influenced the film’s themes and its characters. The main character, Dr.

Strangelove, was described by Kubrick himself to resemble von Braun, versus “beetle-browed

Edward Teller.”179 Strangelove could be interpreted as a conglomeration of both Paperclip scientists, having the obsessiveness of Rudolph and the arrogance of von Braun. It is easy now, to see that Strangelove was perhaps an illustration of von Braun’s “repressed Nazism,” but at that time the scientist had already surpassed scrutiny by becoming a Disney darling.180

“Eight Lost Years:” The Post-Sputnik Push for Space Exploration

Having already established a positive public image, von Braun, unlike Rudolph and their colleagues, boldly spoke out against the U.S. government during the Sputnik crisis from 1957-

1958. Shortly after the Soviet satellite was launched, Time ran an article that argued the faults of the Truman administration. The article stated that there were “eight lost years” after the war, and

178 “Who Was Dr. Strangelove?,” Slate, 9 March 1999, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/1999/03/who_was_dr_strangelove.html. 179 Grant B. Stillman, “Two of the MADest Scientists: Where Strangelove Meets Dr. No; or, Unexpected Roots for Kubrick’s Cold War Classic,” Film History 20, no. 4 (2008): 490. Although Teller did not influence the main character’s physical appearance, as von Braun did, the Hungarian physicist did influence Strangelove’s accent. Kubrick admits that Teller’s heavy accent was a part of the character’s persona, but that “his accent isn’t really that close to what Peter did.” The director also notes that the idea that Strangelove was modeled after Henry Kissinger is simply a “popular misconception.” 180 “Who Was Dr. Strangelove?,” Slate, 1999.

69 that the missile program had not been given adequate attention. At this point, U.S. organization of military R&D was “dismal.”181 Von Braun agreed and declared that “the United States did relatively little about rocket research until the beginning of the Korean War.”182 Von Braun and former President Truman were at odds immediately following the Sputnik launches. The scientist maintained his argument that Truman had not utilized available resources properly, and the former president argued that he had. At one point an opinion surfaced that von Braun should accept at least some of the blame because the missile program was under his control. To refute this, von Braun “needed to only point out that he had not even been an American citizen at the time he was said to have held the nation’s missile programme in his hands.”183 Von Braun did not back down, even when facing ridicule, and instead softened his response by claiming that the reason the missile program was not aggressive enough was because the American people wanted homes, automobiles, and other more classic innovations rather than long-range rockets.184 At this point, although NASA had not prioritized von Braun’s research, nor was the scientist given the resources to begin a serious space exploration program, the German rocket expert’s status was elevated by the attention given to his bold views and impressive expertise.

A search for Rudolph’s reaction to the Sputnik launches yields nothing. While it may be safe to say that the scientist had an opinion on how the U.S. government was handling its missile program, it was not publicized. Von Braun’s opinions were continually in the newspapers. He also did not shy away from declaring his own worth, insisting that the Soviet launch was not due to their acquisition of German rocket experts. Like many of the other Germans Rudolph did not

181 Rip Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 7; Zuoyue Wang, In Sputnik’s Shadow: The President’s Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press), 33. 182 Ibid. 183 Ibid., 8. 184 Ibid.

70 make headlines, nor was he sought after for interviews as was von Braun. In fact, von Braun, while working under General John Medaris, enjoyed quite a bit of freedom. He was able to build and test over a half dozen Jupiter-C missiles without “alerting the Pentagon to their true nature,” which was Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) development.185 When Sputnik launched, von Braun’s actions were just as bold as his words, as he continued to test and launch missiles. He lamented, “For God’s sake turn us loose and let us do something. We can put up a satellite in sixty days.”186 President Dwight D. Eisenhower had been an original supporter of

Paperclip, and after Sputnik he launched an intense campaign to make science a public priority.187 This movement humanized the scientists, and it also accelerated von Braun’s public image and authority, and by default, increased his team’s value, including Rudolph.

At this point, between 1958 and 1960, von Braun had become a bonified celebrity and was able to distance himself from his National Socialist past. As Neufeld writes, von Braun and his team were now seen as the protected “pet” of the Army.188 As the newly formed NASA conglomerate gained speed, debates raged on about whether to split up von Braun’s team. Von

Braun was a vocal proponent of keeping his colleagues together, and warned that he and his top specialists, if separated, may leave for better paying industry positions. Despite the continued tension between von Braun and NASA leaders, the German scientist’s fame continued to grow when the lunar probes Pioneer III and IV launched. And after a long tug of war Eisenhower announced that the Army would house NASA, leading to von Braun’s promotion as head of the

185 Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower’s Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 9; Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 153-155. 186 Ibid., 11. 187 Ibid., 14. 188 Neufeld, Von Braun, 335-336.

George C. Marshall Space Flight Center and designer of the Saturn V launch vehicle.189 Von

Braun remained in high regard, and in 1970 he moved to Washington D.C. to work as NASA’s

Deputy Associate Administrator for Planning.190 The German rocket expert did not stay in this position for long, and in 1972 he retired from NASA.

The Debate Over Von Braun’s Legacy

Von Braun’s public image went unchallenged until 1976. In May, von Braun was the subject of a heated debate over whether he should receive the Medal of Freedom. The debate began with a memorandum from the Director of Planning and Research Office of Public Liaison,

Wayne H. Valis, to Director of Communications, David Gergen. The message concerned von

Braun’s chances of receiving the award. A similar memo between Heather M. David, author of the Lives to Remember series, and William J. Baroody Jr., of the White House Office of Public

Liaison, urged the White House official that von Braun was deserving of the award and called him an “adopted American.” They both argued that the scientist’s years of invaluable work for the U.S. space program should not go unrecognized. 191 Von Braun had been excluded from the original Medal of Freedom nominee list, but continual letters from public figures and government officials poured into Gergen pressuring him to reconsider the German scientist’s status to receive the award. In June, two U.S. government officials sent letters to Gergen and fellow Gerald Ford administration member Dave Marsh. Both letters argued for von Braun to receive the award, that he was “strongly supported,” and stated, “Perhaps the President could do something else for him before he dies,”192 as von Braun was, at that time, battling an aggressive

189 Ibid., 346. 190 William Hines, “New Space Airline Von Braun’s Vision,” Lowell, MA: Lowell Sun, 20 February, 1970, 32. 191 Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Office of the Press Secretary David Gergen 1974-1977, Medal of Freedom Nominee File, 20 May 1976 memo, (hereafter cited as “Gergen Files”). 192 Ibid., 23 June 1976, letter from Judy Muhlberg to Marsh and 25 June 1976, letter from Jason L. Stern to Gergen, Gergen Files.

72 form of pancreatic cancer. His supporters wanted von Braun to receive recognition quickly, so that the award would not be made posthumously. After the abundance of letters in support of von

Braun came in to Gergen, he requested a background investigation of the scientist’s activities in

Germany during the war, but the resulting resumé of von Braun did not include any hard details of his Nazi past.193 On the note sent to Gergen regarding von Braun’s background information, the Press Secretary wrote, “Judy: Sorry, but I can’t support idea of giving medal of freedom to former Nazi whose V-2 was fined with over 3000 British and Belgium cities. He has given valuable service to U.S. science but frankly he has gotten as good as he has given.”194 Despite this, NASA was in full support of von Braun to receive the award, and in its biographical file on the German scientist, it did not mention anything about his political past nor his work at the

Mittelwerk facility. Instead, the NASA biography only listed von Braun’s awards.195 This push for von Braun to receive the Medal of Freedom was a culmination of his work and the numerous connections he made during his U.S. government career. Gergen’s opinion that the scientist should not receive the award was unpopular with some of his close colleagues; even NASA was willing to whitewash von Braun’s Nazi past, though not all in the U.S. government agreed.

Although von Braun ultimately did not receive the Medal of Freedom, he has multiple other highly respected honors that have not and are not at risk of being revoked.

The Road to Becoming a Nazi War Criminal: Rudolph’s Post-War Career

Although von Braun received more awards than his friend, Rudolph was still honored for his work, somewhat due to von Braun’s urging. Once in America, Von Braun expressed his appreciation for Rudolph through invitations to speak at universities and nominations for

193 Ibid., 16 July 1976, Gergen responds to Muhlberg’s letter, Gergen Files. 194 Ibid., 21 July 1976 note from Gergen to Muhlberg. Note: the word “freedom” was underlined by Gergen, Gergen Files. 195 Ibid., September 1970, via the NASA biographical data, found in Gergen Files.

73 academic awards, but rarely did he mention Rudolph in interviews or other published pieces. On the contrary, Rudolph spoke at length to his biographer about von Braun and his past work for the German military. Rudolph described his colleague as overly eager at times, especially when superiors were not present. But Rudolph also recognized that he enjoyed a more unrestricted lifestyle because of his close proximity to von Braun. While Peenemünde was being built,

Rudolph was in charge of ordering the materials necessary for the site and described the process as fantastic, as he was able to procure whatever he needed without any questions from

Dornberger or other officials.196 One might describe their relationship as Von Braun the initiator and Rudolph the executor. The difference was how each of the scientists came into their positions under the German military. Though he accepted, Rudolph was coerced by Dornberger and later SS official Karl Jaeger, the responsibility that exiled him from the U.S., while von

Braun continually chose his assignments.

Shortly after the scientists arrived in the U.S., Rudolph and the rest of von Braun’s team were stationed at Fort Bliss to continue work on German V-2 rockets. Then, in 1947, Rudolph was employed by the Research and Development Division, Ordnance Department of the Army at

Fort Bliss, Texas. After another brief investigation into his past, Rudolph moved on to work for the Solar Aircraft Company based out of San Diego, California.197 In 1950 Rudolph and von

Braun worked side by side once again, and in 1951 the scientists were transferred to Redstone

Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. In Huntsville von Braun led the Army’s rocket development

196 Ibid., 48. Rudolph spoke at the Rollins College Animated Magazine Conference, where he was also awarded an honorary doctorate. 197 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Freedom of Information Act, 1949-1983, Arthur Louis Hugo Rudolph, Part 1 of 1 BUFILE: 105-11507, 14, https://vault.fbi.gov/Arthur%20Rudolph%20/Arthur%20Rudolph%20Part%201%20of%201/view, 3-5, 13.

74 team and Rudolph was the technical director for the Redstone Arsenal Guided Missile Project, and within the year he applied for American citizenship.198

While von Braun was appearing in Disney’s television shows and campaigns, Rudolph was back in Huntsville, looking to the future and directing larger projects. A 1956 decision by the U.S. Army for a “shoot and scoot” missile led Rudolph to his next project, the Pershing program.199 Rudolph was the project’s director and responsible for putting a team together, handling the $500 million budget, and visiting and inspecting contractors. Rudolph’s time as the

Pershing project director overlapped with the creation of a centralized civilian space program, and although von Braun’s team was immediately sent to work for NASA, Rudolph was crucial for the Pershing program to succeed and stayed behind.200 This paid off, and in 1960 Rudolph received the Exceptional Civilian Service award. Not long after, Rudolph joined von Braun and the rest of the team to work for NASA. Von Braun’s confident demeanor flourished in his new role, receiving regular fan mail and having his fellow Paperclip scientists “completely under” his

“control…and generally look[ing] to him for guidance and control.”201 Von Braun appointed

Rudolph as the manager of the Saturn V rocket, a part of the Apollo program, and for this responsibility NASA awarded Rudolph with the Distinguished Service Medal. The scientific accomplishments of both Rudolph and von Braun are easily comparable, but Rudolph could not escape his Nazi past the way von Braun had.

198 Ibid., 26-29. 199 Marsha Freeman, “Arthur Rudolph and the Rocket That Took Us to the Moon” (paper presented at the 54th International Astronautical Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, the International Academy of Astronautics, and the International Institute of Space Law, Bremen, Germany, 29 September- 3 October 2003), 6. 200 Ibid., 7 201 FBI, VonBraun, part 3, 14.

The Investigation

As explicated in the first chapter, Eli Rosenbaum began his investigation into Rudolph’s past after reading an excerpt from a monograph written about the Dora concentration camp.

Early on in his inquiry, Rosenbaum read interviews conducted in 1947 with the Paperclip scientists, as well as other interrogations from 1951. In each circumstance Rudolph was deemed to be suitable for entry into the U.S. as well as permanent citizenship. Rosenbaum also utilized the recently passed Sunshine Act, an amendment to FOIA, enacted in September 1976. This act was one of the many laws within FOIA framework that was intended to provide more transparency from the government.202 After this was passed, numerous FBI files were released which Rosenbaum used in the beginning stages of his investigation into Rudolph’s past.

Rosenbaum reached an impasse when, in order to continue his inquiry, he needed to access documents that were to be released in September 1981. These crucial documents included the U.S. Army Investigation and Trial Records of War Criminals, and the trial of Kurt Andrae Et.

Al. (and related cases) that took place in Dachau, Germany, in August 1947. Rosenbaum employed the Sunshine Act to try and obtain more information on the CIA’s activity between

1945-1950 relating to the German scientists involved in Paperclip. Rosenbaum found a document that discussed Rudolph, and contained a testimony declaring the German scientist’s presence in the U.S. as a “security threat” and his war time activities “dangerous.”203 As with this document, the 1943 memorandum that Rudolph sent back to Jaeger after his tour in Oranienburg was not used in the OSI’s investigation, and only came to the surface years after Rudolph’s

202 CIA, The Government in the Sunshine’ Act: Implementation, June 9, 1978, released 9 August 2006, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81M00980R001200090025-3.pdf. The original Sunshine Act implementation specifically stated that “certain Executive agencies…give notice of their business meetings and open them to public observation unless they must be closed for any of ten specific reasons. If the agency finds that the public interest requires, it must open its meeting to public observation even if there is a reason to close it.” 203 Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 30.

76 reinvestigation.204 There was proof of the scientist’s guilt well before Rosenbaum began connecting the pieces.

In a scathing editorial piece written for the Washington Post in November 1984, the anonymous author expressed anger and resentment towards the U.S. government for their unnecessary early employment of war criminals, citing Rudolph’s recent expulsion. The enraged citizen ended the article arguing that no statute of limitations should exist when it involves crimes against humanity. The author also stated that the shoddy way in which the government handled Paperclip was a “crucial part of the past generation’s political history” and affected

“politics now and in the future…”205 Arguably, a fundamental piece of Rudolph’s case was that once the public and personal relationship with von Braun ended and his use to NASA expired

Rudolph was no longer shielded from prosecution.

Years after he was exiled from the U.S., Rudolph continued to speak out against the war crimes charges that were brought against him by the OSI. Many of his fellow scientists involved in Operation Paperclip were not reinvestigated, either because they were too difficult to locate, or they had passed on, like von Braun. During the examination of Rudolph’s case, the OSI re- interviewed witnesses. Two of these witnesses claimed to have seen both Rudolph and von

Braun together on the day of a mass hanging, but this testimony was considered invalid by the

Attorney General and thrown out.206 There was also a camp of those who spoke out in support of

Rudolph and against the OSI’s investigation of the scientist. In October 1985, the New York

Times printed an article that included an interview from an aide to the Reagan administration.

204 Neufeld, Rocket and the Reich, 187; FBI, Arthur Rudolph,105; Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988), 37. 205 “The Nazi Rocket Experts,” Washington Post, 6 November 1984, accessed 3 April 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/11/06/the-nazi-rocket-experts/0b6de6e3-77f0-49bc-8545- 8f7597bab4a6/?utm_term=.2bb56da23b2e. 206 Franklin, An American in Exile, 157.

The aide, former White House Chief of Communications, Patrick J. Buchanan, met with two visitors who were seeking the restoration of Rudolph’s citizenship. The two visitors were identified as fellow NASA scientists, Eberhard Rees and Frederick Ordway III. Rees had succeeded von Braun as director of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville,

Alabama, and was also a Paperclip colleague. Buchanan was adamant that he did not encourage or pressure the Justice Department to restore Rudolph’s citizenship. The politician only took the petitions collected by the two visitors and listened to their appeals. Buchanan stated that he did not become involved in any legal matters tied to the case because it went against White House ethics. Despite this, Buchanan later wrote articles criticizing the OSI’s investigations of alleged

Nazi war criminals, but did not specifically vocalize support for Rudolph.207 Although Rees and

Buchanan were in support of an examination of the OSI’s actions, neither associated their name too closely with Rudolph, who had already retired and never held the same status as his outspoken friend and colleague, von Braun. Although Buchanan was a critic of how the OSI conducted its business, he was not going to risk his status to protect Rudolph. The German scientist could no longer rely on the veil of protection that came with being close to von Braun.

Another proactive supporter of Rudolph and critic of the OSI was Representative James

A. Traficant, of Ohio’s 17th Congressional District. The politician went so far as to throw a formal dinner, raising funds to help Rudolph attempt to reinstate his U.S. citizenship. Traficant then brought forth a resolution to Congress for a reevaluation of Rudolph’s case. On 24 May

1990, Traficant spoke on Rudolph’s behalf, calling his Nazi Party membership an act of

“desperation,” and that he had been an outstanding U.S. citizen. He stated that he was most upset with the OSI and their handling of the case, claiming that Rudolph only signed the agreement to

207 “Aide to Reagan Says He Met Allies of an Ex-Nazi Scientist,” New York Times, 17 Oct. 17 1985, accessed 3 April 2017, Newspaper Archive database.

78 relinquish his American citizenship because of his failing health, and that the whole situation was a violation of the scientist’s rights. He concluded by asking Congress to restore Rudolph’s citizenship so that he may have “public hearings, under oath, so that the American people can decide whether Mr. Rudolph was a Nazi victimizer of slave labor, or himself a victim of an

American political authority.”208

Traficant remained resolute in his argument that the OSI’s actions against Rudolph were illegitimate. The representative stated that that investigation was “without merit, substance, and documentation.”209 In the motion, Traficant stated that Rudolph was forced by the OSI to resign his U.S. citizenship, and only did so after having no other options. The politician pleaded

Rudolph’s case, describing the aging scientist to be in poor health, having recently experienced a heart attack, was unable to locate witnesses to corroborate his side of the story, and lacked the necessary financial means to fight the OSI’s case against him. Traficant also addressed the original testimony given by Hanne-Lore Bannasch, secretary to Rudolph’s supervisor at

Mittelwerk, that she had seen Rudolph at the hanging of camp prisoners. He claimed that this supposedly damning evidence against Rudolph was simply misrepresented by the OSI. Traficant went on to share Bannasch’s subsequent statement that she never saw Rudolph commit “even the least improprieties against the camp inmates in the work force.”210 At the end of the motion,

Traficant reemphasized the circulating public petition, signed by both colleagues and citizens, in favor of an investigative review of Rudolph’s case. But this petition, like Traficant’s motion, were not officially supported or co-sponsored. Because of the lack of a co-sponsor, Traficant’s

208 For a transcript of the hearing, see: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, “Resolution to Open a Congressional Investigation into the Arthur Rudolph Case,” Hon. James A. Traficant Jr., The Library of Congress online database, 24 May 1990, accessed 2 March 2016, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r101:E24MY0-B292:; “Lawmaker Advises Accused Nazi to Defy U.S. Government,” European Stars and Stripes (Darmstadt Hesse, Germany), 15 May 1990, 7. 209 Traficant, “Resolution to Open a Congressional Investigation into the Arthur Rudolph Case,” 2. 210 Ibid.

79 motion was moved to the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law in

June 1990, but no further action was taken.

About the same time, Ordway wrote a bold response to Hunt’s article, “U.S. Coverup of

Nazi Scientists,” published in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 1985. Also, in his book,

The Rocket Team, Ordway states that the decade long research conducted for the book resulted in finding no incriminating evidence against Rudolph. He cites other scholars who argue that if

Rudolph is guilty of war crimes, then so are many other Germans who were spectators of forced labor.211 Ordway discussed the claims of overwork and long hours, stating that Rudolph himself often worked 14-hour days. He also inquired as to why the OSI waited nearly forty years for this information to be examined and for Rudolph to be investigated.212

Although Rees, Ordway, and other NASA and Paperclip scientists stood in support of

Rudolph during the OSI’s investigation, the majority of those that spoke about the case sided with the Justice Department. Neal Sher, director of the Justice Department’s OSI, commented on the Rudolph case stating that it was “an awful irony that his experience and expertise in rocketry had to be used in this country over the bones of so many innocent victims of Nazi Germany’s crimes against humanity.”213 Though this statement is tragically and completely true, Rudolph was far from alone in his work for the Third Reich. The U.S. took numerous individuals from

Germany in the fields of rocketry, medicine, and physics, among others. Allan Ryan, former

Justice Department official and head of the office that investigated and prosecuted Nazi war criminals from 1980-83, argued that Rudolph came to the U.S. by way of deception, and that if the scientist had divulged the truth right away, then he would have been tried the same as other

211 Frederick I. Ordway III, “Nazi Coverup,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1985, 66-67. 212 Ibid., 66. 213 CIA, “Minority Report,” Christopher Hitchens, Nation, 17 November 1984, 1.

80 former Nazis.214 Once again this statement is moot. The immigration policy process that

Paperclip underwent was manipulated to fit the mission, rather than the other way around.

Specifically, there was no impetus to evaluate the policy at the time because of the inevitable fallout, and officials kicked the can of the “Nazi issue” down the road. Furthermore, there is proof that very early on Rudolph admitted to knowing about the slave laborers and the horrendous conditions in which they lived and worked, but this information did not come out until the Justice Department was forced to gather it in the mid-1970s.

Rudolph is the only Paperclip scientist to be formally and publicly prosecuted by the OSI, and was the U.S. government’s scapegoat during the Nazi hunting resurgence in the 1970s.

Fellow Paperclip scientist, Konrad Dannenberg, worked alongside both Rudolph and von Braun, from Peenemünde to Huntsville. His conscience remained clear over the years, as he later shared that German science during the war was pure and that the “army was the only rich uncle with enough money to pay for the things we wanted to do.”215 But, there is no clear record that

Dannenberg was von Braun’s confidant. Dannenberg, Rudolph, and von Braun worked closely together, and it is inevitable that they formed some sort of personal bond. But the relationship between Rudolph and von Braun was unique, and the men formed a lasting friendship.

Dannenberg, along with 22 other German scientists, petitioned President Ronald Reagan to reinstate Rudolph’s American citizenship, but failed.216 These men all worked at the same facilities, with the same rockets, and under the same SS supervisor, but Rudolph, like von Braun, was in a leadership position. His closeness with von Braun was what protected him and what also led to his demise. Rudolph’s case was a form of appeasement to the critics of the Justice

214 ABC Nightline, hosted by Ted Koppel, produced by ABC News Productions, aired 19 October 1984, on ABC (Washington D.C., 1984). 215 Jeremy Pearce, “Konrad Dannenberg, 96, Top Rocket Scientist, Dies,” New York Times, 23 February 2009, 25. 216 Ibid.

Department’s handling of Operation Paperclip. He symbolized the individuals that were never prosecuted; he represented the scientists like von Braun that never faced justice. He was shielded from prosecution for so long because of his work and the notoriety and importance of his colleague, but once von Braun had passed away, Rudolph remained bound to the disintegrating image of his friend, the rocket expert, and left with nowhere else to hide.

CHAPTER V. OPERATION PAPERCLIP: A CONTROVERSIAL MISSION AND FLAWED IMMIGRATION POLICY

“When you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success.” -Robert Oppenheimer217

To trace the origins of Wernher von Braun’s “veil of protection,” each scientist’s experience with Operation Paperclip’s associating immigration policy must be explored. An early indicator of von Braun’s priority over the rest of his team are his Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) files. Von Braun’s outnumber Arthur Rudolph’s by 212 pages, yet both men were described as possessing exceptional abilities. The FBI described Rudolph as a “key person in the production line” and a “sincere” man by numerous family members, friends, and current as well as former colleagues. Von Braun’s early files, pre-1960 are very limited, but describe him as being “of superior character and reputation…loyalty above question.”218 In both dossiers, files listing the men’s social acquaintances have been almost completely redacted, but all of their contacts’ opinions are listed as positive. Another of von Braun’s contacts described the scientist’s concentration, “when the applicant sets his sights on particular goal, he will not be distracted from that goal until he has successfully completed it.”219 Like von Braun, Rudolph’s co-worker also described him as the “type of person who would not stop at anything if it might further his ambitions.”220

Shortly after arriving in the U.S., both men received an unexpected summons to return to

Germany to attend the trial of their former colleague, Georg Rickhey, who had been extradited

217 United States Atomic Energy Commission, J. Robert Oppenheimer Vol. II, Washington D.C., 13 April 1954, 95. 218 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Freedom of Information Act, 1959-1974, Wernher von Braun, part 1, 33, https://vault.fbi.gov/Wernher%20VonBraun. 219 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Freedom of Information Act, 1949-1983, Arthur Louis Hugo Rudolph, Part 1 of 1 BUFILE: 105-11507, 14, https://vault.fbi.gov/Arthur%20Rudolph%20/Arthur%20Rudolph%20Part%201%20of%201/view, 105. 220 FBI, VonBraun, part 1, 46.

83 back to Germany to face war crime charges in the Dora-Nordhausen case. Linda Hunt contends that their appearance in this trial would have implicated and publicized Rudolph’s authority over the slave labor used at Mittelwerk, and von Braun would be faced with explaining his own involvement and cognizance of the conditions and prison labor at the facility. The Army

Ordnance Office refused to release the two scientists to testify at the trial, citing security reasons.

But, only months earlier, von Braun had left the country to retrieve his girlfriend.221 Due to his importance to the rocket program and America’s national interest, von Braun enjoyed a higher level of freedom than his compatriots.

Von Braun and Rudolph were mutually praised for their expertise in rocketry, evidenced by awards, most presented by NASA, and admiration from their colleagues. Von Braun’s charisma rapidly advanced his reputation in comparison to Rudolph’s, and this dynamic charisma worked in tandem with his charming appearance. In the FBI dossiers, von Braun’s physical description, the six-foot, blonde haired, blue eyed vision, is listed on page 11. In contrast, Rudolph’s five feet, eight-inch and 175-pound stature is not listed until page 44.222

Although Rudolph only had six years on von Braun, his appearance deceivingly aged him. In a biography of von Braun written for the Medal of Freedom nomination, his hobbies and handsome appearance are highlighted instead of more objective details.223 And, a former associate of von Braun described a female relative who likened the scientist to the “famous photograph of Lord Alfred Douglas of Oscar Wilde fame,” and that, “His manners were as perfect as a rigid upbringing could make them.”224 These were the details listed in von Braun’s

221 Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 70-71.; FBI, VonBraun, part 2, 35. 222 FBI, Arthur Rudolph, 44. 223 The Gergen Files, “Medal of Freedom Nominee File,” 607-609. 224 Michael White, Acid Tongues and Tranquil Dreamers: Tales of Bitter Rivalry that Fueled the Advancement of Science and Technology (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 304.

84 file when the government was considering his immigration to the United States. These observations were considered worth noting, that is, until the 1970s when a second-wave of Nazi hunting occurred in the U.S.

The Nazi Hunting Resurgence

Although the Cold War drew attention away from more aggressive and consistent efforts, individuals like Simon Wiesenthal continued to track Nazi war criminals. Wiesenthal, a former prisoner of Mauthausen concentration camp, dedicated the entirety of his life after the war to locating and helping to prosecute Nazi war criminals. Tom Segev’s biography of Wiesenthal states that he encountered legal barriers when attempting to indict certain former Nazis, and posits that the Cold War was a pivotal reason for the lack of effort to locate these war criminals earlier, asserting that “more than once Wiesenthal saw that offenders he had located and wanted to prosecute were employed…in the service of the United States or other countries…”225 Unlike

Wiesenthal’s unrelenting decades long hunt for Nazi war criminals, the prosecution of such individuals in the U.S. lost its fervor as the Cold War lingered on.

In the 1970s there was a resurgence to locate and prosecute Nazi war criminals, specifically those living in America. Following a period of grieving during the immediate postwar era, it was the succeeding generation that began this second wave of prosecution. During this decade there were numerous wide-ranging foreign relations and bureaucratic events that influenced this movement. U.S. and Israeli cooperation improved as those in Washington saw

Israel as a defensive extension against Soviet influence in the Middle East. Secretary of State,

Henry Kissinger signed a memorandum with Foreign Minister Yigal Allon that stated, “The

United States Government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel’s security of

225 Tom Segev, Simon Wiesenthal: The Life and Legends (New York: Random House, Inc., 2010), 9.

85 sovereignty by a world power.”226 In the same year as the agreement between Israel and the U.S. the Church Committee Hearings took place which investigated federal intelligence operations to determine if any illegal or unethical activities took place by any federal government agency. This committee found that from Franklin Roosevelt through the early 1970s U.S. intelligence operations, both domestic and international, were the result of America’s development as a superpower, not by a single decision or administration. These investigations into U.S. intelligence agencies flung the door wide open for the Nazi hunting resurgence. Also, sociologist

Daniel Bell argued that Vietnam ended American exceptionalism by showing the public that the

U.S. was just like any other nation and was subject to weakness and loss of power. The U.S. as a

“City on a Hill” was no longer applicable. Along with each of these previous three developments the “Cold War consensus” made public discussion of foreign policy a reality, which was not seen before the Vietnam War.

The changing sociopolitical climate made finding and prosecuting former Nazi war criminals living in the U.S. more viable. Former Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman became a crucial architect of the developing movement. Holtzman, known for her determination, had personal ties to this mission, and shared that both her father and mother had relatives who experienced terrifying events at the hands of the Nazis. Holtzman was elected to the House in

1973, and then gained a seat on the Immigration Subcommittee of the House Judiciary

Committee. In 1974 Holtzman was quoted as saying that she brought to Congress’ attention the need for a more formal process of locating and prosecuting war criminals in America.227 The

226 “Israel-United States Memorandum of Understanding,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Volume 3: 1974-1977, 1 September 1975. 227 Rochelle G. Saidel, The Outraged Conscience (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1984), 103; Elizabeth Holtzman interviewed by the USC Shoah Foundation, “Bringing Nazis to Justice” (video), YouTube, published 13 August 2013, accessed 3 September 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJzZM43ZJaA.

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) possessed a list of these offenders, and transcripts contained notes on allegations dating back to the 1940s, yet no government agents were assigned to investigate the cases. Holtzman publicized this information in the spring of 1974, with plans to create a special unit within the INS, but it was not until the summer of 1977 that plans were officially made to create such a task force. In her own words to the press in 1974, she expressed her frustration with the lengthy timeline of this proposal:

“It is outrageous that the Immigration Service has been dragging its heels on the investigation of alleged Nazi war criminals living in the United States. Since last August, the New York office of the Immigration Service has been the ‘control office’ for Nazi war crimes investigations. It has had information concerning these 38 alleged criminals. Yet officials admitted to me today that in a period of over nine months, they have virtually done nothing. They conceded that they have not interviewed one single witness in any of the 38 cases. They have not initiated any deportation proceedings…In view of the charges that political pressure has stifled INS investigations in the past, this failure of the Immigration Service to act against these alleged war criminals is a particularly serious problem. The American people expect expeditious action from the Immigration Service…”228 Eyewitness accounts listed in the documents were not pursued, nor was there any present work being done in the cases. Holtzman’s plan of action included the following: create a special War

Crimes Strike-force within the INS, which headed the investigations; appoint a full time expert lawyer to be present for all proceedings linked to the investigations; establish the investigation’s mission priorities with timetables; and create a system for communication with all foreign and domestic governmental agencies and other sources.229

The timing of Holtzman’s determination to create a task force coincided with a thaw in

American and Soviet relations. During a visit to the Soviet Union in 1975, Holtzman discussed the prosecution of Nazi war criminals with Deputy Procurator General, Mikhail P. Malyarov,

228 Ibid., 105-106. Note: The document does not identify these 38 alleged war criminals. 229 Holtzman interviewed by USC Shoah Foundation, “Bringing Nazis to Justice.” Note: Holtzman later moved the special unit to the Justice Department after the delays and lack of motivation from the INS.

87 who provided support to the American representatives. Malyarov also shared that the U.S. had never attempted to communicate or work with the Soviet Union on locating and providing witnesses for investigations.230 In the winter of 1976 the State Department, after much prodding from the Congresswomen, sent over three cases to the Soviet Union to find out if they had any information on those individuals. Holtzman was pleased that the U.S. government was finally taking action, but was quick to criticize their resistance to contact Eastern European countries for assistance with the investigations. She was also unwilling to let the delay go unnoticed, stating that these actions did not make up for the “nearly 30 years of Immigration Service delay and neglect.”231

Holtzman and her colleagues shifted their attention to questioning whether the CIA and other intelligence agencies had intervened in potential offenders’ investigations causing the obvious “laxity” of the INS. By considering different types of cases handled by the CIA,

Holtzman and her task force hypothesized that they would discover a pattern of coverups involving key Nazi figures currently or formerly employed by the U.S. government. An example of this occurred in the summer of 1976 when former Nazi, Edgars Laipenieks, received a letter from the CIA informing him that he was not to be deported, that the INS should cease all action against him, and for Laipenieks to contact CIA officials if this did not take place. Laipenieks conducted several missions for the CIA in the 1960s, and the agency paid for national and international trips to disseminate information about the Soviet Union. The CIA had good reason to protect Laipenieks and keep quiet the details of his work for the agency.232 Holtzman and her colleague wrote to the CIA expressing concerns that the agency had previously taken this same

230 Saidel, The Outraged Conscience, 110. 231 Ibid., 112. 232 Ralph Blumenthal, “Some Suspected of Nazi War Crimes Are Known as Model Citizens,” New York Times, 18 October 1976, 16.

88 action in other cases. She then requested the agency to forward all written and oral communications between the INS and the CIA concerning individuals with alleged ties to Nazi war crimes. The requested report was to include any influence the CIA had on the investigation of such individuals, or if it delayed the process. Holtzman also wanted the agency to deliver any communications concerning alleged war criminals between the INS and other executive agencies including, the OSS, FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and NASA.233

Concern over suspected Nazi war criminals residing in the U.S. was already a heated discussion, and the New York Times ran a series of articles further publicizing the struggle between Holtzman and the slow-moving INS. Holtzman was quoted in a May 1974 article stating that the inadequate INS investigations made America a “haven for at least 73 alleged

Nazi war criminals over the last 25 years.”234 Other complaints voiced by Holtzman were that in at least 15 of the cases eyewitnesses were not interviewed and the agency did not contact any foreign governments or document centers to obtain crucial information on the alleged offenders.

She went on to write a letter to INS Commissioner Leonard F. Chapman Jr., in which she called the agency’s conduct “haphazard, uncoordinated, and unprofessional.”235 The agency fired back, when Sol Marks, the Immigration District Director, calling the Representative’s accusations

“dead wrong.” Despite this, Holtzman released information proving that at least five of the 43 cases currently being investigated were dismissed for unclear reasons, and “in some cases for no reason at all.”236 Holtzman prompted the extremely delayed evaluation stage of Paperclip policy that never truly occurred during the immediate post-war period. By releasing this information on alleged Nazi war criminals, government officials had no choice but to evaluate the program,

233 Saidel, The Outraged Conscience, 113-114. 234 Ralph Blumenthal, “Rep. Holtzman Calls U.S. Lax on Nazi Inquiries,” New York Times, May 21, 1974, 8. 235 Ibid. 236 Ibid.

89 especially after von Braun’s death, rid the U.S. of any other alleged Nazis, and then terminate the program.

Both the State Department and INS were aware of the allegations that were aimed at them. Just before Linda Hunt’s shocking article on Nazi coverups ran in Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientist, the State Department sent a memorandum entitled, “Press Guidance on Alleged Help to

Nazis and Collaborators.” It was a detailed, lengthy letter on how to deal with the recurring claims that U.S. officials knowingly helped Nazi war criminals and collaborators to escape justice, and by helping them to immigrate to the United States.237 The document clearly stated that Operation Paperclip gave “some basis to allegations that U.S. officials helped Nazis immigrate into the U.S,” but that a clause in the CIA Act of 1949 provided that “the Director of

Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of the Attorney General and the Director of the

Immigration and Naturalization Service, may bring up to 100 persons a year into the United

States notwithstanding any other provision of law.”238 The next page in the document records concerns with State Department involvement.

The State Department was publicly accused by fellow government officials of impeding investigations of alleged Nazi war criminals and for ignoring the Justice Department’s requests for cooperation. One of these officials, Joshua Eilberg, representative from Pennsylvania, claimed that the State Department failed to cooperate with the investigations, and the

Representative sent these concerns in a letter to the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, which was released on 30 June 1974.239 The INS, a subset of the Justice Department, stated on 5 June

1974, that 37 individuals were being actively investigated for war crimes. One of the highest

237 NARA General Records of the Department of State, 1763-2002, “Press Guidance on Alleged Help to Nazis and Collaborators,” Container ID: 32, Record Group 59, 1 (hereafter cited as “Press Guidance”). 238 Ibid. 239 Ralph Blumenthal, “Delays Charged in Nazi Inquiry,” New York Times, 1 July 1974, 10.

90 profile cases in this group was that of Hubertus Strughold, a former Nazi physician who came to be known as the, “father of space medicine.” Strughold experienced a reinvestigation of his actions during WWII, but was not made to relinquish his citizenship. Another individual on the list, Bishop Valerian D. Trifia, became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1957, despite conflicting reports on his testimony to immigration interviewers. Trifia denied any involvement in war atrocities or that he had lied to immigration officers. It was only after mounting pressure from the press that an investigation on Trifia was opened. Trifia was eventually made to relinquish his citizenship after almost 25 years of the government sitting on available information on his wartime past.240 The two cases are closely related to those of von Braun and Rudolph. Both

Strughold and von Braun held higher ranking and more publicized positions within the American science sector, while Trifia and Rudolph were unable to rise to the same level of notoriety in their careers, and were both exiled after delayed investigations. This constructs a pattern that occupational value equated to asylum, which extended beyond the case of von Braun and

Rudolph.

The State Department was accused of impeding investigations conducted by the Justice

Department, which may have been in part due to their changing bureaucratic structure. One such structure, The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was originally created in June 1948 as a part of the State Department. Its mission was to “provide a permanent covert political action capability.”241 The formation of this department was via a National Security Council (NSC) directive, which also ordered the nomination of a director for the OPC, even though the department was attached to the CIA. Frank Wisner was nominated for the position. During

WWII, Wisner was in the OSS and served as Deputy to the Assistant Secretary for Occupied

240 Ibid. 241 NARA State Department, “Press Guidance,” 2.

Areas for several months. His responsibility in this position was to coordinate all civil aspects of the administration of occupied Germany, Austria, and Japan.242 In this position, Wisner likely had access to information from all departments involved in Operation Paperclip’s early implementation. Wisner and those involved in the OPC were connected to the State Department in more than one way. A later investigation, released in an August 1982 report, reveals that the

OPC was a cover name for a faction of the OSS and later the CIA. Also, a search conducted for the years 1948-1952 showed that there was no phone directory linked to the OPC and those listed to be a part of this department were recorded as being assigned to P—the Office of the

Counselor.243

The State Department’s pattern of secrecy did not stop after the formation of the elusive

OPC. Holtzman narrowed her attention to the case of Dr. Strughold, who was brought into the

U.S. in 1947 to construct a department of space medicine at the Air Force School of Aviation

Medicine at Randolph Field, Texas. He is credited with making manned space flight possible through his work with low-pressure chambers and other space capsule simulators. Strughold’s name appeared on the original list of 38 suspected war crime offenders, but only weeks later his case was closed following Congressional inquiries sent on his behalf.244 Strughold’s investigation concerned his alleged involvement with medical experiments conducted at Dachau concentration camp in 1942. A colleague of the physician was tried at Nuremberg, but was later acquitted due to circumstantial evidence. A document surfaced that placed Strughold at a 1942 scientific conference where the concentration camp experiments were discussed. The report lists

13 scientists in attendance at the conference in Nuremberg in October 1942, and states that Dr.

242 Ibid. 243 Ibid., 20. 244 Ralph Blumenthal, “Drive on Nazi Suspects a Year Later: No U.S. Legal Steps Have Been Taken,” New York Times, 23 November 1974, 48.

Strughold lectured on the temperatures of the sea, in which, he clearly revealed his experiments conducted on inmates of Dachau.245 The State Department had no comment on this release of information by Holtzman. The Immigration Office’s response to Holtzman’s claims were that hard evidence was still needed to pursue serious investigation of an alleged offender, prompting

Deputy Director Henry Wagner to comment, “If we take someone and hang them from the lamppost, is that progress? We need evidence.”246 Although the INS was attempting to obtain evidence, as the 1978 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report later showed, they were not given full access to the documents needed to perform appropriate investigations, nor were personnel from State and other departments apparently willing to cooperate.

The State Department was once again in the press, as Holtzman publicly admonished

Kissinger and the Department for failing to contact the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries for crucial information on the alleged suspects. There were rumblings from other government officials, as reported by columnist Ralph Blumenthal, that the State Department

“may be reluctant to complicate relations with the Communists or that some of the suspects may have powerful allies in the Government.”247 Between January and August 1974, the INS sent six requests to the State Department, and received no reply.248 Holtzman and Eilberg took matters into their own hands and visited Moscow in 1975. The trip was a success, with the Russian government pledging their cooperation, and provided the U.S. with two files of more than 100 pages on suspects.249 This was movement in the right direction, but it took far too long to reach

245 Ibid. 246 Ibid. 247 Ralph Blumenthal, “Inquiry on Nazis Called Lagging,” New York Times, 25 August 1975, 11. 248 Ibid. Note: Holtzman spoke out against this inaction, to which she finally received a response. The State Department argued that it had taken several initiatives in finding information on the cases, including checking the Berlin Document Center, but there was little new information discovered there. These efforts were called “pointless duplication” by Holtzman. 249 Ralph Blumenthal, “Nazi War-Criminal Suspects in U.S. Face Deportation as Drive Widens,” New York Times, 3 October 1976.

93 this point. The State Department, CIA, and other agencies mishandled these resources and information for 30 years. The reason given, time and again, for this decades-long delay was that the necessary information was simply not available. Maurice F. Kiley, the Immigration District

Director in New York, bluntly stated that, “We didn’t have the evidence prior to this time.”250

The difficult nature of the cases, haphazardness and lack of interest by authorities, and allegedly, efforts by some persons interested in blocking action against alleged war criminals were circulating reasons as to why the investigations were surfacing in the mid to late-1970s rather than 30 years prior. Despite this, lists of suspected war criminals were available to U.S. authorities soon after the Nazis surrendered on 8 May 1945. Therefore, the recurring arguments made by certain immigration personnel and the State Department that information was not available to pursue investigations are unfounded. Also, after 1952, immigrants were no longer required to reveal if they had persecuted any nationality or minority.251 Since von Braun and

Rudolph entered the U.S. in 1945, neither scientist was subject to this rule. Legally they would have been required to divulge information concerning any involvement with war crimes to their entrance interviewers. The FBI and the State Department were in charge of filing these reports, but appeared to have suppressed this information for years, conveniently choosing to ignore it.

In May 1982, Blumenthal presented new evidence suggesting that government documents containing information about alleged Nazi war criminals were tampered with. The most recent investigations were conducted by the Justice Department and the GAO. Initially the

1978 report concluded that the GAO could not find conclusive evidence of a conspiracy to impede inquiries into the alleged offenders’ pasts. It is also important to note that the GAO’s

250 Ralph Blumenthal, “3 Appear at Deportation Hearings in Killing of Civilians Under Nazis,” New York Times, 16 November 1976, 19. 251 Ralph Blumenthal, “The Mixed Reasons for New, U.S. Nazi Hunt,” New York Times, 28 November 1976, 185.

94 findings were concluded in 1977, but the report was not released until the following year, after von Braun’s death. Shortly after this the GAO also released a statement that it had come to their attention that the 1978 report was hindered by other departments unwilling to cooperate.252 Other important findings from the report included a statement that specifically referenced von Braun.

Towards the end of the report the document provides reasons as to why certain government agencies were scrambling after the war to obtain these German experts. Strained relations with the Soviet Union was given as the primary cause for concern at the close of WWII. The U.S. government “selectively” used certain German officials to strengthen their knowledge of the

Soviet Union. And, Wisner specified that, “similarly we used Wernher vonBraun for his advanced knowledge in missiles. Such use in no way justified granting haven to Nazi war criminals; a review of files available to the Department does not indicate any such use.”253

Despite these statements that make it sound like there was no incriminating evidence found to indict any departments or officials, the GAO was not granted access to all necessary documents to properly conduct its investigation.

Prior to the official investigation, in 1953 guidelines were set for how the GAO should conduct its reports. The guidelines stated that GAO officials, when performing audits, surveys, examinations, and investigations, would normally not require access to classified security information. It also directed GAO personnel away from needing access to sensitive information, such as plans or policies “which are the bases for determination of requirements concerning the number and disposition of units, armaments of units, numbers of personnel.”254 If GAO officials did find that they needed access to such sensitive information, then the inquiry was referred to a

252 Ralph Blumenthal, “Possible Cover-up on Nazis is Focus of New U.S. Inquiry,” New York Times, 23 May 1982. 253 NARA State Department, “Press Guidance,” 22. 254 NARA Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1921-2008, “Dissemination of Classified Security Information to Representatives of the General Accounting Office,” Container ID: 26044425, Record Group 330, 5 March 1953.

Department of Defense official or the Secretary of the Military Department.255 If the GAO followed these guidelines set in years prior, then any requests for secure information involving examinations into alleged Nazi war criminals would have been sent right back to the agencies that were accused of aiding the technicians’ entrance into the U.S., thus leaving them to indict themselves.

The State Department Finally Responds

In 1984, the same year that Rudolph was exiled, the GAO released a statement that attempted to explain why the investigation was taking place, asserting that “U.S. intelligence agencies generally refrained from employing Nazi war criminals or notorious Nazis or collaborators, but nevertheless used some undesirables and helped them emigrate from

Europe.”256 The document states that there were eleven undesirables who immigrated to the U.S., that four received official help, and three of the remaining seven were now deceased. In 1982, before the release of this report, the State Department requested the Embassy in Athens to interview Robert P. Joyce, who had been the State Department liaison officer with the CIA in the early 1950s and was living in Greece in retirement. He responded that he had not “the slightest recollection of any subject even remotely connected” with the recruitment of former Nazis or

Nazi collaborators.257 While serving in his State Department position, Joyce oversaw setting up the necessary organization for the refugee groups, as ordered by the Department and CIA after the formation of the National Committee for Free Europe in 1948. Therefore, he had knowledge of the information moving back and forth between departments since he was the principle point of contact. Joyce died in February 1984, without ever having to divulge serious information

255 Ibid. 256 NARA State Department, “Press Guidance,” 3. 257 Ibid., 6.

96 concerning his knowledge of State Department immigration activities involving Rudolph, von

Braun, or any of their colleagues.

In October 1984, Blumenthal also published another article in the New York Times about

Rudolph’s case and his exit from the United States. The official statement from the Justice

Department was that Rudolph, as the director for the production of V-2 rockets at Mittelwerk,

“participated in the persecution of forced laborers, including concentration camp inmates, who were employed there under inhumane conditions.”258 NASA had no comment in reply to the

Justice Department’s announcement. In the article, Blumenthal linked Rudolph with his friend and colleague, von Braun, and noted that Rudolph was not included on an Allied list of war criminals created after the war, even though other personnel of the rocket factory- those not a part of von Braun’s inner circle- were convicted of war crimes and jailed or executed.259 The existence of these trial records and convictions were detailed in the Dora-Nordhausen war crimes cases, in which pretrial investigations began in April 1945, and indicted Mittelwerk colleague,

Rickhey.260 This was evidence of prior knowledge of Rudolph’s criminal activity, but he was permitted to enter the U.S. despite this due to the value of his expertise and connection to von

Braun.

The Director of the Special Investigations Unit that handled the case, Neal Sher, stated that Rudolph’s prominence in the rocketry field could not save him from prosecution. He also said that this proved that his department was prepared to “act against anyone who might have

258 Ralph Blumenthal, “German-Born NASA Expert Quits U.S. to Avoid a War Crimes Suit,” New York Times, 18 October 1984, 13. 259 Ibid. Those individuals tried included both management personnel as well as engineers. 260 Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), 27 April 1945-11 June 1958, United States Army Investigation and Trial Records of War Criminals: United States of America v. Kurt Andrae et al. (and Related Cases), Record Group 153 and Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1942- Record Group 338 microfilm, 3, https://www.archives.gov/files/research/captured-german-records/microfilm/m1079.pdf.

97 persecuted others abroad.”261 Once again, the Justice Department was ready with an excuse as to the thirty years wait on Rudolph’s investigation. The Department claimed that it was only recently that the office compiled information on war crimes that occurred at the rocket factory. In fact, Rudolph’s position in Mittelwerk was known since 1945, when the Allies were rushing to obtain information from the factory before the Soviet Army claimed that territory. Information about the factory and its relation to the Dora camp has been accessible from accounts in books and scattered testimony throughout more than three decades of war crimes trials.262 The article ends with a chummy snapshot of von Braun and Rudolph together followed by a photo of a Nazi crematorium.

Conclusion and Application

Wernher von Braun was a man of exceptional knowledge and talent, well liked, and highly respected. This thesis did not set out to take these titles and attributes away from the

NASA scientist, nor would such a mission further any righteous cause. Instead, the arguments presented expanded upon the wealth of literature on Operation Paperclip and its participants by shifting the scope and methodology. This project began as a mission to objectively prove von

Braun’s war guilt by placing him side by side with his colleague, Arthur Rudolph. Their vast similarities, both personal and occupational, were meant to illustrate that von Braun “got away with it.” He worked in the same settings as Rudolph, and held more powerful positions of authority, but his prominence and importance to the U.S. space program allowed for these factors to be brushed aside; this also made it possible for his close colleagues’ Nazi pasts to be morally disregarded. Instead, as most research does, the sources presented a different central argument.

261 Blumenthal, “German-Born NASA Expert Quits U.S. to Avoid a War Crimes Suit,” 18. 262 See: Jean Michel, Dora: The Nazi Concentration Camp Where Modern Space Technology was Born and 30,000 Prisoners Died (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1980).

Authors that paved the way in this field, such as Michael Neufeld, Linda Hunt, John

Gimbel, and Clarence Lasby each had different purposes in their research, some of which was dictated by the date of their publication. Lasby, who’s monograph was first published in 1971, was a pioneer in his analysis of Paperclip. He communicated with over 200 scientists who participated in Paperclip, and researched the documents that were declassified at that time. Lasby laid the groundwork for future research, but was limited by his timeline. Many of the documents used later by historians were not yet released, there were still many ongoing investigations and behind the scenes work occurring, and Lasby opened the door to a much more intricate investigation of Paperclip. It took another 15 years for Hunt to publish her years-long research endeavor on the operation. Hunt’s first piece, an article in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, was printed in 1985 and revealed her bold arguments that government agencies altered the scientists’ dossiers in order to quickly immigrate them to the United States. Hunt faced backlash, namely from Frederick Ordway III, but she remained confident in her assertions and subsequently published Secret Agenda in 1991.

About the same time, in 1990, Gimbel’s monograph, Science, Technology, and

Reparations, coined the term “intellectual reparations,” when referring to the scientific and technical information that the U.S. obtained at the end of the war. He really begins the conversation about policy procedures during Paperclip’s early years, but focuses on the value of the intellectual reparations taken from Germany, and asserts that their value was never evaluated.

Neufeld, still actively researching this field, carefully examined these past research ventures, but also had the advantage of the declassification of numerous documents related to Paperclip. His first monograph, Rocket and the Reich, was published in 1995 during the upsurge of interest on

Paperclip that began with Hunt’s radical discoveries. Neufeld pushed further and can be credited

99 with tearing down the protection that surrounded von Braun. Neufeld analyzed von Braun’s Nazi past and brash confidence and how they both influenced his time in the U.S., while remaining respectful of the scientist. His 2007 publication on von Braun is considered the authority on the biography of the iconic NASA maven. Unlike von Braun, the literature on Rudolph was sparse and remains just as sparse. The only biography of Rudolph was written by Thomas Franklin in

1987, three years after his exile, and reads as a vindication for the German scientist. Although

Franklin’s book is anything but objective, it does provide details of Rudolph’s upbringing that his FBI files did not include.

By researching the origins of von Braun’s backstory, it was clear that he was destined to be a confident and charismatic leader. Unlike von Braun, Rudolph’s early years painted a picture of humble beginnings, a drive to work with rockets, and not much else. It is also important to note how easily von Braun’s power transferred from Germany to the U.S., and it quickly became clear that the “father of space travel’s” veil of protection that extended to his colleagues began well before he was employed by the American military. The research revealed that officials stretched and molded immigration policy to create a new set of guidelines to quickly bring the

German technicians to the U.S. which resulted in a loophole that was created by and for von

Braun and his team. This act set a precedent, which indicated that von Braun and his team were valuable enough that they did not have to abide by U.S. government legal procedures, all of which was permitted by leading politicians and military officials. This precedent was continually reinforced, as evidenced by the team’s entrance into the U.S. before the immigration policy was approved by President Truman, by von Braun’s ability to travel back and forth to Germany when there was supposed to be a restriction on international travel for Paperclip participants at that time, by the U.S. government protecting von Braun and Rudolph from being subject to the Dora-

100

Nordhausen war crimes trial, and the State Department’s reluctance to justly consider the files on either Rudolph or von Braun.

This precedent, which included the legal protection of von Braun and his colleagues, was exacerbated by von Braun’s extensive list of public appearances and Disney television spots.

While von Braun worked tirelessly for the space program, he also made time for the media. This made it possible for Rudolph and his German colleagues to work quietly. The attention that von

Braun garnered, both the outspoken divulging of his new research on space exploration and his presence in popular culture, rehabilitated his Nazi past and, to an extent, those of his NASA colleagues. Von Braun’s importance to the U.S. space program was two-fold: his expertise was unmatchable, as was his team’s, and he became the charming, trustworthy face of space travel.

The U.S. government did not risk tainting such an image because it would have jeopardized the whole point of Paperclip’s immigration policy procedures.

The Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union bought the U.S. government time, but only three decades worth. By the time the Vietnam War ended, the American acceptance of the “Cold

War consensus” was waning, as was faith in American exceptionalism, while relations with

Israel grew stronger. These factors, among others, caused the foreign policy environment in the

U.S. to change and reopened the door for politicians to reconsider the prosecution of Nazi war criminals. In other words, in the 1970s it became legitimate to reopen the cases of alleged war criminals living in the U.S. now that the Soviet threat had diminished, and U.S. scientists and engineers had caught up with their German counterparts, making the latter less valuable to

NASA and the U.S. government. During this second wave of Nazi prosecutions Congresswoman

Elizabeth Holtzman’s special task force took several additional years to form due to State

Department delays. There is room to question the timeline of the government’s involvement in

101 the Nazi hunting resurgence. Just because the FBI dossiers were available to specific government personnel from 1945 on does not necessarily mean there was a determined conspiracy to hide it.

The various agencies involved in Operation Paperclip and its immigration policy compartmentalized the specific information that they had access to. But, bureaucratic structure does not necessarily unconditionally answer all the reservations surrounding the delayed and selective reinvestigations into alleged Nazi war criminals, including the similar cases of Rudolph and Bishop Valerian Trifia.

This thesis is not meant to question the significant contributions that von Braun and

Rudolph made to the U.S. space program and development of NASA. Instead, it is calling into question how much officials manipulated policy to grant von Braun, and subsequently Rudolph and his team, wide ranging liberties after escorting them out of Nazi Germany. This immigration policy is what first began the crafting of von Braun’s “veil of protection” and the mindset that allowed it to continue. The disjointed immigration policy, formed by the circumstances and without a timely evaluation, established a questionable precedent and set the guidelines for future policy procedures until a monumental shift in the sociopolitical environment in the U.S. made it necessary to revisit and revise. Today, the vetting process for those who are labeled as war criminals is still problematic. These procedures include a full FBI investigation, yet international war criminals have been found to be working in public capacities, while individuals with undetermined criminal pasts are lingering through the process to enter the U.S.263 It cannot be said for certain that these current issues with war criminals immigrating to and living in the U.S.

263 See the 2016 case of Ex-Somali Army Officer, Yusuf Abdi Ali, who fled Somalia and applied for asylum and later citizenship in the U.S. in 1993 and 1996. He was expelled from the U.S., but then reentered the country after providing false information to officials.

102 stemmed from Paperclip’s mishandled immigration policy, but it is worth exploring the similarities in guidelines and lack of timely policy evaluations.

Von Braun and Rudolph did not enter the U.S. to harm anyone, and it was never documented that either man attempted to establish Nazi ideology in their workplaces or homes.

Even so, it is more important to examine the steps that were taken allowing them to hurriedly immigrate to the U.S., and just as significant, the steps that were ignored to allow them to stay so long without judgment. Despite the new information that has been released, and the literature published on Paperclip, its immigration policy, and participants, it has only been in the last two decades that von Braun’s Nazi past underwent more critical examination. Placing him next to

Rudolph and exploring their similar lives, yet different fates, is a portion of a much wider investigation.

103

BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources “350 Germans Aid U.S. Science.” 17 May 1947. Kenosha, WI: Kenosha Evening News. “Affidavit of Membership in NSDAP of Prof. Wernher von Braun.” Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1921-2008. National Archives- College Park (NACP), RG330, Accession 70A4398. “Aide to Reagan Says He Met Allies of an Ex-Nazi Scientist,” 17 Oct. 1985. New York Times. Accessed 3 April 2017. NewspaperArchive database. “Alien Scientists Choose U.S. As ‘Homeland,” 4 January 1949. Salt Lake Tribune. “Allied Control Authority Germany, Jan./Feb. 1946.” Enactments and Approved Papers, Vol. 2. Accessed 27 November 2016. https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/Volume-II.pdf. Alsop, Stewart. “Matter of Fact.” 17 November 1950. Sheboygan, WI: Sheboygan Press Telegram. “Arthur Louis Hugo Rudolph.” Part 1 of 1 BUFILE: 105-11507. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Freedom of Information Act, 1949-1983. https://vault.fbi.gov/Arthur%20Rudolph%20/Arthur%20Rudolph%20Part%201%20of%2 01/view. Bethe, H.A. and H.S. Sack. “German Scientists in Army Employment: II-A Protest.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3, no. 2 (February 1947): 65-67. Blumenthal, Ralph. New York Times (New York, NY), May 1974 ̶̶̶ October 1984. Accessed via Newspaper Archive database, http://access.newspaperarchive.com. “Citizenship Opposed for Nazi Scientists.” 30 December 1946. New York, NY: New York Times. “Dissemination of Classified Security Information to Representatives of the General Accounting Office.” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1921-2008. NACP, ID: 26044425, RG330. 5 March 1953. “Exploitation of Foreign Scientists.” Memorandum to Major General S.J. Chamberlin. The War Department. NACP Gift Collection, ID: 18558952, Box 14. Fleischer, Dave. Superman, “The Mad Scientist.” Film. New York: Fleischer Studios. Distributed by Paramount Pictures, 1941. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_frD6bGp63U. “German Scientist Says Platform Can Be Built in Space.” 4 December 1946. Dunkirk, NY: The Evening Observer.

104

“H. Graham Morison, interview by Jerry N. Hess, 4 August 1972.” Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum Oral History Collection. Transcript. Washington D.C. Online access. https://trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/morison2.htm#transcript. Hines, William. “New Space Airline Von Braun’s Vision.” 20 February 1970. Lowell, MA: Lowell Sun. Hitchens, Christopher. “Minority Report.” Central Intelligence Agency. Nation. 17 November 1984. “Israel-United States Memorandum of Understanding.” Volume 3: 1974-1977. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 September 1975. “JCS 1067.” The United States Embassy, April 1945. Accessed 27 November 2016. http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga3-450426.pdf. Kellogg, E.R., George C. Stevens, and James B. Donovan. The Nazi Concentration Camps – Prosecution Exhibit #230. Film. United States Army Signal Corps., 1945. NACP Film ID: 2272, RG111, 238.2 reel 4. Accessed 14 April 2016. https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn1001630. Kimball, Ward. Man in Space. Television. Burbank, CA: Walt Disney Animation, 1955. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFXza9RH7-E. Koppel, Ted. ABC Nightline. Television. Produced by ABC News Productions. 19 October 1984. Washington D.C., 1984. “Lawmaker Advises Accused Nazi to Defy U.S. Government.” 15 May 1990. Darmstadt Hesse, Germany: European Stars and Stripes. Lucas, Jim G. “U.S. Can’t Afford to Send German Scientists Home; Know Our Military Secrets.” 9 February 1950. El Paso Herald Post. McKimson, Robert. Daffy Duck, “Birth of a Notion.” Film. Burbank, CA: Warner Bros. Pictures, 1947. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1ym6dj_daffy-duck-ep-41-birth-of- a-notion_fun. “Medal of Freedom Nominee File.” 20 May 1976 Memorandum. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library- John Marsh Files, Office of the Press Secretary David Gergen 1974-1977. Box 21. Oppenheimer, J. Robert. United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. II. Washington D.C. 13 April 1954. Ordway, Frederick I. “Nazi Coverup.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, no. 11 (December 1985): 66-67. “Outstanding German Scientists Being Brought To U.S.” Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, 1860-1952, File Unit: Public Relations Bureau, War Department. 1 October 1945. College Park: NACP, ID: 2988852, RG165.

105

Pearce, Jeremy. “Konrad Dannenberg, 96, Top Rocket Scientist, Dies.” 23 February 2009. New York Times. “Press Guidance on Alleged Help to Nazis and Collaborators,” General Records of the Department of State, 1763-2002. NACP, ID: 32, RG59. “Recommendations drawn up at request of Gen. Chamberlin for the attention of Gen. Walsh.” National Security Archives, 27 June 1947. Accessed 2 March 2016. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB146/. “Records of the Central Intelligence Agency 1894-2002.” Paperclip [PROJECT]. Second Release of Subject Files Under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Acts. NACP, ID: 19068640, RG263. “Resolution to Open a Congressional Investigation into the Arthur Rudolph Case.” H.Res.404. U.S. Congress. 101st Congress, 1989-1990. Hon. James A. Traficant Jr. The Library of Congress online database. 24 May 1990. Accessed 2 March 2016. “Select Documents Released Under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Acts Relating to Nazi War Crimes: Operation Paperclip.” DG 2of2. State Department June 1940- April 2002. NACP, RG59, ID: 26156388. Strom, Virginia. “American Cooking Tasteless, Says German Rocket Scientist; Dislikes Rubberized Chicken.” 6 December 1946. El Paso Herald Post. “Terminating War 1943-1944.” Map Room Papers (Roosevelt Administration). NACP MR370.1. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27578755. “The Government in the Sunshine Act: Implementation.” Central Intelligence Agency. 9 June 1978. Released 9 August 2006. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA- RDP81M00980R001200090025-3.pdf. “The Nazi Rocket Experts.” 6 November 1984. Washington Post. Accessed 3 April 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/11/06/the-nazi-rocket- experts/0b6de6e3-77f0-49bc-8545-8f7597bab4a6/?utm_term=.2bb56da23b2e. “United States Army Investigation and Trial Records of War Criminals.” United States of America v. Kurt Andrae et al. (and Related Cases). Microfilm. Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), 27 April 1945-11 June 1958. Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1942. NACP, RG153 and RG338. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/captured-german-records/microfilm/m1079.pdf. Washington D.C. AP. “Germany Pays Off with Help of Scientists.” 4 December 1946. Roswell Daily Record. “Wernher VonBraun.” Part 1-7. FBI, FOIA, 1949-1983. https://vault.fbi.gov/Wernher%20VonBraun/Wernher%20VonBraun%20Part%201%20of %207/view.

106

Secondary Sources Adams, Guy B., and Danny L. Balfour. Unmasking Administrative Evil. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. Bower, Tom. The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1987. Breuer, William B. Race to the Moon: America’s Duel with the Soviets. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Brewer, Garry D., and Peter DeLeon. The Foundations of Policy Analysis. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1983. Brzezinski, Matthew. Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries that Ignited the Space Age. New York City: Holt Paperbacks, 2008. Bulkeley, Rip. The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991. Carter, John J. American Intelligence’s Employment of Former Nazis During the Early Cold War. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2009. Countess, Robert H. Review of An American in Exile: The Story of Arthur Rudolph, written by Thomas Franklin. The Journal of Historical Review 8, no. 2 (1988): 224-231. Divine, Robert A. The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower’s Response to the Soviet Satellite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Dornberger, Walter. V2. London: Hurst and Blackett, 1954. ______. Peenemünde: die Geschichte der V-Waffen. Berlin: Ullstein, 1989. Feigin, Judy. The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust. Edited by Mark M. Richard. Washington: United States Department of Justice, 2008). Franklin, Thomas. An American in Exile: The Story of Arthur Rudolph. Huntsville: Christopher Kaylor Company, 1987. Freeman, Marsha. “Arthur Rudolph and the Rocket That Took Us to the Moon.” Paper presented at the 54th International Astronautical Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, the International Academy of Astronautics, and the International Institute of Space Law, Bremen, Germany, 29 September- 3 October 2003. Gimbel, John. Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990. Grunden, Walter. Secret Weapons and World War II: Japan in the Shadow of Big Science. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005.

107

Holtzman, Elizabeth. Interviewed by the USC Shoah Foundation. Bringing Nazis to Justice. Video. Published 13 August 2013. Accessed 3 September 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJzZM43ZJaA. Huberts, Leo W.J.C., Jeroen Maesschalck, and Carole L. Jurkiewicz ed. Ethics and Integrity of Governance. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2008. Hunt, Linda. Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991. ______. “U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, no. 4 (April 1985): 16-24. Hunter, Allen ed. Rethinking the Cold War. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998. Jackson, Sophie. Hitler’s Heroine: Hanna Reitsch. Stroud, United Kingdom: The History Press, 2014. Jacobson, Annie. Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program That Brought Nazi Scientists to America. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2014. Johnson, David A. Warfare History Network. “Germany’s Deadly V-2 Rockets.” 8 December 2015. Accessed 3 March 2016. http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/germanys- deadly-v-2-rockets/. Judt, Matthias, and Burghard Ciesla ed. Technology Transfer Out of Germany After 1945. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996. Kaufman, Zachary D. United States Law and Policy on Transitional Justice: Principles, Politics, and Pragmatics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Klein, Julia M. “In Pursuit of Justice,” The Pennsylvania Gazette, 22 February 2017. Accessed 3 March 2016. http://thepenngazette.com/in-pursuit-of-justice/. Lasby, Clarence J. Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War. New York: Atheneum, 1971. McGovern, James. Crossbow and Overcast. New York: Paperback Library, 1966. NASA. Marshall Space Flight Center. “Biography of Wernher von Braun.” Accessed 1 March 2016. http://history.msfc.nasa.gov/vonbraun/excerpts.html. ______. “The Highway to Space.” Accessed 17 April 2016. http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4201/ch1- 3.htm. Neufeld, Michael J. The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era. New York: The Free Press, 1995. ______. Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War. New York: Vintage Books, 2007.

108

______. “Wernher von Braun, the SS, and Concentration Camp Labor: Questions of Moral, Political, and Criminal Responsibility,” German Studies Review 25, no. 1 (February 2002): 57-78. Newell, Catherine L. “The Strange Case of Dr. von Braun and Mr. Disney: Frontierland, Tomorrowland, and America’s Final Frontier,” Journal of Religion and Popular Culture 25, no. 3 (2013): 416-429. Newton, Michael. “Peter Lorre: Master of the Macabre.” The Guardian. Last modified 12 September 2014. Accessed 4 April 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/film/2014/sep/12/peter-lorre-master-macabre-bfi. Patton, Carl V., and David S. Sawicki. Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993. Piszkiewicz, Dennis. The Nazi Rocketeers: Dreams of Space and Crimes of War. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1995. “Public Policy Theory.” Lecture at the University of North Florida, Jacksonville, Summer 2014, 4-11. Accessed 4 April 2017. http://www.unf.edu/~g.candler/PAD5384/03.pdf. Rosenbaum, Alan S. Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. Saidel, Rochelle G. The Outraged Conscience. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1984. Segev, Tom. Simon Wiesenthal: The Life and Legends. New York: Random House, Inc., 2010. Sellier, Andre. A History of the Dora Camp: The Untold Story of the Nazi Slave Labor Camp That Secretly Manufactured V-2 Rockets. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003. Simpson, Christopher. Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988. Smith, Bruce L.R. American Science Policy Since WWII. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011. Smith, David. Disney A to Z. Glendale, CA: Disney Editions, 1998. Stillman, Grant B. “Two of the MADest Scientists: Where Strangelove Meets Dr. No; or, Unexpected Roots for Kubrick’s Cold War Classic.” Film History 20, no. 4 (2008): 487- 500. Telotte, J.P. “Disney in Science Fiction Land,” Journal of Popular Film and Television 33, no. 1 (2005): 12-21. Valero, Larry A. “The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947.” Central Intelligence Agency. Last modified 14 April 2007. Accessed 26 November 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi- publications/csi-studies/studies/summer00/art06.html.

109

White, Michael. Acid Tongues and Tranquil Dreamers: Tales of Bitter Rivalry that Fueled the Advancement of Science and Technology. New York: Harper Perennial, 2002. “Who Was Dr. Strangelove?” Slate. 9 March 1999. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/1999/03/who_was_dr_strange love.html. Wiesel, Elie. “The Perils of Indifference.” Speech given at The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Washington D.C., 12 April 1999. Wright, Mike. “The Disney-Von Braun Collaboration and Its Influence on Space Exploration.” Conference paper presented at the Southern Humanities Conference, Huntsville, AL, 12- 14 February 1993.