Islamic Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact Or Fiction?
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ISLAMIC TERRORISM IN THE SAHEL: FACT OR FICTION? Africa Report N°92 – 31 March 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. A WEST AFRICAN ISLAMIST PRIMER................................................................. 3 A. WEST AFRICAN SUFI ISLAM..................................................................................................4 B. THE SALAFIYYA: WAHHABIYYA AND THE GSPC..................................................................5 1. The Wahhabiyya........................................................................................................6 2. The GSPC ..................................................................................................................7 C. THE JAMA'AT AL-TABLIGH .....................................................................................................8 D. ISLAMIC NGOS...................................................................................................................10 III. POLITICAL SPECIFICITIES.................................................................................... 14 A. MAURITANIA: A PERMANENT PLOT? ..................................................................................14 B. MALI: THE THREAT FROM THE NORTH................................................................................16 1. The Tablighi Da'wa .................................................................................................16 C. THE QUESTION OF DR. KHAN..............................................................................................17 D. THE GSPC..........................................................................................................................18 E. NIGER: THE THREAT FROM THE SOUTH...............................................................................21 F. CHAD: THE QUESTION OF SECULARISM ..............................................................................22 IV. U.S. ANALYSIS AND POLICY.................................................................................. 25 A. GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS: OIL AND ISLAMISM..................................................................25 B. MILITARY TRAINING IN WEST AFRICA................................................................................27 1. Africa Crisis Response Force (ACRF) ....................................................................27 2. African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)..............................................................27 3. Operation Focus Relief (OFR).................................................................................28 4. African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) ....................28 5. Coastal Security Program ........................................................................................28 6. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) .............................................................28 7. The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)...........................................................29 C. THE PAN-SAHEL INITIATIVE ...............................................................................................30 V. RESPONSES AND PERCEPTIONS.......................................................................... 32 A. EUROPE ..............................................................................................................................32 B. SAHELIAN MILITARIES........................................................................................................33 C. SAHELIAN GOVERNMENTS ..................................................................................................34 D. SAHELIAN POPULATIONS ....................................................................................................34 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 35 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SAHEL REGION ......................................................................................................36 B. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................37 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................38 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA...........................................................39 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD MEMBERS........................................................................................41 Africa Report N°92 31 March 2005 ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE SAHEL: FACT OR FICTION? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Sahel, a vast region bordering the Sahara Desert been seriously weakened in Algeria and Mali by the and including the countries of Mali, Niger, Chad and combined efforts of Algerian and Sahelian armed Mauritania, is increasingly referred to by the U.S. military forces. as "the new front in the war on terrorism". There are enough indications, from a security perspective, to justify The U.S. military is a new factor in this delicate balance. caution and greater Western involvement. However, the Its operations in the four countries are orchestrated by Sahel is not a hotbed of terrorist activity. A misconceived the European Command (EUCOM) headquarters in and heavy handed approach could tip the scale the wrong Stuttgart, Germany. In the absence of Congressional way; serious, balanced, and long-term engagement with willingness to fund a serious engagement by other parts the four countries should keep the region peaceful. An of the government, the Pentagon has become a major effective counter-terrorism policy there needs to address player by emphasising the prospect of terrorism, though the threat in the broadest terms, with more development military planners themselves recognise the inherent than military aid and greater U.S.-European collaboration. dangers in a purely military counter-terrorism program. There are disparate strands of information out of which a With the U.S. heavily committed in other parts of the number of observers, including the U.S. military, have world, however, Washington is unlikely to devote read the potential threat of violent Islamist activity in the substantial non-military resources to the Sahel soon, four Sahelian countries covered by the Americans' Pan- even though Africa is slowly gaining recognition -- not Sahel Initiative (PSI). There is some danger in this, but in least due to West Africa's oil -- as an area of strategic this region, few things are exactly what they seem at first interest to the West. The resultant equation is laden with glance. Mauritania, which calls itself an Islamic republic, risks, including turning the small number of arrested harshly suppresses Islamist activities of any kind, while clerics and militants into martyrs, thus giving Mali, a star pupil of 1990s neo-liberal democratisation, ammunition to local anti-American or anti-Western runs the greatest risk of any West African country other figures who claim the PSI (and the proposed, expanded than Nigeria of violent Islamist activity. Those who Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) believe poverty breeds religious fanaticism will be still under consideration in the U.S. government) is part disappointed in Niger, the world's second poorest country, of a larger plan to render Muslim populations servile; whose government has maintained its tradition of tolerant and cutting off smuggling networks that have become Sufi Islam by holding to an unambiguous line on the economic lifeblood of Saharan peoples whose separation of religion and the state. livestock was devastated by the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, without offering economic alternatives. To The prospects for growth in Islamist activity in the region avoid creating the kinds of problems the PSI is meant to -- up to and including terrorism -- are delicately solve, it needs to be folded into a more balanced balanced. Muslim populations in West Africa, as approach to the region, one also in which Europeans and elsewhere, express increasing opposition to Western, Americans work more closely together. especially U.S., policy in the Middle East, and there has been a parallel increase in fundamentalist proselytisation. However, these developments should RECOMMENDATIONS not be overestimated. Fundamentalist Islam has been present in the Sahel for over 60 years without being To the U.S. Government: linked to anti-Western violence. The Algerian Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which lost 1. Establish a healthier balance between military and 43 militants in a battle with Chad's army in 2004 after civilian programs in the Sahel, including by: being chased across borders by PSI-trained troops, has Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction? Crisis Group Africa Report N°92, 31 March 2005 Page ii (a) opening USAID offices in the capitals of 9. Focus development aid in the north on two sectors, Mauritania, Niger and Chad; -- livestock and tourism -- both of which need significant investments in infrastructure, beginning (b) tailoring significant development programs with roads, to become viable. to nomadic populations in northern Mali, with emphasis on roads and livestock Dakar/Brussels, 31 March 2005 infrastructure (wells and regional slaughterhouses); and (c) promoting tourist infrastructure in such historic places