Florida State University Libraries

Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School

2009 This Way Please: The Role of the and the in Shaping the Iraqi Crisis Blake A. Draper

Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PUBLIC POLICY

THIS WAY PLEASE: THE ROLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE UNITED STATES IN

SHAPING THE IRAQI

By

BLAKE A. DRAPER

A Thesis submitted to the Department of International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2009

The members of the committee approve the thesis of Blake A. Draper defended on November 6th, 2009.

______Peter Garretson Professor Directing Thesis

______Elwood Carlson Committee Member

______Mark Souva Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members.

ii

I dedicate this thesis to the people of , who continue to suffer the indignities and hardships brought upon them by decades of tyrannical rule and persistent conflict.

iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to thank Cadence Kidwell for being a dedicated educator who encouraged me to pursue my desire to research and write. I also thank Monsignor William Kerr for his life-long dedication to peace through education and his guiding role in so many lives. It was a conversation with him that launched this thesis long before the writing began. I thank my sister Autumn and brother-in-law Jeff for opening their home to me as I finished work on this thesis and figured out many other things in my life. Thanks to Dr. Peter Garretson for agreeing to oversee my work and being always patient and supportive. Finally, thank you to Mike for the all- important technical support.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ...... vi List of Figures...... vii List of Abbreviations ...... viii Abstract...... ix INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1. CONTEXT AND CAUSES...... 4 2. DESTINATION CHOICES...... 13 Overview of Destination Choices ...... 13 Overview of Religious Identity...... 17 Overview of Legal Status ...... 20 Examination of Destination Choices ...... 21 ...... 21 ...... 28 ...... 33 ...... 39 Turkey...... 41 Iran ...... 43 Gulf Cooperation Council...... 44

3. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES...... 46 Preparation for a Refugee Problem...... 47 US Role in Mitigation...... 51 CONCLUSION...... 63 APPENDICIES...... 66 REFERENCES ...... 73 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 77

v LIST OF TABLES

1. UNHCR end-of-year figures for total registered Iraqi and asylum seekers, 1978-2008...... 6 2. Estimated number of Iraqi refugees as of August 2008, compared to host country regular population...... 14 3. Per capita GDP in Iraqi-refugee accepting Middle Eastern states...... 16 4. Religious identity of Iraqi UNHCR-registered refugee population, by percent, as of August 2008...... 18 5. Funding appropriations for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Project Code 04000, Migration and Refugee Assistance, fiscal years 2004-2008, in millions of US dollars...... 50

vi LIST OF FIGURES

1. Total UNHCR-registered Iraqi refugees worldwide, 1978-2008...... 7 2. Proportion of religious identities, UNHCR-registered Iraqi refugees as of August 2008...... 19 3. UNHCR referrals for Iraqi refugees versus arrivals to the US, February 2007 – January 2008...... 59

vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DART Disaster Assistance Response Team GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDP Internally Displaced Person IOM International Organization for Migration IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund MECC Middle East Council of Churches MOU Memorandum of Understanding NGO Non-governmental Organization OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance OPE Overseas Processing Entity PRM Population, Refugees and Migration (Bureau of the US State Department) UAE United Arab Emirates UNHCR High Commissioner for Refugees USAID United States Agency for International Development USRAP United States Refugee Admissions Program SIV Special Immigrant Visa TPR Temporary Protection Regime

viii ABSTRACT

The Iraqi Refugee Crisis began in 2006 as a result of the instability and violence that prevailed in Iraq following the 2003 US-led invasion and occupation. Instead of being directed to camps, flowed across international borders of Middle Eastern states nearby Iraq to live in urban centers and face varying levels of legal accommodation and deteriorating economic security. The policies of individual states in the Middle East, along with complex demographic factors, have influenced where Iraqis have gone. The role of the United States in affecting the destination choices of Iraqis is examined in this paper because of the powerful position of the US in the Middle East region and its role in creating the refugee crisis. The evidence reveals that the diplomatic relations between Middle East host countries and the United States, and the self- serving political interests of those states has created and maintained a regime in which Iraqi refugees are stuck primarily in host countries along Iraq’s western border. The states involved in the Iraqi Refugee Crisis have applied political self-interest to their adherence to mechanisms of international law to which they are subject. A realist perspective of international relations is employed to explain the stability-seeking, risk-averse behavior of the states influencing the direction of migration. The purpose of this paper is to determine the destination choices of Iraqi refugees and explain the factors that dictated those choices.

ix INTRODUCTION

In March 2003, a military coalition led by the United States invaded the country of Iraq to remove its President from power and institute a new democratic regime. Three years later, instability and violence in Iraq incited an event of massive population displacement that has affected more than two million Iraqis who fled their country, along with tens of millions of citizens of the countries that have received them. The formative document of international refugee law is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It defines a refugee as a person who “owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (United Nations High Comissioner for Refugees 1951). The United Nations has applied that definition to the millions of Iraqis who have fled their homes in recent years, giving them the legal status of refugee and all the rights endowed therein. While the situation in Iraq has led to both cross-border refugee flow and internal displacement, this study will focus on refugees, and will not address internally displaced persons.

The term Iraqi Refugee Crisis has entered common usage for the human rights groups, research institutes, and governments who have been tracking the situation of Iraqi refugees and their impact on host societies. It will be used in this thesis to refer to the massive cross-border displacement of Iraqis that began in 2006 and lasts until the present day. The Oxford English Dictionary defines crisis as “a vitally important or decisive stage in the progress of anything; a turning-point; also, a state of affairs in which a decisive change for better or worse is imminent; now applied esp. to times of difficulty, insecurity, and suspense in politics or commerce.” The term crisis is appropriate because Iraqi displacement has major significance for the stability of host countries in the Middle East and the political goals of United States and many other countries. Non-engagement could have serious humanitarian and political consequences.

The analysis in this thesis will be based primarily on a realist interpretation of refugee flow. Refugee situations are typically thought of in humanitarian terms, but they often carry larger geopolitical implications to consider. Charles Keely of Georgetown University argues that the natural state of order in the international system is people living within the borders and under

1 the protection of their own state, and any large uncontrolled movement of people threatens the stability of the system. Every state has a responsibility to contain and protect its own citizens. When a state fails in that role, a refugee outflow occurs. Refugee situations upset the natural equilibrium of the international system, and the system will attempt to counter the threat and return to balance. Keely argues that the instruments of the international refugee regime – aid- dispensing organizations, international treaties, and the United Nations – do not exist strictly for humanitarian purposes. Instead, they act primarily to restore equilibrium to the system when a state fails to fulfill its proper role (Keely 1996). Under the perspective outlined above, the Iraqi Refugee Crisis is regarded primarily as a threat to international stability and the political goals of states involved.

The Iraqi Refugee Crisis has received little public attention despite the more than two million refugees involved and the enormous burden it has imposed on host governments. This study will bring the details of the situation to light and explain where Iraqi refugees have gone and why. The purpose of this thesis is to explain the direction of migration for Iraqis fleeing their country. The vast majority of Iraqi refugees have taken refuge in one of the states nearby Iraq in the Middle East region. An examination of the push and pull factors in those countries is presented. Those factors developed via domestic policy decisions and political influences from states outside the region. The role of the United States in affecting the direction of migration is of central consideration in this thesis.

Chapter 1 provides the demographic context of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis, with a look at the historic pattern of Iraqi displacement, up to and including the current situation, as well as describing the conditions that have led to displacement. Chapter 2 provides a detailed account of what Iraqis have experienced in the various host countries. The Iraqi Refugee Crisis has been a particularly difficult challenge for governments and NGOs in the region because the affected population was not placed in camps and instead had many destination choices. The discussion of conditions present in destination countries is essential, as living conditions and accessibility are the most immediate influences on Iraqis’ choices. Chapter 3 examines the role of the United States in affecting the direction of migration. The United States is featured due to the role it played in starting the war and its powerful diplomatic and military influence that makes it the dominant extra-regional state actor in the Middle East. The US has an irrefutable interest in the

2 crisis, since the stability of the Middle East region is key to US political goals. Interest in mitigating the adverse effects of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis has been acknowledged on numerous occasions by officials in the US government. All states involved, including the US, also had objective legal responsibilities to assist vulnerable Iraqi refugees under several mechanisms of international law. Finally, this work assumes an additional responsibility on the part of the United States tied to its role as the ultimate instigator of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis.

Because the Iraqi Refugee Crisis is ongoing, much of the available information comes from organizations working with refugees currently – the UNHCR; International Rescue Committee; International Crisis Group; and several human rights advocacy groups including Amnesty International, , and Human Rights First. Some data comes from research institutes like Migration Policy Institute and The Brookings Institution. Several critical pieces of information and quotes come from news media sources such as the UN News Center, state media outlets, and some major national newspapers. Finally, some documents that were useful particularly for examination of the US role in the crisis came from the US State Department.

The evidence will show where Iraqi refugees went and what factors affected their choices in an attempt to explain the demographic and geographic composition of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis and the political forces that have sustained it.

3 CHAPTER 1

CONTEXT AND CAUSES

Demographic statistical data compiled and published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides an illustration of the scope and composition of Iraqi displacement. A fair treatment of the current situation requires the context of the Iraqi displacement in the years prior to 2003 particularly the Saddam Hussein Ba’athist regime that ruled Iraq for the 24 years preceding the 2003 US invasion. Iraq is a country accustomed to conflict and the fleeing of refugees. The data for total Iraqi refugees registered with the UNHCR for the twenty-five years before the invasion are presented below in Table 1 and show that Iraqis taking refuge in foreign countries was a not a phenomenon that began in 2003. In 1988, two years before the first , there were more than half a million UNHCR-registered Iraqis refugees. That number represents only a part of the actual amount, i.e. the ones that registered with UNHCR. Many refugees, such as those with the financial means to support their own escape, or those who fear deportation or other legal trouble never register with UNHCR. A partial explanation of the large numbers of Iraqis seeking refuge in neighboring countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s is the intimidation and genocide perpetrated by Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime. Political scientist David Romano writes about the decades of intimidation and mass murder enacted against those in the Iraqi population deemed threatening to the Hussein government, such as the in northern Iraq, the Shia in the south, and anyone else considered disloyal. Hundreds of thousands of Shia Arabs were either forcibly deported to Shia-dominant Iran or fled there on their own accord beginning in 1969 and continuing throughout the 1980-1988 Iran- (Romano 2005). According to Romano, “Particularly in northern Iraq, but also in the Shiite south of the country, Saddam’s authoritarian regime and its policies of ethnic cleansing were responsible for huge numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.” The most atrocious incident of the Ba’athist regime’s violence against its own people was the 1987-1988 genocidal “al-Anfal” campaign, during which an estimated 150,000 – 200,000 Kurds were murdered, including an incident involving the use of poison gas against the town of Halabja. Following al-Anfal, hundreds of thousands of Kurds in Northern Iraq fled to either Iran or Turkey (Romano 2005). In southern Iraq, the Ba’ath regime

4 drained the marshes that the Shia Marsh Arabs called home, destroying the ecosystem that supported their communities and compelling many to flee to Iran and Saudi Arabia (Romano 2005).

Those not targeted specifically for elimination by Saddam Hussein had other reasons to flee Iraq. Undesirable and unsafe conditions have plagued Iraq for several decades - Iraq was at war with Iran for most of the 1980s, and there was a significant spike in the number of Iraqi refugees in 1985, a year in which Iraq and Iran made several offensive military strikes against each other. Another spike came in 1990 and 1991, the years of the Iraqi invasion of and the first Gulf War, when Iraqis fled to escape the collateral violence of military conflict with the US. The data show that military conflict in Iraq has historically led to an increased amount of refugees seeking safety outside of Iraq. On the next page, Table 1 shows the absolute numbers of Iraqi refugees from 1978 through 2008, as well as the percent change from previous year, which indicates the relative scale of refugee outflows.

In 1985, nearly 300,000 people fled Iraq, creating a 294% difference from the previous year’s number of Iraqi refugees. In 1990, the First Gulf War created a change of 123%. In response to the crisis, Syria and Jordan in 1990 allowed for the first time the establishment of UNHCR branch offices within their borders (Zaiotti 2006). Also in 1990, the UN Security Council imposed tough economic . These sanctions brought scarcity and poverty to Iraqi society, which had previously been one of the wealthiest in the Arab world. Despite the disabling of the Iraqi economy through the 1990s, a downward trend in the total number of Iraqi refugees prevailed following the end of the First Gulf War. The downward trend continued through the 2003 US invasion and first two years of occupation. Beginning in 1993, the number of Iraqi refugees worldwide decreased steadily every year except for one minor increase in 2001, to a low-point of 262,293 at the end of 2005, until it peaked at 2.2 million at the end of 2007. The year 2006 had the highest percent change and most dramatic refugee outflow in a 30-year period, with an increase of 1,162,427 Iraqi refugees, a 440% change from the previous year. Table 1 clearly illustrates a massive outflow of Iraqi refugees during the years 2006 and 2007, as well as the relative severity of the current crisis versus earlier refugee outflows.

5 Table 1. UNHCR end-of-year figures for total registered Iraqi refugees and asylum- seekers, 1978 – 2008.

Year Worldwide Iraqi Percent change refugee population1 from previous year 1978 560 Not available 1979 31,000 + 5435.7% 1980 31,098 + 0.3% 1981 66,589 + 114.1% 1982 103,766 + 55.8% 1983 103,721 - 0.0% 1984 101,724 - 1.9% 1985 401,503 + 294.7% 1986 400,745 - 0.2% 1987 410,818 + 2.5% 1988 508,468 + 24.8% 1989 507,986 - 0.1% 1990 1,133,805 + 123.2% 1991 1,321,853 + 18.7% 1992 1,343,824 + 1.7% 1993 771,077 - 42.6% 1994 749,834 - 2.8% 1995 718,719 - 4.1% 1996 714,730 - 1.6% 1997 707,338 - 1.0% 1998 675,030 - 4.6% 1999 642,886 - 4.8% 2000 526,179 - 18.1% 2001 530,511 + 0.8% 2002 422,512 - 20.3% 2003 368,580 - 12.8% 2004 311,884 - 15.4% 2005 262,299 - 15.9% 2006 1,424,726 + 443.2% 2007 2,279,245 + 60.0% 2008 1,873,519 - 17.8%

Figure 1 offers a further visual illustration of the declining Iraqi refugee population trend, and the abrupt reversal of that trend in 2006.

1 UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Data extracted: 11/08/09

6 UNHCR­registered Iraqi refugees, 1978­2008 2500000

2000000

1500000

Number 1000000

500000

0 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 Year

Figure 1. Total UNHCR-registered Iraqi refugees worldwide, 1978-2008.

The era of Saddam Hussein’s rule gave Iraqis plenty of reasons to flee Iraq for the relative safety of neighboring countries. Although the purpose of Operation Iraqi Freedom was to unseat Saddam Hussein and bring democracy and peace to Iraq, the development of poor security conditions through the war and occupation gave Iraqis continued reason to flee their homes. The mismanagement of the occupation created a new source of danger – civil conflict introduced by a new, armed and violent portion of Iraqi society. One effect of an authoritarian regime is stability and order. Although Saddam Hussein had terrorized and murdered thousands of his own people, Iraqis enjoyed relative stability in daily life in the years before the 2003 war. When the US-led military coalition removed Saddam Hussein from power, it also removed the system of law and order without an effective plan to replace it. With first no active police force, and then a highly ineffective one, Iraqi society became destabilized and deteriorated into routine violence and danger.

A general sense of lawlessness and chaos has pervaded Iraq since the war began. In mid- 2003, Iraqis began to be threatened by the increasing presence of extremist militias and their enforcers who eventually took control of entire neighborhoods in . Militant religious extremist groups based on sectarian identities gradually developed into organized and effective fighting forces in the streets of Iraqi cities. Ordinary Iraqis became targets of intimidation and

7 violence for these groups. In addition to enforcing strict, conservative codes for dress and alcohol consumption that were not part of life under the secular rule of Saddam Hussein, these militant groups fight each other and routinely assault the US military and other coalition forces in Iraq. Attacks have often ended in the deaths of uninvolved citizens who are caught by stray bullets or explosive devices intended for enemy militias or US soldiers. Car bombs and explosives placed in crowded public places have also become common weapons used against civilians associated with a particular religious or political affiliation. The incidence of financially motivated abductions rose dramatically after the occupation began - many Iraqis have been kidnapped and held for ransom. The ransom money obtained from abductions is used to finance the operations of extremist militant groups. While traveling the roads, Iraqis, especially residents of Baghdad and other cities, are routinely stopped at checkpoints run by US military personnel, local militias, or common criminals. At these checkpoints Iraqis are subject to humiliating searches at best, and robbery or abduction at worst. The ever-present danger in Iraq has led to displacement on a massive scale, compelling Iraqis to leave their homes for refuge in other regions of Iraq or across national borders into neighboring countries.

The dangers confronting Iraqis were especially pronounced in Baghdad and other cities. A characteristic of the Iraqi refugee population that is distinct from most refugee populations around the world is that it is predominantly urban in origin and destination. 80% of UNHCR- registered Iraqi refugees originate from Baghdad, with less than 5% fleeing from the rural areas of Ninewa, Diyala, Kerbala, Basrah, and Anbar provinces (Harper 2008). The overwhelmingly urban composition of the Iraqi refugee population is explained by the fact that the violence perpetrated by sectarian militias has occurred in places where Sunni and Shia are mixed, which is mostly in cities. The destinations of fleeing Iraqis are also concentrated in urban areas. 75% to 90% of refugees live in the capital cities of the Middle East (Harper 2008). Unlike typical refugee populations, Iraqis live not in camps isolated from the native population, but are instead blended into the urban communities where they have taken residence (Margesson, Bruno and Sharp 2009). The Iraqis’ non-camp situation has disadvantages from a humanitarian perspective. Refugees in camps can be monitored and accurate surveys of needs conducted. They can easily be provided with essential needs, as well as information about rights, benefits, repatriation and resettlement options (International Rescue Committee 2008). Legal status is usually more certain in camp situations. As an indigent population with limited options for medical treatment, Iraqis

8 are also in a more fragile health position than camp-based refugees may be. The dispersion of Iraqis makes it difficult for health organizations to assess their health status and treat illness, which also threatens the public health of the host country. A noteworthy characteristic of the Iraqi refugee population is its dispersion throughout various urban centers with no formal support network, leaving individuals at higher risk to indigence, illness, and legal trouble.

Despite the emergence of unsafe conditions early in the occupation, Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate the fact that the Iraqi Refugee Crisis as defined in this paper did not begin immediately after the 2003 invasion. In fact, the declining trend of the 1990s carried on through 2005 as the global number of Iraqi refugees continued to decrease during the first two years of occupation. The absence of a major refugee outflow during the war came as a surprise to NGOs preparing to respond. Several aid agencies predicted mass population displacement to follow the military invasion of Iraq and its immediate aftermath. On March 28, 2003, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs released a fifty-five page flash appeal for humanitarian response to serve anticipated Iraqi refugees and IDPs (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2003). Contrary to expectation, there was no major humanitarian crisis in the immediate aftermath of the war.

From 2003 to 2005, Iraqis were both leaving and returning to Iraq, but the data above illustrates the fact that the net effect was more returns than departures during that period. Much of the Iraqi refugee population repatriated to Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein - some independently and others via UNHCR-administered repatriation programs. A UNHCR news report from December 2005 cites the organization as having returned 20,500 refugees to Iraq from Iran and Saudi Arabia during the first several months of occupation in 2003, and the Iraqi Ministry of Trade having record of the independent return of some 270,000 Iraqis around May 2003 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2005). In April 2004 the Iranian news agency reported that some 65,000 Iraqis living in exile in Iran had returned to Iraq through their own arrangements, in addition to 4,600 that had been recently repatriated by the UNHCR working in Iran (IRNA news agency 2004). In some cases, refugees were given incentives in exchange for their return to Iraq. The Washington Times reported that Iraqi Shia religious scholars studying in Iran were offered $200 to $300 by the International Center for Islamic Studies to return to their city of origin in Iraq and preach Islam for six to nine weeks (Pejman

9 2003). Many Iraqis living as exiles during the Saddam Hussein regime felt compelled to return to Iraq after the overthrow of the Hussein government, presumably because of the promise of a new, non-oppressive political regime coming into power. While there was little known at the time about how Iraq would develop politically in the post-Saddam era, the sudden absence of the tyrannical Ba’athist regime certainly inspired many Iraqis to return to their country to participate in and benefit from a new form of government.

Although the overthrow of the notoriously oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein brought many Iraqis back home with feelings of hope for a new era, the reality on the ground in Iraq was one of deteriorating security and a reduction in quality of life. Those who had the money and connections to comfortably flee Iraq did so during the early period of occupation, when the worst of the violence and social disruption was yet to come. There were two main groups that fled Iraq during those early years of occupation. One was individuals and families with strong ties to the former regime. While the removal of the Saddam Hussein government inspired thousands of Iraqis to stream back into Iraq, it had the opposite effect on those closely associated with the former regime. The Coalition Provisional Authority and subsequent Iraqi government were unfriendly to anyone with Ba’ath Party associations, officially excluding them from continued service in government or business with the new regime. This policy stripped high-ranking, wealthy Ba’ath Party members of their jobs and prestige in Iraqi society, causing them to seek new lives in nearby Arab states. Because of their financial wealth, and the presence of the Ba’ath party in Syria, these former government officials and their families fled Iraq in comfort – unlike the individuals that typified the displaced Iraq population (Margesson, Bruno and Sharp 2009).

The second group that fled Iraq during the early years of occupation was affluent families that sought to escape the deteriorating security situation and could afford to move and establish a new life in a foreign country. According to a report by the Brookings Institution and the University of Bern, many affluent and secular families began to leave in 2004 due to the increased presence of hard-line Sunni and Shia militant groups that threatened their lifestyles (al- Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). This group of refugees left relatively early and did so relatively comfortably, escaping to affluent Persian Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates. It is important to note that these early refugees, whether with Ba’ath Party associations or not, were wealthy, urban-dwelling Iraqis. The wealth of these early refugees matters because it

10 helped to dictate the time period in which they fled. The refugees to flee Iraq the earliest were the most capable of doing so – they had the financial means to make the move safely and likely had business contacts in other countries, as well as the ability to afford housing and schooling for their children.

While it is clear that the Iraqi refugee crisis did not begin in earnest until February 2006, it is important to acknowledge that the conditions leading to massive cross-border displacement were present in Iraq before that time – in fact violence became an issue soon after the invasion in 2003. The Feminist Press at the City University of New York published the writings of a 24-year old female Iraqi blogger living in Baghdad, known only by the pseudonym “Riverbend” who described a situation of ever-present danger and curtailed quality of life in Baghdad throughout 2003 and 2004 (Riverbend 2005). Average Iraqis tolerated the worsening conditions for several years, and no large refugee movement occurring during the first three years of occupation. The reality of increasingly dangerous conditions and the flight of wealthy Iraqis during that period suggest that poorer Iraqis tolerated the unsafe conditions simply for lack of financial means to leave.

UNHCR data shows that massive population displacement in Iraq began in 2006, three years after the invasion. Since historically military conflict in Iraq has quickly led to refugee outflows, the gap in time between the US-led invasion of Iraq and the start of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis is a curiosity. The chronological disparity begs the question of what caused the sudden mass displacement. The requisite conditions for the Iraqi refugee crisis were established by the US-led invasion and the mismanagement of the security situation. However, the drastic spike in the size of the Iraqi refugee population evident in Figure 1 represents the effect of the February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari “Golden” Shia mosque in the city of Samarra, north of Baghdad. The bombing was the spark that ignited a wave of sectarian violence and struck a devastating blow to the stability of Iraqi society. It was at that point that a large, less financially secure cohort began to leave (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). Numerous aid agencies and scholars have identified the Samarra mosque bombing as a watershed event of the civil conflict in Iraq. It was an event that caused security conditions in Iraq to worsen beyond the point of tolerance for millions of ordinary Iraqis. While there was a small group of wealthy Iraqis that fled Iraq in the early years of occupation, it was not until after the 2006 mosque bombing that

11 Iraqis began to flee their homes en masse, seeking refuge both within and outside Iraq, and dramatically reversing the trend of a declining Iraq refugee population.

12 CHAPTER 2

DESTINATION CHOICES

The countries surrounding Iraq theoretically provided refugees numerous possible destination choices. An even distribution among them may have lessened the difficulties for Iraqi families and for the governments accommodating them. However, distribution was not even because destination choices were not equal in feasibility. Some states have received many more Iraqi refugees than others, notwithstanding strong similarities among them in factors that typically determine destination choice - distance, culture, and language. A small number of countries have been forced to cope with the majority share of the over two million Iraqi refugees. This chapter will examine the factors present in seven Middle Eastern states – Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, and Iran, plus the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In this study, the GCC will be treated as a state unit due to the small proportion of Iraqi refugees in its member states and the similarity of experience for Iraqis in those places. The GCC consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The purpose of this chapter is to determine where Iraqi refugees have gone and what factors drew them there.2 Below is a brief overview of several key considerations for the destination countries – the number of Iraqis hosted, the religious identity of the refugee population, and responsibilities under international refugee law conventions.

Overview of Destination Choices

The table below shows the estimated Iraqi refugee population in individual Middle Eastern states and the GCC. The figures are estimates based on UNHCR registration and reporting by national governments.

2 See Appendix A for a reference map of the region.

13

Table 2. Estimated number Iraqi refugees as of August 20083, compared to host country regular population.

Country of Estimated Iraqi Population of Iraqi refugee population as refuge refugee population4 host country5 percentage of host country population Syria 1.0 – 1.5 million 20,178,485 7.4% Jordan 450,000 – 500,000 6,342,948 7.9% Lebanon 50,000 4,017,095 1.2% Egypt 20,000 – 40,000 83,082,869 0.04% Turkey 6,000 – 10,000 76,805,524 0.01% Iran 57,000 + 66,429,284 0.08% GCC* 200,000 + 41,155,4376 0.5% *Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE) including approx. 50,000 in Kuwait, 100,000 in UAE, 5,000 in Saudi Arabia and 50,000 in Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain (unofficial estimates).

Table 2 depicts the absolute size of the Iraqi refugee population in each country and shows that figure as a percentage of the host nation’s regular population. The percentage in the last column indicates the relative severity of the situation in each country and shows who has shouldered the largest burden. Syria and Jordan stand out, with the percentage of Iraqis as part of their total population at 7.4 and 7.9 percent, respectively. For perspective, 7.4% of the population of the United States is 22,733,697 – larger than the population of the State of Florida.7 The amount of refugees Syria and Jordan have accepted would be tantamount to the United States accepting a number of refugees exceeding the populations of the states of Florida or New York.

3 Refugee figures listed in this table are the UNHCR totals for the respective countries, and all are not necessarily the result of the 2003 US occupation. Based on estimates by national governments and UNHCR, figures as of August 2008, according to UNHCR Iraq Situation Update.

4 United Nations High Comissioner for Refugees. Iraq Situation Update. UNHCR, August 2008.

5 CIAWorld Factbook 2008. .

6 Collective population of the six GCC member states.

7 Based on CIA World Factbook US Population estimate for July 2009, and US Census Bureau Florida population estimate for 2007. Found at and .

14 The country with the next highest percentage is Lebanon, at 1.2%.8 Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and the GCC have percentages of less than one percent. It must be noted that the estimates of the number of Iraqis in these last four locations are limited by the fact that those governments have not engaged with the Iraqi refugee crisis on the level of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The figures depend heavily on UNHCR data, which offers no guarantee of accuracy as to the actual number, since many refugees fail to notify UNHCR of their presence. The estimates are based on a combination of government reporting and UNHCR knowledge. Despite admitted limitations, it is the data published by UNHCR, the designated refugee agency of the United Nations and the leading authority on refugee movements, and thus it is the best available data. Even assuming inaccuracies in the absolute numbers, the primary usefulness of the data is to show relative burden on host countries, which I can find no reasonable grounds to dispute.

The compounding factor for the poor conditions that are characteristic of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis is the low per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the countries that have received Iraqis. In order to fully understand the crisis, a look at the number of refugees in each place must be paired with a discussion of the relative wealth of those countries, as the standard of living and economic situation in a country influence the conditions that refugees face. Low GDP means low revenue for governments and thus fewer resources to support effective social services, especially during a period of massive population influx. The flood of Iraqis into neighboring states has severely strained the national social services systems that provide basic needs such as education and health care. In most cases, Iraqi refugees are not allowed to work and are in a dire financial situation, so they rely heavily on state-provided services. Many of the effected states have requested billions of dollars in aid money from Western governments and NGOs to assist in coping with the abrupt population surge.

Per capita GDP is a metric used to measure relative wealth among nations. The nations coping with Iraqi refugees represent a broad range of per capita GDP. According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the average per capita GDP of the GCC is $25,578, giving the GCC a collective rank of 28th in the world, between Hong Kong and New Zealand (NationMaster n.d.). However, Iraqi refugees make up less than one percent of the population of

8 The United Arab Emirates has a higher percentage as an individual country, at 2.1%, but for the purpose of this study is considered part of the larger collective GCC.

15 the GCC and, as discussed above, most Iraqis living in the GCC live comfortably with financial independence. The most common destinations for Iraqis are on the lower end of world per capita GDP rankings. The Iraqi refugee-accepting Middle Eastern country with the next highest per capita GDP is Lebanon, ranked #81 (NationMaster n.d.). The rankings drop dramatically from there, down to the lowest, Egypt, at #141. Table 3 below provides the complete ordered data for per capita GDP of the countries within the scope of this study.

Table 3. Per capita GDP in Iraqi-refugee accepting Middle Eastern states

Country World Rank GDP per capita

(in US dollars)9

GCC (collective) #28 $25,578.12

Lebanon #81 $5,603.50

Turkey #82 $5,521.47

Iran #104 $3,323.16

Jordan #120 $2,537.83

Syria #135 $1,790.19

Egypt #141 $1,425.58

Syria, Jordan and Lebanon stand out among the nations that have received Iraqi refugees. The large number of refugees they have accepted, along with their relatively low per capita GDPs have contributed to these countries being the setting of the worst sustained conditions being faced by Iraqi refugees. They exhibit the most common characteristics of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis. While all the bordering states of Iraq and in the broader Middle East region have received some refugees, the vast majority of Iraqis who left Iraq to escape the conditions created by the 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing went to one of those three countries.

9 Based on 2006 figures.

16 Another possible explanation for the direction of the Iraqi refugee flow derived from the per capita GDP data is that wealthier countries were more capable of resisting the influx of refugees. The GCC countries in particular had the capability to prevent the entry of unwanted refugees. Saudi Arabia constructed a high-tech barrier along its border with Iraq costing seven billion US dollars (Human Rights Watch 2007). A fortification of that cost would have been impossible for Syria or Jordan to afford. Those countries instead have spent the last several years requesting billions in dollars of aid from the international community to mitigate the effects of the refugee explosion within their borders. Considering the length of the Iraqi-Saudi border, Saudi Arabia would presumably have far more illegal Iraqis without the access to readily available funds for security infrastructure construction. Poorer states may have wished to prevent entry in similar way, but could not afford to effectively protect long borders, and were thus forced to cope with the massive influx internally.

Overview of Religious Identity

A major consideration for Iraqis fleeing their country is their religious and sectarian identity. Although sectarian division has become a cause for violence in Iraq in recent years, it is important to note that Iraq’s diverse populace coexisted without major incident for decades under the Ba’ath regime. The most prevalent division that has arisen, due to the violent activity of armed militias, is that between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Under the rule of Saddam Hussein, overt social disturbances based on sectarian identification were not common because the secular regime effectively oppressed religious identity, preventing the incidence of violent public attacks. The harsh methods of state surveillance and oppression practiced by Saddam Hussein’s government were eliminated when the Ba’ath regime was overthrown. The removal of despotic rule created a power vacuum, and combined with the stress of war, led to the explosion of sectarian violence.

Sunni and Shia Muslims are not the only religious groups of significance in Iraq. There are also Christians, Sabeans, and Yezidis. The figures on religious/sectarian breakdown of Iraqi refugees are highly limited. Table 4 below depicts the religious breakdown of the Iraqi refugee population in nearby Middle Eastern countries. Figure 2 offers a graph visualization of the same data. These percentages are limited in their representation in that they only include those persons

17 registered with the UNHCR, and due to the volatile nature of religious identity in Iraq, surveyed persons are sometimes dishonest about their religious affiliation, a difficulty that is impossible to control statistically.

Given the Sunni-Shia sectarian violence that has been the main cause of Iraqi displacement, a potential curiosity for the reader is why so many Shia refugees have fled to countries like Syria and Jordan, despite the Sunni dominance in those countries and Iraqi Shia refugees’ historic pattern of fleeing to Shia-dominant Iran. For that answer I turn to the insight of the Brookings Institution report by al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner. Interviews with Shia revealed some reasons for choosing that country. One is that refugees are not only seeking security but also economic opportunity. Employment prospects in Syria are better than most places in the region, including within Iraq, where it is difficult to find a location with both employment and security. Shias also leave Iraq for Syria seeking asylum or third-country resettlement, which they cannot do from within Iraq or as easily in other nearby countries. The nature of the sectarian conflict has been of religious polarization and extremism, and moderate and secular Shia (and presumably all refugees, regardless of sect affiliation) do not wish to live under the strict religious edicts enforced by Shia extremist groups. According to al-Khaldi, Hoffman and Tanner, Baghdadis in particular were accustomed to a freer, more secular lifestyle.

Table 4. Religious identity of Iraqi UNHCR-registered refugee population, by percent, as of August 200810

Sunnis Shi’ite Christians Islam Sabean- Yezidis Other unspecified Mandean

Syria 58% 19.5% 14.5% 2.9% 4% 0.7% 0.6%

Jordan 59% 27% 12.5% N/A 0.7% 0.2% 0.6%

Lebanon 20.9% 44.2% 34.6% 0.2% - - 0.1%

Egypt N/A N/A 2% 96% N/A N/A 2%

Turkey 22.6% 7.8% 63.9% 3.8% 0.2% 1.3% 0.5%

10 UNHCR Iraq Situation Update – August 2008.

18

Proportion of religious identities, UNHCR­registered Iraqi refugees 100% 90% 80% 70% Other Yezidis 60% Sabean‐Mandean 50% Islam ‐ unspeciied 40% Christians 30% Shi'ite 20% Sunnis 10% 0% Syria Jordan Lebanon Egypt Turkey

Figure 2. Proportion of religious identities, UNHCR-registered Iraqi refugees as of August 2008.

Historically, Shia refugees have fled to southern Iraqi provinces where the concentration of Shia is higher than in Baghdad or northern provinces. However, beginning in 2007, those provinces began restricting entry to only persons with relatives currently living there, forcing many Shias to seek safety elsewhere. Finally, a very significant cultural factor is in play – Iraqi Shias are Arab, and feel more comfortable in an Arab country where Arabic is spoken (al- Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). This last reason particularly, along with the others, challenge the popular myth that has arisen out of the conflict in Iraq that the Sunni-Shia divide is deep and unbreakable, that the two religious sects “hate each other,” and that hatred fuels the ongoing violence. A mature demographic and sociological analysis of the conflict in Iraq and the resulting refugee outflow indicates that the average Iraqi seeks what most people do – material security, financial security, and sense of belonging and identity within his local community. The actions of a small number of extremists have made those things difficult to achieve in current day Iraq.

19 Overview of Legal Status

The primary mechanisms in international law that define and protect the rights of refugees are the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the subsequent 1967 Protocol. The only states in the group under study that have responsibilities under international refugee law are Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. The remainder - Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the GCC are not party to the 1951 Convention on Refugees or the 1967 Protocol. This officially relieves them of any specific legal obligation for the granting of status, rights, or protection to refugees that enter their territory. On January 1st, 2007, the UNHCR made a major announcement that broadened the protection due to Iraqi refugees by classifying those from central and southern Iraq as prima facie refugees, a designation in international law that allows for collective application of the term refugee. A UNHCR statement following the announcement said that that because of “large numbers involved, individual refuge status is not feasible” (Human Rights Watch 2007). In the UNHCR-published research paper Realizing Protection Space for Iraqi Refugees: UNHCR in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, -based Associate Resettlement Officer Anne Evans Barnes argues that certain refugee-related obligations have become part of a larger international legal and moral regime that applies to a state even in the absence of that state’s acceptance of the 1951 convention. The main obligation is that of nonrefoulement – the right not to be forcibly returned or expelled to a situation that would threaten one’s life or freedom. This essential right is found in article 33 of the 1951 convention, and is further expressed in article 3 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment(Barnes 2009). The only states not bound to nonrefoulement by one of those two agreements are Oman and UAE. Barnes argues that nonrefoulement “has risen to the level of customary law, thus binding all states not to engage in this practice” (Barnes 2009).

In the discussion of destination choices, it is important to examine how host countries have constructed legal status for Iraqi refugees, how they have run border control operations, and how Iraqis have been treated once inside. The insight to bear in mind when examining the legal status of Iraqis refugees is again one taken from Barnes, and warrants quoting: “Overwhelmed, even states with traditionally generous admission policies and practices can respond by violating the principle of non-refoulement, by denying admission, through implementing highly restrictive

20 entry requirements and by engaging in detention practices that violate international standards” (Barnes 2009).

Barnes and political scientist Ruben Zaiotti, along with several reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Migration Policy Institute explain that the apprehension Middle Eastern governments have regarding refugee issues stems from their troubling experiences dealing with Palestinian refugees. This may help to explain why most states in the Middle East are not party to the 1951 convention. Barnes explains that Middle Eastern governments fear that the rights accorded to refugees under the convention may in practice result in refugee populations remaining on their soil indefinitely, forcing an unwelcome burden on their economies and social services (Barnes 2009). So far, the Iraqi Refugee Crisis has had that exact effect on host countries, giving justice to their concerns and reluctance. Syria and Jordan have been at the forefront of the Iraqi refugee crisis, taking on over two million people into their borders and their developing economies. This influx of people has caused strain on society, from raising rent in Damascus to violent public attacks in . The burden of dealing with refugees has caused Iraqi refugee-accepting countries to alternate between fulfillment, neglect, and outright violation of their duties under international refugee and humanitarian law. Of course the concept of “duty” here is vague, as few of the countries are party to the official conventions on refugee law, and one can only apply a subjective standard of responsibility.

Examination of Destination Choices

Syria Syria has taken in more Iraqi refugees since 2003 than any other country. It has been the most popular destination for a number of reasons including geographic proximity, ease of entry, access to social services, and employment prospects (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). Many of the positives about entering and living in Syria have been eliminated since policy changes took effect in late 2007, but not before they encouraged well over a million Iraqis to seek refuge in and around Damascus. Most of the Iraqis in Syria arrived during the initial phase of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis in 2006, and because the government has made no concerted effort to

21 find Iraqis and deport them, those who avoid attention are able to go on living in Syria, though their legal status puts them in a fragile position.

Syria’s geographic proximity is one factor that attracted many Iraqis – it shares a border with Iraq, and the road to Damascus from the main population center of Baghdad is safer to travel than the road to Jordan. The road to Jordan crosses the notoriously volatile Anbar province, which is dangerous for all, but especially Shia. Syria is the best choice for refugees with family and business in Iraq that they need to travel to and from freely (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). Finding transportation to Syria is easy – the demand for international land travel out of Iraq expanded after the 2003 invasion, and a number of transportation companies have opened offices across Baghdad that offer bus and collective taxi service to Damascus for a reasonable price (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). The trip is dangerous, however, with militias and robbers frequently stopping vehicles to rob the occupants or even murder them based on sectarian affiliation. For those who survive the voyage, the outlook is generally better at the Syrian border than other places. Interviews conducted by researchers of the Brookings Institution revealed two things that attracted Iraqis to the Syrian border during the initial wave – families were admitted together as a general practice, and border guards did not inquire about sectarian affiliation. This is in contrast to the border crossing at Jordan, where young male family members were turned away and where there were reports of border guards intimidating Shia refugees (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007).

Easy of entry was a major reason that Syria received so many Iraqi refugees. Syria has had the most liberal entry requirements of any state neighboring Iraq. As part of its standing policy of pan-Arab solidarity, Syria does not require a visa for citizens of Arab states. Iraqis enjoyed the privilege of visa-free entry to Syria until late 2007. Syria’s initial unconditional admittance of Iraqis, based on the open-border policy for Arabs, comes from the government’s Decision No. 1350 of 15 August 1984, which decreed that “nationals of all Arab countries, of the Arab Gulf, and of all emirates and sultanates shall be exempt from: entry or transit visas, residence permits, exit visas, and passport holding requirements and all fees normally levied thereon”(The Minister of Interior 1984). The law states that a citizen of an Arab country need only produce a simple identity card to enter Syria. However Iraqi nationals have faced some difficulties in entering Syria in the recent past. The first Gulf war led to the closure of the Syrian-

22 Iraqi border, and it was not reopened until 2002, incidentally just in time for the 2003 US invasion (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). Despite the land border being closed through the 1990s, the general policy towards Arabs did not change and at the beginning of the 2003 war the border was open to Iraqis.

While the official policy states that Arab citizens do not need a visa for entry, what it means in practice is that one need not apply for a visa prior to arrival at the border. As Iraqis began to flee to Syria after March 2003, they were unconditionally granted an entry visa on-the- spot, valid for three months and renewable once for another three months at any Directory of Immigration and Passports office within Syria (Amnesty International 2007). This remained true up until the beginning of 2007, when regulations became stricter and legal stay allotments were shortened. In 2007 Syria began granting one-month visas renewable for an additional two. At the end of the two-month visa, Iraqis were forced to leave Syria at the border checkpoint then immediately re-enter to obtain a new one-month visa. According to some Iraqis interviewed on the matter, this was a dangerous endeavor due to the presence of extremist groups operating just across the border (Amnesty International 2007).

Syria made concessions to Iraqi refugees, but officials did not tolerate any affront to their generosity. In 2007, Syrian officials told Amnesty International that they were aware that the majority of Iraqis in Syria were living there irregularly and doing so without valid visas, and that the government was tolerating it for the moment. However they also acknowledged that some Iraqis who had been accused of criminal acts had been forcibly returned to Iraq, although they were never formally charged or tried (Amnesty International 2007). This and other information collected by Amnesty International led the organization to conclude that Iraqi refugees who become involved in conflicts with Syrian citizens were at high risk of being returned to Iraq against their will (Amnesty International 2007). Iraqis are able to make a life in Syria once entering, as long as they do nothing to attract the attention of authorities.

The most drastic change in Syrian immigration policy towards Iraqis was introduced in September 2007 and went into effect October 12, 2007, just after Ramadan. It was then for the first time that Syria imposed a visa restriction that limited entry to Iraqis visiting for commercial, scientific, educational, or transport purposes. It also required them to have the visa before arriving at the border (O'Donnell and Newland 2008). This change in policy was a response by

23 the Syrian government to the huge increase in Iraqi refugees beginning in 2006 and the lack of support by the international community. It was intended to forestall the continued influx of unemployed Iraqis that were moving to Damascus with little to no means to support themselves. Andrew Harper of the UNHCR noted that the new visa policy underscored the “increasingly desperate position” of Syria in coping with the large amounts of Iraqi refugees entering the country and putting strain on social services (Harper 2008).

There was powerful political pressure within Syria to do something about the unchecked flow of Iraqis. The International Crisis Group interviewed several Syrian officials about the visa decision. Saddam Hussein was executed in December 2006 – a meaningful and controversial event for Iraqis that the Syrian government claims triggered social disturbances. Gatherings of Iraqis to mark that and other events led to security concerns for Syrian officials (International Crisis Group 2008). As a further impetus, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki accused Syria of purposely harboring refugees hostile to the Iraqi government, and directly requested the stricter visa policy to reduce the amount of Iraqis allegedly traveling to Syria to take part in extremist, anti-government activities (Amnesty International 2008). While conceived as a way to curtail extremist activity, this “blunt force” method actually served mostly to endanger average peaceful Iraqis by making one of their escape routes more difficult.

Several human rights groups have decried the policy as being harmful to Iraqis by endangering their lives and thus violating human rights standards for refugee treatment. The problem they cite is that visas had to be applied for at the Syrian embassy in Baghdad, which is a dangerous endeavor. At a press conference on September 11, 2007, UNHCR spokesperson Ron Redmond expressed concern on the behalf of UNHCR for the safety of Iraqis, explaining that the Syrian embassy is located in the Al-Mansour district of Baghdad, an area known for sectarian violence. Iraqis expressed fear that they would be easily identifiable targets for violence when visiting the embassy (UNHCR 2007). Redmond indicated that the UNHCR had received assurances from numerous Syrian government agencies that no Iraqis would be forcibly returned to Iraq. This is an important acknowledgment of Syria’s nonrefoulement responsibilities, but the stricter visa policies and the logistical side effects that force Iraqis into dangerous situations can be interpreted as a form of violation of the nonrefoulement principle. At the urging of

24 international aid organizations and Iraqis themselves, Syria later made the new visa available at the border, which made obtaining it safer and more feasible.

The categories of Iraqi citizens that could obtain a visa after the new practice went into effect included academics and their immediate families; students attending Syrian universities; children attending school; authorized drivers of cargo and passenger vehicles transporting between Baghdad and Damascus; those seeking medical treatment in Syrian hospitals (with proper documentation); official sporting and cultural delegations; business people with commercial interests in Syria; and various categories of Iraqis married to Syrian citizens, legal residents, or holders of valid visas (International Crisis Group 2008). In total there are now thirteen categories under which Iraqis may qualify to be granted a Syrian entry visa. Most of the Iraqis who had already established a life in Syria were able to legally renew their visa under one of these categories, though it became difficult for newly arriving refugees. International Crisis Group reports that purchasing a forged medical certificate was one way that Iraqis circumvented the newly restrictive visa policy (International Crisis Group 2008). Even those Iraqis who managed to navigate the stricter policy suffered when the Syrian government decided to further harden its stance toward refugees in May 2008. While there was no official change in policy at that time, immigration officials did suddenly became stingier with visas and began pressuring Iraqis to leave, including by denying renewals to the parents of children enrolled in Syrian schools (International Crisis Group 2008).

Education is one of several key social services that attract refugees to particular areas. Because most Iraqi refugees were destitute, the availability of social services was an important factor for destination choice. Public services were more readily available to Iraqis in Syria than in most other places. Throughout the crisis, there have been no official restrictions preventing Iraqi children from attending Syrian schools. However, the Syrian Ministry of Education claimed that as of May 2008, the number of Iraqi children enrolled in primary and secondary schools was 43,749 (Amnesty International 2008). While up from an estimate of 30,000 a year before, that figure is low considering the total number of Iraqis living in Syria. By a conservative treatment of the total refugee population size, there should have been roughly 350,000 school-aged Iraqis living in Syria during the worst phase of the crisis (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). Several factors help explain the low attendance. Iraqis are not legally allowed to work in Syria,

25 so families often send children into informal street work to earn money. For instance, Amnesty International reports having worked with a group of Iraqi children who did not attend school, in favor of working on the streets of Damascus selling chewing gum and polishing shoes, out of the necessity to earn money for their families (Amnesty International 2008). Teenaged Iraqis in Syria commonly find illegal work in restaurants, shops and construction (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). The Brookings Institution interviewed a number of Iraqis who had enrolled their children in school or had attempted to. Some reported the procedure to be fairly routine – obtaining documents from the Iraqi embassy and registering with the Ministry of Education(al- Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). Others had difficulties when specific documents were requested that would have required a trip to Iraq to obtain, or when their children were turned away because of a school being over capacity. Some Iraqis have also kept their children out of school because they are living in Syria with an invalid visa and fear that school registration may bring their illegal status to the attention of authorities.

Healthcare is another important service that attracts refugees. The options for medical treatment in Syria are government hospitals, private hospitals, Syrian Red Crescent clinics, and free clinics run by religious charities. Iraqis in Syria received free health care in government hospitals until the end of 2005, when more strict regulations were imposed. Since then, Iraqis can receive free treatment in public hospitals for emergency cases (Amnesty International 2007). Iraqis with adequate means use private hospitals, but this is the most expensive option and few Iraqis are able to afford it. The majority of Iraqis living in Syria use Red Crescent clinics for medical services (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). The Syrian Red Crescent works closely with national authorities, and per an agreement between the UNHCR and Syrian Ministry of Health, Iraqis registered with the UNHCR can be treated at Syrian Red Crescent clinics, with UNHCR covering 80 percent of the bill (Amnesty International 2008). Even with the assistance provided, the remaining portion of the bill may be prohibitively expensive for poorer Iraqis. Also, the strictly outpatient capability of the Syrian Red Crescent Clinics precludes treatment of serious illness or injury. The last option is charitable clinics, which are staffed by volunteer doctors. Though initial treatment is free and open to all, refugees must be registered with the UNHCR to receive continuing treatment because these clinics are partially funded by the Red Crescent and UNHCR (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). The requirement to be UNHCR- registered for ongoing treatment is discouraging for those fearful of their legal status in the

26 country. Despite these difficulties, Iraqi refugees in Syria do have several options for medical care at varying levels of cost and quality, making Syria a relatively attractive destination choice.

The employment prospects in Syria have been another attractor of refugees. The entry visa given to Iraqis prohibits them from working, which has lead to a high rate of unemployment among refugees. In 2007, the Brookings Institution rated Iraqi refugee unemployment in Syria at 47% (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). However, it has been possible for Iraqis to work and even own businesses in Syria, although both are officially illegal. Many Iraqis find jobs and work illegally, providing a cheap labor force to Syrian employers. Iraqis have found work as waiters, construction laborers, maids, stevedores, and other jobs in the informal sectors of society (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). Authorities generally tolerate employment of Iraqis as long as they do not give employers cause to complain (Amnesty International 2007). Some Iraqis have started their own businesses, usually in partnership with a Syrian national who can legally register the company. Even when partnered with a Syrian citizen, Iraqi business owners have paid protection money to police to prevent the shutdown of their establishments(al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). The Syrian government has been welcoming to certain professions that are in demand – doctors, teachers and engineers are offered work permits (Amnesty International 2007). Whether officially sanctioned or not, earning a living in Syria can be done with a careful navigation of the system. Many Iraqis have been attracted to Syria for its availability of employment.

It is clear from the demographic data that Syria has been the most popular destination for Iraqi refugees. The reasons above help to explain why Syria has been so attractive. Additionally, the per capita GDP data indicate that the standard of living is lower in Syria compared to other nearby countries, which is an appealing quality for refugees with limited money and uncertainty about finding work (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007). There is also a “snowballing” effect in play – as more Iraqis went to Syria, the promise of a supportive social network and the presence of family and friends already there served to attract more over time. Finally, a less quantifiable yet all-important factor is the common wisdom that Iraqis are treated better in Syria than elsewhere (al-Khalidi, Hoffman and Tanner 2007).

27 Jordan

Jordan has been the second most popular destination in the Iraqi Refugee Crisis. The high estimate of the number of Iraqi refugees living in Jordan is 500,000, which is less than half the amount in Syria, but still a significant figure. There have been some attractive qualities to Jordan, but most of those evaporated before the crisis began in 2006. As of 2007, only 56.5% of Iraqi individuals in Jordan held valid residence permits, which suggests that many of them had entered under looser restrictions and were by then living illegally, at risk of arrest and deportation (Fafo Norwegian Research Institute 2007). Entering and living in Jordan has proven to be more difficult for Iraqis than in Syria. Since 2003, traveling to Jordan from Iraq has been a risky and uncertain endeavor. From the city of Ramadi, about 60 miles west of Baghdad, there is only one road leading to the Jordanian border, making fleeing refugees easy targets for thieves and sectarian militias (Frelick 2006). The road to Jordan from Baghdad is a more dangerous than those leading to Syria, as it passes through the unstable Anbar province, which is particularly dangerous for Shia Muslims. For refugees that make it to the border safely, the outlook is not much better.

The ease of entry to Jordan has decreased over time since the war began, although the Jordanian government did little to really engage the issue. When the war began in 2003 there was no formal policy for the processing of Iraqis at the border, and for the first three years of the war, Iraqis were admitted and classified at the discretion of the Jordanian border agents. As Jordan is not party to the 1951 convention and its constitutional asylum law does not provide for refugees of the type fleeing Iraq, Iraqis were treated in numerous unpredictable ways, sometimes classified as “tourists” and given short term visas that did not permit employment, or variously regarded as “guests,” “temporary visitors,” or “illegal aliens,” all with the explicit and prominent threat of deportation for violation of terms (Human Rights Watch 2007). Several reports from UNHCR and human rights groups monitoring the situation describe Jordan’s stance as a choice to “benignly ignore” the Iraqi population within its borders for the first two years of the US occupation of Iraq, allowing Iraqis to fend for themselves, and not making any special concessions or services available (Human Rights Watch 2007).

Before the onset of the full-scale crisis in 2006, some Iraqis went to Jordan to seek refuge and were able to make it in without much trouble. This was because the early refugees to Jordan,

28 like the GCC, were wealthier Iraqis who already had significant investments in Jordan (Fagen 2007). According to Patricia Weiss Fagen of Georgetown University, “before and after 2003, wealthy Iraqis fearing instability tended to invest and establish residences more often in Jordan than Syria” (Fagen 2007). There are close tribal ties between the two countries, and wealthy Sunni businessmen were welcomed into the overwhelmingly Sunni population of Jordan (Fagen 2007). For these and other reasons, early Iraqi refugees to Jordan enjoyed a relatively warm reception from Jordanians. The welcome would begin to pale once Jordanians began to perceive the presence of Iraqis as pernicious. The popular hospitality toward Iraqi refugees in Jordan ended after November 2005, when three separate explosions set off by Iraqi suicide bombers killed a total of sixty-three people in Amman (Harper 2008).

After the bombing incidents, the Jordanian government cracked down on Iraqi entries, rejecting many from entering Jordan at the land border and making it difficult for Iraqis to obtain or renew temporary residence permits (Frelick 2006). One important policy decision Jordan made was to prohibit the entry of Iraqi men between the ages of 18 and 35. Going into effect in November 2005 as a direct response to the Amman bombings, the policy was designed to restrict entry of young men who fit the profile of the Amman bombers and other known perpetrators of “terrorist” attacks. The main effect of the embargo was to break up families with a man between those ages and to introduce a major roadblock for Iraqi families hoping to escape to Jordan (O'Donnell and Newland 2008). Families were forced to choose between abandoning sons/fathers at the border and returning to Iraq. The policy was particularly troublesome in cases where the rejected man was the breadwinner of the family. The government’s stricter approach came just months before the Samarra Mosque bombing and the start of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis. The shift in approach had a large effect on the movement of Iraqis to Jordan. Without the restrictive entry policy, Jordan’s geographic proximity to Iraq likely would have made it an equally popular destination for Iraqi refugees as Syria proved to be.

For the estimated half-million Iraqis that did manage to make it into Jordan, conditions were precarious. Employment prospects were similar to those in Syria – Iraqis are prohibited from working in Jordan, which exacerbates poverty and compelled some to risk the consequences to find informal, illegal work (Amnesty International 2008). The Norwegian Research Institute Fafo classified 78.5% of as either unemployed or “Not

29 economically active” – meaning those not working nor seeking work (Fafo Norwegian Research Institute 2007). Standard of living is higher in Jordan than in Syria, making it a more difficult place for refugees to afford. In September 2007, Jordan began allowing Iraqi children without legal residence status to attend public schools. The move was welcomed but seen as “too little, too late” because parents were not allowed to work to support the children, and were still subject to deportation if caught (International Crisis Group 2008). Amnesty International reports that the public school system struggled to accommodate the roughly 24,000 Iraqi refugee children under its care at one point in 2007, as schools suffered from overcrowding and double-shift schedules (Amnesty International 2008). Healthcare is also less accessible in Jordan than in Syria. While Iraqis have access to emergency care, further treatment at public hospitals is not provided to non- residents, and the availability of Red Crescent and charitable clinics is sparse (Amnesty International 2008). Private hospitals are an option, but most Iraqis cannot afford the high cost. The Catholic relief organization Caritas provides healthcare to those registered with the UNHCR, but the majority of Iraqis are not registered (Amnesty International 2007).

Other than the bar on young males, Jordan had no formal, unified policy regarding Iraqis during the height of the Iraqi refugee crisis from 2006 until May 2008. For that period, Iraqi entry was largely subject to the informal and unpredictable discretion of border agents. But the only persons generally permitted entry during those years were those with proof of valid Jordanian residency, those seeking medical attention and holding hospital certification of their condition, and those with invitations to attend conferences in Jordan (Amnesty International 2007). Like Syria, in-demand professionals such as doctors, engineers, professors, and businessmen were able to obtain residence permits (Harper 2008). The government also allowed Iraqis making significant financial investments into Jordan’s economy to obtain renewable residency permits. For those seeking residency permits but who were unable or unwilling to invest in Jordanian enterprises, a deposit of around US $150,000 into a Jordanian bank was required (International Crisis Group 2008). A survey of Iraqis in Jordan shows that for the years 2006 and 2007, 61% of new Iraqi refugees in Jordan were in the lowest 3 quintiles of household wealth (Fafo Norwegian Research Institute 2007). The poverty of the displaced population meant that the heavy financial requirement for residency permits served as a stumbling block for the average Iraqi refugee seeking valid residency in Jordan. The entry and residency permit restrictions seemed to have a larger effect on the poorest quintile of the Iraqi refugee population

30 in Jordan, with only 22% holding a valid residency permit/visa, whereas 80% of the wealthiest quintile had valid residency or visas (Fafo Norwegian Research Institute 2007).

For persons not fitting into one of the accepted professional categories and without enough money to invest or deposit, entering Jordan ranged from difficult to impossible. Young men were banned entirely, and older men, women and children were either rejected at the border or faced with the difficult decision to abandon the young male members of their families in the dangerous environment of Iraq. Some Iraqis were lucky enough to obtain a two-month tourist visa. The tourist visa served the purpose of getting Iraqis across the border, but it required the holder to exit end reenter the country in order to renew (Harper 2008). Exiting was risky because re-admittance was not guaranteed and was in fact less likely as time went on. Persons caught staying past the expiration of a tourist visa were subject to a fine of US $2 per day overstayed – the paying of which would have been difficult for impoverished Iraqi refugees prohibited from working (Harper 2008). Although some managed to manipulate the system, the banning of young males, the strict entry policy for all others, and the generally unaccommodating reception by border agents meant that the Jordanian border was essentially closed to poor and unconnected Iraqi refugees seeking Jordan as a destination during the height of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis.

On May 1, 2008, new visa requirements went into effect for Iraqis entering Jordan. Since then, Iraqis wishing to enter Jordan are required to apply for a visa prior to arriving at the border (International Crisis Group 2008). Jordan operates in agreement with TNT, a private Dutch courier company. Iraqis must apply at one of TNT’s 13 offices across Iraq who assess a charge of 15,000 Iraqi dinars (about US $13) per person, then forward the request to Jordanian officials (International Crisis Group 2008) (Amnesty International 2008). TNT then transports approved applicants to Jordan.

In 1998, Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding that allowed the UNHCR to process asylum applications in the country (International Crisis Group 2008). This was the most progressive action taken by the Jordanian government towards recognizing and accommodating refugees but had little effect on how it dealt with Iraqis. Both Amnesty International and the Migration Policy Institute report some cases of Jordan arresting Iraqis who had overstayed their legal allotment of time and forcibly deporting them back to Iraq, through both the land border and airports. That forced deportation is a serious breach of the nonrefoulement principle but

31 allowed under Jordanian law. Jordan also refused to adhere to the Temporary Protection Regime (TPR) that UNHCR declared in April 2003 on behalf of Iraqi refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon that declared protected status of Iraqi nationals. The UNHCR’s January 2007 announcement granting prima facie status to Iraqi refugees further expanded the responsibility for the international community to deal effectively with the crisis and provide protection. Jordan maintained no formal policy addressing Iraqis and their prima facie refugee status, and seemed to respond negatively to the announcement, with increased reports of border and visa difficulties for Iraqis.

Article 21(i) of the 1952 Jordanian Constitution states “Political refugees shall not be extradited on account of their political beliefs or for their defence of liberty”. Jordan did not apply that provision to Iraqi refugees. Zaiotti reports that Jordan has granted asylum to some high-profile political figures, such as was done with a high-ranking Iraqi official and his brother in 1995, but these decisions were issued by royal decree at the discretion of the monarch, and were not a realistic possibility for the average person (Zaiotti 2006). Although Jordan accepted UNHCR’s role in refugee processing and decisions on asylum cases, it stopped short of offering formal guarantees of protection for refugees, maintaining sovereignty and discretionary authority within their borders.

Even with its highly restrictive policies, Jordan has been the second most popular destination for Iraqi refugees. One reason may be that it was subject to the “snowballing” effect that Syria experienced – the more Iraqis that went there, the more that followed to take advantage of social networks of family and friends already in country. Still, the border was extremely difficult to cross during the massive outflow of 2006-2007, so the fact that it remained so high in the rankings of Iraqi refugee accepting countries speaks to the relative difficulty of entering other nearby states. Employment prospects and social service availability were worse than Syria’s, and the difficulty of entry and unaccommodating legal status for Iraqis were the most prohibitive aspects of Jordan as a refuge destination. One positive caveat was the ability to apply directly to the United States Refugee Admission Program (USRAP) in Amman. While USRAP accessibility was an attractor, the prevailing conditions of legal insecurity weakened its utility. Jordan’s common border with Iraq is likely a major factor that has dictated its high refugee intake despite its unaccommodating legal environment.

32 Lebanon

Lebanon’s burden of Iraqi refugees has been much lower than its neighbors. Ranked 3rd in number of Iraqi refugees received, it had an estimated 50,000 Iraqis living within its borders at the peak of the crisis. Not a small number, but noticeably smaller than that found in Syria or Jordan. In most cases, Iraqis have not been eligible to apply for an entry visa at the Lebanese border – arrangements have to be made beforehand. Limitations on eligibility have meant that the Lebanese border was essentially closed to Iraqis throughout the refugee crisis. For Iraqis with proper credentials, there are a few ways to enter Lebanon through the land border crossing without a pre-arranged visa. Those eligible to apply for an entry visa at the land border crossing include businessmen with proof of membership in an Iraqi Chamber of Commerce, doctors and engineers with proof of membership in a professional association, and those with a doctor’s report certifying their need for medical treatment in Lebanon (Ridderbos 2007). Another option is to secure a tourist visa as a means of entering, however tourist visas can be obtained only at the Lebanese embassy in Baghdad or at the international airport. To be granted a 15-day tourist visa at the airport, an Iraqi must show he has US $2,000 in cash, a non-refundable return ticket, and a hotel reservation (Ridderbos 2007). For the embassy application, one must show the equivalent of US $10,000 in a bank account and demonstrate the tourist nature of the visit (Ridderbos 2007).

The average Iraqi refugee does not have the professional credentials and/or cannot afford the required financial guarantees for entry visas. Thus, most Iraqis seeking refuge in Lebanon have entered illegally. Because Lebanon does not share a border with Iraq like Syria and Jordan do, getting to Lebanon is more complicated, forcing most Iraqis to enter Lebanon illegally via Syria using the services of human smugglers (Ridderbos 2007). The Danish Refugee council surveyed Iraqi refugees in Lebanon in late 2007 and determined that 78% had entered the country illegally (Khalidi 2007). A simple explanation for the amount of Iraqis in Lebanon is its geographic location. The 50,000 Iraqis in Lebanon may be a statistical inevitability of Lebanon’s shared border with Syria. With an estimated 1.5 million Iraqis in Syria, it seems only logical that Lebanon has received some overflow as collateral effect.

Like Jordan, Lebanon has a refugee provision in its domestic law. The 1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country allows

33 foreigners “whose life or freedom is in danger for political reasons” to request political asylum in Lebanon (Ridderbos 2007). However, in practice, this provision was never implemented for the Iraqi refugee population, despite the granting of prima facie status by the UNHCR. In anticipation of the refugee outflow from Iraq, Lebanon signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UNHCR in September 2003 which stated that Lebanon would not be considered a country of asylum or permanent refuge and obliged UNHCR to conduct third-country resettlement for persons it recognized as refugees (Ridderbos 2007). Ironically, the bureaucratic complications in registering with UNHCR and complying with the MOU has led to the arrest and deportation of many Iraqis who turned to those mechanisms seeking protection from forced return to Iraq.

Under the MOU agreement, Lebanon’s General Security issues “circulation permits” to asylum seekers and UNHCR-recognized refugees, valid for up to one year (Ridderbos 2007). However, because UNCHR was not able to guarantee resettlement for Iraqis within that year period, many Iraqis have been arrested for expired circulation permits. If a refugee is not accepted for resettlement within the one-year grace period, his continued presence in Lebanon is considered illegal and he is subject to arrest, detainment and deportation. Per the MOU, a circulation permit is only issued to an Iraqi who entered the country illegally and applied for UNHCR refugee status within two months of entering (Ridderbos 2007). Yet, those who entered with a valid entry visa (such as a tourist visa) and stayed past the expiration found no legal way to stay in the country, often being arrested and deported. Thus, Iraqis fleeing to Lebanon faced a difficult choice between entering illegally and hoping for mercy, and entering legally and risking forced return anyway after a prescribed period of time.

To further complicate the situation, the granting of prima facie status to Iraqi refugees in late 2007 meant that the UNHCR was no longer required under international law to evaluate refugee applications on an individual basis, and thus stopped, instead offering Iraqis “refugee certificates” to identify them as refugees or asylum seekers. Even before the MOU was signed, the TPR for Iraqis in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon stated that UNHCR would not interview Iraqis for refugee status determination on an individual basis (Ridderbos 2007). Without individual interviews, UNHCR was unable to apply for circulation permits, and instead distributed the refugee certificates. The certificate is all that most UNHCR-registered Iraqis received.

34 Unfortunately the Lebanese government does not recognize the certificates, and holding one does not exempt a person from penalty for illegal presence in the country, which proved to be a real problem for some refugees when they were arrested, detained and deported (Ridderbos 2007). Several NGOs that have worked with Iraqi refugees indicate that Lebanon was a popular destination for those Iraqis seeking third-country resettlement because popular wisdom prevailed that applications from Lebanon were more successful than from other nearby countries. Thus many Iraqis traveling to Lebanon innocently inserted themselves into the UNHCR system at a higher rate than in Syria and Jordan, only to find themselves trapped in bureaucratic complications, at serious risk of arrest and deportation.

For a few months in 2007, Lebanon offered foreign nationals who had entered the country illegally an option to legalize their status. Applicants had to register with General Security and pay a fine of US$ 635 for their illegal stay. Then, the applicant had to secure a work contract with a Lebanese employer certified by a notary public and obtain a work permit from the Ministry of Labor before returning to General Security with passport, work permit, proof the employer had deposited US$1000 with the Housing Bank, a valid insurance policy, and medical laboratory test results certifying the applicant as free of HIV/AIDS (Ridderbos 2007). Successful applicants were then subject to an annual fee for their residence permit, the amount ranging from US$1,200 to $267, depending on their line of work. Most Iraqis attempting to apply for the program found it difficult to find an employer willing to sponsor them due to the availability of other more permanent foreign workers, and the cheapest permit category (unskilled worker) did not entitle the applicant to obtain residence permits for family members (Ridderbos 2007). The complex process and financial requirements of this program made it difficult for all but a few Iraqis to successfully navigate.

Although police in Lebanon have not systematically arrested illegal Iraqis, Lebanon is known to be an unfriendly and risky place for Iraqis without valid permission to be there. Because the government has not recognized the rights of Iraqis as UN-declared refugees, there have been no instructions issued to law enforcement officials on how to deal with Iraqis. Thus the way Iraqis are treated by police is unpredictable and largely dependent on the discretion of the individual police officer. Sometimes Iraqis show the refugee certificate and are let go, and other times they are arrested (Ridderbos 2007). Iraqis have been arrested in Lebanon in sufficient

35 enough numbers to make the fear of arrest a real concern. As of January 2008, Amnesty International reported that some 600 Iraqi refugees, 323 of them registered with the UNHCR, were being detained in overcrowded conditions alongside the regular criminal population (Amnesty International 2008). The figure illustrates the fact that affiliation with UNHCR does not offer guarantees against arrest. Iraqis arrested by Lebanese police are subject to one-to-three month sentences in jail, and then are often detained indefinitely until they volunteer to return to Iraq (O'Donnell and Newland 2008). The choice between indefinite detention and “voluntary” repatriation is hardly a choice at all. According to interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch, the experience of suffering in poor, cramped conditions in Lebanese prisons has led many Iraqis to choose to return to Iraq even in cases where they feared they would be killed (Ridderbos 2007). The fear of imminent death is exactly what asylum law and the international refugee regime protects against, and the indefinite detention of Iraqis in Lebanon is both a repellent for destination choice and a breach of the nonrefoulement clause of international law to which Lebanon is bound.

One reason Lebanon has attracted Iraqi refugees despite the difficulties in getting there and establishing legal residency is its demographic diversity. Lebanon is far more diverse than other countries in the scope of this study, with a large Christian and Shia Muslim population. The figures on religious identity of Iraqi refugees presented above in Table 4 show that the proportion of both Christians and Shia Muslims is higher in Lebanon than most of the other host countries. The majority of Iraqis in Lebanon are Shia Muslims, at 44%, while Christians follow at 35%. These figures are a sharp contrast to Syria and Jordan, where Sunni Muslims make up close to 60% of the Iraqi refugee population in both countries. Lebanon has historically had the most diverse population in the Middle East, with many more Christians and Shia than the other countries in this study (except Iran, in the case of Shia). Syria and Jordan are predominantly Sunni, and Christians and Shia found a less supportive religious environment in those places. Unlike Syria and Jordan, Iraqis in Lebanon have been allowed to establish charities to support their fellow countrymen (International Crisis Group 2008). Shias have been able receive support and assistance from the Lebanese branch offices of Ali al-Sistani, the Grand Ayatollah of Iraq’s Shia community (International Crisis Group 2008). Lebanon’s religious and cultural diversity is likely a large contributing factor to the size of the Iraqi refugee population there. Iraqi Shia and Christians were probably attracted to the possibility for a larger supportive religious community

36 in Lebanon, or at least better tolerance for their religious identity as opposed to other nearby countries, where they would have been a small minority.

The employment prospects in Lebanon are similar to those in Syria and Jordan. Aside from the categories discussed above, Iraqis are not permitted to work, and many turn to illegal employment to support their families. Iraqis who do find employment face exploitation and have no recourse for mistreatment by employers. Common forms of exploitation include paying less than minimum wage, late payment/non-payment of wages, or demanding the employee pay the sponsorship fees that are supposed to be the responsibility of the employer (Ridderbos 2007). Illegal workers risk being reported if they cause trouble, and even those working legally under the employer sponsorship program are subject to the demands of employers who can simply drop their sponsorship of recalcitrant workers (O'Donnell and Newland 2008). Human Rights Watch interviewed Iraqi refugees in Lebanon about the employment situation. Many refugees described a difficult economic situation in Syria that made it difficult to find well-paying jobs and compelled them to cross the border into Lebanon where employment (albeit illegal) was easier to find and better paid. The Iraqis who made the move to Lebanon from Syria for job purposes acknowledged their awareness that arrests were more common in Lebanon, but felt the need to risk arrest in order to support their families (Ridderbos 2007). Moving to Lebanon for work presented a financial paradox, however, because while employment may have been more available and wages higher, the cost of living in Lebanon is also much higher, with per capita GDP more than three times higher than Syria. Thus, the higher wages in Lebanon may not have done much to improve refugees’ lives unless a man left his family behind in Syria and sent remittances. The search for gainful employment provided another difficult compromise for Iraqi refugees when seeking a country of refuge.

It is clear that entering and living in Lebanon has been highly challenging for Iraqi refugees, and the anemic social services in Lebanon do not make life any easier. Iraqi children are allowed to attend public schools on a strict space-available basis, and Human Rights Watch reported that as of 2007, few Iraqi children had actually managed to enroll (Ridderbos 2007). The Lebanese education system is dominated by private schools, and most Iraqi children who have attended school have been in private institutions (Khalidi 2007). 54% of male and 64% of female Iraqi children in Lebanon were enrolled in school as of 2007 (Khalidi 2007). Private

37 school is expensive, and most families cannot afford it with their own means. Since the crisis began, UNHCR has made numerous appeals to governments and NGOs for funds to support the education of Iraqi children. Several religious charities working in concert with UNHCR have provided financial assistance to Iraqi families wishing to send children to private school (Ridderbos 2007). In some cases the tuition assistance is not enough to ensure attendance due to additional costs of supplies, books, and transportation (Ridderbos 2007). Family financial needs also affect school attendance - because Iraqi men are targets for arrest, families often send children into the streets for informal work to support the household, keeping them out of school (O'Donnell and Newland 2008). An additional obstacle is the fact that the language of instruction for math and sciences is English or French, and most Iraqi refugee children do not have proficiency in those languages, leaving them unable to comprehend lessons (Ridderbos 2007).

Iraqis do not face discrimination for access to health services in Lebanon, simply because they are almost exclusively private. The availability of public health services is sparse in Lebanon and private hospitals are the primary healthcare providers. The poor financial status of Iraqis means most refugees cannot afford medical treatment in Lebanon. Some organizations, such as Caritas and the Middle East Council of Churches (MECC) will cover part of the cost of treatment, but patients need to present a certificate from a designated doctor to the organization. The doctor’s appointment and certificate have fees that are prohibitive for many refugees, and some interviewees described trouble when attempting to fill prescriptions because of noncooperation among clinics, aid organizations and pharmacies (Ridderbos 2007).

Lebanon is the last of the three major Iraqi refugee-accepting countries in the Middle East. With an estimated 50,000 Iraqis refugees living there at the height of the crisis, Lebanon had a much smaller group than Syria or Jordan, but still a significant number considering its population of four million. It was certainly the most difficult choice among the top three because of its distance from Iraq, the legal difficulties encountered, and the lack of social service provisions. Nonetheless, its proximity to Syria, relatively healthy economy, and religious diversity attracted a fair amount of Iraqi refugees who had few other viable options.

Syria, Jordan and Lebanon have been the focus of attention in the Iraqi refugee crisis for a number of reasons. They have been the top three receivers of Iraqi refugees as a percentage of

38 population, and they have been the primary destination of the poor, urban Iraqis that characterize the refugee crisis. Most of the Iraqi refugees in other places have been atypical – meaning in most cases wealthier and more financially independent. The next destination choices addressed have each received fewer Iraqi refugees, either because of geographic factors or a legal prohibition on Iraqi entry. They have received much less attention than Syria, Jordan or Lebanon regarding their role in receiving Iraqi refugees. That lack of attention is due largely to the small proportion of Iraqis there – the next four places addressed have had between 0.5% and 0.01% Iraqi refugees as a percentage of their regular population. The governments of these countries have also not engaged with the Iraqi Refugee Crisis on the level of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon either for political reasons or because the population was simply too small for any noticeable effect on the economy or society. In these countries, international aid agencies have not had the level of involvement that produces detailed information on the population. The small impact of and lack of engagement in the Iraqi refugee crisis by these countries means there is much less information available on the experience of Iraqi refugees in these places. The following destinations will each be treated more briefly than the previous three.

Egypt

Egypt had about 40,000 Iraqi refugees within its borders as of 2008 according to UNHCR. In contrast to most of the other countries in this study, Egypt is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. Fortunately for Iraqis, Egypt has largely adhered to its legal obligation for refugee protection. In the early years of the war, Iraqis were able to obtain a tourist visa by giving their passports to a travel agent in Baghdad who would take them for processing in Egyptian consulates in Amman or Damascus. Once inside Egypt, the tourist visa could be renewed fairly easily (Human Rights Watch 2007). The Egyptian government became concerned when the surge of Iraqi refugees began in 2006, and it imposed new, stricter procedures effective January 2007 that required at least one member of an Iraqi family to apply in person at a consulate. Egypt did not have a diplomatic post in Baghdad, so an applicant was forced to make the expensive and dangerous journey to Syria or Jordan simply to apply for an Egyptian visa (Human Rights Watch 2007). Since most Iraqis could not afford to make the trip to interview at the consulate, the new rule was highly prohibitive for Iraqis seeking Egypt as a

39 country of refuge. The policy change led to a drop in new Iraqi arrivals to Egypt in 2007. The procedure for tourist visa renewal for Iraqis already in Egypt became stricter too, as the Egyptian Ministry of Interior told Iraqis they must register with the UNHCR in order to remain in country (Human Rights Watch 2007). UNHCR experienced a surge in refugee applications as a result. After registration with UNHCR, Iraqis had to return to the Ministry of Interior for a residency stamp (Human Rights Watch 2007). Iraqis who are registered with UNHCR are now able to remain legally in Egypt under a six-month renewable residence permit. Human Rights Watch interviewed Iraqi refugees all over the region and did not discover cases of Egypt deporting Iraqis back to their country. In contrast to most other countries in the region, Egypt took steps to ensure Iraqis protection from refoulement. Another benefit found in Egypt was the ability to apply directly for the United States Refugee Admission Program from Cairo, a privilege that began in 2007. Although getting there became more complicated over time, the safety of protected legal status once inside Egypt has been an important incentive for Iraqis to seek refuge in Egypt.

Although the legal situation for Iraqis in Egypt is fairly benevolent, refugees still face significant challenges to a dignified, productive life. Egypt has the lowest per capita GDP of all the countries in this study, and many Iraqis were attracted to Egypt because of the low cost of living. However, they found that rapid inflation drew down their savings significantly once arriving (Rosen and Younes 2007). Iraqis are also not allowed to work in Egypt, further draining savings and exacerbating their poverty (Harper 2008). As in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, working illegally is an option but puts the worker at risk of legal trouble that could jeopardize his refugee status. Even Iraqis seeking illegal work are not able to find it easily in Egypt because the country suffers from a high rate of unemployment. Most refugee job seekers are unskilled, a category of worker that faces particular difficulty in a job market with high unemployment. An added challenge is the fact that Iraqis have to compete with Egyptian nationals for jobs, an equation in which foreigners usually do not fare well. (Rosen and Younes 2007). Some Iraqis have been able to open their own businesses, but do not have complete autonomy because an Egyptian partner is required to register and operate (Rosen and Younes 2007).

Another challenge is that Iraqis in Egypt cannot easily access the key social services that contribute to quality of life. The government has barred non-citizen children from attending

40 public-funded government schools, and thus only the few Iraqis wealthy enough to afford private tuition can have their children in school (Amnesty International 2008). Healthcare is also not widely available for Iraqis in Egypt, with treatment in government hospitals possible in some cases but not guaranteed (Amnesty International 2008). The delicate political environment in Egypt has meant that Iraqis have been prohibited from establishing charitable support organizations that have served to lessen the suffering of the refugee community in other places (Rosen and Younes 2007). Egypt is also not a friendly place for religious minorities. It is a majority Sunni country, and religious minorities are not well tolerated. Shia Muslims are prohibited from public celebrations of faith (Rosen and Younes 2007). Unfortunately it is not possible to know the sectarian composition of the Iraqi refugee population in Egypt because the government survey of Iraqis classified all Muslims as one group without sectarian specification.

Egypt has few positives to offer as a destination choice. It does not share a border with Iraq, which forces refugees to either fly or transit through another country. Iraqis cannot count on employment to support their families, they are largely unable to access educational and medical services, and non-Sunni Muslims face discrimination against free practice of their faith. Despite shortfalls in quality of life, Egypt still attracted a fair amount of Iraqi refugees. While 40,000 is the figure assumed for this paper, some estimates put the number of Iraqis in Egypt at the end of 2006 as high as 150,000. The pull of an accommodating legal environment found in Egypt cannot be underestimated, as so many Iraqis literally feared for their lives. It seems the tens of thousands of Iraqis who went to Egypt made the decision to endure scarcity in many aspects of life in order to simply live without the imminent threat of death they perceived back in Iraq.

Turkey

Turkey has received an estimated number of Iraqi refugees of between 6,000 and 10,000, a fairly insignificant figure considering the size of the Turkish population and that of the whole crisis. The reasons for a low number of Iraqi refugees in Turkey have as much to do with Iraq’s geography and internal political landscape as they do with Turkish policy. Turkey shares a border with , the autonomous federal region home to Iraq’s ethnic Kurdish population, which gained de facto independence with the establishment of a no-fly zone

41 following the first Gulf War. Due to its cultural, political, and geographic insulation from the rest of Iraq, Kurdistan did not experience the sectarian violence and displacement that plagued the central and southern parts of the country. The difference in conditions between northern Iraq and the rest of the country was great enough to be reflected in policy moves by UNHCR. The 2007 announcement of prima facie status applied only to Iraqis originating from central and southern Iraq.

Kurdistan has remained relatively peaceful since the 2003 war, and the Kurds of northern Iraq did not have reason to leave their homes en masse. As of January 2008, only 5% of the UNHCR-registered were Kurds (UNHCR 2008). With no representation in the pre-2003 Ba’ath government and as targets for Saddam Hussein’s genocidal attacks, Iraqi Kurds have long assumed a unique identity from their Arab countrymen to the south. Given its autonomy, Iraqi Kurdistan has operated effectively as an independent country since 1991. The cultural and political boundary between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq made it uncommon for the poor, urban, Arab Iraqis that typified the displaced population to use Iraqi Kurdistan as a route out of the country.

The main reason the north was an unpopular escape route was the fact that it leads only to Turkey, a place with a culture even more foreign to Arab Iraqis than Kurdistan. The role of language should not be overlooked as it dictates destination choice. All other factors aside, the Arabic speaking refugees of Iraq were not highly interested in seeking refuge in a country whose language they did not speak when given so many Arabic-speaking alternatives. Although Turkey is a Muslim country, the Arabic speaking people of Iraq would find a hard time surviving in a country that speaks Turkish, especially considering the delicacy of dubious legal status.

Turkey is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, but has ignored many of its responsibilities under those laws. After an unpleasant experience with Iraqi refugees during the 1991 Gulf War, Turkey decided early in the war to close its border to Iraqi refugees (Verma 2003). In preparation for the anticipated April 2003 refugee outflow that never actually came, the Turkish government built 18 refugee camps on both sides of the border. Turkey intended from the beginning to stem the flow of Iraqi refugees into their territory by directing them towards camps where they could be easily monitored and controlled. Given the choice between living as part of a normal functioning society in the capital cities of the region and being

42 held in a camp, it is easy to see why so few Iraqis went to Turkey. The camps were not available by the time the crisis actually began anyway, since three years passed between the start of the war and the start of the refugee outflow. Even as the crisis began in 2006, Turkey maintained its policy of not allowing Iraqi refugees to settle there, although it sometimes allowed asylum seekers to stay for a limited amount of time to seek resettlement in another country (Edwards 2007). Turkey’s minor concession for asylum seekers did not do much to help refugees since the land border crossing remained closed. Research from Human Rights Watch shows that many Iraqis transited through Turkey on their way to Greece to apply for asylum in the European Union (Frelick 2008). Human Rights Watch reports that the Hellenic Coast Guard has pushed boats containing Iraqi refugees back toward the Turkish coast after damaging them to undermine their seaworthiness (Frelick 2008). Iraqis arrested by Turkish officials on their way to Greece or rescued from sinking boats in the Aegean Sea have been routinely detained and placed on buses that take them back across the Iraqi border (Frelick 2008). UNHCR reported hundreds of cases of forced deportations by Turkish authorities (Edwards 2007). In some cases, Iraqis were deported despite registration with UNHCR and the holding of refugee status (UN News Centre 2007). The forced deportation of Iraqis illustrates Turkey’s lack of tolerance for refugees and a violation of its obligations under the Refugee Convention and other international legal instruments. Turkey was the least popular destination in the Iraqi refugee crisis, for a combination of its location, cultural distance, and unwelcoming stance toward refugees.

Iran

Iran had an estimated 57,000 Iraqi refugees within its borders in early 2008 according to UNHCR. Due to the state control of media in Iran and the government’s tenuous and distant relationship with international aid agencies like UNHCR, the situation for Iraqi refugees in Iran is difficult to determine. What is known is that Iran has had a closed-border policy for Iraqi refugees since 2003. The Iranian government announced it would turn back Iraqis as part of a standing wartime policy to block refugee entry during conflict (L. O'Donnell 2003). Like Turkey, Iran had a bad experience with Iraqi refugees during the 1991 Gulf War, when more than a million Iraqis flooded across the border (Neuffer 2003). Also, by 2003 Iran claimed to be dealing with over two million on its eastern border (Neuffer 2003). The

43 government said it would assist refugees on a limited basis, allowing in only refugees deemed to be in life-threatening physical danger, and then only to camps established just across the border (Neuffer 2003). Ahmad Hosseini, the head of refugee affairs in the Iranian Ministry of Interior was quoted; "We are not ready to receive refugees any more, for budgetary reasons. In this new era, we will help refugees, but in their territory" (Neuffer 2003). The Iranian government requested the help of UNHCR to administer the camps (IRNA News Agency 2003). Iran’s commitment to care for endangered refugees was welcome, but it signified an individually based discretionary judgment in contradiction to the broad protection required under the Refugee Convention.

Throughout the war and subsequent Iraqi Refugee Crisis, Iran seemed more concerned with repatriating Iraqis than hosting them. Thousands of Iraqis returned to Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein. However the UN made the decision to halt repatriation efforts in late 2003 following the bombing of UN headquarters in Baghdad (IRNA News Agency 2003). Iran’s Iraqi refugee population is composed mostly of Shia Muslims who fled there during Saddam Hussein’s oppressive rule. It is difficult to say how many of the 57,000 were part of the 2006 crisis because the UNHCR figure does not distinguish between the tens of thousands of Iraqis in Iran prior to the 2003 invasion and those who came after the 2006 Samarra mosque bombing. It is fair to say that Iran’s closed border policy precluded the entry of the Iraqis seeking shelter after that point. The cultural and linguistic differences between the Arab culture of Iraqi and the Persian culture of Iran are also important in explaining why Iraqis may not have seen Iran as an attractive destination.

Gulf Cooperation Council

The GCC consists of member states Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The total number of Iraqi refugees in the GCC member states was approximately 200,000, which composes less than one percent of their collective population. As previously discussed, Iraqis who fled to the GCC countries were atypical of the mass that has defined the crisis. The GCC countries were not very popular destinations for Iraqi refugees, both for their expense and inaccessibility. Those who sought GCC countries as a destination were

44 generally wealthy, early arrivers and produced no negative impact on the economy and society of their hosts. For those who could afford it, the attraction of the GCC was its healthy economy and comfortable living standards. Wealthy Iraqi businesspeople were able to continue their pursuits in the burgeoning economies of the Persian Gulf region. Those poorer Iraqis who may have sought neighboring Saudi Arabia or Kuwait as a destination found the borders of both countries to be closed.

In 2007 Saudi Arabia announced its intention to build a wall along its border to block entries from Iraq, and was at the time deploying security forces to intercept Iraqis attempting to enter (Amnesty International 2007). A high-ranking Saudi official told Human Rights Watch flatly that Saudi Arabia would not accept refugees, and that the issue was the responsibility of the United States (Human Rights Watch 2007).

Kuwait has maintained a strict policy prohibiting the entry of Iraqi refugees (Human Rights Watch 2007). Kuwait shares a border with Iraq, but a 10-mile wide demilitarized zone and the heavy presence of US troops along the frontier made the land crossing nearly impossible for refugees. Kuwait’s oil fields lie along its border with Iraq, a major reason the government sees border security as a priority. As part of an $8.5 billion plan to boost oil production, Kuwait has made initial efforts to construct a permanent border fence for the protection of drilling facilities (Alterman 2007). Some Iraqis tried to flee to Kuwait by sea, only to be turned away by authorities patrolling the coastal waters for illegal immigrants (Fairweather 2003).

The level of accessibility to the GCC was highly influenced by its wealth. The GCC states had the resources to afford effective security measures against Iraqi entries. As the land gateway to the rest of the GCC, Saudi Arabia’s $7 billion border wall is a perfect example, while Kuwait had the wealth and support of heavy US military presence to bolster its security perimeter. Most Iraqi refugees could only afford to travel by bus or car, and since Saudi Arabia sits between Iraq and the rest of the member states, the GCC was effectively inaccessible to that majority of refugee families who could not afford an air ticket. The ability of the governments to afford preventative measures to keep out all but the wealthiest Iraqis, the expense of living in the GCC, and geographic difficulties all explain the low number of Iraqi refugees who have successfully sought refuge in the GCC.

45 CHAPTER 3

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

A complex matrix of factors has affected destination choice in the Iraqi Refugee Crisis. The countries neighboring Iraq and those of the broader Middle East region have assumed the major share of Iraqis fleeing violence, at great cost to their economies and social stability. The policy decisions of each country affected the direction of the refugee flow by making some states more accessible or more attractive than others. While geography has made Middle Eastern countries the top receivers of Iraqi refugees, their influence on the direction of the migration is not exclusive. Politics and policies of other states have also greatly affected Iraqis’ choices. The security and wealth of the European Union has made it an attractive destination to which many Iraqis have traveled both legally and illegally to seek asylum. Most countries in the EU have been unwelcoming to Iraqis and the number of Iraqi refugees accepted into European countries is negligible.

Several European countries have engaged with the Iraqi Refugee Crisis in ways other than accepting asylum and resettlement applications. They have given monetary aid to Middle Eastern governments to deal with the crisis and other effects of the Iraq war. Some have assisted in surveying and analyzing the Iraqi refugee population in order to allow the host countries to better lobby for international support, as in the cases of Norway’s survey in Jordan, and Denmark’s survey in Lebanon. However, the country outside the Middle East with the most significant influence on the Iraqi Refugee Crisis through both engagement and neglect has been the United States. As the most powerful extra-regional state actor, the United States’ role in influencing destination choice is an in important object of study. This chapter will examine the US role in the Iraqi Refugee Crisis. First will be a look at the preparation for a refugee problem as part of war planning and reconstruction efforts. Second is an examination of the United States’ mitigation of the crisis through resettlement efforts and local assistance.

46 Preparation for a Refugee Problem

As the instigator of the war and the primary actor in the transitional government of Iraq, it is worth examining what preparations the US government made to cope with the potential refugee outflow that the UN predicted in 2003. The US began Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 as part of a goal of the George W. Bush White House to oust Saddam Hussein and bring a democratic government to Iraq. The US played a dominant role in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. As the leader of the invasion and the architect of the new, post-Saddam Iraq, the US had both a responsibility and strategic interest in mitigating the negative effects of a refugee situation in or around Iraq.

The President and other figures in the US government explained to the public the short- term and long-term goals of Operation Iraqi Freedom in the months leading up to the war. Iraq was first introduced as a subject of concern by President Bush in the 2002 State of the Union address, wherein he categorized Iraq under the now famous “axis of evil” schema (Bush, 2002 State of the Union address 2002). For the next year the Bush administration built the case for the invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein in speeches across the US and before the United Nations General Assembly. During the 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush formally announced his intention for the United States to “lead a coalition to disarm [Saddam Hussein]” pending Hussein’s noncompliance with UN weapons inspectors and refusal to remove suspected weapons of mass destruction from his arsenal (Bush, 2003 State of the Union address 2003). In the months that followed those remarks, US military conflict with Iraq became increasingly likely in the public discourse. During that period, Bush administration officials outlined plans for Iraq, including what would be done to provide stability and rebuild the country.

On September 7th, 2003, six months after the invasion of Iraq, President Bush delivered remarks in which he outlined three objectives for the strategy in Iraq: “destroying the terrorists, enlisting the support of other nations for a free Iraq, and helping Iraqis assume responsibility for their own defense and their own future” (Bush, Update in The War on Terror 2003). The following year, in a speech at the Army War College, Bush explained that the US agenda in Iraq was “freedom and independence, security and prosperity for the Iraqi people (Bush, Outline for

47 the Future of Iraq 2004). The goals described are vague in a manner typical of speeches made by high-ranking political figures, but assuming that the statements are sincere, the Iraqi Refugee Crisis and its threat to the safety of Iraqis and the stability of the Middle East region should have been something treated seriously by the US government.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the US federal government agency responsible for humanitarian aid and development. Refugee crises are typically considered humanitarian issues, and thus the responsibility within the US government for dealing with refugee outflow or internal displacement during the US occupation of Iraq belonged primarily to USAID. In the months preceding the invasion of Iraq, the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) formed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in collaboration with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, the State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and several other government agencies. A DART is a tool that OFDA uses routinely to assist people affected by natural disasters around the globe. The DART formed for the Iraq war was relatively large and extensive in terms of the number of agencies involved and the number of individuals composing its planning team. The involvement of the State Department’s PRM Bureau indicates an understanding of the distinct potential for human displacement as part of the disaster response planning.

USAID held a series of press briefings on the preparation for the Iraq conflict in February 2003. US government officials participating at these conferences made a number of references to refugee preparedness. Elliot Abrams, National Security Council Senior Director for Near East and North Africa and Special Assistant to the President, stated that PRM had provided “over $15 million to international agencies for pre-positioning and for contingency planning,” most having gone to UNHCR (USAID 2003). Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of PRM Gene Dewey repeated the $15 million figure, mentioned an additional $100,000 given to the International Organization for Migration, and explained that the funding contributions of the State Department were intended to “try to leverage as much as possible the efforts of the rest of the donor community” (USAID 2003). At the second briefing in February 2003, a member of the press asked how many refugees the DART team was preparing for. Director of OFDA Bernd McConnell responded that there was no specific number predicted, but that the number of relief

48 supplies stored in USAID warehouses could serve up to a million people. USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios explained his agency was one of many responders to humanitarian crises and that other organizations such as the Red Cross, the UN, and various NGOs were expected to augment the USAID response (USAID 2003).

Two days after the start of military action in Iraq, Andrew Natsios made his first war- time comments on the USAID relief effort, in which he reported that the DART for Iraq was operational and beginning to mobilize relief supplies, especially in southern Iraq, where the Coalition had begun to advance and take control of territory. Natsios described the relief effort underway, and remarked that the DART did not yet observe any “large-scale refugee movements” or internally displaced people (USAID 2003). On March 27, 2003 Natsios testified before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations concerning USAID activity in Iraq, explaining that his agency would be most active in operations budgeted under the newly created Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Account that the President had requested as part of Congressional appropriations bill H.R. 1559. Of the total $74.7 billion allotted in the bill, $543 million was marked specifically for humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons “in and around Iraq” (Executive Office of the President 2003). H.R. 1559 was passed by Congress and signed by the President on April 16th, 2003, putting into action the first major US funding appropriation for refugee assistance in Iraq.

The establishment of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Account was a pivotal development in the US government’s refugee-related activity, as it provided a designated source of funding in the federal budget for humanitarian relief to refugees. In late 2003, the account was renamed the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) per the President’s request to Congress for an $87 billion supplemental appropriation (Executive Office of the President 2003). In a period ranging from November 2003 until the end of 2008, which includes much of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis, the US government’s refugee-related reconstruction activity in Iraq fell under Project Code 04000 of the IRRF: “Migration and Refugee Assistance”. The quarterly funding appropriations for the Migration and Refugee Assistance project code from 2004 through 2008 are detailed in Table 5 on the next page.

49 Table 5. Funding appropriations for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Project Code 04000, Migration and Refugee Assistance, fiscal years 2004-2008, in millions of US dollars11

Fiscal Year Quarter Appropriation for Project Code 04000, Migration and Refugee Assistance Q1 0 Q2 105 2004 Q3 0 Q4 0 Total FY 2004 105 Q1 70 Q2 0 2005 Q3 -16 Q4 0 Total FY 2005 54 Q1 0 Q2 27 2006 Q3 0 Q4 0 Total FY 2006 27 Q1 0 Q2 8.6 2007 Q3 14.4 Q4 0 Total FY 2007 23 Q1 0 Q2 0 2008 Q3 0 Q4 0 Total FY 2008 0 2004 - 2008 Grand Total $209

The Migration and Refugee Assistance project code was closed after the first quarter of FY 2009, though the last allocation made was actually made in the third quarter of FY 2007. These figures come from the State Department’s quarterly Section 2207 Report to Congress on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction. According to the narrative portion of those reports, the $209 million allocated through the IRRF over five years was used for a variety of purposes, but directed mostly to internally displaced persons (IDPs). The funds were used to distribute relief supplies to IDPs, administer capacity building programs for the Iraqi Ministry for Displacement

11 US State Department. Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction, January 2004 – October 2008.

50 and Migration and to fund some programs run by NGOs that served vulnerable Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries. The IRRF is useful for showing the amount of reconstruction-designated funds directed toward Iraqi displacement, but does not reflect the US government’s entire financial commitment to Iraqi refugee assistance. The complex nature of the Iraq war and the US government’s role in reconstruction makes it difficult to trace all the funds directed toward refugee issues and their sources. In most cases, the act of leaving Iraq left refugees outside the influence of US reconstruction efforts, whose assistance to the displaced focused on IDPs.

US Role in Mitigation

There are two ways that the United States has acted to mitigate the adverse effects of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis – resettlement of refugees within its own borders to reduce burden on other countries, and financial contributions to governments and aid organizations addressing the needs of Iraqi refugees within their host countries. The United States has accepted a relatively meager amount of Iraqi refugees compared to the Middle Eastern states discussed in the previous chapter. Note the use of the term “accepted” in place of “received,” with geography as the primary factor that distinguishes between the two. The Middle Eastern states to which most Iraqis fled received Iraqi refugees, partly out of a feeling of humanitarian obligation, but also because they were not equipped to stop the massive flow across their borders. They deal with huge numbers of Iraqi refugees simply because they happen to be close enough to Iraq to be in the path of the massive overland displacement. Consequently, those states have tolerated refugees with varying levels of legal accommodation. Most of them allowed UNHCR to operate within their borders to assist Iraqi refugees in a humanitarian and legal capacity. UNHCR has three “durable solutions” for refugees – voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. The governments of the region have favored the third-country resettlement option over supporting local integration into their own societies.

Third-country resettlement is the UNHCR’s solution for refugees of ongoing conflicts. The preferred durable solution – voluntary repatriation – was not a considered a viable option by UNHCR because of the sustained conditions of violence in Iraq. UNHCR has the expertise, experience, and transnational political standing to navigate the complex process of third-country resettlement application on the behalf of refugees. Because of their proximity to Iraq, the Middle

51 Eastern states discussed in the previous chapter became countries of first asylum. “Country of first asylum” is an international legal concept without a universally accepted definition, but it often prevents refugees from going to any country other than the first one they entered because of the delicate burden of proof involved in political asylum cases (Kjaerum 1992). Iraqis who went to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, etc. were technically already sheltered from the threat they claimed in Iraq, making it difficult to prove the life-threatening need that asylum applications require. Thus third-country resettlement was successfully conducted for most Iraqi cases under the special mandate of UNHCR.

Countries without proximity to Iraq or a tradition of pan-Arab solidarity, such as the EU states and the US are instead in a position to accept refugees for asylum and/or resettlement. While Iraqis could find ways to cross borders illegally into nearby Middle Eastern states, it was nearly impossible to gain access to Europe or North America without the proper documentation. For the US in particular, which must be reached by air or sea from Iraq, illegal Iraqi entry has not been an issue. Iraqis accepted by the US as refugees for resettlement endured a complex process involving the UNHCR and numerous US government agencies and their partner organizations. The State Department established the Iraq Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Task Force in February 2007 under the direction of Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky. It was designed to coordinate assistance and resettlement efforts for Iraqi refugees and IDPs among US agencies and international organizations (O'Donnell and Newland 2008).

All Iraqi refugee admissions have been subject to the limitations imposed by the annual Presidential Determination on Refugees, which is made per the recommendation of the State Department and other government agencies. There is an annual cap on total refugees admitted to the US, as well as regional admission caps, and Iraq’s region competes with the rest of the world for a share of the total. The global annual cap has not been met since September 11, 2001, and even the regional ceilings are not always set to their maximum allowance. Despite rhetoric from US officials in favor of increased support for Iraqi refugees, the annual goals set for Iraqi admission in the years 2007 and 2008 were below the pre-established maximums for the region.

There were two ways Iraqis could obtain resettlement under US law. One was through the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), and the other through the Special

52 Immigrant Visa (SIV) program. Direct application to the USRAP was only available in Jordan and Egypt (International Rescue Committee 2008). The exclusion of Syria from the direct application process is a consequence of unfriendly diplomatic relations between the US and Syria, and was a weakness in US resettlement efforts, considering the number of Iraqis in Syria. Those seeking US resettlement from Syria and all other countries beside Jordan and Egypt were required to register with UNHCR, who would refer their case to the State Department for screening. UNHCR processing was known to take several months longer than a direct application to a US embassy or partner organization.

In order to reach the US through the USRAP program, refugees in Jordan and Egypt could apply directly to an Overseas Processing Entity (OPE) run by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In all other countries they had to register with the UNHCR and wait for referral to the State Department. Applicants to the OPE were interviewed by the Department of Homeland Security for security purposes. If accepted, they were then given medical screening and cultural orientation before being flown to the US by IOM and handed over to refugee resettlement agencies in the US. Those resettlement agencies assumed responsibility for employment and housing assistance once refugees reached US soil (International Rescue Committee 2008). The State Department began allowing Iraqis to apply for USRAP from within Iraq in May 2008, but eligibility is based on past persecution or well- founded fear of future persecution (Epstein 2009). The requirement for a pre-established threat makes the long waiting period for USRAP application processing a real danger to applicants’ safety. A State Department official stated in early 2009 that there was unlikely to be any reduction in wait time, due to ongoing and unspecified processing delays (Epstein 2009).

The SIV program was available to Iraqis who worked directly for the US government, organizations working under contract with the US government, or US-based media organizations and NGOs. In total there were six categories of employees/family members of employees that qualified for US resettlement under the SIV program.12 The wide applicability of SIV program made it popular, but participation presented a paradox because Iraqis perceived working for the US government or American companies as a veritable death sentence. It is widely reported that

12 See Appendix B for details.

53 Iraqis associated with the US military and other American entities have been common targets for violence by insurgent groups within Iraq. For those that braved the risks of working for the US government and applied for the SIV, availability was a problem for several years. Iraq and Afghanistan are part of the same region under the US government’s geographic schema for refugee admissions – the Near East and South Asia (US Department of State 2007). Prior to 2008, Iraqis and Afghanis working as translators for the US military had to share a regional limit of 500 SIVs. In 2007, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a bill to the US Congress called the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, whose purpose was to increase US assistance and resettlement for Iraqi refugees. It became part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, which was signed into law by President Bush in January 2008. Under the new law, the cap was increased to 5,000 Iraqis and their family members (an expected 10,000 – 12,000 total people), which is in addition to the general refugee admissions permitted under USRAP (International Rescue Committee 2008).

Although the policy of the US towards accepting Iraqi refugees became more generous over time, the actual admissions did not always keep pace. The US has received sharp criticism from numerous NGOs that deal in migration issues for its low acceptance rate of Iraqi refugees. The annual number of resettled Iraqi refugees in the US dropped drastically in 2002. In 2001, 22,470 UNHCR-referred Iraqis were resettled in the US, while only 460 were resettled in 2003. 200 were resettled in 2006, the first year of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis (O'Donnell and Newland 2008). The main reason for the low numbers is the fact that the Department of Homeland Security instituted new, stricter security screening procedures for the Middle East region following the attacks of September 11th, 2001 (O'Donnell and Newland 2008). In February 2007, the US government responded to the outbreak of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis by announcing a goal to accept 7,000 Iraqi refugees by the end of the fiscal year on September 30th (O'Donnell and Newland 2008). By the end of FY 2007, the US had resettled only 1,608 Iraqis, well short of the goal (International Rescue Committee 2008). The situation improved a year later, as the goal of 12,000 set for FY 2008 was surpassed, with 13,823 Iraqis resettled by the end of September (Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State 2008). Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides only for the right to seek asylum, not to obtain it. The granting of asylum is the sovereign right of a state – one that the US exercised to its discretion, with reluctance tied largely to security concerns (Kjaerum 1992).

54 Iraqis seeking resettlement in the US based on their refugee status face bureaucratic challenges, most prominently the long wait time for security clearance. SIV applicants face great personal risk while waiting for processing and clearance, due to their association with the US government. The legislation introduced by Senator Kennedy brought a much needed increase in available SIVs for Iraqis, and resettlement goals set by the State Department brought thousands of Iraqi refugees to US soil with access to housing, employment, and education. Iraqis resettled in the US experienced far better conditions than they did in the countries surrounding Iraq, though the cultural difference should not be overlooked. On the individual level, the US government engaged with Iraqi refugees in a way that acknowledged their rights, and even went beyond, with job placement and housing assistance. At the collective level, however, the US contribution to mitigating the Iraqi Refugee Crisis through resettlement was minuscule. The 13,823 Iraqis admitted to the US in 2008 is an insignificant figure compared to the nearly 2.5 million refugees spread across the Middle East region.

US diplomatic relations with countries in the Middle East span a broad range, from decades-long partnerships to outward hostility. The nature of US relations with the states of the Middle East has had an influence on both the direction of migration in the Iraqi Refugee Crisis, and the conditions facing refugees in each place. The close partnership the US has with Kuwait has made the small Persian Gulf state to the south of Iraq an important staging location for US military forces during the invasion and home to ten US military bases where routine transshipment and refueling activities have continued since 2003 (Alterman 2007). The permanent presence of US military forces gives Kuwait de facto protection, and the US receives subsidized oil and gas supplies in return (Alterman 2007). Jon Alterman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explains that Kuwait felt abandoned by its neighboring Arab states in the First Gulf War. The invading was instead repelled by the US military, and Alterman believes the experience has caused Kuwaitis to question the utility of the pan-Arab identity that Syria and other Arab states have embraced (Alterman 2007). Since the First Gulf War, the US and Kuwait have cultivated a close friendship that has undermined Kuwait’s identification with the greater Arab community. The low numbers of Iraqis successfully taking refuge in Kuwait despite geographic proximity is due to the lack of a pan- Arab welcome policy and the heavy presence of US military forces that is tied inextricably to the oil infrastructure located along the border.

55 As the most powerful state in the GCC, Saudi Arabia has maintained a more independent diplomatic stance vis-à-vis the United States. The two countries have a historically long and friendly relationship, including the First Gulf War, in which the US military protected Saudi oil infrastructure along the Kuwaiti border. Saudi Arabia’s protection of its border against Iraqi refugee entry was done primarily by it own forces and independently funded, but given the close partnership between the US and Saudi Arabia, it is conceivable that the migration of Iraqis towards the Saudi border was an area of concern to the US military. The most important overlapping interest between Saudi Arabia and the US, however, was the threat of extremists, particularly the group Al-Qaeda. The burgeoning of Al-Qaeda in Iraq has presented a major security concern to the Saudi government, which maintains a tenuous hold on power. The Saudi interest in arresting the flow of Iraqis and possible extremists across the border is of utmost importance for both the Saudi monarchy and the US government. The Saudi king would stand to lose power if religious violence sufficiently destabilized Saudi society, and the US cannot afford to lose a powerful ally and trade partner to a revolution. The two governments have historically shared intelligence and coordinated security forces to combat the threat of terrorist organizations. Thus, while little public information is available on the subject, it is fair to assume that the US government worked closely with Saudi officials to stem the tide of Iraqis across the border, in order to minimize the threat to Saudi stability. Saudi Arabia’s own wealth made the task easier to pull off, with a ready funds to construct an effective security infrastructure.

Jordan is another country with a long, close partnership with the United States. However, as a poorer country than Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Jordan was not able to prevent the entry of Iraqi refugees as effectively. US assistance to Jordan for the Iraqi refugee problem was made in the form of financial contributions to help mitigate the strain of refugees on Jordanian society once inside. Jordan has received more than $10 million in direct aid from the US to help the government cope with Iraqi refugees, and its general military and economic aid package grow by 48% in recent years (Simon 2009). Next door, Syria, with its 1.5 million Iraqi refugees, has received no direct aid from the US government to assist in the refugee crisis. The US has designated Syria as a State Sponsor of Terrorism since 1979, which prohibits the provision of direct assistance under US law (US Department of State n.d.). For the host countries to the west and north of Iraq, US assistance focused on the mitigation of negative effects of refugees already within the borders, rather than helping to prevent entry, as in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This

56 assistance came in the form of direct aid or contributions to UNHCR, the Red Crescent, and numerous NGOs.

In 2007 Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration Ellen Sauerbrey traveled to Syria, Jordan and Turkey to hold talks with government officials on the Iraqi refugee issue and coordinate efforts with host governments. These trips produced the most definitive and revealing public statement from a US government official on US responsibility in the Iraqi Refugee Crisis. On March 26th, 2007, Sauerbrey testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia. The State Department titled the transcript of her remarks “Iraqi Volunteers; Iraqi Refugees: What is America’s Obligation?” The opening paragraph of Sauerbrey’s testimony is rich enough in significance that it warrants quoting at length:

“Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss Iraqi refugees. I welcome the opportunity to detail some of the actions the Administration is taking to provide protection and assistance for Iraqis in neighboring countries of first asylum and for populations inside Iraq. The Administration shares your concern about the current situation facing Iraqi refugees and is committed to helping improve conditions for them in countries of first asylum. We are working closely with host governments in the region, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and non- governmental organizations (NGOs). Through these partnerships, we are providing assistance to the neediest refugees and are seeking durable solutions for all of them. In keeping with international norms, past experience and the wishes of many individual refugees, it is often most appropriate to provide assistance and protection to refugees in the region until such time as it is safe to return home. However, we also are actively pursuing resettlement to the United States for some who require this important form of international protection” (Sauerbrey 2007).13

13 See Appendix C for full text of testimony.

57 The testimony indicates a clear preference for the management of the Iraqi refugee problem by keeping refugees where they are and taking steps to mitigate the adverse effects on host societies and governments. Sauerbrey indicates that much of the US effort is through contributions to international aid organizations. The channeling of funds through such organizations was particularly important in the case of Syria, due to the history of strained relations between the US and Syria that prohibits direct aid and fosters Syrian mistrust of US influence. Sauerbrey’s trip to Syria was a poignant event as it broke Washington’s two-year moratorium on high-ranking diplomatic visits to Damascus (Yacoubian 2007). Syrian Foreign Minister Faysal al-Miqdad told the Sauerbrey and her delegation that his government would accept international assistance and that it prefers to work with UN organizations (Sauerbrey 2007). Sauerbrey points out that the US provided $8 million of UNHCR’s operational budget for Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in 2006; $3.3 million to International Catholic Migration Commission to assist vulnerable refugees in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan; 30 percent of UNHCR’s Iraq Appeal for FY 2007; and an additional $35 million to various other organizations serving Iraqis (Sauerbrey 2007). The listing of numerous fulfilled funding commitments shows that the US government was interested in supporting organizations that worked locally to provide medical care and education to Iraqis within their countries of first asylum. As discussed in Chapter 2, these services were one of the attractors that brought refugees to one destination over another.

In Sauerbrey’s testimony, resettlement is presented a secondary option for Iraqi refugees. She says that the US government is “working closely with UNHCR to prioritize U.S. resettlement for vulnerable Iraqis,” and that refugees are encouraged to register with UNHCR to “make their needs known” (Sauerbrey 2007). However, Sauerbrey qualifies the group of Iraqis who are eligible as “some who require this important form of international protection” (Sauerbrey 2007). UNHCR’s designation of Iraqis as prima facie refugees meant that all Iraqis from southern and central Iraq would qualify as in need of such protection. Sauerbrey’s use of the word “some” establishes the US government’s deniability of an undefined group of Iraqi refugees, in contradiction to responsibility under the 1967 Protocol. My argument assumes the existence of both an objective responsibility on the part of the US to assist Iraqi refugees under international law, as well as a subjective responsibility tied to the US government’s role in instigating the crisis. Sauerbrey attempts to deny that subjective responsibility by stating that of

58 the over 2 million Iraqi refugees in countries bordering Iraq, “a large percentage of them had left Iraq prior to 2003” (Sauerbrey 2007). The data presented in Chapter 1 contradicts that assertion. Sauerbrey states that as of the time of her testimony, the US had resettled 692 Iraqis since April 2003, and indicates a desire to expand resettlement capacity for Iraqis. She cites security- screening delays and a dearth of referrals by the UNHCR as reasons for slow progress (Sauerbrey 2007). However, a chart produced by the International Rescue Committee shows that UNHCR referrals increased steadily throughout 2007, while actual arrivals to the US lagged behind (see Figure 3 below).

Figure 3. UNHCR referrals for Iraqi refugees versus arrivals to the US, February 2007 - January 2008.14

14 Source: International Rescue Committee. Five Years Later, A Hidden Crisis: Report of the IRC Commission on Iraqi Refugees. IRC Commission on Iraqi Refugees, New York: International Rescue Committee, 2008. 9.

59 A careful analysis of Ellen Sauerbrey’s testimony reveals the US government’s self- assigned responsibility in the Iraqi Refugee Crisis. Her trip to the region shows that the US recognized the problem and the funding she outlines indicates a willingness to engage the issue. It is clear however, that the US government has preferred taking action addressing refugees’ needs locally over offering US soil as a place of refuge. The number of Iraqis accepted for admission to the US, both through SIVs and the USRAP program pales in comparison to the total number of Iraqis displaced across the region. With its high per capita GDP and population exceeding 300 million, the absorptive capacity of the United States far exceeds the admissions that have been allowed. Sauerbrey implicitly states the preference of the US government to address the crisis locally. The justifications offered are “keeping with international norms, past experience, and the wishes of many individual refugees” (Sauerbrey 2007). The reasoning behind “international norms” as a justification for the local approach is questionable. The preferred solution under UNHCR policy is voluntary repatriation, which was not an option in this case because of the ongoing state of conflict in Iraq, and host governments did not support the other option of local integration. The elimination of those solutions left only resettlement. Sauerbrey’s use of “international norms” and “past experience” for justification of the local approach to mitigation is likely made with respect to past situations in which refugees were located in camps that allowed for a sustained humanitarian attention while they awaited repatriation. The diffusion of Iraqi refugees throughout the capital cities of the Middle East makes the utility and effectiveness of a traditional assistance regime questionable. The situation facing Iraqi refugees demands an approach that is sensitive to their precarious position.

Sauerbrey’s last reason, “wishes of individual refugees,” is the most viable. Coming to the United States would be a significant cultural environmental shift for Iraqis due to differences in majority religion and language. Furthermore is the negative association Iraqis may have with the US after the experience of war and occupation. To assume that many Iraqis would rather remain in an Arabic-speaking majority Muslim country to await repatriation is fair. However Sauerbrey’s testimony offers no survey-based evidence of that feeling among Iraqis refugees, and Figure 3 above indicates that thousands of Iraqis were applying for US resettlement and not receiving it throughout 2007, a clear indication of desire to resettle in the United States.

It must be stressed that the diffused, urban characteristics of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis

60 mean that resettlement should be used on a larger scale than it has been to mitigate adverse effects. Providing the durable solution of resettlement gives people displaced by conflict an opportunity to reestablish their lives and live with the dignity afforded all human beings under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The US government made an effort to provide the resettlement option to Iraqi refugees, but the reality of paltry commitments shows a lack of real dedication to the cause. Ellen Sauerbrey’s testimony to Congress is the most express representation of US government policy toward the Iraqi Refugee Crisis. Although it was not formalized or declared from an inter-agency level, it is evident that the intent of the US government was to keep Iraqi refugees in the Middle East region and deal with the problem locally.

The landscape of US diplomatic relations and related interests in the Middle East had a significant impact on the destination choices of Iraqi refugees. One thing it affected was accessibility to resettlement programs. In the case of Egypt and Jordan, the situation was amicable enough to allow for direct application to the US refugee admissions program. Syria, on the other hand, at one point refused visas to Department of Homeland Security employees to process applications. For this and other reasons, direct application to USRAP never became available in Syria, and refugees had to rely on the slower process of UNHCR referral. The availability of resettlement options was an important choice factor, which likely attracted Iraqis to Jordan and Egypt at a rate higher than would have been without it.

As in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the US played a role in preventing refugees from entering countries where their presence may have significantly threatened US interests. In the countries that were not able to prevent Iraqi entry, US relations with those governments affected the conditions facing refugees. The relationship could be measured in type and amount of financial assistance provided to governments to help them cope with the refugee influx. Where the US had friendly relations, millions of dollars in direct aid was provided to the government. Funding was also funneled through international aid organizations such as the UNHCR, Red Crescent, and various religious charities. With little money of their own and deprived of the right to work, the services provided by international aid organizations undoubtedly affected Iraqi’s destination choices. The efficiency of direct aid versus funding to third-party providers is debatable, but Jordan was a country that received help from the US in

61 both forms, while Syria was only eligible for indirect funding, usually to contributions to the operational budgets of the UNHCR and other international organizations.

The provision of social services is a double-edged sword for host governments, because while it mitigates the effects of poverty, crime, and disease on their society, it can also serve to attract more refugees and provide incentive for longer stays, possibly overwhelming the capacity of the programs and undermining their purpose. The implicit US policy of treating the Iraqi refugee problem locally most likely compelled the US government to provide assistance to both allies and foes near Iraq to help them manage the Iraqi refugee population within their borders and prevent it from spilling out and significantly destabilizing the region.

62 CONCLUSION

The Iraqi Refugee Crisis is a complex transnational movement of people involving numerous political, legal, economic, and cultural factors that have helped to determine the destination of Iraqi refugees fleeing their homes. The purpose of this thesis has been to explain the direction of migration for Iraqis fleeing their country.

Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon were the most popular destinations for Iraqi refugees and became the countries of first asylum for over 2 million of them. The rest of the states in the region – Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and the GCC received the remaining number of roughly 307,000. The direction of migration was primarily westward, due to a combination of factors including geography, religious identity, ease of entry, legal status, and the provision of quality-of-life enhancing social services. The factors present in each country were dictated both by internal politics and international political dynamics.

The internal political decisions of host countries have offered a range of approaches to the Iraqi refugee influx. Some states welcomed Iraqis initially and gradually decreased their support for admission and legal protection. Others banned entry entirely and took steps to discourage the stay of those who managed to enter covertly. The United States made some effort to admit Iraqi refugees and integrate them into society, but enjoyed the benefit of distance from Iraq, which made the massive cross-border flow experienced by Middle Eastern states a non- issue. US resettlement activity for Iraqi refugees has been characterized by a lack of dedication and denial of responsibility to assume a fair burden of the refugee population. The US’s weak effort for resettlement indicated its preference for an alternative mitigation method – local treatment of refugees’ needs within their countries of first asylum.

The international political influence on the direction of migration in the Iraqi Refugee Crisis was dominated by the United States and characterized by an agenda to keep Iraqis in their Middle Eastern countries of first asylum. Within that broad agenda, the US used its influence to direct the migration flow and sustain the location of refugee population in a manner that best served its own interests and the mutual interests of its allies.

63 A point that I hope this thesis has illustrated is that the Iraqi Refugee Crisis has a distinct character that places it among the most difficult refugee situations in history. Refugees are often regarded as homogenous collection of poor and desperate people moving en masse to the nearest point of safety to be protected by the United Nations or some humanitarian NGO. The situation in and around Iraq, as well as the choices and motivations of those fleeing, show that there are many factors at play that have dictated movement of Iraqis both through incentives/disincentives and forcibly imposed restrictions that threaten refugees’ ability to effectively seek security. In many cases, destination choices defied strong cultural conventions in favor of economic opportunity. Social networks also factored into choice, so with Syria and Jordan having the most highly developed social networks of Iraqis prior to the war, it is understandable that they became appealing destinations when violence broke out.

As of the writing of this thesis, the Iraqi Refugee Crisis continues. Middle Eastern states neighboring Iraq still suffer the burden of refugees living within their borders, and the UNHCR continues to work with host governments to seek permanent solutions. The evidence presented provides a relatively simple conclusion: Iraqi refugees have been largely neglected by the international community, especially by those states with the highest ability affect their fate – their Middle Eastern host countries and the United States. The alignment of diplomatic relations between the US and host countries, along with the intertwining political interests of said states have formed a de facto regime under which Iraqi refugees live in uncertain legal and economic status primarily in states along the western flank of Iraq, with no foreseeable resolution.

The Iraqi Refugee Crisis as defined and detailed in this study is a situation that demands rectification under the regime of international refugee law. It also threatens the stability of the international system per the realist perspective. Refugees are expensive and risky liabilities for a state to cope with, as indicated by the widespread reluctance demonstrated by Middle Eastern countries. Many of the host countries have a long and difficult experience with Palestinian refugees to inform their behavior. While some states have been unable to effectively prevent Iraqi entry, it is likely that the effort being put forth by the wealthier and more powerful states involved is carefully calculated to provide the desired stability with a minimum level of investment in refugees. This appears to be the implicit, informal policy of the GCC and the United States. While the realist perspective explains and supports those policy choices, they have

64 created a situation in which human beings are treated in way that violates their rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and numerous other mechanisms of international law.

In the case of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis, as with most events in history, states’ behavior appears to be dictated more by unwritten, systematic factors, i.e. the search for stability with minimal self-risk and the maintenance of power, over the written code of the international system. However, international law has not been completely absent as a factor in the Iraqi Refugee Crisis. Within host countries, manifestations of the international refugee law regime, in the form of UNHCR activity and humanitarian assistance from NGOs, has helped to determine the destination choices of Iraqis. At the macro level, international law has been abrogated for self-serving political interests. At the micro level, however, mechanisms of international law have prevented Iraqis from descending into utter abandonment. Further study is needed to reveal how states discussed in this thesis have balanced their self-serving political interests with responsibilities assigned by the international system.

65 APPENDIX A

MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Source: The University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. "Middle East Maps - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection - UT Library Online." University of Texas Libraries . November 5, 2008. http://lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east.html (accessed November 6, 2009).

66 APPENDIX B

REQUIREMENTS FOR US SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA (SIV)

The following individuals (and their spouse and unmarried children under 21 years of age) may seek access through the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program:

1. Iraqis who work/worked on a full-time basis as interpreters/translators for the U.S. Government or Multi-National Forces (MNF-I) in Iraq;

2. Iraqis who were engaged as Locally Employed Staff (LES) by the U.S. Government in Iraq;

3. Iraqis who are/were direct-hire employees of an organization or entity closely associated with the U.S. mission in Iraq that has received U.S. Government funding through an official and documented contract, award, grant or cooperative agreement;

4. Iraqis who are/were employed in Iraq by a U.S.-based media organization or non- governmental organization;

5. Spouses, sons, daughters, parents and siblings of individuals described in the four categories above, or of an individual eligible for a Special Immigrant Visa as a result of his/her employment by or on behalf of the U.S. government in Iraq, including if the individual is no longer alive, provided that the relationship is verified;

6. Iraqis who are the spouses, sons, daughters, parents, brothers or sisters of a citizen of the United States, or who are the spouses or unmarried sons or daughters of a Permanent Resident Alien of the United States, as established by their being or becoming beneficiaries of approved family-based I-130 Immigrant Visa Petitions.

67 APPENDIX C

TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION ELLEN SAUERBREY

“Iraqi Volunteers; Iraqi Refugees: What Is America's Obligation?”

Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia

Washington, DC

March 26, 2007

Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss Iraqi refugees. I welcome the opportunity to detail some of the actions the Administration is taking to provide protection and assistance for Iraqis in neighboring countries of first asylum and for populations inside Iraq. The Administration shares your concern about the current situation facing Iraqi refugees and is committed to helping improve conditions for them in countries of first asylum. We are working closely with host governments in the region, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Through these partnerships, we are providing assistance to the neediest refugees and are seeking durable solutions for all of them. In keeping with international norms, past experience and the wishes of many individual refugees, it is often most appropriate to provide assistance and protection to refugees in the region until such time as it is safe to return home. However, we also are actively pursuing resettlement to the United States for some who require this important form of international protection. Before discussing our overall response, let me brief you on my recent trip to Egypt, Syria and Jordan. It was a productive, useful trip. All governments expressed their willingness to continue to offer assistance to Iraqis in need. In Egypt I met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who told me the 100,000 or so Iraqis they host are straining their already overburdened education and health systems. The Egyptian Government expressed security concerns because of the number of Iraqis entering on false documents. In Syria, I met with Deputy Foreign Minister Mikdad. He described the strain that more than one million Iraqis are putting on Syrian Government services, such as health and education, and noted some of the social and economic consequences of the influx of Iraqis, such as crime, high rents, and rising prices. He also expressed concern about the security implications of the Iraqi presence. He said that Syria would

68 accept international assistance and prefers to work through UN organizations. He left the door open to NGO activity as well. The Jordanian Government also indicated its willingness to continue to help Iraqis. Officials said public schools were open to some Iraqis and indicated a need for international support to their education and health systems to cover the additional burden. However, Jordanian officials also expressed their security concerns, citing the 2005 bombings in Amman that were conducted by Iraqi extremists. In addition, we consulted closely with UNHCR and international NGOs throughout the trip. UNHCR has begun to ramp up its operations in the region, as have other international organizations and partner NGOs. Since 2003, the Administration has provided more than $800 million to support the World Food Program (WFP), UNHCR, ICRC, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and a range of NGOs. Inside Iraq, these programs have provided direct assistance and reintegration support to returning Iraqi refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq, and third country national refugees. For Iraqi refugees outside Iraq, we have helped meet basic humanitarian needs. Humanitarian programs reinforce America's reconstruction and security efforts in Iraq. Our support has increased the capacity of Iraqi Government ministries working with refugees and internally displaced persons, provided training to non-governmental organizations serving refugees, and assisted thousands of victims of conflict. These programs helped many of the 300,000 Iraqi refugees who returned home between 2003 and 2006 to reintegrate into their own communities and helped many of the estimated two million IDPs inside Iraq to meet basic needs. However, due to the increase in sectarian violence in 2006, this trend has reversed, with many Iraqis fleeing their homes to other areas of Iraq and to neighboring countries. Most displaced Iraqis have found refuge with host families. UNHCR estimates that between 600,000 to 700,000 Iraqis have become displaced within Iraq since February 2006 joining an already 1.2 million internally displaced and that another 2 million Iraqis are in countries bordering Iraq, though a large percentage of them had left Iraq prior to 2003. Many organizations, including UNHCR, have raised concerns about new arrivals and growing numbers of Iraqis in these countries, though neither UNHCR nor the governments of Jordan or Syria have definitive figures on the size of the population. Anecdotal reporting from NGOs in the region indicate that many Iraqi children in these countries do not have access to schools or adequate health care, despite the stated willingness of hosting governments to allow access. We need better information on the situation and needs of Iraqis in these countries, particularly their protection concerns. The Government of Jordan on March 22 signed an agreement with a Norwegian NGO to conduct a survey of Iraqis in Jordan, which will help guide the international community in focusing assistance and protection activities. The Government of Syria is considering a similar survey of Iraqis. Although these surveys will be important tools, we are not waiting for precise numbers before addressing the needs of vulnerable Iraqis in neighboring countries. In February, Secretary Rice established the Iraqi Refugee and Internally Displaced Task Force, led by Paula

69 Dobriansky, Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, to focus and coordinate USG response and efforts. We are increasing our support to UNHCR and NGO programs benefiting Iraqis in these countries. In 2006, the U.S. provided nearly $8 million of UNHCR's operational budget for Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. In 2006, we also provided $3.3 million in funding to the International Catholic Migration Commission to assist the most vulnerable Iraqis in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. In 2007, we are expanding support for these and similar programs serving needy Iraqis in neighboring countries, beginning with the $20 million appropriated in the full- year Continuing Resolution. We have already contributed 30 percent or $18 million to UNHCR's FY2007 Iraq Appeal of $60 million. An additional $15 million is included in the President's FY07 supplemental request and we will monitor recent refugee and displacement needs and identify additional funding if necessary. The Administration will also continue to help expand the capacity of the international community to address the new needs. Our support for UNHCR's refugee protection mandate and our bilateral diplomatic efforts with host governments have been and will remain essential tools in preserving the principle of first asylum, maintaining humanitarian space in refugee hosting countries and ensuring that assistance reaches vulnerable refugees. This was the thrust of my recent trip to the region. Jordan and Syria have been hosts to Iraqis for many years and have largely kept their borders open as people continued to flow out of Iraq. Both Jordan and Syria are also hosts to sizeable Palestinian refugee populations, and we recognize the additional burden Iraqi refugees place on these countries. We are working with UNHCR to see how we can help bolster their capacity to provide protection and assistance so Iraqis do not over-stretch social service networks and these governments' ability to continue to receive Iraqis seeking asylum. Another aspect of our response to Iraqi refugee needs in the region is a planned expansion of our U.S. resettlement program. The U.S. has been resettling Iraqi refugees since the mid-1970s. To date the U.S. has resettled more than 37,000 Iraqis, the vast majority of whom were victims of Saddam Hussein's regime. Since April 2003 we have resettled 692 Iraqis in the United States. Following the 9/11 attacks, for security reasons, the United States instituted an enhanced security review of existing Iraqi resettlement cases that effectively halted their admission until this requirement was lifted in 2005. Since then, resettlement of Iraqi cases has resumed, but only small numbers of referrals had been received until recently. Now, we have acted aggressively to expand our ability to offer more Iraqis refuge in the United States during 2007. One element of this expansion has been to boost UNHCR's resettlement operations. In the last two years, we provided an additional $900,000 of funding targeted to support UNHCR resettlement operations in the region. These expanded operations have increased registration efforts, thereby allowing UNHCR to identify more vulnerable cases and boosting the number of referrals to our program and those of other resettlement countries. The design of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program allows substantial flexibility regarding the number of Iraqis (or any other nationality) the United States can resettle in any given year. The constraints we face for Iraqi refugees are the same as those that affect our resettlement program in other parts of the world. Challenges include: identifying those in greatest

70 need from among so many; rapidly expanding the processing infrastructure; and conducting multi-stepped security checks. Clearly security checks are of fundamental importance in processing refugees from this region. Given the large numbers of Iraqis in Syria and Jordan, with some estimates as high as 1.5 million, the U.S. and other third country resettlement programs will play a small but important role in the international community's overall effort to meet Iraqi refugee needs. We are working closely with UNHCR to prioritize U.S. resettlement for vulnerable Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Syria and other countries. At the same time, we are quickly building up our processing infrastructure in the appropriate locations. Processing of newly referred Iraqi cases is already underway in Turkey, Syria and Jordan and will accelerate and expand into other countries as more cases are referred. I want to recognize some of the special populations that have received attention from humanitarian organizations in 2006 - minority populations in Iraq and Iraqis who have worked closely with the United States in Iraq. Some have called for special protection and programs for these people, including religious minorities such as Christians, who have fled Iraq or those who have worked for the American Government or U.S. organizations or companies. Many of these Iraqis are in refuge in Jordan, Syria, or Turkey and may be unable to return to Iraq because they fear for their lives. We intend to ensure that these special populations receive the same consideration and access to the U.S. resettlement program as others and we are encouraging them to contact UNHCR to make their needs known. We also recognize the dangers that certain individuals in Iraq might face due to their association with the United States and the management issues associated with recruitment and retention of Embassy local staff in demanding environments such as Iraq. Existing legislation created a program that allows Special Immigrant Visas for up to 50 Department of Defense translators per year. The Administration is currently working to identify the best way to broaden our existing authorities to address such situations involving local staff. We are also working with Embassy Baghdad to determine how best in practice to provide urgent protection to individuals at immediate risk because of their association with the USG. We are collaborating with the Department of Homeland Security and other involved agencies in this regard. I want to take a moment to talk about important programs the U.S. Government supports inside Iraq. While recent reports have highlighted the conditions of Iraqis in neighboring countries, we must not forget populations of concern still inside Iraq. UNHCR and the Iraqi Government estimate there are as many as 2 million internally displaced persons and another 44,000 third country national refugees in Iraq. The U.S. Government continues to support UNHCR, ICRC, and key NGO programs inside Iraq to assist communities with new internally displaced persons, recently returned refugees, and other victims of violence. For example, we support important programs of the ICRC that upgrade hospitals throughout the country and provide medical services to those who are innocent victims of the armed insurgency. We also fund and provide diplomatic support to programs that seek to protect, assist, and provide durable solutions for Palestinian, Turkish, and Iranian refugees inside Iraq. In 2005 and 2006, we funded the movement of over 3,000 Iranian from the Al Tash near the

71 strife-torn town of al Ramadi to a safe area in Northern Iraq - providing permanent housing, employment programs, and local integration support. We are also working closely with UNHCR and the governments of Iraq and Turkey to enable the voluntary return of more than 10,000 Turkish Kurdish refugees from the Mahkmour refugee camp to their home villages in Turkey. In addition, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the lead USG agency on IDP issues, continues its strong support to protect and assist internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq. USAID is also providing assistance to host communities bearing the burden of increasing IDPs. Because the steady increase in displacements will require additional funding in 2007, the President has requested $45 million in FY 2007 supplemental funding for USAID to support IDPs in Iraq. Mr. Chairman, we appreciate your interest in Iraqi refugee issues and look forward to working closely with you as we seek to expand protection for these Iraqis, third-country national refugees, conflict victims, and IDPs and ensure that the vulnerable among them receive assistance, access to social services, and, for the most vulnerable, the opportunity to resettle to a third country. Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee. This concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

72 REFERENCES al-Khalidi, Ashraf, Sophia Hoffman, and Victor Tanner. Iraqi Refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic: A Field-Based Snapshot. An Occasional Paper, Project on Internal Displacement, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2007. Alterman, Jon B. Iraq and the Gulf States: The Balance of Fear. Special Report, Iraq and its Neigbors Project, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007. Amnesty International. "Millions in Flight: The Iraqi Refugee Crisis." Amnesty International, 2007. Amnesty International. Rhetoric and Reality: The Iraqi Refugee Crisis. London: Amnesty International Publications, 2008. Barnes, Anne Evans. Realizing protection space for Iraqi refugees: UNHCR in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Research paper, Policy Devlopment and Evaluation Service, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, : UNHCR, 2009. Bush, George W. "2002 State of the Union address." Washington. D.C., January 29, 2002. —. "2003 State of the Union address." Washington, D.C., January 28, 2003. —. "Outline for the Future of Iraq." Carlisle, PA, May 24, 2004. —. "The Future of Iraq." Washington, D.C., February 26, 2003. —. "Update in The War on Terror." Washington, D.C., September 7, 2003. Edwards, Steven. "World must aid Iraqi refugees: conference; Largest Mideast Exodus Since 's Creation, UN Says." National Post (Canada), July 27, 2007. Epstein, Ruthie. Promises to the Persecuted: The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2008. Human Rights First, New York: Human Rights First, 2009.

Executive Office of the President. "President Submits $74.7 Billion Supplemental Appropriations Request for Funding War on Terrorism." The White House [archives]. March 2003, 2003. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/pubpress/2003-06.pdf (accessed July 7, 2009). —. "President Submits Request for Funding War on Terror." The White House [archives]. September 17, 2003. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/pubpress/2003-37.pdf (accessed July 7, 2009). Fafo Norwegian Research Institute. Iraqis in Jordan: Their Number and Characteristics. Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Fafo Norwegian Research Institute, Fafo, 2007.

73 Fagen, Patricia Weiss. Iraqi Refugees: Seeking Stability in Syria and Jordan. Georgetown University; Institute for the Study of International Migration; Center for International and Regional Studies, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 2007. Fairweather, Jack. "Kuwait refuses haven to refugees fleeing Saddam." The Daily Telegraph, February 10, 2003. Frelick, Bill. The Silent Treatment: Fleeing Iraq, Surviving in Jordan. Refugee Policy Program, Human Rights Watch, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2006. Harper, Andrew. "Iraq's refugees: ignored and unwanted." International Review of the Red Cross (Cambridge Journals) 90, no. 869 (March 2008): 169-190. Human Rights Watch. "Iraq: From a Flood to a Trickle: Neighboring States Stop Iraqis Fleeing War and Persecution." 2007. International Crisis Group. Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Middle East Report No. 77. International Crisis Group, 2008. International Rescue Committee. Five Years Later, A Hidden Crisis: Report of the IRC Commission on Iraqi Refugees. IRC Commission on Iraqi Refugees, New York: International Rescue Committee, 2008. IRNA News Agency. "Iran ready to shelter Iraqi refugees in border camps, official says." IRNA News Agency, March 18, 2003. —. "UN stops repatriation of Iraqi refugees." IRNA News Agency, September 14, 2003. Keely, Charles B. "How Nation States Respond to Refugee Flows." International Migration Review (The Center for Migration Studies of New York) 30, no. 4 (1996): 1046-1066. Khalidi, Aziza. Iraqi Population Survey in Lebanon. Danish Refugee Council, , Lebanon: Danish Refugee Council, 2007. Kjaerum, Morten. "The Concept of Country of First Asylum." International Journal of Refugee Law (Oxford Journals) 4, no. 1 (January 1992): 514-530. Margesson, Rhoda, Andorra Bruno, and Jeremy M Sharp. Iraqi Refugees and Internally Diplaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis? Report for Congree, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009. NationMaster. "GDP (per capita) by country. Definition, graph and map." NationMaster - World Statistics, Country Comparisons. http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp_percap- economy-gdp-nominal-per-capita#source (accessed September 8, 2009). Neuffer, Elizabeth. "Confronting Iraq/Border Policy; Iran Preparing to Turn Back Iraqi War Refugees." Boston Globe, February 26, 2003. O'Donnell, Kelly, and Kathleen Newland. The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: The Need for Action. Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2008.

74 O'Donnell, Lynn. "Iran braces for influx of refugees as hostilities loom." The Irish Times, March 19, 2003: 13. Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State. "U.S. Government Reaches Record for Iraqi Refugee Admissions and Humanitarian Assistance in Fiscal Year 2008." U.S. Department of State. October 2, 2008. http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/oct/110578.htm (accessed October 8, 2009). Pejman, Peyman. "Iran sends Iraqis home to preach; U.S. wary of Shi'ite exiles being paid by center in Qom." The Washington Times, July 8, 2003: A17. Ridderbos, Katinka. Rot Here or Die There: Bleak Choices for Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon. Human Rights Watch, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007. Riverbend. Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog from Iraq. New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2005.

Romano, David. "Whose House is this Anyway? IDP and Refugee Return in Post-Saddam Iraq." Journal of Refugee Studies (Oxford University Press) 18, no. 4 (2005): 430-453. Rosen, Nir, and Kristele Younes. Egypt: Respond to the needs of Iraqi refugees. Refugees International, Washington, D.C.: Refugees International, 2007. Sauerbrey, Ellen. "Iraqi Volunteers; Iraqi Refugees: What is America's Obligation?" Washington, D.C., March 26, 2007. Simon, Steven. Won't You Be My Neighbor: Syria, Iraq and the Changing Strategic Context in the Middle East. Working Paper, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009. The Minister of Interior. "Decision No. 1350 of 15 August 1984." Interior Ministry, Syrian Arab Republic, 1984. The White House. "President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." The White House [Archives]. May 1, 2003. http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html (accessed July 3, 2009). UN News Centre. "Turkey: UN agency 'deeply regrets' deporation of Iraqi refugee." United Nations News Service. March 13, 2007. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21842&Cr1# (accessed September 30, 2009). UNHCR. "Briefing note: UNHCR fears for safety of fleeing Iraqis as Syrian visa restrictions bite." Geneva, September 11, 2007. UNHCR. Iraq Situation Update - 4th January 2008. Update, Iraq Support Unit, United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees, UNHCR, 2008. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Flash Appeal for the Humanitarian Requirements of the Iraq Crisis - Six-month response. Flash Appeal, Geneva: UNOCHA, 2003.

75 US Department of State. "Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2007: Report to The Congress." Washington, D.C., 2007. —. State Sponsors of Terrorism. http://state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (accessed October 11, 2009). USAID. "USAID Speeches: Briefing on Humanitarian Assistance to Iraqis in the Event of War - 02/25/03." U.S. Agency for International Development. February 25, 2003. http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2003/sp030225.html (accessed June 8, 2009). —. "USAID Speeches: Press Briefing - 02/24/03." U.S. Agency for International Development. February 24, 2003. http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2003/sp030224.html (accessed June 8, 2009). —. "USAID: Assistance for Iraq - USAID Administrator Andrew S. Natsios Briefing at U.S. State Department." U.S. Agency for International Development. March 25, 2003. http://usaid.gov/iraq/vid_032503_2b.html (accessed June 8, 2009). Verma, Sonia. "Turkey planning to avoid repeat of '91 refugee crisis." Toronto Star, March 27, 2003. Yacoubian, Mona. Syria's Relations with Iraq. USIPeace Briefing, Syria Working Group, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007. Zaiotti, Ruben. "Dealing with non-Palestinian Refugees in the MIddle East: Policies and Practices in an Uncertain Environment." International Journal of Refugee Law (Oxford University Press) 18, no. 2 (2006): 333-353.

76 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Blake A. Draper received his Bachelors degree in International Affairs from the Florida State University in 2007 and continued studies there to earn a Master of Arts in International Affairs in December 2009. Blake has conducted graduate research on Qutbian Islamism and the democracy protection mechanisms of the Organization of American States. Blake studies Arabic and has an interest in the ongoing plight of within the Palestinian Territories and living as refugees around the world. Blake is passionate about the importance of law in society, particularly the regime of rights-based international law that developed in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Blake worked at the Claude Pepper Center for Intercultural Dialogue in Tallahassee, Florida as a researcher and developer of programs fostering intercultural dialogue. He has also worked in various positions supporting public education in Florida and Wisconsin.

77