Canadian Military History

Volume 18 | Issue 3 Article 7

3-27-2015 Panjwayi Alamo The efeD nce of Strongpoint Mushan Sean M. Maloney

Recommended Citation Sean M. Maloney (2009) "Panjwayi Alamo The efeD nce of Strongpoint Mushan," Canadian Military History: Vol. 18: Iss. 3, Article 7. Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss3/7

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Sean M. Maloney

hroughout 2008, a small band of The enemy needed to facilitate Canadians living and working Abstract: The future of the movement of enemy personnel, T rests in the country’s ability to field alongside soldiers of the Afghan supplies and weapons from Baram effective national security forces. National Army (ANA) occupied an Canada has played a significant role in Cha–Helmand Valley–Maywand into isolated outpost in mentoring the Afghan National Army Panjwayi. Once in Panjwayi, there are designated Strongpoint Mushan. (ANA) since 2003. By 2008, the ANA other routes that lead into both the Once the pivotal leg of an ambitious was operating in battalion strength southwest suburbs of City in . Strongpoint security and development plan, and to the “rocket box” northwest of Mushan was a vital position that Strongpoint Mushan quickly became interfered with enemy activity in Kandahar Air Field where 107 mm an orphan as priorities changed, the region and the men from the rockets are fired at this vital ISAF the plan shifted, and the weight of Operational Mentoring and Liaison logistics and support facility. This available friendly forces moved to Team and their Afghan counterparts route is also one of several used by held that ground in the face of vast the eastern part of the district. At the amounts of firepower directed at their those engaged in the transport of same time, abandoning Strongpoint positions. narcotics to Pakistan. A strongpoint Mushan after such a lengthy at Mushan is extremely inconvenient occupation would not only result in for the , the Hezb-e-Islami a Taliban propaganda victory, but at a map, the embattled triangular Gulbuddin (HiG) and other anti- would also remove the only coalition Zharey district lies south of Ring government and criminal elements. presence in that part of Panjwayi, a Road South (), the main In 2006, Mushan was quiet as the presence that was aggravating the International Security Assistance battles raged in Taliban leadership in its attempts to Force (ISAF) service route to the Pashmul and Sperwan Ghar. It was challenge Canada and Afghanistan forces fighting in widely believed that the “police” for control of the vital districts and the primary commerce artery in presence in Mushan at that time was west of Kandahar City. There was and through Afghanistan. Panjwayi really a militia belonging to elements no good solution to this dilemma, district, also triangular in shape, lies in the provincial power structure that so the position was kept manned to the south of Zharey district, with had some relationship to the narcotics and resupplied in an increasingly the separating the trade. Mushan was important to them dangerous environment, even when two. The forbidding Registan Desert as product could not move along it was cut off on the ground. This is is directly south of Panjwayi district, Ring Road South or through Zharey the story of the Canadian soldiers of with the Dowry River separating district because of the fighting that the Operational Mentor and Liaison the two. The tapered western point raged there throughout the year. Teams (OMLT) and the Afghan of Panjwayi district marks the In mid-2007, soldiers they worked with in the confluence of the Arghandab and (TFK) formulated a plan to construct a defence of Strongpoint Mushan.1 Dowry rivers – it is also the meeting road from Panjwayi town to Mushan, place of Zharey, Panjwayi, and the and then another from Mushan to Band-e Timor communities from Ring Road South. In general the Why Mushan? . Maywand leads to idea was to facilitate commerce and the Helmand river valley, and routes security in this extremely fertile ushan is geographically from that region branch to Baram Cha district. Mushan was the pivot for this Mimportant to coalition efforts in Pakistan (see map on next page). project and its enhanced stature in west of Kandahar City. Looking the plan resulted in the construction

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of better defensive facilities there. to mount costly ground resupply collided in the fight over Mushan, In time, Afghan National Police operations. There were no fewer with the Canadian soldiers from the replaced the local “police,” the than 14 IED attacks directed against OMLT and the Afghan soldiers from defensive works were designated a Canadian vehicles during this period. the Kandaks caught in the middle. “police sub-station” and a National Eventually, the decision was made to Mushan had to hold. Directorate of Security detachment cease ground resupply and a variety moved in. This in turn increased of aerial solutions were explored, enemy interest in Mushan which was including the use of contracted The OMLT and the Kandaks demonstrated by a significant rise in civilian Mi-8 helicopters. insurgent violence in the western part The situation also resulted in oalition soldiers have been used of Panjwayi district. Subsequently the the redeployment of forces away Cto train the emergent Afghan decision was made to designate the from some of the police sub-stations National Army since 2002. When police sub-station as a strongpoint along the Mushan-Panjwayi road Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and then deploy Afghan National which added to the physical was the main coalition effort in Army troops to Mushan. and psychological isolation of Afghanistan, Embedded Training In early 2008, Strongpoint Strongpoint Mushan. There were Teams (ETTs) were the primary Mushan was one of a line of police higher level considerations. The connection point between the ANA sub-stations and strongpoints Canadian government was a minority and the coalition forces at the tactical along the Panjwayi-Mushan road. government anticipating an election level. As NATO ISAF gradually Enemy forces mounted a campaign campaign some time in 2008 in which supplanted OEF and more non-North against this chain of facilities, which the costly commitment to Afghanistan American countries joined the effort, escalated throughout the spring would undoubtedly be an issue. Any new terminology emerged – the of 2008. Mechanized forces had to enemy analysis of Canadian media Operational Mentor and Liaison be used to resupply and replace would have concluded that casualties Team or OMLT. personnel along this chain which inflicted against Canadian forces The ETTs were similar to Vietnam- in turn attracted enemy Improvised would have a strategic effect on era Special Forces A-Teams working Explosives Device (IED) cells. The Canada’s commitment to a combat with non-professional indigenous battle along the Panjwayi-Mushan role. At the same time, Canadian forces. Indeed, the burden of ETT road nearly became a sub-campaign and Afghan forces could not retreat work initially fell on the 19th and 20th unto itself partly because the absence from Mushan for operational and Special Forces Groups in the early of Canadian helicopters forced TFK psychological reasons. These factors days of the war. As the ANA emerged

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as an institution, the ETTs shifted to 2007 to handle ANA operations in were three infantry kandaks 1/1, 1/2 a more conventional posture as the the province. 1/205 Brigade’s kandaks and 1/3, a combat support kandak intent was to create a professional varied in number, however, and it (4/1) and a combat service support army to replace the Special Forces- would be a mistake to assume that kandak (5/1). For transport, each backed militias. A US National Guard 1/205 Brigade had the same level kandak had a varying number of Ford brigade took over this mission from of stability that a Canadian brigade Ranger pickup trucks, Hummers the special forces by 2004. The NATO- has. In 2006, it wavered between armed with 12.7 mm machine guns, led OMLTs were originally supposed one and three kandaks. At that time and International 7-ton trucks. Paper to supplement the OEF ETTs and the Canadian OMLT was capable of organizational charts are, however, provide mentoring at brigade and mentoring a single kandak. deceiving when dealing with Afghan Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2009 Mike by Map drawn higher levels, but as NATO took T h e O M LT r e q u i r e m e n t s units. In general, not all three infantry greater control of the coalition effort, increased dramatically in 2007, to kandaks were deployed at once. the NATO OMLTs increasingly the point where nearly an entire Some were undergoing refit, others handled tasks previously done by Canadian infantry battalion was had personnel on leave. There were the ETTs. Confusingly, ETTs and required to reorganize into OMLTs always a percentage of personnel OMLTs shared the same battlespace to mentor the various components of absent without leave for reasons throughout Afghanistan. 1/205 Brigade. 3rd Battalion, Princess that cannot always be attributed to Canada’s involvement with Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, shirking of duty. Local conditions mentoring at the tactical level dates an organization whose soldiers meant that it could take days for back to 2003-4 when a Canadian ETT and officers had on average two soldiers on leave just to get home. worked with ANA units in Kabul. At tours in Afghanistan, was selected. The CS and CSS kandaks at this that time, the Canadian ETT consisted 3 PPCLI was the first Canadian point were not fully manned nor of 15 personnel led by a major who infantry battalion to have any were the more specialized trades worked closely with a “kandak,” the contact with Afghans back in 2002. like engineers and logisticians fully ANA equivalent of a battalion. That Subsequently, “B” Company was trained. commitment evolved into significant the force protection company for Canadian involvement with the the Provincial Reconstruction Team Kabul Military Training Centre when it was first established in Introducing 1/1 Kandak and from 2003 to 2006, where Canadians 2005. In other words, these soldiers the Kandak 1/1/205 OMLT worked alongside American, French had experience working with Team 2 and British soldiers and their Afghan Afghans, and specifically Afghans counterparts to raise, train, and equip from Kandahar province, in non- he Kandak assigned to Zharey the kandaks that would form the traditional situations. Tdistrict in the spring and manoeuvre forces of the ANA. In 2008, 1/205 Brigade consisted summer of 2008 was 1/1 Kandak, For a variety of reasons related of five kandaks totalling, on a good commanded by Colonel Anwar. to the deterioration of the situation day, around 2,900 personnel. There 1/1 had three infantry companies, in Kandahar province, Canada committed more resources to the expansion of OMLTs in the fall of 2006. By this time 205 ANA Corps was stood up and the kandaks assigned to operations in Regional Command South came under its control. 1st Brigade of 205 Corps, or 1/205 Brigade, was established by

Brigadier-General Gul Aqa Nibi, commander of 205 Corp (Kandak 2-1- 205) Afghan National Army, gives an interview to Canadian reporters after the Transfer of Command Authority Ceremony held at Joint Task Force Afghanistan HQ, Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, 11 May 2008.

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A Canadian soldier assigned to the OMLT (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team) on sentry duty at a strongpoint operated jointly by Canadian and Afghan soldiers.

each of about 70 men; a weapons were generally weak. They suffered it worked with a Dutch OMLT and company of 188 personnel divided from poor French training in Kabul an American ETT. While in Oruzgan, into four platoons; a headquarters and some were appointed because of 1/1 focused on becoming proficient and headquarters company and a political or tribal relationships. The at platoon-level operations. Two combat service support company of OMLT constantly strove to present to companies of 1/1 were deployed to around 70 men. 1/1 and its support the Afghans a national outlook. That retake the Centre in companies were based out of Forward said, an estimated 60 percent of 1/1 an action that took place in 2007. This Operating Base (FOB) Masum’Ghar, was Pashtun, and Uzbeks dominated required what was euphemistically with two companies deployed to the other 40 percent. Dari was the called “heavy mentoring” by the FOB Sperwan Ghar and another language of choice, with Pashtun ETT and the Dutch OMLT. It was not to Strongpoint Mushan. Three of used informally. Notably, the NCOs proficient at independent kandak- the weapons company platoons publicly declared that “We are one level operations when it re-deployed occupied strongpoints along the Army” and generally did not engage to Kandahar in November 2007. 1/1 Panjwayi-Mushan road. 1/1 Kandak’s in divisive ethnicity issues. entered the line in Panjwayi district leadership included a tactically 1 / 1 K a n d a k w a s f a i r l y in late February 2008. and politically proficient executive experienced. It was formed in Kabul The Canadian OMLT paralleled officer who kept things together. back in 2002 where it initially acted the kandak structure. Kandak 1/1/205 1/1 Kandak’s strength lay in its non- as part of President Hamid Karzai’s OMLT Team, as it was formally commissioned officers (NCOs) and protection force. 1/1 spent a lot known, was commanded initially by their regimental sergeant-major of time projecting from Kabul to Major Mark Campbell (until he was (RSM). The operations sergeant and provinces in Regional Command East critically wounded in June and then company sergeants-major were rated when a surge was required. In 2005 it replaced by Major David Proctor) and as strong. Their officers, however, was sent to Oruzgan province, where consisted of 26 Canadian soldiers.

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Right: A Canadian sergeant of the Operation Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) (right) comes back from an operation with Canadian and Afghan soldiers. Below right: An OMLT RG-31 Nyala light armoured vehicle parks in front of a line of Afghan National Army Ford Ranger trucks mounting 12.7 mm machine guns at a leaguer near the village of Nakhonay, in the Panjawai district.

Sixteen of these were the company AR2008-Z140-10 Cpl Simon Duchesne, CFJIC by Photo mentors, with each team consisting of four men and an RG-31 Nyala armoured vehicle: their callsigns were

CFJIC AR2008-Z100-1 CFJIC 71A through 71D. The OMLT also had a five-man command post with an RG-31 armoured patrol vehicle and an eight-wheeled Bison, callsign 71. There were three specialized mentors (logistics, medical, and operations) and a sergeant-major mentor. Each company team consisted of a captain, a warrant officer, and two corporals or privates. However, the leave plan and field injuries meant that on many occasions the four-man Photo by MCpl Karl McKay, CFJIC AR2008-K119-10 CFJIC McKay, MCpl Karl by Photo teams could be reduced to one or two men. Similarly, not all of the vehicles were operational as the OMLT had no integral electrical and mechanical engineering support and could not always draw on other Chest rigs predominated instead of The Afghan soldiers were Canadian resources, especially if 1/1 traditional webbing. extremely polite and respectful of Kandak was operating away from Culturally, the Afghan troops elders. They understood “place”and the Canadian battlegroup. In effect, were uneducated reflecting what rank, and tended to be non- a skeletal Canadian light infantry had happened to the country over confrontational. They would go company mentored a motorized the past 20 years. The mentors noted out of their way not to humiliate Afghan kandak that was operating problems with learning, problem guests in any way, as hospitality in a static role. solving, and abstract thinking. was a cornerstone of not only the Working with Afghan soldiers The Afghan soldiers had difficulty Pashtunwali code, but of Afghan was an eye-opening experience to conceptualizing second and third society generally. Their faith was an Canadian soldiers trained in the order effects, but more importantly integral aspect of their daily lives, context of Western culture and a many had trouble associating ground to the point where it could interfere European-based military system. with its depiction on a map. Math with operations. Soldiers would pray The ANA had uniforms, most of skills were limited. “The planning collectively before, after, and even which were various versions of cycle,” as one mentor explained, “was during patrols – a sentry would be the American woodland pattern moment to moment.” Again, this was deployed as the prayer mats were battledress, and wore different not surprising since the young men pulled out. coloured berets. All the men had emerged from a survivalist culture For the most part, the Afghan helmets and 95 percent had body where life expectancy was short and soldiers understood the basics and armour in the infantry companies the Taliban discouraged the study of they could work as a team. The main though bravado discouraged them anything other than the Koran. problems lay in planning, combat from wearing the protective gear. service support, and their tendency

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This picture, taken from a Canadian CH-47 Chinook and facing west, shows the confluence of the Arghandab and Dowry Rivers where the Reg Desert, Maywand district, Zharey District, and western Panjwayi District meet. Mushan is indicated by an arrow.

to be reactive. The danger in any resistance. By the end of March 1/1 and pass the information back to OMLT was that the mentors would Kandak had a company in Mushan, the CIMIC teams at the Provincial take over the problem-solving tasks another in and around Panjwayi town Reconstruction Team. and the teams had to be vigilant in and bazaar, and another deployed passing on this responsibility to the up at a district centre in . The Afghan leaders. Clearly, there was no kandak and its mentors initiated Mushan: Environs, impetus to improve if the Canadians a patrolling programme along the Occupants, and Initial did everything for them. The Afghan Panjwayi-Mushan road, but with Operations NCOs did lead by example and that the lack of police in these locations, was considered to be a major positive the best the teams could provide he strongpoint itself is located factor. was a temporary day-time presence. Ttwo kilometres east of Mushan The war around Mushan in early Another task was to provide village, next to the unpaved road. 2008 revolved around efforts to affect overwatch security to the Panjwayi- The Mushan Bazaar is approximately a relief-in-place (RIP) of the forces Mushan road paving project that 300 metres northwest of the position. stationed in Mushan. The outgoing had just started near Panjwayi town. On market days the bazaar, which OMLT and ANA company from On occasion, coalition operations is the economic centre for the area, another kandak was replaced with damaged property in the battle area. swells to 400 people. Just south of a new rotation in early March. This As the kandak and the OMLT had no the bazaar is a building that used to was a complex operation involving integral Civil-Military Cooperation be used as a clinic. A small Kutchi3 a strong mechanized force that (CIMIC) capability, they also sent out camp is situated to the northeast. encountered significant enemy assessment patrols to note damage For the most part, the terrain is flat

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and consists of traditional Afghan the insurgent activities through Key generally apathetic but at the same compound complexes with high mud Leader Engagements (KLEs) and by time expressed positive sentiments walls, grape growing trenches, grape casual contact with the population. about the ANA’s presence. Whoever drying huts, and walled growing The Afghan soldiers, being more was in charge, or appeared to be in areas for the crops. conversant with local culture than charge, they would back. They were Strongpoint Mushan is 100 Canadians, had insight into the caught between the insurgents and Photo taken by author by taken Photo metres by 150 metres square. The situation that an array of technical the Afghan government and in effect main wall is made from Hescobastion collection means could not match. determined that in Mushan it was too and has two observation towers: For example, around 7 March, an risky to take a position. It was easier one to the north, the other south. ANA company commander held to do nothing and just carry on with There are three run-up positions an impromptu shura at the bazaar. day-to-day life. used by Ford Ranger vehicles with The local merchants told him that Further patrolling and KLEs DsHkA and PKM machine guns the enemy would mount significant started to flesh out information about mounted on them. A pit with a 60 operations against the strongpoint the enemy. There was a spotter or mm mortar occupies the centre. in a month’s time. The merchants facilitator close to the strongpoint, It has no air conditioning and is were upset by this development and an estimated 12-15 insurgents infested with sand fleas and ugly and asked the Taliban to stay away within Mushan itself. Information camel spiders. The ANA and the from Mushan. This information was suggested that the regular patrolling OMLT lived in modular tents, but confirmed by a follow-up patrol. The had a deterrent effect on this cell’s there were several bunkers which remains of two failed 107 mm rocket operations, that they were somewhat consisted of a layer of sandbags, launches, discovered on separate frustrated, and wanted help. They one man high. Concertina wire patrols, pointed towards a higher were particularly concerned about surrounded the perimeter, backed up probability of future enemy action. the coalition presence at the bazaar with Claymore area defence weapons. The locals within the three to for unknown reasons. A week ANA strength varied between 62 and four kilometre security “bubble” later, two men who were 68, amounting to two platoons. The around the strongpoint were evidently monitoring the

ANA company at Mushan had a mix of PKM, DshKa, KpV 14.7 mm, and .50 cal machine guns augmented with RPG-7 rocket launchers. The first OMLT team into Mushan4 was 71B, led by Captain Craig Robertson, and included Warrant Officer Rob Crane, Corporal “Rusty” Myroniuk, and Corporal Shaun Copeland. Generally, the Canadian OMLT team had three to four personnel stationed at Mushan. The OMLT personnel had their personal weapons, plus a Carl Gustav rocket launcher and M203 grenade launcher attachments for their weapons. For the most part, the platoons at Mushan ranged out three to four kilometres from the strongpoint. These “framework” patrols in and around Mushan and the bazaar A US Army OH-58D Kiowa Warrior in Afghanistan. produced significant information on

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Canadian soldiers of the OMLT and Afghan National Army soldiers walk through a poppy field during an operation in the Panjwayi district, Afghanistan, 1 May 2008.

movements of a patrol were detained. Cavalry (“The Banshees”) arrived There was, however, a striking ISTAR reports about enemy interest on the scene. Using the splash of the difference in the professionalism of in Strongpoint Mushan’s activities grenades as a marker, the helicopters the two forces. On one joint patrol, started to pick up in the area around made six runs on the target firing .50 the ANA were appalled by the mid-March. cal machine guns and rocket pods police behaviour towards women 71B and the 3rd Company soldiers as the ANA kept the enemy pinned and lack of respect for property. The then had a contact on 25 March three down. Enemy firing ceased and, discussion between the two forces kilometres south of the strongpoint. because the ANA patrol was critically became quite vocal on one occasion. Five insurgents armed with a PKM short of ammunition, it withdrew At the beginning of April, the machine gun engaged the patrol while covered by an MQ-1 Predator coalition mounted Operation Toor from a compound. When the ANA UAV. One suspected insurgent was Azadi along Route Fosters. Toor deployed and fired back, the enemy apprehended by a hastily-established Azadi was designed to resupply withdrew. The Afghans caught a man vehicle check point and three enemy all of the police sub-stations and who had enemy logistics documents were seen to flee from the engagement strongpoints and conduct a RIP in his possession. The following day, in the direction of a Kutchi camp for individuals and sub-units. 3rd another ANA patrol and 71B were located near the Reg desert. Follow Company was supposed to be part of engaged by what was believed to up KLEs suggested that the locals this RIP. 71B and the ANA extended be ten insurgents firing RPGs and were concerned about the unusual patrols to the east of Mushan as PKMs from behind walls and a grape- increase in insurgent activity around part of this effort. Unfortunately, as drying hut. During the 40-minute Mushan. vehicle casualties mounted from IED firefight, 71B fired M203 grenade Notably, the ANA started to bring attacks, the force halted to the east launchers at the hut as a pair of Afghan National Police (ANP) along less than half way to Mushan. On 3 Photo taken by author by taken Photo OH-58Ds from Company “B” 2-17 with them during search operations, April, the link up between the forces

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occurred and 71A, consisting of civilian contractor-flown Mi-8 HIP the bazaar, enemy forces from Captain Matt Aggus, Warrant Officer helicopters, to resupply the combat across the river in Zharey started to John McNabb and Master Corporal outposts and strongpoints. One engage from a distance. The mentors Trevor Saina replaced 71B, while 3rd “Jingle Air” HIP dropped its load in a recommended that the patrol plan Company RIP’d with 1st Company. panic when confronted with a volley include those areas, but the ANA The team and its Afghan of RPGs on approach to another company commander was reluctant counterparts mounted daily combat outpost. The enemy set an to do so without air support so for framework patrols and compound ambush which deterred recovery the rest of April patrols focused on searches throughout April. of the supplies, and then raided the the bazaar and areas west of the town. Intelligence revealed that the enemy pallet and exploited the contents of In May, the 71A team, consisting was annoyed at the continued the mail bag for PSYOPS purposes of Aggus, McNabb, Saina and presence of the force and planned against the Canadians manning the Corporal Dan Meeking, a medic who to bring a mortar into the area but outpost. was attached from the Police OMLT, their logistics system was having After this debacle, aerial resupply replaced 71B at Mushan during problems deploying the weapon and of the strongpoints along FOSTERS Operation Toor Azadi II. (Corporal Photo by Cpl Simon Duchesne, CFJIC AR2008-Z140-07 Cpl Simon Duchesne, CFJIC by Photo its ammunition. was limited to the “emergency AMR” Tyler Latta arrived back from leave Resupply was a significant – a US Army UH-60 from Task Force later on and Meeking rotated out). problem for the men occupying Eagle Assault, escorted by a pair of There was an immediate spike in Strongpoint Mushan. The American OH-58D Kiowa Warriors from The reports of unarmed enemy personnel and British transport helicopters Banshees (if AH-64 Apaches were observing this RIP operation, but supporting operations in Regional unavailable as was usually the case), again there was little enemy activity Command (South) would not fly in would land at the Mushan helicopter with the exception of an IED attack to Mushan unless they had AH-64 landing site, the crew chief would against a patrol from “B” Company, 2 Apache support. The operational kick out boxes of ammo, and the PPCLI, an ANA section, and mentors tempo in RC(S) in the spring and Blackhawk would immediately from 71A. This was a particularly summer of 2008 meant that there l i f t off covered by the gruesome attack in which the enemy were few AH-64s available for used a ten-year-old boy to carry a mundane resupply task. The the explosives. This child was Helicopter Landing pushed ahead by an Site at older man in the direction of the patrol, and then remotely detonated. The attack killed an ANA o r b i t i n g soldier and wounded two Canadians OH‑58Ds. and one Afghan.5 When OMLT By this time preparations for personnel had their Operation Nolai was in progress. This mid-tour leave, they was a 2 PPCLI battlegroup operation had to be escorted by a in Zharey district which was designed foot patrol east to the police to move south from Ring Road sub-station at Talukan. This South towards Mushan. The Mushan became a staple of life at force was to play a supporting role Mushan was exposed and subject Mushan when 71B came back in to by providing a feint to the south. to dust clouds, which were hard replace 71A in mid-April. The 71B On 26 May, however, a number of on helicopter engines. Emergency team instituted night patrolling in the insurgents shot at an ANA patrol resupply became the order of the day, area in order to increase the ANA’s (accompanied by Warrant Officer with food, water and ammo kicked proficiency at that art. This produced John McNabb) from a compound. out the doors of helicopters when results in the ISTAR system, so more The Afghans mounted a clearance they were available. Consideration and more patrols were mounted as operation with “minimal prompting” was given to using C-130 Hercules part of a “manouvre to collect” from the multi-national pool to programme designed to flesh Contracted Mi-8s and Mi-17s flown by conduct parachute resupply out the size and intentions of pilots from the former Soviet Union drops using GPS-guided pallets, the enemy apparatus in and flew resupply missions to Strongpoint but instead the decision was around Mushan. As patrolling Mushan Photo taken by author by taken Photo made to use “Jingle Air,” became more regular around

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and their leadership retained a “cool in with an M-72 LAW and a M203 The Sperwan Ghar M-777s fired demeanour” during the engagement. grenade launcher. An enemy sniper several smoke missions to screen The enemy fled north into Zharey then started to pick away at the the compound from any potential with “B” Company supported by Afghans who had gone to ground in observers or mortar fire controllers. an MQ-1 Predator in close pursuit. a nearby wadi. The two M-777 guns Subsequently an insurgent Within two days, the insurgents from “C” Troop, “B” Battery, 1 RCHA commander told the shopkeepers at attacked the strongpoint with small under the command of Lieutenant the Mushan bazaar to close up and go arms fire from the direction of the old Candice Dunn (who later became home because “the war has started.” clinic. known as “The Angel of Death” by The situation around Mushan the some of the soldiers her troop was deteriorated again on 31 May. Between supporting) fired smoke to screen The Defence of 15 and 20 insurgents split between the ANA as they broke contact, leap- Strongpoint Mushan four compounds ambushed a 20-man frogging back in good order in two Afghan patrol and three Canadian groups. ISTAR reports indicated that he number of engagements mentors in a three-sided ambush, a Taliban cell leader and five other Tfrom the north bank of the river while the strongpoint simultaneously insurgents were killed during the continued to mount in early June. In received harassing sniper fire. The course of these engagements. They almost every case a patrol that was ANA patrol endured ten minutes of were attempting their own version involved in a “Troops in Contact” small arms and RPG fire before the of a Key Leader Engagement at the (TIC) event was mortared once it patrol sergeant organized his PKM time the patrol appeared. returned to the strongpoint. None of machine guns to respond during a The next day, several mortar these rounds initially made their way lull in the fire. The mentors joined rounds landed near the strongpoint. into the compound, but incoming Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2009 Mike by Map drawn

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rounds were seen to bracket it 100 the hut and a 1000-pound bomb on metres in each direction. This was an the old clinic. These strikes reduced indicator that a trained enemy mortar both structures to six-foot piles of fire controller was present in the area. rubble. The M-777s from Sperwan Between 8 and 10 June, ISTAR Ghar fired an additional five 155 mm reports indicated that the enemy rounds to catch the enemy as they was annoyed at what they perceived withdrew. to be the pro-government tilt of the The first platoon from the bazaar population in Mushan and intended then swept south to link up with to go into the bazaar and intimidate the second platoon at the old clinic, the merchants. One theory was where they found a lot of casings and that the intended second order some salvage, but no bodies. Low on effect was to have merchants stop ammo the decision was made to head selling fresh food to the ANA in the back to the strongpoint and call in a strongpoint in order to aggravate casualty evacuation flight. Two Ford the supply situation. A local source Rangers loaded with ammo and led complained to the Joint District by Sergeant Major Bashir sortied out Coordination Centre in Panjwayi to the bazaar to act as a reserve as about the intimidation. the withdrawal took place. The F-15s As a result of this information, the remained overhead as long as they company in the strongpoint surged could. two platoons into Mushan Bazaar ISTAR then reported that the as a show of force to demonstrate to enemy was attempting to hide its the population that the government dead bodies and assorted body would not be intimidated. As the parts in culverts so they could deny two cut-off groups deployed (see the coalition forces a battle damage map) they came under enemy fire. estimate. These remains were to be One platoon, moving in behind the retrieved later. The enemy estimated bazaar, took rounds from a grape it sustained 15 killed in this action. hut to the west, while the second As the situation heated up platoon received small arms and RPG throughout June, a ground resupply fire from positions west of the old operation named ROOM SERVICE clinic. A Canadian Sperwer Tactical was spun up by an armoured combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) team from “B” Squadron, The Lord was orbiting the battle, and a pair of Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians) US Air Force F-15s were available, but led by Major Chris Adams. This there were problems in employing particular “river run” brought in an the firepower because of the close additional mentor and five more ANA proximity of the engaged forces. The soldiers, just in time for Operation firefights stalemated after about 30 NOLAI. The Mushan force’s role in minutes, and then the strongpoint NOLAI was to cross the river with started taking fire. The Afghans in a platoon and two mentors and then the run-up position machine guns distract enemy forces further north were able to identify and engage one right before they were attacked by of the compounds where the enemy an infantry company from 2 PPCLI Photos from the top: was shooting from, as did the platoon and an infantry company from near the bazaar. The enemy then Orders group prior to Operation NO LAI another Kandak, all supported by the for 1st Company, 1 Kandak. started to exfiltrate from the position Strathcona’s Leopard 2A6M tanks. opposite the bazaar. Warrant Officer Captain Matt Aggus confers with his The Mushan force was ordered to not Afghan counterpart during a cordon and get decisively engaged. John McNabb, who was not trained as search operation. a forward air controller, contacted the As the Afghans and Canadians

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2009 Mike by Map drawn Corporal Tyler Latta on patrol. F-15s. The orbiting fighter-bombers crossed the river bed into Zharey dropped two 500-pound bombs on Warrant Officer Johnny McNabb and district on the morning of 14 June, an Jack. Photos courtesy of Tyler Latta & John McNabb Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009 57 11

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Afghan soldier spotted an insurgent with an RPG in a compound. As the platoon took up firing positions, the enemy unleashed a high volume of small arms fire against the coalition forces from a grape field to the west. An OH-58D from The Banshees, already on station, swept up from the Photo taken by author by taken Photo river bed, but the communications between the ground forces and the helicopters were not working. Corporal Tyler Latta jumped up onto a wall and pointed in the direction of the enemy so the Banshees could go to work and .50 cal machine gun fire raked the grape field. Then between 8 and 10 insurgents opened up from covered positions to the north in a tree line. The Afghans returned fire that was inaccurate but voluminous. Pumped on adrenalin, the RPG gunners fired too high, arching their rockets to no effect. One of the other mentors, Corporal Tyler Latta, fired M203 grenade rounds into the northern tree line to mark the target, while ISTAR reports confirmed that a force of between 10 to 15 Taliban were in the area. The OH-58D made multiple gun runs on the tree line until it had

Photo by Cpl David Cribb, CFJIC IS2008-9182 Cribb, CFJIC Cpl David by Photo expended its ammunition. The snub- nosed rocket pod was employed until it too was out of rockets. This engagement lasted 15 minutes. A Canadian TUAV then spotted an insurgent lugging an 82 mm recoilless rifle heading north. An orbiting MQ-9 Reaper subsequently ended this threat by dropping a 500-pound bomb. The fire from the tree line dropped off and the Afghans and their mentors moved in, finding seven dead enemy. Photo courtesy Latta and McNabb Photo Then two elders approached, but some of the Afghans believed that they were being used to plant false Top: Operation ROOM SERVICE was the periodic Mushan resupply task executed by information or worse trying to suck the Strathcona’s tank squadron and other mechanized forces. the platoon into an ambush in the Middle: A newly-acquired Canadian Forces Leopard 2 main battle tank, moves through compound complex to the northwest. a forward operating base in , Southern Afghanistan, 25 October 2008. The As the OH-58D was low on fuel, it tanks are helping to provide support and protection for the battle group. headed home. Once the helicopter 1st Company, 1st Kandak and it operational mentoring and liaison team on return to departed, five insurgents opened up FOB Masu’m Ghar. with small arms. The decision was

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made to move back to the river bed of proximity-fused high explosive and hold, so a request for fire from the rounds in the same area after he saw 1 RCHA M-777’s at Sperwan Ghar was three enemy moving in that area. submitted. This mission could not be An Afghan soldier then spotted a executed. With the Afghans running single insurgent and dispatched him low on ammo, McNabb and Latta with an RPG round. The fight was on decided to use their smoke grenades as a five-man insurgent group then LT2005-0526 CFJIC to cover a withdrawal across the river opened up on the platoon. Lieutenant bed, as an Afghan section sortied Dawa Jan, who had been trying out from Mushan to the south bank to calm the panicked interpreter, to assist. However, once the platoon ordered the platoon to move back was back at Strongpoint Mushan, to the south bank. As they moved three mortar rounds landed right across, they saw that the Kutchi camp on the southwest edge of the wire. on the south back was being packed Shrapnel hit an Afghan commander up and a trail of people were moving in the shoulder and Captain Hyatt to the west. This was not a good sign. was slightly wounded. The .50 cal An ISTAR asset reported that there and C-6 machine guns in the towers were several non-Kutchi present,

immediately opened up on the point some wearing black turbans, but courtesy Latta & McNabb Photo of origin using the “uneducated they appeared to be unarmed. As the guess” method. ISTAR reports enemy fire resumed from the north later estimated that 12 enemy were bank, Lieutenant Jan prepared to killed during the course of the day’s move the platoon east along the river operations, all on the north bank of when an Afghan soldier spotted men the river. with weapons on a wall paralleling On 15 June, a similar cross- the river on the south bank. The river operation was mounted from Sperwan Ghar M-777s fired a linear Mushan, but this time the entry smoke mission, followed by a high point was shifted 800 metres west. explosive mission onto the wall. Starting out at 0300 hours, the probe The platoon dashed across the river courtesy Latta & McNabb Photo ran into trouble immediately due to a bed to secure the position. The wall, navigation error which put them 200 however, was 25 feet high which metres further west in an area that forced the platoon to continue east had virtually no cover when the sun once more, which produced a repeat came up at around 0430 hours. ISTAR of the situation – the artillery fired reports indicated that the enemy “just smoke but then the enemy opened went nuts” and ordered local forces fire from the north bank. McNabb’s to observe and engage as rapidly as helmet was knocked off by an RPG possible. When this information was blast, while Latta sought out an relayed to the platoon, the interpreter extraction route. The guns fired a started to panic and started to urinate linear HE mission down the river courtesy Latta & McNabb Photo every five minutes. Some of the ANA bank in a bid to stop the fire. The soldiers started to panic too, which rounds “walked” down the north put McNabb and Latta in a bind. side of river and had a noticeable Photos from the top: Knowing that panic is contagious effect on the enemy’s aim. A Canadian Sperwer Tactical Unmanned and must be countered immediately, As the platoon finally made Aerial Vehicle ready for launch. McNabb and Latta decided to have its way back to the strongpoint, it OMLT 71A at the end of the Mushan the “C” Troop M-777’s drop some came under ineffective fire from the operations: MCpl Trevor Saina, WO John smoke to the north of their location. bazaar. The guns from Sperwan Ghar McNabb, MCpl Tyler Latta, Capt Matt Aggus, Cpl Craig White. ISTAR reports told the platoon that now had to shift fire since combat the enemy was worried about how outposts elsewhere along FOSTERS MCpl Tyler Latta and WO John McNabb at Strongpoint Mushan. close the smoke was to their position, were under attack. An orbiting MQ-1 so McNabb called in a fire mission Predator spotted four insurgents 500 “The guys.”

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rockets were fired from the west. The Canadian mentors and the ANA responded with a high volume of direct and indirect fire to ward off the attackers. During the course of the firefight, ISTAR reports indicated that the enemy wanted to generate casualties so that the coalition would respond with a MEDEVAC helicopter, which in turn was to be targeted for destruction. After this engagement, the enemy force in the Mushan area ran short of ammunition which slowed their operations for a time. The next day, an ANA patrol noted that women and children were evacuating the area west of the bazaar. This was an ominous sign. Twenty-four hours later on 28 June, RPG volleys, small arms and now an 82 mm recoilless rifle poured fire Photos taken by author by taken Photos onto the strongpoint. The Canadian mentors dragged out their Carl Gustav and fired back with 84 mm rocket-assisted projectiles. They also bombarded the attackers with the 60 mm mortar and emptied box after box of .50 cal ammunition as the Afghans moved the Ford Rangers into the run-ups and engaged with 12.7mm DshKa’s. On 29 June, a smaller volume of small arms fire was directed at the Mushan force from a pair of grape drying huts to the northwest. The ANA returned fire. The next day what appeared to be a coordinated small arms attack from the northwest and the south west was repelled. The situation quieted down until 4 July when an ANA patrol in the bazaar was Troops In Contact (TICs) – Each pin represents a contact with enemy forces. The shot at and the strongpoint mortared. top map shows the TICs for the OMLT in Panjwayi District, while the second shows The insurgents said “goodbye” to the TICs around Strongpoint Mushan for the same period. 1st Company and the 71A team with a devastating mortar attack which metres away from Mushan preparing contacts during Op NOLAI, however, wounded five ANA soldiers, and to fire RPGs. They were successfully left the company in Mushan low disabled the 60 mm mortar. One of engaged with a Hellfire missile. on most supplies. While awaiting the wounded suffered a serious brain Operation NOLAI disrupted resupply, the strongpoint and its injury, which was attended to by the enemy harassing fire that was occupants were engaged in almost Canadian medic, Master Corporal being directed at patrols near the daily gunfights throughout June. Ian Mothas. Almost all of the medical bazaar in addition to the distraction The insurgents then mounted a bold supplies were used up. The severely generated to support the 2 PPCLI attack on 22 June. Machine gun fire wounded Afghan soldier later died. company operation. The heavy raked the strongpoint, while RPG

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and small arms fire, coming from both metres from the mortar pit and its Mortar Games banks of the river, was inaccurate. ammo stash. Captain Lerch, using The ANA stood and fought back as his binoculars from one of the towers he Strathcona’s Leopards artillery was requested. Sergeant and covered by Corporal Duarte Tdeployed again on 5 July during Abdul Haq, seeing an Afghan soldier with a .50 cal machine gun, called Operation ROOM SERVICE 2 and fire his machine gun in a jerky and down corrections to Master Warrant fought their way to Mushan, resulting ineffective fashion, grabbed the Officer Rod Dearing and Corporal in multiple engagements along the PKM, ran up and fired the weapon, MacDonald, who were manning the Arghandab River. 2nd Company stunning and scattering part of the 60 mm mortar. Corporal John Prior and the 71B team took over from ambush force. Then, in what has fired the 25 mm from a LAV-III with 1st Company and 71A, who had to be the dumbest move in Taliban Master Corporal Todd Woods in the deployed into a “bubble” around military history, an insurgent armed other tower spotting. The next day the strongpoint in order to receive with an RPG ran onto the river bed the insurgents held a funeral for the column. 71B and 2nd Company directly in front of a Leopard 2 and their mortar expert and credited the were greeted with a mortar attack tried to engage the tank. Two tank “government mortar team” with the on 9 July, which produced two more commanders apparently argued kill. Several Afghan soldiers received Afghan casualties and took out the over who was going to take him out, wounds and were medevaced by communications equipment. In this so both fired simultaneously and UH-60s covered by Banshee OH- attack, five mortar rounds were vapourized the insurgent with 120 58Ds. The Afghans and the mentors fired from the vicinity of the clinic mm HEAT rounds before he could maintained their rigorous patrol and two hit inside the compound. fire his rocket launcher. schedule in the surrounding area. A subsequent fire destroyed the Meanwhile, back at Strongpoint Operation LEWE, a sweep by “B” accommodation tents and most of Mushan, Afghan National Army Company 2 PPCLI, was put together the strongpoint’s stores. The 71B patrols were engaged from Zharey to disrupt enemy activity and give commander, Captain Slade Lerch district any time they went near the strongpoint some breathing room. requested that a Joint Terminal Air the bazaar and the indirect fire Fighting patrols from 1st Company Controller (JTAC) and other assets attacks continued. From 7 to 26 and 71A, Weapons Company and be deployed to Strongpoint Mushan July, Strongpoint Mushan and its 71D, and “B” Company fanned out to deal with the mortars. occupants, now augmented to include west of Mushan, which resulted in On the return trip, the 71A team seven Canadian mentors, were several TICs but no mortars. and the ANA company was tucked engaged on 14 separate occasions At the end of July, 2nd Company into the “bubble of steel” provided with various combinations of small and the 71B team returned to Mushan by the tanks of the Operation ROOM arms fire, RPG attacks, and mortar on Operation ROOM SERVICE 3, SERVICE column which snaked fire. In one of these engagements, and Captain Aggus, Master Corporal its way back along the Arghandab the strongpoint took several mortar Saina and Corporal Latta returned. River towards Mas’um Ghar forward rounds, one of which landed two While the RIP and resupply was operating base. 71A’s ordeal was not over yet. The column was hit by enemy fire and Captain Matt Aggus dismounted with the Afghans to engage the ambushers as the Strathcona’s Leopard 2s returned fire with their 120 mm guns. The enemy fled. The column was hit again 600 metres further along but this time the enemy focused on the ANA’s soft- skinned Rangers. The enemy RPG

An Afghan soldier has decorated his RPG with flowers while he patrols through a AR2008-K074-024 CFJIC McKay, MCpl Karl by Photo marijuana field in the Panjwayi district, August 2008.

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A British RAF Chinook fires CHAFF against a detected threat before touching down at a 3 RCR battlegroup forward operating base, 22 October 2008.

the mortar base plate, and sight in the weapon. Other insurgents,

CFJIC IS2008-9139 CFJIC obviously more expendable than “the specialist,” were used to fire and reload the weapon while the specialist left the mortar position long before the counter-battery fire arrived. As the counter-battery fire improved and patrol programme expanded the security “bubble,” the enemy mortar specialist and his apprentices were forced to move in progress, the enemy was bold duds in the ground around the north of the Arghandab River. enough to engage the tank leaguer strongpoint and the ammunition was with seven rounds of ineffective determined to be of Iranian origin. mortar fire the first night. When The enemy now resorted to a new Relief In Place they tried it again the following tactic. A delegation of people arrived night, the mortar was engaged with at the Joint District Coordination fter its successful participation two 500-pound bombs from a pair Centre in Panjwayi town, and asked Ain another incursion into Zharey of US Marine Corps F-18s, while for a shura, which was granted. district, 1/1-205 Kandak and its insurgents manoeuvring to engage They petitioned the government to mentors were extracted from Mushan on the ground were discouraged from have the strongpoint and its forces and rotated back to Camp Hero doing so by 120 mm gun fire from the removed. They asserted that crops for refitting, training, and rest by Leopard 2 tanks. An estimated five and compounds were damaged by September 2008. Canadian engineers insurgents were killed. the various resupply operations and deployed to the FOB Mushan and laid Once ensconced in the strongpoint they demanded restitution for the “Rhino Snot” and Moby Matting to and the tanks had gone home with damage. The problem was that this improve the helipad. Canadian CH‑47 the 71A team, the new occupants delegation did not in fact represent Chinook helicopters escorted by CH- were subjected to a coordinated the people of Mushan at all and the 146 Griffons took over resupply small arms direct fire and a mortar Afghans identified one man as a and RIP missions. A company from attack, which resulted in two mortar relative of a known Taliban fighter. 2/2-205 “Strike” Kandak moved hits inside the compound and three When this approach did not into the FOB. Families started to casualties. On 26 July, 71B and an work, small arms attacks on the move back into the area at this time. ANA patrol were engaged by a strongpoint resumed on 14 August, Captain Sahim Ravatullah personally section of insurgents. Patience had followed by two more mortar attacks guaranteed that he and his men worn thin and “C” Troop’s M-777’s on 20 August. This time, an ISTAR would provide security to the area from Sperwan Ghar were called into system was able to identify the point during a shura held with the local action to deal with the ambush. As of origin of the mortar attacks and elders. Constant framework patrols if in retaliation, five mortar rounds the M-777’s from Sperwan Ghar demonstrated his resolve over a two- were fired at the strongpoint the next blanketed the position with 155 week “honeymoon” period. day, but this grouping was not as mm rounds in an effort to kill the By the end of October 2008, accurate as previous attacks. None of mortar teams. What emerged later relations between the local population the rounds landed anywhere near the was that an enemy mortar specialist and the new ANA company were compound. This attack was replicated was brought in to replace the one improving. The Taliban, noting that the following day, leading some to killed in a previous engagement. the bazaar was the nexus of this speculate that a new mortar team was This individual’s modus operandi improved relationship, established now in play. Patrols found numerous was different. He would establish a rival market three kilometres west

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of Mushan town with checkpoints elements of the OMLT in the summer of 2008 I interviewed the personnel to protect it and used intimidation End Game involved in the Mushan operations as patrols to demand that the locals they rotated out of the position. I would close the existing bazaar near the trongpoint Mushan was clearly especially like to thank Lieutenant- Colonel Dan Drew, Major Dave Proctor, FOB. Attendance at the regular bazaar a disruptive element to the S Master Warrant Officer Rod Dearing, dropped 75 percent over the course of enemy programme for Panjwayi and Warrant Officer Chuck Cote for one week but the ANA and the OMLT and Zharey districts as evidenced their insights into OMLT operations at this time. I would also like to thank responded by pushing out west of by the significant resources, varied Corporal Tyler Latta, Warrant Officer John the town. The Taliban’s response and escalatory methods, and scarce McNabb, and Captain Matt Aggus for was to resume harassing mortar fire expertise the insurgents employed in sharing their experiences with me. I also was briefed by the army aviators from directed against FOB Mushan in late their attempts to remove the coalition “Company “B,” 2-17 Cavalry on their role November and even brought in one presence. The willingness of the supporting Canadian and Afghan forces of their scarce 82 mm recoilless rifles. Afghan soldiers to continuously exert in Panjwayi district. I would also like to thank Lieutenant Candice Dunn and On 17 November three first round a presence in the area, even if it was “C” Troop, “B” Battery 1 RCHA. Major hits eventually landed inside the limited at times to a three-kilometer Steve Nolan, Captain Sean French, and FOB, killing two and wounding four security “bubble,” demonstrated to Warrant Officer Joe Doucette from the follow-on OMLT rotation, assisted me Afghan soldiers, while other mortars the population that the government with the events of late 2008. Note that were fired towards Zangabad and was there to stay, even while under certain control measures and intelligence collection assets have been blurred in IEDs were laid on the road to the east heavy contact over several days. The this narrative for operational security in order to discourage reinforcement. question of how to expand that bubble considerations. Some names have been Unlike the previous locations, the so that governance and development altered to avoid personal embarrassment. 2. The Canadian soldiers from 71A asked new mortars were emplaced by activities could expand was not me to note that they do not view their their teams inside houses and fired addressed during that time, given actions at Mushan as extraordinary in through holes cut in the roof. Clearly, the security situation. In the Afghan the context of what other elements of the OMLT were engaged in at the time in any aerial retaliation which resulted cultural context of the war, the sort of Zharey and Panjwayi districts throughout in destroyed buildings and dead obstinacy projected by the defenders 2008 and wanted to convey that this is but civilian “human shields” would of Strongpoint Mushan can have a one action in the course of their tour in Afghanistan. They took pains to express be exploited by the enemy and positive effect on the population – if to me their concerns about being labelled condemned by the Western media. the message is conveyed properly “self-aggrandizing” by others because ISTAR reports confirmed that this by both the defenders themselves their actions appeared in print and other actions did not. The full story of the was another professional team that with a PSYOPS team, with CIMIC OMLT and its other operations during had infiltrated from Pakistan. As quick impact projects, and by the that time will be told in a future narrative US Army UH-60s conducted the provincial and national governments so that all OMLT elements receive equal historical recognition for their efforts. MEDEVAC, Canadian M-777s and a via their methods. Sadly, this level of 3. The Kutchi are nomadic and can be found British 81 mm mortar team from 42 coordination does not yet exist within throughout Afghanistan. They tend to live in domed tents and keep camel, Commando worked with the OMLT the Afghan National Army structure sheep, and donkey herds in addition to and the ANA to suppress the new and they remain dependent on the various agrarian pursuits. enemy teams as best they could given coalition forces for such support. 4. At least from this particular rotation. 5. Those who observed this attack remain the new circumstances. As of February 2009, Strongpoint psychologically scarred by it. “M” Company, 3 RCR eventually Mushan continues to hold and surged into the area and captured provide a security presence to the three mortar tubes. One was still people at the western end of Panjwayi warm after being fired. After these district. operations, the bazaar near the FOB re-opened. In January 2009 the local Dr. Sean M. Maloney is the historical advisor to the Chief of the Land Staff. He has merchants told the ANA that they Notes travelled annually to Afghanistan since 2003 were not getting the same amount of to observe coalition operations. He is the business in the “Taliban bazaar” and author of several books including Enduring 1. A note on sources: The author was the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan preferred the previous arrangements present in the spring and summer of (Potomac Books, 2005) and Confronting where they could make real money. 2008 for the Route Fosters “duel” and the Chaos: A Rogue Historian Returns to observed it from several levels. During Afghanistan (Naval Institute Press, 2009). a research trip to the forward-deployed

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