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Panjwayi Alamo the Defence of Strongpoint Mushan Panjwayi Alamo the Defence of Strongpoint Mushan Canadian Military History Volume 18 | Issue 3 Article 7 3-27-2015 Panjwayi Alamo The efeD nce of Strongpoint Mushan Sean M. Maloney Recommended Citation Sean M. Maloney (2009) "Panjwayi Alamo The efeD nce of Strongpoint Mushan," Canadian Military History: Vol. 18: Iss. 3, Article 7. Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss3/7 This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : Panjwayi Alamo The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan Panjwayi Alamo The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan Sean M. Maloney hroughout 2008, a small band of The enemy needed to facilitate Canadians living and working Abstract: The future of Afghanistan the movement of enemy personnel, T rests in the country’s ability to field alongside soldiers of the Afghan supplies and weapons from Baram effective national security forces. National Army (ANA) occupied an Canada has played a significant role in Cha–Helmand Valley–Maywand into isolated outpost in Panjwayi district mentoring the Afghan National Army Panjwayi. Once in Panjwayi, there are designated Strongpoint Mushan. (ANA) since 2003. By 2008, the ANA other routes that lead into both the Once the pivotal leg of an ambitious was operating in battalion strength southwest suburbs of Kandahar City in Kandahar province. Strongpoint security and development plan, and to the “rocket box” northwest of Mushan was a vital position that Strongpoint Mushan quickly became interfered with enemy activity in Kandahar Air Field where 107 mm an orphan as priorities changed, the region and the men from the rockets are fired at this vital ISAF the plan shifted, and the weight of Operational Mentoring and Liaison logistics and support facility. This available friendly forces moved to Team and their Afghan counterparts route is also one of several used by held that ground in the face of vast the eastern part of the district. At the amounts of firepower directed at their those engaged in the transport of same time, abandoning Strongpoint positions. narcotics to Pakistan. A strongpoint Mushan after such a lengthy at Mushan is extremely inconvenient occupation would not only result in for the Taliban, the Hezb-e-Islami a Taliban propaganda victory, but at a map, the embattled triangular Gulbuddin (HiG) and other anti- would also remove the only coalition Zharey district lies south of Ring government and criminal elements. presence in that part of Panjwayi, a Road South (Highway 1), the main In 2006, Mushan was quiet as the presence that was aggravating the International Security Assistance Operation Medusa battles raged in Taliban leadership in its attempts to Force (ISAF) service route to the Pashmul and Sperwan Ghar. It was challenge Canada and Afghanistan forces fighting in Helmand province widely believed that the “police” for control of the vital districts and the primary commerce artery in presence in Mushan at that time was west of Kandahar City. There was and through Afghanistan. Panjwayi really a militia belonging to elements no good solution to this dilemma, district, also triangular in shape, lies in the provincial power structure that so the position was kept manned to the south of Zharey district, with had some relationship to the narcotics and resupplied in an increasingly the Arghandab River separating the trade. Mushan was important to them dangerous environment, even when two. The forbidding Registan Desert as product could not move along it was cut off on the ground. This is is directly south of Panjwayi district, Ring Road South or through Zharey the story of the Canadian soldiers of with the Dowry River separating district because of the fighting that the Operational Mentor and Liaison the two. The tapered western point raged there throughout the year. Teams (OMLT) and the Afghan of Panjwayi district marks the In mid-2007, Task Force Kandahar soldiers they worked with in the confluence of the Arghandab and (TFK) formulated a plan to construct a defence of Strongpoint Mushan.1 Dowry rivers – it is also the meeting road from Panjwayi town to Mushan, place of Zharey, Panjwayi, and the and then another from Mushan to Band-e Timor communities from Ring Road South. In general the Why Mushan? Maywand district. Maywand leads to idea was to facilitate commerce and the Helmand river valley, and routes security in this extremely fertile ushan is geographically from that region branch to Baram Cha district. Mushan was the pivot for this Mimportant to coalition efforts in Pakistan (see map on next page). project and its enhanced stature in west of Kandahar City. Looking the plan resulted in the construction Published© Canadianby Scholars CommonsMilitary @History Laurier, ,2009 Volume 18, Number 3, Summer 2009, pp.47-63. 47 1 Maloney - Panjwayi Alamo.indd 47 10/6/2009 1:19:04 PM Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 7 Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2009 Mike by Map drawn of better defensive facilities there. to mount costly ground resupply collided in the fight over Mushan, In time, Afghan National Police operations. There were no fewer with the Canadian soldiers from the replaced the local “police,” the than 14 IED attacks directed against OMLT and the Afghan soldiers from defensive works were designated a Canadian vehicles during this period. the Kandaks caught in the middle. “police sub-station” and a National Eventually, the decision was made to Mushan had to hold. Directorate of Security detachment cease ground resupply and a variety moved in. This in turn increased of aerial solutions were explored, enemy interest in Mushan which was including the use of contracted The OMLT and the Kandaks demonstrated by a significant rise in civilian Mi-8 helicopters. insurgent violence in the western part The situation also resulted in oalition soldiers have been used of Panjwayi district. Subsequently the the redeployment of forces away Cto train the emergent Afghan decision was made to designate the from some of the police sub-stations National Army since 2002. When police sub-station as a strongpoint along the Mushan-Panjwayi road Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and then deploy Afghan National which added to the physical was the main coalition effort in Army troops to Mushan. and psychological isolation of Afghanistan, Embedded Training In early 2008, Strongpoint Strongpoint Mushan. There were Teams (ETTs) were the primary Mushan was one of a line of police higher level considerations. The connection point between the ANA sub-stations and strongpoints Canadian government was a minority and the coalition forces at the tactical along the Panjwayi-Mushan road. government anticipating an election level. As NATO ISAF gradually Enemy forces mounted a campaign campaign some time in 2008 in which supplanted OEF and more non-North against this chain of facilities, which the costly commitment to Afghanistan American countries joined the effort, escalated throughout the spring would undoubtedly be an issue. Any new terminology emerged – the of 2008. Mechanized forces had to enemy analysis of Canadian media Operational Mentor and Liaison be used to resupply and replace would have concluded that casualties Team or OMLT. personnel along this chain which inflicted against Canadian forces The ETTs were similar to Vietnam- in turn attracted enemy Improvised would have a strategic effect on era Special Forces A-Teams working Explosives Device (IED) cells. The Canada’s commitment to a combat with non-professional indigenous battle along the Panjwayi-Mushan role. At the same time, Canadian forces. Indeed, the burden of ETT road nearly became a sub-campaign and Afghan forces could not retreat work initially fell on the 19th and 20th unto itself partly because the absence from Mushan for operational and Special Forces Groups in the early of Canadian helicopters forced TFK psychological reasons. These factors days of the war. As the ANA emerged http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss3/748 2 Maloney - Panjwayi Alamo.indd 48 10/6/2009 1:19:04 PM : Panjwayi Alamo The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan as an institution, the ETTs shifted to 2007 to handle ANA operations in were three infantry kandaks 1/1, 1/2 a more conventional posture as the the province. 1/205 Brigade’s kandaks and 1/3, a combat support kandak intent was to create a professional varied in number, however, and it (4/1) and a combat service support army to replace the Special Forces- would be a mistake to assume that kandak (5/1). For transport, each backed militias. A US National Guard 1/205 Brigade had the same level kandak had a varying number of Ford brigade took over this mission from of stability that a Canadian brigade Ranger pickup trucks, Hummers the special forces by 2004. The NATO- has. In 2006, it wavered between armed with 12.7 mm machine guns, led OMLTs were originally supposed one and three kandaks. At that time and International 7-ton trucks. Paper to supplement the OEF ETTs and the Canadian OMLT was capable of organizational charts are, however, provide mentoring at brigade and mentoring a single kandak. deceiving when dealing with Afghan Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2009 Mike by Map drawn higher levels, but as NATO took T h e O M LT r e q u i r e m e n t s units. In general, not all three infantry greater control of the coalition effort, increased dramatically in 2007, to kandaks were deployed at once. the NATO OMLTs increasingly the point where nearly an entire Some were undergoing refit, others handled tasks previously done by Canadian infantry battalion was had personnel on leave. There were the ETTs.
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