Astrid Sahm* ISSOpinion November 2008 Virtual or real change? The parliamentary elections in

Many Europeans had been cautiously optimis- tic that September’s parliamentary elections in ­Belarus would help break the deadlock in EU- Belarusian relations. However, not a single op- position candidate was elected, and interna- tional observers declared that the elections fell short of international standards. Is seri- ous about rapprochement with the West? And how Copyright: Sergei Grits/AP/SIPA can the European Union best encourage progress with its eastern neighbour?

So far the European Union has not been very suc- cessful in its attempts to apply a strict positive conditionality approach towards Belarus. Since the parliamentary elections in 2000 − the first national elections after the controversial constitutional ref- erendum of 1996 − Belarusian elections have been treated by the EU as a litmus test for the improve- ment of relations. The procedure was the same each time: the EU demand for free and fair elections as a precondition for ending the international isola- tion of Belarus was totally ignored by the Belarusian authorities. Consequently, the European Union was forced to introduce new sanctions against Belarus, like the enlarged visa ban for leading officials af- ter the parliamentary elections in 2004. Belarus was not included in the European Neighbourhood Policy A Belarusian woman casts her ballot paper at a polling station during parliamentary elections in Minsk, and therefore, among other things, in 2007 the visa Belarus, 28 September 2008 costs for Belarusian citizens increased to €60, while Ukrainian and Russian citizens continued to get the question has therefore been, would the 30 Septem- cheaper visa of €35. In response, the Belarusian lead- ber parliamentary elections bring about any change ership accused the EU of developing double standards in this situation? and declared that it would make no compromises in order to get privileges from the EU. The argument In summer 2007 the first political prisoners were that ‘nobody is waiting for us in the EU’ was used to released, one of the 12 demands of the EU’s 2006 explain to the population that any attempt to change document ‘What the European Union could bring to the direction of Belarusian foreign policy would Belarus’ as a precondition for the intensification of not bring positive results. In other words, the EU- relations. However, the authorities hesitated to re- Belarusian relationship has been at a deadlock. The lease the former presidential candidate Alexander

* Dr. Astrid Sahm is Director of the Johannes Rau European Union Minsk International Educational Center. Union européenne

1 European Union Institute for Security Studies Kazulin until August 2008. The releasing of ­political gotiations – finally marked the end of Lukashenka’s prisoners was the first time that the Belarusian lead- virtual integration policy with at the begin- ership publicly admitted to fulfilling one of the EU ning of 2007. Simultaneously, after the short energy demands in order to enlarge the possibilities of supply cut in January 2007, the EU for the first time cooperation with the EU. Furthermore, President recognised the importance of Belarus as a transit ­Alexander Lukashenka declared in summer 2008 that country. the parliamentary elections would be conducted in accordance with Western rules and that he could en- Following this, both the Belarusian leadership and visage some opposition members being represented the European Commission cautiously tried to estab- in the parliament. In other words, for the first time, lish more direct contacts. The biggest achievement the authorities seemed to be genuinely interested in was the agreement on opening a Delegation of the Eu- receiving international recognition for the country’s ropean Commission to Belarus, signed by EU Commis- elections. The main obstacle was that in the politi- sioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Belarus Deputy cal arena the Belarusian leadership clearly wanted to Foreign Minister Valery Voronecki in March 2008. The avoid any substantial changes. However, being inter- main interest of the Belarusian authorities was to at- ested in a real improvement of relations with the EU, tract foreign investments in order to compensate for it could not totally ignore the demands articulated in the economic impact of the increased energy prices the 2006 document, hence the pre-election gesture of and to ensure the necessary modernisation. Indeed, releasing political prisoners. a large number of normative documents have been adopted aiming at the improvement of conditions for small and medium enterprises. According to the re- Reorientation of foreign policy? port ‘Doing Business 2009’, published by the World During the 1990s Lukashenko decided to pursue a Bank and the International Financial Cooperation in course of unilateral orientation on Russia, aimed at 2008, Belarus moved from position 115 to position assuaging post-Soviet nostalgia in large segments of 85. However, the efforts of the Belarusian govern- the population. There were also economic reasons in ment to reduce the dramatic trade deficit by import the form of cheap energy resources and other ben- substitution regulations were at odds with this soft efits. In exchange he offered the Russian side his economic liberalisation. willingness to support the Russian reluctance for NATO enlargement and, thus, to become some kind of anti-Western outpost. The special relationship with Invisible elections Russia, formalised by the signing of contracts on the There was ground for some hope that the parlia- creation of a , also allowed Lukashenko mentary elections in 2008 would be different to to ignore the Western critics of his increasing anti- previous elections. Indeed, there had been some democratic domestic policy, cumulating in the adop- improvements at the beginning of the election cam- tion of a new constitution by a controversial refer- paign: The Central Election Commission (CEC) active- endum at the end of 1996 giving nearly unlimited ly cooperated with the election observation mission competences to the president. of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-op- Sporadic declarations made by Lukashenka during re- eration in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR). The CEC sessions cent years that he would like to improve his country’s were open and attended by accredited observers and relationship with the Western world were clearly media. For the first time, political parties nominat- caused by the deterioration of the relationship with ing candidates were allowed to appoint advisory Russia during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. These members to the CEC. Opposition members had also statements were principally aimed at threatening the slightly increased access to District Election Com- Russian leadership with losing its closest ally, in or- missions, though their percentage remained quite der to ensure the continuation of cheap energy sup- low. Of 98 nominated opposition candidates, 78 plies and other privileges from Russia. Consequently, were registered compared with 47 registered can- these announcements remained on a purely rhetorical didates in 2004. No candidates were de-registered level and were not accompanied by concrete steps to during the campaign by the election commissions. meet the preconditions for improved relations with Some candidates noted progress in their ability to the West. The increase of energy prices and the deal conduct meetings in authorised campaign activities on selling shares of the company Beltransgaz to Rus- without interference. In response to some critical sia’s Gazprom – after 14 long years of difficult ne- remarks in the interim report of the OSCE observa-

2 European Union Institute for Security Studies tion ­mission the CEC even decided to repeat once elections, where, among others, the Vice-President the candidates’ spots in regional branches of state of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Anne-Marie Liz- television and radio during prime time. in and opposition representative Vladimir Nistyuk participated. However, there had been no substantial changes to the quite restrictive election law. Elections to the 110-member Chamber of Representatives have to be Traditional oppositional conflicts conducted on the basis of a two-round majoritarian The failure of the political opposition in the elec- system in 110 single-mandate constituencies. The tions cannot entirely be explained by the absence registration rules for candidates are quite strict of conditions for fair and free elections. The main and registration can be refused for minor formal registered opposition parties continue to be the Be- mistakes in the lists of collected voters’ signatures larusian Popular Front (BPF), the Party of Belarusian or in income declaration. The CEC registered a to- Communists (PCB), the Belarusian Social Democratic tal number of 285 candidates out of 365 candidate Party Hramada (BSDP-H), and the United nominations. Due to some withdrawals only 263 of (UCP). These opposition parties united in 2005 under them finally contested the elections. That means an an umbrella organisation entitled the United Demo- average of 2.4 candidates per constituency. In 15 cratic Front (UDF) and supported Alexander Milinkev- constituencies only one candidate ran. Consequent- ich during the presidential elections of March 2006. ly, for the first time all deputies were elected in Milinkevich was also supported by the European Coa- the first round – in 2004 a second round had to be lition, a grouping of unregistered opposition par- conducted in at least one constituency. Thanks to the ties with European integration as their main objec- agitation of the authorities, 26% of the electorate tive. However, after the presidential coalition new participated in early voting compared with 17% in conflicts over the leadership arose among the UDF, 2004. However, the majority of voters had no de- and Milinkevich was replaced by a collective execu- tailed information about their candidates because tive committee of the party leaders. During the par- of the minimal presence of campaign materials. The liamentary elections both the UDF and the European campaign fund of c.US$800 that every candidate was Coalition fielded their own candidates. Consequently, officially allowed to use made it impossible to con- the split of the opposition forces was obvious to the duct an active campaign. Consequently, the elections population. were barely visible and the result largely controlled by the authorities. According to independent polls only 7.6% of the popu- lation could imagine participating in actions against Mainly because of the problems of restricted cam- the falsification of election results, although about paign possibilities and the insufficient transparen- one third of voters are convinced that the results are cy of the vote count, the OSCE/ODIHR election obser- manipulated. A meeting organised by the opposition vation mission stated in its preliminary conclusion on the election night in the centre of Minsk was at- that despite some minor improvements the elections tended by only 500-1,000 people. Because of the ex- ultimately fell short of OSCE commitments for demo- pectations of the majority of voters that the main task cratic elections. Besides that, no opposition candi- of a parliamentary deputy is to solve the personal date had been elected. Therefore, the 2008 elections problems of the people living in his or her constitu- repeated − in contrast to the promises made by the ency, it is a more rational choice for them to vote authorities in summer 2008 − the familiar pattern for a representative of the executive structures, and of previous elections. While the elections results, not for an opposition candidate. The fact that some consequently, can not be treated as surprise, the opposition forces supported the idea of a boycott or moderate reaction of the Belarusian authorities to announced the withdrawal of their candidates on the the OSCE/ODIHR assessment was significantly differ- eve of the elections was also not helpful in convinc- ent from former times when the non-recognition of ing voters of the reliability of the opposition. the elections regularly led to a strengthening of the anti-Western propaganda of the regime. This time, One reason why the idea of a boycott was quite popu- official comments exclusively focused on the posi- lar within the opposition was the wish to prevent the tive aspects of the OSCE/ODIHR report and expressed potential recognition of the parliamentarian elec- the hope for an intensification of the relationship tions by the European Union. The cautious contacts between Belarus and the EU. For the first time Bela- of the EU with the Belarusian authorities were in- rusian TV showed live debates on the results of the terpreted as disloyalty towards the opposition. This

3 European Union Institute for Security Studies position paradoxically found its reflection in the for ordinary Belarusian citizens and thus made it ­regime’s propaganda, which blamed the opposition easy for the Belarusian opposition to criticise the for preventing the rapprochement of Belarus and unilateral abolishment of the visa ban for Alexander the EU. At the same time, the official media stated Lukashenka. that the opposition itself does not follow European behaviour, because its leaders refuse to quit their At the moment the EU’s strict positive conditionality party positions despite several election defeats. This approach towards Belarus is the only promising strat- would appear to be a powerful argument and indi- egy. It is now up to the Belarusian leadership to un- cates that the opposition needs to think about new dertake further steps for the gradual normalisation of strategies and personalities. In order to improve its relations. The next six months will show whether the public rating the opposition forces should, among Belarusian leadership is ready for real reforms in or- other things, enable a more comprehensive perform- der to create the precondition for the improvement of ance by putting younger people in leading positions relations. There is a high risk that it will conduct only and developing ways to work intensively with the cosmetic changes and thus replace the virtual integra- population in the period between elections. tion with Russia with a virtual approach to the EU. Additionally, the negotiations with Russia on energy prices for 2009 will create new pressure on Belarus to Geopolitics or values? join the Russian monetary system. Therefore, a proac- Many opposition representatives have argued that tive EU policy is demanded in order to support the EU policy towards Belarus has been determined by weak reform tendencies in Belarus. geopolitical arguments and not by democratic prin- ciples. The EU has welcomed the position of the Be- In its policy towards Belarus the EU needs to keep larusian president in so far not recognising the uni- the balance in addressing different target groups: lateral independence declared by South Ossetia and the official structures, the opposition forces, the civ- Abkhazia despite pressure from Russia. However, il society and the passive population. The dialogue the EU decision, adopted on 13 October, to lift the with the official structures should focus on concrete visa ban for Alexander Lukashenka and other Bela- topics such as energy, transport, privatisation, so- rusian officials for a six-month period cannot only cial welfare and education, and involve not only the be explained by geopolitics. Taking this decision, executive authorities, but also the newly elected the EU has demonstrated its readiness for a positive parliament. The ENP would appear to be an optimal response to the steps undertaken by the Belarusian framework for the gradual improvement of the rela- leadership in realising the EU demands for the re- tions because, in contrast to Ukraine, the Belarusian lease of political prisoners. Therefore, the latest leadership is not interested in getting an EU mem- EU decisions are of great importance in showing the bership option. In addition, neighbouring Lithuania Belarusian authorities that the EU is really open for and Poland can play a very important role in promot- the realisation of a step-by-step approach. Further- ing substantial change in Belarus. The reality is that more, the EU decision also promised additional ac- substantial political change in Belarus is impossible tivities for the further strengthening of civil soci- without an evolution of its political culture. The best ety structures in Belarus. Unfortunately, at the same way to promote such change seems to be the intensi- time the EU did not decide to reduce the visa fees fication of multilevel contacts.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the EUISS

4 European Union Institute for Security Studies