Issopinion November 2008 Virtual Or Real Change? the Parliamentary Elections in Belarus
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Astrid Sahm* ISSOpinion November 2008 VIrtUAl Or rEAl chANgE? thE pArlIAmENtAry ElEctIONS IN BElArUS Many Europeans had been cautiously optimis- tic that September’s parliamentary elections in Belarus would help break the deadlock in EU- Belarusian relations. However, not a single op- position candidate was elected, and interna- tional observers declared that the elections fell short of international standards. Is Minsk seri- ous about rapprochement with the West? And how Copyright: Sergei Grits/AP/SIPA can the European Union best encourage progress with its eastern neighbour? So far the European Union has not been very suc- cessful in its attempts to apply a strict positive conditionality approach towards Belarus. Since the parliamentary elections in 2000 − the first national elections after the controversial constitutional ref- erendum of 1996 − Belarusian elections have been treated by the EU as a litmus test for the improve- ment of relations. The procedure was the same each time: the EU demand for free and fair elections as a precondition for ending the international isola- tion of Belarus was totally ignored by the Belarusian authorities. Consequently, the European Union was forced to introduce new sanctions against Belarus, like the enlarged visa ban for leading officials af- ter the parliamentary elections in 2004. Belarus was not included in the European Neighbourhood Policy A Belarusian woman casts her ballot paper at a polling station during parliamentary elections in minsk, and therefore, among other things, in 2007 the visa Belarus, 28 September 2008 costs for Belarusian citizens increased to €60, while Ukrainian and Russian citizens continued to get the question has therefore been, would the 30 Septem- cheaper visa of €35. In response, the Belarusian lead- ber parliamentary elections bring about any change ership accused the EU of developing double standards in this situation? and declared that it would make no compromises in order to get privileges from the EU. The argument In summer 2007 the first political prisoners were that ‘nobody is waiting for us in the EU’ was used to released, one of the 12 demands of the EU’s 2006 explain to the population that any attempt to change document ‘What the European Union could bring to the direction of Belarusian foreign policy would Belarus’ as a precondition for the intensification of not bring positive results. In other words, the EU- relations. However, the authorities hesitated to re- Belarusian relationship has been at a deadlock. The lease the former presidential candidate Alexander * Dr. Astrid Sahm is Director of the Johannes Rau European Union Minsk International Educational Center. Union européenne 1 European Union Institute for Security Studies Kazulin until August 2008. The releasing of political gotiations – finally marked the end of Lukashenka’s prisoners was the first time that the Belarusian lead- virtual integration policy with Russia at the begin- ership publicly admitted to fulfilling one of the EU ning of 2007. Simultaneously, after the short energy demands in order to enlarge the possibilities of supply cut in January 2007, the EU for the first time cooperation with the EU. Furthermore, President recognised the importance of Belarus as a transit Alexander Lukashenka declared in summer 2008 that country. the parliamentary elections would be conducted in accordance with Western rules and that he could en- Following this, both the Belarusian leadership and visage some opposition members being represented the European Commission cautiously tried to estab- in the parliament. In other words, for the first time, lish more direct contacts. The biggest achievement the authorities seemed to be genuinely interested in was the agreement on opening a Delegation of the Eu- receiving international recognition for the country’s ropean Commission to Belarus, signed by EU Commis- elections. The main obstacle was that in the politi- sioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Belarus Deputy cal arena the Belarusian leadership clearly wanted to Foreign Minister Valery Voronecki in March 2008. The avoid any substantial changes. However, being inter- main interest of the Belarusian authorities was to at- ested in a real improvement of relations with the EU, tract foreign investments in order to compensate for it could not totally ignore the demands articulated in the economic impact of the increased energy prices the 2006 document, hence the pre-election gesture of and to ensure the necessary modernisation. Indeed, releasing political prisoners. a large number of normative documents have been adopted aiming at the improvement of conditions for small and medium enterprises. According to the re- reorientation of foreign policy? port ‘Doing Business 2009’, published by the World During the 1990s Lukashenko decided to pursue a Bank and the International Financial Cooperation in course of unilateral orientation on Russia, aimed at 2008, Belarus moved from position 115 to position assuaging post-Soviet nostalgia in large segments of 85. However, the efforts of the Belarusian govern- the population. There were also economic reasons in ment to reduce the dramatic trade deficit by import the form of cheap energy resources and other ben- substitution regulations were at odds with this soft efits. In exchange he offered the Russian side his economic liberalisation. willingness to support the Russian reluctance for NATO enlargement and, thus, to become some kind of anti-Western outpost. The special relationship with Invisible elections Russia, formalised by the signing of contracts on the There was ground for some hope that the parlia- creation of a Union state, also allowed Lukashenko mentary elections in 2008 would be different to to ignore the Western critics of his increasing anti- previous elections. Indeed, there had been some democratic domestic policy, cumulating in the adop- improvements at the beginning of the election cam- tion of a new constitution by a controversial refer- paign: The Central Election Commission (CEC) active- endum at the end of 1996 giving nearly unlimited ly cooperated with the election observation mission competences to the president. of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-op- Sporadic declarations made by Lukashenka during re- eration in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR). The CEC sessions cent years that he would like to improve his country’s were open and attended by accredited observers and relationship with the Western world were clearly media. For the first time, political parties nominat- caused by the deterioration of the relationship with ing candidates were allowed to appoint advisory Russia during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. These members to the CEC. Opposition members had also statements were principally aimed at threatening the slightly increased access to District Election Com- Russian leadership with losing its closest ally, in or- missions, though their percentage remained quite der to ensure the continuation of cheap energy sup- low. Of 98 nominated opposition candidates, 78 plies and other privileges from Russia. Consequently, were registered compared with 47 registered can- these announcements remained on a purely rhetorical didates in 2004. No candidates were de-registered level and were not accompanied by concrete steps to during the campaign by the election commissions. meet the preconditions for improved relations with Some candidates noted progress in their ability to the West. The increase of energy prices and the deal conduct meetings in authorised campaign activities on selling shares of the company Beltransgaz to Rus- without interference. In response to some critical sia’s Gazprom – after 14 long years of difficult ne- remarks in the interim report of the OSCE observa- 2 European Union Institute for Security Studies tion mission the CEC even decided to repeat once elections, where, among others, the Vice-President the candidates’ spots in regional branches of state of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Anne-Marie Liz- television and radio during prime time. in and opposition representative Vladimir Nistyuk participated. However, there had been no substantial changes to the quite restrictive election law. Elections to the 110-member Chamber of Representatives have to be traditional oppositional conflicts conducted on the basis of a two-round majoritarian The failure of the political opposition in the elec- system in 110 single-mandate constituencies. The tions cannot entirely be explained by the absence registration rules for candidates are quite strict of conditions for fair and free elections. The main and registration can be refused for minor formal registered opposition parties continue to be the Be- mistakes in the lists of collected voters’ signatures larusian Popular Front (BPF), the Party of Belarusian or in income declaration. The CEC registered a to- Communists (PCB), the Belarusian Social Democratic tal number of 285 candidates out of 365 candidate Party Hramada (BSDP-H), and the United Civic Party nominations. Due to some withdrawals only 263 of (UCP). These opposition parties united in 2005 under them finally contested the elections. That means an an umbrella organisation entitled the United Demo- average of 2.4 candidates per constituency. In 15 cratic Front (UDF) and supported Alexander Milinkev- constituencies only one candidate ran. Consequent- ich during the presidential elections of March 2006. ly, for the first time all deputies were elected in Milinkevich was