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The case for identity creation: Reproductive technology and the rhetoric of social intervention

Pondozzi, Jeannine C., Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1988

Copyright ©1988 by Pondozzi, Jeannine C. All rights reserved.

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THE CASE FOR IDENTITY CREATION:

REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

Jeannine C. Pondozzi, B.A., N.A.

* * * * w

The Ohio State University 1SBB

Dissertation Committee Approved by William R. Broun

. f ■ n j Joseph h . Foley A " ■ / Adviser Victor D. Ulall Department of Communication Copyright c by

Jeannine C. Pondozzi 1900 To Mom And To Susan And To all persons For uihom identity is important

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Dr. William R. Brown For his guidance and inspiration, support and insight, and critical rigor throughout this "dissertation" process. I thank Dr. Brown, especially, for his ability to listen and For his respect For my own thought and creative process, and For his patience. I appreciate the comments, suggestions, and humor oF Dr. Joesph M. Foley, and the work and participation oF Dr. Victor Wall in the Final days oF this dissertation. I am grateFul to Dr. James L. Golden For his inspiration, and For Dr. Goodwin F. Berquist without whose optimism I would have given up long ago. In addition, I am grateFul For the love and support oF my Family: Mom and Dad, Rich and Jan, Dee and Amanda, Donna, Tony, and Mark. Their love is a sustaining presence. And, I am grateFul to my Friends: to Susan Opt, whose steady Friendship and clear thinking keeps me in touch with the "real"; to Angela Campbell who is always there; to Judie Thorpe and Gloria Galanas For their continuing eFFort to "stay near." I am grateful to Polly Lacy, Barbara McCabe, Scott Marshall, and Chris Scodari for their support and confidence. Especially appreciated is the encouragement of Dr. Jack Douglas, Mary Douglas, Darlene Broun, Danielle Bonetti, Renee Adamany, Denise Pigeon, and Joanne St. Hilare. I am indebted to Judy and John Hoeffler for sharing so very much of themselves— and to my buddy, Nicholas Hoeffler, in uihose presence there is always sunshine. Finally, I owe special gratitude to the Congregation of the Sisters of St. Joseph of Carondelet— valiant women, all— in whose company I have lived and learned, laughed and cried, grown, and loved. VITA

June IB, 1 9 4 E ...... Born— Syracuse, NY 1965-present ...... Educator: New York StatB High Bchncls, Mount St. flary’s College, Los Angeles; The College of St. Rose, Albany, NY; The Ohio State University 1966 ...... B . A . English, The College of St. Rose Albany, NY 1 9 7 E ...... M.A. English The State University of New York at Albany, NY 1978-1980 ...... Lecturer: Mount St. Mary’s College Los Angeles, CA 19B0-19B4 ...... Assistant Professor The College of St. Rose Albany, NY 19B4-19B7 ...... Teaching Assistant: Department of Communication, The Ohio State University 19B7-present ...... Lecturer: Department of Communication, The Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Communication Studies in: Rhetorical theory and criticism— Drs. William R. Broun, James L. Golden, John J. Makay Mass Communication— Drs. Joseph M. Foley and John Dimmick Interpersonsal Communication, Conflict— Dr. Victor D. Wall TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION...... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii VITA...... v CHAPTER PAGE I. STUDY OVERVIEW...... 1 Introduction...... 1 Extent and Purpose of the Study...... 3 Background For the Study...... B The Specific Area of Study...... 10 Overview of the Study...... 20 The Importance of Naming...... 23 Data Selection and Audience...... 24 Summary...... 28 II. LITERATURE REVIEW...... 23 Introduction...... 2S Selection of Materials: Feminist Discourse...... 32 Communciation Scholarship...... 35 Dissertation Abstracts...... 37 Review of Materials: Feminist Discourse...... 37 Traditionalism...... 40 Liberalism...... 45 Marxism/Socialism...... 51 Radicalism...... 62 Communication Scholarship...... GB Dissertation Abstracts...... 7B Studies in the Rhetoric of Social Intervention...... 73 Summary...... 62 III. THE NAMING PROCESS: THE SYMBOLIC CREATION OF REALITY...... 06 Introduction...... B6 UJhat Naming Is...... B7 The Naming Process: How Individuals Create Reality...... 89 How Individuals Form Concepts...... 100 The Rhetorical Function of Naming...... 110 Naming and the Identification Process...... 1E0 Summary...... 1E3 IV. METHODOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW...... 1E6 Introduction...... 1E6 The Concept of Rhetorical Vision...... 1E7 Brown’s Social Intervention Model: A General Overview...... 130 Ideologizing as Communication Process...... 136 Summary...... 15E V. THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION AS CRITICAL METHOD...... 153 Introduction...... 153 Attention and the Rhetoric of Social Intervention...... 16E Power and the Rhetoric of Social Intervention...... 174 Need and the Rhetoric of Social Intervention...... 1S4 Summary...... E15 VI. NAMING REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: THE POWER TO SAVE...... E10 Introduction...... E1B Users of Technology and the Power to Save...... E1S The Process of Name Creation in the Languaging Community of Users of Reproductive Technology...... EE9 Implications of Naming for Users of Reproductive Technology...... E36 Summary...... E41

vii VII. NAMING REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: THE POWER TO DOMINATE...... E42 Introduction...... 242 Denouncers of Technology and the Power to Dominate...... 243 The Process of Name Creation in the Languaging Community of Denouncers of Reproductive Technology...... 261 Implications of Naming for Denouncers of Reproductive Technology...... 267 Summary...... 26S VIII. NAMING REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: THE POWER TO DETERMINE...... 270 Introduction...... 270 Critics of Reproductive Technology and The Power to Determine...... 271 The Process of Name Creation in the Languaging Community of Critics of Reproductive Technology ...... 283 Implications of Naming for Critics of Reproductive Technology...... 207 Summary...... 2S0 IX. SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION...... 2S2 Introduction...... 232 Summary and Discussion...... 292 The Research Question and Perspectives of Women’s Identity...... 2S2 The Method of Investigation...... 297 Discussion of the Data...... 300 Conclusions from the Data...... 308 The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Model 317 Suggestions for Future Research...... 321 Conclusion...... 322

ENDNOTES...... 327 LIST OF REFERENCES...... 328 Primary Sources...... 328 Secondary Sources...... 337

viii Chapter I

STUDY OVERVIEW Introduction □ne of my most Frustrating nightmares repeats the scenario of being caught in an invisible trap. No matter what setting the dream details— an idyllic mountain meadorn, a busy city, street, an ordinary classroom or office— the action is always the same. Persons carry on what appears to be normal activity. In the meadow, they picnic; on the city street, they walk, board buses, buy newspapers; in the office, they work at desks. Soon, however, it becomes clear that persons in the dream are restricted. They seem to be able to speak, but no one can hear them. They can approach each other, but they cannot touch. There is always some invisible barrier beyond which they cannot proceed. In many ways they are unrestricted. No one can stop the thief who takes money from the newsboy on the street. No one can detain the student who walks out of the classroom. At the same time, persons in the dream are supremely restricted. They cannot assist the employee who

1 2

has tripped, Fallen, and hurt himself. They cannot ccmFort the child cn the street who is lost and crying. In the surrealistic world, the appearance of the crying, lost child always precedes the cacaphonous end to the nightmare. There would be no world if people couldn’t touch. Perhaps, I always think in this part of the dream, the creatures invisibly trapped are not "real" persons, but "appearances" of persons who will simply evaporate with the dawn. But, if this is so, why am I always awakened by the sounds of impact as the creatures struggle mightily against the invisible restriction? Though the images in the dream clearly depict physical isolation, it is the personal fear of symbolic isolation which has prompted this research. A more hellish existence cannot be imagined than one in which persons do not "touch"— a world in which persons cannot understand other persons, nor make themselves understood. Yet, this happens frequently in our everyday experiences. Lie have difficulty articulating and understanding symbolically created reality. My concern over symbolic isolation and my experiences as a woman in the turbulently active political atmosphere of the 1960s has prompted interest in the symbolic ways in which women make real and articulate identity. How is it that I name who I am? How do I tell that name to others? 3

Identity Is important in that it situates us and is an anchor in the ordBr which we create For ourselves From the chaos oF multitudinous experiences, sensed and non-sensed impressions. Is it possible that the identity I create For myselF is comprehensible only to me? How can I share my "name" with others? The research presented here is one eFFort to dispel some oF the terror oF the nightmare.

Extent and Purpose oF the Studu This study investigates the process oF identity sense- making. More speciFically, it investigates how women symbolically constitute the reality oF "identity". This is the study oF a rhetorical process and as such is grounded in the human power oF name creation, a process which, according to Mary Daly C13735, has been stolen From women CB5. "The old naming was not the product oF dialogue— a Fact inadvertently admitted in the Genesis story oF Adam’s naming the animals and the woman" C85. In our male-dominated society, the "naming oF women has been eFFected by men primarily through the control oF social institutions that determine behavior and attitudes" CRuth, 1380:055. In order to investigate the rhetorical process oF identity sense-making, this study will Focus on the academic discourse Cand thB popular discourse which might interest 4 women who participate in the academic discourse) about "women’s place in the design and utilization of technology in our society"— in particular, in the design and utilization of reproductive technology CZimmerman, 19B1:E). Reproductive technology includes "a variety of technological interventions at any point in the process of reproduction, from conception Cincluding its prevention) to the possibility of developing an artificial womb" CBirke, 1386:6). Women’s discourse on reproductive technology provides apt data for the study of identity creation because it contains on a microlevel the crux of women’s battle on the macrolevel of society: Feminist research has well documented that over thousands of years the control of women’s bodies, and in particular of our reproductive biology, has been a crucial factor in the oppression of women Cas a social group and as individuals) by men CKlein:65). This study will not consider intervention into the reproductive process which prevents conception and birth. Instead, the concern will be with reproductive technologies, those "biomedical/technical interferences during the process of procreation . . . aimed at producing a child" CKlein, 19B5:5). "New reproductive technologies" encompass pre-conception sex selection and post-conception sex determination techniques, artificial insemination, and the full gamut of "test tube" techniques: in vitro fertilization Ce.g. 5

the fertilization of an egg cell uiith sperm in a glass dish in the lab), embryo replacement, transfer and "flushing", embryo freezing, and— yet to come— cloning and the artificial placenta: the "glass womb". They [[reproductive technologies) also comprise the increasing number of antenatal tests during "normal" pregnancy such as amniocentesis, the alpha-foeto protein test, foetal monitoring by foetoscopy and sonogram/ultrasound, and at birth Ce.g. epidural anesthesia which "knocks out" a birthing woman from the waist down) CKlein:64-65). Women have a long history of endeavoring to define . thBmsBlvBS, their role and status in society. In their efforts to gain recognition as full, functioning human beings who should be accorded the same privileges and opportunities as men in the social sphere, women have had to contend with three basic factors which have affected their social and legal status: Cl) the lesser physical strength of women; CE) the physical limitations of frequent pregnancy; C3) the traditional responsibility of women for early childcare CGlazer-Malbin & Waehrer, 197E:3). Any discussion of woman’s identity, therefore, must take into consideration her reproductive process. "The reproductive function of a woman," writes Ti-Grace Atkinson C1374), "is the only innate function which distinguishes women from men. It is the crucial distinction upon which all inequities toward women are grounded" Cl). Further, woman’s capacity to bear and nurture children is the "crucial distinction" upon which our present social 6 structure is founded. It is this "crucial distinction" which has been used, in many instances, to Justify woman’s "place" in the social structure CNarlow & Davis, 1976). Today, perhaps more than ever before, coming to grips with and understanding this "crucial distinction" is of utmost importance to women’s understanding of themselves as women because today this most "crucial distinction" is being challenged by the new reproductive technologies. The part played by women in the reproduction of children, the "naturalness" of the reproductive process, the right of women to control their bodies, the very foundation upon which some women assert their identity and others assert thBir uniqueness— all are called into question by reproductive technology. Questions of women’s identity have been investigated from several perspectives: sociological, philosophical, political, psychological. Research in these areas helps provide an understanding of women as they attempt to "find a place" in the social structure, but research in these areas does not attend to the process of women creating the reality of "identity." Rhetoric is one dimension of a communication perspective. It focuses on the human capacity to make and use symbols. Thus, to investigate the rhetorical process of identity sense-making in women’s discourse about their place 7

in the design and utilization of reproductive technology is to study the underlying symbolic design of the discourse and the process by which symbols are used to construct reality CBrown, 197B). Given the recurring patterns of struggle which appear in society at large and in this area of technology, the inquiry asks what new insights can be gained from a rhetorical study of the process which women (1) use to make "identity" into sense experience or CS1 find senss CmBaning) in "identity" or both? Specifically, I. To what extent are the women in the dialogue concerning reproductive technology engaging in name creation or simply using names mBn have already imposed on them? A. How do women learn Cattain) names for their identity? Who are the "language tutors"? B . What behaviors accompany the learning of names? II. What are the names for identity and what are the strategies that characterize identity creation? A. What expectancies do the names create for the application of those names to new instances of identity? B. What languaging communities agree upon what expectancies associated with the names? C. How do names for identity operate in a rhetorical dialogue? What criterial attributes characterize what names and point to what expectancies? III. What are the potential implications arising from the names? A. How do the names for women prompt reification of relationships among men, women, and birth interventions? 8

B. How do the reified "relations" affect names for needs, hierarchy and concepts of being, knowing, and valuing in the perceived "reality" of women’s identity? C. How do reified "needs" affect names for relations and concepts of being, knowing, and valuing in the perceived "reality" of women’s identity?

Background for the Studu

The struggles and difficulties surrounding women’s identity which occur in discourse about women’s function, place and status in society are analogous to the episode in Through the Looking Glass in which the Red Queen tells Alice •that "it takes all the running uou can do to keBp in the same place" CCarroll, 1971:157). Success, near success, or failure in thB struggle for equal opportunity and status is often interrelated with the tensions and contradictions women face in their efforts not only to find their "place," but also to define themselves in that place. The Red Queen pattern, then, is that women keep trying to find their place in this man-named world when what they need to do is define themselves, rather than adjust or attempt to revisB their roles via names that men Cas inventors, builders, protectors, etc.) have given them. This has a history. The myth of progress does not acknowledge women’s role in the advancement of civilization CStanley, 1983), but 9

centers instead on the male tool makBr uiho in thB Genesis story was created in the image oF the Lord God, given domination over all creatures, and commanded to cultivate the earth. Thus, man, the inventor, was given the ability to cope with the vastness oF nature and to make liFe more comFortable For himselF and his descendents. Technology, "the development and use oF tools to solve problems," emphasizes the male’s ability to hunt, to Feed and clothe himselF and his oFFspring, and to clear the wilderness CZimmerman, 19B1:356). Some historians and anthropologists contend that the more tools man invented and perFected, the greater his progress. Mazlish C1967), in Fact, cites Washburn (I960), an anthropologist, who asserts that the very tools man used made possible his way oF life and even shaped his physical structure. Washburn links tools and their use with physical traits such as pelvic structure, bipedalism, and brain structure to show that it was the male’s success with tools which started the evolutionary trend and led to the civilization we know today CMazlish:4). The male, then, is credited as the primary inventor oF the most signiFicant technology Ci.e., Fire and medicine) and with the inventiveness that led him not only to cultivate and care For the earth but also to subdue it in 10

thB service of progress. By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the machine had become the metaphor which described the human experience (Merchant, 19B3). During the Scientific Revolution, the way things worked became of special interest. God was seen as an engineer, a mathematician who had set the cosmos in motion. The whole universe was thought of in terms of atoms or particles which moved together like the well-oiled parts of a machine, and enthusiasts of progress such as Francis Bacon advocated dominating and molding nature through the use of mechanical arts CMerchant, 19B3). The growth of commercialism and industrialization pushed progress into the twentieth century. Today, as in the past, technology represents the triumph of human intelligence CBush, 19B3:1533. The microprocessor chip at the heart of today’s "smart" machines is the latest herald of progress in this century. The ubiquitous chip, a powerful reminder of the importance of technology in our culture, testifies to the myth of progress which tells the story of male control over the world and of male ability to make and use tools which have brought civilization to its present point. 11

The high-technology scenarios Zimmerman C19033 envisions, however, present a rather different picture for women. She portrays women as isolated.

CThey are! isolated at home, trapped in electronic cages, using cable TV, computers, and touch-tone phones for video shopping . . ., Cor women! forced to do data entry or circuit board assembly from home for piecework pay, so they can work and care for children at the same time. . . .Cor women finding! their time- and labor- saving home appliances the first victims of the energy shortage . . .Cor women! left out of the futurB altogether as genetic and reproductive engineering discoveries pair cloning with artificial wombs to make women extraneous even to biology C3-4) . Yet, Zimmerman, in recounting these "technical" scenarios, i is merely echoing the frustration and alarm of feminists who in business and politics have experienced a Red Queen pattern: for women the past is prologue. The pattern can be traced even in the most recent ways women have "advanced" in political, economic and social spheres. Some of the most important changes over the last decade have been in the increased number of women who have assumed public roles or who have sought success and employment outside the home. In the 19B0s, for example, more women than ever were enrolled in educational institutions. By 1902, BO.0% more women were enrolled in college courses than in 1972 CVetter & Babco, 1904:14). By

1903, 77\ of all women C61SJ in 1970) participated in the U.S. labor force. Women held 40.93s of the managerial and 12

professional business positions, broke into engineering C12.7fc), worked in mathematical and computer science Fields C29.650, and practiced law C15.3JJ) CU.S* Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1904).

All women, however, who entered careers outside the home did not attain such success. In 1983, the administrative support Cincluding clerical) positions were filled in large measure by women C79.95s). Secretaries, stenographers and typists are almost always women C9B.22)

CU.S. Bureau of Statistics, 1984). In 1984, 14.1\ of all women C10.1* of all men) lived below the poverty level. OF those women, 6.5/J C4.9£ of men) had gone to college for one year or more. In 1984, the median income for womBn was $8,888 as opposed to $15,800 for men. The median income in 1984 for female heads of households with no husband present was $12,803 as compared to an average earning of $23,325 for male heads of households with no wife present. The picture is worse for black women who head households. Their earning averages $8,648 as compared to white women in the same position who earn $15,134 on the average CU.S. Bureau of Statistics, 1984). Statistics, of course, do not tell the whole story. Beyond the issues of "gains" or "losses" in the political, 13 economic and social spheres, there is a sense of ambivalence about uiho women are in any sphere. Having been warned about the dangers of "the feminine mystique" CFriedan, 1983), the "new" women emerging from the contemporary women’s movement seem less sure today about what constitutes feminine fulfillment. Having learned to acknowledge their "expansive needs," women have not learned how to accommodate "dependency neBds" CApter, 19B5:3). Women, for example, detail the difficulty of breaking into the male business world CMcBroom, 19861, but having "made it," wonder if "the strategies that catapult women to career success almost guarantee failure in CtheirD personal lives" CLevine- Shneidmen & Levine, 1985:113). The "new" image of the woman who has become a professional success and who, at the same time, mothers children is a confused image. CThis image! contains some confused, often contradictory aspects. It emerged with the promise to solve all women’s problems; it rose high on the expectation that these problems would be solved. And because these expectations have not been met, the new image . . . is in danger of subsiding. Already there is a resurgence of the romantic notion of motherhood as female destiny and therefore as fulfillment CApter:1). Apter’s sense of the subsiding of the "new image" and the return to more traditional ways of viewing "female destiny" is echoed by Jan Zimmerman C19B3), who perceives new technology as "doing the impossible" for women: pushing 14

the clock backward. [The clock is running backward! to a period before the current Women’s Movement, back before the growth of multinational corporations, before the expansion of government-sponsored research, back before the suffragist era, back to the Industrial Revolution, to the Scientific Revolution, back perhaps to the early roots of capitalism and rationalism in the Middle Ages (3) .

How can this be, when women scholars and some feminists have hailed advancements in technology Cas they have hailed advancements in other areas) as possible promises of liberation for women? It is happening, according to Zimmerman C1983), because "Cl!ike any other human activity, technology reflects the values, thoughts, ideologies, beliefs, and biases of its creators .... In this time . . . and in this place . . . those creators are almost all men"

C3) . In 1903, when the latest version of the Equal Rights Amendment met its demise, women who had fought so hard for the amendment’s passage refused to concede defeat. Despite the fate of the ERA Cand regardless of whether it is ever resurrected and ratified), some feminists believe the amendment "will remain the symbol of the Second Women’s Movement Just as the suffrage amendment has been for the First Women’s Movement" CHoff-Wilson, 1986: xi). It is, however, an ambiguous symbol. On the one hand, the ERA 15

represents Failure, a reminder of women's "condition of unequal Constitutional status," of exclusion From the "Federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights" Cxi). On the other hand, the Equal Rights Amendment stands for the success of a movement, the importance of which lies less in the drama of an amendment’s ratification than in a movement’s statement about an effort on behalf of women’s desire For equal opportunity and status. Indeed, the contemporary women’s movement which reached its climax in the 1970s revived and extended a two-hundred- year-old debate over women’s rights. It provided impetus For federal and state commissions on the status of women, brought pressure For special legislation on behalf of women, created the EEOC along with numerous task Forces on women’s rights, and brought to public awareness a host of issues from women’s right to seek employment outside the home, to their choice of surnames and the use of Ms.., to their argument that women have the right to control their own bodies CNarlow & Davis, 1976). Yet, today women are still . struggling to improve their social status and political and/or economic opportunities. It is the Red Queen pattern all over again: women are continually running Faster and Faster to stay in the same place CZimmerman, 19B1). 16

Dimen (1966) summarizes the present predicament of women as one which is ambiguous and contradictory. The present state of feminism is like the present state of women— ambiguous and laden with contradictions. Women are living in a time when, despite the gains they have made toward social equality, patriarchy retains a stubborn, if not more hidden, hold in all of our thoughts, feelings, and social institutions. The currrent problem is that womBn are supposed to live as if they were free when in fact freedom is still in the future. To live in such a particularly ambiguous circumstance is to struggle endlessly with contradiction. . . . We want to shape our own lives to satisfy our own desires, yet find ourselves conforming to familiar social rules and institutions that imprison rather than free us. Still, at the same time as we collude in patterns and rules ingrained in us by childhood and tradition, we also try to resist the temptation to follow them Cxx). If, indeed, the past is prologue and Dimen is correct in her assessment of women’s present predicament, then perhaps the comtemporary women’s movement has been merely another episode in a rather confusing and complex saga about women’s nature, status, and place: Women are perhaps caught in a vicious circle, doomed to make organizing efforts to achieve the impossible. In some ways, of course, the past will always be prologue, as this study will show. But the past need not be, for any of us, the future. As for Dimen’s "current problem," it is misstated. The diffuculty is not "that women are supposed to live as if they were free when in fact freedom is still in the future," but that even amidst changes women may be imprisoned by their own efforts 17

to be "free." As this study will show, some women are clear about who they say they are, what they want, and what roles they wish to assume. The difficulty is that women have not been sufficiently reflective about the most basic issue: identity . Since the eighteenth century, issues of women’s identity have been subordinated to arguments over alleged social effects. Such issues have arisen from different views of women’s roles. There are those who defend women’s traditional position "by arguing that it is in accord with some kind of biological imperative," or who criticize this position by claiming that biology would not be destiny if women were given "opportunities for education and professional advancement which were equal to those of men" CJaggBr & Struhl, 137B:xii3. There arB others, still, who condemn women’s oppressed position on the grounds that it is "a symptom of pervasive oppression endemic to a class society" Cxii): and, finally, there are those who, denying that a class system alone results in sexism, advocate the interdependence of gender and class in an attempt to create "a new system that is not dependent on male domination or any exploitation of one group by another" C141). 18

Clearly, then, different assumptions about who women are arise from and lead to different Cand sometimes contradictory) ways of viewing women in the historical/technical/political context. Based on these assumptions, research from various perspectives— socio­ political, philosophical and/or psychological— have attempted "the documentation of and explanation for women’s continuing inequality" CBanks, 19B1:1). While "who woman is" has been important to the assumptions underlying these perspectives, the process of identity sense-making has not been investigated.

The Specific Area of Studu

Since the lS70s the topic of women in technology has been a growing area of research. Reflecting the feminist concern with equating tools and machines with male values, expertise, and control, papers and panels on women’s roles in the invention and use of technology began to appear at the annual meeting of the Society for the History of Technology CRothschild, 19B3:xv). Today there is a significant amount of literature and research which, while acknowledging the importance and prominence of technology in our society, investigates Cl) the roles of women as active participants in technological change, CS) the effects of 19 technology on women, and C3) the technical, cultural processes which position women as being outside of and dominated by those processes. The most recent Feminist scholarship dealing with women and technology refutes the notion that technology, either as a Field of endeavor or as "tools," is off-limits to women. In fact, there is evidence to substantiate claims that women have been not only consumers but also inventors of significant technology CStanley, 19B3), that women are not "anti-technocrats: CTrescott,1379:31, and that women have experienced the same limited opportunity, oppression and sexism in the area of technology as they have in the larger social sphere CZimmerman, 19B1). Since 19B0, a concern has grown among women about the major developments in the technology of human reproduction. While such technologies may be potentially beneficial to women Cand the whole of humankind), there is the fear on the part of some feminists that reproductive technology processes might well be used as a means of oppression for women. Feminists who Fear reproductive technology see it as an extention of the controlling, male-dominated patriarchy. This study addresses specifically the area of reproductive technology because the issue of woman’s identity turns, for 20 the most part, upon women’s role in bearing and caring For children. The area of reproductive technology provides a microcosm in which to investigate the question of identity creation. Overview of the Studu This dissertation investigates identity creation rooted in the human capacity to name— that is— to construct symbolic reality. The Focus oF the study is on identity sense-making in the naming behavior oF women, since identity is a key issue in women’s struggle to overcome the Red Queen Syndrome. Because "the naming behavior oF womBn" and "identity sense-making" are such broad areas, the study attends to women’s symbolic constitution oF identity in the discourse on reproductive technology. The study suggests that this specialized discourse, because it centers on woman’s reproductive role, contains in microcosm the whole oF the struggle over woman’s identity. Thus, Chapter Two reviews literature and scholarship by women about women’s identity as it appears in Cl) Feminist discourse, C2) communication scholarship, and C3) Dissertation Abstracts. In addition, Chapter 2 surveys scholarly works which use as their methodology Brown’s C197B) model oF social intervention. Brown’s model is grounded in the naming process and provides a way oF 21

accounting for the symbolic construction of reality as well as for the maintenance/decay of that reality. Chapter Three discusses the naming process, how human beings symbolically constitute reality for themselves and for each other, and how naming is used by human beings in a rhetorical dialogue. The chapter concentrates on the way persons make meaning through "abstractive seeing" and how the process results in persons’ making sense of the world. Chapter Three explains how persons, having named the world, use names. Chapters Four and Five describe and explain the methodology for this dissertation. Chapter Four is a general overview of Brown’s C197B) model of social intervention. The purpose of the chapter is to provide a view of the model as a whole and to explain how "ideologizing" is "communication process"— that is, how through the symbolic construction of reality, "human beings can comprehensively order their experiences and subsume their specific activities" CBrown, 197B:1E45. Chapter Five demonstrates the operation of the model as critical method. The chapter situates the model within the rhetorical critical tradition and then discusses how Brown’s representative system works to explain women’s attempt to 22 name thBmselves. The chapter shows, through extended examples from the women’s movement, how the model both explicates rhetorical acts of women as they name who they are and how the model is a means of framing knowledge about women’s "place." Chapter Five details the workings of the subcycles of the model: nBed, power, and attention, and shows how the interrelation of the subcycles provides ways of exploring identity creation through an investigation of the symbol-making/symbol-using activities of human beings. Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight detail the rhetorical process of identity creation by examining the academic and popular discourse about women’s place in the dBsign and utilization of reproductive technology. Chapter Six discusses the languaging community of women who are in favor of using reproductive technologies and who view these techniques as mechanisms which "free" them to fulfill their reproductive capacity. Chapter Seven focuses on the languaging community of women who denounce reproductive technology as the controlling and dominating arm of patriarchy. Much of the discourse of women who denounce reproductive technology is a direct refutation of what users of technology see as freeing. Chapter Eight details the responses of the critics of reproductive technology, attempting to sort out the names others use regarding 23

reproductive procedures in order to make overt the underlying issues suggested by these names. The Final chapter summarizes the study, discusses conclusions and implications of the study and suggests areas For further research. The Importance of Naming Naming is a rhetorical process, a mode of action, a way of making human experience into symbols. Symbolic conceptions of the world mediated by language provide a way of knowing the world. Through the rhetorical process of naming, we shape the shaping of our experience. In a complex and continuous process, human beings create names which create social institutions. The social institutions, however, also create names which focus attention and direct behavior. We learn to catalogue the world, to create "expectancies" associated with names, to act in accordance with those expectancies, to focus attention on what unites or divides us Cflakay & Brown, 1378). This study will show how the underlying process involved in naming reality is important to an understanding of who women are in relation to their environment Ctheir needs, and other people). It is a study in microcosm and can be applied to the naming proces of all human beings. 24

Data Selection and Audience

Several classifications in the Libraru of Congress Subject Headings led to a number of works related to "women and technology": Women— Addresses, essays, lectures; Women, Technology— Addresses, essays, lectures; Women— Human reproduction; Women— United States— Attitudes. From the works suggested by this list, I selected only books authored or edited by women Cbecause I am studying the discourse of women) since 1976, the year "Women in Technological History (WITH) was formed . . .with a major purpose to promote ’scholarly research, publication, and teaching about women in the history of technology’" CRothschild, 19B3:xv). Among the books selected were four volumes of collected essays by women interested in the relationships among women, technology and production, technology and social values, women in technical policymaking, women and the development of technology, and women and technological change. There was also one book about women, technology, and the future by a single author. All five books helped provide a general understanding of women’s positions regarding women’s role in the overall area of technology. The literature on reproductive technology, however, furnishes the specific data for this 25 dissertation. I began collecting the specific data by searching LCS under the following headings: Amniocentesis— Social aspects; Artificial Insemination, human— Social aspects; Human Reproduction— Social aspects— Political aspects; Pregnancy— Social aspects— Addresses, essays, lectures; Prenatal Diagnosis— Social aspects; Women— Sexual behavior; Women’s Rights. The search yielded eleven books, seven of which are collections of essays on reproductive technology. Again, I chose books authored by women. Some of the collections have more than one editor, some of which are men, but all the articles which provide the data are authored by women. A search of Studies on Women Abstracts and Women Studies Abstracts from 1300 Cwhen technology and reproduction began to be linked in the subject headings) to the present listed over 75 possible articles by women dealing with women’s concerns about human reproductive technology. Both sets of abstracts are important because they range across many academic disciplines and index all the major books and Journals Cincluding international ones) dealing with women in relation to the subject headings in the abstracts. 26

AFtBr reading through the data collected, as described above, it became apparent that women in the academic discourse about women and reproductive technology uiere responding to popular discourse about women in reproductive technology. I checked the bibliographies of the women writing the academic discourse in order to read Firsthand what the academics were responding to. AFter ascertaining the themes and issues to which academics were responding, I then checked The Readers’ Guide to Periodical Literature For the past two years in order to determine whether there were any new themes in the popular literature. From this survey, I Found three new articles oF note. They covered, For the most part, the recent Baby n Case. In addition to the articles From The Reader’s Guide, three articles were serendipitously obtained. Two articles I Found in [Is. magazine to which I subscribe (These articles also appeared in The Readers* Guide. 3: one article was Found in People Magazine, an article which caught my eye as I was browsing through the magazine. I used the article because it contained a recent case oF surrogacy. This search For data yielded a sample oF 10B pieces oF discourse: 35 Journal articles, 17 newspaper articles, IB popular magazine articles, 33 articles which appeared in books Cedited collections on reproductive technology or 27

other edited collections related to the subject), and 5 books Cnot edited collections) devoted to issues of reproductive technology. In analyzing the data, I accounted for the Following power shares in women’s endeavor to create identity: women who approve of the techniques of reproductive technology, women opposed to such techniques, and women who both approve and disapprove of reproductive technologies. In addition, it was necessary to take into account such power shares as social institutions Csuch as the law and the medical profession), men, and the "patriarchy" Cwhat some feminists refer to as the male-dominated social sphere). Finally, Dissertation Abstracts was searched using an online data base and the key words: women, female, world view matched with identity, self-concept, reproduction-tive technologies, surrogate, insemination, in vitro fertilization matched with communication, mass communiation, sociology, philosophy, psychology, political science, language and literature. The key words were chosen so as to avoid scholarship of a technical nature. One search was used for two purposes: Cl) to ascertain the extent of the scholarship on women’s identity and reproductive technology, and (E) to ascertain what kinds of studies have used 28

Brown’s C197B5 model of social intervention. No scholarship was found that could add to the data on women and reproductive technology. Several works were found on identity and some works were found to have used Brown’s model. These works will be reviewed in the next chapter.

Summaru

This dissertation, then, investigates women’s identity from a communication perspective. More specifically, the study uses a rhetorical model based in the naming process to reach conclusions about how women learn and create names for their identity. The chapter began by stating the personal impetus for this research. It then detailed the extent and purpose of the study, and explained the background and the specific area of the study. This chapter also provided an overview of what will be presented in the following chapters, made a statement about the importance of naming, and explained how the data for this study was selected. The next chapter will consider how scholars have approached women’s identity— their role, status and function in society. Chapter 11

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

In 13B3, Betty Frledan (1903), in her now classic The Feminine flustigue. criticized society’s expectations of feminine fulfillment declaring that "the core of the problem for women today is . . . a problem of identity" (77). Ten years later, Mary Daly (1973), speaking of the same problem, maintained that "women have had the power of naming stolen" from them. UJe have not been free to use our own power to name ourselves, the world or Bod. The old naming was not a product of dialogue— a fact inadvertently admitted in the genesis story of Adam’s naming the animals and the woman. Women are now realizing that the universal imposing of names by men has been false because partial. . . . To exist humanly is to name the self, the world and God (8). What Friedan and Daly have proclaimed during the past two decades is no less true today: The American woman has "no private image to tell her who she is, or can be, or wants to be"; instead, she is given a "public" image, the "feminine mystique" (in whatever farm), a name created by society and reinforced by the media, to tell her who she is (Friedan:

29 30

72) . This is not new, of course. In the Western world, men and institutions dominated by men have had much to say about who women are Cor should be) In classical antiquity, For example, Plato CRepublic) considered women to be "lesser" men while Aristotle CPolitics) saw women as possessing inferior human traits. In the Hebrew world, women were respected and were sometimes influential, though Judged subordinate to men in Genesis. The Romans subjected women to the patriarchal order while allowing them to participate in some social, public functions CMarlow & Davis, 1976: 6). During the Middle Ages, Christianity was the dominant systematic and comprehensive patriarchal philosophy/theology. Having grown out of Judaism, Christianity perpetuated the ancillary role of women by pointing to scriptural passages which stated that woman was created for man CGenesis 2:IB) and that a wife was to be submissive to her husband CEphesians 5:22). Despite the writings of such men as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola C14G3-1494) and Cornelius Agrippa Cc. 14B6-1535) who asserted the dignity of women during the Renaissance, the status and perceived nature of woman changed little during that time CMarlow & Davis: 11). Some educational 31 opportunities uiere open to women during this time, but the rising Protestant reform stressed woman’s position as wife and mother (Hamilton, 1978). While the dignity of woman within the marriage bonds was a challenge to the notion of the evilness of woman as preached by the Roman church, it was, nevertheless, considered a secondary position, one of companion and helpmate to the husband, the head of the household. Such a conception of woman persisted into the age of industrialization and is reiterated by social institutions today. Though there are several variations on the thBme of woman’s nature, status, and role, the constant in the male version is woman as ancillary, secondary, complementary to man. Her main role is to bear and raise children; his, to subdue nature and contribute to the progress of civilization. Some women's ideas about who they are, however, differ from the male version. It is women’s conceptions of themselves that concern this study. Therefore, this chapter reviews literature and scholarship by women about women’s identity as it appears in Cl) feminist discourse, CE) communication scholarship, and C3) Dissertation Abstracts. In addition, this chapter surveys scholarship that uses Brown’s C197B) model of social intervention as its method of 32 inquiry.

Selection oF Materials: Feminist Discourse

It is impossible, of course, to review all the discourse of women who have, in various ways, characterized women. The literature is vast and complex and cuts across many fields. Thus, for this review, mainly books by women who have written about woman’s nature have been selected. In addition, articles which appear in anthologies or collections devoted to woman’s identity or woman’s nature have also been considered. In searching for literature on "woman’s identity," I tried to locate writings of women which argue or advocate a theory about who woman is or could be. In writing about "who woman could be," the authors usually advocate some commitment to or action in favor of the proposed possibility for woman. This eliminates books and articles about specific topics in women’s studies Ci.e., mothBr-daughtBr relationships, working mothers, dual career families, etc.) unless such topics are somehow used to illustrate identity-creating action or commitment to a theory of identity. The review contains more books related to the identity of woman than articles, since books generally allow for a 33

more thorough development of the subject than do articles. The articles appear in collections devoted to specific theories Cor ideas) about utoman’s identity (i.e., Marxist Feminist theory). It is assumed that editors of the collections have chosen the articles specifically to illustrate a particular point of view about woman’s identity and that the articles in the collections are considered basic or "classic" to the theory and/or are thought to express principles/concepts important to the theory. In an effort to determine the thought of individual women in regard to woman’s identity, only books and articles by a single author have been selected for review. Grouping individual points of view should repeat patterns and points of view of multiple authors as well as reduce to a manageable number the books to be reviewed. Collections, of course, may have multiple editors, some of which may be men, but each article selected for review has been written by one woman. The collections each present either a single view/theme regarding the identity of women, or sections that Focus on a single view/theme. The articles within the collections or sections present variations on that view/theme. 34

Books selected for this review have been written after 1963, since that is the publication of Friedan’s The Feminine flustiaue. which is generally used to mark the beginning of the contemporary women’s movement CMarlow & Davis, 197B; Jaggar, 19B3; Banks, 19B1). Assumed in this study is that the contemporary women’s movement is a continuation of the "first wave" of femininsm, beginning with Mary Wollstonecraft CBanks, 19B1), and that questions concerning woman’s identity have not yet been resolved. Neither is there an agreed upon definition for woman’s identity. Thus, books since 1963 by women ought to continue the discussion/dialogue of the identity issue and should include or build on definitions of woman’s identity articulated from Mary Wollstonecraft to Betty Friedan. The publication date of articles is not so important as the publication date of the anthologies in which they appear. For example, editors of an anthology dealing with a particular theory of woman’s nature might well select "classic" and/or rudimentary articles on, say, Marxist feminism, which appeared in a Journal in the 1950s. The article may not have been considered particularly important in the 1950s, but may well have been considered fundamental to the feminist theory anthologized after 1963. 35

A search of the Library Control System (LCS) at The Ohio State University Library revealBd well over 300 possible titles related to woman’s identity. The search was conducted using the Following categories listed in the Libraru of Congress Subject Headinas: Feminism/Women— philosophy, Political (Politics), United States, Psychology, History, Quality oF LiFe, Socialism, Social Structure, Political Science, Sex-Role. Since The Ohio State University Library System is the seventeenth largest in North America CHandbook. 1383:3), and contains within it a Women’s Studies Library, it is assumed that the titles located on LCS would be representative oF the most signiFicant books on the subject under consideration. A total oF 55 books and IB articles From collections were selected For inclusion in this review.

Selection oF Materials: Communication Scholarship

Because journals are the key to ongoing scholarship in the Field oF communication, the search to determine what kinds oF studies women have conducted about women’s identity began by consulting The Index to Journals in Communication Studies Through 1SB5 (Nation) and Communication Abstracts. Nation indexes all the journals in the Field oF 36

communication C15) except Women’s Studies in Communication. In nation’s Index the Following categories were searched: Women— Communication Courses, Contemporary Rhetoric, Electronic Journalism; Women in— Print Media, Television, Theatre; Women— public address; Women’s Debate; Feminist Rhetoric, television; Sex Differences— Interpersonal Communication, Public Speaking, Small Groups; Sex in — Print Media, Television, Persuasion; Sexism— Persuasion. Communication Abstracts is an international survey. It abridges books in the field of communication as well as articles from the communication journals. Communication Abstracts was consulted in an effort to locate any books written by women about woman’s identity from a communication perspective. In addition, Communication Abstracts was used to locate pertinent scholarship in Women’s Studies in Communication and in the Journals from 19B6-19B7 not listed in the Matlon Index (through 1985). 5ome communication Journals indexed in Matlon are not cross-referenced in Communication Abstracts (i.e. Communication Education). Those Journals were searched by consulting their tables of contents for 198B and 19B7. 37

Selection of Materials: DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS

Dissertation Abstracts was searched in the manner described in Chapter 1. The object of the search was not only to ascertain the extent of the scholarship on woman’s identity and reproductive technology, but also to ascertain what kinds of studies have used Brown’s (1978) model of social intervention as a method of inquiry.

Review of the Materials: Feminist Discourse An examination of women’s discourse revealed that ideas about woman’s identity (woman’s role and status in society) depends mainly upon (1) women’s views of their differences/similiarities to men, (E) women’s v Ibws of "inequities," and (3) women’s views of what it means to be a fulfilled (happy) person in American society. The theories of woman’s identity articulated by women can be categorized broadly in terms of socio-political categories: (1) traditionalism, (E) liberalism, (3) Marxism/socialism, and (4) radicalism. Before I proceed with the review, however, a word needs to be said about the delineation of these categories. After examining the literature, it is evident that certain authors operate from a basic set of assumptions and principles from which they explain who woman is or could be. The categories 38

are those spoken of often in the literature CJaggar, 19B3; Donovan, 1965; Marlow & Davis, 1976), and follow Jaggar & 9truhl C197B) and Jaggar C19B3) in grouping women authors according to their ideas about human nature. My assumption is that women authors base their ideas and conclusions about woman’s identity upon thBir understanding of what it means to be a human being. There are, of course, difficulties that derive from any attempt to categorize theory. In the first place, theories appear to be "things" because we think of them in that way. Much of their substance, however, rises and falls with the continuity and change in perceived social realities. We likB to think of these theories as discrete, but they are not. They are not meant to be discrete. They simply name the general names women have given to woman. They providB basic contexts from which to talk about women’s ideas about woman’s identity. Secondly, categorization of theory entails the organization of this categorizer. It is this organization that provides the perspective from which readers view feminist theory. It is the abstractions, the names of this categorizer, that help the reader see with this categorizer’s eyes the common ways women identify 39

themselves— and at the same timB the fundamental differences

among them. The categorizations of the ways uiomen talk

about woman’s identity, therefore, are merely ways of

maintaining order; they are not as important as what women

say about identity. Admittedly, therB are some omissions. First, a specifically religious theory of the nature of woman has been omitted because much of that discourse is specialized and therefore outside the mainstream of contemporary feminist dialogue. In cases where the assumptions of feminist religious theory overlap with general theories of woman’s identity, religious theory is subsumed under the categories of this review. Mary Daly (1973,1978), for example, though a religious philosopher, espouses the basic tenets of radicalism. Another omission is a special category for feminists of color. While any theory of the nature of woman cannot ignore the experiences of women of color Cor, indeed, the experiences of any group of women), the principles and assumptions of the theories discussed in this review are meant to apply generally to all American women. Also, although some of the authors chosen for this review have identified themselves as lesbian feminists or have used lesbians for a case study in order to theorize about the 40

identity of woman, lesbian Feminism, too, has been omitted as a separate category. Many lesbian Feminists Follow the principles oF radicalism. The categories, then, are broad, generally accepted ways oF thinking about woman’s identity and activity in the socio-political sphere CJaggar, 1983; Marlow & Davis, 1976; Donovan, 1995). In some respects, the categories described here are oversimpliFications; in others, distortions. In no respect, however, are they meant to be Judgments. They are meant as representations oF basic gestalts about the nature oF woman and are used here as a means oF giving order to the proliFic literature about how women view themselves.

Traditionalism The traditional view oF who woman is is based on the biological structure oF human individuals. It is this natural structure, For the most part, rather than individual eFFort or social institutions, which determines human interests, desires, social roles, abilities, needs and psychological orientation. The biologically based diFFerences between men and women, thereFore, are seen by traditionalists as being natural, unchangeable, and, in most respects, good. The traditional view argues that woman’s identity is determined by her physique, which is smaller 41 than man’s, wBaker, lass sturdy, and uniquely structured to bear children (Marloui & Davis: 17). It Follows From this that woman is CiF not inFerior) secondary to man in all respect's. It is, however, an inequality traditionalists can accept. In the "natural" order oF things woman is considered dependent upon man. Because oF her physical structure, woman is unsuited For certain tasks and Functions and is incapable oF acquiring the qualities or skills which would enable her to survive on her own. The traditional view oF woman’s nature supports the idea that division oF labor Falls naturally along biological lines. Woman is naturally suited For the domestic sphere— to bear children, to keep house, to serve Cor complement) the man who must provide a living and contribute in the public sphere outside the home CSchlaFly, 1977). The traditional view, then, assumes male dominance in the human species. Here, the name For woman is helpmate- mother and companion. Woman is man’s natural complement and, iF woman is to be all that she is capable oF becoming, she must seek to please man by developing "womanly" qualities— passivity, delicacy, sensitivity, nurturance Cflorgan, M., 1971)— thus enabling man to be all that nature intended. 42

The traditional view lends itsBlf to the interpretation that woman, because she is "weaker" than man and different from him anatomically, is "inferior" to man and, perhaps, evil. But this is a male version of traditional woman’s nature CSamra, 1371) which women who identify woman from this innatist view fight against. Some traditionalists see woman as good, fascinating, privileged, and even superior to man in many ways— though they see man as dominant or "first" in the hierarchy of the species. Elaine Morgan C1972) is such a traditionalist. She takes the Darwinists to task, for example, for their insistence that "man" is the agent of evolution. It is woman, Morgan insists, who developed first, shedding most body hair, standing Brect, using tools. Even though woman, for Morgan, is "superior" in many ways, man is still dominant in the hierarchy of the species. Hrdy C19B1), in tracing the development of female primates notes that the

"inferiority" of the fBmale is stereotypical. CTlhere is no basis for thinking that women— or their evolutionary predecessors— have ever been dominant over men in the conventional sense of the word . . . Cthere are) substantial grounds for questioning stereotypes which depict woman as inferior to man . . .Cl). Women, however, can achieve fulfillment and happiness in American society. Because human beings are a step above 43

primatBS, natural inequities need not lead to the oppression

of women by men. Biological inequities between men and

women determine who women and men are and their roles in the

social sphere. Traditionalists such as Helen Andelin C196E3), Ruth Peale C1971), Maribel Morgan C1971, 1973) and Phyllis Schlafly C1977) have no intention of advocating sexual equality of the sexes— socially or otherwise. Both Andelin and Peale maintain that a woman’s happiness and fulfillment lie in being loved by a man. The differences between the sexes are divinely ordained and the road to personhood for woman lies in her efforts to succeed at being a wife and mother. Morgan agrees with Andelin and Peale that a woman’s happiness depends upon how well she fits the womanly role. If women do not feel fulfilled, it is their own fault; woman’s biology inclines her toward nurturance and tolerance. In both her books, Maribel Morgan explains how woman as wife has the responsibility to meet her husband’s needs, to make him happy. If a woman wants her marriage to succeed, she must find ways to accept her husband as he is, admire him, adapt to his needs, and appreciate what he does for her C1973:SI). 44

Schlafly’s The Power of the Positive Woman advocates much the same position as do Andelin, Peale, and floragan. According to Schlafly, woman is created by nature for the "highest" calling: to bear life. Her place is beside her husband CIS). Though Schalfly admits that women can make contributions in the public sphere, her basic thesis is that women need to develop a positive attitude in order to accept the identity that has been ordained for them by nature. Wolgast C1380), though she speaks in terms of "equality," also defines woman by her biological function. Uiolgast advocates special rights for women based on their capacity to bear children. UJolgast does not see legal equality as a benefit to women since legal rights for women interfere with women’s relationship to their children.

In summary, then, women who are traditionalists emphasize the biological differences between men and women.

Though men and women are both members of the human species, biological structural differences determine who they are and their roles and status in society. Traditionalists do not reject thB concept that men are considered "dominant" members of the species sincB thB "inequality" nBBd not lead to oppression. Women can be happy and fulfilled in American society by accepting their roles as helpmate-mother and companion. 45

Liberalism Feminists who write in the liberal tradition define woman as a human being, an individual with the capacity to choose her own mBans to Fulfillment CDowling, 19B1). This view of woman as responsible agent is rootBd in Enlightment philosophy which considers that to be human is to possess the ability to think, to know, and to understand the universe which, during the seventeenth century, was thought to be governed by simple rational laws (Merchant, 19B0). Human beings in this position are placed above the animals in the "Chain of Being" and are distinguished From all other forms of animal life by possessing the capacity to guide their moral and social life. Human beings can thus claim certain natural rights by virtue of their "humanness," regardless of their gender. Liberal feminists, then, see no difference in the human capacity among men and women and claim that attitudes of male dominance are a result of social conditioning CAndreas, 1971). Human beings Cmen and women) thus claim the right to rule over the non-rational world, to establish societies in which they can fulfill their human potentiality. In this view, individuals become extremely important. They are, in fact, considered "ontologically prior" to social groupings 46

CJaggar:EB). Individual human beings use reason in an instrumental way to achieve ends, and they assume that individual desires and interests can be pursued and Fulfilled in some measure apart from the desires and interests of others CJaggar: 30; Donovan: 3). Liberal Feminists lay great stress on individual choice and criticize society For impeding the fulfillment of women who, they assume, possess human rational capacity in the same degree as do men CFriedan, 19B3; 19B1). In Fact, liberal Feminists stress thB same Enlightenment ideas that constitute Familiar political values in the United States. The inherent value of the human being— eloquently expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the American Bill of Rights— has, since the time of Mary UJollstonecraFt C179E), been at the heart of the liberal Feminist’s definition of woman. To be human means to possess a rational mental capacity CJaggar, 1383). Liberal Feminists hold that women as well as men possess this capacity in equal measure CRothman, 1978; Amundsen, 1377). This does not mean that individual differences do not exist. The assumption is that the essential human quality— the capacity to reason— belongs to all human beings. It only appears that men are more capable in the social sphere than women because women have 47

been, For the most part, relegated to the home and have not had the same opportunities For social-political development as have men CJaneway, 1371; Friedan, 13B3D. Much writing oF liberal Feminists argues For the "humanness" oF woman by criticizing the traditional view oF woman and advocating establishment oF a "place" For women in the public sphere, as well as suggesting strategies For change. Papa C1BB1) seeks to conFront the traditional idea oF woman’s inFeriority by exposing sexism in society and in the Christian church. Even though Papa reFers oFten to scripture, her work is oriented more socially than theologically. Her main point is that the inFerior status oF woman derives From woman’s lack oF opportunity and the male interpretations oF humanness within the church. ThB church’s interpretation oF women as inFerior beings is, according to Papa, a moral outrage, since both women and men possess the same quality oF humanness. Both Rothman C1B7B) and Amundsen C1977D attack traditional deFinitions oF womanhood, but while Rothman describes thB changes in woman’s status since 1B70, Amundsen concentrates on the powerlessness oF the American woman to exercise her rights oF personhood. 48

Reeves (1979), too, looks at the social stereotypes that define concepts of women. She discusses patterns of performance— patterns that limit woman to private space— and patterns of thought that underlie traditional reasoning about woman’s place (2-3). Reeves urges women to take note of the direction Df their lives and to ask serious questions about their significance as human beings C159). Among the strategies for change, liberal feminists support raising the consciousness of American women as well as advocacy for women’s rights in the social sphere. In The Feminine tlustioue Coriginally published in 1963), Friedan C19B3) encourages women to examine their own lives and represent their own needs. Later, Friedan (1901) argues for the inclusion of men in women’s decision-making. Billings (1974), in writing about independence, urges breaking mental sets that may be confining and using self-examination as a way of enhancing self-conept (3). Dowling (1991) explores the concept of self-responsiblilty and Clinebell (1973) affirms the importance of self-assertion while promoting the notion of "meeting in the middle" (32-33). The message of Clinebell’s book is that the dominance-submission pattern of relationships between men and women are a result of social conditioning and should be replaced by patterns of negotiation carried out between equals (110-19). 49

Andreas C1971), in inquiring into the possibilities For social change, takes particular note that social influences and institutions "are partly responsible For the ways that sex differences develop in a society" (3). Andreas discusses how social institutions have limited women’s opportunities in the social sphere. Her main strategy is to "unmask" the "ideological premises" of educational, religious, and business institutions which dictate the way people must live. Social change, according to Andreas, can be accomplished only when women Clike men) are free to develop their human potentiality (139-40). Advocates of liberal feminism Ci.e., Janeway, 1971; Friedan, 1993; Andreas, 1971) usually urge women to expand their horizons beyond the confines of the home. Thus, in their writings, they analyze social conditions at length. Janeway investigates society’s beliefs and dynamics in order to enable women to deal better with the changes they need to make in their lives as they establish themselves in the social sphere. Kolbenschlag (1991) uses popular fairy tales to delineate restrictive social attitudes toward women and to provide ways of breaking through such attitudes. 9ince liberal feminists view women as having the same human essence as men, some writers focus on breaking down 50 the social barriers that keep women from reaching their Full potentiality. Janeway C1971) explores social myths. Dowling C19B1D maintains that women are not "trained for Freedom at all, but For its categorical apposite— dependency" (3). Such barriers limit woman’s Free "choice" CFriedan, 19B3) and prevent her From attaining Full human stature. In order to eFFect social change, women must insert themselves into public liFB where they can inFluence the laws that govern society (Reeves, 1979:1595. Liberals acknowledge that there are innate diFFerences between men and women and among individuals, but these diFFerences do not determine sex roles. Society does that. Liberals point to the androgynous paradigm as a solution to the distinction in gender which is socially instituted CJaneway, 1971; Yates, 1975). It is possible For individuals, though physically Female or male, to act in society as human persons. Gendered, psychological behaviors, tasks, values traditionally assigned to males or Females "should be shared by both, except For behavior dictated by purely physiological diFFerences" CYates, 1975: 3). Traditional Female/male roles can disappear through strategies oF conversion. The primary Focus oF social change becomes cultural rather than narrowly political or social, and the goal oF androgynous ideology is pluralism— 51 diversity within unity CYates:21). For liberals, then, human beings have essentially the same rational capacity. Innate differences are not as important as the essential human rational capacity. Social inequities between men and women would disappear if all persons within the system shared legal equality. Ulomen, like men, can be happy, fulfilled human beings in American society if social conditions change and opportunities in the social sphere are equally available to all. Marxism/Socialism Marxist/Socialist feminism is directly opposed to the liberal tradition. Though there are some significant differences between feminists who claim to be Marxists and those who claim to be socialists, both groups are discussed in this section of this review because they share a common method of social analysis and a common conception of what it means to be human. For both Marxists and Socialists the human being is a unique biological/environmental/social combination. Human beings are, of course, biological creatures. They share with other living creatures biological needs and endeavor to satisfy those needs.

It is, however, through meaningful, creative activity— praxis— that human beings distinguish themselvBS from other 52

living creatures. Not only do human bBings interact with the environment to satisfy physical needs, human beings also transform the non-human world through conscious and purposeful activities which, in turn, constitute humanness CMarx, 1367:170). For Marx, this conscious and purposeful activity— praxis— is social in nature and is also a way to satisfy human needs. Thus, according to Marx, the satisfaction of human needs is the "first historical act"; that is, the human being produces ways to satisfy neBds. This, in turn, leads to the creation of new needs which must be satisfied CMarx & Engels, 1370: IB,43). In thB continuous process of generating new ways to satisfy needs, human beings create their humanness through productive activity CJaggar: 54). The mode of production, then, in any society becomes of paramount importance, since through it human beings establish social relations and form their consciousness CMarx, 1367). The human being constitutes/expresses him/herself through materialistic, productive activity. This assumes that human beings do not create themselves in isolation but rather in some changing historical context. Marxists, in taking account of human productive activity within an historical context, analyze social relationships that are, at base, materialistic, that is, economic and 53 political— the organized ways in which persons attempt to satisfy needs and constitute their humanness. For Marx, the key to understanding social relationships is understanding the notion of class. History shows that with the onset of industrialization and the institution of private property, society was fragmented into groups. One main group, the proletariat, has, since the Industrial Revolution, been in constant struggle with society’s other main Cand dominant) group, capital. The proletariat class struggles against the capitalist class for control of the means of production. Belonging to a specific class in society means sharing similar experiences, productivity, and social conditions— a class consciousness— which sets the pattern of class attitudes, thought and action CMarx, "Communist Manifesto," 1968) . The ideology of the proletariat is dialectically opposed to the ideology of the capitalist class which structures society by dictating its mode of production. The capitalist mode of production dehumanizes the proletariat, who must produce in order to satisfy the needs of the capitalist. The proletariat, deprived of conscious, meaningful activity, struggles with the capitalist in an effort to constitute its own humanness CMarx, 1367). Marx advocates revolution, overthrowing the 54

capitalist society, in order to create a communal society which would guarantee that everyone could engage in meaningful activity. Actually, however, it is Engels’ remarks concerning women’s subordination which Marxist feminists apply to questions of woman’s nature and to what oppresses women. According to Guettel C1974), woman’s nature, like man’s, is formed and expressed through praxis. Thus, questions of woman’s situation are investigated by looking at woman’s productive labor. In adopting the Marxist perspective, feminists liken women’s domination by men to the proletariat’s domination by capitalists. What Marxist feminists advocate is that women shed "false consciousness"— male ideology— and develop a consciousness of their own so that eventually women can "develop a strategy to organize for liberation" CGuettel: 1) . Marxist feminists concentrate on aspects of woman’s work: what woman’s work is, how it is valued, how it is exploited, how it influences woman’s life. The major aspects of woman’s work which Marxist feminists discuss at length are domestic work Cincluding reproduction! and wage work Cwork outside the home). Both Guettel C1974) and Bmith C1977) agree with Engels that when women and men, in the time before the establishment of private property, were able 55

to engage in creative (though separate) activity, there bias no alienation Found in gender. Before the matriarchal •~ociety (which Engels describes as rather utopian) was taken over by patriarchal powers, men and women each were in control of their own labor. No one was dominant. Property was held in common. With the establishment of privatB property, however, came surplus, the exchange of goods and services, ownership, hen benefited from the transition because they became dominant. Women’s work was devalued and relegated to the private sphere. The household became the basic economic unit in the new capitalist society (Engels, 194E). According to Marxists, the new society was founded on the domestic labor of the wife, who kept the basic economic unit viable and produced wage laborers while the husband sold his labor to capital (Smith, 1977; Guettel, 1974; Hamilton, 197B) . For Engels the solution to thB problem of women’s oppression lay in the communization of domestic work and in women’s full participation in the work force outside the home (Engels, 194E). What Guettel (1974) advocates is that production relationships need to change before a new society can be created (E3) . Since Guettel accepts the 56

Fundamentals of historical materialism, she argues that it is the condition of labor which determines the conditions of life (*±9) . Not only must women enter the workforce outside the home, but they must also share in the ownership of production (49). Karen Sacks (1975) and Kathleen Gough C1975) also support Engels’ view that women will never achieve "social adulthood" unless they can move into the social sphere (£E1). Again, simply entering the work force is not the whole answer for women Cor for society as a whole). According to Hamilton C1970), Marxists believe women can be liberated only with the complete overthrow of the captialist system. Other Marxist feminists who have written on work include Peggy Morton C1980), Gayle Rubin (1975), Margaret Benston C197B), and Evelyn Reed C1978). Morton looks at the family as a unit operating to maintain the reproduction of labor (£47). The needs of the economy determine the structure of the family. The woman is in a mid-position trying to maintain her role as housewifB-nurturBr against that of laborer (reproducer) (849) Benston maintains that housework is important in the economy since women in households produce what is consumed by their Families. Their work, therefore, is not without value. It is, in fact, unalienated because what women produce is for "use" 57

not for surplus (131). Reed considers that women have been oppressed by social forces rather than by their biology (1E4). Women’s biology is not their destiny because women are social beings— with all that that implies in the Marxian sense (4). Socialist feminists, on the other hand, have modified the traditional Marxist position. While they share the historical, materialistic methodology with the Marxists, socialists incorporate and synthesize some ideas from the radical feminists. Like the Marxists, socialists hold that human beings constitute their humanness through interrelations within a society. Jaggar C1983) contends that while Marxists understand that women are oppressed by capitalist patriarchy, that is, by the sustem of social organization, socialists look at particular institutions which oppress women. While Marxists analyze the oppression of women from an economic perspective, socialists see women as being most oppressed by sexism in our society C133-34). Socialists insist that all women do not belong to the same class, that women sometimes struggle against each other, for example. Despite Jagger's attempt at differentiating Marxists from socialists, in most cases the distinction is blurred because both groups of feminists rely on concepts 58

Socialist feminists also discuss questions of class as they apply to women. Sandra Harding C1SB43 seeks the material base of patriarchy and capital. Jackie UJest C1S7B) articulates the basic socialist position regarding the relationship between women and sex and class. Rowbotham C1973) finds the solution to women’s subordination to lie in communism, while French C19B5) writes about the patriarchal system in terms of power. On the topics of sex and gender, Mary O ’Brien C1983) stresses that the different social relationships of men and women to the reproductive process affect their consciousness of that process. Because woman’s experience with reproduction is a continuous process from conception through birth and childrearing, her philosophy of "birth and regeneration" allows her to tend, in her life and lifestylB, toward "policies of integration with nature and life" CS015. Petchesky C1SB01 argues for women’s reproductive rights, given the the materialist conditions of contemporary society

(663) . In addition, socialists such as Juliet Mitchell C1974), Nancy Chodorow C1S7B) and Dorothy Dinnerstein C1S76) concentrate on psychological aspects of women and differences between men and women. Even though 59

articulated by Marx and Engels. Socialist feminists also uirite about the same themes as do the Marxists— alienation, work, biological reproduction. In some cases, the emphasis may tend specifically toward woman’s culture and experience and the oppression that stems from the sexual divisions in all areas of society. Ann Foreman C1977) and Zillah Eisenstein C1979) explore women’s alienation in the domestic sphere. Foreman also argues that "Femininity" is a social construction that alienates women by reducing them tD sexual objects C21). Rubin C1975) explains the function of domestic work as contributing to surplus through reproductive labor C156). In speaking about women’s relations to capitalism, Mitchell C1973) stresses the importance of Feminist consciousness and argues that women’s "entry into the work­ force is not enough: theu must enter in their own right and with their own economic interest" C1B0). Michele Barnett C19B0) analyzes women’s oppression by returning to "pre­ capitalist" society as described by Engels and then argues that women at that time were indeed alienated and oppressed and did not live in a utopian society C51). Hartman C19B4) discusses men’s control over women’s work and considers, also, that the difference in wages between men and women contributes to women’s oppression C9, 25). 60

psychoanalytic theory is at base rooted in the biological determinism of Freud, some socialist Feminists claim that psychoanalysis as a method helps explain gender construction. Many socialist feminists use Freud’s theory, but base it in historical materialism. Chodorow C197B), for example, examines the concept of gender within Family relationships and relates gender to the sexual division of labor. In addition, some socialists have investigated other aspects oF women in a sexist/oppressive society. Hartsock C19B1; 19B33 argues for the development of a "Feminist standpoint" to counteract patriarchal subordination, since women’s activity is not the same as men's activity regarding labor experience and practice. Fisher-Manick C19B1) supports examining women’s experience but warns against consciousness-raising that is directed at one class of women— white, middle class (157-585. Fisher-Manick’s point is that women of one class can assume the position of the "dominant" class and can oppress women of another class in the same way as men oppress women in the sexist society. Jane Flax C19B1) underscores the need For Marxist theory in Feminist issues because it is through praxis that Feminist revolution and freedom From oppression will occur. Henly C1977) concentrates on the dialectical relationship between 61 women’s body language and gender. Henly seeks to expose the tension between sex and society with reference to norms of gender which she interprets as norms of sexist power. Thus, feminists who write from the perspective of Marxism/socialism share the historical materialist method of analysis. Praxis is important to both Marxists and socialists. All human beings create their own consciousness in specific historical situations through interactions with the natural environment and human society. Marxists and socialists, however, tend to concentrate on the differences between men and women as a class. Some socialists such as Jagger C1903) claim that socialists Cin contrast to Marxists) recognize differences other than class differences C126). Jagger contends that socialists recognize physical and psychological differences between men and women as well as class differences, age differences, etc. Further, socialists claim to recognize these differences among women. Marxists and socialists claim that inequities (between man and women or between women and women, or both) are the result of "class" distinctions. Marxists and socialists advocate a classless society to alleviate inequities. 62

Radicalism

Radical feminism is expressed in a vast, complex array of literature. Radical feminism is not an organized feminist theory such a liberalism or Marxism in that it does not stem from an existing political theory CJaggar, 1903). Rather, radicals incorporate several assumptions about human nature from the liberal and the Marxist/socialist views. Common to most radical feminist theory, however, is its focus on what is distinctly "female" in human nature— woman’s reproductive capacity. This does not mean that radical feminists believe that biology is destiny. Rather, for radicals, human beings are either female individuals or male individuals whose experiences of life and living are different because of their relationship to reproduction. Radical feminists selected for this review stress values derived from the experience of human individuals who are women. In general, these theorists see the human being as having the capacity to direct, control Cfor some theorists, create) their lives so that they can achieve human fulfillment. The focus, however, is on the reproductive capacity of women which, for radical feminists, is the origin of societal structures. 63

Several radical feminists, then, have written about the "woman’s issue" using human biology as a starting point. In Amazon Ddusseu. a collection of the author’s own essays and speeches, Ti-Brace Atkinson C1S74) tackles questions of how sex is related to power. The issues are significant for women, she says, because such issues are related to identity. The issues of "power" lead quickly to the problem of "identity." Identity is the foundation of "free will" and "responsibility." The choice, the decision to fight any given oppression depends upon "identity." Cxxiii). For Atkinson, the reproductive experience defines womanhood; because of this experience women are oppressed and exploited by men C1-53 . For Susan Brownmiller C1S763, "all men keep all women" in a state of fear because men have the ability to rape C53. The male is "a natural predator" and female his "natural prey" (6). In another book, Brownmiller C1984) asserts that biology alone does not determine what is "feminine" in our society C153. In Femininitu. Brownmiller traces "significant feminine principles" to basic biology, but also explores socially constructed concepts of female gender, including the female-against-female competition to attract men C17- 1BD . 64

Dworkin (1979), like Brownmiller, talks about the power of male oppression. Dworkin, however, explores pornography as an instrument of male dominance and violence. The male- supremacist ideology supports the "metaphysical assertion of self" that expresses itself in "intrinsic authority" C13). It is this authority that is used as power and expresses itself in pornography. It has the same ability to terrorize as does physical violence C14, 15). Germain Greer C1971) also discusses the female body so that women can reassess themselves C4). In order to learn who they are, women must question the most basic assumptions "about feminine normality in order to reopen the possibilities for development which have been successfully locked off by conditioning" (4). Thus, Greer begins with the specifics of the female body and then moves to other aspects of woman and relates them to biology: soul, love, hate. Firestone’s classic C1970) is actually an historical materialist analysis of woman’s subordination. But Firestone doBs not explain women’s oppression in terms of economics. Instead, she explores the "sexual substratum" by concentrating on "biological reproduction and childbearing, leading to unequal division of labor" based on sex (4, S4B). 65

Washburn (1977) submits that woman’s search for identity is a search for "wholeness" via the life-crises of "being a Female body." Lerman C19B6) uses psychoanalytic theory to present a "Feminist theory oF Female personality" Cxix). She asserts that women must Formulate theory about women. Rather than seeing Female biology as the root oF problems For men and women, Lerman, in reevaluating Freud’s theory, maintains that Female biology can become the starting point For a woman-centered psychoanalytic theory. Mary Daly (1973; 1970) celebrates Female biology. In her books, she supports the myth oF the Amazon but asserts that woman’s specialness goes beyond biological distinction. Actually, Daly’s works are based on woman’s ability to name the world. Much oF the book involves re-naming the universe From a woman’s point oF view. SherFey (1970), too, celebrates Female biology by insisting that woman has a superior sexual cycle. Men, Jealous oF this high sexual drive, needed to suppress women in order to establish dominance (224) . In OF Woman Born. Adrienne Rich (197B) argues that mBn have always been "haunted by the Force oF the ideas oF dependence on a woman For liFe itselF" (11). In looking at the process oF reproduction, Rich distinguishes between "motherhood" and the patriarchal "institution oF motherhood" 66

(34). While motherhood is "one part of female process," Rich contends that it is "not an identity for all time" (37) .

In Sexual Politics. Kate flillett (1370) takes the male system to task For relegating women to a lower caste status through the power of male ideology . Her work begins with scenes of sexual abuse From prominent male authors in order to illustrate male attitudes toward women. Millett sees sexual abuse as a political strategem For the domination of women.

Several other radical feminists have written on various topics related to woman’s experience. Roxanne Dunbar (1S70) urges that women recognize that their sexual differences have conditioned their oppression. Dunbar counsels revolution to overthrow present society so that a new social structure can be built based on feminist principles. Singer (1976) speaks in terms of male-female "psychic dualities" (1). She decries the tendency to seek polar dominance and, like liberal femininsts, argues For the abolition of gender stereotypes and for the establishment of an androgynous society (33). Because Singer sees present attitudes toward sex and gender as the basis of women’s domination, she advocates a sexless, genderless society, but not for the 67 same reasons as do some liberals. According to Dana Densmore (1973), women have spent too much energy arguing about sexual freedom. Liberation means being free spiritually and intellectually as well as sexually. Susan Griffin C190O) focuses on another aspect of female experience— woman’s feelings and her experiences as one with the natural world. Griffin rejects excessive attention to reason, which she sees as a masculine trait. Instead, women need to get in touch with their feelings that give them a special way of knowing and being. Radical feminists, therefore, concentrate on the similarities in all women’s experiences and how those experiences are different from the experiences of men, especially in the area of female biology. Some radical feminists celebrate female biology while others see it as a source of oppression. Some radical feminists experience the process of reproduction as a source of power; others look upon the process of reproduction as a tyranny. Though all radical feminists agree that women are oppressed and that much of the oppression is related to perceptions and processes of sex and gender differences in society, radical feminists do not agree as to how oppression should be eradicated. 68

Review of the Materials: Communication Scholarship

The object in searching the communication scholarship uias not to revieui every study on women. Rather, the intention was to ascertain how, since 19B3, women in the Field of communication have studied women and how these studies might be related to woman’s identity. Again, articles written by one scholar were selected For review. No books were Found on the topic. Only two articles were Found which relate directly to woman’s identity. Both are related to the category oF liberalism. In "AFFirmation by Negation in the Women’s Liberation Movement," Brenda Hancock C197ED uses a dramatistic approach to show how uiomen deFine themselves in contrast to the identity oF males C264) . Hancock shows that by naming the capitalist society as "enemy," radical Feminist rhetoric "has created Feelings oF sisterhood and a new identity For women by angrily negating or rejecting the identity oF males C264) . It is Hancock’s opinion that a group oF women can attain aFFirmation by deFining themselves "as the antithesis oF traditional masculinity" C2713. In line with the precepts oF dramatism, Hancock asserts that such actions on the part oF women separate them From the "enemy," redirect guilt, and uniFy the group in common cause 69

CS71). In the end, however, Hancock criticizes these "pro- woman" strategies by stating that women’s rhetoric must go beyond "man-hating and unification." Ultimately, Hancock sides with the liberals who favor changing the society which produces sexist attitudes CH71). Karlyn Kohrs Campbell C19B0), in her analysis of Stanton’s farewell address, shows how the crusader, in detailing the "principles and values underlying the struggle for woman’s rights" is also identifying the human being as a solitary individual C30E, 306). Campbell makes the point that in her speech, Stanton emphasizes that woman is, like man, a solitary human individual who must be responsible for her own burdens. The solitary quality of woman "is a refutation of the argument that woman is dependent on man " and a refutation of the "inferiority of women" C307). Here Campbell is stressing Stanton’s belief in the essential humanness of all persons. Although these two articles explore in some measure the identity of woman, as does this study, these articles do not focus on the process of identity creation. Campbell C19B0) shows how a social reformer’s defense of humanistic individualism is also a rationale for feminism C304). In essence, Stanton uses herself as a paradigm for human 70

solitude. She names herself as a human being whose essence is the same as any other human being. For Stanton, according to Campbell (19B0), the magnitude of human solitude is a human experience (306) . Hancock’s article seems to be delineating a process involved in identity creation, but the movement she speaks of is a dramatistic progression in which naming the enemy in the first act sets the stage for further enactment. Indeed, Hancock speaks of negating a name and of the immediate results of that negation— sisterhood among revolutionary women (566). At the conclusion of the article, however, Hancock affirms that negation and unification is not enough, and she asserts that women will have to come forth with some social programs for the reconstruction of society (671). UJhat Hancock does, then, is expose some rhetorical strategies in the rhetoric of the radical women’s liberation movement (661). Some communication studies were found focusing on some aspect of woman’s communication activity or on some issues in women’s studies from a communication perspective. These include research on (1) the women’s movement, (6) individual women rhetors, (3) women in the mass media, (4) aspects of woman’s language, (5) feminist culture, (6) gender differences, and (7) teaching about women. 71

(1) Studies of the uiamen’s movement are various and difficult to classify, though all of the following echo aspects of liberalism. Sonja Foss C1979a, 1979b) and Noreen Kruse (19B3) write about the rhetorical conflict among groups over the ERA. Solomon C1970, 1979, 1903) focuses specifically on the conflict between supporters of ERA and STOP ERA. Campbell C1973) explores the rhetoric of the women’s movement as a distinctive genre, while Gold C19B1) looks at the movement’s beginning by considering the rhetoric of the Grimke sisters. In studying the movement as a whole, Campbell (1993) analyzes feminism as a single rhetorical movement that incorporates early and contemporary feminist rhetoric. Other scholars, such as McPherson (1973), Yinling (19B3), and Luebke (19BB), focus on techniques of women’s communication and particular forms of advocacy during the movement. Finally, Kroll (19B3) uses fantasy theme analysis to explain how the rhetoric of the women’s movement is altered as it moves from small group to public view.

(E) In the area of individual women rhetors, Mansfield (1971) and Japp (19B5) have written about Abigail Duniway, active in the suffragist cause, and Angelina Grimke, an abolitionist. Studies of political leaders have been 72

presented by Dees (1573) in her piece on Bernadette Devlin, and by Berry C1S81) who focuses on Emma Goldman’s rhetoric of agitation. Graham (196*1), as a contributor to a symposium, makes some observations about Margaret Chase Smith during the 1564 presidential campaign. The speeches and speechmaking of Ti-Grace Atkinson are explored by Beatrice Reynolds (1973). In investigating writers of major works, Huyink (1979) analyzes Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics, while Hynes (1975) studies the dramatic propaganda of a play by Mercy Dtis Ularren. None of the women presenting these studies is directly supporting a socio­ political theory as delineated above. All are interested in the achievement of women. (3) The most prolific literature concerning women in the mass media involves studies about women’s images. Concerned with the sexual stereotyping of women on television are Lemon (1977) who writes about the portrayal of women (and blacks) during prime time; and Levine (1976), who argues that the television comedienne, rather than her Jokes, is the object of derision. Mildred Downing (1974) finds that the heroines of the daytime soap operas are portrayed as the most adequate human beings on television. Linda Busby (1975) gives an overview and summary of research on sex roles in the mass media, current to 1975. Finally, 73

Canter C1977) discusses the "Report of the Task Force on Women" conducted by the Corporation For Public Broadcasting and uionders what happened to its recommendations. In examining the print media, Jones C1975) complains of the stereotyping of the spinster detective. Gibbons C1979D, through a series of questions, examines the relationship between advocates of women’s rights who edit periodicals For women, and the mass media For whom the women’s movement was a news event. Farley C197B3 looks at the presentation oF the ERA in various women’s magazines. Anderson C1973), using Kate Millett’s precepts For an ideology oF sexual politics, analyzes the images oF contemporary women politicians as they appear in women’s magazines. C4) Btudies on the topic oF aspects oF women’s language are as varied as studies on the women’s movement. Both Taylor C19B6) and Kramer C1974) investigate the diFFerences in language between the sexes. Taylor, however, investigates non-verbal behavior while Kramer considers evidence For "systems oF co-occurring, sex-linked linguistic signals" C14D. Sterk C19B6) compares and critiques salient stylistic Features oF woman’s epideictic discourse. Fern Johnson C19B3) provides a critical analysis oF the major attitudinal positions on women’s language. Somewhat related 74

to studies detailing differences in language between men and women are articles by Nancy Bliese C1977) on sex-role stereotyping of the adjectives women use, and an empirical investigation by Patricia Bradley C19B1) of the "Folk- linguistics" of women’s speech. (5) Two studies were found on women’s culture. One, by Patti Gillespie C1978) explores the rhetorical phenomenon of feminist theatre. The other, by Carol Stern C1983) examines the rhetoric of social gatherings Cparties) in fiction by Virginia Woolf and Henry JamBs in order to ascertain feminine sensibility in communication. C6) ThB study of sex differences in communication is a popular area of research, flost studies Df this type arB conducted through team effort; thus, the names of all the researchers appear as authors oF the manuscript-. What follows is a survey, however, of articles by one woman researcher. The topics covered represent studies of sex differences in communication conducted by multiple researchers. Gome scholars focus on the research process itself. Sonja Foss C19B4), for example, examines the discursive practices that govern sex difference research from a female perspective. Karen Foss C19B4) attempts to link research on communication and gender to Feminist theory, while Jackson (1984) surveys the available research 75

methods useful in the study of gender role in communication. Barbara Bate C19B4) ascertains uihat concepts in gender/communication research are submerged. Other aspects of gender/sex differences in communication include a study an self-disclosure CChin, 1906), one study an speech accommodation CUheeless, 1904), and two on gender profiles: Dohrmann C1975) looks at children’s TV, and Siegerdt C1903) delineates a representation of organizational communication behavior. In addition, Johnson C1904) outlines the positions for knowing about gender differences in social relationships. C7) Three studies are concerned with women and education. Jackson C1961) describes the teaching style of Mabel Farrington Gifford. Karre C1976) offers strategies for eliminating stereotyped sex-role in communication classrooms. Both Sonja Foss C1970) and Cynthia Berryman C1979) present methods and materials for the presentation of courses on women. Berryman focuses on women in communication; Foss, on contemporary feminist theory. Thus, a survey of the scholarship related to women and women’s identity in the field of communication reveals two articles that relate directly to women’s identity. The other articles relate to aspects of women’s communication 76 activities or to issues in women’s studies from a communication perspective. The socio-political categories are not explicit here, but most articles imply liberal principles. It would be difficult, in fact, not to hBar undertones of the socio-political categories in any discussion of women's activity. These articles from the field of communication delineate women’s communicative achievements, for the most part, what is communciated about women, or what differences occur in the communication behavior of men and women. Although a case could be made for the presence of specific lines of argument from the socio-political categories presented above, it is not in the interest of this survey to do so because Cexcept for the two articles by Hancock C1972) and Campbell C19B0) discussed above) what women have written about women in the field of communication does not relate directly to identity creation. These studies do not consider that the dynamics of identity reside in the communication process itself.

Review of the Materials: DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS

Dissertation Abstracts was searched in an effort to determine what studies have been conducted in the area of woman’s identity and reproductive technology, the subject of this study. In addition, I wanted to locate studies that 77 used Braun’s C197B) model of social intervention as their methodology. This survey uas not limited specifically to women scholars, since the intention of this search uas not to ascertain uhat uomen have researched about uomen, but to discover uhat scholarship has been presented on the same topic and using the same method of inquiry as this study. No research uas found on the topic of women’s identity and reproductive technology, but several studies uere found on uomen’s identity. None of thBm, houever, used Broun’s model as the investigative instrument in the reseach. Ulhat follous is not a complete survey of the studies, but a sample of the kinds of research that has been conducted on this topic. Identity as an area of inquiry cuts across several fields and research related to uoman’s identity appears to abound, particularly in the 1370s, uhen much attention uas focused on the uomen’s movement. Several studies in psychology, for example, investigate the identity experience of college uomen Ci.e., Josselson, 1972; Brady, 1973). Some seek to relate feminist identification to vieus on uomen’s issues CFreeman, 19BB) uhile others detail psychological factors involved in uoman’s identity CKimelman, 1973). Still others focus on role conflict, rolB identity, gBndBr 78 identity, leadership identity, and self-concBpt investigated in conjunction uiith numerous variables (See Kirsch, 1974; Lubban, 19BE); Chavow, 19B1). These studies, however, are empirical in nature, and were conducted through questionnaires or interviews of a designated sample in order to measure variables related to identity. In other areas of the social sciences, research has related perceptions of power and coping patterns to sex-role identity in women (Joyce, 13B4), has explored the social construction of sexual identity (Reback, 19BB), has identified the changing role of American women (Chafe, 197E), and has compared role perceptions among housewives and professional women (McKenzie, 197ED. Again, while such studies are about identity, most of them are not about the process of identity creation. The study by Reback (19B6) is about the "construction" of identity. It analyzes gesture, symbols and objects in the lesbian world. Though the methodology involves symbolic interactionism, the study is based, broadly, on social interaction rather than on the creation of social reality through languaging strategies, as is this present dissertation. There are several studies about woman’s identity in the fields of language and communication. Much research in the language area, however, focuses on fictional characters 79

Ci.e., Eldis, 19B6; Hill, 13B5; McGrath, 197B; Skaggs, 197B). In the field of communication, Fish C1975) attempts to determine the meaning of femininity as reflected in the verbal statements of a selected group of women. This research, however, is conducted from a phenomenological point of view, which is not the perspective of this study. Runyon-Lancaster C19B05 also researches the communication of identity, but this study is an interactionist approach emphasizing the social situation in which identity is enacted. Runyon-LancastBr compares and contrasts expressions of identity monitored during group interactions with identity descriptions from the Twenty Written Statements Test. While this is a study of identiy process, it is an attempt to measure a progression which is never complete. Studies in the Rhetoric of Social Intervention Six dissertations have used Brown’s C197B) model of social intervention as a method of inquiry into intra- and interpersonal rhetorical processes. Anderson C19B31 and Corley C1SB3) focus on the attention subcycle in Brown’s model— on conceptualizations of worldview. Both Anderson and Corley apply Brown’s process model to the comprehensive life interpretation of leaders. In the study of Carl F.H. 80

Henry, Anderson shams ham HBnry manages continuity and change in order to maintain his conception of reality. Corley uses the model to demonstrate horn Holmes negotiates worldview identity through rhetorical action. Like the research of Anderson and Corley, the present study explores symbol-making and symbol-sharing as the basis of rhetorical action. Unlike the the above mentioned studies, however, the study at hand is concerned with the rhetorical process of women as a group rather than with one feminist leader. Also, the present study focuses on perceptions of power in the identity process and the implications of those perceptions as revealed by the model. Lopez C19B5) also focuses on attention or the "imput- switching" subcycle of Brown’s model to study national development policy making. However, while LopBz examines aspects of symbolizing which featured or obscured opportunities for probing action and organization in the ideology of national development, he also uses Brown’s model in conjunction with Burke’s representative anecdote. While in the present study concerning identity creation, Bormann’s concept of rhetorical vision is explained, rhetorical vision is used as a synonym for Brown’s concept of gestalt Cor worldview). The "rhetorical vision" is not intended to be a part of the method of inquiry for the present study. 81

Stoner C1SB7) researches the Free Speech Movement. Stoner uses Brown’s C1SB7) attention and power cycles to show how the students who perceived the university as "factory" intervene to influence the organization of hierarchical structure of the university. Both Snyder C13B7) and Dpt C13B7) study symbol-making as the basic human dynamic. Snyder integrates all the subcycles of Brown’s model in his research on Campbell as an agent of change in perceptions of need, power and attention in the Stone-Campbell movement from 1B30-1B40. Opt, likewise, uses all three subcycles of the model in considering the changes in the perceived reality of artificial intelligence and expert systems. The present study, too, explores the symbol as the basic human dynamic and uses all three subcyles in the investigation of women’s identity creation. Like Opt’s work, too, the study presented here examines thB process under consideration from a naming perspective. Even though all six studies use Brown’s model, each study is unique in that it uses the model to highlight different aspects of the communication process. In turn, in applying the model to different communication events or to different perceptions of reality, the researchers show the 82

range and versatility of the model. No two studies using the Brown model can be the same since, at core, the model relies on the symbol-making/sharing propensity of the researcher. At the same time, communication scholars, with their awn rage to construe an ordered world feature and mask aspects of the communication process in human beings.

Summaru

A review of thB literature and scholarship about woman’s identity, then, reveals materials on the subject in a variety of fields. In feminist discourse, ideas about woman’s identity follow assumptions about human nature. Uomen attempt to express what it means to be a human being who is a woman in the American society. The feminist discourse on woman’s identity, therefore, can be categorized in four ways: Cl) Human nature is determinded naturally by biology (traditionalists); CS) Human nature is distinguished from animal nature by the inherited and nurtured mental capacity to think, choose and control the environment Cliberals); C3) Human nature is constituted through meaningful, creative activity Ctlarxists/socialists); and CH) Human nature is based in the mental capacity to think but is biologically influenced such that human nature is 83 constituted in the social sphere through meaningful, creative activity. This activity is distinctly masculine or Feminine (radical Feminists). These are not discrete categorizations. They overlap in several areas because they are based up the ways in which women Cl) view their differences/similarities to men, CE) view "inequities" between men and women and between women and women, C3) view what it means to be a Fulfilled person in American society. The literature written by women who can be categorized as "traditional" or "liberal" assumes names for the human individual or for woman. For the most part they argue as to the appropriateness of those names and they discuss why those names should be accepted or how society could be changed in order For those names to be accepted. They do not Focus on how those names are created as this dissertation does. Feminists in the Marxist/socialist tradition and those categorized as "radical Feminists" do discuss the ways in which women constitute identity. The Marxists/socialists Cand some radical Feminists), however, see materialistic creative activity as the basic human dynamic. Some radical feminists base the identity process, in part, in male/female experience and activity. In this study, Following Brown (1978), I will consider that symbol-making/sharing is the 84

mast Fundamental activity of the human creature. In the communication scholarship, tuio studies are related to the identity of woman. ThB article by Campbell C19B0) is not about name creation. It shows how Elizabeth C. Stanton used a namB to articulate an idea about human identity. Hancock’s C1972) article identifies how women name the enemy, but, except For arguing For the paradox of affirmation by negation, Hancock’s article does not consider other aspects of identity creation. There are several other studies found in the communication journals relating indirectly to woman’s identity, but For the most part they isolate aspects of the communication process as it applies to women, or explore the ways in which women talk about themselves or others from a communication perspective. They do not study the process of identity creation. Several dissertations have presented research on the topic of woman’s identity. These studies, however, are either empirical in nature, or concentrate on some aspect of woman’s identity in conjunction with one or more variables. The dissertations in the field of communication on woman’s identity do not focus on identity creation. There are no dissertations which investigate the identity of women in 85 conjunction with reproductive technology. Six dissertations use Brown’s C197B) model of social intervention as the investigative tool. These studies and the study at hand share symbol-making as the essential Focus because naming reality is at the heart of the Brown modBl. The present study differs from these six in subject area and in emphasis. Overall, the literature suggests that identity is an important topic of consideration and research. The present study will begin by discussing the naming process before describing the method of inquiry and analyzing the data. Chapter III

THE NAMING PROCESS: THE SYMBOLIC CREATION OF REALITY

introduction

In this study, identity sense-making is assumed to be a rhetorical process. To identify is to name, to provide a symbol for, to construct the human symbolic reality For something or some experience CBrown, Ul. , 197B) . To engage in identity sense-making is to engage in the process of naming oneself. to keep arriving in the midst of change at the sense of "continuity, sameness, and uniqueness that is confirmed daily in one’s actions and in the mutual affirmations of others" CDoyle, 1974:IB). Identity sense- making means to give reality to oneself, to "'make one’s identity happen’ within one’s own cultural and historical period" CDoyle:IB). Naming is Far from a simple matter. It involves the human abstractive process that depends upon conceived interrelationships among perceived objects, persons, and experiences in a particular culture amd time period. In order to understand, then, how someone can "name oneself" and so "make identity happen," it is necessary to understand

86 87 what naming is and than to look closely at the identification process itself. What Naming Is Naming— "holding on to the object by means of its symbol" CLanger, 1957:1353— is a uniquely human activity. In Western world mythology, naming set the human being above the beasts CGenesis 2:BOD. Beasts cannot produce symbols, read symbols, share symbols to the same extent as can the human being CLanger:72). Naming is the most fundamental activity, the process by which people transform, that is, make real, experience through symbols CLanger, 1975). The human being, in fact, cannot "know this world by means other than symbolic conceptions, many of which have been mediated by ordinary language ..." CMakay & Brown, 1972:65). The now familiar story of Helen Keller’s coming to symbolic awareness illustrates that naming is the key to human mental life CLanger:2B). The liquid running over the hand of blind-and-deaf Helen Keller became more than W-A-T-E-R, a sign spelled by fingers, more, even, than a substance asked for when thirst prompted. What Keller realized was that water had a name, "that a certain datum in her limited sense world had a denotation, that a particular act of her fingers constituted a word" CLanger:62). This 88

human "abstractive seeing," an ability beyond physical human sight, enables individuals to disregard everything about a sense datum except the form it embodies CLanger:72), to make patterns of the Form— in short, to make symbols through which individuals construe an ordered world and thus make sense of Cor make "real") reality. The art oF naming is the "common, universal, and necessary act oF the ancestors oF the Chumanl race" CHooney, 1976:203). It is through naming that the grossi bestioni became human CVico, NS: par. 377). Naming is a Fundamental human need, a "rage," Burke says C1966) oF the symbol-using animal reaching For perFection. And yet, naming is an activity human beings take For granted, hardly reFlecting upon the process. Is it possible, asked Burke C1966), For us how important our symbol system is? But can we bring ourselves to realize Just how overwhelmingly much oF what we mean by "reality" has been built up For us through nothing but our symbol systems? Take away our books, and what little do we know about history, biography, even something so "down to earth" as the relative position oF seas and continents? What is our "reality" For today Cbeyond the paper-thin line oF our particular lives) but all this clutter oF symbols about the past .... And however important to us is this tiny sliver oF reality Bach has experienced Firsthand, the whole overall "picture" is but a construct oF our symbol systems C5). How, then, do we create our reality?— that is, how do we symbolically constitute our reality? What is the process 89

like for individuals? How do individuals make real reality For each other? And Finally, what role does naming have in the rhetorical process? THE NAMING PROCESS: How Individuals Create Realitu Even though, as Burke C1966) points out, "the ultimate origins oF language Care! as mysterious as the origins oF the universe itselF" C44), we can attempt to describe what happens when we use symbols to order and make real our world. All human beings use the same process to create reality symbolically, but the "reality" created varies among individuals. Let me explain. I am assuming that there are objects, persons, and events outside my skin and that I can somehow "know" and "grasp" them CSwanson, 1977a: £09) through the "abstractive seeing" oF which Langer speaks. I am also assuming that the objects, persons and Bvents in the world outside my skin are "intersubjective," and presenting themselves more or less the same to all persons CSwanson:£09), and that what one "knows" can be make known to others. The rub lies with the "more or less," For even IF the external world stands as basically the same For all individuals, there is no guarantee that each individual will "see" Cphysically and/or abstractively) the sensed world in the same way. While the shared human propensity For symbol-making and symbol-using can draw 90 people together, it can be divisive, too CBurke: 1966:13). As human beings, each of us shares with all other members of our kind the ability to make real the world, but each has a somewhat different perception of reality; that is each person views the external world through his/her own terministic screens and selective perception CBurkB:5E). There are a number of reasons for this. The sensing mechanisms may differ among persons. Some individuals may be blind, color blind, or deaf. Some persons have better memories than others; some pay more attention to detail. People have different innate and acquired need, learned in different social environments. Further, individuals interrelate differently with different people. Thus, an event in the external world, named and viewed through a variety of terministic screens, will be perceived, recorded/remembered, and interpreted differently by different people CBurke:46). "Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must also function as a deflection of reality" CBurke:45). Let us look, now, at how individuals "create" reality. 91

This communication process, by which one grasps Cknowsl, names, and shares Cmakes known], "is achieved by means of expressive actions which operate in language as signals, signs and symbols" CLeach, 1376:9). These ways of taking in and responding to our environment are essential ingredients in the way we make meaning. Though differences among them, as we shall see, are important, we are not always aware of those differences. In fact, we act as though the differences do not exist when we mix up signals, signs and symbols as we utilize and/or combine all three in our efforts to make meaning CLeach:13). This tendency to mix up signals, signs and symbols, what Leach C1976) calls "code switching," C22) is characteristic of the way persons make meaning and explains both the creative aspect in the human endeavor to construe an ordered world, as well as the confusion that results as persons transform reality and attempt to share their perceptions with others. A discussion of "meaning" needs to take into account "the relationship between observable patterns in the world out-there, and unobservable patterns 'in the mind’" CLeach:17), what Makay & Brown C1972) take to be "the sumbolic operation Cname-as-separate-from-thing) as opposed to the signal operation Cname-as-part-of-thing)" C370). 92

There are several ways that individuals respond to the world "out-there." One is by responding to a signal. A signal is an indicator which triggers some reaction. It is mechanical and automatic; human beings, like other animals, respond to a great many signals every day CLeach:IE). The smell of food, for example, triggers salivation; thirst prompts the body to seek water. "The message and the message-bearing entity are simply two aspects of the same thing" CLeach:IE). A sign, too, can trigger a reaction. A sign, like a signal, is an indicator and transmits sense messages CLanger:30). For instance, a person hearing the sound of thunder takes that sound as a sign that it is going to rain. The person’s reaction mau be to move toward shelter. A person who sees smoke usually understands that this is a sign of fire and mau be moved to investigate the cause of the fire, run from the fire, put out the fire, and so forth. "The use of signs," says Langer, "is the very first manifestation of mind" CE9). As soon as the animal Chuman or otherwise) becomes aware of sensations functioning "as signs of conditions in the surrounding world, the animal receiving them is moved to exploit or avoid those conditions" CLanger:E3). 93

A sign usually operates in context uiith other objects or events. Signs do not usually occur in isolation but convey information in some context; that is, . . signs are always contiguous to other signs which are members of the same set" CLeach:13). I have bBBn spBaking hers of natural signs Cthunder, smoke) and will discuss shortly signs in the context of human language. The point of importance now is that signs occur and operate in some "fixed denotation." In other words, there is some "intrinsic prior relationship between A and B" CLeach:14). This kind of relationship Leach describes as "metonymy." "Very roughly," Leach points out, "metonumu is where 'a part stands for a whole’; the index which functions as a sign is contiguous to and part of that which is signified" CLeach:14) . A sign, then, can function outside the skin, but it can also be manipulated "in the mind." I have been discussing signals and signs as indicators which operate outside the skin. But for the human being, signs are not only indicators. Human beings can turn a sign into a signal and can also use signs as signals CLanger:30). In the case of the "conditioned reflex," for example, signs can become "a concomitant of a stimulus" CLanger:23). The bell, which in another context may be a sign of an oncoming train, triggers 94

salivation in Dr. Pavlov’s dogs. At the same time, a tolling bell can become Cin a certain context) a symbol of the suffering and mourning associated with death. In another sense, though, a picture of a bell can be used as a representation of the telephone company. In this instance, however, the symbol has become so conventionalized that it becomes a sign CLeach:13). In such cases, code-switching among signs and signals can produce alternative construals of an assumedly intersubjective reality. That process is clearer when one considers the addition of symbols to the picture. Symbols, of course, are arbitrary representations and have no intrinsic or prior relationship to the thing Cevent, person) represented CLeach:14). In American culture, the white dress in an advertisement is recognized as the symbol for a bride. In another culture it might be recognized as the symbol for a widow. Symbols, then, are metaphors which indicate the agreed upon similarities in persons, objects and events. Thus, "where metonumu implies contiguity, metaphor depends upon asserted similarity" CLeach:14). This is important because while the discussion thus far has attempted to focus upon the human response to the environment outside the skin, it has been assumed that 95

something is going on inside the skin— in the mind. Not only does the person "take in" the external data through the senses, but s/he also responds to the sense data. The response may be, as me have seen, a sensory, physical response Csalivation, thirst). It could, however, be a response of "mind"; that is, the person can somehow project "something" onto the sense datum— a name, so that the sense datum has, For that person, a certain "reality" in the mind. The sense datum can be "taken into" the mind as sense image and can be manipulated by the mind: it can be compared with other sense images, categorized, associated with certain contexts so that, For example, it is possible For one name to call up For the person a whole range oF associations. Not only is a cowboy the man who rides a horse and keeps cattle in line, but the cowboy also can be a metaphor For the strength, Fearlessness, impeccability oF American manhood. The "in the mind” process oF "taking in" sense data and projecting some denotation created in the mind is the essence oF meaning-making. It is the human capacity to make relationships not only among the data outside the skin, but also between sense data and sense images, between the inFerrable relationships in the world "out there" and the created relationships in the mind. "The diFFiculty is to 96

understand how the sense-image, with which we can play games in the imagination is related to objects and events in the world out-there" CLeach:10).

We have already discussed how the human being responds to signals and signs and how persons can denote things and events in the external world arbitrarily. We have also seen how signs can be used as signals or how symbols, when conventionalized, can be signs. It is also important to note that some names, Csuch as "dog," "move," etc.) "orginate as descriptions of objects and events in the external world Cwhllel others are generated in the mind without reference to particular things and events in the external world" CLeach:13). What this amounts to is that from the external, observable world, the human beng "takes into the mind" Cabstracts) a sense image which s/he can then project back onto the external world as a name or as a denotation. This is what Leach calls "code mixing," the process not only of moving from metonymy Csensed experience inside and outside the skin), but also actually taking one for the other, or acting as if one is the other. The making of meaning is not, then, simply a process of intake/output, but a process of relationship-making and code mixing through which human beings give order to their world. Here are some 97

examples. For English-speaking people the letters FEMALE designate the sex that produces ova and bears children. There is no special reason why this is so. FEMALE is merely the name, the symbol Cmetaphor), the categorization English- speaking people have agreed to give to a particular sex. By means of this name a Female can be referred to whether she is present or not. Besides, this arbitrary name CFEMALE) can be applied to persons or objects in a variety of ways. Electronics technicians, for example, abstracting from female anatomical structure, refer to certain electronic connectors as FEMALE. In this country, FEMALE usually applies to both the sex and gender of women. That is, we associate certain social attributes (characteristics) with females— nurturance, for example, gentleness, passivity. It is possible to apply the arbitrary name CFEMALE) to men or to children. When the arbitrary name (metaphor) is applied over and over again, the relationship between the human person Cor object) and FEMALE begins to appear intrinsic (metonymic)— as do the relationships between the attributes of FEMALE and the persons or objects to which they are applied. In this way "code mixing" takes place. Metaphoric (symbolic) and metonymic (sign) relationships are notionally distinct and, indeed, in our ordinary processes of communication we make some 98

show of keeping them apart .... By code switching between symbol and sign we are able to persuade one another that metaphoric non-sense is really metonymic sense CLeach:E£). This linguistic code switching is a Fundamental component in the making of meaning and is a common tendency, as well, in forming relationships in human societies. The stories persons tell themselves and each other about the construed things become so taken for granted that the storytellers assume an intrinsic connection between the stories and the societal order, concepts and functions. For example, there is no intrinsic connection between the man we name as CDUIBDY and American manhood. There is no intrinsic connection between manhood and bringing home the bacon, between womanhood and cooking the bacon. But stories of cowboys, men and women in these contexts are repeated so often that we act as if the sense image is the sense ob lect. somehow we convert concepts into objects; "we give them relative permanence, and in that permanent material form we can subject them to . . . operations Cof the mindD" CLeach:37). Thus, via code switching, in making meaning Csense of the world), the human mind is capable of manipulating concepts, of drawing relationships and so of symbolically constituting reality, of making the mind produce an ordered world. 99

That "world," however, may not be the same For all persons. Our symbol system "necessarily directs attention into some channels rather than others . . . Csuch that! much that we take as observations about 'reality’ may be but the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms" (46).

UJhat predicament are we in, then? While "much of our 'Reality’ could not exist for us were it not for our profound and inveterate involvement in our symbol systems" (4B), we are plagued by ambiguities arising from differences in perception. What do human beings do about this? They classify; that is, they agree within the "language community" that certain concepts or language categories (words) relate to certain non-language categories (referents in the sensed world, or names "inside the skin"). A language category asserts a similarity among referents, but depending upon classification, categorization also points to "differences that make differences" Ctlakay & Brown, 197E:369). It is through the application of "same or different" to referents that we are able to share perceptions and come to some understanding of how others make sense of the world. 100

THE NAMING PROCESS: Houi Individuals Form Concepts The human animal is a social being who seeks through a system of symbolization to get beyond "the paper-thin line" of his/her own particular life CBurke:5). In order to do that, individuals depend upon the "vital principle of language Cand perhaps of all symbolism): Metaphor" CLanger:13B-139). A metaphor is more than a figure of speech, an implied comparison. A metaphor "is not mere ornamentation," Mooney C1976) reminds us Cparaphrasing Cicero), "but a necessity of communication arising from the poverty of language" C199). For Aristotle, the proper use of the metaphor was a mark of genius, for it meant that the person using metaphor had "an eye for resemblances" CPoetics:91). The appropriate use of metaphor is pleasing; it adds to our knowledge, for through metaphor we begin to "see" resemblances when there appears to be none and so learn new concepts through manipulation of ordinary language CRhBtoric:S06). A metaphor, then, can be thought of as a figure of speech and also as a language category that asserts similarities. When we assert similarities, of course, we do not eliminate differences. We subsume them. "In a genuine metaphor, an image of the literal meaning is our symbol for the figurative meaning, the thing that has no name of its own" CLanger:139). For example, in a 101

discussion concerning reproductive technology, a woman, contemptuous of in vitro fertilization might state that "the technician who cradles the petrie dish rules the world." Participants in the discussion, then, have not only an image of the activity of the technician, but also an image for a "mood." The speaker conveys the movement of the petrie dish by the technician as well as the wau the dish is moved. The participants in the discussion know what a lab technician is. They also know that a petrie dish is the "glass" wherein the human egg is fertilized by human sperm. The speaker here evokes an experience— "an image of the literal meaning"— which is expressed in terms of "cradle" and "rule." In this culture, we know what it means to "cradle" something. Ule understand the "rocking," "holding," and "nurturing" aspects of the word, which in this culture are usually associated with mother. The speaker invokes an image of motherhood. Further, we understand thB "power," the "authority," the "influence" involved in "ruling." In an instant, participants in the discusion abstract the similarities and understand that the speaker is attempting to convey a new concept— namely, that motherhood Cwith its attendant influence) has been taken over by "technicians." 102

□ur understanding of the metaphor depends upon our ability to "see" the similarities amidst differences in our experiences. Our understanding of the mBtaphor, in other uiords, depends upon how uie categorize. To categorize is to render discriminably different things equivalent, group the objects and events and people around us into classes, and respond to them in terms of their class membership rather than their uniqueness CBrunner, 1356:1). Human beings categorize for a number of reasons. The

first has been already discussed: it is tD "reduce the complexity of the environment" CBrunner:IE). ThBrB are so many "things" in our environment which present themselves in such an array and variety that categorization enables us to make sense or order out of those discriminably different people, objects and events. The abstraction process which enables persons to do this has already been discussed. Human beings categorize to identify the objects in the world CBrunner: IE); They place objects in a class so that they recognize them again. Having once "identified" a person as FEMALE, we can recognize a female again whether she is an adult, a child, a electronic connector, a flower. When we cannot identify something, "we experience terror in the face of the uncanny" CBrunner:IE). An infertile woman, for example, who must face the mechanical procedures of an infertility clinic is uneasy until she can identify 103 artificial insemination as "Nature’s helper." Having named the proces, she "knouis" something about it and the process "Fits" into the order of her world. Reducing the complexity of the environment by placing objects in classes "reduces the necessity of constant learning" CBrunner:IE) . We do not have to find a new name for a Female every time we encounter one. Once persons have abstracted defining attributes from objects, Future acts of categorizing are accomplished through recognition rather than through renaming. Consequently, categorization enables us to predict our activities in relation to the objects we have identified CBrunner:IS). We know how to react to a substance that is named as "poison," or to a person who is identified as "mother." Dur category system provides direction for "instrumental activity" without the need for further direct testing CBrunner:IS). When a women can name the process of artificial insemination as "Nature’s helper," not only can she "Fit" it into her world order because she knows something about it, but she can also predict what might happen if she uses it. Finally, the human ability to categorize permits persons to order and relate classes of events CBrunner:13). 104

It is the interrelation of classes of events Cnot only individual events) that give meaning to our world. We can uiatch the activity of a woman breastfeeding a child and can categorize the activity Cthe individual event) as

"nurturing." Actually, w b can classify SBVBral kinds of activities as "nurturing," but we can also placB "nurturing" in the class of "sustaining." The point is that we operate with category sustems— classes of events that are related to each other in various kinds of superordinate systems .... The moment an object Cor event! is placed in a category, we have opened up a whole vista of possibilities for "going beyond" the category . . . CBrunner:13) — which brings us back to metaphor as a way of linking categories. We speak of "a brook running swiftly," of "a rumor running through the town," of a "fence running along the river" CLanger:140). In none of these examples does "running" connote leg-action; what we do in this case is to abstract from "running"— a kind of movement— the concept of "continuous quick movement" and apply it to classes of objects that do not run. In Leach’s terms we have moved from metonymy to metaphor when we abstract "continuous quick movement" from the runner progressing along the country road and have moved from metaphor to metonymy when we apply "action" to objects that do not "run." 105

This establishment of relationships essential to the making of metaphor is what Grassi (1376) calls "the act of inoenium" (171). Inoenium. for Grassi, enables the human being to "grasp" reality— that is, to "know" reality, to see "similitude as a common element in things" (171). For Grassi, rational thought, in the traditional sense, consists of "connecting and abstracting in order to define sensory manifestations with a view to attaining universal and necessary principles and in order to substantiate or explain corresponding definitions" (184). But, with Vico, Grassi confronts this process with "metaphorical thinking." [Metaphorical thinking] is also a process of combining, connecting, and abstracting, but not of a rational nature tin the traditional, Cartesian sense]. The ingenious vision of relationships between sensory manifestations, a vision inherent in metaphor, represents the primary aspect of combining, the aspect of sharp-wittedness (104). Metaphor, then, is a way of thinking, a means to knowledge because it is a means of forming concepts. If, in Grassi’s view, human beings can understand each other’s metaphors, then they would have understanding of how other human beings think. Not only would they understand the similarities among names, but they would be aware, also, of differences among names that make a difference. This is important, since unless persons can understand how others think, they can become trapped in their own ordered view of reality— 106 their awn way of thinking. No intersubjective reality could be negotiated and shared. Grassi C19B0) uses the tragic prophet Cassandra as an example of one who comes to understanding through the use of metaphor. Cassandra, who possesses the gift of prophecy, is the chosen mistress of Apollo. Because she has denied herself to Apollo, she bears the punishment of having no one believe her prophecies or understand her utterances. Grassi recalls Cassandra’s exchange with thB Chorus in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon■ As first the Chorus and then Cassandra speaks, it is clear to the audience that the two are not communicating. Each is speaking from a personally ordered view of reality— a view that neither shares with the other. Each "moves in a space and time of its own" CEE). ThB Chorus speaks in the language of logical rationality; Cassandra, in language that is pictorial and poetic CEE) . Neither can understand the other because there is no shared metaphor— no way to link the names each speaks. Finally, in her frustration Cassandra asks Apollo whu he has placed her in this predicament. The Chorus responds when it recognizes the plea for an explanation. The Chorus’ explanation, however, is in the form of an image that 107 touches Cassandra. When the Chorus and Cassandra recognize that they both possess the ability to "grasp" and "know" reality, but that the reality of each must bB communicated so that the other can understand, they come to grips with "sameness" and "difference." The Chorus and Cassandra may have different views of "reality," but the act of ingenium is the same. When Cassandra asks for an explanation and the Chorus replies in the form of an image, both Cassandra and the Chorus have found ways to negotiate and share "reality." Perhaps the use of metaphor as a way of linking categories can be better illustrated through a contemporary example. In the recent movie, Children of a Lesser God, the protagonist is a young man who is a teacher of deaf children. In his capacity as teacher he meets Cand subsequently falls in love with) a beautiful young woman who is deaf and who is employed as a housekeeper at the school. The young woman refuses to learn to vocalize. She communicates through sign language which the teacher can readily understand, but those who do not understnd sign language cannot communicate with the woman. Throughout the movie, the young man is constantly frustrated in his efforts to get the woman to vocalize. To him silence is an obstacle, something that keeps the woman he loves from interacting more fully in the world "outside." She tells 108

him that he dees not understand "silence," that though they have the same name For "silence," they do not understand the same experience by that name. It is only, she tells him, when he can find a way to share her silence Cunderstand what she understands) that he will know the difference between her "silence" and his "silence." Then he will understand, too, why she cannot vocalize. At the climax of the film, the teacher goes swimming late one night in the school swimming pool. As he immerses himself in the water, he lets his body sink downward into the silent depths of the pool. Here he finds the metaphor that enables him to grasp the woman’s meaning For silence. Alone in that deserted pool, the teacher realizes that silence is not merely the absence of sound from the woman’s life; silence is. her life. It is all-enveloping, simply there. It is not an obstacle: it is the medium through which she lives. She can no more escape the silence than he can remain below the surface of the water. Through a powerful metaphor, then, the teacher becomes aware of the woman’s meaning of silence. They now share a "reality" of silence, even though the teacher is aware that silence for him and for her is not the same. 109

The metaphor, Finally, "lies at the root of our human world" CGrassi, 1980:3). The abstractive process happens in an instant and is the means through which we name, through which we recognize phenomena "as similar or dissimilar, useful or useless, to our human realization" C30). In the end, in order to make meaning, we must use metaphors. CUIe must] resort to metaphors, invoking a transposition from the empirical realm of senses, in which "seeing" and the "pictorial" move to the foreground: to "clarify," to "gain insight," to "found," to "conclude," to "deduce" C33) . One more point needs to be stated before moving on to the next section. It is important to understand the extent to which naming is bound up with culture. Roger Brown C195B) quotes Kluckholn and Kelly (1945:7) in defining culture as "all those historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rational, irrational and non- rational which exist at any time as potential guides for the behavior of [persons]" (304). Members of a particular culture form an "agreement to see and think of the world in a certain way" (304). It is evident, then, that those categories persons use "to sort out and respond" to the world around them are "reflections of the culture" into which such persons are born CBrunner:10). The language, the way of life, the religion and science of a people: all of these mold the way in which Ca person] experiences the events out of which Chis/her] 110

own history is Fashioned. In this sense, Chis/herD personal history comes to reflect the traditions and thought-ways of Chis/her] culture, for the events that make it up are Filtered through the categorical systems Cs/he] has learned CBrunner:10).

THE NAMING PROCESS: The Rhetorical Function of Namlno In the process of naming, then, persons learn more than "the acquisition of a motor skill." What persons learn is to categorize, to Form relationships among phenomena, to coordinate linguistic categories "with categories of the nonlinguistic world" CBrown, R.:E47). Once having made this coordination— that is, having learned "the association of referent and name" Cflakay & Brown, 197E:370)— it is possible to use names in a rhetorical dialogue C36ED. When I speak of a "rhetorical dialogue," I am referring to the symbolic interaction among persons of a "language community." Rhetoric refers C13 both to the theory of symbol-making and symbol-using as social dynamics and CE) to the practice of creating and using those dynamics through symbolic interaction. When persons engage in a rhetorical dialogue, they use symbolization to "make some statements about the world that invites some particular response to the world" Cflakay & Brown:367). In making that statement, persons use names which create expectancies in listeners and which "direct attention to some aspects CoF the world] Ill

rather than to others— which becomes the major way in which

words function rhetorically" Cflakay & Brown:36B). Basically, "names of concepts in rhetorical discourse" direct attention in three ways: Cl) names "point" to different criterial attributes among those potentiallu determining and thus "clarify" what often in reality is ambiguous; CE) . . . names carry suggestions of approach or avoidance; C3) . . . simultaneously, Cnamesl produce either a "blinder" effect or a "transcending" effect Cflakay & Brown:37£). When persons name concepts in a rhetorical dialogue, they "select and suggest various criterial attributes from the potential ones available in the perhaps ambiguous phenomenon itself" Cflakay & Brown:37E). Moreover, the selection of names shapes expectancies in the listener and sets up the possibility of potential shifts in the perception of names. A "criterial attribute" is a distinctive feature of a name. It serves to characterize a name so that what is often ambiguous in names is made clear to symbol-makers/sharers. For example, MOTHER can be an ambiguous name. Ordinarily by MOTHER we mean a woman who bears and/or nurtures Cphysically/emotionally) a child. A child can identify her mother, perhaps, because this is the woman who bore her and the woman who cares for her. But the child who was conceived in vitro, gestated in the womb of one woman and then handed over to another woman to raise, 112

may encounter some ambiguity in the name MOTHER. Consequently, the child may spBak of her "natural" mother— that is, the uioman from whose egg she was conceived. The child might consider the woman who lent her womb during the fetal months as being a "surrogate" mother. The child may name the woman she lives with simply "mother." The courts, however, might consider the woman who cares for the child as being the "adoptive" mother. The present situation in Nicaragua is ambiguous in that both the people who have formed a government and the people •fighting against the government claim legitimacy. The main parties to the confrontation, the Sandinista government and those opposing the government, have beBn named in various ways by American lawmakers and some concerned U.S. citizen groups. Those who perceive the Sandinista government as a threat to U.S. interests name the Sandinistas as "Marxists" and those opposing the government as "freedom fighters." Naming the Nicaraguan government as "Marxist" directs attention to a concept of government which is associated with a threat to American democratic practice. Likewise, by naming opposing forces as "freedom fighters," rhetors suggest attributes akin to revolutionaries battling an oppressive government, or of persons fighting for civil rights— what Americans usually associate with the American 113

Fight for independence. However, a shift in the name can call attention to different attributes and thus create a different perception of the Forces battling the government. Those in the U.S. in sympathy with the present Nicaraguan government assert that the Sandinistas comprise a validly constituted government, though "socialist" in nature. The opposing forces, then, are named as "contra" or "guerrilla" forces. Naming not only directs attention by selecting criterial attributes; it also suggests approach or avoidance behavior. "The linguistic name suggests the action toward a nonlinguistic category . . . Has well as] responses by listeners to the user of the name . . . Cflakay & Brown:373). This means that there are names which provoke a positive or negative response, names which "fit" or do not "fit" well into the ordered world of the listeners. Richard Weaver C13703 calls such names "god terms" or "devil terms" CS3S1. For Americans, "freedom" is a "god term," a name associated with a positive or favorable connotation. "Marxist" is a "devil term," a name which connotes "anarchy," "repression," "not-freedom." The speaker chooses names not only which direct attention to certain criterial attributes, but also names which at the same time suggest how the audience ought 114

to respond to the names. However, the reputation of the rhetor may be enough to influence approach/avoidance behavior on thB part of the audience. So strong has been the ethos of President Ronald Reagan since 1980 that his simple assertion of a name has been enough for some people (actually, of most Americans, if the polls can be believed) "to accept the name, the criterial attribute, and the associated approach or avoidance value" Cflakay & Brown: 373). Names also direct attention and create expectancies •through "blindering" or "transcension." This means simply that this is another way in which speakers can pre-dispose the audience to respond to names. Women who oppose technology which in any way intervenes in the process of conception and birth sometimes speak in terms of "reproductive prostitution." Scientists talk about "genetic engineering" or "reproductive technology." Women, particularly those who see in such technologies a means of overcoming infertility, are in favor of "procreative" or "birth" technology. In other words, rhetors choose name which either "mask," "blind" (blinder) audiences to certain aspects of a name, or which feature some aspect that moves attention to what unites speaker and listener "at another level of naming" (Makay & Brown:375). The rhetor who speaks 115 about "reproductive prostitution" is choosing names with criterial attributes that mill draw attention to the worst aspects of that technology which intervenes in the process of conception and birth. She is suggesting avoidance behavior and "blindering" the audience to any positive aspects of this technology. At the same time, the rhetor is attempting to unite her listeners on another level of naming: Most women are united in their condemnation of prostitution. Names, then, can be used for a rhetorical purpose. In making some statement about the world, rhetors choose names which explain the statement. The rhetor speaks to an audience who responds to the statement and who is necessary if the rhetor is to achieve his/her rhetorical goal. It works this way. A rhetor who makes some statement desires some change. CEven if there were such a thing as a "purely informational" statement, that statement would makB some change by adding, at least, to the knowledge or information store of the audience.) The achievement of the change becomes the rhetor’s rhetorical purpose. In attempting the change, the rhetor uses names to direct the attention of his/her audience— which must respond in order to mediate the rhetor’s goal. 116

In giving reasons to explain his/her statement, the rhetor uses rhetorical reasoning, that is, develops strategies or appeals that might enable the audience to accept the adequacy of the rhetor’s explanation. This

involves uihat Makay & Broun C1972) call "complex naming" or "the unfolding of an extended utterance" C377). The structure of rhetorical reasoning consists of Cl) the statement of a name . . . C2) Cthel statement of its appropriateness because of the criterial attribute uhich the phenomenon possesses . . . folloued by C3) a statement of the expected or appropriate response; or C4) a listing of reasons that the categorizing of reality is accurate C377). UJhat Makay & Broun C197E) are delineating here are the steps uhich "provide strategy for Cthe] improvisation of messages, as they unfold in the give-and-take of dialogue" C377). By uay of illustration, suppose that tuo childless uomen, one married, the other unmarried, make arrangements to undergo the process of artificial insemination. The married uoman is artifically inseminated by donor sperm under the supervision of a physician at a clinic uhich provides services to childless couples. The unmarried uoman inseminates herself after making arrangements privately to obtain donor sperm. Each uoman conceives and gives birth to a healthy child. The male donors somehou discover the identities and uhereabouts of their biological children and 117

sue for visitation rights on the ground that they are the "fathers" of the children. The lawyers for the women argue that both men are merely "sperm donors" who have no more responsibility or control over the use of their sperm than a blood donor has over the use and control of his blood. The court, however, rules that the man who contributed his sperm to the unmarried woman is, indeed, the "father" of her child, while the man who contributed his sperm to the married woman is a "sperm donor" Cillustration adapted from Corea, 19B5a:49-57). Both lawyers and the court are asserting names. They are selecting criterial attributes that direct attention to certain aspects of the names which set up certain expectancies suggesting behavior toward the names. For example, "father" and "fatherhood" suggest approach behavior. The name also creates a "blinder" effect in that by naming the men as "fathers," their role as "sperm donors" is masked. At the same time, "father" unites the men on another level, despite the differences surrounding the process of donation. In the give-and-take of dialogue, however, the lawyers and the court do not merely assert names. They list reasons why their categorization of reality is accurate. They may argue by sign, analogy, example, and so forth. In this 118

instance, the court explains the criterial attributes necessary to make the distinction between "father" and "sperm donor." The court, then, finds "the difference that makes a difference" CMakay & Brown:377). The court, in other words, gives explanations why one man is not "father" and the other man is not "sperm donor"— even though both men volunteered sperm. Thus, through rhetorical reasoning a rhetor can develop the appropriateness of name3. But, the development of the appropriateness of names can be used rhetorically to serve as "a 'topic’ for generating message content." This means that by "considering names for kinds of names," the rhetor can better shape messages in accordance with rhetorical purposes" CMakay & Brown:379). The discussion of the rhetor’s effort to "categorize phenomena rhetorically" is "nearly analogous to the ancients’ system of common topics, but is based on CtheD discussion of the nature of categories . . ." CMakay & Brown:3B0) and helps in the understanding "that one major name generator is the concept of 'the difference that makes a difference’" C379). According to Makay & Brown C197E), "Ctlhe two superordinate topics implicit in all rhetorical dialogue are Cl) 'this-is-different-from-that ’ and CE) 'this-is-the-same- 119

as-that’" so that uihat we call "topics" or message content are "intrinsically related to the basic processes in perception" C3B0) . However, in order to understand the rhetorical Function of these two superordinate topics, we need to relate them to the concept of approach/avoidance discussed earlier C3B0). Recall the example of the two men who volunteered their sperm for the process of artificial insemination. IF the court in its Judgment admits sameness between the two donors, then the husband of the married woman cannot be .treated as the natural father of the child. OF course, he is not, and the court in this case is breaking with patriarchal tradition in this country by regarding the husband as the natural Father, but the purpose of legal sperm banks and clinics where the artificial insemination of women by donor sperm can take place is to "allow" the husband to be the natural father of the child. In the case of the married couple, the husband can use the donor sperm as he would use a donor’s blood. Therefore, "this" Cdonor of sperm to the legal sperm bank) is different from "that" Cdonor of sperm to the unmarried woman). the "uncategorized ‘this’ is differentiated from the categorized and negative 'that’" so that the donor of sperm to the legal sperm bank C"this") gains approach value CMakay & Brown:3B0). On the 120 other hand, if the lawyers can demonstrate "this" donor to the legal sperm bank to be the same as the negative "that" donor to the unmarried woman, then the "this" becomes negatively valued and received avoidance value C3B01. The court, though, in rendering its decision, applies the topics of sameness and difference. The donor to the legal sperm bank fails to fit the category of "father" since the genetic contribution alone does not constitute fatherhood. A "father" is one who "supports," "cares for," "provides male identity for" a child. The donor to the unmarried woman, in the opinion of the court, should provide these things since there is no other lawful "father." Thus, the assertion of a name is not enough to fulfill a rhetorical purpose nor to reach a rhetorical goal. CTDhe rhetor must also offer explanation or proof of the appropriateness of the name being assigned. Helpful in deriving content for either asserted or amplified names are topics for "invention," which are really names for kinds of content CMakay & Brown:387).

NAMING AND THE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS Naming oneself is part of the constitution of human symbolic reality. A person gives "reality" to her/himself by providing a name, a symbol, for the self and seeing that name in relationship with other names— all of which operate in the context of the superordinate NAME the person has for 121

"the may things are" CBrouin, 1970). I have explained that before a person can use names in a rhetorical dialogue, a person has to learn names. Persons "learn a name by associating it with the quality [criterial attribute!) shared among class members that are examplars of it" CMakay & Brouin:36B). After learning a name, a person can use it in rhetorical dialogue. Instead of starting by conceiving a shared attribute among members of a class and then associating a name, the receiver of meanings in communication typically begins with a name that then creates an expectency of the shared attribute being present CMakay & Broun:3BB). This naming and identification process can be illustrated by looking at the uay uomen name themselves.

In 1974, both Sherry Ortner and Nancy Chodorou declared that uomanhood is defined by motherhood. Ortner C1974) argued that across most cultures uoman is defined in terms of her reproductive capacity. Chodorou C1978) considered that uoman's capacity to bear children not only defined her, but gave her status as uell. What Ortner and Chodorou argue is not neu. In many respects, identifying "uoman" uith "mother" follous the most traditional ideas about uho uoman is. Betty Friedan C19B3) and Mary Daly C1973), of course, assert that uomen have learned these names from the men uho dominate society. Friedan and Daly argue that uomen learn 122

uho they are by associating womanhood with motherhood as "the quality shared among class members that are exemplars of it." Though this may indeed be the case, women have also used "mother" in rhetorical dialogue to create expectancies of the shared attribute. Much of the way women have created the expectancies has depended upon the way in which they perceived themselves in the overall cultural and historical period. It is important to note that in this country the name given to "person" includes the attributes "useful" and "productive." To be a person in the United States is to be a useful, productive, success-oriented individual CRobertson, 1SB0:129). Achievement, then, in this country, is a vital component of personhood. Of course, for many people, "person" means "male." Even though this may have been more explicitly held before the contemporary women’s movement, the ideas still exists today. Uomen, however, have always asserted themselves as "persons." In rhetorical dialogue, an example of which we shall see in the ensuing chapters of this study, women have identified themselves as "achieving individuals." Uhat we shall see, however, is that while the criterial attributes associated with "achieving individuals" are different, the process of identity creation remains the same. 123

SUMMARY In this chapter I have discussed the importance of naming in the construction of human symbolic reality. Naming involves "abstractive seeing," the human ability to pay attention to form— to similarities and differences in the external world— and to project names of forms onto external objects, persons and events. This process results in a person’s making sense of the world. Persons categorize, that is use symbols to name concepts in the world for a number of reasons: Cl) to reduce complexity by being able to identify objects in the world and by reducing the necessity for constant learning of those objects, C2) to predict activities in relation to experience, and (3) to be able to relate classes of objects and events to each other. Thus, persons categorize in order to give meaning to their world and to be able to share that meaning with others. Names Ccategories) operate rhetorically mainly by directing attention to different criterial attributes of categories, by creating expectancies of how we are to approach or avoid the category, and by producing either "blindering" or "transcending" effects. 124

Names also operate for rhetorical purposes. That is, rhetors make some statement and choose names uihich explain the statement. In giving reasons to explain the statement, a rhetor uses rhetorical reasoning to develop strategies or appeals that might enable the audience to accept the adequacy of the rhetor’s explanation. This involves complex naming, or "the unfolding of an extended utterance" CMakay & Brown:377). Developing the appropriateness of a name can serve as a "'topic’ for generating message content" C379) . This involves understanding how "the difference makes a difference" or how employing topics as names leads "to certain kinds of names" C3B0).

The process of naming can be applied to the naming of the self— creation of identity. In naming oneself, a person understands who s/he is in the context of the world in which s/he exists. The context of this "world" includes the names for other persons and the environment and well as for what a person needs to interact in the "world." The remainder of this study is concerned with how women create their identity from a communication point of view. By looking specifically at the case of how women see themselves in relation to reproductive technology, this study will show that the 125 process of of identity-creation is a process of complex naming. Chapter IV

METHODOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW

Introduction

The study of the symbol-making/symbol-using activity involved in identity creation nBBds a mBthodology which is grounded in the naming process and which can provide a way of accounting for the symbolic construction of reality as well as for the maintenance and/or decay of that reality Ccontinuity and changes in that reality!. The discourse about women’s role and place in the area of reproductive technology arises From the clash of rhetorical visions— that is, from different ideas of "the way things are" in American society and of the way women fit "the way things are." One idea of "the way things are" is society’s view of women in any age and in most areas of endeavor. It is the traditional vision of women rooted in Western world culture. The other visions are those of the women who, perceiving hiatuses in the traditional view, propose alternative ways to identify themselves and how they should "fit" to "the way things are."

126 127

Findings from an investigation of the rhetorical process of identity creation in women’s discourse about who women are and where they Fit in the design and utilization of reproductive technology should be applicable to the process of identity creation in general. It is assumed that the process studied in the micro-level of this case study repeats patterns which occur on the macro-level of social identity. In order to focus on the process involved in identity creation, this study will rely on the model of social intervention developed by William R. Brown C197B, 1982, 19B6, 1987) and on Ernest Bormann’s C197E) related idea of rhetorical vision. This chapter will Cl) explain the concept of rhetorical vision C2) present a general overview of Brown’s model, and C3) discuss ideologizing as communication process.

The Concept of Rhetorical Vision

Bormann uses "rhetorical vision" to name a way in which human beings construe social reality. Bormann C1972) owes the origin of his idea to the work of Robert Bales who, in Personalitu and Interpersonal Behavior, developed the concept of "the dynamic process of group Fantasizing" C39B). In his work with small groups, Bales discovered that members 128 of a "zero-history" group would dramatize a theme in such a way that the other members of the group would become involved in the common symbolic reality produced by the dramatization C397). This Fantasy theme was the group’s way of talking about common problems or topics in a non- threatening way. More significantly, however, the dramatic theme provided a way For all the group members to create and participate in a "common culture" C397). Reasoning from Bales’ studies, Bormann agrues that the same process takes place in the larger society. The dramas which involve people in a symbolic reality are "rhetorical visions" which "chain out in the group to create a unique group culture" C398). In this study, the culture at large and the culture of reproductive technology provide the underlying themes From which women construct the reality of their identity. Bormann’s concept can provide for this study a kind of "truth in action" CBrown, 19B1-.4). This means that For Bormann’s rhetorical vision, as For "Mead’s symbolic interactionalism and Burke’s dramatism," the "act in its context" is of essential consequence CBrown, 1981:4). Because the rhetorical vision creates a culture of its own, it provides a sense of situational significance because of its relationship to the "here-and-now" CBormann: 379). 129

Rhetorical vision, then, is a contextual concept which leads to a better understanding of events, the better to cope with them. Better understanding of socially constructed symbolic realities leads to better coping with them, even as Kenneth Burke announced . . . "that we should better understand Hitler's 'magic,' that it might never be practiced here’ CBrown, 1981:5). Bormann’s concept of rhetorical vision provides a way of examining the growth of visions associated with women’s identity and, therefore, a way of understanding action— that is, of understanding what happens as women develop and participate in or fight against traditional views to express their ideas of woman’s identity, role, and worth in the area of reproductive technology. In order to account for the significance of these actions, however, one needs to look not only at growth but also at the "dynamics-at-large" which contribute to the decay/growth of the vision CBrown, 19B1:7). While Bormann’s conception of the evolution of rhetorical visions provides "descriptions of social realities," Brown’s model of social intervention furnishes a way Cl) to account holistically for growth, maintenance, and decay of rhetorical visions as being determined by integrated relations between event and context and CE) to inhibit/facilitate strategicallu the workings of the relations themselves C1981:7). 130

Bormann’s concept of rhetorical vision and Brouin’s model stand in complementaru relationship to each other and promise a means of synthesizing "relations among communication events and their contexts" CBrouin, 19B1:7). In this study, rhetorical vision is taken to mean a symbolic construction of reality shared by a group of people within a common culture. A rhetorical vision, in this study, is most often associated with a specific theme, concept or issue within the culture or society Cwomen’s rights; civil rights! and grows, is maintained and decays through the process of intra- and interpersonal ideologizing.

Brown’s Social Intervention Model: A General Overview

In his model, Brown emphasizes the "internal relatedness" or "coherence" within systems (Pepper, 1945:74). Unlike communication modBls which yield knowledge in order to analyze objects or experiences "according to Ctheirl participation in real and universal categories of communication potency, with a concomitant view of reality as corresponding to such categories or forms," or to predict Cpossibly control) human communiation outcomes, or to help people cope with experience or communication influence, Brown’s model yields knowledge which suggests 131

intervention into human communication CBrown, 13B :E07). Brown’s is an organicist model that Focuses on the relationships within events— how they grow, develop and • decay . In the social system, human beings live out a particular interpretative world view from which they perceive, know, and value themselves, others and objects in their world. Human beings also exist in relationship to each other and their environment and symbolically organize their lives around adjusting the power or interdependence between themselves and others in order to satisfy needs. According to Brown C137B), then, "human beings act as though the world makes comprehensive sense to them" C12E). When it does not, when human beings perceive "gaps," anomalies in their communicatively constituted world view, they use their symbol system to compensate For the gaps so that they do not get caught in "vicious circles," which will eventually destroy the world view by requiring a shift to an alternative world view C133).

Brown’s model utilizes three sub-cycles or systems analogous to the integrative Formats which individuals use to order their world and compensate For the gaps. Intrapersonal, interpersonal, and interpretative sub-cycles 132

are referred to by Brown as "the needs sub-cycle, the power sub-cycle and the input-switching sub-cycle" respectively C135). It is important to note that the sub-cycles are interrelated and Function in conjunction with each other. Brown’s representative system is "holographically conceived" with need, power, and attention Cinput-switching) as connection points, "each of which implies or contains information on the other two" CBrown, 1987:1-2). By focusing on one or another of the nexuses, Brown’s system of social intervention features either need, power, or attention as one of the ways human beings have of categorizing or naming their world CBrown, 197B). The intrapersonal sub-cycle can be explained generally in terms of advocacy of salient needs. Members of a system who become aware of needs require an "open channel"— that is, the sensitivity of significant others to the advocacy and their own openness to needs-meeting maneuvers of others. Unless there is a response to members of the system who advocate either individually or as a collectivity, the salience of the perceived need theoretically will increase, as will the advocacy. If insensitivity to the advocacy continues, the needs will become more salient; the advocacy, more strident; the system, involved in a vicious circle, eventually will break down. The action of the intervenor 133

reverses the trend of the vicious circle either through need-attribution or need-denial which either facilitates/impedes advocacy or Facilitates/impedes openness of the system to the power sub-cycle CBrown, 19B7). In the interpersonal or power sub-cycle, the perceived interdependency among the members of the system is of major importance. Each member, according to Brown, shares power; that is, each member influences the others and is in some manner dependent upon the others to satisfy certain needs and jointly make "decisions that affect events still to come" CBrown, 1986:185). Individual power sharers Cthose responsible for certain roles in the relationship) create, maintain or contribute to the demise of human interdependency through two strategies: "the facilitating of cooperative interdependence and the facilitating of competitive interdependence to produce the mixed relationships necessary to make possible the periodic challenge to and affirmation of thB power coda's hierarchy" C194). A change in the quality of interrelatedness will, of course, impact upon the future choosing of the power sharers C194). Attempting a power intervention means maneuvering to affect the interdependency among the power sharers through 134 the use of threat, exchange, and integry. Following Boulding C1978), Brown uses these three "social organizers" as the tactics "which are negotiated as trades of one sort or another" C194). Usually, threat is used by the intervener who seeks to adjust the interrelationship at the expense of the others. Nothing is given up by the intervenor, but something potentially need-threatening to another power sharer may be withheld or promised by the intervenor in exchange for whatever the intervenor needs that the other power sharer has. The exchange tactic is used when each power sharer, individual or corporate, is willing to give up something in return for something else. Since self-gratification is the primary concern here, the system will run down if the tactics of threat and/or exchange are used exclusively. The tactic of integry, however, is used to promote a satisfactory interrelationship among the power sharers. It is based upon the identitu of the parties; that is, the exchange takes place because of who or what the power sharers are. Brown quotes Boulding on this point: "I will do something or I will ask you to do something because of what I am and because of what you are" C194D. Intervenors, of course, use specific rhetorical maneuvers according to their own inventions to "provide the actualization of strategy and tactic ..." C194). 135

In utilizing the interpretative sub-cycle, the intervenor perceives anomalies in a construed world view Cor Fitting relations where others see anomalies) and advocates an attention-switch; that is, s/he attempts to persuade auditors to change their perception of the prevailing gestalt. In order to accomplish this, the intervenor moves strategically to Feature or mask the anomaly through rhetorical maneuvers— specific, identifiable action or created events— designed to promote a new assembly, a new organizational pattern in the auditors’ conceptions of epistemology, axiology and/or ontology CBrown, 19B2). This, then, is a general overview of Brown’s model of social intervention. It is important to remember that none of the sub-cycles works in isolation. A shift in a gestalt will mean that neBds are altered, as are relationships. When there is advocacy for new needs, perceptions and interdependencies change. Likewise, power interventions will change the quality of interdependency which at the same time affects the needs of the power sharers in the new relationships. When the power shifts, so too does the gestalt. 136

Ideologizing as Communication Process According to Brown C197B), "ideology" applies to "any symbolic construction of the world in whose superordinate 'name’ human beings can comprehensively order their experience and subsume their specific activities" CIS1!). Ideology, for Brown, does "not mean a pejorative 'false consciousness’"; neither does it mean simply a "conceptual framework." Ideology, "requisite to any world view," is a function of communication process C1E4). Ideologizing is rooted in the symbol-making process itself so that Cl) through the abstracting nature of symbol-making, persons fulfill the uniquely human need to construe an ordered world; CS) through the social process of symbolic abstraction, human beings "reifu interpersonal roles, status, and hierarchy," and as "participants in an ideology negotiate and ratify" interpretative relationships of the world CBrown,197B:124). Therefore, it is this "symbol- making and sharing— by which interrelated entities and individual needs, motives and beliefs are named— that we are led to "a communication-system view of the rise and fall of ideologies; they flourish when the communication system compensates for vicious circles, and they decline when it fails to do so" C1E4). 137

Ideology is grounded in the human propensity to name— or categorize— experiences, objects, and events so that they seem repeatable. Persons conceive a world which is arbitrated "Cl) by our very senses, CE) by our reification of some 'kinds’ and not others, and C3) by the tacitly agreed-upon rules for consituting 'kinds’" C1E5). Ule have already discussed at length in CChapter Three) how the senses SBlact and limit human pBrcBptions of thB world, and how thB human mind, not only abstracts form from sxpBriBncB and applies form to other experiences, but also imputes complex relationships among forms C1E5). The third way in which persons arbitrate the world is through the rules we have for constituting categories. Because we usually "infer identity or other name not from a single attribute exhibited by an instance but from several attributes taken together," we tacitly agree upon how attributes or clues are to be combined for making inferences CBrunner, et al: 41). There are rules for the way human beings constitute "conjunctive,"

"disjunctive," and "relational" categories. Brown C197B), extending the work of Roger Brown, Brunner, Goodnow and Austin, locates ideologizing in relational categorizing. The "rule of grouping" for relational categorizing specifies the relationship between defining attributes CBrunner: 43). Thus, in relational categorizing, 138

not only do we conjoin attributes, we also demarcate the relationships among them. For example, in the universe of "mothers" we may define as a class "mothers eligible to receive free daycare" as all those single mothers earning 510,000 per year or less and who have children under the age of six. These women, specifiable as a class, are defined in terms of the relationship among their income, their marital status, and the ages of their children. Of course, we could have constituted the class of "mothers eligible to receive free daycare" by relating attributes in any number of ways. The important point is that the concept or category can be invented or constructed CBrunner: 44). And once the entity of "relationship" is abstracted and reified, a resource of the symbol-making creature is to make abstractions of abstractions to produce "configurations" of relationships, thereby providing the cognitive economy of systematically organizing a wide array of concepts (Brown, 1978:126). UJhat Brown C197B) is referring to, then, is the process by which human beings relate attributes in such a way as to produce a configuration of experience C126). For example, after constructing Cor configuring) the class of "mothers eligible to receive free daycare," or the class of "human beings," and after using these classes numerous times, a person forms a oestalt of the class. This means that upon confronting a member of the class, a configurational quality ' 139

or expectation of the unity of attributes prevails. All the attributes, in fact, do not have to be present, nor does the person have to "check" to see that all the attributes are there in order to recognize a human being or "humanness." A person mill recognize the man behind, say, a sales counter as a human being even though his legs and feet are not visible. The observer will "fill in" these attributes. "When the conception is well enough established, it takes on the property of being able to serve as a discriminable and seemingly irreducible attribute of its own" CBrunner: 47). Ideologizing involves the symbol-maker’s construction of configurational attributes in the extreme. Brown C1970) refers to this as "the abstracted dimension of ultimacu . . . that category of experience on which one is willing to bet the meaning of one’s life" C126). It is through the recursiveness of relational categorizing Cwhich results in] a superordinate symbolic construction of "reality" with "order," "coherence," and "system," altogether giving thB participant in the ideology the sense of power accruing from any comprehensive explanation of experience C1EB). This results for the individual in "one. real. knowable world" C127). And this "fulfills the uniquely human propensity for categorizing all experience" C1E7). Moreover, by naming experience, a process of abstraction, the individual reduces uncertainty and the complexity of the 140

environment because s/he can recognize names. Using them repeatedly gives the individual a sense of "symbolic control inherent in recognition" C127). Not only do human beings ascribe "complex interpretative relationships to the world" C1E4), but; they also constitute social relationships. Individuals draw "upon the reifying nature of symbol-making to ascribe reciprocal, complementary. and comprehensive social relationships to members of a community" C1E8). The adherents to a particular ideology are symbol-sharers who, through the mutual ascription of motives, statuses and roles, negotiate a "place" or social identity within the social ideology. In this way they can account for their behavior and act "as though the world makes sense" C1E3). The process of recursive categorizing discussed above can be put to use by human creatures who in sharing an accepted ideology order the social world. Human creatures, in other words, name/create relationships among persons in order to create social identity. This means that not only must the human creature name/create "self"-wants or motives or interpersonal relationships, s/he must communicate "such ‘needs,’ ‘purposes,’ and 'relations’ as these categories are reified/abstracted/attributed to a ‘self’ by ‘others’" 141

C129).

Through symbolic transformation, which is an abstracting and reifying process, human beings name experience, and also "infer and ascribe or impute 'needs/motives’ to others based upon whatever behavioral symptoms they can observe and categorize" C1293. In this way, human beings can account for the behavior of the "self" and the "other." They attribute motives so that "it is clear to a self and to others that one acts in ways that socially shared motives would explain" C129). As feminists marched, wrote books and otherwise advocated for women’s rights in the late 1960s and through the 1970s, the general public and the media attributed motives of selfishness to women whom they perceived to be "home wreckers." Women such as Phyllis Schlafly were perceived to be "home savers." Advocates of "women’s rights," on the other hand, saw themselves as acting ethically. Advocates, the media persons, the general public, Phyllis Schlafly— all were sharers in the same social ideology, the American Dream, and all sought to account for social identity within that ideology. Hence, all behaved "as though the world makes sense" C129). Persons create interpersonal relationships by reifying "'self’ and 'other’ in 'relationship’" C129). This occurs 142 when persons, "First one and then the other becomes a hypostatized 'reflecting consciousness’" uihile engaging in categorizing as though in "the original word game" CRoger Brown: 1956:EB4). As each participates in the "game," First as "tutor" and then as "player," each learns to anticipate and to discover defining attributes, to learn what is distinctive and equivalent in the other’s naming, and to give linguistic responses to Form hypotheses about honlinguistic categories CR. Brown:EB4-EBB). Persons then can interact socially in "reciprocal" and in "complementary naming of 'self’ and 'other’"CBrown, 197B:1E9). Persons name peer relations "when the ‘self’ and the ’other’ reciprocate with the same category of reified social identity . . ."C1E9). During the suffragist movement, "equalitarian" and "social feminist" were names given to peers in the fight for women’s rights, but each name implied different motives for explaining behavior. Persons name hierarchical relations "when the 'self’ and the 'other’ exchange names that complete each other" C1E9). Teachers and students are hierarchical complements; so are bosses, secretaries and clerks. Some women order the world by dividing it into feminists Cthose in favor of liberating the restricted status of women) and oatriarchists Cthose in 143 favor of affirming traditional male domination in the social sphere). In-group/out-group membership is thBn dBfinBd according to each woman’s point of view.

Interestingly, such complementary social identities make possible the implication, up and down the hierarchy, either of shared Ccooperative) "motives" or of contrasted Ccompetitive) ones even while holding constant individuals’ "places" as superior and inferior. Whether an equal or not, however, one who acts as though one "knows one’s place" [either as conformist or as rebel] is behaving as though the world makes sense or could do so" CBrown, 1S7B:130). While reciprocal and complementaru ascription of relationships constitute social identity, ideological hierarchy comes about when "hypostatized social relationships are rendered comprehensive" C130). This means that a person who is capable of symbol-sharing in a particular ideology and who has status in the hierarchy or "comprehensively graded set of social ’relationships’" carries out actions "as though Ethel ideology were making sense of the world" for that individual C130). In the women’s fight for suffrage, the hierarchy of social relationships applied to those women (who in exchanging symbols about the status of women) acted as though "all persons are created equal." In carrying out actions "as though an ideology were making sense of the world" persons negotiate interdependence or roles within social relationships. Interpersonal roles 144 emerge "in response to three questions: 'Who am I?’ 'Who are you?’ and 'Who is that?’" C130). As persons endeavor to answer these questions, they work out roles For the "self" and the "other" and, given the mutual understanding of social identity which those roles entail, expect certain activities of the person in a particular role. For Brown C1978), role expectancies "constitute rules, or more precisely . . . action corollaries, those deeds by which a self is to demonstrate a commitment to and competency for participation in an ideological community" C130). Persons negotiate interdependencies when they enact the action corollaries and other persons validate or affirm the fittingness of the actions. The negotiation, then, of mutual agreement to social identity becomes overtly ideological when individuals act toward each other as though their acceptance or rejection of role performance depends upon presence or absence of behaviors to which "motives" and "beliefs" associated with ideology are attributable C131). Not only do those participants in a particular ideology act as though the ideology comprehensively orders the world, but participants also create ideology by "utilizing symbols to mediate mutual 'needs," 'motives,' 'beliefs,’ and 'identities’" C131). Adherents share responsibility, that is, "power with others in interpersonal roles ..." C132). Brown C1978) discusses three interdependent interpersonal 145

roles that share the power of creating and maintaining the ideology. Using Kuhn’s explanation for the change in scientific paradigms, Brown illustrates how the roles of innovator. practitioner and cumulator interrelate to create scientific theory. The innovator places the current scientific paradigm in crisis by finding anomalies and by restoring their "fit" in the new paradigm. The practitioner, the "puzzle-solver", uses accepted criteria in an attempt to validate the current paradigm, or ratify a new one. The cumulator finds ways "to make theoretical changes seem continuous" C132). The roles of innovator, practitioner and cumulator are examples of what Brown means when he maintains that interpersonal roles must be included as a subsystem in any ideologizing system C1321. Therefore, individuals who ideologize are participants in an ideologizing system. Human ideologies flourish when the communication system "compensates for vicious circles that otherwise exacerbate gaps in human beings’ construed worlds. Ideologies decline when the communication system fails so to compensate" C133) . This "flourishing" and "declining" of ideologies is a process that can be explained by a "systems-view of communication" C133). In a "systems- view" all the components in the system are interdependent 146

and mutually influence each other. The process in a system is nonlinear. In talking about ideologizing as communication process, Broun is talking about Cl) the interdependence of the intra- and interpersonal roles in an ideological system, and CE) the "principles by uihich world views wax and wane" C133) . This interdependence and the "principles" form the basis of the process that accounts for Cl) the success or failure of ideology in meeting intrapersonal growth and survival needs and CE) the compatibility or lack of it in the negotiation of interpersonal roles relevant to ideology C133-134). Because ideologizing is rooted in symbol-making, the process basically compensates "for gaps in symbolizing and for tendencies toward what commonly is understood as vicious circles" C134). Discussed earlier was how in abstracting concepts, attention is directed to some aspects of objects, persons, and experience rather than to others. In other words, inherent in the naming process are "gaps" because human beings simply cannot pay attention to all aspects of experience at once. The abstracting process is used precisely in order to reduce complexity in experience. Yet reducing complexity causes gaps. Ulhen persons ideologize they do the same thing— name. Because persons like to think that the ideology comprehensively orders the world, however, 147 they tBnd to regard gaps as "anathBma" C134).

Accordingly, idBologioal oommunitiBs Find uiays to mBet the possibility that an outgroup or an innovator will recategorize experience and call attention to a heretofore unconceived, and therefore worrisome, gap in doctrine C134). Human beings, therefore, find ways Cmake symbolic moves) "to anticipate and rectify gaps" by shifting attention during categorizing C134). Individuals may redirect attention to different aspects of experience. They may symbolically maneuver to mask the gap or they may seek to feature or concentrate on the gap in an effort to regulate the system. Furthermore, the system needs to compensate for "vicious circles" which, uncompensated, could result in system breakdown. Vicious circles occur in a system when "two or more maladaptive dynamics feed off each other " C134). An illustration can be found in The Feminine Hustioue. Betty Friedan’s statement about women, their potentiality and their place in American society. Friedan addresses all women in her attempt to expose what she considers the vicious circle of their lives: the more women try to conform to the image society projects for them, the more frustrated they become with the emptiness of their lives. The harder they try to overcome the frustration, the more they conform to the societal image. Through specific 148 rhetorical maneuvers, Friedan attempts to reverse the direction of the vicious circle by advocating that women change their perceptions about themselves, identify their own needs and create out of those needs their own image Cor identity) rather than living by that which society advocates for them. Friedan perceives a deviance-amplifying cycle which, allowed to go uncompensated, will eventually obliterate the chance of self-identity among women. The Feminine Mustigue seeks to refocus attention, to magnify all "omissions, inconsistencies, and contradictions" in society’s image of woman and to introduce a "compensatory" image in an attempt to reverse the deviance-amplifying cycle C135). Keeping in mind the illustration, it is possible to abstract the following components for making ideology: Cl) predominantly intrapersonal roles, in which each party to communication combines "source," "audience," and "media" behaviors and which, to avoid vicious circles require response from CE) predominantly interpersonal roles, in which each party to communication enjoys some power share in symbol exchanges and which— to avoid deviance-amplifying— require C3) compatibility-preserving attention switches, so that doctrinal hiatuses in the ideology are compensated for C135). Brown names these components, respectively, as "the needs sub-cycle, the power sub-cycle, and the input-switching sub­ cycle" C135). 149

Overview descriptions of the subcycles occur earlier in this chapter; those descriptions need not be repeated here. UJhat remains, however, is to illustrate the interdependency of the sub-cycles in the process of ideologizing. In the example from The Feminine flustinue. Friedan C19B3) considers that women’s need "to grow and fulfill their potentialities as human beings" apart from their society-designated sexual role C7) constitutes a growth and survival need. In her book, Friedan advocates this need and encourages women to advocate it, too. Without input, however, from others Cpower cycle) in the communication system, the need Friedan names becomes more salient, the advocacy more strident. If the input channel remains closed, the need will become more salient and so on until the deviance- amplifying cycle results in a system breakdown. However, a "needs-meeting response from the environment . . . is deviance-compensating" C13B). If the growth and survival needs of women are met, then the intensity of those needs theoretically subsides. Responsive input in reducing the intensity of the growth and survival needs, also reduces the intensity of the advocacy. It should be noted, though, that unless attention is eventually shifted from carrying out the demands of advocacy, the growth and survival needs will become less salient, advocacy will decrease, the input 150

channel will pay less attention to needs. In the amplification of this type of deviance, the system would "implode" C13B!. The same process can be observed in the power cycle. Sharers of power in the feminist community take roles in order to determine which view Csociety’s or Friedan’s! should guide them in the future. The interpersonal roles of innovator, ratifier, and cumulator apply here. Friedan is a revolutionist who points out gaps in society’s view of women. Other women ratify Friedan’s observations by carrying out or practicing what Friedan suggests. The cumulators of the new view stabilize and affirm the new view through various activities— writing books, putting out a new magazine CMs.. , for example! . There will be less revolutionizing as the new view becomes ratified and less cumulating and so on. The cycle will reverse itself when revolutionizing again throws gaps into critical relief. Indeed, this is exactly what happened in the 1970s when Phyllis Schlafly and her STOP ERA group pointed out what they saw as gaps in the view of "women as equal to men." Schlafly went to work exposing anomalies in the feminist view and became one of a series of intervenors who reversed the revolutionizing trend. 151

The attention-switching cycle depends upon the alertness of the ideologizing community to breakdowns in the comprehensive view C13B) . Suppose, for example, the women’s movement had been successful in changing the traditional view of women’s status and role in American society. Suppose in 13BS, the Equal Rights Amendment had passed so that today women view themselves and are recognized in society as being political equals with men. The more comprehensive and open-ended this view is conceived to be by the members of the ideologizing community, the better it orders and makes sense of the "world" for them "and the greater is the conceived precision of prediction/observation as it is articulated" C1381. Still, the more fully the community articulates the view that "women are the political equals of men," the "less open-ended it appears. . ." C13B). What happens is that members of the ideologizing community pay less attention to anomalies as the view "promises a comprehensive fit" to the world. If anomalies or gaps are noted, they are masked or disregarded as inconsequential to the comprehensive view. When the view’s "fit" to the "world" decreases, more attention is paid to the gap C13B1. It is through "such switching of attention Cthatl potentially deadly symbolic gaps in the fit between Cthe conceived view! and the 'world’ are compensated for, and the 152

ideology . . . is maintained" C1383. Thus, ideologizing is a communication process. Ideologies do not proceed "Full-grown From the mouth or pen oF individual ideologues" C13B). Rather, "the communication and creation oF ideologies proceed together" and are grounded in the human propensity to make and use symbols and in the Fundamental human need to construe an ordered world. Summaru In this chapter I have explained Bormann’s concept oF rhetorical vision in relation to Brown’s model. I have also presented a general overview oF the representational system that will be used in this study as well as the theory underlying that system. The next chapter will demonstrate how Brown’s model oF social intervention operates as critical method. Chapter V THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION AS CRITICAL METHOD

Introduction

Sixty years ago, Herbert LJichelns C1925) set rhetorical criticism squarely on its feet by declaring his concern, not with beauty nor permanence but with "effect" CWichelns in Scott and Brock, 1972: 54). Ulichelns’ effort, while legitimizing rhetorical criticism as a viable discipline, has raised several issues among critics, not the least of which includes the problem over "effects," and the difficulty with the "distinctiveness" of rhetorical criticism. The "effects" issue is not without significance. Message-makers generally intend for their discourse to have some impact on audiences. It is, however, unquestionably difficult for the critic to determine effects or, in fact, to obtain "reliable" evidence for any "outcome" of a rhetorical act. Further, because rhetoric has to do with human language, with the creation and use of symbols, which finds expression in various ways— and always in a context—

153 154

the critic needs tc consider psychological, sociological and historical Forces along with the message. Given the difficulties with determining rhetorical effect, the critics" might Cl) decide to focus on the "quality" of the discourse rather than its effects, CE) opt to treat the rhetorical act as one influence among many, or C3) determine to treat the rhetorical act as one influence giving impetus to probable effects. At any rate, it is difficult For critics to ignore the "effects" issue because message-makers quite obviously use rhetoric to influence the lives of others, their own lives, and/or the environment. The social intervention model, rather than viewing change from a cause-effect perspective, considers social intervention as a process of adjustment among relationships of various components of the social/rhetorical system. In this model, the message-maker, perhaps having been influenced by individuals or groups within the system or by the prevailing ideology of the social system, becomes the change agent whose rhetoric sets the adjustment process in motion. Further, the social intervention model avoids the sticky "effects problem" because the model is not linear and because the model treats the rhetorical act as part of the systemic process in which rhetorical maneuvers are seen as 155 inseparable From events. Change agents attempting to effect an attention-shift, for example, may call attention to some need which affects the interdependence among members of a system. The attempt to balance out power in order to gratify needs influences the changes in gestalt. Since this happens simultaneously, it becomes clear that while intending change, the message-maker has no control over events or the rate of change. The critic, then, rathBr than focusing on the determination of effects, is Free to explicate rhetorical strategies, tactics, and maneuvers, to concentrate on the symbols the message-makers use as they seek to negotiate satisfactory adjustments between themselves and others, or between themselves and their environment CBrown, 197B). Everything, therefore, in the situation becomes relevant to the suasory effort— including the chronology of events, as well as sociological and psychological Forces. Just as significant as the "effects" issue is that of the "distinctiveness" of "rhetorical" criticism. In discussing "what distinguishes the rhetorical critic From other students of human affairs," Swanson (1977a) points to the nature of representational systems which thB critic uses "for construing rhetorical phenomena" as well as for 156

accomplishing the critical goal: "understanding through explanation" Cmaking sense of the rhetorical act) CS14). Despite disagreement in the Field over which representational system "best" illuminates rhetorical acts, the critical experience is mainly "an interpretative activity involving application of specialized representational schemes to rhetorical experience ..." C219). It is interesting that while the application of representational systems to discourse aids in the understanding of rhetorical acts, such application involves also "the study of representational systems For constituting reality"— more, perhaps, "than of reality itself" C214). This "study of representational systems constituting reality" is carried on From what Swanson C1377a) calls the "reflective attitude"— that critical attitude which holds up For scrutiny the very structures of experience and allows For "theoretic discussions of the nature of rhetorical criticism" C211). This study will use the social intervention model to help explain how women make sense of their identity in relation to reproductive technology— that is, this study will illuminate rhetorical acts. But, since the social intervention representational system itself constitutes reality, the model in this study will not only explicate the rhetorical acts of these women as they name 157

who they are, but the model will also constitute the means of Framing knowledge about women’s role in reproductive technology.

While the "reflective attitude" provides a view of the experience of criticism, there are various ways to understand the interpretative activity of rhetorical criticism. Swanson C1377a) argues that all research is carried out from the "natural" attitude, that is From the attitude which assumes that persons, objects events in the world have ontological status— they exist CEOS). Also, From the perspective of the natural attitude, the objects in the world are knowable and inter-subjective, presenting themselves more or less uniformly to all persons CEOS). Critics who conduct research From the natural attitude take on one of two distinct stances: the mundane stance or the critical stance CEOS). The difference between critics who study rhetorical events From the mundane and critical stances lies in their attitude toward knowledge of objects, persons and events in the world: They "disagree about whether human experience of the world is necessarily Factual" CEOS). Those critics who carry out research From the mundane stance view knowledge as unproblematic. COJur experience of the world produces objective knowledge, purely Factual understanding uncontaminated 158

by our interpretation or creation of it. Accordingly, persons situatBd in thB mundane stance have no reason to test the accuracy of thBir experience of the world C209). Those who carry out research from the critical stance see knowledge as problematic— as needing verification (209-210) . That is, the critical stance takes the accuracy of knowledge produced in a specific experience as open to question and examines the "fit" between the world as known through experience and the world as it objectively and indubitably is (209). Critics who take a mundane stance toward the representational system view their activity not as interpreting experience, but as "apprehending and recording the way of the world" so that the message produced by such critics "is typically explication rather than argument" CSwanson, 1977b:311). On the other hand, critics who take a critical stance toward the representational system will most probably "engage in discourse which is argumentative or demonstrative Coffering verification for their conclusions! rather than merely explicative" (312). Critics, argues Swanson C1977b), perforce also take a stance toward their representational systems which may be classified either as a first or second order construction system for "apprehending understanding, and accounting for human actions" (speakers’ discourse) (307). In first order construction systems, "the meanings of actions are 159

ultimately apprehended or constructed by the researcher, not by those persons uihos actions are being studied" C306-307) . Thus, critics mho use First order systems see meanings as "pre-given to researchers in an unproblematic world" C307). Critics who use first order construction systems, of course, "take human actions— speakers’ discourse, auditors’ reactions, and the like, as their subject matter" C307). But critics using First order systems do not assert the value of explanatory concepts "on the basis of their grounding in the meaning and understanding of audience members" C307D . Rather, For First order critics, such understandings of, say the audience, "constitute a portion of the information used by the critic in Formulating the 'meaning’ of the of the rhetorical event" C307). Many traditional, Neo-Aristotelian critical studies, For example, are representative of First order construction systems. If critics use the Aristotelian model From the mundane stance, they view knowledge as unproblematic— the discourse speaks For itself. Thus, critics would argue that the conclusions they draw using this model are Faithful to the model. "The components of discourse identified in such studies— modes of proof, For example— are relatively invariant" C307). On the other hand, critics using an Aristotelian model in the critical stance would argue that 160

the conclusions obtained From applying the model to the discourse are accurate because they have been verified by historical "fact" (310). Second order construction systems allow For interpretation of human action by participants in the action. Burkians, for example, would look at the rhetor’s discourse as an action within a dramatistic "scene." Betty Friedan’s book, The Feminine flustigue. is Friedan’s interpretation of the plight of women in the 1960s. Critics using second order construction systems would take into consideration not only Friedan’s interpretation of the situation, but the interpretations of her audience, both the audience who agreed with her and the audience who disagreed. Critics using a Burkian (second order construction) model from a mundane stance would argue that the model provides a framework for conclusions which are not simply idiosyncratic interpretations of individual critics. The conclusions would be considered reliable because they are explicated by the model C311-313). In other words, critics who take a mundane stance toward second order systems, usually use the system "as a first order system rather than as a second order system" (31E). Critics using the Burkian model from the critical stance would argue that the conclusions are 161

accurate because they have been verified in some way. Verification may be achieved by comparing conclusions produced by a critical method to the critic’s naive experience of the rhetorical event as a perceptive audience member Cas contrasted to a rhetorical critic applying a specialized interpretive system), to results of "abjective," quantitative measurements, to consensus of observers whose interpretive systems are not called into question, and the like C31E). The model of social intervention can be considered as a second order construction system since its most important feature is that human symbolic actions are constructed through the interpretative process of naming. The model is sensitive to the meaningfulness of human symbolic action and takes persons’ symbolic constructions of reality as data from which the critic can account for symbolic actions. The stance toward the model or social intervention in this study will be the critical stance since conclusions are not based on "objective, observer-free reality," but on interpretations of this situated rhetor who takes the role of "a perceptive audience member" C31E). We turn now to the operation of the model. It is, to repeat briefly, an organismic model which stresses "communicative intervention" CBrown, 1981: 5). It focuses on relationships within events— their growth, development and decay— and on "evolutionaru reality" which is the basis for facilitative/inhibitive participation" CBrown, 19B1:7). 162

The model "has three nexus— attention, powBr and need" each of which can be discussed as a sub-cycle CBrown, 19B1:E). It is important to reiterate here that even though the sub­ cycles need to be discussed one at a time, they do not work in isolation. Because the model is holographically conceived, each part "implies or contains information on the other two" CBrown, 19B7:E). Further, shifts or alterations in one subcycle will mean shifts and/or alterations in the other two. Attention and the Rhetoric of Social Intervention As human beings name the world, they pay attention to some aspects of reality rather than to others. Using the naming process, persons constitute an "image" or "subjective knowledge" of the world which "largely governs behavior" CBoulding, 1966:5-6). For Brown C19B7), rhetorical interventions can be "conceptualized as shifts of attention from one lifeworld-organizing gestalt to another ..." CE). CClonceptually, an attention-switch requires that Cl) at least two patterns or interpretative "templates" always be potentially involved in our sizing up a situation; CE) each pattern itself be capable of rendering the situation coherent; and C3) movement from one to another— with a consequent reconstituting of the situation— be necessary before a "switch" will have occurred CBrown, 19BE: 17). The American women’s movement for political equality illustrates the interaction among persons whose 163

interpretative templates of the "may things are" differ. The push for the adoption of an Equal Rights Amendment began over a half-century ago. The movement grew out of the women’s suffragist movement spearheaded by the National Women’s Party CNWP). Even though women had acquired the right to vote with ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1919, the NWP continued to mobilize in the face of what they construed as deprivation and ambiguity in the status of women. The vote, in their opinion, was merely a symbol. In most practical political ways, women were still considered inferior to men and were denied equal opportunity with them. The NWP saw inequity in the fact that in most states women could not serve on juries or be considered guardians of their children. In 19E5, for example, the foreign wife of an American man could be brought into the United States exempt from quota law, but a foreign husband of an American women was subject to the quota provision. There were vast inequities, too, in the area of employment. Legislation designed to protect women from the evils and hardships of the work world discriminated against women who wanted or needed to work CConovan & Gray, 1983:10). The Equal Rights Amendment, sometimes called the Lucretia Mott Amendment, was adopted by the NWP at its annual convention in 19E1 and introduced into both houses of 164

Congress in 1923 CBecker, 19B1:191. The NWP, frBsh From the suffragist victory, looked upon federal law as the most suitable conduit for achieving equal opportunities for individual women. There were women, however, who disagreed. They were the "protection-minded" feminists who, though they had supported the NWP in its fight For the vote, Favored, instead of the Equal Rights Amendment, protective legislation and special benefits for women as a group even if such arrangements meant treating men and women differently CConoven & Gray, 19B3). Here, then, are two interpretative "templates," each of which rendered the situation coherent For each group. The equalitarians, standing on a narrow legal base, affirmed the right of the individual to equal opportunity while the protectionists maintained the traditional view: that women needed benefits as a sex. Since the protectionists perceived the natures of men and women as being different, they opposed any law which required the government to treat males or females as individuals without regard to gender. Protection-minded Feminists wanted women to be treated as women. The equalitarian feminists, by contrast, demanded that women be treated as persons whose natures they deemed the same as men’s CConoven & Gray:9). 165

The equalitarians were attempting to shift attention away from the traditional view while the protectionists fought to preserve the traditional view— though both groups agreed that women needed the law to insure rights for women. Each group, then, would facilitate or inhibit the attention- shift through formal rhetorical moves. Basically, according to Brown C19BE), the message-makers could use "two basic formal strategies for reconstructing human experience: conceived-anomaly-masking and -anomaly-featuring" CE1). This means that those promoting the attention-switch Cequalitarians) would feature anomalies, stress gaps, in the traditional view while masking Cminimizing) gaps in their own. On the other hand, those in favor of the traditional view Cprotectionists), would tend to mask or deemphasize anomalies in the traditional myth and emphasize the gaps in the alternate "template." Besides the basic strategies the attention-shift may be tactically actualized, among other ways, by Cl) changing back and forth among conceptions of epistemology . . .; CE) passing . . . also among variant modes of axiology and ontology; C3) going from one level of metaphor to another, including the alteration of appearance-reality, as Bormann has shown, along with other means of rendering rhetorical visions "immune to corroboration"; and C4) moving between strict and loose construction of any portion of a lifeworld considered as a "set of sovereign wishes CBrown, 13BE:E1). 166

In the illustration of the American women’s movement For political equality, the equalitarians moved tactically in order to shift attention to women as independent political persons. The protection-minded feminists considered such a change as a threat to the whole traditional structure of women’s "place" in American society. Women who perceive themselves differently from the established view will also value themselves, others, objects differently. ThBir relationships will change; so will thBir needs. While the protectionists agreed with thB equalitarlan3 that women needed the law to insure women’s rights, protectionists were not in favor of undercutting tradition. Both the equalitarians and the protectionists used rhetorical maneuvers in order to facilitate or impede an ontological shift in the "nature" of women. The equalitarian feminists, in demanding that women be treated as persons whose natures are the same as men’s, pointed out a flaw in the traditional view of women: the position of women was not consistent with the American spirit of independence. The equalitarians grounded their arguments in the basic American story which featured thB idealism of the founding fathers. In 1923 the Lucretia flott Amendment which stated that "CmJen and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States in every place 167

subject to its Jurisdiction" was considered by the equalitarians as a rephrasing of "all men Cpersonsl are created equal," as stated in the Declaration of Independence CEoual Rights) .

Looking upon themselves as constructive revolutionists, the equalitarian feminists shaped their strategy by likening themselves to the patriots of the American Revolution. Theirs was a cause imbued with "the spirit of 1776 . . . [the] spirit of change, the spirit of militant protest against oppression . . . [the] spirit of fundamental human freedom" (Uhite, 1925:29). To the protectionists, however, such a "spirit of change" would seriously Jeopardize remedial industrial legislation for women and— more to the point— would eventually "affect seriously the whole attitude on the part of men and women to the obligation assumed as husband and wife" CCouncil of Catholic Women, 1925:341). This did not mean that protection-minded feminists were opposed to women’s working outside the home. The industrial revolution was, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, already carrying through "the first stage in the changing position of women" CDegler, 1964:654). The protectionists could accept this change: they masked the gap in the traditional 168

view by insisting that the First right of woman was their right to be women Cwith all that implied in the traditional sense). Thus, as long as women were "protected," treated as women Cdifferent From men), working women would not be considered a threat to the traditional view oF women. The equalitarians, though, launched direct attacks against tradition. During the 19E5 Congressional hearings on equal rights, the NUIP used Facts, statistics, existing laws, and personal testimony to point out discrimination against women in the control oF their property, in exclusion From Jury duty, in the immigration laws CBlack, 1325):5-7). In their eFForts to make their case For equality, they projected a new image oF woman, one deFinitely not acceptable to protectionists or to the society at large, even though equalitarian demands derived From Fundamental American idealism. The "new" woman was an individual, an agent, able to earn For herselF and her dependents clothing, Food and lodging CBlack:B). She was intelligent, competitive, capable oF participating in the political arena. It was an image oF emancipation and individualism. It was a disturbing image— one oF the woman asserting herselF, directing her own creativity, exercising options, uniting in solidarity with other women. While the equalitarians, then, Featured emancipation and 169

individualism, they masked the responsibilities of most women at that time: that of homemaker and childbearer. But, in response to such attempted iconoclasm, the protectionists featured anomalies in the equalitarian worldview and masked anomalies in their own. During the 1325 Congressional hearings, for example, Elisabeth Christman C19255, secretary-treasurer of the National Women’s Trade Union, emphasized the threat total "equality" would bring: women would be subject to the same labor laws as men; they would be required to work the same hours and at the same tasks. There would be no consideration for women as women C21). Agnes G. Ryan C13255, executive secretary of the National Council of Catholic Women, used a straightforward rhetorical maneuver. She simply dismissed the whole ERA idea as "fundamentally unsound," "unreasonable," and "ridiculous" C215 While protectionists drew attention to anomalies in the equalitarian view, protectionists masked in their own view the growing assertiveness among women and the desire and/or need among women to seek employment or fulfillment outside the home. There is no end to the debate, of course. The Equal Rights Amendment, first introduced into Congress in 1323, and in nearly every subsequent session of Congress since, is 170 still a topic For debate. Though the attempt is clear, there has never been a single-version reconstituting of the situation for all women. The point of this extended example has been to illustrate how different interpretative templates make sense of a situation, and how message-makers use rhetorical moves to intervene in the symbolic reality of a group to influence a change. Each group saw differences between the interpretative templates that made the difference in their own. Further, it could be said that each group Cequalitarians and protectionists) sought to ■maintain its own interpretative template lest the "flaws" pointed out by the group advocating the alternate template should result in a vicious circle and the destruction of a group’s interpretative reality. Equalitarians, for example, may well have used rhetorical maneuvers to point out that the more women rely on "protectionist" strategies to secure rights, the more they will have to fight the male-dominated "law" every time they come up against discrimination in the social arena. The more they have to Fight, the more they become aware of their lack of political protection and equality before the law. The protectionists, however, might have insisted that the more women and men are treated as equals, the more women will have to assume the positions of men. The more women assume the positions of men, the more 171

often associated uiith "control," "authority," or "influence." These are causal conceptions of pouier and Cgiven the discussion of effects) are difficult to apply to rhetoric or to the rhetorical act. Brown C19B6), however, offers another version of power and lays out "its systemic strategies as rhetorical means to social intervention as opposed to social control"C181). As an alternative to a causal version of power, Brown C1986) presents an evolutionary, systems-approach in which power is an "interaction of processes leading to stability •and alteration in society" C1B4). Brown begins his explanation with Luhmann’s C1979) "concept of power as a 'symbolically generalized communication medium’" Cin Brown:182). For Brown power conceived as communication medium, by serving both the evolutionary and systems-view of the social world, becomes not a process of causing but of selecting, on extra-discursive bases, among potentialities for behavior . . . (1BE). Ulhat Brown, following Luhmann, means is that power, like love, or truth, or money, can be conceived as a medium of communication. Such media are additional to language and contain a "code of generalized symbols" which guide "the transmission of selections" "among potentialities for behavior" C1B2). 172

Key to Luhmann’s concept of power is the phrase "transmission of selections," for the code contains the set of taken-for-granted rules Cnot laws) "For acceptance and rejection among contending choices" CBrown, 1906:182). In the case of power, the set of rules includes "'symbolization of the power sources, . . . limitations on power,’ 'hierarchy,’ and 'consistency’" CLuhmann, 1979: 131, 141, quoted in Brown, 1996:1B2). In addition, "choice- transmission by power" differs from "choice-transmission by other media" in that the power code "provides for .'asymmetrical ordering of preferences’ between power holder and power subject, and it also provides sanctions as alternatives to be considered by acceptance of this asymmetrical ordering of preferences" CBrown, 1966:1B2 on Luhmann: 149, 120-22). Ue can think, then, of the power code as "tantamount to culture" which, among other things, contains "taken-for-granted rules that set boundaries For acceptance and rejection among contending choices" CBrown, 19B6:1B2). An example of power as a communication medium can be seen in the ethos of Anna Howard Shaw who played a dominant role in the women’s suffrage movement. In 1904 she became president of the National American Women’s Suffrage Association CNAWSA) CBanner, 1974:91). Shaw was a brilliant 173

orator but had limited administrative skill. Nevertheless, her oratorical ability and her position as president of the NAUSA allowed her to use power as a medium of communication effectively. Shaw was "censorious and dictatorial" as a president" CBanner:92), but her preferences for advancing the women’s suffrage issue, along with sanctions as to what would happen if her preferences were not followed, ruled the day. Although Shaw had been Susan B. Anthony’s chief lieutenant, Shaw’s tactics were morB moderate than were Anthony’s. Rather than spurring her followers on to new kinds of action in the cause, Shaw preferred "the traditional path of trying to educate women through reasoned pamphlets and genteel meetings" CBanner:S2). Lest the women of the NAUSA be associated with "radical groups, like the anarchists, or the early axe-wielding, saloon-destroying members of the UICTU CUomen’s Christian Temperance Union] whom the press so derided" CBanner:32), Shaw held to a conservative course. Indeed, though many women in the NAUSA disagreed with her tactics, Shaw’s determination and her status as a power medium helped the women’s suffrage movement toward respectability CBanner:S3). The example shows that power as a communication medium can be an efficient way of reducing complexity among choice- 174

they will be treated like men who spend most of their time outside the home working and running society. Thus, according to Brown C19821: the attention-switch, dynamically considered, amounts to a grand strategy For thB rhetoric of social intervention as its corollaries lead to changes in the way human beings name and thus make "real" their relationships with one another. Formally, the strategies for promoting gestalt-shifts are only two, arising From the recurrent question oF "same" or "diFFerent" that human categorizers ask about their experience in relation to other events. Each strategy, anomaly-masking and anomaly-Featuring, may be advanced by tactics such as switching From one cognitive style to another, and each such change is actualized by such traditional rhetorical maneuvers as turning the tables, arguing by residues, and the like C251. In the example oF the American Women’s movement For political equality, I have tried to illustrate how anomaly- masking and anomaly-Featuring on the part oF equalitarians and protectionists was advanced tactically through the attempted Facilitation/inhibition oF an ontological shiFt. The attempted actualization oF the change was carried out through such rhetorical maneuvers as arguments From the viewpoint oF American idealism, deliberate iconoclasm, and dismissal oF the new concept as ridiculous. Power and the Rhetoric oF Social Intervention

"Power" is usually conceived as the capacity or ability to act eFFectively. In the social sphere "power" is most 175

making. Anna Howard Shaw at the top of the hierarchy in the women’s suffrage movement used her status and power as a communication medium. Her followers had but to carry out her preferences. Brown (1986) quotes Luhmann (1979) on the elegance of power-as-medium: Symbolic generalizations Cin medial) make it possible to shift partially the process of transmission of reduced complexity from the level of explicit communication to the level of comolementaru expectation Cas between power holder and power subject] and therebu to take some of the pressure off the communication process, which is time-consuming, clumsu and rendered unsubtle bu language CLuhmann:130 in Brown:183). There is, however, a significant limitation to Luhmann’s conception of power. Communication through power is only part of the picture for the rhetorician. Luhmann (1979) stresses communication through power— that is, what is made possible by meaning because as a sociologist he is not all that interested in power through communication— "what makes meaning possible." Besides, for Luhmann (1979) "'CtJhe constitutive process’ of all media, including power, ’is hidden from view’" ( p.19 in Brown, 1906:183). Brown (1986), however, would bring to light the "constitutive process of power." When we look for what is crucial in power creation, we find that it is in "the interpretation of relationship between power holder and power subject . . ."(Brown:183). Power holder and power 176 subject can, of course, shift roles. "the rhetorician," states Broun, "sees that 'complementary expectations’ can arise only in instances of conceived interdependency betueen the shiftable roles of power holder and power subject" C183). In the field of communication, "settings and actions involving interpretations of interdependency commonly are thought of as being rhetorical" C1B3). In order to "see" human beings constituting a power code, we have to see actions in some "province" of interdependence. For Brown C1386), Boulding suggests that ■this "province" might be likened to a "market" or an "economy" in which human beings make preferences among contending choices in order somehow to affect the future. Says Boulding C1978), "The power of an individual decision maker . . . is the amount of change in the state of the universe he can accomplish by choosing one future rather than another" Cp. 834 in Brown, 1388:1B41 . □f course, since it is difficult to "see the actual working out of alternative futures," we need to focus on what we can "more readily see" in the human creation of power. That focus, according to Brown C13BB), would emphasize "human interdependency as the locus of power" which would lead to the consideration of power as "the collection of shares which individuals or groups have in 177

picking a version of anu scenario to be fleshed out in the future" C104). When Brouin discusses the "division of power into shares," he is referring to "what we are accustomed to calling responsibility" C1B4). By means of what I call such power shares and their consequent conceptions of interdependency, human beings divide the decisioning on futures in ways that not only distribute vindication, exhilaration, or prizes among parties to the decision but also parcel out among them risks of guilt, shame, or penalties. The power code develops amidst interpreted interdependency as traders in enacting futures CBrown:104). Thus, Brown (1906) is not referring to power as a causal process. Rather, he considers power "as interaction of processes leading to stability and alteration in society" (104). Brown uses Pepper’s C1970) concept of the "root metaphor theory of knowledge" and the distinction between "mechanistic and evolutionary conceptions of change" to illustrate the difference between "causal and non-causal definitions of power" C1B4). Some theories of knowledge work like a machine. The aim and goal of "mechanistic" theories is "control" as a level controls the object it lifts. "Control" in mechanistic theories of knowledge imply "a one-to-one relation between the lever of the rhetor’s act and motion in the audience. Other theories of knowledge, Brown’s included, can be likened to growth. These are 178

"evolutionary" theories whose goal is "intervention" which "no matter how visible, implies a mediating relation between thB rhBtor's act and ongoing action of the audience" C1B51. It is important to note, however, that "in either version of power, its code governs the transmission of selections" C1B5). For Brown C13B6), then, power can be defined as human interpretations of hierarchical mutual dependency during acts of future choosingC;1 power is akin to an economy: a growth-based evolutionary version of change as consequence of interacting influences C1B5). In sum, power for Brown C19B6) has three attributes. "First, its genesis is taken-for-granted interpretations forming a code .... Second, power is code-ordered relational communication .... Third, . . . the process constitutive of power becomes open to inspection" C1B5). Ulhat follows is an illustration of persons "making power real among themselves" which, according to Brown C19B6D, is necessary "to the symbolizing creatures who in a world of complexity choose without deliberating in the classical sense of the word" C1B5). By 1314 most organized segments of the women’s movement in the United States "had come together around a commitment to suffrage as their main goal" CBanner, 1974:B7). However, the diversity of the groups involved in the movement as well 179 as the press and the public provide an example of the genesis of power among groups "who ascribe interdependent shares to each other while spreading the risk of choices" CBrown, 19BG:1B5). In this illustration, the focus will be upon the suffragists who, within their power share evolved a power code of complementary expectations. The common concern of suffrage brought to NAUSA the support of many women’s groups such as the church society of Lutheran women, organizations of working women, federations of mothers’ clubs, professionsl women, and so on CBanner: 1974:120). The membership in NAUSA, however, consisted of two major groups: the militants Csometimes called radicals) and the progressives Csometimes called social feminists). The militant women had a long history of campaigning for the vote but had broken with the suffrage crusade in 1BBB when Congress gave the vote to Black men but refused the vote to women CBanner, 1974:BB). Led by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the militants favored universal suffrage for American citizens and wanted to pressure Congress into passing a suffrage amendment. The progressives, who had long worked for social reform, were led by Lucy Stone, who wanted to focus on passage of suffrage rights for women in the states. In 1B93, militants 180

and moderates joinBd ForcBs into NAUSA mainly because as separate groups thBy could accomplish little CBannerBB3 . However, in-fighting and repeated disagreements over how to choose what political future for women kept the NAUSA from developing an effective power code. Finally, in 1314 mutual ascription of interdependent power shares as well as interactive decisioning among suffragists made power real for the suffrage groups. Besides, the groups within the suffrage power share, had to contend with an antagonistic public as well as government officials who would vote for/against a suffrage amendment. Another power share of primary importance was the press. The militants finally recognized that to reach audiences that could help influence the outcome of their cause, they needed the help of the progressives. The militants, therefore, adjusted the definition of their goal. The attainment of the vote would become, not an end in itself, but a means to emancipation of women. If women could vote, they reasoned, women could influence social institutions CBanner, 1374:1143. This appealed to the progressives, who had been working to achieve reform within existing political and social institutions. Progressives discovered that social change was difficult without the vigor of the militants. The interactive decisioning between 181

the militants, whose tactics alienated the society at large and repeatedly received bad press, and the progressives, whose conservative tactics kept social reform at a snail’s pace, helped to evolve a power code of complementary expectations within the power share CBrown, 1986:165). Since both groups within NAUJ5A now saw the amendment as a means to an end, the power code could regulate their behavior. Though there were still disagreements among militants and progressives, for the most part both groups were able to work together toward influencing the political future for women. The power code, in regulating behavior and in setting boundaries, was able to reduce the complexity involved in choosing a future which included suffrage for women mandated by amendment to the federal constitution. Accordingly, the suffragists by 1914 "revived flagging local organizations, introduced new lobbying techniques, standardized membership lists, and established state headquarters" CBanner:1974:1E0). Aware, too, of the power of the press, they sought attention by introducing "the suffrage parade— a striking innovation that gained national attention" CBanner:1E1). While the militants modified tactics which appeared threatening to the public and which 182

mould alarm lammakers and pomerful lobbying groups, the progressives adopted nem tactics of parades and rallies. The progressives, too, brought to NAUI5A tight organization uihich helped present the image of a unified effort CBanner:123) . Thus, the groups involved in the suffrage movement made pomer real "by ascribing it interdependently to one another." CBromn, 19B6:1B6). In the mutual interpretations of their relations, meaning as mell as pomer mas made possible C1BB). As the pomer code evolved, the groups could better select mhich actions mould be more significant than others for choosing the future. Depending upon shared interpretations during future choosing, then, the groups mediated "each other’s goals" so that the future could also become real CBromn, 19B6:1B5). The example of the attribution of interdependent pomer shares in the momen’s movement for suffrage mas meant to illustrate Broom's definition of pomer as non-causal and relational. Moreover, it should be noted that besides the constitutive aspects of pomer, the illustration shoms the sources of pomer and locates their boundaries. Both the general public and government officials, for example, mere seen as pomer holders by the suffragists. Pomer mas limited through attribution and through mutual interpretations of 183

relations. Though suffragists saw government officials as having the power to vote yes/no on the suffrage amendment, suffragists did not see government officials as having absolute power to choose the future for women Celse why would they fight?). Likewise, government officials, while recognizing that suffragists could be disruptive in making their demands known, understood the persuasive influence of the political protesters was limited by, say, officials’ ability/willingness to listen to complaints, the expediency of bowing/not bowing to protesters’ demands, protesters’ ability to persude and so on. Also, the illustration shows that as the parties in the suffrage movement took each other into account, the complementary expectations became the "conventionalized rules for roles" the participants would take in choosing the future. Ulhat happens, therefore, in the attribution of interdependent power shares is that not only are relations constituted, but expectations are created which regulate behavior CBrown, 19E36:1B7).

If we step back, then, and view women’s advocacy for rights on a macro-level, we can see the working out of "a cultural code of behavior which depends upon hierarchical interdependency" CBrown, 19B6:1B7). If we could look at the 184

American women's advocacy For rights From its emergence in the 1800s until the demise of the Equal Rights Amendment in the early 1900s, we would see the logic oF the power code across time. It would appear as "a rhythm oF cycles organized as a spiral by progressive developments" CBrown, 19B6:187). The rhythm oF cycles would show us recurring patterns "oF power attribution and limitation" that would "Foster awareness oF power through communication." But it would also show us "power as a medium, i.e., oF communication through power" CBrown, 1885:1B7). The power code as a medium would subsume "worldviews or ideology as bases for choices" and transmit "reductions of complexity" enabling "social actors to choose actions without having to treat them as enactments of credo or knowledge" CBrown, 1906:107) . Looking across time, then, at the women’s movement For political rights, the cyclic pattern shows that the more the women advocated, the more the "keepers of the culture" Cgroups in opposition! Fought to preserve traditional roles For women. Meanwhile the press, acting as a "social arbiter," brought to public awareness new ideas about "woman’s place." As the public adjusted to the idea of expanded roles For women, the government slowly legitimized the adjustments and, thus, realigned the power CBrown, 185

19B6:IBB). This happened across time as women obtained educational opportunities, entered the work Force, won the right to speak in public, advocated For social reForm Cnote the Fight For temperance CWCTUD, kindergartens, settlement houses, child-labor laws). With the adjustment oF power among shareholders came a decrease in advocacy, a decrease in activity among the "keepers oF the culture," a decrease in "arbitration" on the part oF the press, and decrease in political legitimizing on the part oF the government— until the lack oF change in women’s condition gave way to increased advocacy, increased opposition, and so on in a cyclic pattern CBrown, 19B6:1BB). Such lulls in the women’s movement as described aFter the readjustment oF power occurred, For example, aFter women obtained the vote, aFter World War II, and aFter the deFeat oF the Equal Rights Amendment in 19BE CBanner, 1974). Over time, the power code would be maniFested "in its recurrent constitutive and regulating patterning oF relationships among the power shares" CBrown, 1986:IBB). The patterning would be seen as consistent as power is attributed since "hierarchy" would be working, along with sanctions and asymmetrical preFerencBS. In the late lBOOs, the women oF the WCTU under Frances Willard decided they 186

could not remain silent or passive in the face of certain social evils. The disorder they created served notice to government officials and the society at large that they were willing to engage in destructive activity in order to be heard CBanner:32). When the UCTU exercised this power sanction, the other power shares made adjustments in the asymmetrical preferences. In legitimizing the adjustment Cthe Prohibition Amendment, for example, in 1913), hierarchical positions were realigned so that the power of future-choosing was also revised. This, then, is a meaning-centered version of the power code which— having been created through mutual attributions and interpretations of relations among power shares— regulates complementary expectations among power shares, relies on sanctions, supports the claim of power sharers to asymmetrical preferences CBrown, 1386:132), and "subsumes ideology in its transmission of choices among the parties for future-choosing" C190). The practicing of power rhetorically involves the social creation of power through formal moves: strategies, tactics and maneuvers. Once again, the formation of the power code as well as its operation is evident and "power through communication is seen to complement Luhmann’s communication through power" CBrown, 1336:193). 187

Because the power code at bottom provides relationships For relationships, its visibility-rendering strategies, tactics, and maneuvers all have to do with the creation, maintenance, or demise of human interdependency during Future choosing. Strategies of power intervention number only two: the Facilitating of cooperative interdependence and the facilitating of competitive interdependence to produce the mixed relationship necessary to make possible the periodic challenge to and affirmation of the power code’s hierarchy CBrown, 19B6:133-194). As stated in the last chapter, the tactics are three in numbBr: threat, exchange, and integry, Boulding’s C1978) social organizers. The "straegies depend tactically on generalized symbolic meanings to constitute and regulate motives for cooperation and competition: CBrown, 1999:1945. The numbers and kinds of maneuvers, which depend upon the "practitioners’ and scholars’ analyses," make real the strategies and tactics as well as "the sanctions and avoidance alternatives as supports for asymmetrical preferences in the power code" CBrown, 1989:194). The rhetorical practice of power can be illustrated by Focusing on the moves of Margaret Sanger as she advocated for the legitimization of birth control methods. Though Margaret Sanger’s name eventually became synonymous with the birth control movement, contraception was an issue long before she came on the scene. During the early nineteenth century native born American women of the middle and upper 188

classes had been attempting to avoid pregnancy with increasing success, flale cooperation, however, was required For the methods in widest use— withdrawal, continence, and abstinence— and while they were quite acceptable uptown, they were not popular in the tenements and poor city districts. Douches, sponges and condoms recommended by early contraceptive tracts were advertised discreetly in the newspapers and available to the middle and upper classes; the poor were either largely unaware of such devices or could ill-afford them. In 1093, however, the new Comstock laws classified contraceptive information and devices as obscenity and prohibited all dissemination, manufacture, importation, or distribution of such information or devices— including circulation or proliferation via the mail service CWoloch, 1904:364-6). By the time Margaret Sanger began practicing as a public health nurse in 1904, the Comstock legislation had widespread official support from doctors, who viewed contraception as a health hazard, and from clergymen who claimed contraception bred immorality and threatened the sanctity of motherhood CWoloch, 1904:364). Still, the well-to-do continued to practice birth control and also managed to procure the contraceptive devices. As the nineteenth century progressed, however, concern that the 189

native born and well-off white Americans "were wiping themselves out by having too few children" added a survival imperative to the contraception ban. Officials strenuously enforced the Comstock laws and by the end of the century, abortion, too, was outlawed in all the states CUIoloch: 365) . No one was more aware of the divergence in social privilege between the haves and have-nots than Margaret Sanger. By 1912, several forces in her life influenced her competitive relationship with the social structure and with the government: her early experience of her own mother’s misery, her exposure to Emma Goldman and the radical left, her marriage to William Sanger on a romantic impulse, her experiences as a public health nurse in the tenements of New York City CSanger, 1932). Perceiving women as victims, first of a society which dictated women’s "place," and second, of men who regarded the marriage act as their right regardless of its consequences for women, Sanger, at first, constituted her competitive relationship with the male-dominated social structure tactically through threat. Sanger established herself as a writer and speaker in socialist circles. Typically, in her early writings in the Call. she would openly advocate contraception, describe clearly "the facts 190 of life," and, in socialist fashion, pen invectives against the social system’s exploitation of women (Gray, 1979:41). Following the legal power code, officials of the Post Office had one of Ganger’s articles removed from the Call. Ganger’s response was to increase her advocacy by continual confrontation with the system: she participated in the factory strikes in Hazelton, Pennsylvania; she was arrested for striking a police officer; she produced, from her kitchen table, her own iconoclastic Journal, The Woman Rebel (Sanger, 1932). In 1914, Sanger’s home publication brought her an indictment for violating nine counts of the Comstock laws. □n August 25, 1914, Margaret Sanger was arraigned before the United States District Court for southern New York. Having requested a delay, she was permitted six weeks to prepare her case, but in the interim, Sanger prepared, instead, a practical manual entitled Familu Limitation and had 100,000 copies printed (Baskin, 1976:x). Then, reasoning that there was no point in going to trial since she was obviously guilty of violating the law, Sanger left word with her husband to distribute Familu Limitation, packed her bags and sailed for England (Sanger, 1932). Margaret Sanger returned from her self-imposed exile wiser and more determined than ever. During a year abroad 191

she had learned a great deal about human reproduction and contraception. She also learned that birth control would have to be a medical service. Making contraception available to everyone would no longer be simply a free speech issue as she had proclaimed in The UJoman Rebel CReed, 1978:90). Sanger returned, too, with a better understanding of thB reform procBss. Confrontation with the established order was not enough. Sanger realized she would have to form cooperative relationships with others in order to convert the estranged and turn the undecided and alienated in the society toward the movement. Thus, Sanger turned from woman rebel to "nurse-mother lobbying among social and professional elites" CReed, 197B:95). She drew on the support of wealthy women to help finance and distribute birth control literature CSanger, 1938:186). She lobbied between 1981-1985 for a "doctors only" bill which would recognize the right of physicians to give contraceptive information CReed:101). Utilizing the tactic of exchange, Sanger was willing to give over the distribution of contraceptives to the medical profession in return for professional and legal legitimacy CReed:108). 192

However, Sanger also continued her competitive strategy. She broke the law several times because she understood that such action would give her more publicity and access to the public Forum of the courts. Eventually, it would be through the courts that Sanger would establish the right of the physician to receive contraceptive devices through the mails. Accordingly, Sanger opened a birth control clinic in the Brownsville section of Brooklyn. She continued to distribute Familu Limitation during speaking tours, and inaugurated the First birth control conference in the United States CSanger, 193E). Finally, Sanger sought to express her ideas and intervene in the lives of individuals through her writings. She Founded The Birth Control Review, "dedicated to voluntary motherhood" and to Fight against society’s view of contraception CBirth Control Review. 1919). She also produced several books including Women and the New Race and The Pivot of Civilization which proclaimed Sanger’s dominant themes: better sex is a positive good in any community; the practice of continence is impossible for normal people; the end of marriage is not procreation, but spiritual communion CSanger, 19£0:43-36). Here in her writings the tactic of integry is used most effectively— though it formed the basis of all Sanger’s actions on behalf of women. Sanger 193

identified with women as victims in the society even as she acknowledged that, by her very womanhood, she was part of the predicament CReed:83). Therefore, Sanger acted, not because she wanted anything from women, but because she was, as a woman, a victim among victims. Thus it is that Margaret Sanger exemplifies a person attempting a power intervention. In order to satisfy a need she managed to create, maintain, and contribute to the demise of that interdependency through facilitating cooperative and competitive interdependencies. She produced the mixed relations that challenged societal power structures CBrown, 19B6) . Sanger maneuvered to affect the interdependency among power shares through the use of threat, exchange, and integry. Her maneuvers varied from writing articles, to engaging in direct acts of civil disobedience, to working for reform within the established social system. In this illustration, then, "the locus for intervention of the rhetoric of power" is the interdependence of power shares choosing the future within the codified system CBrown, 19B6:19B). Such a system, as we have seen, contains, of course, the sources and limitations of power, as well as hierarchy, sanctions, and asymmetrical preferences. When the code is seen "as context for the 194 pouier shareholder’s Formalized strategies, tactics, and maneuvers For power," the creation oF the power code becomes apparent, and thus, we can understand how power as communication is complemented by communication as power— that is, how what makes meaning possible is complemented by what is made possible by meaning CBrown, 1906:1B3).

Need and the Rhetoric oF Social Intervention

"Need" is the third nexus oF Brown’s system oF social intervention— that is, "need," along with power and attention, is one oF the entry points For rhetorical intervention. Need, oF course, is present in "interventions conceptualized as shiFts oF attention"— as is power. In the attentioh-shiFt, new needs and qualities are attributed to persons as attention Focuses on new liFeworld-organizing patterns. Likewise, the new patterning "entails the relative opening or closing oF attention toward members oF an in-group and/or out-group" and constitutes new relationships, "either competitive or cooperative, or one and the other" CBrown, 19B7:2). Need, along with attention, is subsumed in power-based interventions, "inasmuch as need is presumed in human interdependency as the locus oF power and inasmuch as power subsumes worldviews as bases For choices CBrown, 19B7:2). Thus, need is always part oF the 195

process of intervention. When focusing on need as a nexus, attention and power are subordinate in the intervention process. The social realization of "need" makes attention shifts concomitant with it as persons or groups attend to one need rather than to another, shifting their attention from needs related to individual identity, to those Joined with collective identity, for example. Further, "need" makes "power" concomitant with it as persons’ opening and closing attention to audiences for need advocacy affects competitive or cooperative interdependency CBrown, 19B7:E-3!. Thus, in Brown’s C19B7) holographically conceived model, the whole is contained in each part CE). In looking at rhetors’ actions through the lens of the model, we see a rhetoric "not of social control but of social intervention" since "rhetors’ actions affect the ongoing growth of the social system Crather than pulling the levers of the social machine, as in the rhetoric of control!" CBrown:31. Brown C19B71, then, in "treating need as superordinate inventional topic," considers "the nature and genesis of what persons are accustomed to name as 'need’" C31 . In order to do this, Brown C19B71 looks at "need" as both biosocial "given" and as symbolic creation C31 . Biosocially "given" needs have their origin in human physiology and/or the human social system. The "needs" for clothing and shelter, for example, are both survival requirements and 196 social rBquirBmBnts. Such "nBBds," says Brown (1907), do not explicitly depend "on human communication For their origin although communication may be assumed to have had a role in the nurture half of the nature-nurture pair" C3). In order to obtain these needs, persons Find ways of intervening into the social system: they barter, Find a medium of exchange, learn how to sew, cheat, etc. Some of the biosocial "given" needs are what Brown (19B7) calls "individuality-stressing" or "personality needs. Others are "group-centered" needs C4) . Whether individuality-stressing or group-centered, in order to meet needs, human beings must interact with other human beings and/or with their environment. When these biosocial "givens" are communicated, they become social interventions; that is, through communication, appeals are made For these needs. However, it is important, Brown C19B7) points out, that even though these biosocial nBeds are "expressed and shared through symbols, they— not the symbols— are the engines of change in human aFFairs" (4). From this point of view, "need," like "power" can be considered a medium of communication. However, persons also create needs when "needs" are "names taken as phenomena" CBrown, 1987:55. Having already considered in previous chapters the impetus of the human 197

being toward symbolic transformation of experience, it is not difficult to understand that persons symbolically constitute needs. Since human beings name so as to confer order on experience and to reduce the complexity in experience, it is reasonable to assume that "needs" are made real by naming— that is, by symbolically attributing them to "self" and to "others" CBrown, 1987:5). Need, then, is created or made "real" through "the social exchange of symbols CBrown, 1987:6). Ulhat happens, however, is that persons forget that the need is merely a name. We have already spoken about "this process by which 'need’ as naming is lost sight of in need as realitu" CBrown, 1987:6). Chapter Three contains a discussion of Edmund Leach’s C1976) concept of "code- switching." Briefly, persons usually make a distinction among signal, sign and symbol. Persons know that generally signals and signs are indicators which can trigger reactions. Symbols are usually considered arbitrary representations and have no intrinsic or prior relationship to things Cevents, persons) represented C14). However, human beings do not always distinguish among signals, signs, and symbols when they use them. In many instances, writes Leach C1976), "Signs are converted into symbols, symbols 198

into signs, signs and symbols both masquerade as signals ..." C45) .

This process of "code-switching" is carried out in human beings because of the mental process of "taking in" data from the world out3ide the skin CLBach calls this

"metonymy" C14D and projecting back on the world outside the skin some denotation created in the mind CLeach calls this "metaphor" E141). When human beings "code-switch," they do not simply move From metonymy (From what is outside the skin) to metaphor Cto the representation inside the skin). Human beings actually take one For the other, or they act as if one is the other. For example, we act, at times, as though a Football player is. a bear Cor a "Refrigerator"), as though the Marlborough man is American manhood, as though a women holding a child is motherhood. Similarly, we act as though love, motherhood, Justice— and need— are actual things because we have observed experiences of love, motherhood, Justice, and need, and we have named these experiences. By naming them, we have made them "real," and we act as though they— rather than the experiences— are phenomena. "In a phrase, via code switching, we symbol mongers produce metaphor as reality and reality as metaphor. By such a representational process, ‘need’ as naming is lost sight of in need as reality, as phenomenon" CBrown, 1987:7). 199

Naming "need" is part of the human nBed to construe an ordered world. What is required also "is the social exchange of names and naming strategies CBrown, 19B7:8). When we name "needs," then, we must also employ "power" "as the code For human interdependency via negotiated needs," and we must focus attention on "either the anomalies or the coherence within a worldview version of needs met or unmet" CBrown, 1987:0}. Having named "needs," they become Cthrough code-switching) "taken-for-granteds." □nee derived as taken-for-granteds, needs can be taken as enthymematic materials in the rhetoric of need intervention, in which the nature, the hierarchy, or the consequences of needs are urged— including the ideological identities entailed in persons as needers CBrown, 1987:8). During a need intervention, either "group-stressing" or "individuality-stressing" needs are salient. Emphasis on group-stressing needs Foregrounds "the shared identity among persons in the community"; Featuring individuality- stressing needs highlights "the possession of unique personal qualities" CBrown, 1987:8). The following is an example of the socially constructed need For happiness/fulfillment among middle-class suburban women Following the second World War. The example will show how code-switching creates the need and how "need" can be a dynamic For social intervention CBrown, 1987:11). 200

In the fifteen years following the second World War, American women came to understand and accept that their "place" in society was considered to be the home. The home, after all, seemed to hold the most promise for the fulfillment of the American Dream, since the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness had been interrupted and forever changed by a depression, a war, and the explosion of the bomb CFriedan, 1903:182). "The feminine mystique," the version of the American Dream for women stressed group identity. Women sought to become all they could be: housewives and mothers. This metaphor of the fulfilled American women (housewives, mothers) found expression in having a home in the suburbs, five children, two cars in the garage and the endless trivialities that went with keeping the house, chauffeuring the children, and making husbands happy CFriedan, 1983). The reality-as-metaphor was found in the fluffy, manicured models who looked out of the pages of Ladies’ Home Journal. They had become the icons— housewives/mothers— surrounded by shiny counters and well- waxed floors, fighting the daily battles of dirty toilet bowls and stained clothing, trying to prepare the perfect meal, keeping the kids spotless and the rugs vacuumed. They had found their happiness in motherhood and the endless 201

chores attached to that status CFriedan, 1983). Individual needs For women in the social sphere Cthe need for self-direction, self-reliance, achievement) were not stressed. Some women, of course, took advantage of educational opportunities, some refused to give up their jobs to returning GIs after World War II, some chose "careers." host women, however, listened to the voice of society and chose to find fulfillment/happiness as wives and mothers CFriedan:1B4). It was in their capacity as wives and mothers, however, that women’s individual need for "achievement" was stressed. Women were encouraged Cby media, especially) to find creative ways of pleasing husbands and children. The metaphor of achievement became reality as women endeavored to become beautiful, to be an expert at personal care, to keep a clean and tidy house, to prepare nutritious, economical meals— in short, to manage a household with style. Every advertisement for soap, convenience foods, household gadgets, and personal products became metaphor for the achievement of good household management CFriedan, 1983) . Thus, the example illustrates how, for middle-class women in the 1950s, the need for happiness/fulfillment was socially constructed via code-switching. The example can 202

also be used "to model ’need’ as a dynamic for social intervention, to see ’need’ Cl) salience, C£) advocacy, and C3) responsiveness" as a way of communicating need and to see need "both Cl) as a phenomenal ’given’ to be expressed in communication, and CE) as a symbolic creation to arise in communication" CBrown, 1987: 11-1E). The model is conceptualized as cycles "or more accurately," as Brown C1907) says, as "spirals, since events/contexts change and do not by analogy occupy the same ’space’" C1E). Because the need spiral is a continuous process we can begin at any of the spiral’s Junctures. For illustration, we assume that there is a "socially shared name for the need," and begin inspection of this dynamic of need intervention at the Juncture of the need spiral at which persons experience or attribute "a need relevant to their growth and survival" CBrown, 1987:IE). In the example, women after World War II experienced, attributed to themselves, and were attributed by societal institutions, a need for "happiness/fulfillment." Simultaneously, with the experiencing of need salience, "there occurs individual and/or group advocacy for needs-meeting by relevant others in the communication system" CBrown, 1987:IE). During the 1950s, societal institutions— businesses, schools, 203

government, churches— Found ways of advocating For the "happiness" and "achievement" oF women. Women also advocated For their own "needs" by, For example, purchasing Cand thus increasing the demand For) gadgets and commodities to FulFill their own and their Family’s growth and survival needs. Further, "concomitantly with experiencing and advocating needs is an opening or dampening oF attention to others in the system who conceivably have the ability to be responsive to the advocated need" CBrown, 1907:IE). The institutions in the social system responded to women’s demand For commodities which would make their happiness complete. Thus, a need For a group-stressing growth and survival need is named. The more salient the need becomes the more advocacy For the need occurs and the less advocacy For individuality-stressing needs occur. The more attention to meeting group-stressing growth and survival needs by relevant others that occurs, the less becomes the salience oF group-stressing needs, the less occurs the advocacy For such needs. However, When attention switches to more salience on individuality-stressing needs, there is more advocacy For individuality-stressing needs, and more attention to individuality-stressing needs, less attention to group-stressing needs, and so on. Vicious circles 204 develop when relevant others Fail to respond to the needs. Without response From relevant others the need becomes more salient and more advocacy occurs. When relevant others respond to the needs, saliency theoretically is lessened and so is advocacy. The spiral continues iF there is a switch From group-stressing to individuality-stressing needs, or iF the cycle is reversed when group-stressing or individuality- stressing needs are met. In the case oF the need For women’s happiness/ FulFillment aFter world War II, the need For women Cas a group) to Find happiness in the home became salient. That is, the need was named and stressed For women as a group. Societal institutions advocated For this need CSo did women who wanted "happiness"), and social institutions supported and encouraged women to meet this need in the peace-time years Following the second World War. As attention to group-stressing needs oF womBn to Find happiness by making a home For themselves and their Families was being met, less attention was given to meeting individuality-stressing needs For women. Also, as group-stressing needs were met, such needs became less salient, and advocacy For them lessened. But, then, individuality-stressing needs, the needs For individual achievement by women became more salient. There 205

was more advocacy For these needs and the society paid attention by introducing women to gadgets and commodities which would add "flair," "style," and "imagination" to housekeeping and household chores CFriedan, 208) . Need-based intervention can occur at any of the three junctures: saliency, advocacy, or response. An intervenor would imploy specific strategies, tactics and maneuvers in order to change the direction of the spiral. At the Juncture at which societal institutions were making salient group-stressing needs, Betty Friedan intervened to alert women to "the feminine mystique," Friedan’s name for society’s group-stressing need. Friedan wanted women to pay less attention to "the feminine mystique"— in all its guises CFriedan considered even society’s version of individuality- stressing needs as part of the "mystique.")— and more attention to individuality-stressing needs which women themselves would name. OF course, it should be pointed out that group-stressing needs and individuality needs are only apparent polarities. Ulhile attention is focused on one, the other is subsumed CBrown, 13B7:2P). While Friedan was trying to get women to identify individual needs of achievement, she was aware that it was important that women identify, as well, what they need as a group. However, what Friedan saw as a vicious circle for women stemmed from 206 society’s naming of needs For women. The more women try to conform to the image society projects For them, the more Frustrated they become with the emptiness of their lives. The harder they try to overcome the Frustrations, the more they conform to the societal image. Friedan in The Feminine tlustioue C1903) advocates that women change their perceptions about themselves, identify their own needs and create out of those needs their own cultural image rather than living by that of society. According to Brown C19B7), in order to carry out strategies of "individual-centered needmaking and group- stressing needmaking," intervenors employ the Following tactics: Cl) Intervenors may affirm/deny needs, either by needers’ own self-affirmation, or that of others. . . . C2) Concomitantly, intervenors may prompt some means of advocacy and at the same time discourage others. . . . C3) Concomitantly, intervenors may Facilitate/impede attention by needers to potential need-meeters C23).

Friedan wanted women to affirm and advocate their own needs so that society would pay attention to what women wanted. In what follows, it will be shown that Friedan maneuvered mainly through historical-based argument, name- calling, analogy, personal testimony, and her own research to expose the social institutions that perpetuate "the 207

Feminine mystique" and to show that the societal vision For women is False. This vision, this "Feminine mystique," keeps most women in the home and impedes their maturity, preventing them From achieving the growth oF which they are capable CFriedan, 1383). Friedan C13B3) begins by explaining that besides the situation in America in the years immediately Following Ulorld War II, there were salient reasons For women’s return to the home, reasons which were interwoven in the sociological, psychological, and historical Fabric oF the •twentieth century. Friedan returns brieFly to the heroines oF the past to show that women have a history oF speaking out against the societal vision which— though in diFFerent Form— has been present in every American century. Women such as Ernestine Rose, Margaret Fuller, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Margaret Sanger, and others, all lived, loved, were loved and married, but also set out to abolish the conditions which kept them From being all they could be. They Fought slavery, Founded educational institutions, demonstrated For birth control, advocated For the vote. What happened aFter the vote? By the 1330s, women were being educated, seeking employment and generally Fighting against the image oF "helpless gentility" so prevalent in society’s identity oF women. But then came the 1340s, and 208 women began to retreat; the 1950s, and women surrendered CFriedan: 90-10E).

In the 1940s, according to Friedan C19B3), the ideas of 5igmund FrBud hBlpBd reinforcB the tyranny of "shoulds" for womBn. Taking his c u b From the strict dBtBrminism which characterized the scientific thinking of the Victorian era, Freud perceived women as inferior, strange, and childlike. Primarily, women existed in terms of man’s love, to love in return and to serve his needs. Because Freud’s followers could see women only in the image defined by Freud, they helped popularize his ideas, some form of which were taught, preached, practiced and disseminated by educators, church personnel, psychologists and popular media C105-1E5). "Freud was accepted so quickly and completely at the end of the forties that for over a decade no one even questioned the race of the American educated women back to the home" C1E3). Besides the Freudian influence, social science became mired in functionalism which began as an attempt to make social science more "scientific" by borrowing from biology the idea of studying institutions as if they were muscles or bones CFriedan:1E7). In other words, institutions were considered in terms of their "structure" and "function" in 209

the social body. But "the function" often got translated into "the function must be" and accepted whole-heartedly its own definition: Woman is what society says she is CFriedan: 198-135). Another factor contributing to women’s return to the home was, according to Friedan C19B3), the new "sex- directed" educators. The one lesson a girl could hardly avoid learning if she went to college during the fifteen years after World War II was not to get seriously interested in anything besides finding a husband. A woman would need to get married and have children if she wanted to be normal, happy, adjusted, feminine. Admittedly, she learned some of this lesson at home and some from her environment as well as from her contempories, but higher education did not develop her critical, creative intelligence. In fact, sex-directed educators taught women in college in the years after World War II to adjust within the world of home and children. Courses in "Marriage and Family Life" were popular during those years and typical feminized curricula in higher education included studies in sociology, anthropology, psychology— those in contrast to pure science or fine art CFriedan: 150-1011. Thus, writes Friedan C1983), by the mid-1950s women had returned to the home "to live by sex alone." They had 210

internalized society’s vision for happiness. With their husbands drawn in after them and the door shut securely

against the outside world, they began to H v b the "pretty lie" of "the feminine mystique" (204). After having traced the route "by which sophisticated thought circled back on itself to perpetuate the obsolete image of femininity," Friedan (1383) turns to "how the image meshed with prejudice and misinterpreted frustration to hide the emptiness . . . from women themselves" (20B). Friedan describes the societal image of group-stressing needs which reached its apex in the late 1350s: Millions of women lived their lives in the image of those pretty pictures of the American suburban housewife, kissing their husbands goodbye in front of the picture window, depositing their stationwagonsful of children at school and smiling as they ran the new electric waxer over the spotless kitchen floors (18). Women’s only ambition was to be the perfect wife and mother. Their only thought was for "feminine" concerns: hygiene, beauty, children, relationships. They left the world outside the home to men, gloried in their role as women, and when the census taker knocked on the door to ask what they did for a living "they wrote proudly on the census blank: 'Occupation housewife’" (IB). However, in her own research and in her capacity as speaker, lecturer, and writer, Friedan (1383) noticed a 211

strange malaise among American women in the middle years of the twentieth century. Women who had "made it" to the housewife Mecca, "successful" actors in the feminine mystique were experiencing discontent with society’s version of happiness. Labeling it "the problem that has no name," Friedan describes in detail the inner dissatisfaction of housewives who, at that time, felt "empty, somehow . . . incomplete," "tired," as if they "don’t exist" C21). Friedan intervenes to persuade women that they need to think of themselves in a different way. In so doing, they will value their persons, their relationships, their homes in a different way, and they will rely upon sources other than societal institutions for knowledge about themselves. Friedan advocates for a new vision— since the feminine mystique is a problem. In Friedan’s vision, women advocate for themselves: decide for themselves about themselves. As her arguments unfold, it becomes clear that while societal interveners attribute to women the group-stressing needs of the feminine mystique, societal vision managers deny advocacy for a solution the "the problem that has no name." When Friedan C19B3) names the problem as women’s need "to grow and fulfill their potentialities as human beings" apart from their society-designated sexual role C7), she is 212 attempting to switch attention From group-strBssing to

individuality-stressing need. Once this nBBd has a name,

Friedan can encourage advocacy for the need. Friedan uses several maneuvers to facilitate attention of potential need-meeters to the new individuality-stressing need. First, Friedan quotes testimony of women from the very audience she is addressing to encourage women that they are not alone. Friedan C19B31 made contact with hundreds of suburban housewives who suffered the problem she names, women in whom the dissatisfaction was stirring, who had "lived their whole lives in pursuit of feminine fulfillment" C27). All attested to the same symptom, the same yearning for something beyond achievement that comes from keeping a home C3E). Friedan C19B3) also seeks to delegitimize institutions and individuals in society who presume to attribute need to women. Friedan has harsh words far women’s magazines that print virtually no articles except those that encourage women as housewives C501 . Friedan also takes educators to task for designing "life adjustment" courses for women C161- 1B35. American business, too, and advertising encourage the feminine mystique. According to Friedan, the institutions of business and advertising conspire to maintain the nameless-yearning, energy-to-get-rid-of housewife state by 213

creating products that promise to liberate women for careers in the home C207-20B). By exposing society’s vision and the false need attribution of its institutions, Friedan hopes to encourage women to advocate for new needs. Friedan C19B3) foresees that eventually society will pay attention, but it will not happen overnight because women themselves will have to be the first to meet their own needs. There are no easy answers in America today; it is difficult, painful, and takes perhaps a long time for each woman to find her own answer. First, she must unequivocally say "no" to the housewife image. This does not mean, of course, that she must divorce her husband, abandon her children, give up her home. She does not have to choose between marriage and career . . . . It merely takes a new life plan— in terms of ones’ whole life as a women CFriedan:342). Friedan C19B3) insists that society’s institutions can be potential need-meeters once women decide what they want. The history of the first wave of feminism in the United States attests to feminists who left the home to battle for "women’s freedom to participate in the major work and decisions of society as equals with men" CBO) . In that age, too, Friedan C1983) identified "the problem that has no name," and the larger society vilifying the movement away from the home as the denial of women’s very nature. But the feminists, pioneers on the front edge of woman’s evolution, 214

Fought against the then prevalent dictum that anatomy was woman’s destiny and asserted their need to grow by asking two simple questions: "Who am I?" and "What do I want?" And then they went on to educate themselves, to write, to demonstrate, to enter the professions. Women such as Jane Addams, Carrie Chapmann Catt, Elizabeth Blackwell advocated For thBir needs From an inner impulse which Facilitated the openness of the system and allowed for a redistribution of pome of the power CFriedan:BO-lOB). What Friedan C19B3) was advocating, then, was a change From Focusing on group-stressing needs to giving attention to individuality-stressing needs For women. She hoped women would begin to advocate For their own needs, individual needs, rather than those imposed by society upon the "collectivity" it labels "women." □F course, all this happens within the social system, and what Friedan sees as changes For women reflects the holographic dimension of Brown’s C1S07) model. Since every part contains the whole, need interventions also involve shifts of power and attention. The woman who knows herself as a person, who advocates For her own inner needs, who endeavors to grow through crative work of her own will Find that her power share at home and/or in the larger community will be altered. She will no longer be "second in command," 215 no longer solely responsible for all the household chores. Ulhile the husband and children mill have to take more part in household management, the woman will have to learn an outer-directedness, responsibility for her own decisions, the politics of community-mindedness, the assertiveness of those who interact in an unsheltered, unprotected environment CFriedan:33B-37B). Women, then, who become aware of their own needs come to a new understanding of themselves as persons. At the same time, they value objects, persons, and experiences from a new perspective and are open to new avenues of knowledge. Only women aware of the feminine mystique can label "the problem that has no name" and so reshape the cultural image of femininity so that women can "reach maturity, identity ..." CFriedan:364).

Summaru

The study which follows proposes to use Bormann’s concept of rhetorical vision and Brown’s model of social intervention to investigate the process of identity creation in women’s dialogue about reproductive technology. The study should provide insight into how women create their identity through naming strategies, and what implications 216

such identity creation might have For women in the future. The study attempts both to illuminate rhetorical theory and rhetorical acts. The methodology described in the last two chapters combines both contextual elements Cwhich Focus on acts) and organicist elements Cwhich Focus on intervention). Since the social intervention model is sensitive to the meaningFulness of human action and views human knowledge as interpretative in nature CSwanson, lS77b:31B), the theory should be able to explain actors’ interpretative construction of the world. Since the social intervention model is organized holistically and corresponds to the basic ways individuals not only make sense of but also relate within their interpretative construction of the world, the model should illuminate how human beings symbolically constitute their beings and help in understanding something of the symbolic evolution of identity CBrown, 13B1). Therefore, the social intervention model will be used to explore identity creation since the model is grounded in naming, "the uniquely human propensity For categorizing all experience" CBrown, 137B:1B7). In Featuring "need," the model emphasizes an interpersonal process of symbolic abstraction, the internal experience of ideology or sense- 217 making of the world C125). In Focusing on "power," the model calls attention to the symbol-sharing activity of persons, that is the "social-identity" building activity of persons (1283. Finally, in stressing "attention," the model highlights the organizing gestalt within which persons constitute their beings by attributing needs and qualities to themselves and others CBrown, 19B7:23. It is important to note that this is a process model in which the subcycles work together. A shift in gestalt will mean that needs are altered. When needs change, perceptions change, as do interdependencies. When the power shifts, so, too, does the gestalt. It is the interplay of power, need, and attention that helps explain interrelatedness in the symbolically constructed experience of human beings. Thus, the social intervention model provides ways of exploring identity creation through an investigation of the symbol- making/symbol-using activities of human beings. Chapter VI

NAMING REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: THE POWER TO SAVE

Introduction

The symbol-making/symbol-using activities of human beings include the process of identity creation. To engage in identity sense-making is to engage in the process of naming oneself, to keep arriving— in the midst of change— at the source of "continuity, sameness and uniqueness that is confirmed daily in one’s actions and in the mutual affirmation of others" CDoyle, 1974:IB). The model of social intervention shows how one can "make real" or how one can "make happen" one’s own identity through the symbolic construction of need, power, and attention. In investigating the rhetorical process of identity creation, this chapter will examine the symbolic interaction among members of the languaging community of women who see themselves as users of reproductive technology. These women name reproductive technology as "savior." This chapter will Cl) describe the languaging community of users in relation

218 219

to the name Csavior) created For reproductive technology, C2) examine the process of name creation and, C3) explore the perceived realities of identity constituted by the naming of reproductive technology.

Users oF technoloou and the Power to Save

Languaging communities arise within cultures. The culture within which one lives is the primary language tutor For the names people have For themselves, others, and For "the way things are." Because persons need to make sense oF the contradictions in their lives, in society and in the environment, they tell themselves stories. That is, they name "the way things are." Ule call these names "myths" CRobertson, 1900). flyths are stories; they are the attitudes extracted From stories; they are "the way things are" as people in a particular society believe them to be; and they are the models people reFer to when they try to understand their world and its behavior CRobertson:xv). In this country, technology is seen as the engine oF progress CRobertson, 1900:187). Technology can "Fix" whatever may have gone awry in nature. Technology can "solve" diFFiculties encountered in the working and running oF the social structure. Technology can relieve burdens and inconveniences and enable people to be independent and to 220 command Forces that otherwise would be beyond human control CRobertson: 1E39-1905. Women For whom reproductive technology is "savior" see Fetal diagnostic techniques and- such procreative methods as artiFicial insemination, surrogate motherhood, in vitro Fertilization, and embryo replacement/transFer as Freeing mechanisms. InFertile couples, single women, career women, and couples who risk passing on genetically based disabilities— all look to reproductive technology to produce not only healthy babies, but babies biologically related to the couple. Given the orientation in American culture toward independent, productive citizens CRobertson, 1980}, and the obsession oF science to perFect nature CCorea, 19B5a5, producing healthy oFFspring is a paramount consideration For women oF childbearing age. Fetal diagnostic techniques such as amniocentesis and the Alpha-Fetoprotein test as well as various Forms oF Fetal therapy provide the hope that women can be rescued From the stigma and burden oF giving birth to a "deFective" child CCorea, 19B5a). In addition, the present structure oF society is such that the biological relationship between parent and child is extremely important. Though the biological connection seems to matter more to men than to women CCrowe, 19B5:549D, women who would use reproductive technology also express strong 221

desire For such a connection. Users of technology mould prefer, rather than adopting a child, to use procreative technical methods in order to attempt to give birth CCrotue, 19B5) .

All of this, of course, is intimately related to perceptions of motherhood. "Motherhood" in the present

American social structure is usually applied "to momen mho have either a biological relationship to a child, or a relationship of exclusive hurturance sanctioned by the state" CCrome:540). This definition affirms the traditional myths of mhat it means to be a mother. A mother has a special relationship mith her child because she is the bearer of its life. The biological bond is strengthened after birth mhen the mother nurtures the child. The specialness of the mother’s relationship mith the child is affirmed even if the child is adopted. In the "relationship of exclusive nurturance" the moman is expected to be the primary caretaker of the child, to provide an environment For the child’s gromth as if the child mere flesh of her flesh. Today’s users of technology, then, chain out a pro-natalist vision born of traditionalism and disenchantment mith the momen’s movement in the 1970s CRomland, 19B5b:75). For users 222 of reproductive technology, motherhood is the essence of womanhood. Bearing a child means a woman has come of age CRowland:540D. Further, bearing a child is what makes a woman a woman. No matter what other job or occupation a woman may have, her essential "work" is to bear children. This does not necessarily mean that biology determines woman’s role and status. But it means to some women— specifically for users of technology— that being able to reproduce is what gives a woman’s life total meaning. Following the traditional myths of motherhood, these women equate having children with using a power that belongs uniquely to women. For some, of course, children are the Fruits of the marriage bond, and this means motherhood is associated with a network of social myths regarding family roles and relationships. For other women, however, marriage is merely a social construction. They consider that regardless of the sanction Cinstitution! of marriage, women have the right to produce children. That is, since having the capacity to give birth is unique to women, women have the right to use that capacity whether or not they are married. Flaws in nature or situations in the social or economic structure may make childbearing either biologically impossible or infeasible for a variety of reasons not 223

related to biology: the woman may be single, lesbian, or poor, for example. IF reproductive technology can somehow "Fix" what is naturally Flawed, then it can "Free" womBn, allowing them to bear liFe CCorea, 19B5a). Likewise, surrogate motherhood and artiFicial insemination allow women who had Found bearing children impossible For social or economic reasons to participate in the reproductive process. Women, then, who name reproductive technology as "savior" consider that the power oF that technology aFFords them Freedom to be a woman and gives them an "increased degree oF control over Cthel reproductive capacity" CKern & RidolFi, 198S:252). A closer look at the reasons For using the various Forms oF reproductive technology will make clearer how important the "savior" is in some women’s lives. ArtiFicial insemination CAI), which is "the introduction oF sperm into the vagina by means other than sexual intercourse" CHanmer, 1981:178), has been Found useFul in relieving some Forms oF inFertility . In the United Btates, approximately one in six couples oF childbearing age are inFertile. "There are at least 4.3 million married women in the United Btates, or somewhat under 15 percent oF married couples, who are inFertile though some Feel those 224

Figures vastly underestimate the extent of the problem" CCorea, 19B5a:146). Corea’s figures date From 1976. Finkelstein and Clough C19B3) quote Andrews C19B1) as reporting that infertility is on the rise in the U.S. C397) . Fleming C19B0) reports that there are six million couples of childbearing age who are inFertile— "that is one out of every Five couples. In BO percent of the cases, the problem is Found to be the woman’s; in 40 percent, the man’s" CEO). harried couples who suffer the "pain" of infertility CRowland, 19B5a:540) can use AI to produce biologically related offspring. A woman can be inseminated by her husband’s sperm CAIH) or by the sperm of a donor CAID). If the technology is successful, then the social pressure to reproduce is removed. Crowe C1985) reports that infertile women "state that external social pressures with regard to reproduction were very strong . . ." and "that it was they rather than their husbands who were subject to more social pressure in terms of the number of times they were asked about their childbearing intentions" C549) . In addition, infertile women felt "excluded from the social nexus of mothers and couples with children" C549), experienced guilt for not being able to bear chldren— to the point of wanting their husbands to divorce them for the "unfairness" of not being able to give him children C550). One women reported, 225

"I Felt my body was cheating me. It had let me down"; another didn’t like her body: "It [infertility] makes you veru contemptuous" (Crowe:550).

IF, however, the woman cannot conceive through artificial insemination, she has other technical options. If she can produce eggs, then she can undergo a laparoscopy, a surgical procedure which allows the surgeon to view the pelvic organs and to remove eggs From the ovaries CCorea, 19B5a:101). The eggs can then be fertilized via the husband’s Cor a donor’s) sperm in vitro, that is "in glass" outside the body CCorea, 19B5a:100). Once Fertilized, the embryo can be "replaced" in the womb of the woman from whom the eggs were "harvested," or "transferred" into the womb of another— the surrogate "mother," who will gestate and birth the child (Murphy, 19B4:70). In a recent case, Pat Anthony, a 4B-year-old-woman, served as the surrogate mother for her own daughter and gave birth to triplets, her own biological grandchildren (Levin & Reid, 19B7:39). Because she could not bear to watch her daughter, Karen, agonize over her infertility and because she was afraid a surrogate mother who was a stranger might want to keep the baby, Pat Anthony "incubated" the eggs and, with the help of reproductive technology, saved the genetic 226

parents From suffering and indignity CLevin & Reid) . Not only are married couples saved by procreative technologies, single women Cheterosexual and lesbian) claim "that childbearing is a woman’s reproductive right" CCorea. 19853:43). Using donor sperm, unmarried women can participate in artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization and embryo replacement/transfer. Corea C1985a) reports that in 1980 a woman challenged the right of physicians to refuse her AID on the grounds that she was unmarried. For such an alleged refusal, she sued a clinic in Detroit. 5he dropped the suit when the clinic, a division of Wayne State University’s School of Medicine, announced that marital status would not be a factor in selecting "patients" for the procedure C43). Further, increasing numbers of single women from all walks of life are using reproductive technologies. There are women who want a child but do not want marriage or a sexual relationship. These women are able to take care of themselves. They want a child. They are in their thirties. They have no guarantee they will ever meet, love and marry a man who will also want a child. So they go ahead on their own and bear a baby CCorea, 19B5a:43-44) . Some women find ways of using reproductive technologies without recourse tD clinical services. In 1957, a lesbian in Los Angeles solicited donor sperm from a man she knew and inseminated herself with instruction From staffers at the Los Angeles Feminist Women’s Health Center CCorea, 19B5a:44). 227

Other women obtain literature on "alternate Fertilization or "self-insemination." Books and articles explain the process of self-insemination, "describe how to pinpoint ovulation so the woman can inseminate herself at the optimal time for fertilization, . . .Candl report how women have found sperm donors, . . . and what problems these women have encountered" CCorea, 19B5a:45). There are women, too, who consider that childbearing is a service. These are the surrogate mothers, women who gestate children For other women or for couples. In the case of couples, the surrogate can be artificially inseminated with the husband’s sperm or can accept the transfer of an embryo, the result of the wife’s egg fertilized in vitro using the husband’s or donor sperm. Though it is possible for the surrogate also to serve a single woman by accepting the transfer of an embryo, the result of the single woman’s egg fertilized in vitro using donor sperm, there are no examples of this in the literature. Pat Anthony, as a surrogate mother gestated her daughter’s triplets "for love" CLevin & Reid:43). Anthony did not trust a "stranger" to serve as surrogate. Besides being afraid that the surrogate woman would try to keep the child, Anthony does not approve of the "rent-a-womb system 228

of parenting," and considers that what she did For her daughter "is the acceptable Face oF surrogacy. . . . There was no payment, no commercialism" (43). But some women think they should gBt paid For such a valuable service. Karen Smith, For BxamplB, who had servBd as a surrogate mother, told Suzanne Rubin C1983b) in an interview that although providing a baby For an inFertile couple is "a beautiFul thing," her primary reason For Signing a contract with the Surrogate Parent Foundation was "For money." My First reason, I guess, was For money— I’ll be receiving $10,000. At the time Cl decided) my daughter was going to be starting First grade at a private school and that would help pay three to Four years oF her tuition. Basically it was my Mom’s and Dad’s idea to do it . . . they talked to me about it and thought it would be great For me C21B) For other women, money is one reason among others For being surrogate mothers. The underlying attitude with many women is that they are giving "the giFt oF liFe" and they are somehow "special" because they are relieving the suFFering oF others CCorea, 19B5a:231).. Many women think the public needs "to be educated as to the nobility oF the transaction between couple and surrogate" CCorea:221). 229

The Process oF Name Creation in the Lannuaoina Communitu of Users pf Reproductive Technoloou As users of reproductive technology name "technology" and "motherhood," they are creating a reality about womanhood. In combining metaphors they create a new reality about womanhood. It works this way. Neither "technology" nor "motherhood" exists "outside the skin," but we act as if they do. From a conglomeration of machinery and procedures and activities users abstract similarities and speak and think in metaphors. They experience technology as machinery, instruments, methods, procedures. They experience "motherhood" either directly through the birthing process or by observing a woman and her child: the actual birth process, the act of suckling the child, toilet-training the child, etc. Through the process of "code switching" described by Leach C1976) they make "technology" and "motherhood" metonymically "real." "Technology" and "motherhood" become reified. Users act as if the metaphor is real— as if "technology" and "motherhood" exist. In order to "fit" both metaphors into a perceived "reality" of womanhood, users have to reduce the ambiguity which arises when the metaphors are associated. The name MOTHER carries with it the criterial attributes of "life- 230

giver," "life-sustainer," "nurturer." Further, to be a mother in the view of users is to be associated with the process of giving birth— the natural order of "the way things are." The criterial attributes, therefore, feature aspects of MOTHER which invite approach behavior. To be a "life-giver," a "life-sustainer," a "nurturer" is to particiapate in the highest calling possible for women. A mother perpetuates the human race. A mother has a unique capacity . A mother is special. While featuring the above aspects of MOTHER, users "blinder" aspects which would suggest avaidance behavior. The physical birth process can be painful, dangerous to one’s health, and even, at times, fatal. Many womBn find that caring for children can be burdensome: Children need constant care, which may fall mostly to the woman; children can be a financial burden; children can restrict the activities of women.

For users of reproductive technology, then, to be a woman is to be a mother. It is expected in this languaging community that a woman will bear children. This is also the traditional definition for woman in our culture. Users of of technology have learned the name MOTHER from the culture, but in order to apply the name to women who, for some reason cannot bear children, users require a shift in perception. 231

"Technology," too, carries with it critBrial attributes. It is the "engine of progress." It can relieve burden, Bnable control. It can "Fix" whatever does not "work"— even if it does not "work well" in the natural order. But, "technology" is associated with the "non­ natural" order, with what human beings do with "things." In order to "Fit" reproductive technology into their view oF what it means to be a woman, users "blinder" aspects oF reproductive technology which would encourage avoidance behavior, and they Feature aspects oF reproductive technology which would encourage women to approach the technology as iF it were a natural process. Take, For example, the case oF a woman who is going to a clinic to be inseminated artiFicially with donor sperm. The process has so many non-natural aspects, that the woman could easily avoid it. "When you’re in the clinic being inseminated," the young woman said, "you don’t actually comprehend what’s going on. You see the syringe and you have to remind yourselF, 'Gee, there’s a baby in there.’ And then you have to lie there on the table For 10 minutes aFter they do it with this strange sperm in you, but you think about other things. It does melt out oF your mind in daily living. But you’re going to go through your liFe knowing you did this, knowing that there’s somebody out there who’s part oF you somehow" CFleming, 1980:14). 232

The woman also disclosed the agony of returning to the clinic month after month until "she Felt so hollow, and the sex at home, because of the effort of trying to conceive, because the touch of her husband reminded her of the doctor’s touch, was not happy" (Fleming:SO). And this was not all. Both the young woman and her husband needed to come to terms with the reality that should she conceive, the child would not be his biological offspring, that their life together as husband and wife would never be biologically "fruitful" CFleming:SO). What the couple needed to do was "blinder" those aspects of reproductive technology tht encouraged this avoidance behavior. They did this by naming reproductive technology as "same as" the natural process. The husband, for example, is invited into the room "when his wife is being inseminated and, if he wishes, actually to perform the insemination himself" CFleming:50). Besides, the young woman told Fleming C19B0) that she and her husband "always make sure to make love right around the time I come in for my insemination" and that she always requests that her husband’s sperm be mixed with the donor’s sperm. "Who knows, maybe his sperm is the one that gets in" C50). Also, should the woman conceive, the child is considered the husband’s natural offspring and the procedure is not thought 233 of as adulterous. In describing the process, the woman speaks to Fleming in terms of "insemination," not artificial insemination. In the case of surogacy, many times the surrogate mother will get to know the couple. Karen Smith wanted a relationship with the contracting couplw so she wouldn’t feel like a "baby factory" CRubin:21B3. When I met my couple, I insisted that they had to be in the delivery room. . . . I told them they have to experience the childbirth. They have to be there to watch their child being born, especially the mother. And I told them the whole satisfaction of it all for me is watching them. Watching their faces C21B) . Pat Anthony, too, wanted both her daughter and Alcino, her son-in-law, in the delivery room, but hospital regulations barred him. Pat Anthony, though, talked only of "sharing birth" with her daughter. By concentrating on the "gift," Anthony retained her status as grandmother rather than acknowledging her role as "mother." The surrogate mother, then, blinders a crucial aspect of childbirth which women tend to avoid: giving up thB baby. They fBaturB, instead, the "giving of a gift," or the doing of "what a woman does best" CFleming:213. They feature the nurturing, life-giving, enabling aspects of MOTHER. In the case of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer, women feature "prenatal adoption" and blinder the 234

technical aspects of these procedures. Amniocentesis and other prenatal tests are considered "diagnostic" or "therapeudic" CCorea, 1905a). In sum, women who use reproductive technology name the procedures as "the same" as natural human reproduction. Technology, therefore, is no longer seen as "machinery." Attention is directed as intergal with human conception. The procedures involved in artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, for example, are seen as having the ability to transcend "natural limitations CGohdes, 19B4), as possessing the means to aid women in their "sex specific" natural right to bear children CTaub, 19BE). These attributes assigned to reproductive technology by users direct attention to the "saving" or "rescuing" qualities of reproductive technology. Many users prefer the name "birth" technology or "procreative" technology to "reproductive" technology CClough, 13B3) to suggest the symbolic approach value toward technology. Ann Snitow C19BB) looks upon the procedures involved in reproductive technology as an advancement— one that can enhance human life. After all, why not start an embryo in a petri dish? Or take an egg from one woman and plant it in another’s uterus? Isn’t it an unlooked-for advance that doctors can now lift a fetus from the womb, operate on it for 235

problems discovered by new methods, then return it again? (4£) . Reproductive technology, then, becomes associated with saving power, with power we understand in this culture as "advancement" and "progress." UsBrs expect that birth technology can aid them in producing healthy and biologically connected offspring. In other words, birth technology becomes a part of who women are as "women"— in helping to provide children within the marriage bond, in allowing women to feel "feminine," in making it possible for women to "like" their bodies (despite the defect), and to feel accepted in the company of other women and married couples with children CCrowe, 1905)— or to fulfill themselves as mothers without sexual intercourse. Instead of seeing reproductive technology as non- natural, users make it continuous with the natural process. They do this so that "reproductive technology," "fits" within their vision of "motherhood." By constituting "reproductive technology" as being continuous with the natural process of "motherhood," women stablize their view of themselves as women. 236

Implications of Naming Fear Users oF Reproductive Technoloou

There are important implications following from the attention shift from technology-as-machine to technology-as- conception. One implication is that the need to reproduce has become more salient, especially for women for whom childbearing was biologically impossible or socially infeasible before the advent of reproductive technology. The "group-stressing" need to reproduce C'the shared identity among persons in the Clanguaging] community") becomes more salient than the "individuality-stressing" need C'the possession of unique personal qualities") CBrown, 1907:8) for achievement in ways other than producing children. Further, for women in this languaging community stressed is the need for participation in biological motherhood as opposed to say, adoptive motherhood. Another implication following from the attention shift from technology-as-machine to technology-as-conception are shifts in perceived interdependencies among men, women, technology and social institutions. Women who use reproductive technology must depend upon mechanical techniques for conception as much as they depend upon men. And, users depend upon the expertise of people who know how to interface human biology with mechanical techniques in 237 order to produce a child. Some women depend upon men For sperm only; others, depend upon husbands For their cooperation For their consent in the process oF artiFicial insemination by donor sperm.

Moreover, women who use reproductive technology depend upon the indulgence oF law, secular and sometimes sacred, so that the techniques used to produce a child are considered compatible with existing laws oF legitimacy or church laws concerning morality. In the case oF surrogacy, the woman Cor the couple) depends upon the services oF another woman who will gestate the child and the services oF the law so that the process will not be construed as child-selling. The attention shiFt implies other relational shiFts as well. The sexual act need not result in procreation, so that men and women participating in that act may not be partners in the biological process oF procreation. In the case oF an inFertile couple, their relationship as partners in procreation results not From the sexual act, but From their agreement to participate in the techniques and procedures oF reproductive technology. This may, in eFFect, be a relationship oF exchange— even threat Cno sexual act, perhaps, iF the husband does not agree that the wiFe make use oF AID). 238

Single women and lesbians, as other examples, need not have any sexual relations with men in order to produce a child. In the case of self-insemination, a woman may make some exchange with a man in return For his sperm. In the clinic, those who control technology Cdoctors, scientists) become partners in procreation. Men who donate sperm do not usually know for whom the sperm is used— or, for what purpose in many cases. Men, thus, become estranged from the children they may father and, in a deeper sense, estranged From themselves, as far as their activity is concerned. Women who use donor sperm have no relationship with the donor and in most cases accept the child produced through artificial insemination as their own. If the woman is married, the child is considered the legitimate offspring of the woman and her husband. IF the woman is single, she often considers that the child is hers alone. Usually, she wants nothing to do with the sperm donor. CCorea, 19B5a). In the case of surrogacy several relationships are possible. Before the advent of reproductive technology, it is possible that women who were unable to bear children saw themselves in a competitive relationship with women who could. Many women, for example, have testified to the "pain of infertility" (Rowland, 19B5a:540) and to the pressure they felt to bear children and the exculsion they felt "from the 239

social nexus of mothers and couples with children" CCrowe, 19B5:549). Burrogacy has helped change the relationship From what perhaps was perceived as competitive to cooperative. Borne women such as Karen Smith were willing to exchange their ability to bear children For money CRubin, 19B3b). Other women, such as Pat Anthony, provided surrogacy service or love (integry) CLevin & Reid, 19B7) . In either case, women were willing to help women bear children— not in the sense oF midwiFery as in the past, but in the actual gestation oF the child. The surrogate, then, as the gestating mother, bears a special relationship to the child. The child is literally Flesh oF her Flesh iF she was inseminated with the husband’s sperm. Even iF the surrogate mother gestated the child aFter embryo transFer, she still has Felt the First quickening oF liFe, has still nurtured the Fetus and birthed the child. Giving the child up to be raised by another couple Cor another woman) separated the birth mother From the child. IF the surrogate has been inseminated with the husband’s sperm, she bears a special relationship to the husband, but one which, in this case, she must not acknowledge. She must stand in the wiFe’s stead, gestate the child but not be a wiFe. 240

And what of the child’s relationship to all these people? For the most part, it will depend upon how the child makes sense of his/her place in the order of things. Suzanne Rubin, For one, tells of her pain and anger at discovering that she was the product of artificial insemination by donor CRubin, 19B5a:E11-E13). Some lesbians insist that the conventional one child-one mother relationship will simply be exchanged for a close interrelationship of a group of mothers and their children CKlein, 1S04:3BE). Shifts in needs and relationships, then, are bound up with shifts in attention. Reproductive technology perceived as a savior means that something that is mechanical becomes a "living" partner in procreation. Procreation is no longer seen only as Cl) the result of the sexual act, or CE) the sexual act within a conventional marriage. For this languaging community, womanhood is not defined by the capacitu to bear children, but by the actual bearing of children. Through reproductive technolgy, which has been symbolically constituted as part of the natural process of birth, childbearing becomes possible for virtually all women. Women in this languaging community, then, name themselves by affirming, for the most part, the traditional 241

name For woman. A woman is a childbearer. These women make sense of who they are by Featuring attention to the nurturing aspects oF motherhood and masking the non- nurturing aspects. They admit change Ctechnology) by making it continuous with their view oF human reproduction as a natural process. In this way, they keep order in their worldview. They make their identity "real." In the midst oF change, they keep constant that "sameness and uniqueness" that is conFirmed daily in “their actions and in the mutual aFFirmation oF others in the society: men and social institutions.

Summary

In summary, this chapter has described the languaging community oF users oF reproductive technology and has discussed how users oF reproductive technology create their identity through the process oF naming. Finally, the chapter has explored some oF the perceived realities oF that identity by lookig at the systemic implications oF the names. In the next chapter we will see how another languaging community names reproductive technology and how that naming creates identity and realities oF identity constituted by the naming. Chapter VII

NAMING REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: THE POWER TO DOMINATE

Introduction

In contrast to the users who name reproductive technology as "savior," denouncers consider that the same reproductive technology is a demon. By Far the most vociferous group, denouncers see reproductive technology as controlling and repressive and equate it with the male effort to control and dominate uiomen in the patriarchal society. Much of the discourse of women who denounce reproductive technology is a direct refutation of what the users of technology see as "Freeing." In analyzing the languaging community of denouncers, this chapter will Cl) discuss denouncers in relation to the name Cdemon) created for reproductive technology, CE) examine the process of name creation, and C3) explore the perceived realities of identity constituted by thB naming of reproductive technology.

242 243

Denouncers of Technolonu and the Pouier to Dominate

Denouncers, such as Jalna Hanmer C19B4 5, contest the vision of users as being in consort with the dominant ideology of patriarchy: "Perfect" babies, "unfulfilled" women— these are the stories with which the mass media has Csicl introduced the public to the phenomenon of test-tube babies and other new reproductive technologies. We are given an admiring view of modern man’s Csicl technology, and are reminded that all of this is done "for the good" of individual women. The justification for reproductive experiments on women is always couched in terms of a woman’s "right" to have a baby, or of every baby’s "right" to be "perfect" C43B). The cost to women, however, is immense in terms of invasion of a woman’s body and loss of control over her reproductive processes. Klein C19B5) asserts that the procreative techniques carried out via reproductive technology focus on "parts of women" C66). That is, technology has used and abused the parts of women in order to gain control of the reproductive process. [Technologists tryJ to control the reproduction of the human species. The technodocs have embarked on dissecting and marketing parts of women’s bodies: eggs, wombs and embryos. Women are being dismembered— split into separate reproductive parts which can be reassembled, perhaps in a different order, perhaps using parts from different women. Woman has become . . The Mother Machine: an incubator; a vessel; a reproductive body. And "man" is closer to being the procreator of the species— playing God— than ever CBBD. 244

Although artificial insemination may be one answer to infertility, denouncers claim that the male-dominated medical profession "institutionalizes" the process because it "poses a threat to patriarchal descent and it provides women with a means of rebellion" CCorea, 1985a:37). The institutionalization of artificial insemination "controls women who might defy malB rules for reproduction" and protects traditional notions of "legitimacy" of offspring CCorea, 1905a:30). 5elf-insemination is frowned upon by the medical •profession and the courts. The medical profession insists that artificial insemination is "therapy" for infertility and must be administered to a married woman or to a surrogate in the service of a married heterosexual couple. In I960 CPeople v. Sorensen! and in 1977 CC.fl. v. C.C.3 the court ruling followed traditional patriarchal thinking. In I960, the court found that an AID child was legitimate and "upheld the criminal conviction of a man for not supporting the AID child conceived with his consent during his marriage" CCorea, 1985a:51). Even though the child was conceived through insemination by donor sperm, the court upheld the patriarchal concept that the child’s "father" is responsible for the child’s support. Since the child conceived through AID was legitimized by the court’s ruling 245

that the husband is the child’s natural father, the husband was therefore, in the court’s eyes, responsible for the child’s support. In 1977, the court ruled in favor of a man who had donated his sperm to a single woman. The man was granted visitation rights and was held responsible for the support of the child CCorea, 19B5a:51). Here, using the same patriarchal principle that the father is responsible for the child’s support, the court ruled in favor of the father even though sexual intercourse had not occurred between donor and the single women. In the eyes of the court, both men were the "fathers" to the children. In order for a woman to be artificially inseminated "legally" and with "approval" Cat least from the medical profession), the process must take place in a clinical setting. The process must be "therapy" for infertility. Donor sperm must be selected in an effort to match the characteristics of the husband "so the child can more easily pass as the natural offspring of that husband" CCorea, 19B5a:54). A birth certificate names the husband as the "father" of the offspring and the couple is often advised "not to tell the AID child or their family or friends how the child was conceived" CCorea, 19B5a:54). Such techniques of control, according to denouncers, are an affront to woman 246

and reinforce the traditional view that a woman is not a woman unless she can give her husband a child— even if the difficulty lies with him. In addition, the techniques and secrecy surrounding AID suggest that the woman must be subject to the the wishes of her husband and must follow the advice of the patriarchal society represented by the medical profession. In challenging this process of artificial insemination, denouncers are assaulting "men’s 'right’ to define what is best for women" CHanmer,1904:4463. In addition, artificial insemination is not readily available to all women who request it. If it were, writes Hanmer & Allen C19B0), "we could expect an extension of its use, particularly among women who do not want to conceive in the usual way and who possibly may not wish to live with a man or with the father of the child" CS133. Such attitudes and behavior, however, threaten the very roots of patriarchy. [These attitudes] would be a potential threat to men psychologically and to their superordinate position in the family. The truth is that at present women do not need men for reproduction to the same extent that men need women: with sperm banks, few men are really necessary. Perhaps men are beginning to realize this; if so, we can expect them to be frightened and to seek to retain power over reproduction C213). Procedures even more invasive, controlling, and demeaning to women than artificial insemination are those 247 related to in vitro fertilization CIVF). Before a human egg can be fertilized "in vitro" and the embryo implanted in the womb, the woman must undergo painful, exhausting and risky surgery in order to obtain her eggs (FinkelstBin, 19B3:39B). The First step in the IVF process is the collection of eggs. This involves a surgical procedure. In the most popular method, women receive local anesthetic, gonadotropin injections and ultrasound monitoring of the ovaries. The reproductive technologist punctures through a woman’s abdominal wall, filled bladder, and ovary to obtain an enlarged follicle containing an egg (Murphy, 19B4:70). The procedure appears to be simple, but denouncers of reproductive technology insist that it is not. IF the technologist does not obtain the egg at the time in a woman’s menstrual cycle when ovulation has occurred or is ready to occur, the technologist must induce ovulation. Hormones called "fertility drugs" must be injected into the woman to stimulate the growth of the egg follicles in the ovaries. More hormones must be injected to induce the ripening process and ovulation. Powerful dosages can speed up the ripening process CCoream 19B5a:109-110). What denouncers object to is the invasion of the woman’s body, the introduction of artificial hormones to induce and increase the rate of natural processes. In the body’s natural processes, the hypothalmus controls the 248 release of pituitary hormones and regulates a woman’s reproductive cycle. In simulating the work of the hypothalmus, the medical profession Cmen) "are taking over one function of a woman’s brain" CCorea:110). Moreover, in order to obtain the eggs, the surgeon must make small incisions in the abdominal wall so that a slender, optical device called a laparoscope may be inserted. The scope allows the surgeon to see inside the woman’s body so that another instrument can efficiently vacuum the eggs from the ovarian follicles CCorea:111). While the medical profession insists that the operation "makes few demands on the patient," denouncers point out that there are several physical risks. Hormonal treatment to superovulate a woman can result in "hyperstimulation" of the ovary, which can enlarge the ovary and cause the formation of cysts. No one knows what the long-term effect of artificial hormones may have on women. Further, women undergo trauma from vacuuming out the egg and no one knows how this procedure may affect the ovary’s natural secretion of hormones CCorea:149). Beyond this, of course, are the risks involved in embryo transfer or reimplantation. There is danger of infection, potential damage to the uterus during the procedure, and the risk of ectopic pregnancy— complications 249

arising when the embryo Fails to implant in the uterus CCorea, 19B5a:150). But denouncers are worried about more than the physical implications of these procedures— though they do not minimize them. The procedures and practices surrounding IVF affirm assumptions about woman’s sexuality and her place in society.

nedical practitioners are acknowledged as experts about the Functioning of Female bodies and thus occupy a priviledged place in defining the standards of normality and deviance. . . . A woman must demonstrate her worthiness to become a part of a technological conception programme; she must Fit the practitioner’s notion of a "good mother." First she must be married; . . . In addition, a woman must demonstrate her suitability of her skills and motives For parenting. A woman also must be a "good patient" CAlbury, 1984:581. Moreover, continued use of these procedures aids the patriarchy in seeing women not so much as "baby makers" as "egg storers." Members of the medical profession could easily see themselves as directors and controllers of women’s egg production and could "approach women’s bodies with the urgency of efficiency experts" CMurphy:711. The millions and millions of eggs present in women’s bodies are seen by the technolgists as millions and millions of unborn people. The high number of unused eggs, an average of 1,999,550 of the original two million eggs per woman, are Judged as excessive "egg wastage." Embryos are seen as "wasted" too. . . . How can reproductive technologists remove "waste" in reproductive practices? . . . Reproductive 250

technologists use new techniques to take over and improve egg storage, leaving women to be merely suppliers of eggs and the recipients of embryos (Murphy:71-7E). Corea (19B5a) worries about human eggs that are obtained by means other than those described above. What happens to such eggs? Women undergoing hysterectomies, For example, or women operated on For endometriosis, For polycystic ovaries or For "unspeciFied" gynecological diFFiculty have had eggs removed From their bodies (101). In some cases, doctors encouraged women to engage in unprotected intercourse and to chart their ovulatory cycles. Necessary gynecological operations were scheduled in an eFFort to obtain Fertilized eggs (101). What happens to these eggs and these zygotes? They are used For experimentation, according to Corea (19B5a)— and the women From whom the eggs were taken have no say in the use oF these viable eggs. Corea describes the various eFForts oF Edwards and 9teptoe and others to Fertilize human eggs in vitro. In one experiement, in order to capacitate or condition the sperm so it could Fertilize the eggs, Edwards persuaded a Female patient to allow him to insert a tiny chamber Filled with sperm into her womb. The chamber was lined with a porous membrane that would theoretically allow secretions to pass into it but would not let sperm escape, possibly impregnating the women Csicl (10B). 251

When Edward’s wife, who worried about what might bB the consequences For the patient in such an experiment, asked him if he were certain the sperm would not escape,he assured her he was. But in his book co-authored with Patrick Steptoe C13801, Edwards admitted that he was not sure. "I must confess that I had many a sleepless night Fearing the chamber would burst inside the uterus, releasing the spermatozoa with disastrous results," Edwards recalled CEdwards & Steptoe:59 quoted in Corea, 1385a:107). There have been other experiments with human eggs and zygotes as well. One group of researchers attempted to freeze human fertilized eggs before transplanting them into the wombs of women. The researchers had no idea what damage would occur to the egg or to the woman into whose womb the eggs were implanted CCorea:118). There have also been some attempts "to create chimeras" Chuman/animal hybrids) CCorea:183), and some other proposed uses of IVF: "Imaginative" applications of IVF technology include attempts to fertilize human eggs with gorilla sperm. This kind of experiment, Dr. Roger Short told a federal ethics board in 1373, might give insight into man’s evolutionary origins. The sperm of man and gorilla are almost indistinguishable, he said. If the sperm of four great apes could fertilize a woman’s eggs in vitro, this would suggest that man and gorilla are more closely related than has been thought CCorea:188). This brings denouncers to an important question: "Who owns the embryo"? For denouncers, the implications of 252

ownership are frightening because women are, again, dominated and controlled. Albury C1984) contends that "laws and Judicial interpretations give the decision-making power to doctors, not to women" C59) . The ownership of the embryo has profound implications beyond the often-raised questions of frozen embryos in laboratories. If the ownership of an embryo in vitro is legally established, what will be the status of an embryo in vivo? Will a man be able to prevent an abortion because he is the Joint owner of the implanted embryo regardless of whether a woman consents to continuing the pregnancy? Could a man take out an injunction to enforce a particular diet, non-smoking, or regular exercise on a pregnant woman as an expression of his concern for the care of his property— his share of the fetus? Such speculations reduce women to little more than ambulatory incubators, but are not far­ fetched as they might seem, for men have already gone to court in attempts to deny women abortions in several countries CB33 . Objections to surrogacy and pre-natal diagnostic techniques run along the same line of argument. Susan Ince C19B4), who went through one company’s screening process to become a surrogate mother in order to find out what was involved, denounces the surrogate industry for its "sex- buying" and controlling tendencies and for its traditional affirmation of woman as baby-maker. In this case, however, the affirmation of woman as "baby-maker" refers to the woman as "incubator"— as "thing." The careful screening process was a myth. I encountered no evidence of real medical or psychological safeguards; Just enough hurdles to test 253

whether I would be obedient. The minimal questioning I did was labelled as selfish, dangerous, and unique in their experience, fly impression was that there was a serious shortage of available surrogates and that any appropriate (white and compliant) woman would be rushed into contract-signing and immediately told her perfectly matched couple had been located (110). This would be the case if the surrogate were to be inseminated with the husband’s sperm and contribute half her genes through her egg. In the case of embryo transfer, however, the surrogate need not be white nor healthy nor— as far as the industry in this country is concerned— need she reside in the United States (Corea, 1985a). Once embryo transfer technology is developed, the surrogate industry could look for breeders— not only in poverty-stricken parts of the United States, but in the Third World as well. There, perhaps one tenth the current fee could be paid to women . . . An "authentic" surrogate from the Third World won’t even need to be healthy (Corea, 19B5a:E15). The problem with surrogacy for Corea (1985a) as for other denouncers of reproductive technology (Ince, 1S84; Ruzek, 1980; Rowland, 1985a) is that the woman is reduced to a "thing," a producer, and the baby is reduced to a "commodity," a product (Corea, 19B5a:£19). A price is placed upon both producer and product— all in the name of "helping" women— to be women, to be "helpers" of the infertile, to be supporters of their families through the fee they are paid for doing what women are anatomically suited to do (Corea,

19B5a). 254

Denouncers of reproductive technology claim that prenatal diagnostic techniques are hazardous for the woman as well as for the unborn child. Amniocentesis, ultrasound scans and electronic fetal monitoring can ascertain whether a fetus is free of certain disease, disabilities and/or abnormalities, but to them the risks involved in the procedures far outweigh the advantages. Amniocentesis is a testing procedure carried out under local anesthetic in order to detect "sex-linked genetically transmitted abnormalities" CHolland & McKenna, 1984:416). A needle is inserted into the abdomen of a pregnant woman in order to extract a sample of fluid surrounding the fetus CHubbard, 19B2b:201). Amniocentesis is usually performed in conjunction with ultrasound, a procedure "based on the 'pulse-echo’ principle used in the navy’s underwater sonar equipment" CHolland & McKenna:415). Ultrasound is an imaging process which allows, among other matters, the technologist to see where to insert the needle to avoid injuring the fetus when drawing the fluid sample for amniocentesis. In addition to these procedures, other prenatal tests allow doctors direct contact with the fetus. Through fetoscopy doctors can examine the fetus directly with the 255

aid of a Fiber-optic telescope CFetoscope). A syringe on the telescope allows For the withdrawal oF body tissue and blood From the Fetus CHubbard:201). - Electronic Fetal monitoring CEFM) is a method used to trace Fetal growth and movement, including Fetal heartbeat and FBtal reaction to movement— its own or the mother’s movement From contractions late in the pregnancy. "An unsatisFactory tracing may lead to induction oF labour or even emergency caesarean section, whereas an apparently healthy tracing may assure the doctor that the pregnancy can saFely be allowed to continue" CHolland & McKenna:416) . Denouncers do not deny that in limited circumstances these tests may be necessary CHolland & McKenna:415). Denouncers object, however, to the growing routinization oF these tests which increase health risks to woman and Fetus, intensiFy unnecessary medicalization and legal intervention into the reproductive processes oF women, and lead society to Falsely expect that technology will "save" babies and women CHubbard, 19B2b:202, 218). In using amniocentesis, For example, women risk inFection and spontaneous abortion. Ultrasound has not been

Found to be 100% saFe For use on humans CHolland & McKenna:415). Though some risks have been reduced as technological methods improve, denouncers condemn the use oF 256 technology which is still in the developmental stage. Besides, in the case of amniocentesis, there is another problem. The test cannot be performed reliably until the fourteenth week of pregnancy. It takes approximately three to four more weeks to process the test, which means that a woman who chooses abortion because the test suggests some fetal abnormality would have to opt for that procedure in the second trimester of pregnancy— a difficult and traumatic decision in any event for most women, but more so after quickening CRitchie, 1964:408). Moreover, the "current, uncritical infatuation with prenatal testing . . . lures women into the false hope that, with proper medical advice and supervision, we can have risk-free pregnancies and problem-free children" CHubbard, 190Eb:SO3). To denouncers women and couples who rely on these tests are looking for "technological fixes" that convey an illusion of certainty. Any woman, for any number of reasons, can have a "defective" or "abnormal" child. "But," Hubbard C19BEb) writes, "the likelihood is small unless there is a particular history of a particular inherited condition in either partner’s family"C204). Pregnancy, denouncers insist, is a natural process, but the medical profession would have women treat childbirth and 257

its attendant processes as a "medical event, shaped and controlled by male physicians with professional knowledge about women’s bodily functions" CHubbard, 19BHb:202). The danger is that with the availability of an increasing number of tests, more and more women will feel that they must be at risk of something! . . . Though only two or three births per hundred require medical interventions, society and obstretricians as its agents, by stressing the possibility of a pathological outcome, have it in their power to make every woman fear it will happen to her CHubbard, lSB2b:206). Besides the health risks of medical intervention, there are also "dangers to the legal rights of parents, especially .the pregnant woman" CHubbard:210). Certainly technology in providing information which was never before available increases the number of "choices" in regard to fetal "therapy." Ulhat denouncers worry about is that as these "'choices’ become available, they all too rapidly become compulsions to ’choose’ the socially endorsed alternative" CHubbard, 19B2b:210). For example, after the 24th week of pregnancy Cthe legal threshold of viability) does a woman have the right to refuse diagnostic and therapeutic procedures if a physician states that such procedures and/or therapies will benefit the future child? If the woman did dare oppose the physician, could she be made to comply with the medical procedure through legal order? In the 24th month, does the woman lose all control over her own bodily 258

integrity "in the name of 'Fetal right’"? CHubbard, 19BEb:Ell). And if the woman chaoses to bring forth a child regardless of the finding during amniocentesis that the child may be "abnormal," what legal supports will she have to raise that child so that s/he can participate in a lifestyle of "quality"? CRapp, 1304) In general, then, denouncers indict reproductive technologies for their invasiveness into women’s bodies and for their insubstantial promise that medical attendance and procedures can insure "safe" pregnancies and healthy babies. Denouncers of reproductive technolgies do not deny that women need to attend to prenatal care For their unborn children, but denouncers object to the power exercised by medical experts who control and administer these technologies. What denouncers fear is that women, lulled by the technological fix, will assume a benign medicine when the "medical profession, in fact, fails to differentiate between research to aid infertility and research to change and control conception and the genetic balance" CRowland, 1985b:75). Denouncers fear, also, the directions of experimentation. There are now, for example, technological methods which can ascertain the sex of an unborn child. 259

There are other techniques which can all but guarantee Cthat is, determine) the sex of a child. What will be the implications if couples Cor single, pregnant women) can select the sex of their firstborn— or of any child? Hoskins and Holmes C1984) contend that "if sex selection technologies were widely used in our present patriarchal world, it is likely that males would predominate" CB47). Such a contention is supported by several researchers— not all of them women CSteinbacker, 19B3; Williamson, 1976; Buttentag & Secord, 19B3; Calway-Fagan, Wallston & Babel, 1979). Other reproductive technologies, too, are in the experimental stages for the most part but threaten what Robyn Rowland C19B4) calls "the final solution to the woman question" C35B) . Such technolgies include cloning and the attempted development of the artificial womb. fluch of the popular literature, however, discusses cloning men CMurphy, 1984:B4). "Rarely is the idea of a woman being cloned mentioned, and then it is to suggest the cloning of a beauty queen— Raquel Welch, for example"CB4). More frightening than this, however, is that denouncers see cloning not only as promising men "a kind of personal immortality" but also as giving men "the means of resolving another age-old patriarchal issue— that of the constitution and ordering of 260

human society. Who should be reproduced? How can social hierarchy be rationalized?" CMurphy:B5). The development of an artificial womb would give the medical profession "an open window on a growing fetus" and would provide a "safe" place for the gestation of the fetus CCorea, 19B5a:250). But denouncers object to such a development because they see it as the male-dominated medical profession’s way of dispensing "with the woman’s body and [putting! the fetus in a glass and steel 'mother machine’ . . ."CCorea, 19B5a:252). Corea C19B5) objects strenuously to the assumption that machines are better for the fetus than the natural environment of the womb. Overall, what denouncers are most afraid of in regard to reproductive technologies is that they are yet another way for males to control and dominate women, to tell women what to do, what choices to make in regard to their bodies and the fetuses they are carrying— but most of all to gain complete control over the reproductive process which belongs, denouncers assert, to women after the initial penetration of egg by sperm. Denouncers are trying to reassert what they see as being uniquely theirs: the ability to bear life. In prehistory . . . woman was revered as the life- bearer. But in recorded history, men claim the major 261

credit, relegating woman to the role of vessel or Field For their seed. In all recorded history, there have been only a brieF one hundred years when, with the discovery oF the human egg, men were unable tQ deny woman’s contribution to the child. Men grasped that the egg was the Female sex cell only in 1B61 and that the egg and sperm participated equally in Fertilization only in the late lB70s. As soon as man understood that he was not, in Fact, the sole parent oF the child, he began recreating the myth oF single parenthood by the male, not, this time through religious or scientiFic theory, but through technology CCorea, 19B5a:310).

The Process oF Name Creation in the Lanouaaing Communitu oF Denouncers oF Reproductive Technoloau Like the users, when denouncers oF reproductive technology name "technolgy" and "motherhood" they are constituting a symbolic reality about womanhood. Through the process oF "codB switching" described by LBach C1976), denouncers make "technology" and "motherhood" metonymically "real." The concepts oF "technology" and "motherhood" are symbolically constituted through abstracting qualities From experience with technology and motherhood. Through the activity oF the mind, we move From the sense experience in the world outside the skin to the "non-sense" experiences so that "technology" and "motherhood" become reiFied. Denouncers, as do users, oF reproductive technology act as though "technolgy" and "motherhood" are "real," as iF they exist in the world oF sense experience outside the skin. Denouncers oF reproductive technology act as though 262

"technology" is. a demon. They act as though reproductive technology controls, invades, works devilish machinations against women. Denouncers also act as though "motherhood" is a badge— of woman’s integrity, perhaps, or of woman’s power, uniqueness— or as though "motherhood" is that part of woman which men seek to control.

In the naming process, denouncers name reproductive technology as "same as" the patriarchy, that is, as "same as" men. For denouncers, the criterial attributes associated with reproductive technology include control, threat, invasion, false promises, and objectification of women. Thus, women who denounce reproductive technology direct attention to the aspects of technology which might encourage "avoidance" behavior in the audience. They do this by naming the technology "demon" in a variety of ways and by associating technology with the "demon" men who seek to control and dominate women. In an effort to get listeners to indict reproductive technologies, denouncers’ names draw attention to the "demon" aspects of the techniques perpetrated and directed by demon technologists. Throughout The llother Machine. Corea C19B5a) refers to the developers and supporters of reproductive technology as 'men’ because men overwhelmingly make up the community of 263

reproductive engineers; it is this group of male reproductive engineers who practice their trade upon the bodies of women (Corea:3). Corea’s C1385a) description of "reproductive engineers" makes real the criterial attributes of "technology" which is the "same as" the patriarchy. By describing the patriarchy as objectifying, dominating, controlling, Corea (1385a) fuses "technology" with the institutions of masculinist politics (4). Reproductive technology and males become synonymous with the dominant, controlling patriarchy. Reproductive technology, then, can be expected to act like a demon because it is designed and controlled by demons (men)— who design and control the patriarchy. Jane Murphy (13B4) refers to the technologies which extract eggs from women as "egg farming" and the technologists as "egg farmers" (88). Reproductive technology in the service of the patriarchy assumes that women’s bodies are fertile fields to be farmed. Women are regarded as commodities with vital products to harvest: eggs. Egg-farming thereby limits female bodies to reproductive bodies, more systematically than ever before (88). Corea (1384) refers to egg-gathering technologists as "egg snatchers." In another article, Corea (13B5b) moves from the patriarchal "farming model" in which "men implant women with their seed and then harvest the crop of babies" (38), 264

to the "brothel model" in which "women are collected together and held .... They are controlled with Force, degredation, drugs" (39). Other denouncers name devil-like control qualities of technologists who dominate technology, too. For nurphy (1984), genetic engineering is described as "designer genes" C7G). Taub C19B7) speaks in terms of the "commercialization of the creation of families" (7). Ince (1984) complains against the "technodocs." For flinden (19B5), reproductive technologies are Forms of "prostitution." At the same time that denouncers draw attention to the aspects of reproductive technology which encouragB avoidance, they also "blinder" those aspects which might encourage approach behavior on the part of their audience— women who might seriously consider using these technologies as well as women who support her point of view. Denouncers of reproductive technology "blinder" or mask the "saving," or "helping" aspects of reproductive technology discussed in the last chapter. Denouncers do acknowledge that some technologies may be useful at times, but they "blinder" what users would consider "saving," "Freeing," "helping" attributes of reproductive technologies. In constituting a reality about womanhood, while denouncers of reproductive technology see "motherhood" as 265 one aspect of womanhood, it is a unique aspect: For in motherhood lies woman’s power, provided woman can control her own reproductive process. For this languaging community of denouncers, an essential or defining attribute For womanhood is that woman be able to control her own body. Reproductive technology is named as "different from" womanhood and the "same as" patriarchal domination because reproductive technology is under the control of men and follows male-dominated societal attitudes and directives. Reproductive technology, then, threatens the concept of woman’s control. Denouncers of reproductive technology attempt to intervene into the reality of users in order to direct attention to anomalies in users’ view, namely, that women who use reproductive technologies are not "free," but are controlled and dominated by the men who dominate the institutions in society. Denouncers also mask the anomalies in their own view: Not only can reproductive technologies benefit some women, but also if women were in total control of their bodies and of reproductive technologies, women would be in no better position than they are now. In sum, then, denouncers name reproductive technology as "different From" womanhood and the "same as" male domination. They name woman as a person who has control of 266

the most unique aspect of her personhood. In the view of denouncers, women have always had to fight for control of their own bodies. Here, denouncers are intervening in order to shift relationships among power shares: women, men, the fetus and social institutions.

Denouncers of reproductive technology indict the societal power code which communicates male domination and control— in this case, control of woman’s reproductive process. Denouncers of reproductive technology want to constitute the power shares so that women have control of matters pertaining to human reproduction, and men and society are dependent upon women’s decisions in the area of procreation. Denouncers would depend upon men to contribute sperm, but once the fetus begins to grow and develop inside the woman’s body, the woman must, in denouncers’ view, become the arbiter of the fetus’ fate. The woman decides about prenatal care and prenatal "therapy.” Men Chusband, scientists, lawyers, the medical profession) may, in some ways contribute their expertise to the growth and development of the fetus, but they are not partners with the woman, nor do they have much say in what she decides about what is "right" or "good" for her own body or for the fetus. The woman’s relationship to the fetus becomes superordinate to the man’s. Further, the woman’s relationship to the man 267

who fathered the child is increasingly independent rather than interdependent after the man has contributed sperm. In advocating a shift in power (relationships), then, denouncers place women in a competitive relationship with men in order to satisfy women’s need for control. The tactic in promoting this power shift is mainly threat, since denouncers advocate virtually eliminating men from decision­ making concerning human reproduction. In their concentration upon "who controls" the reproductive process, denouncers would relegate males to being contributors of sperm.

Implications of Naming for Denouncers of Reproductive Technology

In order to satisfy a basic need for control of their bodies, denouncers intervene to shift interdependencies among power shares. Being a mother is important to denouncers, but having control of the birth process is more important. Denouncers of reproductive technology consider that men dominate and control society. UJhat denouncers are saying is that men should not control the birth process since that is something unique and therefore defining of women. 268

Denouncers’ advocacy of a shift in control over human reproduction implies shifts in needs. Denouncers see the "group-stressing" need to control childbearing as more salient than the "group-stressing" need to bear children. Denouncers do not necessarily need children in order to fulfill themselves as women. Denouncers see their need for men and birth technology as ancillary to their need to control the decisions pertaining to birth and the use of technologies. Another implication of the attempted shift in power is a shift in denouncers’ perceptions of womanhood. Women are persons who resist the encroachments of the patriarchy, especially upon their unique reproductive power. Denouncers value motherhood as the unique aspect of womanhood, and they are more aware than ever that woman’s reproductive capacity can be a great source of her power and of her oppression. Women in the languaging community of denouncers, then, name themselves by asserting their opposition to the traditional name for woman. They name themselves by defining their role in the power structure as "controllers of their reproductive process" or as "prime decision-makers" in the birth process. It is, however, that they recognice that motherhood is the unique aspect of womanhood, that denouncers advocate this change. If they can retain control 269

of this unique aspect of womanhood, they can retain control of their unique identity. Summary This chapter, then, has discussed the languaging community of denouncers of reproductive technology. First the chapter gave an overview of why denouncers consider reproductive technology as "demon." Then the chapter examined the process of name creation before discussing the side effects of creating names and the implications of this process for identity. In the next chapter we shall see how critics of reproductive technology use the same naming process to create yet another reality. Chapter VIII NAMING REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: THE POWER TO DETERMINE

Introduction

"Technology,” says Helen Rodriguez C19B2), cannot be characterized except in its sociocultural context. It may be good, bad, or indifferent . . ."C221). Women may respond to "birth" technology, writes Ann Snitow C19B6), "with hope and excitement. But as soon as I say this my next impulse is to bury my enthusiasm under an avalanche of second thoughts and cautionary tales" C42). Technologies are "scientifically based procedures," "means to ends," and "in a limited sense, value free"; "the social and human values, meanings, and politics inherent in the statement of problems to be solved Cby the technologies] are not necessarily part of the technologies themselves" CParlee, 19B6:33). Go say the critics of reproductive technology. This chapter will analyze the languaging community of critics of reproductive technology by Cl) explaining critics’ view of technology as "catalyst," CE) examining the

270 271

process of name creation, and C3D exploring the implications of that name and the realities of identity constituted by the naming of reproductive technology.

Critics of Reproductive Technoloou and the Pouier to Determine

The critics of reproductive technology are a small group of women who, acknowledging their ambivalence toward reproductive technology, attempt to sort out the names others use regarding the procedures and to look at uie underlying issues suggested by these names. The sorting process becomes a reflective means of clarifying issues and attitudes, needs, and relationships in reference to reproductive technology. Before sorting out the names others use, however, critics, like users and denouncers, name technology. Users see reproductive technology as a savior and minimize the risks and difficulties entailed in use; denouncers emphasize technology’s demon aspects while discounting its beneficial possibilities. Critics, howBver, view technology as a catalyst with both savior and demon qualities. For critics, reproductive technology cannot in itself be praised or blamed. What needs attention, according to critics, are the changes which ensue from the use, misuse, or (perhaps! 272 neglect of reproductive technology uiithin the present social structure. Whether technology is considered savior or demon, according to critics, depends in large measure upon who uses/misuses it and why. The recent Baby N Case is an example. In February, 1SB5, Mary Beth Whitehead and her husband, Richard, signed an agreement with William Stern and his wife, Elizabeth. Mary Beth Whitehead Camong other matters) agreed "to be artificially inseminated with William Stern’s sperm, to carry the fetus to term, to surrender custody to William Stern upon the child’s birth and to terminate her parental rights to the child" CParlee: 1SB7:0). The Sterns agreed to pay the Infertility Center of New York SE5,000, 510,000 of which would cover the centers fee, 510,000 would be paid to Nary Beth Whitehead for her "services," and 55,000 would cover Whitehead’s medical, legal and insurance costs. Nary Beth Whitehead conceived through the process of artificial insemination and on Narcii E7, 1SBB, gave birth to a healthy baby girl. But Nary Beth Whitehead decided to keep the child CB). Certainly, the savior and demon aspects of the intervention of technology into the birth process of Baby ri are apparent here. The procedures involved in artificial insemination allowed William Stern to father a child— 273

legitimately, through a woman "acting" in his wife’s stead. Mary Beth Whitehead would perform a "service" enabling aLem to legitimately father a child while being married, but Hary Beth Whitehead would also be compensated for those services. The child would be the biological offspring of William Stern, but she would also be Mary Beth Whitehead’s. In breaking the contract with William Stern, Whitehead considered that she was the privileged parent. In attempting to sort out the concepts and issues involved in this case, critics look, not only at the suviur and demon aspects, but also at the names used and assumed in forming opinions about the case. Should, for example, Hary Beth Whitehead be considered a "surrogate" or a "mother." If she is a "surrogate," is she performing "only" a service? If she is a "mother," then how can she surrender custody for her child? What are the implications, critics ask, when we name Mary Beth Whitehead as a "surrogate mother"? In deciding the Baby H Case, the court found in favor of William Stern. In order to do so, however, the court "merged a standard contract analysis with a test determiumu the child’s best interests, thereby creating a hybrid test" CParlee:S). The court did not consider that Mary Beth Whitehead was the "primary" parent— the traditional 274

consideration of society and some feminists. Mary Beth

Whitehead, in this instance, was seen by a tribunal of Justice in our society not as a "mother," but as a "baby vehicle" CChavkin, 19BE:E19). This brings to light a familiar problem for feminists: how can women retain control over their own bodies'!* CPetchesky, 19B0:67B). In the Baby fl Case, for example, Mary Beth Whitehead claimed that shB should be ablB to keep

the baby because the baby was the product of her body. The body had made its great and proper claim. UuL huw far do feminists want to take this claim, that pregnancy makes women more naturally the privileged parent in a custody suit? How would we feel if the court turned around and said that biology is destiny, that mothers and children are linked by umbilical cords, which can never be socially severed? CBnitow:44). Critics point out, too, that as catalyst, reproductive technology not only can initiate changes in procedures. but can also ensure that women remain "first and foremost as the bearers of children and the nurturers of everyone" C9nitow:44). Users agree that women are first and foremost "bearers of children and the nurturers of everyone"; denouncers disagree. For denouncers, women are first and foremost persons who have control of reproduction— the mosu unique part of their personhood. The reproductive process, then, is important to both groups, but for different 275

reasons. Critics, however, see the new/old order combination as paradox. In fact, the paradox of the new reproductive technologies is that once the imagery of the miraculous and exotic is tripped away, a woman who tries Lu use these services is likely to find hersBlf a partner m the long-established duets that are sadly traditional— between men and women, doctors and patients, husbanas and wives. Maybe it should be no surprise, but it is downright impressive how fast antifeminists politics have moved in on the new ground, setting up the old totem poles: the mother, to blame for her baby’s so- called defects . . and the father, guardian of his own sperm. Sometimes by default of the imagination, sometimes by design, the more unruly possibilities— the new wine of the new technologies— are often poureu uau* into old bottles CSnitow:44) . Critics point out, however, that while reproductive technology is a catalyst, of itself neither good nor bad, the use/misuse of technology can affirm or change concepts or assumptions about the way things are or ought to be. Parlee C13BS) notes that "technologies are always developed for particular purposes. That is, they are developed to solve certain 'problemsC32). Sometimes the applications of certain technologies range far beyond the original problem they were intended to solve. Sonar technology was developed, for example, by the navy in order to keep ships from bumping into hazardous obstructions such as mines. Sonar, of course, is used for other purposes, one of which is to allow physicians a view of the fetus in the womb. But, in the case of the ultrasound techniques used for 276

prenatal diagnosis, what is the "problem"? Parlee C1SBB3 contends that "a 'problem’ is a social and/or physical phenomenon defined with reference to a particular set of values, assumptions, meanings" C32). What is a "problem," then, depends very much upon "who defines it" C325. A physician may decide to use ultrasound, perhaps in conjunction with amniocentesis, in order to determine whether the fetus has some abnormality. What is the "problem"? Will an abnormal fetus endanger the life of the mother? How? In the womb? After the child is born? Having detected an abnormal fetus, does thB woman now have the "problem" of deciding whether she will carry the fetus to term or abort it? Given recent developments in the area of reproductive technology, we are now at a point, for example, where procedures for prenatal identification of certain genetic conditions can, when coupled with elective abortion, provide a solution to the "problem" of unwanted infants with severe mental and physical disabilities. The testimony of disabled persons now alive and productive— and politically active— speaks eloquently, however, to the fact that there is another view of this "problem." The problem from their puinL of view is not primarily that they are disabled, but that the potential existence of others like them, unu implicitly the value of thBir own lives, now is threatened by the availability of technologies to "solve" what ethers have deemed a "problem" CParlee:32). Critics, suggest, then, that users and denouncers look beyond the "savior" or "demon" aspects of reproductive 277

technology and ask questions about names in relation to reproductive technology. The technology itself cannot "cannot question or clarify the values, assumptions, and meanings inherent in the way the problem is defined," but the use of reproductive technology might support prevailing assumptions CParlee:335. Why, for example, do some people consider infertility to be a "problem"? If it is simply that adults have strong needs or desires to nurture infants and children, foster care or choice of particular occupations mould satisty tnern. If it is a desire to nurture, to "have" one’s own child, then we might want to examine the implicit metaphor of children-as-property that has crept in with such psychologically and socially compelling furue. And why is one’s "own" child usually implicitly defined as one’s biological, genetic offspring? CParlee:33J Besides affirming prevailing values and assumptions, critics point out that using/misusing reproductive technology can also change concepts. Take "parenting" for example. Traditionally, a parent is a "mother" or a "father," an organism responsible for the generation of another organism of its own kind. In the social structure, the concept of "parent" has been extended to men and women who adopt children. Reproductive technology gives us new possibilities in the realm of biological parenting— "parenthood without intercourse," for example, or the possibility of "two biological mothers: egg donor and egg 278

bearer" (Snitow:44). Reproductive technologies have, in effect, separated out "components of uihat used to be a single role": that of parent" CParlee:34). Moreover, social parenthood enlarges and/or changes. Elizabeth Stern is the adoptive mother to her husband’s child. This is nui the same as a uioman who becomes an adoptive mother when she marries a man who has already fathered a child. Elizubeun Stern, William Stern’s legal spouse, consented to the procedure which would give her husband a child. In this country, this is new because in the Whitehead-Stern contract, provision was made to insure that the procedures involved in artificial insemination would not constitute adultery CParlee, 1SB6:8). But is. this new? Can it be saiu that Elizabeth Stern and her husband played out thB same scenario with regard to Mary Beth Whitehead as Sari and Abraham with Hagar? CGenesis 16:1-ED. In the Genesis story, Abraham, at the prompting of his wifB, drove out Hagar and her child bBcausB Sarah did not want Ishmael, the son of the slave, to share the inheritance of Isaac, the son of Abraham’s wife CGenesis 21: B-ll). Relations among thB adults in the story are strained from the beginning, and relations among the children of the sons remain strained to this day. 279

PBrhaps, then, critics say, uie ought to givB some consideration to how the use/misuse of reproductive technology might affect our children. What uiill be the relationships among these various "parents" and children? Feminist thought includes a range of trial answers from hopefulness that the more parents, the more opportunities for Io v b , to the belief that whatever the weaknesses of the nuclear family, as long as such families are a social ideal, women must have an equal right to form them and keep them private, excluding whom they choose CSnitow:44). The concrete experience, however, shows that "parenting" scenarios can multiply when reproductive technology intervenes in the birth process. What happens when a lesbian or homosexual couple opt to use the technology? Does the child have a mother/father (biological) and a mother/father "figure"? Should the biological mothBr/father have no claim on the child? How might a child in a lesbian or homosexual household relate to "parents" who are both males or both females? How can men and women who donate sex cells, women who gestate the fetus, as well as men and women who receive the offspring be protected from old and new forms of exploitation? CSnitow:44). It may be, then, that Ctlhe new reproductive technologies are contributing Lu a larger social shift. It is getting hardBr and harder to call parenting simple, natural, or unquestionable anymore CSnitow:45). 280

Or, it may be that calling "parenting simple, natural, or unquestionable" does not matter much. Neither do the social shifts, as long as we are sorting out to what extent the different constructs empower women or, alternately, decrease our power to structure childbearing around our own need and those of the people with whom we live our dailu lives; to what extent we are compelled to accommodate to the convenience of "authorities" who pretend to understand our needs and interests better than we do CHubbard, 1987:332).

For critics such as Ruth Hubbard C19B7D, empowerment presupposes an understanding of "reproductive freedom." in an effort to get "different groups that embrace similar positions about reproductive freedom and the rights of parents and children" to look closely at their differences" so that they can "begin to come together on specific positions and actions," Hubbard discusses the names involved in "surrogate motherhood": Let’s start with definition. I will call the woman who gestates and births the baby "birthmother," the woman who raises the child "social mother," the woman who donates an egg without bearing the baby "egg donor." By analogy, I will call the man who provides sperm "sperm donor" and the man who raises the child "social father" CE1). Having given definition to the various roles of "mother” ana "father" named by users and denouncers of reproductive technology, Hubbard attempts to clarify and crystalize some issues. 281

First, what can be said of a woman who chooses to be a "birthmother" only— that is, a woman who chooses to receive an embryo transplant Cthe result of egg and sperm from another couple fertilized in vitro! or be artificially inseminated with thB sperm of a man who is not her husband or significant other? In clarifying the plight of the birthmother, Hubbard focuses on "choice." If feminists are committed to reproductive freedom, then, reasonably, a woman may "choose the conditions under which she will, or will not, bear a child" (SI!. The woman should be free to make a childbearing alliance with a man or with an infertile couple. Second, what if the birthmother decides she also wants to be the social mother? Suppose she refuses to relinquish the child? The woman, Hubbard contends, has the right to do this: "Whether or not she has provided the egg, a birthmother has gestated the baby. At birth, the baby is literally her flesh and blood" CE11. In other words, according to Hubbard C1987!, the birthmother, no matter what, has primary claim to the child. Again, she seeks to distinguish: In ordinary procreation, both biological parents become their child’s social parents and, once the baby is born, the father’s contribution to its growth and development can be equivalent to or, indeed, greater than the mother’s, if they arrange it that way. In 282

that case, the difference between them that exists at birth can soon become insignificant as parents and baby become attached. But such an equivalence between parents cannot exist at birth. It takes timB— and parental effort— to establish. Therefore I would argue that a father acquires parental rights by parenting his children. Birthmothers have parental rights when Lhu child is born and may subsequently relinquish them CE1) . Hubbard here is not arguing for or against reproductive technology, but is using names to reason to a conclusion. Giving the names we have attached to the various forms of "mother" and "reproductive freedum," Hubbard tries Lu show us some consequences. In order to do this, of course, she needs to make some distinctions. For example, "some feminists present maternity and paternity as equivalent and equal from the moment of birth" CE1D. Hubbard, as a biologist, understands that they are not. She is mindful of the problems the claims of biological difference have raised for women, but she attempts to put the differences in perspective with regard to reproductive technology. It is a mistake to disregard the realities of pregnancy and birth which situate the birthmother differently from anyone else when the baby has Just been born. It is worthwhile to try to understand under what conditions this initial difference decreases and may be erased, but no good can come from denying that it exists. On the contrary, it would be useful to develop a well-thought-out position about haw best to reconcile equality with difference. Ule need it in other siutations, as well as this one. We need to fight for reproductive freedom and for our right to parent or renounce parenting if we can make other arrangements for the care of our children. We gain little for women 283

by creating a false equivalence between birthmotneria and spBrm or egg donors whosB only contribution before a baby’s birth is their gamete CE1). In addition, Hubbard also attempts to clarify the issue of "parenthood." "If uie are going to come up with new technologies and social arrangements that let people become parents who otherwise wouldn’t, we have to broaden uur concept of what constitutes parenthood" CE1). Hubbard argues that if we look at the various "parent" roles possible it reproductive technologies are used, the child could have "five potential claimants to parenthood— a sperm donor, egg donor, birthmother, social mother, and social father" CE1).

It behooves us to decide which claimants will be allowed lu have what relationship to each other and the child.

As I have argued earlier, at birth the birthmother is in a special position to be the "real" parent. Who develops parental or quasi-parental relationships with the child after that depends on who cares for him or her. Clearly, it will raise insurmountable prooiems it five people must agree, or are entitled to go into custody court, over every important decision affecting "their child." But it SBems to me that this is something they need to iron out before they engage in inventive methods of procreation and parenting, not after the baby is born CE1).

The Process of Name Creation in the Lanouaoina Communitu of Critics of Reproductive Technoloou

What critics do, then, is to name reproductive technology as "catalyst." Acknowledging the "savior" and "demon aspeu..- 284

of the technology, critics attempt to clarify issues and use the names users and denouncers have given to various aspects of reproductive technology in order to reason to some conclusion. Besides the names for reproductive technology, critics attempt to discuss crucial concepts uihich affect the ways in which users and denouncers view reproductive technology and its consequences. In order to do this, critics name reproductive technology as "catalyst." They want to draw attention to the changes which will surely occur in repruduuliun Lhruuyn the use/misuse/nonuse of reproductive techniques. UJhat critics want is for both users and denouncers to pay attention to the consequences which will follow from their views of reproductive technology. Critics, then, do not attribute "goodness" or "evil" to reproductive technology. For critics, reproductive technology is the "same as" tool— or tools, if we consider the multiple techniques involved in reproductive technology. Tools are "neutral"; they are "dumb." Critics want women who look upon technology as "savior" and those who look upon technology as "demon" to approach technology as a tool which, of itself, has no value. Critics encourage both groups of women to approach technology by featuring the 285

"catalyst" as an extension of human capacities— in tne bamc way tools are extensions of human capacities. Uhat critics want the women to see is that they must decide how they uixi handle the consequences of the extensions of human capacities. The introduction of tools always brings about change. Critics want to affect the ways in which women understand and know about the "catalyst." Therefore, critics feature the consequences of the use/misuse of the "tools." They urge women to take cognizance of the consequences so that they can decidB if they are willing to accept such consequences. Ulhat critics mask or "blinder," however, is the uncontrollable aspects involved in tool use. The use ot tools has consequences beyond their immediate application.

In the case of surrogacy, for example, what difficulties may occur for the surrogate mother Cif she is married) and her husband after shB hands over the child? Critics aact us though knowledge of the consequences means that women can control them. For critics, then, reproductive technology is a "catalyst." Critics expect the "catalyst" to produce changes but to remain, itself, unchanged. Critics also have a name for woman: a person with the capacity tu make decisions about and order her life, especially in the areas 286

which pBrtain particularly to her. The defining attribute for woman, according to critics, is choice. A woman should be able to choose her life options. She should be able to choose, especially, her options in regard to bearing children, since that capacity is unique to woman. Thus, a woman certainly can choose to be a mother— even to be a mother at all costs. But, in order to exercise this choice, women must have the freedom to choose. The concern of critics, then, is that if women do not agrBe about what consequences thBy will accept from thB "catalyst," womBn may come to have littlB say at all in who usBs/does not use or who controls/does not control or who decides/does not decide about reproductive technology. Given critics’ perceptions of technology and woman, it is evident that they are trying to get women to agree Lu come to some consensus regarding women’s position about reproductive technology. Consensus, of course, will mean change, but the critics are asking more, perhaps, than they realize. In asking women to come to consensus they are asking them to agree to the criterial attribute of "womanhood." They are asking them to reconceptualize womanhood and to accept critics’ name for reproductive technology. 287

Critics, then, attempt a nBad intervention. Critics

are responding to the basic human need to bring order out ul the chaos of this debate over reproductive technology. Critics advocate that women need to pay attention to the changes which reproductive technologyies will bring. Ulhat becomes salient For critics is women’s need to know what they are choosing when they decide to use/not use/denounuu reproductive technology. This neBd becomes important if women are to "survive" because For critics women’s ability to choose what they want in regard to reproduction is a deFining attribute oF "womanhood." This is a "group- stressing" need as Far as critics are concerned, and they use strategies in order to Facilitate attention to this need. Critics attempt to hold up a glass, to reFlect how the women are naming reproductive technology and the possible implications oF those names For women in particular and then For society in general. Critics want to open the channel oF cooperation among women.

Implications oF Naming For Critics oF Reproductive Technoloau

There are several possible implications should women decide to cooperate rather than compete over the way to view reproductive technology. They will have to decide about the 288 relationship between child and "mother." Ruth Hubbard (19B7) proposes that all women who bear children be considered as being "mothers" and that all women who raise children, likewise, be considered as being "mothers." Women who donate eggs, however, should be named as "donors." Children, then, can possibly know two "mothers." The extent to which children should know the "surrogate" mother needs to be decided.

Not only will the relationship of children to "mothers" change, but also the relationship of children to "Father." How will the child know the Father? As source oF liFe (donor oF gamete)? As social parent? What happens to relationships when children are raised in a household with parents oF the same sex? Another implication oF this shiFt in perception oF needs is that women do the deciding. flBn, it seems, are leFt out oF this particular naming process. ThereFore, while critics promote a cooperation between women, they a m (intentionally or not) promoting competition between men and women. Witness, For example, the Final resolution in the Whitehead/Stern case. The child was awarded to William Stern because she is his child. Nary Beth Whitehead may have visiting rights because the child is also hers. But the inFant is not considered to be their child. The competition 289 between man and woman, in this case, was so intense that a resolution to the conflict had to bB sought in a court of l a w . Attention to the need to decide will shift understanding in the way women know themselves. Critics would have women develop a well-thought-out position that would allow them to say, "This is who we are as women and because of who we are, this is what we will do." Ulhatever that position may be, it will most certainly be different from or a combination of the positions the women presently hold. The change will mean that women will value themselves, their children, and others differently. If, for example, women decided that the defining attribute of womanhood is "nurturance," then women know themselves as "nurturers," not necessarily as physical life-bearers, or as persons in control of the life-bearing capacity. They may value children— and others— as persons to be nurlureu, cared for. Critics, then, urge women to come to some consensus about the consequences of reproductive technology, are also suggesting that women come to a common idea about who they are. Once they know who they are, they can decide about what consequences of reproductive technology will be 290

appropriate to who women are and what they need. From a naming perspective, however, critics who urge that women name themselves in relation to who they are— in this case study, in relation to reproductive technology— are urging that that women engage in identity creation. Names, after all, make sense only in relationship to other names— names for needs, For relationships, and names for ways of knowing, being, and valuing. Such names, of course, are abstractions and assert relations among the relationships.

Summaru

This chapter, then, has discussed how the languaging community of critics of reproductive technology attempt to sort out issues, attitudes, neBds and relationships in reference to women and reproductive technology. Ue have seen how critics, in their attempt to clarify and bring order out of chaos, like denouncers and users, also name reproductive technology and act as though reproductive technology is "real." Critics attempt to intervene to bring about coherence and consensus in women’s view of who they are and how reproductive technology fits in the concept or who they are. Critics stress women’s need to bring make order. Critics are prepared to accept change, and urge tnac 291 all uomen should also be prepared to accept change, but they imply that in accepting change they can control change. in the Final chapter ue uill see uhat conclusions about identity can be draun from uomen’s discourse about reproductive technology. Chapter IX SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

In bringing the study together as a whole, this chapter will summarize and discuss what has been presented thus Far. Then, in the light of the social intervention model CBrown, 1S7B5, the chapter will discuss possibilities which might Follow From the way thB languaging communities constitute reality about women’s identity. Next, the strengths and weaknesses oF the model will be considered. Finally, the chapter will suggest possible areas oF Future research and conclude with Final remarks.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The Research Question and Perspectives oF Uomen’s Identity

The study began by asking questions about woman’s identity. The speciFic purpose oF the study was to investigate how women create their identity. Because this is a study in communication, the rhetorical process oF

292 293 identity creation uias investigated From a naming perspective. The specific research question For this study, then, asked what insights could be gained From a rhetorical study of the process which women use to make "identity" into sense experience or find sense Cmeaning) in "identity" or both. Since women’s identity has been studied From perspectives other than that of communication, 1 was looking For the insights into the process of identity creation which a rhetorical model would provide. In order to study the process of identity creation closely, I chose to study women’s academic and popular discourse about women’s place in the design and utilization of reproductive technology— those technological interventions into the process of reproduction which result in the birth of a healthy child CBirke, 1986:6). I chose this discourse For the study of identity creation because it contains on a microlevel the crux of women’s battle on the macrolevel of society: their efforts to define themselves, their role and status in society in ordBr to gain recognition as full human beings who should be accorded the same privileges and opportunities as men. Since issues concerning woman’s reproductive function are at the heart of these efforts, any discussion of woman’s identity needs to take into consideration her ability to bear children. 294

Research began by investigating uihat women in various fields have said about the significance of identity to women’s social position. Examination of feminist discourse showed that ideas about woman’s role and status in society depend in large measure upon how women view themselves as being different/similar to men, how women view certain inequities among themselves and between themselves and men, and how women understand what it means to be a fulfilled Chappy) person in American society. ThB theories of women’s identity in several disciplines were articulated broadly in terms of socio-political categories: Cl) traditionalism, C2) liberalism, C3) Marxism/socialism, and C D radicalism. The differences among these positions, however, lie in the particular focus of each position which directs attention to certain questions and issues. Traditionalists focus on how the natural processes of biology define womanhood. Liberals maintain that the inherited and nurtured mental capacity of human beings to direct their lives and control the environment distinguishes human beings from other animals. Since both uiomen and men possess this capacity, both women and men should be accorded the same social opportunities. On the other hand, Marxists/ socialists direct attention to the human being who creates 295

his/hBr nature through meaningful, creative activity, concentrating on what constitutes meaningful, creative work for women. Finally, for radical feminists, the focus is on distinctly masculine or feminine creative activity. In speaking of woman’s identity, radicals concentrate on woman’s reproductive capacity and woman’s experience of her own biology since that is what distinguishes woman as a human being.

Scholarship by women about women from a communication perspective does not presently relate directly to the definitional question of woman’s identity. In thB field of communication scholarship has focused upon women’s communication behavior on value and policy issues in women’s studies from a communication perspective. This scholarship discusses what is communicated about women Ce.g. strength, courage) in their communicative behavior, on their achievements in human affairs, or on differences occurring in the communicative behavior of men and women Cas in gender studies). This study is also conducted from a communication perspective. It is a rhetorical study and focuses on the human capacity to make and use symbols. The stance here is that rhetoric is a mode of action, a way of making human experience into symbols, the process by which human 296

beings constitute meaning by making sensed experience into metaphor and acting as though metaphor Cnon-sensed experience) mere sensed experience. Studying symbolic conceptions of the world mediated by language provides a way of knowing the world differently from the other perspectives, one, in fact, which is basic to all perspectives. This is the rhetorical process of naming. In studying identity creation, this study starts from the premise that our reality Csociety, culture) is symbolically created through the process of naming. Ule create meaning by naming the experiences outside the skin and also by naming the experiences inside the skin. Ule name sensed experience by abstracting similarities so that the name Cthe metaphor) can be applied to other experiences in the sensed and non-sensed world. We also abstract from abstractions so that we name non-sensed experience and we confuse these metaphors with sense experience. By alternately featuring similarities and differences in the naming process, we create meaning, order in our lives, amidst changes. "Identity" is an abstraction, a name for the non-sensed experience of "who I am." This study asks how the "who I am" is named. Specifically, the study focuses on how women in the case study name, that is, 297 create, identity amidst social changes.

The Method of Investigation

The method of investigation for this study relies on Brown’s C1970) model of social intervention which is grounded in the naming process. This model provides a way of accounting for the symbolic construction of reality as well as accounting for the continuity and change in that reality. In this study the name for a socially constructed reality is "rhetorical vision." This is a concept developed by Ernest Bormann C197E) which describes how groups become involved in a symbolic reality. Bormann’s concept of rhetorical vision is useful in this study because it provides a way of understanding events. By studying the rise of the rhetorical vision, we can see how how groups create a culture in which they can act. The rhetorical vision provides a sense of situational significance because of its relationship to the "here-and-now" CBormann:379). Ulhen we look at the languaging communities of women we can examine the growth of their visions associated with women’s identity and we can, thus, understand what happens as women develop and participate in or fight against, say, traditional views to express their ideas of "the way things are" for women. 298

What Bormann calls a rhetorical vision, Broun would call a worldview. Bormann gives us a description of the constituted social reality; Brown furnishes a way to account for the dynamics at work in that reality. In this study, then, rhetorical vision is takBn to mean a symbolic construction of reality shared by a group of people with a common culture. The vision, though, provides both continuity and change through the process of intra- and interpersonal ideologizing which can be studied using the model of social intervention. Brown C197B3 stresses thB internal relatedness within systems and suggests intervention into human communication. His model focuses on relationships within events. Human beings symbolically create their reality by naming experiences in relation to other experiences. They live out a particular interpretative world view in which they perceive, know, and value themselves, others, and objects in their world. Human beings also exist in relationship to each other and their environment and symbolically organize their lives around adjusting the power or interdependence between and among themselves and others in order to satisfy needs. Human beings act from a comprehensive ordering of the world, and they seek to keep that ordering constant. 299

The process of ordering the world is ongoing; it is a continuous process. What happens, according to Brown C197B), is that human beings symbolically order their world by naming it and by coming to some understanding of "the way things are." This implies that human beings pay attention to certain aspects and ignore others. The aspects human beings ignore or Find non-orderly are gaps Canomalies) in their view. All comprehensive views— evBn rhetorical visions— have gaps, but human beings act "as though the world makes comprehensive sense to them" CBrown, 1978:12E). When it does not, when human beings perceive gaps in their symbolically constituted world, they try to compensate For them so that their world will not be destroyed. IF they cannot compensate For the gaps, then a shiFt to an alternate world view would be required (Brown, 1LT/U: 1JJ.) . Thus, in the continuous process oF ordering their world, human beings admit change. In order to investigate this continuous process oF change, the social intervention model utilizes three sub­ cycles or systems analogous to the integrative Formats which individuals use to order their world and keep it constant. ThesB are the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and interpretative sub-cycles— "the needs sub-cycle, the power sub-cycle and the input-switching sub-cycle" respectively 300

CBrown, 1970:1353. It is of utmost importance to note that the sub-cycles are interrelated and operate in conjunction with each other. Assumptively, this is a holographic conception of reality. In the social intervention system each sub-cycle is a connection point, "each of which imples or contains information on the other two" CBrown, 19B7:1-E3. By focusing on any onB of thB connection points CnBed, power, or attention3, a critic can see the ways human beings have of categorizing or naming their world.

Discussion of the Data

In Chapter six I discussed the rhetorical vision of the languaging community of women who would use reproductive technology. I explained how the women symbolically constituted a view of womanhood. We shall call this view a rhetorical vision. But this vision was constituted within the comprehensive view of what it means to be a person in the UnitBd States of America. The myth of personhood in this country includes, among other things, that individuals are useful and "productive, visibly, of works which are essential" CRobertson, 19B0:S043. For users of reproductive technology this means being able to give birth to a healthy 301

baby. For some women, however, childbirth is either physically impossible or socially infeasible. I have explained in Chapter B how these women attempt to retain their view of womanhood by naming reproductive technology as "savior." These women feature the "saving" ur "good" aspects of reproductive technology while masking those aspects which do not fit with the view. For users motherhood is a natural process. Technology is non-natural. However, women in this languaging community make certain naming moves to mask those non-natural aspects of reproductive technology. UJe have seen in Chapter B, for example, how women maneuver to makB childbearing with the help of technology a "natural" process, harried couples, for example, may engage in intercourse at the time when the wife is artificially inseminated with donor sperm. Sometimt^ the husband’s sperm is mixed with donor sperm. This way there is always the chance that if a child is conceived aftBr the wife is artificially inseminated the child could possibly result from the penetration of the egg by the husband’s rather than the donor’s sperm. In our society lesbians and single uionien are not encouraged to bear children, but with the help of reproductive technology this is now possible. In courts of law, women feature the "saving" aspects of technology and their "right" as a woman 302

to bear a child. In this view, than, users shift attention from technology-as-machine to tBchnology-as-concBption. There are several side effects following from this view. While they have identified themselves, and while they have managed to keep order in their world, they have shifted perceptions of power. They have changed their relationship to their husbands— or to the men who provide spBrm for the technicalities of reproductive technology. They have also changed their relationship to their children, who become products. These women have also changed family relationships: With the acceptance of reproductive technology, some women may choose to raise children without men; perhaps some women may choose to raise children in consort with other women. Women in this languaging community, then, have separated themselves from men— for whom it is also possible to use reproductive technology. A surrogate, for example, could be artificially inseminated with a man’s sperm— even though the man has no wife. Homosexual couples, too, could avail themselves of this service. With the development of the artificial womb, men would not need to use a surrogate to gestate the child. In this case, perhaps, the man could 303

use donor eggs and his own sperm to produce an embryo in vitro. The embryo could then be transferred to the artificial womb. Simultaneously, the shift in power mBans shifts in needs. Made salient, then, is the need for women to produce healthy, biologically connected offspring. This assumes the need for others who may never have been needed before: fertility experts, scientists, technicians. In order to "insure" the birth of a healthy child, we need fetal diagnostic techniques. In order to carry out the procedures involved in artificial insemination and embryo transfer/transplant, we neBd methods of retrieving Bggs and of storing eggs and sperm. The need for such providers and their expertise is a dependency relationship. The being, knowing, and valuing of these experts affects the being, knowing, and valuing of these women. Users of reproductive technology, then, intervene to make technology continuous with the reproductive process. That is, users name technology in such a way that it is as one with the natural process of reproduction. There are, however, ripple effects which accompany this shift in attention from technology-as-machine to technology-as- conception: changes in needs and in relationships. 304

Chapter Seven details hew denouncers of reproductive technology respond to the views of users by naming reproductive technology as "demon." Using the samB process of naming as described in Chapter Seven, denouncers of reproductive technology intervene in order to change women’s perceptions of technology. Denouncers Feature the "demon" aspects of reproductive tBchnlogy by pointing to technology as an arm of patriarchy. In the denouncers' template, wumuu has a unique power, but she must control it. Technology is invasive. Designed and controlled by men, technology is s b b o as a patriarchal instrument of control. Denouncers of reproductive technology renounce the societal power code which places men in positions of authority. Denouncers would like to change that code by putting women in complete control of their reproductive function. In denouncing reproductive technology, this languaging community advocates a change From cooperative to competitive interdependence among women and mBn. Denounces want women to control the use and design of reproductive technology— otherwise, they fight against it. In many cases, denouncers threaten boycott, complete denunciation, or demand takeover of reproductive technology by women. In other cases, they are willing to exchange their complete denunciation for control of the technology. 305

ThB sidB BffBcts dF thB attsmptBd pouiBr intervention on

the part of denouncers include shifts in perceived nBeds. The "group-stressing" need to control childbearing supercedes the "individuality-stressing" need to have a child. Denouncers’ need For men and technology is ancillary to their need to control the birth process.

Another sidB effect of the attempted shift in pouier is

a shift in the ways denouncers perceive womanhood. Denouncers see women as fighting against the encroachments of the patriarchy. Denouncers value motherhood as the unique aspect of womanhood and a source of woman’s overall power in the social sphere. Denouncers, then, Find a large gap in users’ view of womanhood. For denouncers, users accept the traditional view of woman as mother. Using the same process of naming, denouncers feature this gap by claiming that users are controlled by the patriarchy. Denouncers advocate for a shift in the hierarchy of relations between men ana uiumui;. such a shift implies a shift in the source of power, and a shift from a cooperative to a competitive relationship with men. Denouncers want women to control their own reproductive process. If such a shift were to occur, women would decide when to have children and in what manner. A 306

shift in power implies a shift in need. In the case of denouncers, the shift is from the need to bear children to the need to control the reproductive process. Thus, denouncers name women as self-determining individuals who, in controlling the reproductive process, can retain control of their unique identity. Denouncers, however, mask a significant gap in their view of womanhood. They mask the interdependencies among people. The competitive relationship which follows from denouncers’ view of womanhood exacerbates the gap. In Chapter Eight, critics of reproductive technology attempt to sort out the names others use regarding the procedures of reproductive technology and to look at the underlying issues suggested by these names. The most reflective of the three groups, these writers, too, are promoting a vision. The critics name reproductive technology as "catalyst." In so doing, critics intervene in the views of users and denouncers to advocate that change needs to occur. In the opinion of the critics, women must come to some consensus regarding reproductive technology; otherwise, issues will be decided for them. Critics, then, attempt a need intervention. They advocate order in the chaotic debate over reproductive technology. They stress women’s need to know what changes 307 will occur because of reproductive techniques so that women can make the best choices in regard to their reproductive process. Should users and denouncers accept what critics are advocating, there would bB shifts in power and attention. Women would cooperate rather than compete over the way to view reproductive technology. They will need to decide together about what the relationships should be between.child and mother, bBtween men and women, etc. There would be a shift in the hierarchy of order because women would do the deciding. The relationship between men and women would be competitive. Concomitantly with the shift in power would be a shift in the way women know themselves. They would not know themselves as "mother" or "controllers of the reproductive process," but, perhaps, as "deciders" about childbearing. Thus, they will value themselves on what they "decide" to produce.

What critics mask, however, is that deciding upon what consequences of reproductive technology to accept will not control all consequences. The sidB effect of choices will go far beyond what choosers ever expected. 308

Conclusions From the Data

The data support several conclusions. First, looking at the data in the light of the process of naming shows us that in some respects women do, as Zimmerman C19811 Fears, run Faster and Faster to stay in the same place. From Zimmerman’s point oF view, oF course, this Red Queen Syndrome is a sad commentary on the progress women have made toward the accomplishment oF their status as human beings Fully integrated into American society. Ulhat Zimmerman is asking in her writings is whether women must repeat the same pattern oF struggle For recognition in every area oF endeavor. Looking at the situation From a communication perspective tells us that, indeed, they must. In the area oF identity creation women must continually name who they are. They must continually name who they are in relation to others. They must continually name their needs. In their eFForts to name who they are, they keep order in their world. They keep naming who they are within the comprehensive view oF personhood in today’s American society, but women diFFer about what their success or what "being Fully integrated into society" means. A second conclusion Following 'From this is that women have not Found a common name to describe an experience which 309

they all agree belongs uniquely to women. Women are uniquely equipped to bear children— that is, to be mothers, but under conditions in which technology increasingly mediates childbearing, women do not agree about the defining attributes pertaining to "mother." Another conclusion is that women are vocal but not sufficiently reflective about who they are. They are staunch in the positions they hold, but they do not step back from those positions to see where they might be leading. We can see how the languaging communities in this study maneuver to keep their own worlds in order. The study shows, too, that women do not see how they are connected to each other, how they are all participating in the same naming process, and how they are striving for the same goal of identity-creation based on need, power, and attention. They see the differences among women; that is, they see that women strive for different social goals, and they see that women disagree about what woman’s status and role should be in society. What they do not see is that woman’s status and role are negotiated or mediated by themselves and others. These conclusions fallow from an analysis of the data based upon the research questions for this sLudy: 310

I. To what extent are the women in the dialogue concerning reproductive technology engaging in name creation or simply using names men have already imposed on them? Women in this dialogue are certainly engaging in name creation, but they are also using names men have already imposed on them. Percepts of identity are not independent of socio-cultural environments. The American socio-culturai environment which is dominated by males is the language tutor for all of us. Names for experiences are shared among members of a society who make up the social languaging community. The institutions of society present names over and over again, "pointing to, or offering verbal explanations of, the crucial differences and uttering a name for type as it is presented" CMakay & Brown: 370). TV advertising does this, for example, when it presents women as needing a certain kind of perfume, household product, or personal product. The words of the advertisement accompanied by the Juxtaposition of moving images show the view, name and refBrent, so that viewers come to understand "what a woman needs." Viewers who learn the name for "what a woman needs" can apply the name to other instances. Not all names, however, have to be accepted from the languaging tutor. 311

In the case study, some women have named themselves as "mother," the way our socio-cultural envirunmuiiL names women. Users of technology have accepted "childbearer" as the defining attribute of woman. Users have also accepted society’s name for "technology"— "that which can fix." But users, by naming "technology" as continuous with conception, have created a new reality in which "technology" can become a "savior" and a "partner" in procreation. Users of reproductive technology, then, use "transcending" languaging strategies in order to make "technology" part of their view .of "natural" reproduction in order to get other members of the languaging community of users to "approach" reproductive technology as "savior." Denouncers of reproductive technology, on the other hand, fight against society’s name for woman and against users’ name for technology. Corea C19B5a), for example, will not accept that "mother" is the defining attribute for "woman." Denouncers use names such as "baby machine," "baby vehicle," "egg snatchers," "technodocs" to express the controlling aspects of technology, which is dominated by males. Denouncers use "transcending" strategies to unite women against reproductive technology. Denouncers want women to avoid the "demon." 312

Critics, however, will accept neither definition for "woman" nor "technology." Critics name "woman" as "decision maker in regard to her reproductive processes," and "technology" as "catalyst," for reproduction. Critics want to unite women so that women have "choice" in the use of reproductive technology. What the study shows is that users, denouncers, and critics will not accept the same criterial attributes for "woman" and for "technology"; that is, they will not accept the "significant" determiners "of equivalency or difference" CMakay & Brown: 3075. Women in the dialogue, then, create names for identity as well as use names men have already imposed on them. Women in the dialogue identify themselves when they name an experience of being, that is, when they categorize an experience of being and attribute defining characteristics and expectancies to that category. They use "transcending" or "blindering" strategies in order to "move listeners's attention from what [divides/unites] them on one level of naming toward attention to what Cunites/devidesD them at another level of naming" CMakay & Brown: 3755. II. What are the names for identity and what are the strategies that characterize identity creation? In order to create a name, we must find a concept and we must be able to share that concept. 313

For the present, we may say that two conditions, at least, must obtain Cin order For us to learn names!: Cl) we must somehow hit upon the concept that everuthing can have a name, and CE) we need another person to Form a "language community" with us so that arbitrary symbols may be agreed upon as pointers to nonlinguistic categories CMakay & Brown: 370). The languaging communities discussed in the case study, then, use the name "woman" to reFer to the Female oF the human species, but each languaging community Features a signiFicant determiner oF equivalency or diFFerence For the name. For users, "physical motherhood" becomes the deFining attribute oF "woman." For denouncers, the attribute is "controller oF the reproductive process"; For critics, the attribute is "decider about childbearing." Members oF the languaging community become tutors For other members oF the community. The names created by the languaging communities create expectancies For the application oF those names to new instances oF identity. We have seen that users name reproductive technology as "conception" rather than as "machine." Users, then, expect technology to act as "savior." They create For "technology" approach value. Denouncers name reproductive technology as "oppressor" and expect "demon" actions. Critics name reproductive technology as "catalyst" and expect changes. We can see how the languaging communities discussed in the case study use the strategies oF the model oF social 314

intervention in order to create names. Users of reproductive technology Feature attention to "technology as natural" and mask attention to "technology as machine." Denouncers, on the other hand, stress "technology as unnatural." Critics point nut that "technology" is "machinery" and can do what both users and denouncers claim. Users of reproductive technology promote cooperation or interdependence with the medical profession. For users, technology can intervene into the reproductive process for the purpose of producing hBalthy, biologically connected offspring. Denouncers promote competitive relationships with the medical profession. Denouncers see themselves as interdependent with all who resist the domination of women's reproductive process by machines. For denouncers, technology is equated with control. Critics can see both sides. They promote cooperative interdependence among women in order that women might decide how best to use/not use reproductive technology. Users, then, affirm the need for reproductive technology. In affirming that technology is an extension uf women’s reproductive organs, users open the channel to the affirmation of their actions by the medical profession. This, simultaneously, closes the channel to affirmation by 315

denouncers. Denouncers, instead, affirm the nesd to protect women’s reproductive organs from the control of the medical profession Cmen). They, unlike users, seBk to exclude technological intervention— the extension of male hands and

organs— from the H v b s of women. Critics are reflective of the needs of both groups. They affirm the needs of both groups, but critics are not aware of communication as the social dynamic. III. Ulhat are the potential implication arising from the names? Women in this case study name technology as "savior," "demon" or "catalyst." Users promote approach behavior through the defining attribute of "technology as conception" rather than "technology as machine." Users direct attention, then, to women’s being mothers. If women are mothers, then, they need technology so that they can fulfill that role. Their relationship to technology may replace or substitute for the sexual relationship they have with men. Their relationship to their offspring hs primacy over their relationship with men. Denouncers promote avoidance of the "demon" through the defining attribute of "control." Denouncers direct allention to women’s caoabilitu of being true mothers if they Cnot males) can control the means and methods of reproduction. 316

The side effects of these names include women as dominant in the reproductive process. This would put women in a competitive relationship with men. They would need men and technology Cand children, perhaps) in order to fulfill a capacity for motherhood. Critics, though, see technology as something to be approached or avoided depending upon use. Technology is a "catalyst." Critics, therefore, feature attention to women’s knowinp the consequences of the "catalyst" and choosing which consequences they will/will not accept. This •implies that women will cooperate with uuuh uLhur su tnat they do not lose what control they have over their reproductive process. Naming technology as "catalyst” aj.L.Lj implies that women need each other and that they need to know and understand what results from their decision making. Women, then, in this case study, name themselves in the same way as they name the world. Names are non-sensed experiences. "Identity" is a non-sensed experience of being, of "who I am." This non-sensed experience is created through the abstractive process described in this study. The name for "who I am" is created in relation to "what I need" and "who others are." Need and relationships are also non-sensed experiences Cnames). These non-sensed experiences are abstracted and reified. In this case study, 317

relationships among men, women, and birth technologies are abstracted. So are relationships among need, power, and attention. "Identity" arises when relations are made among relations. Ideology, thus, is communication process CBrown, 197B).

THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE MODEL

The effectiveness of the model of social intervention depends upon viewing situations from an organismic perspective— that is, as a total integration of reality. It is this perspective which allows the critic to treat the rhetor’s message in its totality as social milieu. To extricate the message and hold it up to rhetorical scrutiny is to isolate and distort it. Rather than imposing some pattern of rhetorical criticism from without, the model of social intervention allows the message to speak for itself from the crucial existential

interpretations around which human beings organize their lives: need, power, and thB ways of knowing, being and valuing. The model is grounded in the basic human capacity and need to construe an ordered and connected reality. It allows us to see how, in the patterns of naming, human 318

beings symbolically construct thBir ordered reality. The model shows us how we can view the actions of human beings in the light of some ordered reality— even if that ordered reality is different from our own. It helps us to understand that most human beings partake of the same basic human process and that their actions, though seemingly different from our own, proceed from the "sameness" of construing an ordered view. As discussed in Chapter Five, the model also eliminates the sticky "effects" problem in rhetorical criticism because the model is not linear, and treats the rhetorical act as part of a systemic process in which rehetorical maneuvers are seen as inseparable from events. Rhetors attempting to effect an attention-switch, for example, may call attention to some need which affects the interdependence among members of a system. The attempt to balance out power in order to gratify needs simultaneously influences changes in gestalts. Since this happens simultaneously, it becomes clear that while intending change, the rhetor has no control over events, or the rate of change. The critic, then, rather than focusing on the fruitless determination of Bffects is free to explicate, analyze and evaluate rhetorical strategies, tactics, and maneuvers, to concentrate on the 319 symbols the rhetors use as they seek to make satisfactory adjustments betuieen themselves and others, or between themselves and their environment. Everything, then,, it? the situation becomes relevant to the suasory effort— including the chronology of events, as well a sociological and psychological "forces." The model does present some problems, however. The first has to do with articulation of the model’s capabilities. Language is linear, as is our conception of time and events in time. The model is non-linear in its conception and uncovers connectedness. It is easier to think in terms of the model than to write in terms of the model. On the other hand, the model allows us to step outside our linear patterns suggested by language and to view communication events from a different perspective. The model is most useful for intervening. It shows how persons attempt shifts in worldviews, needs, and relationships. The model is not useful for discovering causal relationships. The model discovers patterns in communication events and allows us to make predictions about what sorts of patterns might occur from micro- to macrolevel and the reverse, but the model is not useful for predicting the chronological timing of events. The model will predict events in the form of trend reversal, however. It will show 320

houj people might be caught in "deviance-amplifying" vicious circles, For example. Neither will the model classify events nor help people cope with communication events. The social intervention model helps us to see reality as a process, to render uihat seems disconnected into a connected uihole. Perhaps the greatest criticism which could be leveled against the model is that it is not elegant or parsimonious in its approach to reality. Since human beings experience reality differently, the experience of each human being within a communication event must be taken into account. The model assumes that the process by which individuals name experience is the same. The model, therefore, accounts for what is the same in the human experience of naming and for the differences that make a difference. On the other hand, this is the model’s greatest strength. Human beings are ingenius in their capacity to categorize and the model provides a way of accounting holistically for the human capacity to construe an ordered world. The social intervention model, then, allows us to step back and to see patterns of the symbolic construction of reality as an organic whole. As such, it gives us a view distinctily different from mechanistic, contextual or 321

Formistic models.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This study has looked at women’s identity creation using Brown’s organismic model which allows critics an holistic view of the symbolic creation of reality. Women’s identity creation could be studied From other perspectives as well. Several dissertations reviewed in Chapter Two, For example, use mechanistic or Formistic models to study aspects oF women’s identity. A mechanistic model could be applied to the same data covered in this dissertation in order to ascertain what underlying regularities or rules exist For the process oF identity creation. The same could be said For a Formistic model which seeks to classiFy methods, say, oF identity creation. These models would certainly present diFFerent views oF women’s identity creation— and on some levels diFFerent results. The model oF social intervention, however, is a model which works well in American society. What would happen iF the model were applied to women’s identity creation in another culture? The model assumes that the naming process is the same For all human beings, but in what ways may power and need diFFer among cultures? What kind oF order is 322

important? Houi do women in other cultures incorporate change into their ideas of identity? Another possible suggestion For future research would be to apply the model to more data about women and their roles in technology. It would be interesting to compare the patterns for identity creation in the extended data to the patterns discovered in this data. The social intervention model could also be extended to areas of women’s conflict. . What patterns of identity creation emerge in the women’s debate over women’s place in the workforce? What patterns emerge in women’s debate over abortion? What patterns emerge as Brown’s model is applied, perhaps, to women’s conceptions of power in organizations, or in leadership positions? Brown’s model might also be applied to certain claims by Feminists: the personal is political, for example. What strategies for naming appear? What do the names imply?

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to present the study as a whole. The chapter began with a summary and discussion of the other chapters. Then the implications of the languaging communities were presented followed by the conclusions of the study. The chapter also discussed the strengths and 323

weaknesses of the model and suggested some areas for future study. As a final note, I would like to comment that overall the study has shown the interconnectedness of human beings as they engage together in a process of reality creation about who they are. I began this study by recounting a recurring, frustrating nightmare. I would like to conclude by making some comments about the images of the "trap" expressed in the nightmare and in Zimmerman’s C19B1) "Red Queen" Syndrome. The human propensity to make sense of things, to give order to the world by constituting the "reality" of "the way things are" through the process of naming can easily be looked upon as a kind of "trap." Human beings need order, so they create that order through a process of abstraction. While the process unites us, the very act of naming divides us. While we name in order to create a system through which we can share experience, that experience cannot be communicated entirely. In the study presented here, women create an order about who they are. They work to keep that order by renaming to fill in gaps that appear in their construction of who they are. Thus it is through the continuous process of renaming and filling in gaps that we 324

admit change. UJe name, rename, and Fill in gaps, however, in the context of ideology. The women in this study created their identity in the context of the American Dream. Much of the American Dream has to do with success. A successful person in the American ideology is useful and productive. The women in this study named themselves in the context of what it means to be a useful and productive person. The women in this study, then, kept order in their view of identity even as they admitted change. UJhat the model shows us is that we are certainly trapped in some ways: by our culture, by our basic need for order, by thB vBry process of naming itself. How paradoxical that the greatest human capacity— the capacity to construe an ordered world, to make meaning— can also be our greatest human limitation. It is possible to so order our reality, to so order our identity that we refuse to admit gaps Cwhich are part of every view). In a case such as this, the being ceases to be human. The model shows us, however, that in construing a reality about "who we arB," it is possible to minimize the trap by understanding that we mediate identity for each other. In order to do this, we must remain open— a difficulty for human beings who have such a rage for order. The model encourages us to recognize what is being featured 325 and uihat is being "blindered, " so that we become aware of gaps, not only in the v Ib w s of others, but in our own as well.

The model of social intervention, thBn, shows us the interconnectedness of human beings as they engage together in the process of reality creation— whether they are creating identity or "the way things are" on the political scene. Because this process is so basic to our activity as human beings, it is important to realize how interdependent we are on the articulation of views of "the way things are." Such articulation bespeaks an attempt to share reality. One very difficult part of doing this is that human beings expose gaps when they articulate worldviews. This leaves them vulnerable to intervention by others. What a precarious position! In order to remain human we must risk the order we worked so hard to attain. But we depend on others to savB us from the isolation of our own reality. Articulating our views, reflecting upon them, and commenting upon the views of others keeps our culture from becoming caught in vicious circles and from disintegration. Since human beings have such a rage for order, it is difficult to realize that the order is in the process. Human beings cannot escape naming experience. Naming the experience of 326 identity is the subject of this dissertation— uihich has, of course, named an experience of identity. ENDNOTES

1 The use of the word "Feminist" in this study will refer to an individual who believes in and/or works For the liberalization of the restricted status of women. "Feminism" refers to the belief in the "personhood" of women. "Feminism" has many "Faces" (Banks, 1901), and feminists come From many diFFerent backgrounds, but here the words (Feminist and Feminism) will be used to refer simply to these concepts.

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