3Rd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning

Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning Oxford, United Kingdom, September 21-22, 2015 Edited by: Julian Gutierrez, Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, Michael Wooldridge Preface This volume contains the papers presented at SR 2015: the 3rd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning held on September 20-21, 2015 in Oxford. Strategic reasoning is one of the most active research areas in the multi-agent system domain. The literature in this field is extensive and provides a plethora of logics for modelling strategic ability. Theoretical results are now being used in many exciting domains, including software tools for information system security, robot teams with sophisticated adaptive strategies, and automatic players ca- pable of beating expert human adversary, just to cite a few. All these examples share the challenge of developing novel theories, tools, and techniques for agent- based reasoning that take into account the likely behaviour of adversaries. The SR international workshop aims to bring together researchers working on differ- ent aspects of strategic reasoning in computer science and artificial intelligence, both from a theoretical and a practical point of view. This year SR has four invited talks: 1. Coalgebraic Analysis of Equilibria in Infinite Games. Samson Abramsky (University of Oxford). 2. In Between High and Low Rationality. Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam and Stanford University). 3. Language-based Games. Joseph Halpern (Cornell University). 4. A Revisionist History of Algorithmic Game Theory. Moshe Vardi (Rice University). We also have four invited tool presentations and eleven contributed papers. Each submission to SR 2015 was evaluated by three reviewers for quality and relevance to the topics of the workshop. We would like to acknowledge the people and institutions who contributed to the success of this edition of SR. We thank the Program Committee members and the additional reviewers for their excellent work, the fruitful discussions, and the active participation during the reviewing process. We also thank the members of the Organizing Committee for their hard work in making sure that the workshop could be successfully organised as well as the EasyChair organization for supporting all tasks related to the selection of contributions and production of the proceedings. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the ERC Advanced Grant 291528 (\RACE") at the Uni- versity of Oxford and the Artificial Intelligence journal. Finally, we acknowledge the support of the Department of Computer Science of the University of Oxford. September, 2015 Julian Gutierrez Oxford, UK. Fabio Mogavero Aniello Murano Michael Wooldridge i Table of Contents Coalgebraic Analysis of Equilibria in Infinite Games ::::::::::::::::::: 1 Samson Abramsky and Viktor Winschel Language-Based Games :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 2 Joseph Halpern, Adam Bjorndahl and Rafael Pass In Between High and Low Rationality ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 Johan van Benthem A Revisionist History of Algorithmic Game Theory :::::::::::::::::::: 4 Moshe Vardi Substructural modal logic for optimal resource allocation::::::::::::::: 5 Gabrielle Anderson and David Pym Games with Communication: from Belief to Preference Change ::::::::: 6 Guillaume Aucher, Bastien Maubert, Sophie Pinchinat and Francois Schwarzentruber Epistemic Game Theoretical Reasoning in History Based Models :::::::: 7 Can Baskent and Guy McCusker Verifying and Synthesising Multi-Agent Systems against One-Goal Strategy Logic Specifications ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 8 Petr Cermák,Alessioˇ Lomuscio and Aniello Murano P-Automata for Markov Decision Processes :::::::::::::::::::::::::: 9 Souymodip Chakraborty and Joost-Pieter Katoen Energy Structure and Improved Complexity Upper Bound for Optimal Positional Strategies in Mean Payoff Games :::::::::::::::::::::::::: 10 Carlo Comin and Romeo Rizzi Simulating cardinal payoffs in Boolean games ::::::::::::::::::::::::: 11 Egor Ianovski and Luke Ong Dealing with imperfect information in Strategy Logic :::::::::::::::::: 12 Sophia Knight and Bastien Maubert An Arrow-based Dynamic Logic of Norms :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 13 Louwe B. Kuijer The risk of divergence ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 14 Pierre Lescanne Preference Refinement in Normative Multi-agent System ::::::::::::::: 15 Xin Sun ii Workshop Chairs Julian Gutierrez University of Oxford Fabio Mogavero University of Oxford Aniello Murano University of Naples Michael Wooldridge University of Oxford Program Committee Natasha Alechina University of Nottingham Julian Bradfield University of Edinburgh Krishnendu Chatterjee Institute of Science and Technology Vojtech Forejt Oxford University Valentin Goranko Stockholm University Erich Grädel RWTH Aachen University Julian Gutierrez University of Oxford Paul Harrenstein University of Oxford Andreas Herzig IRIT-CNRS Orna Kupferman Hebrew University Salvatore La Torre Universitàdegli studi di Salerno JérômeLang LAMSADE Alessio Lomuscio Imperial College London Enrico Marchioni University of Oxford Nicolas Markey LSV, CNRS & ENS Cachan John-Jules Meyer Utrecht University Fabio Mogavero University of Oxford Aniello Murano University of Naples Andrzej Murawski University of Warwick Luke Ong University of Oxford Sophie Pinchinat IRISA Rennes Nikos Tzevelekos Queen Mary University of London Wiebe Van Der Hoek University of Liverpool Igor Walukiewicz CNRS, LaBRI Michael Wooldridge University of Oxford Thomas Agotnes˚ University of Bergen iii Local Arrangements Committee Vojtech Forejt University of Oxford Julian Gutierrez University of Oxford Paul Harrenstein University of Oxford Enrico Marchioni University of Oxford Fabio Mogavero University of Oxford Giuseppe Perelli University of Oxford Michael Wooldridge University of Oxford Additional Reviewers Doyen, Laurent Gardy, Patrick Ianovski, Egor Malacaria, Pasquale Schwarzentruber, Francois Invited Tool Presentations EAGLE. Alexis Toumi, University of Oxford. • PRISM. Clemens Wiltsche, University of Oxford. • PRALINE. Romain Brenguier, UniversitéLibre de Bruxelles. • MCMAS. Alessio Lomuscio, Imperial College London. • Invited Speakers Samson Abramsky. University of Oxford. • Johan van Benthem. University of Amsterdam and Stanford University. • Joseph Halpern. Cornell University. • Moshe Y. Vardi. Rice University. • Workshop Webpage https://sites.google.com/site/sr2015homepage/ iv 1 Invited Talk Coalgebraic Analysis of Equilibria in Infinite Games Samson Abramsky Viktor Winschel University of Oxford ETH Zurich Oxford, UK Zurich, Switzerland We present a novel coalgebraic formulation of infinite economic non-cooperative games. We define the infinite trees of the extensive representation of the games as well as the strategy profiles by pos- sibly infinite systems of corecursive equations. Subgame perfect equilibria are defined and proved using a novel proof principle of predicate coinduction which is related to Kozen’s metric coinduction. We characterize all subgame perfect equilibria for the dollar auction game. The economically inter- esting feature is that in order to prove these results we do not need to rely on continuity assumptions on the payoffs which amount to discounting the future. This suggests that coalgebras support a more adequate treatment of infinite-horizon models in game theory and economics. J. Gutierrez, F. Mogavero, A. Murano, and M. Wooldridge (Eds.): 3rd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning 2015 (SR15) 2 Invited Talk Language-based games Adam Bjorndahl Joseph Y. Halpern Rafael Pass Carnegie Mellon University∗ Cornell University Cornell University Pittsburgh, PA Ithaca, NY New York City, NY [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] 1 Introduction In a classical, normal-form game, an outcome is a tuple of strategies, one for each player, and players’ preferences are formalized by utility functions defined on the set of all such outcomes. This framework thereby hard-codes a single conception of how players represent the world insofar as their preferences are concerned. The motivating idea of the present work is to relax this rigidity in a systematic way by using language as the foundation of preference. Roughly speaking, we assume that what the players care about is cap- tured by some underlying language, with utility defined on descriptions in that language. Classical game theory can be viewed as the special case where the underlying language can talk only about outcomes. In general, however, the language can be as rich or poor as desired. In the colloquial sense of the word, the role of “language” in decision making and preference for- mation can hardly be overstated. It is well known, for example, that presenting alternative medical treatments in terms of survival rates versus mortality rates can produce a marked difference in how those treatments are evaluated, even by experienced physicians [7]. More generally, one of the core insights of prospect theory [4]—that subjective value depends not (only) on facts about the world but on how those facts are presented (as gains or losses, dominated or undominated options, etc.)—can be viewed as a kind of language-sensitivity. We celebrate 10th and 100th anniversaries specially, and make a big deal when the Dow Jones Industrial Average crosses a multiple of 1,000, all because we happen to work in a base 10 number system (i.e., our language puts special emphasis on multiples of 10 that would be absent, for example, in a hexadecimal

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