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Nuclear Terrorism and the Escalation of International Conflict

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Nuclear Terrorism and the Escalation of International Conflict 532 NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND THE ESCALATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT Forrest R. Frank The dangers posed by the prolifera­ protect physically nuclear materials and tion of nuclear weapons among nations nuclear weapons stockpiles, particularly of the world to international security those under U.S. jurisdiction.4 How­ have long been recognized by analysts ever, the problem of limiting the escala­ of political and military affairs. 1 Prob­ tion of conflict arising from terrorist lems for international security posed by acts in which nuclear explosive devices, terrorist acts have also been examined.2 radiological weapons, or attacks on Recent analysis, however, has focused nuclear facilities are employed remains on the nexus of these two different to be considered. This paper addresses threats to international security­ this problem. Hopefully it will initiate terrorist acquisition and possible use of scholarly discussion and analysis. nuclear explosive devices, radiological weapons, or attacks on various nuclear Defming Nuclear Terrorism. Nuclear facilities and installations.3 Few studies terrorism can be defined as the have examined the problems arising unauthorized use or .attempted use of from incidents of nuclear terrorism, nuclear explosive devices, use or choosing instead to focus solely on the attempted use of nuclear materials, or feasibility or probability of nuclear ter­ attacks or attempted attacks on nuclear rorism. These studies have resulted in facilities and installations for ex­ significant improvements in efforts to tortionate purposes. The victim of 533 nuclear terrorism may be an individual, to fabricate natural uranium isotope a group of individuals, an organization, 238 into a nuclear explosive device. or a government. The primary actor on It is important to bear in mind that a whom the burden of response to nuclear terrorist trying to construct a nuclear terrorism will fall, however, is the gov­ explosive device does not operate under ernment of a nation on whose territory the same rigorous performance con­ nuclear terrorist acts are committed. straints that bound the efforts of a Governments rather than individuals, military weapon designer. After all, "a groups of individuals, or organizations clandestine nuclear bomb maker may will assume primary responsibility for care little whether his bombs are heavy, response because of the scope and inefficient, and unpredictable. They magnitude of the effects nuclear may serve his purposes so long as they terrorist acts may have on individuals, are transportable by automobile and are property, and the entire fabric of very likely to explode with a yield society. equivalent to at least 100" tons of Four distinct types of nuclear ter­ chemical explosive."s While the amount rorist acts can be considered: overt of expertise needed to construct a bomb threat to use nuclear explosive devices is perhaps no greater than that derived or radiological weapons, or an overt from college physics, chemistry, and threat to attack a nuclear facility; use of perhaps engineering, the amount of ex­ nuclear explosive devices; use of radio­ pertise needed to construct a simple logical weapons; and attacks on nuclear device for dispersing radioactive ma­ facilities housing nuclear weapons, terial is even less. Any container capable peaceful nuclear explosive devices, of dispensing liquid radioactive waste nuclear fuel cycle processes and ma­ under pressure would be sufficient; terials, or nuclear weapons fabrication pouring liquid or particulate radioactive processes and materials. materials into air-conditioning systems How likely is nuclear terrorism? The of large buildings or into urban water answer to this question depends on supplies might also represent highly several factors; however, three factors effective methods of dispersing some seem particularly significant. The first radioactive materials. factor is the amount of expertise needed The amount of expertise needed to to fabricate or otherwise "acquire nuclear attack a nuclear facility depends, in very explosive devices or radiological weap­ large measure, on the kind of facility to ons or to attack various nuclear facili­ be attacked. Some facilities such as ties. The amount of expertise needed to nuclear weapons fabrication plants are fabricate a nuclear explosive device heavily guarded and would require a varies in inverse proportion to the fis­ sizable force of terrorists for there to be sionability of material available. No much chance of a successful attack. expertise is required to assemble a Other installations such as nuclear fuel nuclear explosive device if it can be fabrication plants, nuclear power re- stolen intact from the arsenal of a "actors, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing nuclear weapon state or a state possess­ centers, critical assemblies used in re­ ing "peaceful nuclear explosive de­ search, and various installations using vices." Considerable expertise is neces­ radioisotopes in research, industrial sary to fabricate a nuclear explosive processes, or medical treatments might device from uranium highly enriched in require very little military-type ex­ isotope 235 or 233 or from plutonium. pertise to be successfully overcome. Vast amounts of expertise as well as The second factor bearing on the considerable capital equipment and likelihood of nuclear terrorism is the other economic resources are required accessibility of nuclear materials to 534 potential nuclear terrorists. There are materials that could be used in radio­ many radioactive substances that might logical weapons is often not well regu­ be suitable for use as radiological lated by national or international safe­ weapons. These are materials that could guards. 8 be acquired from scientific supply The third factor that figures promi­ houses, industrial materials wholesalers, nently in calculating the likelihood of and other types of industries catering to nuclear terrorism is the motivation of the research, teaching, and quality con­ individuals and groups employing ter­ trol market. Most, if not all of these rorist tactics to achieve their political substances, however, are not suitable for and/or economic objectives. While our use in nuclear explosive devices. definition of terrorism has excluded There are relatively few materials psychotic or neurotic behavior, de­ that can be taken off the shelf of a ranged individuals might also employ chemical supply house or a nuclear nuclear explosive devices, radiological facy,ity and fabricated into a nuclear weapons, or attack various nuclear explosive device. Most of these materials facilities as a result of their illnesses. are not widely distributed or used out­ One analyst has prepared a list of side the nuclear power or nuclear ex­ potential terrorists and the motivations plosives fabrication industries. These underlying their behaviors: materials include the following: uranium enriched to 90 percent in Possible Malefactors isotope 235 or 233; plutonium; plu­ 1. Foreign governments and tonium nitrate in solution; enriched their agents, acting under orders. uranium isotope 235 hexafluoride; high­ 2. Sub-units of foreign gov­ temperature, gas-cooled reactor graph­ ernments and their agents or mili­ ite-coated fuel particles; fuel elements tary forces acting with or without for light water reactors using plutonium; official sanction. plutonium oxide and depleted uranium 3. Individuals or groups en­ oxide pellets used as fuel for liquid gaged in domestic subversive ac­ metal fast breeder reactors, and critical tivity: extremists, terrorists, nihil­ assemblies used in physics research on 6 ists. college campuses and in industry. 4. Criminals-highly or­ Most, if not all, of these materials are ganized, loosely associated, or in­ regulated by international safeguards dividual. when transferred from a nuclear weapon 5. Psychopaths, severe neu­ state to other states; the U.S. Govern­ rotics, and psychotics, harboring ment also imposes standards of physical sadistic homicidal, or suicidal security on installations handling these motives. materials as well as other materials that 6. Mercenaries in the pay of could, with additional processing, be others, or who need the money to fabricated into nuclear explosive de­ 7 payoff debts, support a heroin vices. Other nations employ similar addiction, etc. systems of physical and accounting safe­ 7. Disgruntled employees guards to minimize the likelihood of seeking to sabotage an installation theft or misuse of these nuclear ma­ for revenge, or out of casual van­ terials. Limiting access to these ma­ dalism. terials by various methods significantly reduces the likelihood that terrorists Motives for Nuclear Malfeasance will be able to acquire materials which could be fabricated into a nuclear ex­ 1. International enmity or plosive device. Unfortunately, access to rivalry. 535 2. Sectional or factional en­ attain their political and/or economic mity, such as civil war, ter­ objectives. rorism. In calculating the likelihood of nu­ 3. Desire to create panic or clear terrorism, at least these three interrupt electrical power, either factors must be simultaneously evalu­ for its own sake or secondary to ated. Merely because an individual has some other design, such as looting expertise in the design of nuclear ex­ under cover of darkness, etc. plosive devices and may have access to 4. Desire to establish credi­ materials that could be used to fabricate bility of later threats of repeti­ such a device, he may not be motivated tion, demands for blackmail pay­ to become
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