532

NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND THE ESCALATION

OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Forrest R. Frank

The dangers posed by the prolifera­ protect physically nuclear materials and tion of nuclear weapons among nations nuclear weapons stockpiles, particularly of the world to international security those under U.S. jurisdiction.4 How­ have long been recognized by analysts ever, the problem of limiting the escala­ of political and military affairs. 1 Prob­ tion of conflict arising from terrorist lems for international security posed by acts in which nuclear explosive devices, terrorist acts have also been examined.2 radiological weapons, or attacks on Recent analysis, however, has focused nuclear facilities are employed remains on the nexus of these two different to be considered. This paper addresses threats to international security­ this problem. Hopefully it will initiate terrorist acquisition and possible use of scholarly discussion and analysis. nuclear explosive devices, radiological weapons, or attacks on various nuclear Defming Nuclear Terrorism. Nuclear facilities and installations.3 Few studies terrorism can be defined as the have examined the problems arising unauthorized use or .attempted use of from incidents of nuclear terrorism, nuclear explosive devices, use or choosing instead to focus solely on the attempted use of nuclear materials, or feasibility or probability of nuclear ter­ attacks or attempted attacks on nuclear rorism. These studies have resulted in facilities and installations for ex­ significant improvements in efforts to tortionate purposes. The victim of 533

nuclear terrorism may be an individual, to fabricate natural uranium isotope a group of individuals, an organization, 238 into a nuclear explosive device. or a government. The primary actor on It is important to bear in mind that a whom the burden of response to nuclear terrorist trying to construct a nuclear terrorism will fall, however, is the gov­ explosive device does not operate under ernment of a nation on whose territory the same rigorous performance con­ nuclear terrorist acts are committed. straints that bound the efforts of a Governments rather than individuals, military weapon designer. After all, "a groups of individuals, or organizations clandestine nuclear bomb maker may will assume primary responsibility for care little whether his bombs are heavy, response because of the scope and inefficient, and unpredictable. They magnitude of the effects nuclear may serve his purposes so long as they terrorist acts may have on individuals, are transportable by automobile and are property, and the entire fabric of very likely to explode with a yield society. equivalent to at least 100" tons of Four distinct types of nuclear ter­ chemical explosive."s While the amount rorist acts can be considered: overt of expertise needed to construct a bomb threat to use nuclear explosive devices is perhaps no greater than that derived or radiological weapons, or an overt from college physics, chemistry, and threat to attack a nuclear facility; use of perhaps engineering, the amount of ex­ nuclear explosive devices; use of radio­ pertise needed to construct a simple logical weapons; and attacks on nuclear device for dispersing radioactive ma­ facilities housing nuclear weapons, terial is even less. Any container capable peaceful nuclear explosive devices, of dispensing liquid radioactive waste nuclear fuel cycle processes and ma­ under pressure would be sufficient; terials, or nuclear weapons fabrication pouring liquid or particulate radioactive processes and materials. materials into air-conditioning systems How likely is nuclear terrorism? The of large buildings or into urban water answer to this question depends on supplies might also represent highly several factors; however, three factors effective methods of dispersing some seem particularly significant. The first radioactive materials. factor is the amount of expertise needed The amount of expertise needed to to fabricate or otherwise "acquire nuclear attack a nuclear facility depends, in very explosive devices or radiological weap­ large measure, on the kind of facility to ons or to attack various nuclear facili­ be attacked. Some facilities such as ties. The amount of expertise needed to nuclear weapons fabrication plants are fabricate a nuclear explosive device heavily guarded and would require a varies in inverse proportion to the fis­ sizable force of terrorists for there to be sionability of material available. No much chance of a successful attack. expertise is required to assemble a Other installations such as nuclear fuel nuclear explosive device if it can be fabrication plants, nuclear power re- stolen intact from the arsenal of a "actors, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing nuclear weapon state or a state possess­ centers, critical assemblies used in re­ ing "peaceful nuclear explosive de­ search, and various installations using vices." Considerable expertise is neces­ radioisotopes in research, industrial sary to fabricate a nuclear explosive processes, or medical treatments might device from uranium highly enriched in require very little military-type ex­ isotope 235 or 233 or from plutonium. pertise to be successfully overcome. Vast amounts of expertise as well as The second factor bearing on the considerable capital equipment and likelihood of nuclear terrorism is the other economic resources are required accessibility of nuclear materials to 534 potential nuclear terrorists. There are materials that could be used in radio­ many radioactive substances that might logical weapons is often not well regu­ be suitable for use as radiological lated by national or international safe­ weapons. These are materials that could guards. 8 be acquired from scientific supply The third factor that figures promi­ houses, industrial materials wholesalers, nently in calculating the likelihood of and other types of industries catering to nuclear terrorism is the motivation of the research, teaching, and quality con­ individuals and groups employing ter­ trol market. Most, if not all of these rorist tactics to achieve their political substances, however, are not suitable for and/or economic objectives. While our use in nuclear explosive devices. definition of terrorism has excluded There are relatively few materials psychotic or neurotic behavior, de­ that can be taken off the shelf of a ranged individuals might also employ chemical supply house or a nuclear nuclear explosive devices, radiological facy,ity and fabricated into a nuclear weapons, or attack various nuclear explosive device. Most of these materials facilities as a result of their illnesses. are not widely distributed or used out­ One analyst has prepared a list of side the nuclear power or nuclear ex­ potential terrorists and the motivations plosives fabrication industries. These underlying their behaviors: materials include the following: uranium enriched to 90 percent in Possible Malefactors isotope 235 or 233; plutonium; plu­ 1. Foreign governments and tonium nitrate in solution; enriched their agents, acting under orders. uranium isotope 235 hexafluoride; high­ 2. Sub-units of foreign gov­ temperature, gas-cooled reactor graph­ ernments and their agents or mili­ ite-coated fuel particles; fuel elements tary forces acting with or without for light water reactors using plutonium; official sanction. plutonium oxide and depleted uranium 3. Individuals or groups en­ oxide pellets used as fuel for liquid gaged in domestic subversive ac­ metal fast breeder reactors, and critical tivity: extremists, terrorists, nihil­ assemblies used in physics research on 6 ists. college campuses and in industry. 4. Criminals-highly or­ Most, if not all, of these materials are ganized, loosely associated, or in­ regulated by international safeguards dividual. when transferred from a nuclear weapon 5. Psychopaths, severe neu­ state to other states; the U.S. Govern­ rotics, and psychotics, harboring ment also imposes standards of physical sadistic homicidal, or suicidal security on installations handling these motives. materials as well as other materials that 6. Mercenaries in the pay of could, with additional processing, be others, or who need the money to fabricated into nuclear explosive de­ 7 payoff debts, support a heroin vices. Other nations employ similar addiction, etc. systems of physical and accounting safe­ 7. Disgruntled employees guards to minimize the likelihood of seeking to sabotage an installation theft or misuse of these nuclear ma­ for revenge, or out of casual van­ terials. Limiting access to these ma­ dalism. terials by various methods significantly reduces the likelihood that terrorists Motives for Nuclear Malfeasance will be able to acquire materials which could be fabricated into a nuclear ex­ 1. International enmity or plosive device. Unfortunately, access to rivalry. 535 2. Sectional or factional en­ attain their political and/or economic mity, such as civil war, ter­ objectives. rorism. In calculating the likelihood of nu­ 3. Desire to create panic or clear terrorism, at least these three interrupt electrical power, either factors must be simultaneously evalu­ for its own sake or secondary to ated. Merely because an individual has some other design, such as looting expertise in the design of nuclear ex­ under cover of darkness, etc. plosive devices and may have access to 4. Desire to establish credi­ materials that could be used to fabricate bility of later threats of repeti­ such a device, he may not be motivated tion, demands for blackmail pay­ to become a nuclear terrorist. Indeed, I ments, etc. suspect that a potential nuclear terrorist 5. Desire to obtain special first would consider using nuclear ma­ nuclear materials for bombs. terials or attacking nuclear facilities, 6. Desire to obtain radio­ then he would acquire the necessary active waste materials for terror, expertise to fabricate a nuclear explo­ homicide, blackmail, or resale. sive device, construct a radiological Motives 6 and 7 may also subsume weapon, or attack a nuclear facility. the desire to control such ma­ Finally, he would seek out the appropri­ terials in order to secure im­ ate materials to carry out such plans. munity from persecution or prose­ Reasonable people may reach dif­ cution for the thieves or for ferent conclusions about the net threat others as stipulated in threats to of nuclear terrorism. Some may con­ the authorities. clude that the threat is not very great; 7. Sadistic motivation­ others may conclude nuclear terrorism merely to cause suffering. This is imminent. My own view is that might take the form of a specific nuclear terrorism is probably inevitable. grudge against particular persons We have already witnessed several ter­ likely to be killed or injured in a rorist or terrorist related incidents in­ nuclear incident, such as em­ volving nuclear materials. ployer, spouse, rival, etc. At least one attempt has been made 8. Suicidal/homicidal motiva­ to extort money from government tion-to die spectacularly, take officials by an individual threatening to other lives at the same time. destroy a city with a homemade, 9. Publicity motivation to get thermonuclear bomb. The attempt was one's name in the papers, or to thwarted by good police work, not pUblicize some specific cause (a because the design of the bomb accom­ frequent motive for aircraft hi­ panying extortion notes was considered 1 jacking and terrorism). defective by government officials. 0 10. Psychotic motivation. This Unknown individuals disseminated can take various forms, depending radioactive materials normally used in on the nature of the delusional medicine aboard an Austrian train in system involved.9 April 1974, causing much concern if not One might add to this list the theft or substantial property damage and casual­ possible use of materials by accident of ties among railroad passengers. 11 Con­ opportunity. Clearly, recent experience cern over possible theft of nuclear weap­ in the Middle East, in Northern Ireland, ons has mounted in the United States in Japan, in the United States, in West­ over the past few years as various ern Europe, and in Latin America shortcomings in the physical security of illustrates the willingness of individuals U.S. nuclear weapons have been re­ to use extreme, extortionate violence to vealed. In 1974, reports reached the 536 press that a Nike-Hercules antiaircraft believe, a 200,000 pound aircraft installation outside Baltimore had been arriving at something on the order broken into in an apparent attempt to of 150 miles per hour. It will not steal nuclear weapons thought to be take the impact of a larger air­ stored at that installation for use in air craft.19 defense.12 During the period, Krieger notes that a Boeing 747 "weighs 1973-1975, members of Congress inves­ about 365,000 pounds and travels con­ tigated the security of U.S. nuclear siderably faster than 150 miles per weapons stored overseas. Senator hour.,,2o Thus, even nuclear power Symington, commenting on U.S. nu­ plants protected by very strong physical clear weapons stored in Korea, reported security on the ground might be vulner­ that we "were not being as careful with able to air attack by kamikaze pilots or our nuclear stockpile in the Far East as remotely piloted vehicles. we are in Europe.,,1 3 The European We have witnessed only a few inci­ situation was termed "critical" by dents resulting in minimal property Senators Pastore and Baker in discus­ damage, little loss of governmental pres­ sions with Defense Secretary Elliot tige, and minimal international conflict. Richardson upon their return from an What will happen, however, if a terrorist inspection of the U.S. European nuclear group succeeds in stealing nuclear ma­ weapons stockpile.14 While many of terials, fabricates a bomb, and actually these deficiencies were corrected in the detonates it? Furthermore, what will eyes of critical Senators,! 5 the U.S. happen if the terrorists steal materials Government intends to continue its from one country, fabricate a bomb in efforts to upgrade the security of nu­ bases on the territory of a second clear weapons stored at home and country, and detonate the bomb on the abroad to the tune of $230 million over territory of yet a third? What will the the period, July 1975 through Septem­ government victimized by a nuclear ber 1977.16 terrorist act do? How will other nations In addition to these problems, there respond to the nuclear terrorist incident have been several known threats against and the countermeasures taken by the nuclear facilities such as nuclear reactors victim government? We turn now to a or uranium enrichment plants.17 The consideration of the physical effects and crash of a B-52 bomber some 20 miles political consequences of nuclear ter­ from a nuclear power reactor plant in rorism. South Carolina1 8 raised the specter of a terrorist flying a "kamikaze" mission The Effects of Nuclear Terrorism. into a nuclear facility. David Krieger There are several physical effects that quotes then Atomic Energy Commission would result from the detonation of a Chairman Dr. James Schlesinger, appear­ nuclear explosive device, the dispersal of ing on a radio question-and-answer pro­ radioactive material, or the attack on gram, discussing this subject with various nuclear installations in which typical bluntness and candor: radioactive material was released. Use of If one intends to crash a plane nuclear explosive devices by terrorists into a facility and one is able to would result in the same types of persuade the pilot that that is the damage caused by military use of nu­ best way to go, there is, I suspect, clear weapons. Dispersal of radioactive little that can be done about the material might cause many of the same problem. problems associated with the effects of The nuclear plants that we are radioactive fallout from atmospheric nu­ building today are designed care­ clear weapons tests or the long-term fully to take the impact of, I consequences of the use of nuclear 537 weapons. Attacks on various nuclear device. Dispersal of radioactive material installations resulting in the release of might not cause casualties; however, it radioactive materials might cause a would necessitate expensive, time­ broad range of physical effects ranging consuming, disruptive decontamination in severity from little more than small efforts.24 spills of radioactive material following Attacks on nuclear facilities in­ accide'nts involving U.S. nuclear tended to cause the release of radio­ weapons in the midair collision of a active material into the atmosphere are B-52 bomber and a tanker over Spain21 perhaps the most difficult forms of to the kinds of damage envisioned as the nuclear terrorism to evaluate in terms result of a nuclear reactor core melt­ of physical effects. The nature of the down with simultaneous failure of the work being carried out at the installa­ emergency core cooling system. 22 tion to be attacked, the kind of Terrorist detonation of a nuclear materials and processes used in the explosive device would cause damage facility, the difficulty in bypassing and casualties as a result of four specific redundant safety features built into the. forces: blast, thermal radiation, prompt facility, the ability of the facility effec­ nuclear radiation, and long-term nuclear tively to contain released radiation radiation. Additionally, disruption of within its physical structures or on the communications and malfunctions of site, and the degree of physical pro­ electronic equipment might occur as the tectionagainst direct attack are all result of electromagnetic pulse. The important variables that affect the severity of these effects would depend physical effects of terrorist attacks on on a number of factors, including the nuclear facilities. While overcoming following: yield of the explosion; types these obstacles to the release of radio­ of materials used in the fabrication of active material into the biosphere during the device, height of the device above a terrorist act is a major task, Theodore ground at the time of detonation; pre­ B. Taylor reminds us that criminals have vailing wind and weather conditions at been eminently successful in attacking the time of detonation and for a period heavily fortified buildings and vaults in of hours thereafter; relative hardness of recent years: the target area; and the amount of In the last fifteen years more relief, rescue, and medical aid immedi­ than two dozen major thefts from ately available to survivors of blast and modern alarmed vaults wired thermal effects.23 directly to a protective agency The effects of terrorist use of radio­ have been reported. Alarm sys­ logical weapons are far more difficult to tems connected only to the door predict. Such effects would depend in of the secured place have been very large measure on the kinds of circumvented, and comprehensive radioactive materials dispersed, the pat­ alarm systems have been success­ tern of dispersal, and the length of time fully disconnected. Burglars have individuals are exposed to radioactive used diamond-tipped steel drills, materials. Use of radiological weapons, acetylene torches, twenty-milli­ in addition to possibly causing casual­ meter antitank guns, thermic ties, would result in the contamination lances, explosives, and other of a wide range of physical resources highly specialized equipment to including land, water supplies, buildings, penetrate cement-filled doors, and capital equipment. These effects steel-reinforced concrete vault would also occur as a consequence of walls, steel vaults, and steel vault radioactive fallout generated by the doors as much as two feet detonation of a nuclear explosive thick.25 538 Taylor argues, in effect, that nuclear may substantially affect the political facilities are vulnerable to attack by consequences of nuclear terrorism. We highly organized, well-equipped terror­ tum now to a consideration of this ists just as are Brinks armored trucks, aspect of the problems posed by nuclear large bank vaults, and other "secure" terrorism. installations. A broad set of qualifications must be The Political Consequences of Nu­ introduced in trying to estimate the clear Terrorism. There is a variety of effects of an attack on a nuclear facility political consequences arising from inci­ that results in the release of nuclear or dents of nuclear terrorism that affect radioactive materials into the biosphere. governments of many states in addition The location of the facility in relation to the government of the state vic­ to large concentrations of civilian or timized by nuclear terrorist acts. While military personnel is obviously impor­ the latter is necessarily faced with the tant in estimating casualties. The most difficult choices in responding to weather at the time of the incident and and coping with the effects of nuclear for a period of hours thereafter is also an terrorism, a number of factors very important factor. The extent to which quickly brings other governments into the site of such an attack was cut off contact With the political fallout of a from outside assistance would also nuclear terrorist act. While the broad affect the number and extent of casual­ range of specific acts of nuclear ter­ ties, as would the reaction of individuals rorism and the incalculable number of displaced by preventative or rescue and potential targets make it impossible to relief efforts. Mass panic arising from detail all the possible consequences of fear, hasty and poorly planned evacu­ nuclear terrorism, analysts should try to ation of areas, unconfirmed rumors, et understand those types of consequences cetera, could claim large numbers of or actions that would be particularly lives through accidents, coronaries, and important in controlling the escalation the withdrawal of medical services by of international conflict following an overworked, frightened, and perhaps in­ incident of nuclear terrorism. jured medical personnel. 2 6 There are at least four major types of The ability of terrorists to acquire consequences or actions that merit and use nuclear explosive devices or attention. First, we should consider how radiological weapons, or to attack the government of a victimized state successfully nuclear facilities causing the will react to the nuclear terrorist act. release of radioactive material into the Second, we should examine how other biosphere may lead to wild speculation states will perceive the victim's actions about the number of casualties in vari­ and reactions to nuclear terrorism. ous scenarios. While numbers are some­ Third, we must consider the actions of what hard to pin down, there are many the government of the state ravished by factors which influence the severity of nuclear terrorism toward other states. casualties resulting from blast, thermal Finally, we should contemplate the radiation, prompt nuclear radiation, and broad systemic consequences of nuclear long-term radiation. The types of terrorism for international relations materials used, weather, distribution of generally. radioactive materials, length of exposure The government of a state which is to radiation sources, and the reaction of attacked by nuclear terrorists in any of the victims of nuclear terrorist acts all the four broad types outlined above is bear on the severity of the physical immediately confronted with several effects of nuclear terrorism. The physi­ problems. It must determine if a threat cal effects of nuclear terrorism, in tum, to use nuclear explosive devices or 539 radiological weapons or to attack nu­ cope with nuclear terrorism might also clear facilities is credible, or it must undertake a variety of nonmilitary and verify the actual occurrence of a ter­ military measures against one or more rorist act. Second, it must identify the other states. Likely targets of these most probable perpetrators of nuclear actions include states thought to have terrorism independently of various supplied nuclear materials to terrorist claims of responsibility. Third, it must groups; states assumed to have harbored cope with a variety of domestic prob­ nuclear terrorist groups before and/or lems generated by nuclear terrorism. after commission of terrorist acts; states Casualties must be treated; the homeless thought to have supplied nuclear ter­ resettled; property, buildings, capital rorists with nonnuclear supplies, techni­ equipment, and farmland must be de­ cal resources, expertise, or money. The contaminated; and the faith of citizens government of the victim state might in their government's ability to protect tum to other states for the extradition them must be restored. of any individual alleged to have been The actions taken by the government involved in the nuclear terrorist inci­ of a state ravished by nuclear terrorism dent. States might also seek interna­ directed solely within its own territory tional cooperation and assistance in to cope with nuclear terrorism may identifying the llources of nuclear ma­ nonetheless precipitate major interna­ terials used in the fabrication of nuclear tional crises leading to international explosive devices or radiological conflict. A number of actions taken in weapons. Claims for indemnification of the absence of confirmation that nu­ individuals, organizations, and govern­ clear terrorist acts have occurred are ments suffering personal injury and ambiguous; given the presence of latent property loss as the result of nuclear or manifest conflict between two terrorism might be filed against various nations or two sets of nations, these states, including nuclear materials actions might be interpreted as prepara­ supplying states as well as nuclear tions for war. For example, evacuation materials recipient states. of cities, censorship of news, drastic The use of military force in response changes in patterns or modes of internal to nuclear terrorism by the victim state communication, suspension of regular cannot be overlooked. Military force commerce, declarations of martial law could be deployed against the same or changes in civil police procedure, wide variety of states noted above. The limited or general military mobilization, range of military actions that could be or redeployment of military forces-in­ undertaken could vary greatly from being might all be reasonable steps for a minimum efforts to close the border government trying to cope with nuclear between the victim state and its neigh­ terrorist acts to take. Each of these bors to more drastic actions. These measures or a combination of such actions might include some or all of the measures might also be perceived as following: interdiction of terrorist infil­ preliminary preparations for war.2 7 tration routes; attacks on terrorist base This interpretation seems especially camps; .embargo or blockade of states likely in those cases where previous real aiding terrorists or permitting terrorists or alleged incidents of terrorism have to operate from their territories; attacks precipitated reprisals by the victimized on the civilian population of other state against its neighboring states or states roughly equaling the destruction other states thought to have been caused by a nuclear terrorist act; responsible for the initial terrorist destruction of other states' nuclear act. 23 facilities; or even a full-scale invasion The government of a state trying to and occupation of other states in 540 reprisal for nuclear terrorism states would become concerned about It is clear that acts undertaken by the nuclear terrorism and might undertake victim state toward other states would actions that could easily be misinter­ have profound effects on international preted by other, potential adversaries. order. The military actions described Successful nuclear terrorism in one part above would be sufficient to unleash a of the world might be an invitation to major war, depending on the states terrorists in other parts of the world to directly involved and the strength of use nuclear explosive devices, radiologi­ their respective alliance systems. Inci­ cal weapons, or attacks on nuclear dents of nuclear terrorism involving facilities as an effective, spectacular materials nominally under international means of achieving political and eco· safeguards would. automatically raise nomic objectives. Government leaders very serious questions about the reli­ might conceivably be faced with a new ability of International Atomic Energy set of dominoes-nuclear facilities, Agency (IAEA) safeguards on nuclear sources of radioactive materials, or materials. IAEA inspection of national sources of fissionable materials. nuclear materials accounts, the primary In surveying the political conse· safeguard against diversion of nuclear quences of nuclear terrorism, it becomes materials, that fail to detect the diver­ clear that nuclear terrorism creates sion of nuclear materials subsequently problems which, in turn, may be more thought to have been used in the com­ destructive over the long term than the mission of a nuclear terrorist act may act of nuclear terrorism itself. Initiation raise very grave questions about the of hostilities between two or more entire safeguards system. Such questions states as the result of a catalytic nuclear once raised would be very hard to quiet, terrorist act ought to be an outcome hence weakening the IAEA's ability to over which great efforts would be ex­ perform its critical function of verifying pended in an effort to avoid it. Unfortu­ the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.29 nately, little attention has been paid to Nuclear terrorism may also raise a the problem of limiting the escalation of number of problems relating to the conflict arising from nuclear terrorism. obligations assumed by the nuclear We now turn to some possible steps that weapon states in their adherence to the might be taken unilaterally, bilaterally, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty­ or multilaterally by nations of the world Security Council Resolution 255, (19 to avoid the "worst case" outcome of a 3 June 1968). 0 The nuclear weapon nuclear terrorism incident. states might find themselves in a posi­ tion of direct confrontation with one Limiting the Escalation of Interna­ another because of demands on the part tional Conflict Arising from Nuclear of the government of the state attacked Terrorism Nuclear terrorism can be by nuclear terrorists for assistance. analyzed in traditional arms control Furthermore, use of nuclear terrorism terms with considerable improvement in by a group claiming the status of a state, understanding of the problems to be i.e., a liberation movement, might cause solved. The objective in developing major political problems.in relations mechanisms to cope with nuclear terror­ among the nuclear weapon states, as ism is to reduce the likelihood of war well as between the nuclear weapon and, failing that, to minimize the effects states and nonnuclear weapon states. of war should it occur. Successful nuclear terrrorism might Nuclear terrorism is an inherently also give rise to more general security ambiguous event. Thus, there is a need problems without regard to actions for all parties-states, international undertaken by the victim state. All organizations, and terrorists-to verify 541 many different aspects of terrorism. In alleged nuclear terrorist acts are not addition to verification, there is a need simply a pretext for the victim to to develop a set of incentives and initiate hostilities against one or more penalties, as well as a means of en­ potential adversaries on the other. forcing these incentives and penalties to Second, potential adversaries of the discourage the escalation of interna­ victim state need confirmation of tional conflict as the result of a nuclear nuclear terr.orism incidents to interpret terrorist act. There is also a need to what are otherwise ambiguous events in detect attempts to employ nuclear ter­ the victim country. Other countries rorism so that appropriate, non­ neither aligned with the victim or escalatory countermeasures can be potential adversaries require verification taken. Let us examine each of these of nuclear terrorist acts so that they problems momentarily. may be able to assist in the management The state attacked by nuclear terror­ of crises by refusing havens to alleged ists has several distinct verification prob­ nuclear terrorists, providing rescue and lems. First, it needs to determine relief supplies and personnel, and whether or not it is under attack by offering their good offices to mediate terrorists, by unauthorized action by disputes arising between the government regular military forces of another state, of the target state and other states it or by a clandestine military operation feels are responsible for nuclear ter­ mounted by another state. The govern­ rorist acts. ment of the state under nuclear terrorist In addition to coping with the prob­ assault must also verify the use of lems of ambiguity inherent in real or nuclear explosive devices, radiological alleged acts of nuclear terrorism, in the weapons, or the successful attack on domestic responses to nuclear terrorism, nuclear facilities so that it may under­ and in the international responses to take appropriate decontamination nuclear terrorism, attention should be actions as well as mobilize necessary paid to the development of mechanisms medical and relief personnel. that militate against both domestic and Other states, too, have a vested in­ international escalation of conflict terest in confirming the identity of arising from incidents of nuclear terror­ nuclear terrorists. Some states may find ism. One set of possible remedies ad­ themselves committed to military action dresses some of the underlying motiva­ by treaty or executive agreement unless tions for escalation on the part of the it can be established that their ally, the victim state. Another set of possible victim of a nuclear terrorist act, is not remedies looks at the problem of under an authorized military assault limiting the scope and magnitude of from another state. States with nuclear escalation in the event of nuclear terror­ weapons or peaceful nuclear explosive ism. devices may also be very concerned There are a number of factors that about the identity of nuclear terrorists would tend to encourage the govern­ as well as the source of nuclear materials ment of a state ravished by nuclear because of their concern about possible terrorist acts to lash out at real or breakdowns in command and control imagined enemies in an effort to cope over their own nuclear weapons. with the problems raised by nuclear Potential adversaries of the victim of terrorism. One of the incentives to nuclear terrorism require verification of lashing out would be to apprehend and a number of acts. First, they too need bring to justice those individuals to verify that nuclear terrorist acts are directly responsible for nuclear terrorist committed by terrorists and not agents acts. An arrangement providing for the provocateur on the one hand, or that prosecution or extradition for 542 prosecution of individuals alleged to S.ome form of agreement to prose­ have participated in nuclear terrorism cute or extradite individuals accused of analogous to the Convention for the participating in nuclear terrorism and Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of another agreement to provide compen­ Aircraft3 1 may be a useful measure in sation to the victims of nuclear terror­ the management of crises arising from ism may take some escalatory pressures nuclear terrorism. While this kind or" out of nuclear terrorism from the per­ guarantee of prosecution may not deter spective of the victim. Neither agree­ terrorists, it may discourage states from ment, however, will do much to aid in kidnapping alleged nuclear terrorists on the verification or detection problems the territory of other states and forcibly alluded to earlier. Here, there are some returning these individuals to the victim recent developments worth noting that state for prosecution.* Such actions augur well for improved international might cause very serious problems for capability to detect nuclear terrorism. the relations among the states directly Earlier in this paper, it was observed involved in the "forcible extradition" of that limiting access to nuclear materials alleged nuclear terrorists. seemed to be tl).e easiest, surest way to Agreement in some form might also reduce the likelihood of nuclear terror­ be reached to provide for the compensa­ ist incidents. An agreement was con­ tion of individuals suffering injury or cluded among the seven major nuclear property loss as the result of nuclear materials supplying nations-the United terrorism. Such an agreement might States, the Soviet Union, the United contain a flat limitation of liability Kingdom, Canada, France, and the comparable to the Price-Anderson in­ Federal Republic of Germany-imposing surance arrangement for the U.S. nu­ a variety of physical safeguards on clear industry;32 it might have pro­ nuclear materials supplied to other visions for sharing of costs among all states under agreements for cooperation nuclear materials supplying and re­ safeguarded by the IAEA. While the ceiving nations. If some mechanism exact content of the agreement has not could be developed to minimize the been made public, newspaper accounts financial losses incurred by govern­ suggest that the kind of physical protec­ ments, private citizens, and various eco­ tion demanded would be sufficient to nomic entities as the result of nuclear improve greatly the likelihood of de­ terrorism, the government of the state tecting attempts to steal nuclear ma­ injured by nuclear terrorism might be terials in transit from supplier to re­ better able to resist internal public cipient as well as from stockpiles of opinion and bureaucratic pressures to materials already in the hands of the 3 resort to the use of military force to recipient nation. 4 redress the grievances of its citizens National intelligence networks rely­ against other states. ing on both national technical means of verification and a variety of other human assets and analytical techniques *The kidnapping and forcible extradition may be able to aid in the verification of of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina to Israel attempted or successful acts of nuclear in May 1960, resulted in a considerable increase in tensions between those two states terrorism. 3 5 The critical problem is the until August 1960, when the two govern­ distribution of intelligence data from ments agreed to drop the matter of forcible one country to another in a manner that extradition. The issue did arise during Eich­ does not compromise intelligence mann's trial when the defense challenged the competence of the Israeli court to try Eich­ sources and methods, but nonetheless mann because of his extralegal extradition to permits all concerned to verify nuclear Israe1.33 terrorist acts, domestic responses to 543 such acts, the possible attempt at nu­ cooperate in carrying out any clear terrorism, and other related ac­ investigation which the Security tions.36 Council may initiate in accord­ The use by the International Civil ance with the provisions of the Aviation Organization (ICAO) of intelli­ Charter of the United Nations, on gence data on possible airplane hijackers the basis of the complaint re­ provided by member nations may be a ceived by the Council. The useful model on which to base a similar Security Council shall inform the scheme of intelligence data sharing. States Parties to the Convention Apparently, when a national intelligence of the results of the investiga­ organization detects a possible airplane tion.40 hijacking attempt, it alerts the ICAO. Verification by challenge would be par­ The ICAO in turn distributes this in­ ticularly useful in better understanding formation directly to all member the actions of the government of the nations. Thus, member states are alerted state trying to cope with the aftermath to the dangers of airplane hijackings of nuclear terrorism. Other states would without anyone nation's intelligence already have some information based on sources and methods being unduly com­ diplomatic reports; verification of promised.3 7 nuclear terrorism by challenging specific Another possible approach to the domestic responses would be beneficial problem of verification of nuclear ter­ in clarifying ambiguous acts without rorist acts and various domestic actions necessarily forcing potential adversaries taken by the victim government might to take actions which the victim state be "verification by challenge" as formu­ would regard as hostile. lated in the Biological Weapons Conven­ Clearly, verification of nuclear ter­ tion.31\ There is no formal on-site in­ rorism could not be handled exactly the spection or other verification of the same way as verification of biological destruction or diversion "to peaceful weapons manufacture or stockpiling. purposes ... of all agents, toxins, weap­ There would be many objections to the ons, equipment, and means of de­ use of the U.N. Security Council as the livery ... " of bacteriological (biologi­ primary investigating organ. Some kind cal) methods of warfare.39 However, of ad hoc arrangement drawn from there are provisions for verification in governments allied with the state vic­ the event a nation believes another is timized by nuclear terrorism, the victim engaging in questionable acts. Article VI state's potential adversaries, and states provides: nominally "nonaligned" in the context (1) Any State Party to this of the possible dispute with technical Convention which finds that any support by the International Atomic other State Party is acting in Energy Agency's office of the Inspector breach of obligations deriving General might be a more appropriate from the provisions of the Con­ verifying force. However, if the burden vention may lodge a complaint for verifying incidents of nuclear terror­ with the Security Council of the ism can be removed from the shoulders United Nations. Such a complaint of the victim government and its poten­ should include all possible evi­ tial adversaries, the chances of managing dence confirming its validity, as crises successfully are probably en­ well as a request for its considera­ hanced. tion by the Security Council. There are a number of other areas that might lead to conflict that will (2) Each State Party to this eventually have to be addressed. Time Convention undertakes to and space permit only a cursory 544 description of the problems yet to be places that might be diverted to ter­ addressed. rorist use? First, how are nuclear materials re­ These questions lead us directly to covered from thefts, unsuccessful at­ the need for an agenda of actions that tempts at nuclear terrorism, et cetera, to can be taken over the next few years. be handled? Who shall pay recovery costs? Who shall insure that these re­ An Agenda for Action. The problem covered materials are adequately ac­ of nuclear terrorism will go away only counted and safeguarded so that they when the more general problem of do not become the source of second or terrorism has been solved. Thus, it is third order nuclear terrorist weapons? necessary to consider a number of uni­ Second, how shall existing safeguards lateral, bilateral, and multilateral steps be enforced? The present IAEA safe­ that can be taken to minimize the guards system merely requires that evi­ likelihood of escalation of conflict dence of safeguard violations be pre­ arising from incidents of nuclear terror­ sented to the Board of Governors-22 ism. national representatives-who may act Clearly, one of the most important as they deem fit. Might the world be and perhaps most easily accomplished somewhat better off if a clear schedule tasks is to restrict vastly the worldwide of pena!ties for violation of interna­ supply of materials from which a fission tional· safeguards be established? nuclear explosive device could be Third, what is the future role of the fashioned until such time as stringent IAEA to be in any scheme of nuclear physical security standards are de­ materials safeguarding and the coping veloped, put in place, and enforced by with problems of nuclear terrorism? The suppliers of nuclear materials. The Janu­ IAEA has become more and more re­ ary 1976 agreement referred to above is luctant to take a vigorous leading role in clearly a step in the right direction. developing physical security standards, Second, I believe there is a need for a procedures, and technology, alleging it unilateral declaration on the part of the lacks the budget and manpower neces­ United States on the seriousness of sary to accomplish these tasks. What nuclear terrorism. Such a statement changes, if any, in the Statute of the should, in my view, include a call for a International Atomic Energy Agency policy of "no safe havens" for nuclear might be in order so that it could be a terrorists, preferably to be codified in more vibrant force in helping nations an international treaty. cope with the aftermath of nuclear Third, I believe there needs to be a terrorist acts? concerted effort to initiate international Finally, what additional steps should discussions on ways to minimize the be taken to enlarge the scope of na­ escalation of conflict arising from nu­ tional and international safeguards on clear terrorism. While the conclusion of nuclear materials? Some might argue additional agreements providing world­ that a large number of materials that wide communications modeled after the could be used in a variety of terrorist United States-Soviet "Hot Line Agree­ weapons are presently beyond the scope ment" would be useful, I think it is very of national or international safeguards. important that we not lose our perspec­ Given the magnitude of the risks these tive on technology. Nuclear technology materials pose to international order, has a habit of failing; it can be made to might this be the time to develop fail. I believe we need to look beyond safeguards on radioactive elements used technological "fixes" to the problem of in industrial research, nuclear nuclear terrorism and deal with the medicine, college teaching, and other "people" problem terrorism implies. 545

At the same time, we should be alert balancing of the rights and interests of to the dangers some remedies to the many diverse groups must take place; problem of nuclear terrorism may pose hopefully it will take place before we to civil liberties, freedom of information must cope with incidents of nuclear exchange, and freedom of movement of terrorism that result in severe escalation peoples across international frontiers. A of international conflict.

NOTES

1. For some early public discussion of the dangers of nuclear proliferation, see "The Baruch Plan: Statement by the United States Representative [Baruch] to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946," in U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament 1945·1959 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960), vol. I, pp. 7-16. For analyses of the dangers of nuclear proliferation presented during the 1950's and 1960's, see National Planning Association, The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1960); Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966); and William B. Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Pegasus, 1968). 2. An excellent summary of Current and past research on the problem of terrorism edited by Yonah Alexander was recently published by Praeger. The study entitled International Terrorism: National Regional and Global Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1976), has an outstanding bibliography. 3. See, for example, the following studies and articles: Robert B. Leachman and Phillip Althoff, ed., Preventing Nuclear Theft: Guidelines for Industry and Government (New York: Praeger, 1972); Theodore B. Taylor, "Diversion by Non-Governmental Organizations," in Mason Willrich, ed., International Safeguards and Nuclear Industry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 176-199; M. Willrich, "Nongovernmental Nuclear Weapon Prolifera­ tion," and D. Krieger, "Nuclear Power: A Trojan Horse for Terrorists," in B. Jasani, Nuclear Proliferation Problems (Cambridge: MIT Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1974), pp. 168-186 and pp. 187-200; Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974); and Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, "Terrorism and the Diffusion of Nuclear Power," a Paper Prepared for Delivery to the XVII Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, 25-29 February 1976. 4. See, for example, regulations for the handling of special nuclear materials promulgated by the Atomic Energy Commission on 5 December 1973; 15 November 1974; and regulations on the packaging of radioactive material for transport promulgated by the Atomic Energy Commission on 22 June 1974. These are reprinted in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, Peaceful Nuclear Exports and Weapons Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), pp. 332-355; see also Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules and regulations governing the physical protection of nuclear plants and materials promulgated in 1975 reprinted in ibid., pp. 356-361. The U.S. Government recently extended its physical protection requirements of domestic nuclear facilities to include materials and facilities exported to other countries. See, for example, the Associated Press story, "U.S. Adopts New Requirements for Export of Nuclear Knowhow," San Jose Mercury-News, 21 February 1976. 5. Willrich and Taylor, p. 10. 6. Ibid., p. 54. 7. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rules and Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 70, 71, and 73, reprinted in Peaceful Nuclear Exports and Weapons Proliferation. 8. See, for example, materials to be subjected to international safeguards described in International Atomic Energy Agency, Safeguards and The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reprinted in ibid., pp. 732-788. 9. Douglas DeNike, "Nuclear Safety and Human Malice," mimeographed paper, University of Southern California School of Medicine, 1972, quoted by Krieger, pp. 195-196. 10. Timothy Ingram, "Nuclear Hijacking: Now Within the Grasp of Any Bright Lunatic," Washington Monthly, June 1973 reprinted in Peaceful Nuclear Exports and Weapons Prolifera­ tion, pp. 32-33. 546 11. "Austria Seeks 'Atom Guerrilla'" Reuter, San Jose Mercury, 23 April 1974; also Thomas O'Toole, "Fear of Nuclear Theft Stirs Experts, AEC," Washington Post, 25 May 1974. 12. Thomas O'Toole, "2 Break-Ins Suggest Thieves Eye A-Arms," Washington Post, 28 July 1974. 13. Ingram, p. 37. 14. "Security Review at Certain NATO Installations," Congressional Record, vol. 121, No. 68,30 April 1975, pp. S7184-S7189, especially pp. S7185-7188. 15. Ibid., p.S7184: 16. Donald Rumsfeld, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1976), p. 86. 17. Ingram, p. 34. 18. United Press International, "B-52 Explodes Near A-Plant," San Jose Mercury, 4 September 1975. 19. James R. Schlesinger quoted from transcript of "Meet the Press," in a Mike Gravel Newsletter, 31 October 1973, by David Krieger, "Terrorists and Nuclear Technology," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 31, No.6, June 1975, p. 32. 20. Ibid. 21. See Phil Goulding, Confirm or Deny (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 23-51. 22. For detailed and criticaI -azialySis-of the effects of a reactor core melt-down see the following: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, The Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors and Related Facilities (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, WASH-1250, June, 1973); U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Power Plants (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Draft WASH-1400, August 1974).

See also Joel Primack and Frank von Hippel, "Nuclear Reactor Safety," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 30, No.8, October 1974, pp. 5-11; Norman C. Rasmussen, "The Safety Study and Its Feedback," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 31, No.7, July 1975, pp. 25-28, and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Oversight Hearings on Nuclear Energy-Overview of the Major Issues (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975). 23. See the following for discussion of the effects of nuclear weapons: S. Glasston, ed., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 2nd Edition, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1962); U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975) and Analysis of Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975); United Nations, Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons (New York: United Nations, 1968). 24. See, for example, problems encountered in decontaminating Eniwetok Atoll described in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Military Construction Authorization Fiscal Year 1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), pp. 399-436. 25. Taylor, "Diversion by Non-Governmental Organizations," p. 190. 26. See U.S. Defense Atomic Supply Agency, Proceedings of the Third Interdisciplinary Conference on Selected Effects of a General War (Washington, D.C.: Defense Atomic Supply Agency Information and Analysis Center, 1971), especially pp. 92-224. 27. See, for example, Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Dell, 1962) for an excellent description of events and perceptions of Europe's leaders leading to the outbreak of World War 1. 28. For further discussion, Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, vol. 20, No.3, April 1968, pp. 454-479; Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972);" and Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1968). 29. See for further discussion, Paul C. Szasz, "International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards," in Mason Willrich, ed., International Safeguards and the Nuclear Industry, pp. 73-141; W. Hafele, "NPT Safeguards," and J. Prawitz, "Arguments for Extended NPT Safeguards," in Nuclear Proliferation Problems, pp. 142-167. 30. J. Goldblat, "The UN Security Council Resolution of 19 June 1968 and the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States," ibid., pp. 236-241. 31. "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft," in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Aircraft Hijacking Convention (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971), pp. 93-96. 32. See, for example, section 2(i) and section 170 of "The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Public Law 83-703 as amended" in U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Atomic 547

Energy Legislation Through 93rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.;:l. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), pp. 5 and 71-80. See also u.S. Congress, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Oversight Hearings On Nuclear Energy-The Price-Anderson Nuclear Indemnity Act (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975). 33. See Isser Harel, House on Garibaldi Street (New York: Viking, 1975), for an account of the Israeli Government's kidnapping and forcible extradition of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina to Israel and the subsequent diplomatic furor over the summer of 1960. Hanna Arendt commenting on this aspect of the Eichmann case in her book, Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Viking, 1963, 1964) observes that Argentina might not have been as willing as it was to forget about the kidnapping of Eichmann had Eichmann been an Argentine citizen. "He had lived there under an assumed name, thereby denying himself the right to government protection, at least as Ricardo Klement (born on 23 May 1913, at Bolzano-in Southern Tyrol-as his Argentine identity card stated), although he had declared himself of 'German nationality.' And he never invoked the dubious right of asylum••.• All this did not make Eichmann stateless, it did not legally deprive him of his German nationality, but it gave the West German republic a welcome pretext for withholding the customary protection due its citizens abroad." (page 240). 34. United Press International, "7 Nation Nuclear Pact Set," San Jose Mercury, 30 January 1976. 35. Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency underscored the value and importance of national intelligence systems in a speech reprinted in the Hackensack, N.J. Record entitled "How Will We Know Who Bombed Us?" 14 February 1975. 36. The importance of protecting sources and methods of intelligence was underscored by Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Ikle in his advocacy of legislation to make such information privileged. See transcript of Meet the Press, vol. 19, No. 31, 3 August 1975, pp. 4-5. 37. "Security Bulletin (RIS:SE-1600-19) ASE-73-3," in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Anti-Hijacking .Act of 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), p. 306. 38. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction," in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), pp. 118-124. 39. Ibid., p. 119. 40. Ibid., pp. 119-120. ----'f!----