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Download PDF File Dr. Khaled Okasha General Manager Dr. Abdel-Moneim Said Academic advisor Supervision by Gen. Mohamed Ibrahim Eldewery Deputy General Manager Editing By Dr. Ahmad Amal Translation By Riham Salah Khafagy Art Direction By Eslam Ali Contents Preface GERD Failure Analysis and the Impacts on Downstream Countries Founding Papers Haidi ElShafei The Blue Gold: Ethiopia’s Dam-Building 40 Strategy and the Concept of Hydro-Hegemony The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Dr. Hamdy Abdel-Rahman Agriculture and the Rural Poor in Egypt 8 Nesreen Alsabahe The Basic Idea of Renaissance Dam and the 44 Real Purpose of Construction The Hydrological and Environmental Dr. Mohamed Nasr El-Din Allam Impacts of Constructing the Renaissance Dam 12 Mahmoud Salama Scenarios of Dealing with the Renaissance Dam 48 Crisis in Light of the International Law Provisions Dr. Muhammed Sameh Amr Environmental Impacts of the GERD: 16 Mitigation and Adaptation Options Shimaa Elbiksh Reality of the Negotiations Path 52 Egypt’s Stance Toward the Developments of Prospects for Cooperation GERD Negotiations Gen. Mohamed Ibrahim Eldewery Pathways of Cooperation to Overcome the 24 Renaissance Dam Crisis: Future Prospects Ambassador Dr. Mohamed Hegazy Revisiting Sudan’s Nile position Mostafa Ahmady 58 28 Water Rivalry on the Nile Dr. Hani Sewilam How Does Ethiopia Think About the Renaissance Dam? 64 Hani Raslan Appendices 30 Egypt-Ethiopia Nile Water Dispute: A Does Ethiopia Want to Resolve the Timeline Renaissance Dam Crisis? 70 Dr. Mohamed Nasr El-Din Allam Full Text of «Declaration of Principles» 32 Between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan on the GERD Project Impact Assessment of the Renaissance Dam 76 The Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Its Letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Impact on Sudan and Egypt Egypt to the Security Council, June 2020 Eng. Haidar Youssef Bekhiet 78 36 Preface this exact moment, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) crisis has reached an unprecedented level of es- At calation as a consequence of Ethiopia’s intransigence at the negotiating table. It continues attempting to impose a fait accom- pli policy, through proceeding with the completion of the dam con- ÷ĂòĎaĂ°ÎÇĀìFĂĀė°»»Ā»sFkĀĂÎĀÎW÷ĂòĎaĂ°Ç£ĀėFĂsòĀÎėĀWs¬°ÇkĀìsĀkFÁĀFÇkĀ starting the operation without reaching an agreement maintaining the rights of the two downstream countries: Egypt and Sudan. This is also contrary to what Ethiopia has bound itself to, under the Declaration of Principles signed in March 2015. Faced with such complicated situation and in parallel with Egypt’s rapid steps toward avoiding the development of this crisis into a direct threat to safety and security on both regional and interna- tional levels; the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (ECSS) con- sidered it important to release this special issue giving in-depth analysis of all aspects related to this crisis as well as the potential pathways to move beyond. Entitled The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Risks, Fallacies and Po- tential Partnerships, this issue opens with three founding papers high- lighting the idea of constructing Ethiopian dams along the Blue Nile 2°ĕsòiĀ÷°ÇasĀ°ĂĀò÷ĂĀsÁsò£skĀ°ÇĀìsĀÁ°k¯ÕÊþġ÷ãĀÎaĎ÷Ā°÷ĀF»÷ÎĀ£°ĕsÇĀĂÎĀìsĀ continuous endeavors of successive Ethiopian governments to imple- ment these dam projects on the ground. ĎĂĀ ÷Ďa¬Ā sÇksFĕÎò÷Ā ėsòsĀ ÇÎĂĀ ĂÎĀ ÇkĀ FÇĀ ÎÝÝÎòĂĎÇ°ĂěĀ ÎòĀ òsF»°ğFĂ°ÎÇĀ without Ethiopia’s exploitation of the exceptional situations that Egypt witnessed at the beginning of the past decade. On the other hand, current development of events draws imperative attention to the established position of international law regarding this crisis, and F»÷ÎĀĂÎĀìsĀk°sòsÇĂĀF»ĂsòÇFĂ°ĕs÷ĀÎÝsÇĀĂÎĀ£ěÝĂĀ°ÇĀÎòksòĀĂÎĀÁF°ÇĂF°ÇĀ its water rights. This occurs at a time when Ethiopia is falsely alleging the absence of any regulatory restrictions under the international law ìFĂĀaFÇĀÝòsĕsÇĂĀ°Ă÷ĀFĂĂsÁÝĂ÷ĀĂÎĀaÎÇĂòλĀìsĀ'°»sĀ°ÇÎėĀkÎėÇ÷ĂòsFÁãĀ As to the political perspective, this issue extensively addresses the re- spective negotiating positions of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, especial- ly after their positions witnessed major shifts over the last year. Egypt and Sudan are now fully aware of the Ethiopian negotiators’ sole task to gain time to help their country impose a fait accompli policy through building the dam without consensus. The Egyptian leader- ship, thereby, made a successful step by calling upon the international 4 | The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Risks, Fallacies and Potential Partnerships community to commit to its responsibilitlies toward maintaining in- ternational safety and security—a step that has been met with a rapid FÇkĀssaĂ°ĕsĀòs÷ÝÎÇ÷sĀòÎÁĀìsĀ9Ç°ĂskĀ4ĂFĂs÷iĀ»sFk°Ç£ĀĂÎĀìsĀ°Ç°Ă°F- tion of Washington negotiations that would have almost succeeded if Ethiopia had not announced its last-minute withdrawal. Despite of the current accelerated pace of political interactions inside Sudan, this has not prevented the new Sudanese leadership from Ws°Ç£Ā Ď»»ěĀ FėFòsĀ ÎĀ ìsĀ ÷°£Ç°aFÇasĀ ÎĀ Fkkòs÷÷°Ç£Ā ìsĀ 2sÇF°÷÷FÇasĀ Dam crisis transparently and courageously. This caused impactful ÷¬°Ă÷Ā °ÇĀ 4ĎkFÇð÷Ā ÝÎ÷°Ă°ÎÇĀ ĂÎĀ WsaÎÁsĀ ÁÎòsĀ aΣǰğ°Ç£Ā ÎĀ ìsĀ ÷sò°ÎĎ÷Ā damages carried by the dam to Aswan in terms of security and wa- ter management. Since the very beginning and in more than occasion, Ethiopia kept refusing to enable international consultancies to conduct the requi- site studies on the hydrological, environmental, economic and social impacts of the dam. Based on this, it was important for us to display ĕFò°ÎĎ÷ĀÝFÝsò÷ĀaÎĕsò°Ç£Āìs÷sĀF÷ÝsaĂ÷iĀF»»ĀÎĀė¬°a¬Ā¬FĕsĀaÎÇòÁskĀ the disastrous damages carried by the construction and operation of the Renaissance Dam to both Egypt and Sudan, if no agreement was reached—as planned by Ethiopia. Though the reality of the current crisis does not allow plenty of room for optimism, given the intransigent approach of Ethiopia; it was also important to include in this publication papers proposing alternative solutions for joint management of the Nile waters. They are proposed in a way that serves the interests of the three countries; safeguards Egypt’s and Sudan’s water security; and allows Ethiopia’s to pursue its development ambitions. By this, the vast array of papers included in this issue comprehensive- »ěĀFkkòs÷÷s÷ĀìsĀ2sÇF°÷÷FÇasĀFÁĀaò°÷°÷ĀòÎÁĀk°sòsÇĂĀÝsò÷ÝsaĂ°ĕs÷Ā and dimensions, leaving no room for ambiguities or doubts while in- terpreting the current setting and the motivations of particpant parties in such interactions. And this is done in a way that integrates with £ěÝĂð÷Ā aÎÇĂ°ÇĎÎĎ÷Ā FÇkĀ òs»sÇĂ»s÷÷Ā sÎòĂ÷iĀ ÎĕsòĀ ìsĀ ěsFò÷iĀ ĂÎĀ kssÇkĀ its just cause of protecting the country’s established rights in the Nile water share. The Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies The Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies | 5 Founding Papers The Blue Gold: Ethiopia’s Dam-Building Strategy and the Concept of Hydro-Hegemony Dr. Hamdy Abdel-Rahman The Basic Idea of Renaissance Dam and the Real Purpose of Construction Dr. Mohamed Nasr El-Din Allam Scenarios of Dealing with the Renaissance Dam Crisis in Light of the International Law Provisions Dr. Muhammed Sameh Amr The Blue Gold: Ethiopia’s Dam-Building Strategy and the Concept of Hydro-Hegemony Dr. Hamdy Abdel-Rahman 0òÎs÷÷ÎòĀÎĀ0λ°Ă°aF»Ā4a°sÇasiĀDFěskĀ9Ç°ĕsò÷°ĂěĀFÇkĀ F°òÎĀ9Ç°ĕsò÷°Ăě Ethiopia does not only seek through its dam-build- MELES ZENAWI AND THE MASSIVE ing strategy to achieve developmental objectives, but DAMS STRATEGY also to lay a new foundation for imposing hydro-he- With the start of Meles’s rule, Ethiopia began a steady gemony on its regional scope, by exchanging oil for movement toward constructing massive dams. The of- water. However, it is not a matter of secret; it is a a°F»ĀÇFòòFĂ°ĕsiĀFkÎÝĂskĀWěĀìsĀ£ÎĕsòÇÁsÇĂF»Ās»°ĂsĀĎÇ- bedrock principle for the governing elite in Addis ksòĀìsĀ°ÇĎsÇasĀÎĀ&s»s÷ð÷Āksĕs»ÎÝÁsÇĂF»Āĕ°÷°ÎÇiĀėF÷Ā Ababa and its backing international powers. This that only through a strategy for building massive dams was openly expressed by a key adviser to the Late and by improving infrastructure to generate power, Prime Minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi as he put could root causes of poverty as well as factors of social it: ‘Ethiopia provides the power, Sudan grows the food and economic backwardness be decisively eliminated. and Egypt brings the cash’. One might add to this and Ethiopians believe that the Blue Nile—also known as according to the current context, ‘South Sudan pro- Abay in Amharic, meaning ‘father of all rivers’—is a vides the oil’. pure Ethiopian river. It was also claimed by some that the Amu Darya River, or Jayhun, mentioned in the Bi- ĂĀ °÷Ā ėÎòìĀ ÁsÇĂ°ÎÇ°Ç£Ā ìFĂĀ Ýλ°Ă°a°ğFĂ°ÎÇĀ ÎĀ ìsĀ ble, is the river surrounding the Land of Kush, in both '°»sĀ°÷÷ĎsiĀF÷Āės»»ĀF÷ĀĎĂ°»°ğ°Ç£Āksĕs»ÎÝÁsÇĂF»ĀÝòÎ- Nubia and Ethiopia. This means that there was some jects for political purposes, is not a new issue; it is a ĎĂ°»°ğFĂ°ÎÇĀÎĀ ¬ò°÷Ă°FÇ°ĂěĀĂÎĀa»F°ÁĀì°ÎÝ°Fð÷Ā¬°÷ĂÎò°aĀ long-standing issue that can be dated back to the era rights to the Nile River waters. This movement was of Ethiopian Emperors who threatened to transform accompanied by increased investments in the agricul- £ěÝĂĀ°ÇĂÎĀFĀò°ĕsòWskĀFÇkĀĂÎĀ÷ĂÎÝĀ°Ă÷ĀÎÎkãĀÇĀÁÎk- ture sector through granting expansion of agricultural sòÇĀĂ°Ás÷iĀìsĀ9Ç°ĂskĀ4FĂs÷ĀĂò°skĀĂÎĀĎ÷sĀėFĂsòĀF÷ĀFĀ land leases to foreign investors—particularly the leases weapon to put pressure on Egypt’s will. On behalf which are often associated with the irrigation projects ÎĀì°ÎÝ°Fð÷Ā£ÎĕsòÇÁsÇĂiĀìsĀ9Ç°ĂskĀ4ĂFĂs÷Ā ĎòsFĎĀ planned during the dam-building phase. ÎĀ2sa»FÁFĂ°ÎÇĀà94 2áĀaÎÇkĎaĂskĀFĀ÷ĂĎkěĀ°ÇĀÕÊþ Ā WěĀė¬°a¬ĀìsĀ94 2Ā°ksÇĂ°skĀĆĆĀ÷°Ăs÷ĀÎòĀÝòηsaĂ÷Ā It is well-known that since the fall of Mengistu Haile to be constructed on the Blue River; four of which &Fò°FÁĀ °ÇĀ ÕÊÊÕiĀ ìsòsĀ ¬F÷Ā WssÇĀ FĀ ÇÎĂ°asFW»sĀ ĂòsÇkĀ were possible sites on the main basin—including the toward the construction, or expansion, of dams and Border Dam whose name was changed later to the ¬ěkòÎÝÎėsòĀÝ»FÇĂ÷}°Ça»Ďk°Ç£Ā6sÇkF¬ÎiĀ6s¹sğuiĀ6FÇFĀ Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
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