Neurotechnologies as weapons in national intelligence and defense – An overview James Giordano, PhD*1-3 and Rachel Wurzman, PhD(c)4 1. Center for Neurotechnology Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA, 22203, USA, 2. Department of Electrical and Computational Engineering, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, 87131, USA, 3. Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, University of Oxford, UK, Email: [email protected], 4. Interdisciplinary Program in Neuroscience, Georgetown University Medical Center, Washington, DC, 20057, USA. Abstract Advances in neuroscience and neurotechnology have necessitated discussions on the ways that such developments could be used as weapons in contexts of national security, intelligence, and defense. This paper defi nes the concept of neuroweapons, and elucidates operational issues associated with their use to aid informational and strategic intelligence, such as brain-machine interfaces to improve effi ciency in data analysis. As well, exploration of neuropharmacologic, neuromicrobiological, and neurotoxic agents are discussed relevant to their utility in combat scenarios. The limitations of emerging neurotechnologies as weapons are addressed, as both regards practical and operational frameworks, and implications relevant to formulation of ethico-legal guidelines and governance of research, development and potential use. Key words: neuroscience, neurotechnology, neuroweapons, neurosecurity, national defense, biotechnology, weaponry Introduction summarized the state of neuroscience as relevant to the 1) potential utility for defense and intelligence applica- Advances in neuroscience have progressed rapidly over tions, 2) pace of progress, 3) present limitations, and 4) the last two decades. The fi eld has become increasingly threat value of such science. In characterizing the chal- interdisciplinary, and has been a nexus for the develop- lenges to advancing defense-oriented neurotechnologies ment and use of a wide range of technological innova- — as well as maintaining the United States’ international tions (viz.- neurotechnology). While usually considered competitive edge — the committee noted that a signifi cant in medical contexts, many neurotechnologies may also problem was the “…amount of pseudoscientifi c informa- be viably engaged as weapons. Such “neuroweapons” tion and journalistic oversimplifi cation related to cogni- are obviously of great interest in and to national security, tive neuroscience.” (1) intelligence and defense (NSID) endeavors, given both the substantial threat that these technologies pose to the Given the relative nascence of neuroscience and much defense integrity of the US and its allies, and the viability of neurotechnology, the development and use of neu- of these approaches in the US NSID armamentarium. A roweapons discussed in this essay are incipient, and in 2008 report entitled Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience some cases, the potential utility of these approaches is and Related Technologies by the ad-hoc Committee on speculative. But any such speculation must acknowledge Military and Intelligence Methodology for Emergent that neurotechnological progress in these areas is real, Neurophysiological and Cognitive/Neural Science and therefore consideration of the potential trajectories Research in the Next Two Decades (National Research that neurotechnologies-as-weapons might assume is both Council of the National Academy of Sciences (hereaf- important and necessary. As well, such discussion must ter referred to as the 2008 NAS ad-hoc committee) (1) entail a pragmatic view of the capabilities and limitations Synesis: A Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy 2011 T:55 © 2011 Potomac Institute Press, All rights reserved Synesis: A Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy 2011 of these devices and techniques, and the potential pitfalls (e.g., prolonged fl ashing lights, irritating music, and sleep of — and caveats to — their use. Herein, we address deprivation to decrease resistance to interrogation) (5). 1) the possible ways that neurotechnologies can be utilized Even the distribution of emotionally-provocative propa- as weapons; 2) the NSID aims that might be advanced ganda as psychological warfare could be considered to be by neuroweapons; and 3) some of the consequences and/ an indirect form of neuroweapon (8). or implications of developing neurotechnologies toward these ends. While such an expansive consideration may be important to evaluate the historicity, operational utility, and practical What is a neuroweapon? (and ethical) implications of neurotechnology-as-weapons, in this essay, we seek to provide a concise overview of neu- A weapon is defi ned as “a means of contending against roweapons, and therefore restrict discussion to applications another “ and “…something used to injure, defeat, or de- of emergent technologies of cognitive neuroscience, com- stroy” (2). Both defi nitions apply to neurotechnologies putational neuroscience, neuropharmacology, neuromicro- used as weapons in intelligence and/or defense scenarios. biology, and neurotoxicology. The former approaches (e.g., Neurotechnology can support intelligence activities by cognitive and computational neuroscience; neuropharma- targeting information and technology infrastructures, to cology) could be used for more indirect (yet still neurocen- either enhance or deter accurate intelligence assessment, tric) applications, including the enablement and/or enhanc- the ability to effi ciently handle amassed, complex data, ing of human efforts by simulating brain functions, and the and human tactical or strategic efforts. The objectives for classifi cation and detection of human cognitive, emotional neuroweapons in a traditional defense context (e.g., com- and motivational states to augment intelligence, counter- bat) may be achieved by altering (i.e., either augmenting intelligence, or human terrain deployment strategies. The or degrading) functions of the nervous system, so as to af- latter methods (e.g., neuromicrobiology, neurotoxicology, fect cognitive, emotional and/or motor activity and capa- as well as neuropharmacology) have potential utility in bility (e.g., perception, judgment, morale, pain tolerance, more combat-related or special operations’ scenarios. or physical abilities and stamina). Many technologies (e.g., neurotropic drugs; interventional neurostimulatory Contending against potential enemies: Neuro- devices) can be employed to produce these effects. technology within information infrastructures and intelligence strategy As implements that target, measure, interact with, or sim- ulate nervous system function and processes, the use of Those neurotechnologies that enhance the capabilities of neurotechnololgies as weapons are by no means a new the intelligence community may be considered weapons innovation, per se. Historically, such weapons have in- in that they provide “…a means of contending against an cluded nerve gas, and various drugs. Weaponized gas other” (2). Certain neurotechnologies may be particularly has taken several forms: lachrymatory agents (a.k.a., tear well suited to affect performance in, and of the intelli- gases), toxic irritants (e.g., phosgene, chlorine), vesicants gence community. The tasks of both human analysts and (blistering agents; e.g., mustard gas), and paralytics (e.g., the technologies they use are becoming evermore recipro- sarin). These may seem crude when compared to the ca- cal and inter-dependent. Without technology to pre-pro- pabilities of the more sophisticated approaches that can cess and sort large quantities of complicated information, be used today — or in the near future (3). Pharmacolol- human analysts could not obtain a cohesive picture from gic stimulants (e.g., amphetamines) and various ergogen- which to draw necessary inferences about the capabilities ics (e.g., anabolic steroids) have been used to augment and intentions of (friendly, neutral or hostile) intelligence combatant vigilance, and sedatives (e.g., barbiturates) targets. Yet, information technology presently requires have been employed to alter cognitive inhibition and fa- human programming and implementation of human-con- cilitate cooperation during interrogation (3-7). Sensory ceived models to parse the volume and types of informa- stimuli have been applied as neuroweapons: some to di- tion collected. Moreover, some information remains prob- rectly transmit excessively intense amounts of energy to lematic to collect (e.g., attitudes and intentions of human be transduced by a sensory modality (e.g., sonic weap- subjects). Neurotechnologies that would facilitate and en- onry to incapacitate the enemy), while others cause harm hance these capabilities might decrease the fallibility of by exceeding the thresholds and limits of tolerable ex- “human weak links” in the intelligence chain through the perience by acting at the level of conscious perception application of neurally-yoked, advanced computational T:56 Synesis: A Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy 2011 strategies (i.e., brain-machine, and machine-brain inter- mittee identifi ed such technology as a potential threat, but faces; BMI/MBI respectively) in the management and one that remains largely theoretical — at least at present integration of massed data. Similarly, neurotechnologies (1). Such computational cognitive frameworks may “bor- can be developed to manage the increasingly signifi cant row” human capabilities, not by mimicking processes in problem of the sheer