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Annex a – FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship Plan

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Annex a – FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship Plan FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship Plan “So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. …we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies…But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.” President Barack Obama April 5, 2009 – Prague, Czech Republic Our budget request represents a comprehensive approach to ensuring the nuclear security of our Nation. We must ensure that our strategic posture, our stockpile, and our infrastructure, along with our nonproliferation, arms control, emergency response, counterterrorism, and naval propulsion programs, are melded into one comprehensive, forward-leaning strategy that protects America and its allies. Maintaining our nuclear stockpile forms the core of our work in the NNSA. However, the science, technology, and engineering that encompass that core work must continue to focus on providing a sound foundation for ongoing nonproliferation and other threat reduction programs. Our investment in nuclear security is providing the tools that can tackle a broad array of national challenges – both in the security arena and in other realms. And, if we have the tools, we will need the people to use them effectively. The NNSA will need to develop and retain the next generation of scientists, engineers, and technicians required to meet our enduring deterrence requirements as well as the critical work in nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, and forensics. People are ultimately our most important resource. We are working closely with our national laboratories to develop and retain the necessary cadre of the best and the brightest to successfully carry out all of our technically challenging programs into the foreseeable future. Thomas P. D’Agostino DOE Undersecretary for Nuclear Security Statement before the House/Senate Committee/Subcommittee on Appropriations/Armed Services March 2010 May 2010 National Nuclear Security Administration Annex A SSStttoooccckkkpppiiillleee SSSttteeewwwaaarrrdddssshhhiiippp PPPlllaaannn Table of Contents List of Figures .............................................................................................................................................v List of Tables........................................................................................................................................... viii Chapter 1 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Overview The NNSA Nuclear Security Complex (Pertinent Aspects) and Program Direction .............1 1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1 1.A. The Complex as it Pertains to Stockpile Stewardship and Management.....................2 1.B. Products.................................................................................................................................2 1.C. How is the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program Organized and Integrated? ............................................................................................................................5 1.D. Historical Funding Summaries for Weapons Activities ...............................................14 1.E. Recent Key Accomplishments..........................................................................................16 1.F. Current and Future Stockpile ...........................................................................................17 1.G. Instruments for Stockpile Stewardship and Management...........................................20 1.H. Current and Future State of Science, Technology, and Engineering Foundation–Role in Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan ..........................25 1.I. Current and Future Infrastructure (Physical and Intellectual) – Enabling the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan..............................................................26 1.J. Future Complex Deliverables...........................................................................................26 1.K. Future Funding for Weapons Activities .........................................................................27 1.L. Challenges–Approaches for Meeting these Challenges................................................30 1.M. In Summary.........................................................................................................................32 Chapter 2 Directed Stockpile Work ............................................................................................................. 35 2.A. Highlights............................................................................................................................35 2.B. Mission.................................................................................................................................35 2.C. Program Structure..............................................................................................................36 2.D. Program Goals....................................................................................................................39 2.E. Strategy ................................................................................................................................40 May 2010 U.S. Department of Energy ii FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship Plan 2.F. Challenges ...........................................................................................................................41 2.G. Recent Accomplishments ..................................................................................................41 2.H. DSW Milestones and Future Plans ..................................................................................44 2.I. Funding Schedule...............................................................................................................46 Chapter 3 Science Campaign......................................................................................................................... 47 3.A. Highlights............................................................................................................................47 3.B. Mission.................................................................................................................................47 3.C. Program Structure..............................................................................................................48 3.D. Program Goals....................................................................................................................50 3.E. Strategy ................................................................................................................................51 3.F. Challenges ...........................................................................................................................52 3.G. Recent Accomplishments ..................................................................................................53 3.H. Science Milestones and Future Plans...............................................................................55 3.I. Funding Schedule...............................................................................................................56 Chapter 4 Engineering Campaign ................................................................................................................ 57 4.A. Highlights............................................................................................................................57 4.B. Mission.................................................................................................................................57 4.C. Program Structure..............................................................................................................58 4.D. Program Goals....................................................................................................................61 4.E. Strategy ................................................................................................................................62 4.F. Challenges ...........................................................................................................................64 4.G. Recent Accomplishments ..................................................................................................64 4.H. Engineering Campaign Milestones and Future Plans...................................................66 4.I. Funding Schedule...............................................................................................................69 Chapter 5 Inertial Confinement Fusion Campaign................................................................................... 71 5.A. Highlights............................................................................................................................71 5.B. Mission.................................................................................................................................72 5.C. Program Structure..............................................................................................................72
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