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CONCLUSION

The development of Caodai has aided and hindered the . Whether or not one accepts the claim of some Caodaists that and division in were inevitable because of the fore• of the Creator is not of great import. The real issue involves the results of sectarianism on the religion. Caodaism seems to have been helped by the formation of new committed to fresh interpretations inasmuch as such schism forced the creation of other new sects and organizations. These, in turn, led to expanded , and the result has been that in the process many new converts were gained. Caodaism has moved in the past two or three decades to become a major religious and social force in . Further, the constant need to redefine goals and purposes has effected a self-conscious identity, so that Caodai followers have managed to protect themselves and their recently recognized religion from poten• tially devastating assaults by the colonial and communist forces. More• over, the appearance of new Caodai sects and organizations has cer• tainly aided in the development within of the philosophical base of the religion; books and pamphlets have been written, and conferences have been held in which alternatives to interested Vietnamese who were not attracted to the authoritarianism of Tay Ninh were articulated. No longer is authoritarian Tay Ninh the only option available to persons both already within Caodaism or to those yet to be converted; there is also the attraction of the more balanced perspective of the Danang , or the self-cultivation emphasis of the Chieu Minh Tam Thanh move• ment. On the other hand, Caodai sectarian development also was a debilitating force. It produced a multiplicity of major and minor sects (over fifty), many of them unable to survive because of instability and lack of credibility. This reflected on the movement as a whole-both in the public eye and in the minds of those in the Caodai communities. With sectarianism came , and with it the troublesome effects of inter-sectarian suspicion and estrangement. When the Caodai needed a united front to exert their influence as a pro-independence, anti• colonial, anti-communist force, they were divided. Schism caused the Tay Ninh organization to lose many key men, internecine battles developed because of the lack of unity and accord among the leaders. Unification of the entire movement-if it is ever accomplished• would lead to a much strengthened, social, political, and religious role 116 CONCLUSION for Caodaism as a force to be reckoned with in Vietnam. The financial strain evident among sects would, upon union, be relieved by the advan• tages of a united treasury. The social outreach of the sects would be unified so that in all areas of the Caodaists would be affecting Vietnamese society with their relief programs. Such a unified plan of social action would be a great publicity boost as well as a public service of major significance. Their youth movements would, if unified, number around twenty thousand young people and this, too, would present a potential social force, capable of attracting attention to the religion because of their strong orientation towards functional societal programs that supplement governmental projects-to say nothing of what other accomplishments might also be realized. At the present, the Caodai have little political initiative. In 1970-71 they had few well-known representatives actively participating in Viet• namese political life. Because of their nationwide strength and absolute majorities in certain areas, a united party would produce strong con• tenders for political office. The projected Caodai university at Tay Ninh would be the logical institution for advanced Caodai educational programs. Caodai students from various parts of South Vietnam cer• tainly would attend "their" university, whereas at the present, sectarian division negates such a program. Nor do there exist incentives to attend universities beyond quite overtly materialistic career plans. From a religious standpoint, a unified religion offers Caodaism the best opportunity to develop longstanding programs that remain dreams rather than , a strong foreign missions endeavor, the strength• ening of Caodai footholds in France and other non-Asian countries, and the capability of presenting an harmonious, united front to other . Although there may be some overlapping of positions necessitating the change of some official's hierarchical rank, unification would give opportunity to appoint trained, chosen, and experienced officials to vital positions that have been vacant for years because of the lack of qualified personnel. Organizational unification would minimize fiscal and management problems. There would be opportunity to rectify the mistaken attitudes, suspicions, and bitter words of previous years. But the realities of the present situation indicate that reunification, though advantageous, will not occur in the foreseeable future. There are too many obstacles. For many of the sects, too much is at stake. The hierarchical ranking of their senior officials, financial independence, the necessity that particular laws would have to be changed and histo• rical positions, strongly maintained and taught to converts, would have