DOCSLIB.ORG

Non-State Conflicts, Weak State Capacity and Regime Change

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Non-State Conflicts, Weak State Capacity and Regime Change Non-State Conflicts, Weak State Capacity and Regime Change Hanna Bugge Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Sciences University of Oslo Spring/May 2014 II Non-state Conflicts, Weak State Capacity and Regime Change Hanna Bugge c Hanna Bugge 2014 Non-State Conflicts, Weak State Capacity and Regime Change Hanna Bugge http://www.duo.uio.no/ Trykk: Kopisten, Oslo II Abstract How does regime change affect non-state conflicts? Within the broader literature coup d'´etats,riots and armed conflict is linked to transition between political regimes. For non- state conflicts there is a lack of systemic inquire about this topic. To investigate this topic I start by examining how states internal conditions put the contexts where violence becomes more or less likely. I argue that states with non-representative institutions and low state capacity put forth conditions where non-state conflicts are likely to erupt. Further, I inves- tigate how regime change alters this institutional set up. The interplay of a state occupied reorganizing and the potential of a different future provide motivation and opportunity for actors dissatisfied with their current situation. If groups fail to display their importance and leverage in the transition period, stakes might be lost when the emerging regime enters office and politics start to consolidate. Using data on non-state conflicts from 1989-2008, I apply a negative binomial regression to test the effect of institutional set up and regime change on non-state conflicts. My analy- ses suggest a relationship between weak state capacity and non-state conflicts. Depending on choice of indicators, and the sample exposed, representative institutions might be an explanation of non-state conflicts. While I fail to find a general relationship between non- state conflicts and regime change, I find a strong relationship when allowing the indicator of regime change to include cases of state collapse. Year to year changes between political regimes cannot explain non-state conflicts, but long periods without a governing body does. III IV Acknowledgements First I want to thank my two supervisors, H˚avard Strand and H˚avard Hegre. Your advices and guidance have been invaluable for me in this process. I also want to thank the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) and H˚avard Hegre for offering me a student scholarship and the opportunity to be part of the project: Reassessing the Role of Democracy: Political Institutions and Armed Conflict.1 The opportunity to participate and be part of the intellec- tual and interdisciplinary environment at PRIO, have been highly stimulating. This friendly atmosphere has also made it an enjoyable process. A special thanks goes to all those attending my presentation at PRIO i March. Your com- ments have been a valuable asset when writing this thesis. In addition I want to thank Jonas Nordkvelle for offering unconditional support with statics and programming, and to Ida Rudolfsen for writing an inspiring thesis. For the girls sitting in the attic at PRIO: Ragnhild Belbo, Stine Bergersen and Lina Elter: thank you for making this spring a joyful experience. To my fellows at Blindern, these two years would have been terribly boring without you. To Erling Hess Johnsen, Torkil Dyb Remøy, Ola Vassli and Aleksander Eilertsen: takk for kaffen! All remaining errors are my own. 1RNC project 217995, http://www.prio.org/Projects/Project/?x=972 V VI Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Introduction and Research Questions . .1 1.2 Main findings . .4 1.3 Definitions . .5 1.4 Organization . .9 2 Literature Review 11 2.1 Grievance Based Explanations . 12 2.2 Political Entrepreneurs and the Manipulation of Conflicts . 16 2.3 Opportunity Based Explanations . 17 2.4 Summary and Remaining Research Gaps . 19 3 Theoretical Framework 21 3.1 Representative Institutions: Incentives to Reduce Tension and Solve Conflicts 23 3.2 State Capacity: Capacity to Govern and Provide Order . 25 3.2.1 State Capacity . 25 3.2.2 Bureaucratic and Administrative State Capacity . 27 3.3 Regime Change: Motivation and Opportunity for Conflicts . 29 3.3.1 Regime Change per se . 29 3.3.2 Direction of Regime Change . 31 3.3.3 The Mediating Effect of Regime Change by Bureaucratic and Admin- istrative State Capacity . 33 3.4 Summary . 34 4 Research Design 35 4.1 Justification of a Quantitative Approach . 35 4.2 Statistical Model and Dependent Variable . 36 4.2.1 Count Model: the Negative Binomial Regression Model . 38 VII CONTENTS 4.3 Operationalization . 40 4.3.1 Unit of analysis . 41 4.3.2 Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Non-State Conflict . 41 4.3.3 State Capacity . 50 4.3.4 Representative Political Institutions . 53 4.3.5 Regime Change . 56 4.3.6 Conditional Effects . 63 4.3.7 Control Variables . 65 4.4 Sources of Bias and Methodological Challenges . 67 4.4.1 Endogenity . 67 4.4.2 Multicollinearity . 68 4.4.3 Omitted variable bias . 68 4.4.4 Missing . 69 4.5 Summary . 70 5 Results 73 5.1 Descriptive Statistics . 73 5.2 Multivariate Regression Results . 78 5.2.1 Representative Institutions . 80 5.2.2 Bureaucratic and Administrative State Capacity . 82 5.2.3 Regime Change . 83 5.2.4 Control Variables . 87 5.2.5 Regime Change by Bureaucratic and Administrative State Capacity . 87 5.3 Probing the Results: Quantities of Interest . 90 5.3.1 Regime Change per se: State Collapse . 92 5.3.2 Direction of Change: Autocratization . 94 5.3.3 Direction of Change: Democratization . 97 5.4 Summary . 100 6 Model Diagnostics and Robustness 103 6.1 Measure of Fit . 103 6.1.1 Adequacy of the Model . 104 6.1.2 Temporal and Spatial Dependency Among Observations . 105 6.1.3 Influential Observations . 106 6.2 Alternative Specifications and Estimation Methods . 109 6.2.1 Alternative Operationalizations . 109 6.2.2 Sub-Samples by Organization Level and Region . 112 VIII CONTENTS 6.2.3 Alternative Estimations . 114 6.3 Summary . 114 7 Conclusion 117 7.1 Findings and Non-Findings . 117 7.2 Limitations and Implications . 120 Appendices 139 A Additional Statistics 141 B Model Robustness 147 C Alternative Specifications 155 D Dataset and Syntax-files 163 IX CONTENTS X List of Figures 4.1 Distribution of non-state conflicts 1989-2008 . 39 4.2 Number of fatalities in non-state conflicts, 1989-2008 . 44 4.3 Authority dimension and ideal polity types, 1989-2008 . 56 4.4 Trends in political regimes: global average SIP score, 1989-2008, . 57 4.5 Trends in regime types: frequency share, 1989-2008, . 57 4.6 Decay functions of regime change, Peru . 64 5.1 Trends in non-state conflicts, counts and country years, 1989-2008 . 74 5.2 Distribution of observations by representative institutions . 76 5.3 Distribution of observations by bureaucratic quality . 76 5.4 Frequency of non-state conflicts by types of representative institutions . 77 5.5 Occurrences of non-state violence by bureaucratic quality, histogram of bu- reaucratic levels . 79 5.6 Predicted counts over representative institutions (Model 1) . 82 5.7 Predicted counts over bureaucratic quality (Model 1) . 82 5.8 Predicted counts over of state collapse (Model 1) . 84 5.9 Predicted counts over regime change (Model 2) . 84 5.10 Predicted counts over autocratization (Model 3) . 85 5.11 Predicted counts over democratization (Model 3) . 85 5.12 Marginal effects (Model 3) . 88 5.13 Marginal effects (Model 6) . 88 5.14 Predicted counts over autocratization by bureaucratic quality (Model 6) . 90 5.15 Predicted counts over democratization bureaucratic quality (Model 6) . 90 5.16 Scenario 1: State collapse for a state at high risk . 93 5.17 Scenario 1: State collapse for a state at low risk . 93 5.18 Scenario 2: Autocratization for a state at high risk . 95 5.19 Scenario 2: Autocratization for a state at low risk . 95 XI LIST OF FIGURES 5.20 Scenario 3: Democratization for a state at high risk . 98 5.21 Scenario 3: Democratization for a state not at low risk . 98 6.1 Sensitivity analysis of states' impact on the parameter estimate of bureaucratic quality . 108 A.1 Occurrences of non-state conflicts by state collapse . 146 A.2 Occurrences of non-state conflicts by regime change . 146 A.3 Occurrences of non-state conflicts by democratization . 146 A.4 Occurrences of non-state conflicts by autocratization . 146 XII List of Tables 4.1 Categories of non-state conflicts . 46 4.2 States with most counts of non-state conflicts, 1989-2008 . 47 4.3 Yearly fatalities by type of organization, 1989-2008 . 48 4.4 Sample of non-state conflicts, 1989-2008 . 49 4.5 Polity Index and SIP index: sample values from Afghanistan, Somalia and Peru, 1989-2008 . 59 4.6 Operationalization of regime changes, sample from Peru and Afghanistan . 62 4.7 Descriptive statistics . 71 5.1 Non-state conflicts by representative institutions . 75 5.2 Non-state conflicts by bureaucratic quality . 78 5.3 Non-state conflicts by type of regime change . 80 5.4 Results, non-state conflicts 1989-2008 . 81 5.5 Results conditional model, non-state conflicts 1989-2008 . 89 5.6 Scenario values for states with low and high risk for non-state conflicts . 91 A.1 Duplicated observations . 141 A.2 Missing values on explanatory variables . 142 A.3 States included in analysis . 143 A.4 Correlation matrix - explanatory variables . 144 A.5 Variance inflation factor test . 145 B.1 Basemodels: poisson and negative binomial . 147 B.2 Results from Model 1 with robust standard errors . 148 B.3 Results from Model 2 with robust standard errors . 148 B.4 Results.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Regime Change in North Africa and Implications
    Journal of Language, Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa Vol. 4 No. 1 2013 Regime Change in North Africa: Possible Implications for 21st Century Governance in Africa Frank K. Matanga [email protected] Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Kenya. Mumo Nzau [email protected] Catholic University of Eastern Africa (CUEA), Kenya. Abstract For most of 2011, several North African countries experienced sweeping changes in their political structures. During this period, North Africa drew world attention to itself in a profound way. Popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt forced long serving and clout wielding Presidents out of power. Most interestingly, these mass protests seemed to have a domino-effect not only in North Africa but also throughout the Middle East; thereby earning themselves the famous tag- “Arab Spring”. These events in North Africa have since become the subject of debate and investigation in academic, social media and political and/or political circles. At the centre of these debates is the question of “Implications of the Arab Spring on Governance in Africa in the 21st Century”. This Article raises pertinent questions. It revisits the social and economic causes of these regime changes in North Africa; the role of ICT and its social media networks and; the future of repressive regimes on the continent. Central to this discussion is the question: are these regime changes cosmetic? Is this wind of change transforming Africa in form but not necessarily in content? In this light the following discussion makes a critical analysis of the implications of these changes on 21st century governance in Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Regime Types and Regime Change: a New Dataset
    Regime Types and Regime Change: A New Dataset Christian Bjørnskov and Martin Rode* August, 2018 Abstract: Social scientists have created a variety of datasets in recent years that quantify political regimes, but these often provide little data on phases of regime transitions. Our aim is to contribute to filling this gap, by providing an update and expansion of the Democracy-Dictatorship data by Cheibub et al. (2010) with three additional features. First, we expand coverage to a total of 192 sovereign countries and 16 self- governing territories between 1950 and 2016, including periods under colonial rule. Second, we provide more institutional details that are deemed of importance in the relevant literature. Third, we include a new, self-created indicator of successful and failed coups d’état, which is currently the most complete of its kind. We further illustrate the usefulness of the new dataset by documenting the importance of political institutions under colonial rule for democratic development after independence, making use of our much more detailed data on colonial institutions. Findings show that more participatory colonial institutions have a positive and lasting effect for democratic development after transition to independence. Keywords: Political regimes, Regime transitions, Measurement, Colonialism JEL Codes: N40, P16 * Department of Economics, Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Allé 4, DK-8210 Aarhus V, Denmark; and Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), P.O. Box 55665, 102 15 Stockholm, Sweden (email: [email protected]); Department of Economics, University of Navarra, Campus Universitario, 31009 Pamplona, Navarra, Spain (email: [email protected]). We thank Greta Piktozyte for excellent research assistance, Andrew Blick and the House of Lords Information Office for kind assistance with the data, and Niclas Berggren and Roger Congleton for comments on an early version.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Appendices for Covert Regime Change
    Appendices for Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War Appendix I: U.S.-backed Covert Regime Change Attempts during the Cold War………………2 Appendix II: U.S.-backed Overt Regime Change Attempts during the Cold War………………65 Appendix III: Additional alleged U.S. Covert Cases……………………………………………66 Note to readers: Appendix 1 contains at least 3 sources for each of the alleged regime change attempts conducted by the United States during the Cold War. As time permits, I have been updating the appendices with additional sources and hyperlinks to collections of operational files. Additional sources are available in the footnotes of Chapters 5-8 of the book. Feel free to contact me at [email protected] if you have any additional questions. (Last updated September 2019.) 1 Appendix I: U.S. Covert Regime Change during the Cold War Target State: Italy Dates: 1947-1968 Tactics: Covert – Election influence, psychological warfare Type of Operation: Preventive Regime Replaced: Yes Examples of Primary Sources: • Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, September 15, 1951, “Analysis of the Power of the Communist Parties of France and Italy and of Measures to Counter Them,” CIA-FOIA, Doc. CIA-RDP80R01731R003200020013-5. • National Security Council, “National Security Council Report: Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in Light of the Possible Communist Participation in Government by Legal Means,” CIA-FOIA, Doc. CIA-RDP78-01617A003100010001-5 • Central Intelligence Agency, February 1948, “The Current Situation in Italy,” CIA-FOIA, Doc. 0000008669 • National Security Council, March 8, 1948, “National Security Council Report: Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in Light of the Possible Communist Participation in Government by Legal Means,” CIA-FOIA, Doc.
    [Show full text]
  • WHY REGIME CHANGE Is (ALMOST ALWAYS) a BAD IDEA
    THE MANLEY 0. HUDSON LECTURE WHY REGIME CHANGE Is (ALMOST ALWAYS) A BAD IDEA By W Michael Reisman* Every impulse to protect the weak and help the infirm is noble. The impulse to use the means at our disposal to liberate a people from a government that poses no imminent or prospective threat to us, but is so despotic, violent, and vicious that those suffering under it cannot shake it off, is also noble.l The action that gives effect to that impulse may sometimes be internationally lawful. It may sometimes be feasible. It is often-but not always- misconceived. I. While we owe the currency and, for many, the notoriety of the term "regime change" to George W. Bush and his advisers, regime change in its modern usage-the forcible replace- ment by external actors of the elite and/or governance structure of a state so that the suc- cessor regime approximates some purported international standard of governance-is hardly their creation. States have long meddled in the politics of other states in order to change the governments there to their own liking, whether impelled by revolutionary political, racial, or religious ideology; fear; or sheer lust for power. Because there is no such place as the "inter- national arena," only the territories of states, much of what diplomats rather grandly style "inter- national politics" has always involved the use of such essential tools of statecraft as thuggery, bribery, and messing in other states to change specific policies or the regime as a whole. And as long as war was lawful, regime change was fair game.
    [Show full text]
  • Non-Proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change 7 Non-Proliferation and The
    Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change 7 Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Robert S. Litwak The Iraq war set an important historical precedent by being the first case in which forcible regime change was the means employed to achieve non- proliferation ends. In advocating this unique use of force, the Bush administration asserted that Iraq’s disarmament, mandated by the United Nations Security Council after the 1991 Gulf War, necessitated regime change because of Saddam Hussein’s unrelenting drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD).1 Although the US and British governments endeavoured to make the case for war based on international law – the Iraqi dictator’s flouting of multiple Security Council resolutions – war was ultimately waged without a legitimising UN imprimatur because of the political deadlock over the inherently contentious issue of regime change. Instead the military action was widely characterised in the American media as a decisive, even paradigmatic, application of the Bush administration’s September 2002 National Security Strategy document, which had formally elevated preemption as a policy option against ‘rogue states’ and terrorist groups in the post-11 September era.2 Viewed through that political optic, the war’s successful ousting of Saddam Hussein from power in April 2003 immediately raised the question as to how this precedent-setting case would affect US non-proliferation policy in addressing other hard cases. President George W. Bush laid down an ambitious marker when he boldly declared that the United States would not ‘tolerate’ the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea – the other two charter members of his ‘axis of evil’ (now dubbed by one observer as the ‘axle of evil’).
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq and the New American Colonialism Emmit B
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by DigitalCommons@CalPoly Moebius Volume 1 Article 10 Issue 2 Privacy 4-1-2003 Iraq and the New American Colonialism Emmit B. Evans California Polytechnic State University - San Luis Obispo, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/moebius Recommended Citation Evans, Emmit B. (2003) "Iraq and the New American Colonialism," Moebius: Vol. 1: Iss. 2, Article 10. Available at: http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/moebius/vol1/iss2/10 This The aG mut is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts at DigitalCommons@CalPoly. It has been accepted for inclusion in Moebius by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@CalPoly. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Evans: Iraq and the New American Colonialism Iraq and the New American Colonialism Emmit B. Evans The following maxim encapsulates the politics and history of the Middle East: There is a saying in the West that the Middle East is a region too important to the outside world to allow it to be governed by M iddle Easterners.1 Within this context, the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States can be under­ stood as a variation on an old colonial theme, but with significant new implica­ tions for the American public and the global community. The importance of the Middle East to the West is historically geopolitical. The region forms a strategic land bridge connecting trade routes between the conti­ nents of Europe, Asia, and Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of Arab Spring Throughout the Middle East and North Africa
    A MODEL OF REGIME CHANGE: THE IMPACT OF ARAB SPRING THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts By OMAR KHALFAN BIZURU BA, Al Azhar University, Egypt, 1996 MA, Institute of Arab Research and Studies, Egypt, 1998 Ph.D. Nkumba University, Uganda, 2019 2021 Wright State University WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL April 21st, 2021 I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Omar Khalfan Bizuru ENTITLED A Model of Regime Change: The Impact of Arab Spring Throughout the Middle East and North Africa BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts. Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. Thesis Director Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D. Director, Master of Arts Program in International and Comparative Politics Committee on Final Examination: _________________________________ Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs ___________________________________ Liam Anderson, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs ___________________________________ Awad Halabi, Ph.D. Department of History ___________________________________ Barry Milligan, Ph.D. Vice Provost for Academic Affairs Dean of the Graduate School ABSTRACT Bizuru, Omar Khalfan, M.A., International and Comparative Politics Graduate Program, School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State University, 2021. A Model of Regime Change: The Impact of the Arab Spring Throughout the Middle East and North Africa. This study examined the catalysts for social movements around the globe; specifically, why and how the Arab Spring uprisings led to regime change in Tunisia, why they transformed into civil war in some countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Syria), and why they did not lead to significant change at all in other places (Bahrain).
    [Show full text]
  • Inspiring Regime Change1
    Inspiring Regime Change1 Stephen Morris2 Mehdi Shadmehr3 1We are grateful for comments of Nemanja Antic, Dan Bernhardt, Raphael Boleslavsky, Georgy Egorov, Alex Jakobsen, Stefan Krasa, Elliot Lipnowski, Dimitri Migrow, Konstantin Sonin, seminar participants at the 2016 Columbia Conference on Political Economy, 2017 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2017 Wallis Institute Annual Conference on Political Economy, 2018 North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2019 Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) Meeting, 2020 AEA Annual Meeting, University of Chicago, University of Illinois, University of Michigan, University of Central Florida, University of Miami and Queen's University, and the discussions of Brenton Kenkel at MPSA, Mehmet Ekmekci at ASSA, Scott Tyson at the Wallis conference, and Alex Debs at the Columbia conference. We have received excellent research assistance from Elia Sartori. An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title \Reward and Punishment in a Regime Change Game." 2Department of Economics, MIT. Email: [email protected] 3Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago, and Department of Economics, University of Calgary. E-mail: [email protected] Abstract We conceptualize the process of inspiring regime change, characterize the optimal inspiration strategy, and study its consequences. Drawing from the literature, we formalize the process of inspiring regime change as a mechanism, in which a leader assigns psychological rewards to different anti-regime actions. Citizens face a coordination problem in which each citizen has a private, endogenous degree of optimism about the likelihood of regime change. Because more optimistic citizens are easier to motivate, optimal inspiration entails optimal screening: a mech- anism to implicitly parse citizens based on their degree of optimism.
    [Show full text]
  • Regime Change for Regime Values
    The Concept of Regime Values Are Revitalization and Regime Change Possible? Paper prepared for the Netherlands Institute of Government annual conference1 Enschede, November 20-21, 2008 Patrick Overeem Department of Public Administration Leiden University [email protected] Abstract The rise, since the 1980s, of the so-called constitutionalist approach in the study public administration is in large part the accomplishment of John Rohr. In this paper, an attempt is made to assess the usefulness of one of Rohr’s earliest concepts, viz. the concept of regime values. In particular, its applicability to regimes other than the United States is examined. After brief overviews of the constitutionalist approach in general and Rohr’s use of the concept of regime values in particular, it is argued that Rohr’s conceptualizations of both ‘regime’ and ‘values’ are problematic and lead to an inherent ambiguity within the concept of ‘regime values’ itself. Specifically, it remains unclear what the obligation to ‘uphold the Constitution’ means, both by itself and in relation to other obligations. The applicability of the concept of ‘regime values’ is affected by the typically American reference points Rohr uses, and can only be improved, it is suggested, by treating ‘regime values’ more frankly as an inherently normative concept. 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Research Workshop ‘Public Values and Public Interest’ in Copenhagen, May 28-31, 2008. 1. Introduction What has been true for Kant in philosophy and Rawls in political theory, for instance, also applies to John Rohr in public administration: great contributions to a discipline are typically not made by job-hopping pracademics doing consultancy work, but by ivory tower scholars working for decades in the same place with a fine brush on learned monographs.
    [Show full text]
  • 91 Template Revolutions
    Template Revolutions: Marketing U.S. Regime Change in Eastern Europe Gerald Sussman and Sascha Krader Portland State University Keywords : propaganda, U.S. foreign policy, democracy, Eastern Europe, National Endowment for Democracy Abstract Between 2000 and 2005, Russia-allied governments in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and (not discussed in this paper) Kyrgyzstan were overthrown through bloodless upheavals. Though Western media generally portrayed these coups as spontaneous, indigenous and popular (‘people power’) uprisings, the ‘color revolutions’ were in fact outcomes of extensive planning and energy ─ much of which originated in the West. The United States, in particular, and its allies brought to bear upon post-communist states an impressive assortment of advisory pressures and financing mechanisms, as well as campaign technologies and techniques, in the service of ‘democracy assistance’. Their arsenals included exit and opinion polling, focus groups for ‘revolutionary messaging’, and methods and training in ‘strategic nonviolent conflict’. Among the key foreign agents involved in the process of creating ‘transitional democracies’, as discussed in this study, are the United States Agency for International Development, the National Endowment for Democracy and its funded institutes, George Soros’s Open Society Institute, Freedom House, and the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. These developments are conceived as aspects of the larger neoliberal program of opening the Eastern European region for commercial, strategic military, cultural, and political domination by the G-7 countries. Four types of foreign assistance studied are: (1) political; (2) financial; (3) technical training; and (4) marketing (propaganda). Introduction The dissolution of Soviet power throughout the region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Central Asia excited a new kind of Western intervention, a ‘soft imperialism’ described in official lexicon as ‘democracy promotion’.
    [Show full text]
  • Responsibility for Regime Change Jay Butler [email protected]
    College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 2014 Responsibility for Regime Change Jay Butler [email protected] Repository Citation Butler, Jay, "Responsibility for Regime Change" (2014). Faculty Publications. 1815. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1815 Copyright c 2014 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW VOL.114 APRIL 2014 NO. 3 ARTICLES RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIME CHANGE Jay Butler∗ What obligations does a state have after it forcibly overthrows the regime of another state or territory? The Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention provide some answers, but their prohibition on interfering with the governing structure of the targeted territoryis outmoded. Based on a careful examination of subsequent practice of the partiestotheconventions,this Article asserts a new interpretation of these treaties and argues that regime changers are nowunderpositive obligations in the postwar period and beyond. Through their conduct and evaluation of modern regime-change missions, states, both individually and acting collectively through inter- nationalorganizations, have manifested revised understandings of obli- gations in the postconflict phase of military operations. Accordingly, this Article argues that regime-changing states now not only have Geneva- based direct obligations to establish security in the territory, promote rep- resentative local government, protect thehumanrightsofthelocalpopu- lation,assistwithpostconflictreconstruction, and safeguard minority groups while exercising control over the territory, but also that such states must ensure that the successor regime—whose installation their initial military intervention facilitated—is one that respects interna- tional human rights law.
    [Show full text]
  • Regime Change and Just War
    ARGUMENTS Regime Change and Just War Michael Walzer the consequence, not the cause, of the war fought by the allies. It wasn’t the aim of the wars declared in 1939 by Poland, France, and Britain to transform the German state. Rather, ast year marked the sixtieth anni- these were paradigmatic just wars; their cause versary of the end of the Second was resistance to armed aggression. And ac- World War and the beginning of re- cording to the just-war paradigm, resistance to Lgime change and democratization in Germany. aggression stops with the military defeat of the The allies confirmed their commitment to de- aggressor. After that, presumably, there is a mocratization at Potsdam in July of 1945, negotiated peace, and in the course of the ne- where the British provided an admirable ex- gotiations, the victims of aggression and their ample of what democracy means. Elections allies may legitimately look for material repa- were held in the United Kingdom while the rations and political guarantees against any fu- conference was going on; Winston Churchill, ture attack, but regime change is not part of the great wartime leader of his country, was the paradigm. It is a feature of just-war theory defeated—and immediately replaced at the in its classic formulations that aggression is meetings (Stalin must have been astonished) regarded as the criminal policy of a govern- by Clement Atlee, the leader of the Labour ment, not as the policy of a criminal govern- Party. This was a classic democratic moment: ment—let alone a criminal system of govern- the ability of the opposition to challenge and ment.
    [Show full text]