Variation in Cognitive Control As Emotion Regulation
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Psychological Inquiry An International Journal for the Advancement of Psychological Theory ISSN: 1047-840X (Print) 1532-7965 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hpli20 Variation in Cognitive Control as Emotion Regulation Blair Saunders, Marina Milyavskaya & Michael Inzlicht To cite this article: Blair Saunders, Marina Milyavskaya & Michael Inzlicht (2015) Variation in Cognitive Control as Emotion Regulation, Psychological Inquiry, 26:1, 108-115, DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2015.962396 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2015.962396 Published online: 09 Mar 2015. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 469 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 6 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=hpli20 Download by: [134.117.10.200] Date: 24 August 2017, At: 13:06 Psychological Inquiry, 26: 108–115, 2015 Copyright Ó Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1047-840X print / 1532-7965 online DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2015.962396 Variation in Cognitive Control as Emotion Regulation Blair Saunders Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada Marina Milyavskaya Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada and School of Psychology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada Michael Inzlicht Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada and Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada Few fields in psychological science are growing as and implementation systems calibrate ongoing infor- quickly as emotion regulation. Undoubtedly hastened mation processing toward the fulfillment of these by the introduction of the process model of emotion goals. Crucially, a continual monitoring process regulation (Gross, 1998), researchers have identified detects events that conflict with current objectives a broad array of emotion regulatory tactics, each serv- (e.g., errors or unwanted impulses), providing feed- ing to alter the intensity, duration, or quality of the back to the implementation systems about the fluctu- unfolding emotional response. In addition to being a ating need to increase or relax levels of control buoyant research area in its own right, concepts from (Botvinick et al., 2001; Carver & Scheier, 1990). emotion regulation have permeated multiple subdisci- Several existing models have identified ways in plines of psychology, including biological, cognitive, which controlled processes can regulate automatic clinical, developmental, personality, and social emotional impulses (Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & approaches, to name a few. Given this rapid expan- Hirsch, 2006; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Teper, Segal, sion, the time is ripe not only to take stock of recent & Inzlicht, 2013). Here, rather than further specifying advancements but also to formulate new ideas about how control processes might serve the regulation of the mechanisms that govern emotion regulation. In prototypical affective material (e.g., negative imag- this light, we welcome the synthesis and conceptual ery, distressing life events), we consider how the pro- development provided by the extended process model cess of regulating emotional experiences might apply of emotion regulation (Gross, this issue). However, to the calibration of cognitive control, even for tasks we also believe that the targets of emotion regulation that are not explicitly emotional in nature. In this might range further than is typically acknowledged regard, we suggest that emotional processing is inher- by existing models. Here, extending contemporary ently involved in goal-directed behavior. For exam- accounts of emotion regulation, we explore the idea ple, in addition to coldly representing the Downloaded by [134.117.10.200] at 13:06 24 August 2017 that the implementation of cognitive control—one requirements of the task at hand, our performance other emergent feature of the mind—can also be goals represent the value of successful performance; viewed as a form of emotion regulation, initiated to goal attainment is particularly valuable when goals reduce the unpleasant experience of challenges to align with overarching values and beliefs (Deci & goal-directed behavior. Ryan, 1985), are externally incentivized (Chiew & In broad terms, cognitive control underlies inten- Braver, 2011), or when a represented objective is per- tional action, calibrating attentional, cognitive, and sonally meaningful (Proulx, Inzlicht & Harmon- action systems to better attain performance goals, Jones, 2012). Consequently, we suggest that situa- particularly in novel or challenging situations tions requiring the use of control (e.g., conflict, errors, (Banich, 2009). Control is distinguished from auto- temptations) are particularly salient when goals are matic processing, where responses are implemented valued, triggering a transient negative affective state in a habitual and spontaneous manner. Of importance, that (a) can be characterized as a type of emotion epi- rather than reflecting the execution of a unitary psy- sode and (b) initiates regulatory action (Inzlicht & chological process, cybernetic approaches decompose Legault, 2014; Saunders & Inzlicht, in press). control into (at least) three core subsystems, including In this commentary, rather than directly critiquing goal setting, control implementation, and monitoring the extended process model (Gross, this issue), we (Carver & Sheier, 1990; Inzlicht, Legault, & Teper, note the generative nature of this model for under- 2014). First, goal setting represents current perfor- standing established cognitive control phenomena. mance intentions (e.g., name ink color, eat healthily), First, we present evidence that situations requiring 108 COMMENTARIES control trigger a negative emotional episode and then rapidity of these evaluations, the error-related nega- discuss two strategies (increasing control and shifting tivity (ERN)—an event-related potential that peaks priorities) that can be implemented to regulate this within 100 ms of error responses (Falkenstein, emotion. Finally, we articulate our view within a Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Gehring, broader, hierarchically organized, valuation process Gross, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993)—varies sys- that directs variation in control to achieve “cognitive tematically with events that increase or decrease the comfort”. affective significance of mistakes (Proudfit et al., 2013). Thus, collectively, these findings from diverse research disciplines converge to suggest that control- Control-Demanding Situations Trigger an demanding situations trigger an emotional episode, Emotional Episode characterized by negative valence, increased arousal, and the engagement of multiple affective response As described by Gross (this issue), emotions have systems. a multimodal structure: Emotional episodes begin with a situation or antecedent event that triggers an affective evaluation (positive vs. .negative), as well Variation in Cognitive Control as Emotion- as “loosely coupled” activation across several affec- Regulation tive response systems, including cognitive processing (e.g., attribution, appraisal), autonomic arousal (e.g., In the previous section, we articulated our view heart rate deceleration, pupil dilation, sweating), that situations requiring cognitive or self-control trig- facial expressions (e.g., frowning, smiling), behavior ger an emotion episode. Next, we consider what (e.g., running, fighting, dancing), subjective feelings adaptive purpose—if any—these task-related emo- (feeling anxious, happy, fearful), and characteristic tions serve. When defining the targets of emotion reg- patterns of neural activation (Coan, 2010; Russell, ulation, Gross (this issue) distinguishes between 2003). Consistent with this definition, considerable “helpful” and “harmful” emotions. Harmful emo- evidence now suggests that situations requiring con- tions—crippling despair, social anxiety, violent trol (e.g., conflict and errors) trigger an emotional anger—bear undesirable outcomes for the individual episode. (e.g., self-harm, social exclusion), and, therefore, are First, there is ample evidence that situations candidate targets for emotion regulation. On the other demanding cognitive control involve the basic “good hand, helpful emotions—the joy of friendship, disgust for me” versus “bad for me” valence judgments that for sources of contagion, pretest anxiety—drive are central to emotional experience. For example, actions with beneficial outcomes, and are therefore modified affective priming studies reveal that considered more welcome forms of affective experi- “conflict” primes (e.g., incongruent Stroop stimuli; ence. In our view, however, a strong distinction Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012) and response errors between “helpful” and “harmful” might represent a (Aarts, De Houwer, & Pourtois, 2012) facilitate and false dichotomy when identifying the targets of emo- interfere with the identification of subsequently pre- tion regulation. Instead, emotions might be consid- sented negative and positive targets, respectively. ered “helpful” in the extent to which they motivate Downloaded by [134.117.10.200] at 13:06 24 August 2017 Further indicating that control challenges are nega- seemingly adaptive behaviors to regulate exposure to tively valenced (Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003), “harmful” events. Feeling anxious before an impor- both conflict and errors provoke the contraction of tant exam, for example, might motivate