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INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type o f computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely afreet reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back o f the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION: POLITICAL PROCESSES AND POLICY OUTPUTS by Daniel B . O'Connor submitted to Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations Chair^^^ v— -----^ * Duncan Clarke William Kincade I t t x JU a m JL 1 ________ Philip Brenner IxiUg (-brb Xr w Louis Goodman, Dean a a. /frwr w f - Date 1997 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 '7-T&4* VU1MPTC11 OIlUBSmr.raokwv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 9809514 UMI Microform 9809514 Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Rood Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To my parents, who gave me life, and to Carol, who makes life worth living Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION: POLITICAL PROCESSES AND POLICY OUTPUTS BY Daniel B . O' Connor ABSTRACT This study examines two questions. Why was the Reagan Administration so successful in increasing military assistance in its first term and less successful in its second term? How did the executive branch and Congress make decisions regarding military assistance and how did this influence resource allocations? The Administration's successes in the first term in increasing the military aid budget can be attributed to: its consistent, high priority, approach toward security assistance requests, including the placement of competent officials to direct the program; weak leadership on the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee; Republican control of the Senate; and the breakdown of the legislative process for handling foreign assistance (and other) legislation. Four supporting factors also played an important role in Reagan's first-term success: the results of the 1980 and 1984 ii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. elections, the low-cost nature of FMS loan guarantees, diffuse views of members of Congress on the subject of military aid, and the advantage that the executive branch generally enjoys over the legislature in the area of foreign policy. The primary reasons for the Administration's lack of second term success in increasing or even maintaining the overall level of resources and country programs were: budgetary pressures and the increasing urgency of reducing the budget deficit, more vigorous leadership in the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee, the loss of the Senate to the Democrats following the 1986 elections, and a thaw in superpower relations following the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in 1985. This study also reveals some of the difficulties of using foreign assistance to support foreign policy priorities. As a tool of foreign policy, military assistance suffers from (among other things) the following: difficulty in reacting to sudden developments, problems in the prioritization of recipients, and fostering unrealistic expectations among aid recipients. The Reagan approach damaged the foreign policy authorizing committees in Congress. The result of the authorization process breakdown was the emergence of a iii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. somewhat new legislative approach to managing foreign assistance in which the appropriations bills carried the policy provisions normally found in authorizing bills. That legacy remained long after the Reagan Administration had left office. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A dissertation represents the love, encouragement, and work of many individuals expressed through the scholarship of one. For all her love, support, and tireless editing, I wish to thank first and foremost my lovely wife, Carol Messing, to whom this work is dedicated. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my family and in-laws for all their support over this long process. Without their selfless support for Carol and myself during the difficult days of 1997, this dissertation could not have been completed. My thanks also to my good friend Raphael Cung and my friends and fellow doctoral students Jason Ellis, Lou Klarevas, Ralph Dell' Aquila and the American University community for all their support and encouragement. To my committee I owe a great deal of thanks. Their faith in me never wavered through the long years of research and writing. Dr. Duncan Clarke has been a mentor, colleague, and friend throughout my years at American University. His insights are reflected throughout the dissertation. Dr. William Kincade provided invaluable substantive and editorial assistance as well as the v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. understanding perspective of someone who worked full-time while writing a dissertation. Finally, Dr. Philip Brenner challenged my assumptions and broadened my perspective. His criticism improved the quality of the dissertation. I also owe many thanks to the former government officials who agreed to be interviewed for this project. Dr. Henry Gaffney and Mr. Glen Rudd, formerly of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, and former government officials who agreed to be interviewed anonymously, provided critical insights into the process and decisionmaking for military assistance. Without their help, this study could never have been written. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .................................................ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................... v LIST OF T A B L E S ...........................................ix LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.................................... xi Chapter 1. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY ............. 1 Military Assistance in Foreign Policy Research Design Research Design Concepts in Policymaking Literature on Security Assistance Conclusion 2. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE.........................................41 Regional and Functional Distinctions Conclusion 3. DECISION MAKING FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE .... 78 Actors and Roles Formulating Administration Policy: Process Conclusion 4. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN P O L I C Y ................ 131 Constitutional Authority and Military Aid Influencing Policy Through Authorizations and Appropriations Legislation vii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Role of Congress Lobbies for Security Assistance Committees in Congress Conclusion 5. APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE . 179 Appropriations Committees Foreign Operations Subcommittees Conference between House and Senate Continuing Resolutions and Military Aid Changed Nature of Appropriations Legislation Administration Requests and Congressional Appropriations: 1981-1988 Conclusion 6. CONCLUSION..................................... 252 Approach Explaining Administration Success: First Term Evaluating Reagan's Second-Term Setbacks Military Assistance and Foreign Policy Conclusion BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... 286 V1U Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES • Table 1. FMS and MAP Assistance to Israel and Egypt, FY 1982-1985 54 2. FMS and MAP Assistance to Israel and Egypt, FY 1986-1989 56

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