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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION: POLITICAL PROCESSES AND POLICY OUTPUTS
by
Daniel B . O'Connor
submitted to
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
in
International Relations
Chair^^^ v— -----^ * Duncan Clarke
William Kincade
I t t x JU a m JL 1 ______Philip Brenner
IxiUg (-brb Xr w Louis Goodman, Dean a a. /frwr w f - Date
1997 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 '7-T&4*
VU1MPTC11 OIlUBSmr.raokwv
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UMI Microform 9809514 Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI 300 North Zeeb Rood Ann Arbor, MI 48103
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To my parents, who gave me life, and to Carol, who makes life worth living
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION: POLITICAL PROCESSES AND POLICY OUTPUTS
BY
Daniel B . O' Connor
ABSTRACT
This study examines two questions. Why was the
Reagan Administration so successful in increasing military
assistance in its first term and less successful in its
second term? How did the executive branch and Congress make
decisions regarding military assistance and how did this
influence resource allocations?
The Administration's successes in the first term in
increasing the military aid budget can be attributed to: its
consistent, high priority, approach toward security
assistance requests, including the placement of competent
officials to direct the program; weak leadership on the
House Foreign Operations Subcommittee; Republican control of
the Senate; and the breakdown of the legislative process for
handling foreign assistance (and other) legislation. Four
supporting factors also played an important role in Reagan's
first-term success: the results of the 1980 and 1984
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. elections, the low-cost nature of FMS loan guarantees,
diffuse views of members of Congress on the subject of
military aid, and the advantage that the executive branch
generally enjoys over the legislature in the area of foreign
policy.
The primary reasons for the Administration's lack of
second term success in increasing or even maintaining the
overall level of resources and country programs were:
budgetary pressures and the increasing urgency of reducing
the budget deficit, more vigorous leadership in the House
Foreign Operations Subcommittee, the loss of the Senate to
the Democrats following the 1986 elections, and a thaw in
superpower relations following the ascension of Mikhail
Gorbachev to power in 1985.
This study also reveals some of the difficulties of
using foreign assistance to support foreign policy
priorities. As a tool of foreign policy, military
assistance suffers from (among other things) the following:
difficulty in reacting to sudden developments, problems in
the prioritization of recipients, and fostering unrealistic
expectations among aid recipients.
The Reagan approach damaged the foreign policy
authorizing committees in Congress. The result of the
authorization process breakdown was the emergence of a
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. somewhat new legislative approach to managing foreign
assistance in which the appropriations bills carried the
policy provisions normally found in authorizing bills. That
legacy remained long after the Reagan Administration had
left office.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A dissertation represents the love, encouragement,
and work of many individuals expressed through the
scholarship of one. For all her love, support, and tireless
editing, I wish to thank first and foremost my lovely wife,
Carol Messing, to whom this work is dedicated. I also owe a
debt of gratitude to my family and in-laws for all their
support over this long process. Without their selfless
support for Carol and myself during the difficult days of
1997, this dissertation could not have been completed. My
thanks also to my good friend Raphael Cung and my friends
and fellow doctoral students Jason Ellis, Lou Klarevas,
Ralph Dell' Aquila and the American University community for
all their support and encouragement.
To my committee I owe a great deal of thanks. Their
faith in me never wavered through the long years of research
and writing. Dr. Duncan Clarke has been a mentor,
colleague, and friend throughout my years at American
University. His insights are reflected throughout the
dissertation. Dr. William Kincade provided invaluable
substantive and editorial assistance as well as the
v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. understanding perspective of someone who worked full-time
while writing a dissertation. Finally, Dr. Philip Brenner
challenged my assumptions and broadened my perspective. His
criticism improved the quality of the dissertation.
I also owe many thanks to the former government
officials who agreed to be interviewed for this project.
Dr. Henry Gaffney and Mr. Glen Rudd, formerly of the Defense
Security Assistance Agency, and former government officials
who agreed to be interviewed anonymously, provided critical
insights into the process and decisionmaking for military
assistance. Without their help, this study could never have
been written.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... v
LIST OF T A B L E S ...... ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...... xi
Chapter
1. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY ...... 1
Military Assistance in Foreign Policy
Research Design
Research Design Concepts in Policymaking
Literature on Security Assistance
Conclusion
2. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE...... 41
Regional and Functional Distinctions
Conclusion
3. DECISION MAKING FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE .... 78
Actors and Roles
Formulating Administration Policy: Process
Conclusion
4. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN P O L I C Y ...... 131
Constitutional Authority and Military Aid
Influencing Policy Through Authorizations and Appropriations Legislation
vii
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Lobbies for Security Assistance
Committees in Congress
Conclusion
5. APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE . 179
Appropriations Committees
Foreign Operations Subcommittees
Conference between House and Senate
Continuing Resolutions and Military Aid
Changed Nature of Appropriations Legislation
Administration Requests and Congressional Appropriations: 1981-1988
Conclusion
6. CONCLUSION...... 252 Approach
Explaining Administration Success: First Term
Evaluating Reagan's Second-Term Setbacks
Military Assistance and Foreign Policy
Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 286
V1U
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• Table
1. FMS and MAP Assistance to Israel and Egypt, FY 1982-1985 54
2. FMS and MAP Assistance to Israel and Egypt, FY 1986-1989 56
3. FMS and MAP Assistance to Base-Rights Countries, FY 1982-1985 58
4. FMS and MAP Assistance to Base-Rights Countries, FY 1986-1989 59
5. FMS and MAP Assistance to Pakistan and Thailand, FY 1982-1985 62
6. FMS and MAP Assistance to Pakistan and Thailand, FY 1986-1989 63
7. EMS and MAP Assistance to Selected Base-Access Countries, FY 1982-1985 65
8. EMS and MAP Assistance to Selected Base-Access Countries, FY 1986-1989 67
9. EMS and MAP Assistance to El Salvador and Honduras, FY 1982-1985 71
10. EMS and MAP Assistance to El Salvador and Honduras, FY 1986-1989 72
11. EMS and MAP Assistance to Africa, FY 1981-1985 74
12. EMS and MAP Assistance Africa, FY 1986-1989 75
13. Congressional Staffing: 1981-1989 ...... 178
ix
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14. Continuing Resolutions and Foreign A i d ...... 233
15. Measures of Change in Appropriations Legislation...... 239
16. FY 1982 Final Appropriations...... 242
17. FY 1983 Final Appropriations...... 242
18. FY 1984 Final Appropriations...... 243
19. FY 1985 Final Appropriations...... 243
20. FY 1986 Final Appropriations...... 245
21. FY 1987 Final Appropriations...... 246
22. FY 1988 Final Appropriations...... 246
23. FY 1989 Final Appropriations...... 247
24. Military Assistance Requests and Congressional Funding, FY 1982-1985 .... 247
25. Military Assistance Requests and Congressional Funding, FY 1986-1989 .... 248
x
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Figure
1. Military Aid Requests and Appropriations, FY 1982-1989 249
xi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1
MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY
Against the trend of steady decline in military
assistance spending beginning in the 1960s, the Reagan
Administration increased military assistance spending in the
early 1980s to its highest level since 1965.1 Such a
development was remarkable given the usual unpopularity of
military assistance with the public, and the fact that a
conservative Republican Administration was paired off with a
House of Representatives controlled by the Democrats.
Through an investigation of policymakers' beliefs and
policymaking roles with respect to military assistance
during the Reagan Administration, this dissertation seeks to
understand the reasons for the rapid increase in military
assistance in the early 1980s and the reductions in military
assistance that followed in the late 1980s.
This study focuses on the then two principal military
^his level excludes military aid to East Asia during the Vietnam war and a one-time Carter Administration package to support the Camp David accords. Military assistance spending peaked in 1984 at $7.7 billion, in 1965 the figure was $7.8 billion. Both figures are in constant 1989 dollars. See Stanley Heginbotham, An Overview of u.s. Foreion Aid Programs (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service), 30 March 1988, 17.
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. assistance programs within the security assistance program:
the Foreign Military Sales Credit program (EMS) and the
Military Assistance Program (MAP) .2 These programs were the
largest and most -important appropriated elements of the arms
transfer section of the security assistance program and
accounted for about one-half of all security assistance each
year during the 1980s.3 During the first Reagan
Administration, resources devoted to military assistance
(MAP and EMS) increased substantially, from roughly $4
zThere is a brief description of these programs in Craig M. Brandt, "Introduction," in Craig M. Brandt, ed.. Military Assistance and Foreign Policy (Wright-Patterson AFB: Air Force Institute of Technology, 1989), 3-5. In FY 1989, the MAP and FMS credit programs were merged into a renamed Foreign Military Financing Program (EMFP) . This study retains the terms FMS and MAP. During the Reagan Administration, under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, loans or credits were provided for the purchase of military equipment under sec. 503(a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. The United States had no reversionary rights to the equipment purchases under EMS by assistance recipients. Transactions financed by the Military Assistance Program (MAP) during the Reagan years came under sec. 503(a) (3), and, similarly, the United States did not have reversionary rights. Under the traditional MAP program in the 1950s-1970s the United States provided equipment (usually surplus) directly and retained reversionary rights to the equipment or on profits from the sale of the equipment. See Congress, House, Comnittee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987: Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations. 99th Cong., 2nd sess., part 3, 1986, 284.
’Military assistance is a subset of security assistance, and some analysts use the terms interchangeably.. For the purposes of this study, military assistance refers to EMS and MAP. Security assistance refers to EMS and MAP, but also to International Military Education and Training funds, Economic Support Funds, Peacekeeping Account Funds as well as smaller accounts such as anti-terrorism assistance. Although the focus of the study is on military assistance, the term security assistance will be used when the activity or action being described pertains to the broad range of security assistance activities. Some analysts use the terms military assistance or security assistance to refer to cash sales of arms made to, for example, Saudi Arabia, cash sales are excluded from this study.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. billion in FY 1982 to around $6 billion in FY 1985.* The
'quality' of that assistance was also enhanced. In 1981,
most U.S. assistance was in the form of loans at market
interest rates. By 1988, over 90 percent of US military aid
consisted of grants, and loans were at concessional (below
market) rates of interest.5
Military Assistance in Foreign Policy
Military assistance is one of several tools for
implementing foreign policy. Military assistance
represents, in essence, the allocation and application of
tangible resources to foreign policy. It involves the
expenditure of funds that could be used for alternative
purposes, domestic or international. The program can be
seen as a microcosm of much of American foreign policy,
representing both bellwether and substance of America's
involvement in global affairs during the Cold War.
Resources provided by the United States to another
country become part of that nation's domestic political
equation, since some internal actors within the recipient
nation benefit from U.S. aid. Assistance directly affects
the lives of citizens in other nations. Moreover, through
the aid program, the United States supports some regimes and
‘See Table 16 and 19 in Chapter 5.
’See discussion and tables in Chapter 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. threatens or undermines others. Professed American values
are sometimes challenged when security interests are pitted
against international law, the principles of the American
democratic tradition, and respect for human rights. In El
Salvador, military and security assistance supported a pro-
American government in battling Marxist-oriented Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (EMLN) guerrillas.
Assistance to Pakistan and Honduras supported friendly
governments in those nations and facilitated covert
assistance to 'freedom fighters' in neighboring Afghanistan
and Nicaragua, respectively.
In terms of military deployment, security assistance
facilitated America's global strategy of forward defense
after 1946. Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain and the
Philippines hosted major American military installations and
received aid in return. The Reagan Administration and its
predecessors used security assistance to expedite base
access agreements with several Asian, Latin American, and
African nations, allowing for American wartime deployment to
their national military bases.6
In domestic political terms, security assistance was
a constant battleground in the Reagan Administration, one
'See Larry Q. Newels, "Economic Security Assistance as a Tool of American Foreign Policy: The Current Dilemma and Future Options," (Washington, D.C.: The National Defense University, 1987), photocopied.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. which arose annually during the authorization and
appropriations process.7 The program's attributes blended,
and continue today to blend, foreign and domestic policy.
Security assistance is an 'internest ic' issue,
"simultaneously, profoundly, and inseparably both domestic
and international."8 James Lindsay and Randall Ripley find
that Congress's handling of foreign policy is coming to
resemble its handling of domestic policy.9 For the president
and members of Congress, this gives the program an electoral
dimension.
Since the inception of the program in the 1940s,
Congress has always been deeply involved in security
assistance policy through the authorizing and appropriations
processes. Yet the traditional processes by which Congress
considered security assistance requests and made policy
through the foreign assistance legislation changed during
the Reagan years. The authorizing process became moribund
and the appropriations process played an increasingly
7Gerald F. Warburg, Conflict and Consensus: The struggle Between Congress and -the- fccal dent .over .Egxeiqn, Policymaking (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), 234.
'Bayleas Manning, "The Congress, The Executive, and Internestic Affairs: Three Proposals," Foreign Affairs 56, no. 1 (January 1977): 309.
'Randall B. Ripley and Janes M. Lindsay, "Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: An Overview," in Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Peffflgg. Policy, on Capitol Jill, eds. Randall B. Ripley and Janes M. Lindsay (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 8-12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. important role in policy issues.
Thus it is evident that security assistance was and
remains an important, interventionist tool of U.S. foreign
policy. It has been a program with important foreign policy
and executive-legislative ramifications that underwent
dynamic change during the Reagan Administration.
Research.Questions
The research design of this study seeks to explain
policy developments during the Reagan Administration by
addressing two key questions. First, why was the Reagan
Administration successful in increasing military assistance
between 1981 and 1984, but considerably less successful in
doing so from 1985 through 1988? Second, how did the
Administration and Congress make programmatic decisions for
military assistance?
Three interrelated subquestions are addressed with
respect to the executive branch. First, what beliefs about
the international system and about the efficacy of military
aid guided decisionmakers? Second, how was military
assistance policy made in the executive branch during the
Reagan Administration? Third, how did executive branch
actors interact with each other and how effectively?
Understanding the congressional role in military
assistance is also essential. Hence, four subquestions are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. proffered to probe the role of Congress in the process.
First, how did the internal congressional dynamics
concerning the role of the appropriations and authorizing
committees influence congressional consideration of military
assistance requests? Second, why did the authorizing
process break down? Third, what beliefs about the
international system and the efficacy of military aid guided
the leaders of the appropriations subcommittees? Finally,
how did the appropriations subcommittees of Congress that
determine military assistance resource levels perceive their
roles and how did these perceptions change over time?
Approach
To answer these questions, executive and
congressional processes and the factors influencing those
processes must be studied. Two sets of factors are most
important: the policymaking roles or positions (what an
actor is able to do) that members of the executive branch
and Congress have in the military assistance decisionmaking
process and actor beliefs (what an actor desires to do)
about the substance of foreign policy, the international
system, and the efficacy of military assistance as a tool of
foreign policy.
Those affecting or attempting to affect foreign
policy do so from two bases. First, policymakers are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. individuals whose decisionmaking is shaped by their beliefs,
knowledge# understanding of history, and personalities.
They have opinions and, perhaps, worldviews that have been
shaped over their lifetimes. "Beliefs represent specific
explanations, hypotheses, or theories that an individual is
convinced are valid in a given moment in time."10 Belief
systems allow decision makers to cope with the vast array of
information and advice received on specific issues and serve
as a filter for information.11 Systems of beliefs generally
resist change over time.
Second, decisionmakers are players immersed in roles
and positions in the executive or legislative arenas. They
are, for instance, presidents, secretaries of state, members
of Congress, or representatives of private interests— with
all the advantages and encumbrances that those roles and
positions in government entail. These roles may cause the
players to form institutional biases, and, as a consequence,
have institutional interests to protect.
Policymaker and legislator roles will be shaped by
several sources, arising both from their positions within
l0Matthew A. Mallet, "The Constancy of Political Worldviews: Continuity and Change in the Beliefs of Pour American Presidents," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, April 1992.
“Ole Holsti, The Operational Code as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief system*, Pinal Report to the National Science Foundation (Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1977), 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the U.S. Government and their careers prior to government
service.12 The values and roles a person had prior to his
or her entry into government service are important. For
example, it probably makes a difference if the
undersecretary for security assistance in the State
Department was a former member of Congress or a career
diplomat. The values individuals form from each role may
differ significantly.
The government position a person occupies also
influences role expectation. For military assistance, the
role of the head of the Defense Security Assistance Agency
differs from that of an assistant secretary at the State
Department or that of a member of the Foreign Operations
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. All
these people are concerned with military assistance, but
each has additional concerns stemming from their respective
positions in government.
Individual roles are influenced by an
administration's foreign policy. The undersecretary for
security assistance in the Carter Administration implemented
a different policy than did her counterparts in the Reagan
I2On this, see James N. Rosenau, "Roles and Role Scenarios in Foreign Policy," in Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Stephen 6. Walker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 46. For more discussion of role, see Katarina Brodin, "Belief Systems, Doctrines, and Foreign Policy," Cooperation .and .Conflict f (1972): 101.
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Administration, because of contrasting approaches each
administration had toward security assistance. Related to
this, commitments by previous administrations will strongly
influence their successors' policies, especially if those
commitments have strong congressional backing.
Neither of these sets of factors, roles or beliefs,
necessarily determine the behavior of a foreign policy
actor. The behavior of human beings is not' narrowly
determined. They often act contrary to what their roles and
positions seem to require. Nevertheless, an examination of
these factors can offer some insight into foreign policy
behavior.13
Methodology
Determining the beliefs of decisionmakers is not
easy. Jerel Rosati notes that there are three sources
available to the analyst to determine beliefs: transcripts
of private discussions, interviews with participants, and
official public statements.14 Ideally, all three should be
employed. Source materials used in this study include:
interviews with most of the key security assistance
policymakers from the Reagan Administration, published and
“Mallet, 7.
14Jerel A. Rosati, "The Impact of Beliefs on Behavior: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration," In Foreign Policy Decision-Mating: Perception. Cognition and Artificial Intelligence! eds. Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (Mew York: Praeger, 1984) ', 162.
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unpublished executive and legislative branch materials
pertaining to military assistance, the testimony of State
and Defense Department officials before the House and Senate
Foreign Operations Subcommittees, the opening statements of
the chairmen of those subcommittees, and subcommittee
hearings and reports.
Many important participants in the Departments of
Defense and State, as well as in the House and Senate, have
been interviewed. These interviews were conducted both on
and off the record for informational purposes. While a few
common questions were asked, most of the questions were
tailored to the interviewee, based on his or her position
and time of government service. Overall, twenty-five
interviews were conducted in 1993 and 1994. Interviews
filled the gaps in the public record and were essential for
providing insight regarding beliefs and role conceptions.
Journalists' accounts of the process occasionally supplement
the interviews.
One potential problem is that of "validity." That
is, do the statements of interviewees reflect their actual
beliefs? Rosati noted that officials need to maintain
credibility with their audience and thus cannot be found to
be saying things radically different in private from public.
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utterances.15 Assistance in validating interviewees'
statements was provided by the public materials cited above
and by the results of other interviews.
Another potential problem with this type of research
is the problem of "representivity. * Brodin addresses this
issue:
Problems of representivity (using statements of a single or a few single individuals to focus on a decision making unit) should not be too difficult. It is reasonable to assume that top authorities, at least in their public statements, demonstrate a large degree of agreement on the central issues.16
Rosati, in his study of the Carter Administration, also
supports Brodin's position on the question of
representivity, noting that an actor may even influence
himself/herself with his or her own declarations.17
This study uses the concepts of belief and role to
explain the actions of policymakers. In doing so, it uses
qualitative data and social science literature to determine
the beliefs and roles of individuals and institutions. Thus
this study will not cognitively map subjects nor will it
present detailed statistical analyses of role behavior.
Qualitative and quantitative data will be presented to
Rosati, "The Impact of Beliefs on Behavior," 163.
lsBrodin, ill.
I7See Rosati, "The impact of Beliefs on Behavior," 158-191; and Jerel A. Rosati, "The Carter Administration's Image of the International System: The Development and Application of a Belief System Framework" (Ph.D. Dissertation, The American University, 1982).
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support the description and analysis of roles and actions.
Research Design. Concepts in I’plicymakinq
Scholars studying executive and legislative branch
decisionmaking in foreign policy have both directly and
indirectly discussed the function that role and beliefs play
in decisionmaking. In the next sections, the concepts of
belief and role will be examined in the context of executive
and legislative branch policymaking.
Executive Branch Policymaking
The scholars and practitioners who developed the
political process and bureaucratic politics approaches to
decisionmaking analysis recognized the influence of roles
and beliefs upon processes and, ultimately, outcomes.18
l*The political process model was developed In the late 1950s and early 1960s by Varner Schilling, Samuel Huntington, and Roger Hilsman. In his analysis Robert J. Art sunned up the key aspects of the political process model by noting: political power Is widely disbursed at the national level; participants In the process have different views on what they would like to see done, and have different conceptions of their roles in the process; political leadership is exercised primarily through persuasion; foreign policy-making is thus a process of building consensus and support for a policy among those who can affect the outcome; and finally, the content of the policy reflects the necessity and conditions by which it was forged. On the political process model, see Varner Schilling,"The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Strategy. Politics and Defense Budgets, eds. Varner R. Schilling, Paul T. Hammond, and Glen H. Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); Samuel Huntington, The conmon Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); Roger Hilsman, "The Foreign Policy Consensus: An Interim Report," Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 (December 1955): 361-382; Robert J. Art,"Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences 4 (Fall 1973):467-490; and Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 Warner Schilling, one of the early proponents of the
political process school, did not believe that content could
be determined by looking exclusively at process. In his
study, he notes the interaction of ideas and process in the
development of defense budgets.
The kind of budget chosen, while nHmarily a result of the ideas policy-makers have about the problems involved, will also be influenced by the kinds of political processes in which their choices are made, and. . .the character of this process is itself a matter of political choice.19
The bureaucratic politics model followed the
political process model in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The idea of "shared images" is a central, if unexplored,
part of the model as developed by Graham Allison and Morton
Halperin.20 The beliefs of players regarding policy are
“Schilling, 17 (emphasis added) .
20irithin the bureaucratic politics model organizational interests are seen as most important, so much so that the proposition "where you stand depends upon where you sit” has become incorporated as a central axiom of the model. Organizational conceptions of roles and missions are additional components of bureaucratic politics analysis. Stronger organizational support is found for missions which the organization considers central. The well-being of national interests is seen as a subset of organizational well-being, in the player's view, organizational health is vital to the national interest. For a discussion of the models see Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Theory and Policy in International Relations, eds. Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972). This model is a modified successor version to the Governmental Politics Model and the Organizational Process Model outlined by Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971). See also Jerel A. Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,” World Politics 33, no. 2 (January 1981): 236- 238; and Morton Halperin,"Why Bureaucrats Play Games,” Foreign Policy 2 (Spring 1971):70-90.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15
crucial variables in setting the stage for bureaucratic
interaction on issues. Allison and Halperin state that:
Beneath the differences that fuel bureaucratic politics is a foundation of shared assumptions about the basic values and facts. These underlying assumptions are reflected in various attitudes and images which are taken for granted by most players. .. .Most participants accept those images, their idea of the national interest is shaped by these attitudes, and their arguments are based on them.21
Lawrence Freedman notes in his critique that "there is
little concern as to who is responsible for the shared
images and the faction channels' that regulate the political
ebb and flow."22
Many analysts of bureaucratic politics agree that the
shared images and assumptions, as well as the external
forces oh policy, are fruitful areas of study. As Jerel
Rosati concludes:
. . .to actually determine the nature of the decision making process, knowledge beyond the decision structure must be considered. The beliefs, personalities, and modes of thinking of the participants will have a direct effect on the decision-making process. In addition, external forces will have an influence on the perceptions of the participants.’ These two clusters of variables— decision context and decision participants— must be analyzed for each decision structure in order to determine the exact nature of the decision-making process. "23
“Lawrence Freedman, "Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Process: A Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Model,” International Affairs 52, no. 3 (July 1976): 439.
“ Ibid., 440.
“Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework," 251.
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Similarly, Robert Art concludes that once the non-
bureaucratic constraints are accounted for, the bureaucratic
» ones count for very little.24 Freedman urges examination of
"those things that the participants take for granted: the
shared images, assumptions and beliefs, and the 'rules of
the game. * "2S
Military assistance policymaking is part of the
larger process of making policy within the executive branch.
The first influence on a new Administration's policy likely
will be the commitments and policies of its predecessor. To
a large degree, policymaking tends to be incremental.
Policymakers concentrate on modifying the details of an
existing policy, not on restructuring the core of that
policy.26 Incrementalism assumes the legitimacy of previous
policy. New programs and policies are modifications of an
already accepted base program.27 Indeed, much of foreign
policy involves the maintenance of pre-existing
relationships and incrementalism fits well with the
stability sought in maintaining relationships.
z*Art, 486.
“ Freedman, 449.
z(Charles E. Lindblom,"The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" Pnhiie Administration Review 19, no. 2 (Spring 1959): 79-88.
“Thomas Dye, Understanding Public Policy. 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Publishers, 1978), 32. Also for a discussion of Incrementalism In policy based on Lindblom, see Michael T. Hayes, Incrementalism and Public Policy (New York: Longman Press, 1992).
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Aaron Wildavsky notes the Influence of incrementalism
in budgeting:
Incremental calculations. . .proceed from an existing base. By base I refer to the commonly held expectations among participants in budgeting that programs will be carried out close to the going level of expenditures. The base of a budget, therefore, refers to the accepted parts of programs that will not normally be subjected to intense scrutiny.20
Wildavsky notes that it was easier for bureaucrats to obtain
approval of budget proposals from Congress if the budgets
contained only small, incremental changes from prior
budgets.29 Absent a sharp change in relevant conditions,
requesting too large a funding increase can damage
organizational credibility, especially with Congress.
However, a small amount Of padding was traditionally
inserted to guard against cuts.30
This is not to say that all changes have been
incremental. Administrations do make major policy changes,
most commonly in their first year in office. These policy
shifts result largely from the beliefs brought in by the new
Administration and the roles that the individual
“Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting: a Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1986), 11.
“Aaron Wildavsky, The -Politics of the Budgetary Process. 4th ed. (Boston: tittle. Brown and Co., 1984).
30This has changed somewhat in recent years with general budget tightening due to the deficit. For a discussion of the influence of budget deficits on recent budgeting see Aaron Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process (New York: Harper Collins, 1992).
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policymakers create £or themselves in the executive branch.
When major policy changes are made, decisions have to be
acceptable to a minimum number of groups and individuals.31
To sum up, the literature on executive branch
decisionmaking processes demonstrates the importance of
roles and beliefs in understanding decision outcomes.
Chapters two and three of this study will focus on the major
actors in the Administration, their roles in the policy
process, and their beliefs concerning the use of military
assistance in foreign policy.
Congressional Policymaking
The role of Congress and the beliefs that key members
of Congress have about military aid form the second area
that must be explored in order to understand military
assistance policymaking in the Reagan Administration.
Although it has a constitutionally-sanctioned major role in
foreign policy, in practice Congress plays a much smaller
role in the foreign policy realm than in the domestic policy
arena, where constituent and local interests carry great
sway. Foreign policy is dominated by the president and he
sees it as his rightful domain. Within the foreign affairs
nBarb«ra Farnham discusses the importance of - acceptability of' policy as an absolute concern of policymakers. See Barbara Farnham, "Political Cognition and Decision-Making," Political Psychology 11, no. 1 (March 1990): 96.
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realm, Congress is at its strongest when it comes to funding
decisions, where its constitutional prerogatives regarding
appropriations come into play. As James Lindsay observes,
"When it comes to structural decisions, congressional
influence over foreign policy is at its- greatest and
presidential influence is at its weakest.1(32 Structural
policy "governs how American resources will be used to
achieve foreign policy goals."33 Furthermore, by granting
or denying resources, "Congress's considerable say in
structural policy gives it indirect leverage over strategic
policy. "3<
Security assistance decisionmaking has unique
qualities that blend structural and strategic policy; thus
it represents an area where both Congress and the executive
branch play strong roles. As elected representatives,
members of Congress have a major role to play in matters of
foreign policy. Under the Constitution Congress controls
many of the broad implements of foreign policy such as
ratification of treaties, approval of trade and commercial
agreements, declarations of war, and setting immigration
policy. Many other aspects of foreign policy
32James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 156.
33 Ibid •
3*Ibid., 157.
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congressional assent. Through the foreign assistance
authorization and appropriations processes. Congress has the
power to involve itself more broadly in foreign affairs, but
in many instances chooses not to do so.
Congress is not an implementing institution, and it
has difficulty getting the executive branch to embrace
i congressional policy preferences. In general, it is easier
for Congress to bar programs than initiate new ones.35
The easiest way to bar a program is to cut or eliminate its
funding or to stipulate how funding will be spent. Thus, as
Lindsay states, "the treaty power has given way to the
appropriations power as Congress*s primary tool for shaping
foreign policy."36
Given congressional control over funding decisions
and the centrality of funding to military assistance,
decisions "made" by the executive branch regarding proposed
security assistance allocations or policy provisions are not
final. Instead, they are opening bids in a bargaining
process with Congress that the executive branch can
influence but cannot control. Through the appropriations
35lbid., 158-159. in fact, in an earlier article Lindsay notes that on balance, "legislative victories on foreign policy appear to be the exception rather than the rule." See James M. Lindsay, "congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters,” Political Science Quarterly 107, no. 4 (Winter 1992-93): 610.
3CLindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. 30.
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power, Congress determines resource levels and can choose to
determine how these resources will be directed.37 The
executive, of course, implements security assistance
legislation. Security assistance decisionmaking, therefore,
takes place within an environment of shared powers, but
where neither Congress and the president can dominate.
Both the president and Congress jealously defend
their prerogatives. As a general rule, the branches do not
use their powers to trample on the exclusive constitutional
authority of the other.38 However, the lines of authority
are often blurred, particularly in the national security
area. Since security assistance falls squarely within the
purview of foreign policy and national security policy,
executive branch officials believe they should have the lead
in allocating foreign assistance within the broad
legislative guidelines set by Congress.39 The Congress often
takes a different approach. Since security assistance is
funded by Congress, the legislative branch has a
„ 37See Jeffrey Meyer, "Congressional Control of foreign Assistance," Yale Journal of International Law 13 (Winter 1988): 89-91.
3'Thomas E. Mann, "Making foreign Policy: President and Congress," in A Question of Balance: The President. The Congress and Foreign Policy, ed. Thomas E. Mann (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989), S.
3'see on this point, Larry A. Mortsolf and Louis J. Samelson, "The Congress and U.S. Military Assistance," in Military Assistance and Foreign Policy, ed. Craig M. Brandt (Wright-Patterson APB: Air Force Institute of. Technology, 1989), 161-165.
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constitutionally-sanctioned central role.40
The executive and legislative branches are not locked
in constant struggle. Neither branch is a monolith and on
many policy questions there is often agreement among
segments in each branch and very often, disagreements among
different elements within one branch of government. For
example, House Democrats and Republicans often disagree,
and, State Department and Defense Department officials
frequently disagree. In matters concerning role
conceptions, however, members of each branch are usually
united in defense of their prerogatives. Executive branch
efforts to secure funds not fully accountable to Congress
generally meet with swift and united congressional
opposition.
Congress wants its role in the process respected.
Under the Constitution and by congressional rules, programs
are authorized and funds are appropriated for authorized
programs. These processes are central to Congress's role in '
the government.
Within Congress, roles have changed as well, with the
appropriations subcommittees for foreign operations gaining
in stature relative to the foreign affairs and foreign
relations authorizing committees. The inability of the
<0see Meyer, 69-110.
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authorizing committees of Congress to enact authorizing
legislation contributed importantly to a shift of power to
the House and Senate Appropriations' Subcommittees on
Foreign Operations.41 This study focuses particular
attention on two key actors in U.S. foreign policy that have
thus far received limited attention, the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees and, especially, their
Subcommittees on Foreign Operations.42
Literature on Security Assistance
There is a large and diverse literature on security
assistance since World War II. This study seeks to build on
this literature, contribute conceptual insights and- a
description of how security assistance policymaking
functioned during the Reagan Administration. Several themes
emerge from the literature.
4IThomas Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 249-253; and John Sewell, William E. Hellert with William Garber in The President. Congress, and Foreign Policy, eds. Edmund D. Muskie, Kenneth Rush, and Kenneth Thompson (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986), 268-270. For background on the House Appropriations Committee see Richard Fenno, The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966).
“Two works describe the subcomnittees ip some detail: Joseph White, "Decision Making in the Appropriations Committees on Defense and Foreign Operations," in Congress Resurgent: Defense and Foreign Policy on caoitol Hill, eds. Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Azin Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 183-207; and Franck and Weisband, 251-253.
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Security Assistance and Foreign Policy
The first theme to emerge from much of the literature
is that all presidents since the 1940s have used security
assistance to support their foreign policy goals.43 In the
1940s and 1950s, the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations
used security assistance to support American policy in
Europe and East Asia.44 For the Truman Administration,
military assistance served the purpose of psychological and
political reassurance for recipient nations.45 For the
Eisenhower Administration, security assistance offered an
inexpensive method to fight global communism. In the 1960s,
grant assistance declined rapidly in the regions outside of
“A good overview of military assistance and its relationship to foreign policy goals is provided in Richard F. Grimnett, "The Role of Security Assistance in Historical Perspective," in U.S. security Assistance; The Political Process, eds. Ernest Graves and Steven A. Hildreth (Washington, DC: Center for strategic and International Studies, 1985), 1-41. Another good overview, also in Graves and Hildreth, is Steven A. Hildreth, "Perceptions of U.S. Security Assistance, 1959-1983: The Public Record," 41-101. See also, Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. 0rConnor, and Jason D. Ellis, Send Guns and Money: sacucity. flaaiataacft.auKi Amccican focciaa .Palicv (New fork*, praeger Publishers, forthcoming 1997).
“On the Truman and Eisenhower Years, see Paul Hamnond, David Louscher, Michael Salomone and Norman Graham, The Reluctant Supplier: U.S. Decl-ttonmaicing for Arms Sales (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Publishers, 1983); Charles Wolf, Jr., Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Andrew W. Westwood, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1966).
“Chester A. Pach, Arming the Free World: The Origins, of the Military Assistance Program. 1945-1950 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Oh the Truman Administration, see also William A. Brown, Jr. and Redvers Opie, American Foreign Assistance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1953).
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East Asia and the sale of military equipment increased.46
Kennedy and Johnson used aid to support their policy
initiatives in East Asia and Latin America, including
internal security support in both regions.47
In the 1970s, Richard Nixon used arms sales to
bolster his foreign policy in the Kiddle East and East Asia.
Security assistance and arms transfers supported the Nixon
doctrine of allowing regional allies to assume a greater
burden for their own defense.48 The Carter Administration
questioned the heavy use of arms transfers as a foreign
policy instrument, but nevertheless increased arms sales to
the Middle East.49 The Reagan Administration used arms
sales and security assistance to pursue its global foreign
policy. Reagan increased assistance to Central America,
Africa, the Middle East, and base-rights nations. The
Reagan Administration policies will be explored in more
detail in Chapter 2.
4*See Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance:. A_ Studv of Policies and Practice (New York: Praeger Studies in International Political and Public Affairs, 1966); and David J. Louscher, "The Rise of Military Sales as a'U.S. Foreign Assistance Instrument," Qrbis 20, no. 4 (Winter 1977): 933-964.
47See Hovey; and Harold J. Clem, Collective Defense and Foreign Assistance (Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1968).
“Lewis soriey, Anna Tranafsra .Pndoi Mixon i .A Pollsy. Aaalvaia (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1983).
49Joanna Spear, Carter and Arms Sales: Implementing the Carter Administration's Arms Transfer Restraint Policy (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995).
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From the literature one can understand how
administrations since florid War II have used security
assistance to bolster their foreign policies. This study
builds on the literature and outlines the approach of the
Reagan Administration for using security assistance to
bolster its foreign policy. It also analyzes how the
Administration approached Congress for military assistance
funding and details the dynamics by which the Administration
influenced Congress's consideration of security assistance
legislation and actually hastened a transition in the way
Congress considered security assistance.
Arms Transfer Policy and Process
Scholars have also assessed the rationales for arms
transfers. These rationales include political leverage,
increased security of allies and friends, economic benefits
to U.S. industry, base-rights and access, and even the
prevention of nuclear proliferation.50 These arguments were
used by the Reagan Administration and will be considered in
Chapter 2.
Scholars over the years also began to examine not
just how various administrations used security assistance to
support their foreign policy goals, but how administrations
*°See Andrew J . Pierre, The Global Politics of nrma Sales (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 15-30.
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approached the question of arms transfers themselves. In
the 1950s, arms transfer policy was assessed against the
necessity of economic rebuilding, particularly in Europe.51
Policy questions in the 1960s revolved around the increased
ability of Europe to pay for arms, and the need to increase
arms sales and decrease grant assistance. These assessments
did not question the legitimacy of arms transfers, either
grant or sale, as a policy tool. In the 1970s, policymakers
and scholars began to assess the legitimacy of arms
transfers as a foreign policy instrument. While the Nixon
and Ford Administrations did not issue an arms transfer
policy statement, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger did
discuss the Ford Administration's criteria for arms
transfers in congressional testimony.52 The Carter
Administration went further than the Ford Administration and
articulated a strong arms transfer policy that emphasized
restraint of the use of arms transfers as a tool of foreign
policy.53 The Carter Administration went so far as to begin
“ See Brown and Opie.
“ Paul c. Warnke and Edward c. Luck, "American Arms Transfers: Policy and Process in the Executive Branch," in Arma Transfers and American Foreign Policy, ed. Andrew J. Pierre (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 202-204.
“There are numerous studies of the Carter Administration's policies. A good recent analysis is in Spear, chapter 5. Good assessments are also offered by Jo L. Husbands, "How the United States Makes Foreign Military Sales," in Anna Transfer8 in the Modem. World, eds. Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 155-161; and Pierre, The Global Politics of Anna Sales. 52-62.
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negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms transfer
restraints, although the effort collapsed due to internal
divisions within the Administration.54 The Reagan
Administration policy (which will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 2) differed sharply from the Carter policy and
emphasized the utility of arms transfers in promoting
American foreign policy goals.55
Many scholars have focused on the process by which
arms transfers are considered within the executive branch.56
Chester Pach describes sharp disputes within the bureaucracy
with respect to the program during the Truman
Administration.57 During that time the Department of
Defense was reluctant to encourage arms transfers while the
State Department was more willing to use arms transfers to
support diplomacy. Security assistance research in the
S4See Barry M. Blechman, Janne E. Nolan and Alan Plant, "Pushing Arms," Foreign Policy 46 (Spring 1982): 142-150.
“Andrew J. Pierre analyzes the Reagan arms transfer statement and policy in Pierre, The slobal Politics of Arms Salas. 62-68; and in Andrew J. Pierre, "Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 60, no. 2 (Winter 1981-82): 275-282; and see also Hammond, Louscher, et al, Chapter 6.
5*M.T. smith, "U.S. Foreign Military Sales: Its Legal Requirements, Procedures, and.Problems," In Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Military Buildun in Less Industrial Countries, eds. Uri Ra'anan, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 345-387; Joseph P. Smaldone, "U.S. Commercial Arms Exports: Policy, Process, and Patterns," in Marketing Security AaaiatAPCC; New j’cripcctivca on Anna Salca# eds. David T. Louscher and Mike D. Salomone (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 185-208; Spear, 20-38; Husbands, 161-166; and Warnke and Luck, 213-220.
S7Paeh, 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1970s focused on. actors In the bureaucracy that considered
the transfer of major weapons systems and how those actors
interact. The financing of credit sales was not an issue of
study. Other scholars, such as Salomone and Louscher or
Kramer have addressed the process with regard to credit
sales. Salomone and Louscher provide an excellent overview
of the steps in the process for determining the budget, but
not of the relative strength of the actors in the process.58
Kramer's description demonstrates the importance of
budgetary considerations in determining EMS levels and
emphasizes the part played by the program in maintaining
political relationships with recipient nations.59
Noel Koch and Jeffrey Lefebvre highlight the
differing perspectives of those in the bureaucracy that take
a global, or generalist, view of foreign policy by dint of
their officials positions, and those concerned with specific
geographic regions. These differing perspectives can lead
to differences of opinion within the U.S. bureaucracy with
regard to arms transfers.60 This study examines the
5>Salomone, Louscher eh al, 95-99.
5,Franklin D. Kramer, "The Government's Approach to Security Assistance Decisions," in U.S. Security Assistancei The Political Process, eds. Ernest Graves and Steven A. Hildreth (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), 105-109.
<0See Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Anna for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia. 1953-1991 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), Z6-27; and Noel Koch, "U.S. Security Assistance to the Third World," Journal of International Affairs 40, no. 1 (Winter
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generalist-regionalist debate within the U.S. security
assistance bureaucracy and how the Reagan Administration
effectively dealt with the problem.
The important factor missing from these process
studies is an evaluation of how different administrations
attempted to ensure that the process used by the bureaucracy
to determine security assistance allocations served to
foster the foreign policy goals of the United States, as
determined by each administration. This dissertation
examines key actors in the State and Defense Departments,
particularly lesser-studied actors, such as the
undersecretary of state for security assistance, to
determine how officials holding those positions during the
Reagan Administration worked with each other and Congress to
support the president's security assistance request.
Congress and Security Assistance
Through the literature, the strong role of Congress
in the construction of security assistance policies is
evident. Congress has used security assistance legislation
to influence policy and to embody the collectively
determined views of the Congress into law.61 Traditionally,
1986): 43-57.
slBrown and Opie; Wolf; John D. Montgomery, The Polities of Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962); and Hovey.
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Congress has been skeptical concerning the provision of
military assistance, and almost always cuts executive branch
requests for military assistance.
During the 1940s, Congress believed that military
assistance should be tied to collective defense structures
such as NATO.*2 During the Eisenhower Administration,
Congress continued to make cuts in the program and became
increasingly uneasy with U.S. aid to Europe, which had
recovered rapidly from the Second World War.*3 Holcombe and
Berg highlight congressional concern regarding the military
assistance program, noting that the program had developed in
a crisis environment in the Truman and early Eisenhower
years and the expectation that, "if the crisis were met, the
job would be accomplished."*4 Congress would also not
provide mutliyear authorizing legislation for the program
sought by the Eisenhower Administration.65
Harold Hovey described the development of the
military assistance program up to 1966. He noted Congress's
continuing concern with program management issues, but
outlined two key propositions with regard to military
szBrown and opie.
“Wolf; and Montgomery.
“John L. Holcombe and Alan Berg, Mao for Security (Columbia, SC: University- of South Carolina School of Business Administration, 1957), 10.
“Ibid., 23; and Montgomery, 209-210.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. assistance. First, he observed that the foreign aid bill
represented the best opportunity for members of Congress to
discuss the direction of U.S. foreign policy with officials
of the executive branch. Second, he noted the trend for
Congress to appropriate lump sums to the president for
assistance and to permit the president to determine aid
allocations among countries. Hovey outlined three reasons
for appropriation of lump sums: (1) Congress saw aid as a
tool of U.S. foreign policy controlled by the president; (2)
the need for flexibility as the United States might have
needed to shift assistance depending on developments; and
(3) the difficulty of any- other approach in managing the
process.66
By the 1970s many in Congress doubted the wisdom of
America's foreign policy and were skeptical about the use of
arms transfers to support that policy. Congress took a more
active role in foreign policy than it had in the 1950s or
1960s, although it had traditionally played a strong role in
the security assistance area. Congress's perception of its
role became critical in the early and mid 1970s.
The work of Richard Moose and Daniel Spiegel
demonstrates the importance of how Congress's perception of
its role in the foreign policy process influences its
“Hovey, 213-214.
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approach, to security Assistance legislation. William
Fulbright's actions in 1973 to foster a stronger
congressional role by using the foreign assistance
authorizing bill to bring Congress into the policy process
demonstrated the changing nature of the debate.67 The
Vietnam war and its aftermath "precipitated in the Congress
a widespread reassessment of what type of aid policies were
generally in the U.S. interest."68
In the debate surrounding the 1976 International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, members of
Congress had to decide what role Congress should play in the
process. Many in Congress were dubious about having
Congress involved in the details of the arms sales, citing
issues of congressional competence.69 In the end, Congress
increased its powers to review executive branch arms sales
actions.70 Moose and Spiegel concluded by noting the
limitations of Congress in making foreign policy by stating:
The Congress can deny funds, and grant or take away statutory authority. But this is usually a reactive process. As such, it is not well suited for efforts to fine-tune or to participate in the day-to-day
"Richard M. Moose and Daniel L. Spiegel, "Congress and Arms Transfers," in Arm* Transfers and American Foreign Policy, ed. Andrew J. Pierre (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 230-232.
"Moose and Spiegel, 233.
"Ibid., 240-241.
70Ibid., 242-243.
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implementation of policy.71
The role of Congress in foreign policy and the part
that security assistance would play in foreign policy raged
throughout the Reagan Administration♦ In their analysis of
the foreign assistance debates of the 198Os, both Cynthia
Amson and Gerald Warburg highlight role-related issues#
such as Congress's setting of conditions for assistance
recipients# which importantly shaped the role of Congress in
foreign policy by using the foreign assistance legislation
to force the executive to pay more heed to congressional
concerns.72 This study adds to the ongoing debate and
assessment of Congress's role in foreign policy and how
Congress uses foreign assistance to influence its role.
This dissertation adds a new dimension to the debate by
analyzing how the changes in the process for considering
foreign and security assistance influenced Congress's role
in foreign policy.
Congress's impact on foreign policy from the 1940s
through the 1970s occurred in large part through the foreign
assistance debates in the House Foreign Affairs and Senate
Foreign Relations Committees. The authorization bills
7lIbid., 258.
^Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroadsi Conorm s . the Reanan Administration, and Central Amanda (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 210-211; and Warburg-,. 232.
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established the policy guidelines for security assistance
and represented the path by which Congress could influence
foreign policy through the annual measure it passed.73
Authorization legislation indicated congressional concern in
foreign relations and the state of executive-legislative
relations generally. Scholarship usually concentrated on
these committees.
By the 1980s, however, the authorizing process was
moribund, and an analysis of it yielded less insight into
Congress's approach to foreign affairs and assistance and
somewhat more insight into the problems of the authorizing
committees themselves.74 For example, Barbara Hinckley's
analysis of Congress's consideration of foreign assistance
using the authorizing process as a guide ends up asking how
the security assistance budget could double in a few short
years during the Reagan Administration when no foreign aid
authorizing bills were being passed.75
Over the years, the appropriations committees
received some attention from scholars. Appropriations bills
were not usually analyzed, although cuts from the
73See Hovey, Chapter 13.
7*Warburg, Chapter 8; and Lindsay, congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy.
7SBarbara Hinckley, Less than Meets the Ever Foreign Policy Making and the Mvth of the Assertive Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 122.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. president's request were discussed by some authors. Hovey,
for example, examines the appropriations committees and
their subcommittees on foreign operations, but he was
chiefly concerned with the slow consideration of the foreign
aid bill by these committees, not with the viewpoints of the
members of the committees.76 Michael Kent O'Leary examined
the role that Otto Passman played in the 1950s and 1960s as
the chairman of the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee,
and is one of the few scholars to recognize the importance
of that position in shaping the foreign assistance bill.77
This study concentrates on the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees and their Subcommittees on Foreign
Operations. These committees passed bills that, in some
form, became law each year. Just as scholars examined Otto
Passman in the 1960s due to his impact on the foreign aid
legislation, the House and Senate subcommittee chairmen in
the 1980s had a substantial impact on the foreign assistance
allocations and consequently on American foreign policy.
This dissertation examines each of the foreign operations
subcommittee chairmen.
7sHovey, 209-212.
""Michael Kent O'Leary, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), 74.
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Critical Perspectives
The critical literature questions the policy process
and framework for transferring arms and argues strongly for
general restraint in arms transfers and an increase in
public and congressional scrutiny with respect to the arms
transfers process.78 Scholars'and activists critical of the
program highlight the role U.S.-provided security assistance
has played in political repression, particularly in Latin
America.79 Anthony Sampson, for instance, notes the strong
interconnection between arms sales, the arms industry, and
the executive and legislative branches of government.80
This study does not directly address many of the
probing and normative concerns found in the critical
literature. However, it does examine policymaker's
conceptions of military assistance. This should be useful
to analysts of U.S. security assistance and Reagan
Administration foreign policy, regardless of their political
dispositions.
7*Michael T. Klare, American Anna Supermarket (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984); and Anthony Sampson, The Arms Ba?aar: From Lebanon to Lockheed (New York: Viking Press, 1977)'.
’’Klare; and Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Arnson, Supplying Repression; U.S., Support, for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981).
•°Sampson; see also Spear, 52-56.
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Literature Summary
This dissertation builds on existing literature
discussed above and adds distinct -perspectives. First, it
uses the variables of role and belief to approach policy
development. It explores the role of Congress and the
executive branch concerning security assistance policy.
The study examines executive branch processes for
determining security assistance budgets and policy, and it
demonstrates how an Administration can structure the
processes to ensure its priorities are met. It also
discusses, the position of the undersecretary of state for
security assistance in more detail than has been previously
done and demonstrates how this office can be the linchpin of
the security assistance process.' The dissertation also
examines the Reagan Administration's strategy with respect
to the important House and Senate authorizing and
appropriations committees. Other studies discuss executive-
legislative interaction, but have not explored the question
of administration influence on the congressional processes
and the idea that an administration would sabotage certain
processes in Congress in the foreign assistance area.
Moreover, the dissertation adds to scholarly understanding
of the House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees.
Previous literature focused more on the authorizing
committees, but they were much less important in the Reagan
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Administration.
Additionally, this dissertation also offers a
snapshot of a critical transitional period. It was during
the Reagan Administration that the authorizing process
became moribund. Congress needed to adapt to this
development, and that adaptation is here discussed. There
was also a transition from loans to grant assistance. This,
too, is examined.
Finally, the dissertation contributes to the
literature on the Reagan Administration itself. It offers
insights on policymaking based on interviews with officials
who managed American foreign policy during the last years of
the Cold War. Thus it offers a resource to future scholars
studying the Reagan Administration and its foreign policy.
This dissertation addresses the question of why the
Reagan Administration was more successful in increasing
military assistance levels in its first t e m than in its
second term. The next two chapters focus on the executive
branch. Chapter 2 discusses the Administration's arms
transfer policy and regional approach to military
assistance, while Chapter 3 examines the Reagan
Administration's process and strategy for requesting
military assistance resources from Congress and for
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allocating those resources. Chapters 4 and 5 .examine issues
of congressional process. Chapter 4 discusses the foreign
aid authorizing process and its problems during the Reagan
years. Chapter 5 focuses on the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees and their Subcommittees on Foreign
Operations. The conclusion. Chapter 6, revisits and answers
the research questions posed in Chapter 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 2
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE
A former Reagan Administration official stated that:
One of the things that Reagan knew was that he totally disagreed with the Jimmy Carter approach to foreign policy/ which in his view was bassackwards/ where you went out and tried to win away enemies and fence-sitters and you treated your friends with relative neglect if they were lucky and contempt if they weren't. Reagan turned it around and friends came first, then fence- sitters and enemies came last. . .It was through the foreign aid budget that we could make the point about treating friends, neutrals and enemies.81
The Reagan Administration entered office worried
about the decline of American military power and what it
perceived as the growing power of the Soviet Union.82
Administration foreign policy goals included:
restoration of. . .Western economic and military strength; the reinvigoration of. . .relationships with friendly states;. . .and the achievement of a relationship with the Soviet Union based on greater Soviet restraint and reciprocity.83
“Former Department of Defense official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 11 August 1994,.
“James L. Buckley, "Arms Transfers and the National Interest," Department, of State Bulletin. July 1981, 51.
“Robert E. Osgood, "The Revitalization of Containment," in The Reaaan Foreign Policy, ed. William G. Hyland (New York: New American Library, 1984), 27-28. Oye notes that the Administration did not consider the defeats in the Third World to be "peripheral." See Kenneth A. oye , "Constrained Confidence and the Evolution of Reagan Foreign
41
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The Reagan Administration espoused the view that the Soviet
Union was a dangerous adversary growing in power, but the
Soviets had overextended themselves and were thus vulnerable
at the geopolitical periphery.84 Using the application of
American military aid and arms transfer resources, the
United States could challenge the Soviet Union at the
periphery.85
Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance,
Science and Technology (hereafter cited as Undersecretary
for Security Assistance or just Undersecretary) James L.
Buckley told Congress that the United States, in addition to
rebuilding its own military strength, needed to help its
allies rebuild their militaries in order to deter
aggression.86 Although military power alone could not solve
the problems facing the international community, the
Administration believed increasing instability was a problem
that needed to be addressed. In addition, increasing
security assistance resources would allow some governments
Policy," in Eagle Resurgent?: The Reagan Era in American Foreign. Policy, eds. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (Boston: Little, Brown and company, 1987), 22.
“Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Reagan. Realism and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984), 26.
“See Pierre, 1981/1982.
“Buckley, 1981, 52; and Alexander M. Haig, Jr., "Security and Development Assistance," Department of State Bulletin. April 1981, Special Section, p. B.
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allied with the United States, such as El Salvador, to
battle guerrilla insurgencies which the Administration
believed were supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba. In
meeting these challenges, the Administration could
demonstrate American leadership.87
Buckley criticized Congress, for having "adopted a
series of restrictions on sales to nations whose behavior. .
.we disapprove of."88 He found that these restrictions did
not affect the behavior or intentions of these nations, but
did undercut their self-defense capabilities.89 The Reagan
Administration downplayed human rights-related criteria for
arms transfers.
One of the first actions the Reagan Administration
undertook upon entering office was to eliminate the Carter
Administration's restrictions on arms transfers.90 Chief
among these was the so-called "leprosy letter," which
directed U.S. Government representatives overseas not to
assist American defense industry representatives in
concluding arms sales contracts with foreign countries.91
’’Buckley, 52.
••ibid.
•*Ibid.
"For a comparison of Reagan and Carter Administration policies, see Pierre, Global Politics of Arms Seles. 62-68.
wIbid., 64.
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Carter had called arms sales an "exceptional instrument" of
foreign policy and sought to impose a ceiling on arms sales
and overall security assistance. The Reagan approach was
very different.
Undersecretary of State Buckley blasted the notion
that arms transfers were morally suspect. He asserted that
Carter's policies had weakened "U.S. influence over the arms
policies of other nations by encouraging them to seek the
weapons they needed from other suppliers."92 Buckley noted
that Carter's restrictive policy fell most heavily on those
nations of secondary-level importance to the United States
that had less political clout.93 The Administration, in
contrast, would be an advocate for countries it believed to
be of strategic importance but which lacked powerful lobbies
with which to pressure Congress for aid. The goal of this
advocacy was to develop a broader array of security
assistance relationships in the developing world. The
Administration argued that these enhanced relations would
both increase the recipients' defense capabilities and
assist in the development of cooperative relationships to
enhance America's global power-projection capabilities.94
“Buckley, 52.
“ Ibid.
“-Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,- Department of state Bulletin. September 1981, 64.
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On July 9, 1981, the White House released the formal
Reagan Administration policy on conventional arms transfers
and security assistance. This document superseded the 1977
Carter directive, Presidential Directive 13.95 The Reagan
Administration's statement termed arms transfers "an
essential element of its global defense posture and an
indispensable component of its foreign policy."96 According
to the directive, the policy would help deter aggression,
increase interoperability between U.S. and foreign
militaries, demonstrate U.S. commitment to its friends'
security, foster stability, and help enhance U.S. defense
production capabilities.97
The policy stated that requests for arms would be
evaluated "primarily in terms of their net contribution to
enhanced deterrence and defense."98 Criteria for granting
requests included: (1) an assessment of military threat to
the recipient, (2) the degree to which the transfer affected
regional stability, U.S. forces, and the financial burdens
of the recipient, and (3) whether the positives of the sale
95For a review of Carter policies, see congress. House, Conmittee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Security Assistance and Arms Transfer Policies for the 1980s. staff Report, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981; and Spear.
’‘"Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,” 61; and Pierre, Global Politics of Arms Transfers. 63.
*7Ibid.
“ Ibid.
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outweighed the negatives." Decisions on arms transfers
were to be made on a case-by-case basis. The Administration
did not want to add to the burden on allied economies
through arms transfers and stated that "in appropriate
cases. . .we [will] be prepared to finance those transfers
on terms that will enable them to take place."100
The Administration's view on the value of the
military assistance investment was best summed up in the
following statement made by a former DSAA director:
Arms sales give us a relationship with a country that we would not have otherwise, and a great deal of leverage. It survives the ups and downs of politics. It's very often low key, but when we need it we can use it. And it enables us to protect American interests without putting Americans at risk. A few bucks goes an awful long way in these countries.101
As the policy evolved, the United States increasingly
supplied those bucks as grants to recipients. As one State
Department official stated, "We have to decide if a friendly
country deserves our military help, and if it does, we will
give the help without draining their reserves."102
"ibid.
100Buckley statement to the Senate Connittee on Foreign Relations, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin. September 1961, 64. Buckley highlighted the Administration's proposed interest subsidies for such nations as Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya and Thailand.
lalFoxmer DSAA Director, Interview by Barry Blechman, October 8 , 1987, in Barry Blechman, The. Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy {Hew York: Oxford, 1990), 119.
102Quoted in Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S., in New Policy, Makes Aid on Arms a Grant to Israel," Mew yark riwm*. December 16, 1983, Al.
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Administration officials cited the insecurity of the
Arabian peninsula, North Africa, and East Asia, the need for
base-rights and access; and Soviet deliveries of large
quantities of sophisticated arms to its regional allies, as
reasons for increased arms transfers and security
assistance.103 The Administration also sought to bring more
order to the planning process for military assistance
through mechanisms such as joint planning commissions.104
In summing up the Reagan approach, Buckley said:
[W]hat we do expect to see as our policy is applied is a qualitative shift in the kinds of countries with which we will be concluding sales. They will include a large number of developing countries which desperately need more effective means of defending themselves against very real or potential threats, countries with which we want to develop cooperative relationships so that, in times of crisis, we may be able to more effectively project our own power and thus help deter aggression. In short we need the greater flexibility required to merge defense and foreign policy goals through enhanced assistance to friends and allies. . .105
Several themes emerged in the Reagan Administration's
security assistance program in early 1981. Above all, the
world was seen as a hostile place, due largely to Soviet or
l03See testimony of Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology James Buckley in U.S. congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,, Conventional. Arms Sale*. Hearing, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981. Hereafter cited as conventional Arms Sales.
lwSee testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense for international Security Affairs Francis J. Vest in conventional nrma Sales. 19.
l0SBuckley, "Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee," 64.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Soviet-inspired threats. The governments of some American
allies were threatened and the Administration wanted to show
the world that it would stand by its friends. Human rights
and nuclear non-proliferation were less important to the
Administration, at least initially, than building relations
with important Third World clients through arms transfers.106
The Administration was also concerned about increased Soviet
power-projection capabilities and its willingness to use
force in Afghanistan. While Administration officials did
promote aspects of the policy such as interoperability and
enhancement of U.S. defense production capabilities in its
testimony to Congress, the heart of the policy was the
cultivation and support of allies in the developing world as
part of the competition with the Soviet Union.107 In
supporting this policy, arms transfers were a central
element of global defense and foreign policy, not an
exceptional instrument.
The developing world became a key arena for American
arms transfers, and countries that previously received no
security assistance now received it. Using security
l0*Later on, human rights would become more important due to congressional pressure. See Tamar Jacoby, "Reagan's Turnaround on Human Rights," Foreign Affairs 64, no. 5 (Sumner 1986): 1066-1087.
l01While military assistance contracts were, of course, welcomed by defense contractors, the substantial volume of equipment orders by the U.S. military services in the early 1980s was the primary factor in enhancing U.S. defense production capabilities.
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assistance, the United States wanted to demonstrate its
commitment to its allies. In many cases the United States
was prepared to finance some or all of these transfers to
developing countries and other allies. Finally, the
Administration believed in most cases that U.S. interests
overrode the detrimental economic or other effects of arms
transfers on those nations.
Functional and Regional Distinctions
The Reagan Administration organized military aid on
the basis of several functional/regional categories in an
attempt to better integrate military aid and the larger the
foreign assistance budget with specific foreign policy
goals.108 This approach evolved over time, but by 1984 the
categories were: "Middle East Peace," "Base-Rights," "Front-
Line/Base-Access," "Central America and Caribbean," "All
Other." The Middle East was the top priority for both the
executive branch and Congress. Military aid to base-rights
countries and aid to Central America was important to the
Administration, but less so to Congress. Assistance to
I0'The presentations to Congress were made by the regional assistant secretaries of state and deputy assistant secretaries of defense for international affairs who discussed the request by region rather than by category. Statistics were also kept by country and region, not by category. The categories served primarily as an internal organizing tool. Richard Aherne, former foreign service officer posted to the Office of the Undersecretary for Security Assistance, interview by author, tape recording, Washington DC, 4 August 1994. See also James L. Buckley, "FY 1983 Security Assistance Requests," Department of state Bulletin, July 1982, 78.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. front-line nations, aside from. Pakistan, and nations that
provided access to military facilities was a lower priority
than aid to the Middle East and base-rights nations.
Finally, sub-Sahara Africa was at the bottom of the list,
and indeed this aid was virtually eliminated when budgets
were reduced by Congress in the latter half of the 1980s.
Middle East Peace
The Administration's security assistance policy to
the Middle East was rooted in the policies pursued by
Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Jimmy Carter in the 1970s.109
Upon entering office, Reagan inherited Carter's Camp David
commitment and he provided the resources for its
implementation.
The Administration also used assistance to underpin a
series of policy initiatives in the region. In 1981, the
Administration briefly pursued a policy of "strategic
consensus" in the Middle East attempting to unite Israel,
Egypt, and the Gulf states against Soviet expansionism in
the region. Assistance to Israel and Egypt, coupled with
arms sales to the Gulf states, was intended to support the
10*See William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward -the ArafrrlggacU Conflict. 1967-1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1979); and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle; Memoirs of_the National Security advisor. 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983).
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strategy.110 The policy quickly foundered, in part because
only the United States seemed to accept the common enemy
thesis. For example, when Secretary Haig discussed the sale
of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia with then Israeli Foreign
Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Haig reported that, "I described
the sale as an element of the defense of the free world;
Shamir spoke of holy war and anti-Semitism."111 With
strategic consensus a non-starter, the Reagan Administration
instead pursued a series of policy initiatives designed to
bolster the peace process, strengthen defenses in the Gulf
area, and limit Syrian influence in Lebanon.
Throughout the Reagan years and thereafter, Israel
received more U.S. military assistance resources than any
other nation. Insuring that Israel was secure from military
attack formed a cornerstone of America'a Middle East aid
policy. Israel enjoyed considerable support in the
Administration. However, when differences of opinion arose,
Israel was not hesitant to voice its objections to Congress
on Administration policy. For example, Israeli officials
sorely tried the patience of the Reagan Administration by
vociferously opposing the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi
U0See Osgood, 43.
ulHaig, 179.
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Arabia.112
Pro-Israel supporters also lobbied Congress for
additional aid resources. In his memoirs, former Secretary
of State George Shultz recalls that in December 1982,
despite the vociferous opposition by himself and the
President regarding a $250 million increase in military aid
to Israel, the supplemental funding "sailed right by us and
was approved by Congress as though President Reagan and
myself had not even been there."113 In 1983 the
Administration, entered into a series of 'strategic
cooperative' agreements with Israel and by 1984 the
Administration agreed to fund the Israel's military aid
program at $1.8 billion in forgiven EMS loans each year,
starting in FY 1985.114
112Haig, 173-174. In the end, to mollify Israel, the Administration requested an additional $300 million in resources for two years for Israel to purchase additional military equipment. Ibid,. 177. As Dr. Henry Gaffney noted years later, "We waited to see if the $300 million [in extra funding] would stop after two years, but of course it didn't." Thus Israel gained additional military aid resources. Dr. Henry Gaffney, foxmer Director of Plans for the Defense Security Assistance Aqency, interview by author, tape recording, Alexandria, Virginia, 25 February 1993.
^George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Tftmrnh: M v Years as Secretary of state (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 112. This occured after the Sabra and Shatila massacres, in which Israel was complicitous. See Ibid., 105-112. See also "Reagan Now Backs Increase in Aid for Israel," New York Time*. 26 May 1983, 13.
U 40n strategic cooperation, see Duncan L. Clarke, "U.S. Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically Untouchable?" Middle Beat Journal 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 206.The total security assistance package to Israel, including Economic Support Funds ($1.3 billion per year), totaled over $3 billion per year. EMS is defined in Chapter 1, note 2. ESF is economic aid granted for national security purposes. It can be in the form of cash transfers, development assistance projects.
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Israel represented a unique case in terms of
linking politics and assistance. Israel could effectively
lobby the U.S. Congress both directly and through pro-Israel
interest groups. As a result of its solid, reliable support
in Congress, Israel had the political base to safely resist
U.S. policies when this was deemed in Israel's interest.
For example, Shultz notes that during the Lebanon invasion
of 1982, "the Israelis took our material support for granted
while defying any criticism of their course of action."115
Others have noted that supporting huge sums of aid on the
basis of Israeli cooperation with, and support of, American
policy in the Middle East may not have been justified.116
American aid to Egypt also supported the Camp David
accords and promoted the anti-Libyan policy pursued by the
Reagan Administration. The roots of the large aid program
to Egypt lay in promises made during the Carter
Administration, when the United States and Egypt negotiated
a $3.5 billion arms agreement.117 This aid was spent
primarily on modernization and replacement of Soviet-origin
equipment.
or commodity grants such as wheat.
115Shultz, 43.
usSee for example, Harry J. Shaw, "Strategic Dissenaus," Foreign Policy 61 (Winter 1985-86): 125-141.
u7Hedrick smith, "Egypt Asks Cor a Big Increase in Arms Deliveries," New York Times. 29 April 1981, All.
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TABLE 1
FMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT FY 1982-1985 (in millions)
FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985 Israel $1,400.0 $1,700.0 $1,700.0 $1,400.0 (total) loans $850.0 $950.0 $850.0 $0.0 grants $550.0 $750.0 $850.0 $1,400.0 Egypt $900.0 $1,325.0 $1,365.0 $1,175.0 (total) loans $700.0 $900.0 $900.0 $0.0 grants $200.0 $425.0 $465.0 $1,175.0 Total $2,300.0 $3,025.0 $3,065.0 $2,575.0
Source: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. overseas grants and Loans. Series of Yearly Data: Mear East, and South Asia. Obligations and Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1990 (Washington. D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 1991).
Military aid to Egypt rose to $1.3 billion a year
in forgiven EMS by 1985.118 American support of Egypt was
fraught with potential problems, many of which stemmed from
the precarious internal situation in the country.119
Externally, both Egypt and the United States shared a
ll*See William B. Quandt, The United States and Egypt (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990), 32-39. Egypt also received a substantial amount of ESF assistance, and security assistance totaled over $2 billion.per year by the mid-1980s. Aid figures are detailed in the annual U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, Congressional. Presentation Documents for Security Assistance Programs (Washington, DC: Department of Defense).
u*See Paul Jabber, "Egypt's Crisis, America's Dileimna," Foreign Affairs 64, no. 5 (Sumner 1986): 960-980.
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concern about the intentions and foreign policy of Libya.120
And, of course, continued peace with Israel was a
prerequisite for continued American support.
Providing military aid to Jordan was another
component of the Administration's approach to the Middle
East largely because Jordan provided a secure border with
Israel. The idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation—
which went nowhere— underpinned the Reagan approach to the
Palestinian problem.121 Military aid to Jordan proved
controversial, however, and Administration attempts to sell
aircraft and anti-aircraft equipment were resisted by
Congress.122
Aid to Egypt and Israel stabilized over the second
Reagan Administration. Despite cuts in aid to other
regions, Israel's political clout, especially in Congress,
forestalled any cuts in assistance to Israel or Egypt.123
U0Barry Rubin, "The Middle East: The Search for Peace," Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1985 64. no. 3, special (1986): 602.
m See Dankwart A. Rustow, "Realignments in the Middle East," in Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1984. ed. William G. Hyland (New York: Pentagon Press, 1984), 590-591; and Rubin, 588-594.
m See on this Joseph Burke, "Determinants of U.S. Arms Sales to the Middle East: A Comparative Case Study," (Ph.D Dissertation, University of Denver, 1986).
U3The experience of 1982 influenced Shultz's thinking years later, when David Obey of the House Foreign Operations Subconmittee suggested a small reduction in earmarks, including Israel's aid, to fund programs being cut. Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead, was initially inclined to accept the proposal. The final decision rested with Secretary of State Shultz * Recalling his early days as Secretary, when the pro-Israel sentiment rolled over his attempt to halt an aid increaag to Israel in the wake of the Lebanon invasion, Shultz said no
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TABLE 2
EMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT FY 1986-1989 (in millions)
FY 1986 FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 Israel $1,723.0 $1,800.0 $1,800.0 $1,800.0 (total) loans $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $1,723.0 $1,800.0 $1,800.0 $1,800.0 Egypt $1,246.0 $1,302.0 $1,302.0 $1,302.0 (total) loans $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $1,246.0 $1,302.0 $1,302.0 $1,302.0 Total $2,969.0 $3,102.0 $3,102.0 $3,102.0
Source: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans. Series of Yearly Data: Near East and South Asia. Obligations and Loan Authorizations. FY_194£?-199U (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 1991).
Base-Rights
During the period following World War II, the United
States signed a series of base-rights agreements with
Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, and the Philippines.124 The
deal, in his view, obey could not deliver on his part of the bargain (reduction of earmarks) and the Administration would be left holding the bag. The Senate staff also informed the Administration that even if it accepted the Obey proposal, the Senate would not accept the proposal. As one former Reagan official put it, "The handwriting m s on the wall that we would lose it and lose all the political clout that went with it." Interview with former Reagan Administration official, August 8 , 1994, Arlington, VA.
U4The United States signed base agreements with other nations such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Great Britain, but the "base-rights" nations continued to receive assistance in the 1980s in exchange for hosting the bases.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. United States provided military and economic aid to these
nations which, in effect, was 'rent' for the land on which
the American bases were constructed. The amount of the aid
was determined by the base-rights agreement 'best efforts'
pledge, negotiated with the host nation. The aid
"commitmentsn made in these agreements were the
Administration’s highest priority below the Middle East
request. Publicly, the Administration discussed the
regional security role of base-rights nations and the need
to arm them. In reality, except for Turkey, U.S. access to
the bases themselves, and not the role of the host military
in any global conflict, was the overwhelming U.S.
priority.125
Base agreements had to be renegotiated with all of
the above nations during the Reagan years. The base-rights
nations proved to be effective bargainers, and by the mid-
1980s the United States had doubled its military assistance
to base-rights recipients.
^For a discussion of base rights, see Duncan L. Clarke and Daniel O'Connor, "U.S. Base Rights Payments After the Cold War," Qrbis 37, no. 3 (Sumner 1993) : 441-457; Craig Brandt, "U.S. Military Bases Overseas: Military Expediency and Political Dileanas," in Military Assistance and Foreign Policy, ed. Craig M. Brandt (Wright-Patterson AFB: Air Force Institute of Technology, 1989), 185-221; and James R. Biaker, vnitfid statca Qyecacflg- Baaing.;-Ad .Anatomy of tint Dilemma (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990).
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TABLE 3
EMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO BASE-RIGHTS COUNTRIES FY 1982-1985 (in millions)
FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985 Greece $280.0 $280.0 $500.0 $500.0 loans $280.0 $280.0 $500.0 $500.0 . grants $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 Turkey $400.0 $400.0 $715.0 $700.0 loans $343.0 $290.0 $585.0 $485.0 grants $57.0 $110.0 $130.0 $215.0 • Spain $125.0 $400.0 $400.0 $400.0 loans $125.0 $400.0 $400.0 $400.0 grants $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 Portugal $65.0 $109.0 $105.0 $125.0 loans $45.0 $52.0 $45.0 $55.0 grants $20.0 $56.0 $60.0 $70.0 The $50.0 $50.0 $50.0 $40.0 Philippines loans $50.0 $50.0 $50.0 $50.0 grants $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $15.0 Total (all $920.0 $1,239.0 $1,770.0 $1,765.0 countries)
Source: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants, and Loans. Series of yearly Data: Wear East and South Asia, and Europe. Obligations and Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1990 (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 1991).
The end of the Cold War made the bases much less
important. Table 4 demonstrates the decline in base-rights
funding.
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TABLE 4
FMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO BASE-RIGHTS COUNTRIES FY 1986-1989 (in millions)
FY 1986 FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 Greece $430.7 $343.0 $313.0 $350.0 loans $430.7 $343.0 $313.0 $320.0 grants $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $30.0 Turkey $615.3 $490.0 $334.0 $159.3 loans $409.5 $177.9 $178.0 $90.0 grants $205.8 $312.0 $156.0 $69.3 Spain $382.8 $105.0 $0.0 $0.0 loans $382.8 $105.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 Portugal $110.0 $80.0 $82.5 $0.0 loans $43.0 $0.0 $2.5 $0.0 grants $67.0 $80.0 $80.0 $0.0 The $102.7 $100.0 $125.0 $125.0 Philippines loans $14.4 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $88.3 $100.0 $125.0 $125.0 Total $1,641.6 $1,118.0 $854.5 $634.3
Soucce: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans. Series of Yearly Data: Mear East and south Asia. Obligations and Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1990 (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 1991).
The base agreements drew the United States into the
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domestic politics of the recipients. In particular, the
United States played a critical role in the removal of
Ferdinand Marcos from power in the Philippines.126 In
Greece, the government of Andreas Papendreou vexed Reagan
Administration officials throughout the 1980s.
As the base-rights nations began to lose aid in the
second term due to budget cuts, the Administration sought 0
other ways to compensate the base-rights nations, such as
the provision of excess defense articles. Assistance
declined rapidly by the end of the Reagan Administration.
Base payments to Spain ended and Congress forced
reductions in the other accounts. In the 1990s, the United
States withdrew from the Philippine bases, sharply cut back
aid to Greece and Turkey, and ended base assistance to
Portugal.127
Front-Line States and Base-Access Nations
The Reagan Administration classified as 'front-line
states' those nations that confronted threats from the
Soviet Union or its allies. Examples of front-line nations
were Thailand, with respect to Vietnam, and Pakistan, which
had the Soviet army on its borders in Afghanistan. Front-
u‘See Shultz, 636; and Carl H. Lande and Richard Rooley, "Aquino Takes Charge,"’ Foreign Affairs 64, no. 5 (Sumner 1986): 1087-1107.
U7For a discussion, see Clarke, O'Connor, and Ellis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. line states (like Thailand) often wanted high-performance
aircraft and tanks to demonstrate U.S. commitment to its
security and to the region.128
Assistance to front-line states also directly and
indirectly assisted resistance groups fighting Soviet-backed
governments in neighboring countries. This fact made
assistance to front-line states a high Administration
priority. In the case of Pakistan, the Administration
successfully lobbied to obtain a waiver for Pakistan from
the law barring assistance to nations acquiring nuclear
enrichment technology outside of international safeguards.
Having received the waiver, the Administration concluded the
sale of 40 F-16 aircraft costing $1.1 billion. The sale
bolstered Pakistan's defenses and allowed American aid to
flow to the rebels fighting the Soviet army in Afghanistan.
While assistance to the base-rights nations was
underpinned by government to government agreements that
included "best efforts pledges" by the United States
regarding specific levels of assistance, front-line and
base-access nations did not receive specific assistance
commitments.
“*Paul Quinn Judge, "Thai Premier Wants US to Play Bigger Role in SE Asia," Christian Science Monitor. 12 April 1984, 13; and "Reagan Announces Sale of 40 Tanks to Thailand," Mew York Time*. 1 4 April 1984, A 5 .
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FMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN AND THAILAND FY 1982-1985 (in millions)
FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985 Pakistan $0.0 $260.0 $300.0 $325.0 loans $0.0 $260.0 $300.0 $325.0 grants $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 Thailand $79.2 $90.0 $99.0 $100.0 loans $74.7 $76.0 $94.0 $95.0 grants $4.5 $14.0 $5.0 $5.0
Source: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans. Series of Yearly DataNear East and South Asia, and East Asia. Obligations and Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1990 (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 1991) .
The United States did sponsor joint planning group
discussions with some of the aid recipients to discuss
military assistance requirements.129
The front-line states had their aid reduced in
Reagan's second term, although they benefited from the
increasing substitution of grants for FMS loans. Again,
Thailand and Pakistan demonstrate these trends. Pakistan'
aid would be cut off completely by the early 1990s.
“’Pakistan m s an exception to this policy.
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TABLE 6
FMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN AND THAILAND FY 1986-1989 (in millions)
FY 1986 FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 Pakistan $311.0 $313.0 $260.0 $230.0 loans $311.0 $313.0 $260.0 $0.0 grants $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $230.0 Thailand $86.0 $50.0 $43.5 $24.0 loans $81.0 $0.0 $23.5 $0.0 grants $5.0 $50.0 $20.0 $24.0
Source: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. pysrssas- grants, and Loaagr. ssries gf Yearly Data; .Wear. East and South Asia, and. East-Asia. jgbligationg and Lean.Authorizations p y 1946-1990 (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 1991).
In the wake of the twin shocks of the Iranian
revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
Carter and Reagan Administrations negotiated agreements with
several nations in. Africa and Southwest Asia in the late
1970s and early 1980s for the use of facilities on their
territories in times of crisis by the planned U.S. Rapid
Deployment Force (RDF) (which became the United States
Central Command when implemented by the Reagan
Administration) .l30 These bases would facilitate the
13“Undersecretary of State Schneider discussed base-rights and base-access nations extensively In a hearing called on the topic of base rights in 1985. See Congress, Rouse, Comnittee on Appropriations, Base Rights. Hearings, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 685-743.
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movement of American armed forces to Southwest Asia in the
event of a threat to the region, under the general aegis of
the Carter Doctrine.131 The 'base-access' nations included
Somalia, Oman, Morocco, Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, Liberia, and
even Egypt. While there were no "best efforts" pledges made
to these nations akin to those made to the base-rights
nations, the Administration sought to provide these nations
with some military aid.
Many of these relationships, such as the one with
Somalia, began in the last year of the Carter
Administration. Concerns about Soviet intentions in the
Persian Gulf and the security of the Sea Lines of
Communications (SLOCs), coupled with the deterioration of
the U.S.-Ethiopia relationship in the late 1970s, led to the
development of a base-access relationship with Somalia that
allowed the United States to use the port facilities at
Berbera.132 The Reagan Administration expanded the Carter
effort and provided a substantial aid package to Somalia
under the aegis of a base access agreement reached in
m For example, RDF maneuvers in 1981 included bases in Oman, Egypt, Sudan and Somalia. See Richard Halloran, "U.S. starts Deploying Troops for Maneuvers in Four Mideast Nations," New York Times. 3 November 1981, 6 .
^See Juan de Onis, "US Clears Way for Delivery of $40 million in Arms to Somalia," New York Time*. 20 January 1981, 28; Richard Halloran, "Reagan to Request $38 Billion Increase in Military Outlays," New York Times. 4 March 1981, Al; and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "The Geopolitics of the Horn of Africa," Middle East Policy l, no. 3 (1992) : 7-22.
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1980.133 TABLE 7
FMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO SELECTED BASE-ACCESS COUNTRIES FY 1982-1985 (in millions)
FY 1982 FY 1983 • FY 1984 FY 1985 Morocco $30.0 $100.0 $69.0 $48.0 loans $30.0 $75.0 $39.0 $8.0 grants $0.0 $25.0 $30.0 $40.0 Sudan $50.0 $43.0 $45.0 $45.0 loans $50.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $0.0 $43.0 $45.0 $45.0 Somalia $25.0 $25.0 $32.0 $33.0 loans $10.0 $10.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $15.0 $15.0 $32.0 $33.0 Kenya $32.0 $18.5 $22.0 $20.0 loans $22.0 $10.0 $10.0 $0.0 grants $10.0 $8.5 $12.0 $20.0 Liberia $12.0 $12.0 $12.0 $12.0 loans $7.0 $6.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $5.0 $6.0 $12.0 $12.0
Source: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans. Scries of Yearly Data; Wear East and South Asia, and Africa. Obligations and Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1990 (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 1991).
Aid to Morocco followed the pattern of Reagan
Administration aid policies in other regions. The tnore
restrictive Carter approach was abandoned as the Reagan
U3Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn. 220-244.
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Administration, moved closer to Morocco through base-access
and similar regional interests.134 Morocco backstopped U.S.
policies in Africa and the Middle East, and provided access
to air bases at Casablanca and Sidi Slimane.135
As Soviet-American relations improved, congressional
support for assistance to base-access nations declined.
Budget cuts in the second Reagan Administration led to
significant cuts in base-access assistance.
Congress became more vocal in its objections to
providing assistance to base-access nations that violated
human rights. Somalia, again, is a telling example. Human
rights violations brought congressional criticism of the
program, although the United States continued to ship
military equipment as the country began its slide into
chaos.136 The end of the Cold War, and indeed of order in
Somalia itself, led to the end of the base agreement. Bases
in Somalia played no role at all in the Gulf Crisis of 1990
or the conflict in 1991.137 In the years following the Cold
U4Bernacd Gwertzman, "U.S. Drops Sahara Issue in Anns Sales to Morocco," New York Times. 26 March 1981, A10.
usSee James F.. Clarity, "Morocco Emerging as Closest Arab Ally," New York Times. 1 February 1983, A3; and Stephen Zunes, "The United States and Mbroceo: The Sahara War and Regional Interests," Arab studies Quarterly 1, no. 4 (Fall 1987): 422-441.
utSee Peter J. Schraeder, "The Horn of Africa: US Foreign Policy in an Altered Cold War Environment," Middia East Journal 46, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 574-575.
U7See Lefebvre, "Geopolitics of the Horn of Africa," 13.
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War base access was divorced, from, the provision, of
assistance. TABLE 8
EMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO SELECTED BASE-ACCESS COUNTRIES FY 1986-1989 (in millions)
FY 1986 FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 Morocco $36.0 $45.5 $53.0 $53.0 loans $1.0 $12.0 $12.0 $0.0 grants $35.0 $33.5 $41.0 $53.0 Sudan $17.0 $6.0 $1.0 $1.0 loans $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $17.0 $6.0 $1.0 $1.0 Somalia $20.0 $8.0 $6.5 $1.0 loans $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $20.0 $8.0 $6.5 $1.0 Kenya $21.0 $8.6 $6.0 $16.0 loans $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $21.0 $8.6 $6.0 $16.0 Liberia $5.6 $1.4 $0.5 $0.5 loans $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $5.6 $1.4 $0.5 $0.5
Source: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants and loans. Series of Yearly Data: Wear East and South Asia, and Africa. Obligations and Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1990 (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 1991) .
Central America
Central America was a major focus of the Reagan
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Administration's foreign policy. El Salvador and Nicaragua
were the chief concerns. The Reagan Administration provided
massive military assistance to the government of El Salvador
in its battle with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (EMLN) . In his memoirs, former Secretary of State
Haig explained the Administration's view that "El Salvador
was not merely a local problem. It was also a regional
problem that threatened the stability of Central America."138
The Administration (nor Congress) could countenance a
leftist victory in El Salvador.139 Haig noted further that
while he "never envisaged the landing of Marines in Central
America. . .1 did envisage notably higher levels of U.S.
aid. . .//14° Haig and others represented the hardline
approach to the situation in El Salvador. Human rights were
not a significant concern for the Administration.141
In his speeches, Ronald Reagan invoked the memory of
the Truman Doctrine to support his Central American
u*Haig, 118. The Administration outlined the international dimension of the conflict in its report United states Department of State, Comminist Interference in El Salvador. Special Report No. 80 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of state, 23 February 1981.) See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Haig Cites 'Hot List' for Soviet Control of Central America," New Yorle Time*. 19 March 1981, Al.
u*Arnson, 210.
l40Haig, 124.
l«See Thomas Carothers, in the of Peme^acv: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reaoan Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 23-24; and Arnson, 52-59.
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policies.142 The operational cornerstone of that doctrine
was, of course, a substantial military assistance program.
The Administration, much to its consternation, had to
biannually certify progress in human rights observance in El
Salvador to Congress in order to continue the military
assistance program in that nation.143 The Administration's
biannual certifications produced a large outcry in Congress.
Many members believed Administration certifications violated
both the spirit and the letter of the certification law.144
While the first certification refused to lay blame with the
Government of El Salvador, the subsequent certification did
acknowledge abuses on the part of the Salvadoran military.145
However, Congress left itself no options as it refused to
cutoff aid and had no power to reject the Administration
drafted certification.
Secretary of State Shultz pursued a different
approach than Secretary Haig with respect to Congress.
Shultz was more frank about the problems in El Salvador but
l42See Ronald ir. Reagan, "U.S. Interests in Central America" reprinted in El Salvador: central aiiMSfiea in the Mew Cold Jfar. eds. Marvin E. Gettleman, Patrick Lacefiled, Louis Menashe, and David Marmelstein (New York: Grove Press, 1986), 13.
l43Shultz, 290. Shultz termed the certification a "major problem in our assistance to El Salvador." See also Arnson, 66-69, 81-87, 96- 100, 113-117.
l44Arnson, 83.
145Ibid., 97.
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emphasized the common, goal of' both the Administration and
Congress of a friendly, democratic El Salvador.146 The
Administration also seemed to gain some small measure of
credibility with congressional moderates by admitting some
human rights problems regarding the security forces of El
Salvador in the certifications.147 By the fourth
certification the Administration admitted that right-wing
terrorists were "responsible for much of the political
violence" in El Salvador."148 But since President Reagan
made assistance to Central America a high priority, he
continued to certify El Salvador was making progress in the
area of human rights and constantly confronted Congress with
assistance requests in his first term.149
In 1984, the election of Jose Napoleon Duarte as
president of El Salvador calmed the battles in Washington
over aid to El Salvador.150 Congress and the Administration
l4SSee for example, Robert A. Pastor, "The Reagan Administration and Latin America: Eagle Insurgent," in Eagle Insurgent?: The Reaaan Era in American Foreign Policy, eds. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber and Donald Rothehild (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 371-372; and A m s o n , 113.
l47Arnson, 98.
l4,Ibid., 211.
l4*See for example. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Address to Joint Session of congress, by Ronald Reagan (Washington, DC: The White House, 27 April 1983); and Arnson, 96-100 and 122-123.
“°See William D. Rogers, "The united States and Latin America," in Eoreian Affairs: America and the World 1984. ed. William 6. Hyland (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985), 572-573, and Arnson, 140-141.
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were both prepared to support Duarte against the more
extreme elements in the country.151 El Salvador was not as
divisive an issue in Reagan's second term as it was in the
first term.152
TABLE 9
FMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS FY 1982-1985 (in millions)
FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985 El Salvador $82.0 $81.3 $196.6 $136.3 loans $16.5 $46.5 $18.5 $10.0 grants $65.5 $34.8 $178.1 $126.3 Honduras $31.3 $48.3 $77.4 $67.4 loans $19.0 $9.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $12.3 $39.3 $77.4 $67.4 Total $113.3 $129.6 $274.0 $203.7
Source: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans. Series of Yearly Data: Latin America. Obligations and Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1990. (Washington. D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 1991) .
The Administration also aided Honduras because it
allowed the Contras to use their territory during their
quest to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. This
assistance supported the Administration's Nicaragua policy,
which included building up the Contras, support for the
m Arnson, 154.
152See Carothers, 31.
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Honduran government, and the development of the Honduran
military.153 The large increases in military aid demonstrated
the Administration's predilection for using military
assistance means to pursue its policy goals.
TABLE 10
FMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS FY 1986-1989 (in millions)
FY 1986 FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 El Salvador $80.0 $80.0 $110.0 $120.4 loans $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $80.0 $80.0 $110.0 $120.4 Honduras $60.0 $60.0 $40.0 $40.0 loans $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 grants $60.0 $60.0 $40.0 $40.0 Total $140.0 $140.0 $150.0 $160.4
Source: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans. Series of Yearly Data: Latin America.. Obligations and Loan Authorizations, FY 1946-1990 (Washington, D.C.: United states Agency for International Development, 1991).
Assistance provided by the Reagan Administration
managed to keep the government of El Salvador in power and
placed tremendous pressure on the government of Nicaragua.
Central America remained a high priority for the
l53On Honduras, see Carothers, 48-51; Glenn Frankel, "Reagan Plans $60 Million in Military Aid for Honduras," Washington Post. 15 July 1982, A30; George D. Moffett III, "Honduras Seeks More US Aid in Return for Backing Reagan Goals," Christian Science Monitor. 21 May 1985, 3; and Peter Grier, "us Fortifying Honduras as Banner Against Sandinistas," Christian Science Monitor. 9 December 1986, 3.
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Administration in its second, term, although the battle with
Congress shifted from funding the war in El Salvador to
funding the Contras fighting the government of Nicaragua.
The Administration also attempted to initiate (or
reinitiate) military assistance programs in Guatemala and
Costa Rica.154 While Congress eventually voted some funds to
support these Central American programs, there was great
concern about human rights and the militarization of the
region.
All Other
A residual category included aid for several regions
and purposes. For example, the Administration provided aid
to bolster political relations with Malaysia and Indonesia
in East Asia. As the Congressional_ Presentation Document
for Security Assistance Programs stated in 1981, security
assistance to Indonesia "plays a special role in supporting
U.S. goals in general and assuring Indonesia in particular
of U.S. commitment. . .to South East Asia."155 While some
concerns were expressed about Indonesian human rights abuses
in East Timor, those concerns did not prevent the expansion
of the program.
lMCarothers, 58-76.
““U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, Congressional-Presentation-for. Security Assistance Propram*, rv (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1981), 61.
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The Administration also provided aid to several
African nations, based on what has been labeled the "getting
in touch with Africa" rationale.156 Regional threats from
Libya and Ethiopia were used to justify some of this aid to
countries such as Niger.157 The Administration also aided
Botswana as a front line state in Southern Africa. In West
Africa, patrol boats were provided for coastal surveillance
against the intrusion of Soviet fishing vessels.
TABLE 11
EMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA FY 1981-1985 (in millions)
FY 1981 FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985 Africa $129.1 $261.1 $227.7 $323.3 $265.6 m s $126.4 $228.1 $199.7 $155.8 $68.0 MAP $2.7 $33.0 $128.0 $167.5 $197.6
Source: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans. Series of Yearly Data: Africa. Obligations and Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1990 (Washington. D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 1991).
Note: FY 1981 figures have been included to demonstrate the rapid increase in aid in the first year of the Administration.
“‘Some have credited this program to the zealous efforts of Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Noel Koch's efforts. Koch believed the United States had near- and long-term interests in the region which justified an increase in aid. Former Department of Defense official, interview by author, tape recording, Potomac, Maryland, 12 May 1993.
l57In fact, in the case of Niger, during the Reagan years the United states became the principal supplier of military assistance to that nation. See Robert B. Charlick, Niger: Personal Rule and Survival in the Sahel (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 137; and Roger Wall, "Politics and Poverty in the Sahel," Africa Report. May-June 1983, 83.
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Note: FY 1981 figures have been Included to demonstrate the rapid increase in aid in the first year of the Administration. Base-access, mentioned earlier, also justified aid to some
East African nations as well as to Liberia.158
In the second term, while the policy concerns
remained, Africa became a victim of budget cuts. The
continent was neither a high priority of Congress nor the
Administration.
TABLE 12
FMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA FY 1986-1989 (in millions)
FY 1986 FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 Africa $192.2 $126.4 $104.3 $24.7 (total) FMS $26.8 $15.0 $12.0 $0.0 MAP $165.4 $111.4 $92.3 $24.7
Source: United States Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans. Series of Yearly Data: Africa. Obligations and Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1990 (Washington. D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 1991).
Conclusion
The assistance debates of the 1980s were
fundamentally different from those of the mid- and late-
1970s. In the 1970s, Congress and the Carter Admiilistration
U(On Administration Africa policy, see Donald Rothchild and John Ravenhill, "Subordinating African Issues to Global Logic: Reagan Confronts Political Complexity," in Eagle Insurgent?: The Reagan Era In American Foreign Policy, eds. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber and Donald Rothchild (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 393-431.
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curtailed aid to recipients on the grounds of human rights
and nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The Iranian
revolution, the Sandanista victory in Nicaragua and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a new consensus on the
part of the Reagan Administration and Congress to pursue
concerns about human rights or non-proliferation "within a
context of maintaining internal stability."159 With
agreement on the goal of stability, during most of the
Reagan years Congress forsook the tools available to enforce
its concerns about human rights and non-proliferation.
Congress instead limited itself to certifications in the
case of El Salvador, waivers in the case of Pakistan, and
reporting requirements and debate with respect to many other
aid recipients.
With the end of the Cold War and the continued
pressure on aid budgets, aid to most of the priority
recipients from the Reagan Administration era collapsed.
Military aid to Africa, Central America and the front-line
states all but ended, and grant military aid to the base-
rights nations was phased out. Only aid to Israel and
Egypt, which enjoyed substantial political support in
Congress, continued unabated.
Aid policies from the Reagan era can thus be viewed
“ ’Arnson, 210.
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in two different lights. By one view, aid can be seen as a
valuable tool that put pressure on the Soviet Union and its
allies and contributed to the end of the cold war. It did
so by pressuring the Soviet Union and forcing it to support
allies around the world. It also demonstrated to the Soviet
Union that the United States would challenge Soviet
interests on the periphery, thus leading to a perpetual
drain of resources that the Soviet Union could not sustain.
By another view, it can be argued that military aid
to many nations exacerbated already existing ethnic and
national conflicts that had • little or nothing to do with the
Cold War. While some conflicts ended, others flared out of
control and led to such spectacles as the collapse of
Somalia. Furthermore, conflicts in places such as El
Salvador and Nicaragua might have ended sooner if the
zealousness with which the Administration pursued military
aid had been devoted to finding political solutions to these
conflicts and promoting stability using development
assistance.
Eight years later, the lessons of the Reagan
Administration lie in understanding how the Administration
and Congress perceived their roles in the process and how
this influenced policymaking for military assistance.
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DECISION MAKING FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE
The Reagan Administration entered office believing
that the United States needed to reassert its leadership
around the world after the perceived foreign policy
disasters of the 1970s. With the American public more
cautious about overt military intervention after the debacle
in Vietnam, covert operations and security assistance were
thought to be promising tools for combating regional r threats.
During its eight years in office, the Reagan
Administration substantially increased the amount and
quality of resources devoted to military assistance. In
Fiscal Year (FY) 1981, the United States spent approximately
$4.0 billion on military assistance, of which only about
$900 million was actually appropriated. The rest was 'off-
budget.'160 By 1988, security assistance expenditures had
jumped to almost $4.7 billion, with all funds for military
assistance appropriated and counted on-budget by Congress.
1<0The term off-budget applies to funds that are approved by Congress, but not counted as actual appropriations from the Treasury in the budget process. Funds that are on-budget are counted as appropriations from the Treasury.
78
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Similarly, the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which had
been slated to be phased out under the 1976 Arms Export
Control Act (PL 94-329), gained new life during the Reagan
years. MAP funding reaching nearly $800 million in the mid-
1980s before declining and finally being terminated in 1989.
The terms of military aid also improved radically. In FY
1982, over 90 percent of military aid was provided as loans
and approximately 10 percent or so as grants. The Reagan
Administration steadily obtained changes in the ratio of
loans to grants. By FY 1989, the ratio was reversed: 90
percent grants, 10 percent loans.161
This chapter focuses on the Administration's process
for deciding on military aid budgets by first identifying
and analyzing the important actors in the security
assistance system. It then outlines and analyzes the Reagan
Administration" s strategy and process for requesting and
allocating security assistance.
The following section outlines the actors and their
respective roles in the planning process for military aid.
It is important to note how that process was structured to
ensure that broader policy priorities were met. Also
notable was the Administration's placement of strong
lwSee table 16 and table 23 for the figures. All of these changes comported with the philosophical position of the Administration discussed in Chapter 2.
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personalities in key positions in the security assistance
decisionmaking process.
Actors and Roles
Administration policy priorities, organizations, and
personalities all played key roles in executive branch actor
effectiveness in the security assistance arena. The
placement of forceful, competent people in key positions was
an important part of the policy process in the Reagan
Administration. Within the executive branch, the
Departments of State and Defense dominated the security
assistance decisionmaking process, with QMB playing a
secondary role.
In both the State and Defense Departments actors
could be divided into the categories of generalist or
regionalist.162 The generalists— the secretary of state,
secretary of defense, undersecretary of state for security
assistance, director of the Defense Security Assistance
Agency (DSAA), assistant secretary of defense for
international security affairs (DOD/ISA), and the assistant
secretary of state for politico-military affairs (PM)—
established assistance priorities among the various regions
of the world. The regionalists, on the other hand, such as
l«For discussion, see Koch, 43-57; and Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn.
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the assistant secretaries of state and the deputy assistant
secretaries of defense for international security affairs,
were naturally advocates for increasing the level of
resources to their particular regions, without regard to
larger policy considerations. The Administration had an
interest in ensuring that assistance was directed so as to
support policy priorities. In practice, this meant
mediating among regional demands for resources. Within
State and Defense, the process was structured so that the
generalists, those taking the broader overview of the
program, controlled the important decision-making forums.
The White House
In any administration, the president is, of course,
the dominant player. The tone and direction he sets for
foreign policy forms the larger context for the
implementation of the military assistance program. The
Reagan White House, of course, set policy direction, but was
not involved in the routine processes of the military aid
program.163
However, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
was involved with the budget process for military
assistance. OMB's influence tends to depend on the style
lS3Of course, this means the normal military assistance program using funds appropriated by Congress. Illicit operations run out of the National Security Council (NSC) ware, of course, a different matter.
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and character of the president, the budget director, senior
advisors, and cabinet members of each administration.164
Traditionally, OMB's approach to security assistance was to
examine the size of the previous year's budget and use that
as a yardstick for determining the next years' budgets.
Usually, once OMB determined the amount of resources to be
allocated for military aid, it was difficult to raise that
figure without the direct intervention of the President.165
During the Reagan years, the situation was different.
Foreign aid became a battle ground between the State
Department and OMB soon after Reagan entered office. In his
zeal to cut spending David Stockman, -Reagan's first OMB
director, proposed drastic cuts in overall foreign aid
(although he agreed to maintain military aid at Carter
Administration levels) . Secretary of State Haig's reaction
was quick and decisive; Haig "rolled" Stockman to ensure
that foreign aid was not cut.166 OMB's traditional role of
limiting program increases was weakened by Reagan's strong
1<4Edward R. Jayne II, "The Office of Management and Budget and National Security Policy in the Carter Administration," in Bureaucratic Politics and national Security; Theory and Practice, eds. David C. Kozak and James Keagle (Boulder, CO.:Lynne Rienner, 1988), 156. For a discussion of (MB and its relationship with DOD, see Duncan L. Clarke, American Defense and Foreign Policy Institutions: Toward a Sound Foundation (New York: Harper&Row, 1989), Chapter 2.
lssKramer, 106.
l*‘See David Stockman, Th» Trinrmh Polities (New York: Avon Books, 1986), 127-130; Haig, 91; Shaw, 109-110; and Richard Whittle, "Foreign Aid, Lighting Rod for Budget Cutting," Congressional Quarterly ffsekly-Rgpart, 7 February 1981, 262.
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support for the program and Stockman's early losing
confrontation with Haig.
OMB nevertheless had a role. In the first two years
of Reagan's term, OMB assembled the components of the
foreign aid budget with inputs from the State Department,
the Agency for International Development (USAID), the
Department of Defense (DoD), the United States Information
Agency (USIA), and United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA). Thereafter, the State Department eventually assumed
this function.167 State and OMB sometimes clashed on
specific items, although State usually prevailed. The
National Security Council (NSC) staff played a lesser role
in the process; its involvement depended on the issue at
hand.
The State Department
The State Department plays the most important role in
the security assistance decisionmaking process at several
levels. The secretary of state has final and ultimate
responsibility over all aspects of security assistance. In
practice, during the Reagan Administration most of the major
decisions were finalized at the deputy secretary of state
level, or at the undersecretary for security assistance
ls7Many of the key policymakers at the State Department such as William Schneider and Bob Bauerlein had worked on the process at OMB and wanted the State Department to bring more order to the process.
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level, before they reached the secretary's desk. While the
regional bureaus could appeal decisions to the secretary, he
usually supported the recommendations sent to him by the
undersecretary or deputy secretary of state.
Undersecretary of State_for.Security Assistance
For most of the Reagan Administration, the
undersecretary of state for security assistance was the
central, player on security assistance issues. In 1983,
Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance William
Schneider, Jr. began forming integrated foreign aid budgets
that included food, development, and military aid.
Schneider, a former OMB official, believed that the State
Department, not OMB, should integrate the foreign aid budget
in order to obtain an "all spigots" view of how much aid
each nation received from the United States.
Thus the office of the undersecretary of state for
security assistance, a position described by one observer
as a "bureaucratic bastard," actually became the linchpin of
the entire Reagan Administration security assistance
process.168 Reagan appointed three men with close ties to
Congress to this post: James L. Buckley (1981-1982), a
1MU.S. Government official (2), Interview by Joseph Burke, Washington, DC, 5 February 1985, In Joseph Burke, "U.S. Arms Sales to the Middle Bast: How and Why," in Military Assistance and Foreign Policy, ed. Craig M. Brandt (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: Air Force Institute of Technology, 1989), 121.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. former Senator from New York; William Schneider, Jr.(1982-
1986), a long time congressional staffer; and Ed Derwinski
(1986-1988), a former Congressman from Illinois. Buckley
and Schneider worked effectively with Congress. Both men
had many contacts and a sense of congressional strategy.
Buckley believed that the Administration had to convince
Congress that it had a multi-year strategy with a consistent
set of strategic rationales.169 Schneider adopted Buckley's
approach and enjoyed the give and take of wheeling and
dealing on Capitol Hill. Schneider was known for working
with both members and staff, whomever could deliver what he
needed.170
Under Buckley and Schneider, the office of the
undersecretary of state for security assistance established
its own channels to Congress, particularly to the
appropriations committees. Under Schneider, the
undersecretary's office acquired its own computer
capability, independent of the State Department network.
I69R±chard Aherne, former Foreign Service Officer assigned to the office of the Undersecretary for Security Assistance, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 4 August 1994. While the Administration did not have a plan on a single sheet of paper, it did have an approach as outlined in its Conventional Arms Transfer Statement. See discussion in Chapter 2.
l70Former Reagan Administration official, interview by author, tape recording, Arlington, Virginia, 8 August 1994. As one House staff member stated, "to this day he was the dominant person who ever held that role," House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. This source requested that the interview not be dated in order to protect the source's anonymity.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86
The computers allowed the undersecretary to monitor the
budget closely. More importantly, the budget was shielded
so that it could not be manipulated by other offices at the
State Department.171 The undersecretary generally acted as
an interface between the working levels of the State
Department, the Administration, and Congress.172 He and his
staff briefed Secretary Shultz, enabling him to rapidly
grasp the complexity of security assistance planning and
allocation issues.173
Problems emerged during Undersecretary Derwinski's
tenure (1987-1988). Derwinski took less interest in the
process, did not like to deal with congressional staff, and
disdained bringing unwelcome news to Congress.174
Illustrative of Derwinski's general limitations was the
following exchange with Congressman Obey:
Derwinski: What I am asking, really, if I have to state it very bluntly. . .is that you put on your shining
m Former State Department official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 May 1993; and former Reagan Administration official, interview by author, tape recording, Arlington, Virginia, 8 August 1994.
172Dr. Henry Gaffney, former Director for Plans at the Defense Security Assistance Agency, interview by author, Alexandria, Virginia, 25 February 1993. See also Burke, "Arms Sales to the Middle Bast," 121.
1730ne former official related how the undersecretary would supply the secretary with a single-page outline of the funding requests for security assistance after PM had overloaded the secretary with a large and unintegrated briefing book. Former Reagan Administration official, interview by author, tape recording, Arlington, Virginia, 8 August 1994.
l74Ibid.
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armor, get on a white steed, and go out and charge Bill Gray [Chairman of the House Budget Committee] and gather the. . .billions we need.
Obey: That is crazy.175
Coordination of the overall foreign aid budget
suffered under Derwinski. In March 1987, overall budget
coordination was moved to Deputy Secretary of State John
Whitehead's office, along with staff from Derwinski's
office.176 Derwinski still formally held the security
assistance accounts, but they were de facto coordinated by
the deputy secretary. In retrospect, the deputy secretary
of state was probably more appropriate for the coordination
role, as the undersecretary for security assistance has an
institutional interest in promoting security aid over other
types of aid.177
I75Congress, House, Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1988. Hearings, 100th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 3, 1987, 855-56.
l76Fomer Reagan Administration official, interview by author, tape recording, Arlington, Virginia, 8 August 1994.
I770ne former 0MB official likened the undersecretary for security assistance's control over the whole foreign aid budget with its security assistance bias to John Lehman taking over the whole DoD budget while he was Secretary of the Navy. The undersecretary's office did assemble the budget while Schneider was there. Once he left, it fell to Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead to assemble the overall foreign affairs budget in the last two years of the Reagan Administration. Former OMB official, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 15 August 1994. In 1985 Assistant Secretary for Management Ron Spiers proposed that a new office be created within the office of the secretary of state to coordinate the overall foreign aid budget. Undersecretary Schneider and AID head McPherson argued that this would only add another layer of bureaucracy and that Schneider was already doing the job. Spiers noted that the system worked because everyone respected Schneider, and questioned whether it would work without him. The problems that
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Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) played
an important role in supporting the undersecretary of state
for security assistance and in forming an early budget. PM
collected much of the necessary information, and worked
closely with DSAA in forming the generalists' position on
the budget. However, PM was less important than the office
of the undersecretary of state for security assistance on
matters of military assistance policy planning than it had
been in previous administrations for three reasons. First,
the assistant secretary of the bureau of politico-military
affairs had less interest in security assistance than in
other issues such as arms control. As a consequence, PM was
left out of the high-level decision making group for
security assistance.178 Second, security assistance became
very resources-focused, and PM did not have DSAA's or the
undersecretary's technical expertise for resource
occurred after 1986 seem to confirm spier's views. Former Reagan Administration official, interview by author, tape recording, Arlington, Virginia, 8 August 1994.
m This group consisted of the undersecretary of state for security assistance, the director of the Defense security Assistance Agency, and the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs— senior policymakers in State and Defense who could broker interagency deals on military assistance. The working level meetings were conducted under the aegis of the Security Assistance Program Working Group (SAPRWG), discussed later in the chapter.
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management.179 Finally, Buckley and Schneider were strong
undersecretaries who assiduously expanded the role of their
office.
state Department Regional Bureaus
The regional bureaus were in closest contact with the
country recipients of security assistance. For the bureaus,
security assistance was part of the currency of diplomacy.
Traditionally, the regional bureaus were strong advocates
for 'their' countries and tried to gain more resources for
country programs. In countries with which the United States
did not have a formal joint committee to coordinate military
assistance planning, field inputs for security assistance
would come from the embassy, which worked in close
coordination with the bureaus. The bureaus also provided
much of the background information for the interagency
meetings.
State's regional bureaus worked closely with their
counterparts in DOD-ISA with whom they shared almost
identical interests on military assistance issues.180 If a
country's military assistance funding was cut in the
m Former Reagan Administration official, interview by author, tape recording, Arlington, Virginia, 8 August 1994. At one point the undersecretary for security assistance tried to have the Politico- military Bureau maintain the database, but the Politico-military Bureau proved unable to do the job.
1MSee Koch, 43-57.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. allocation process, the State department assistant
secretaries and the DOD-ISA regional deputy assistant
secretaries (DASs) could appeal funding decisions that
involved their regions. At the State Department, the
assistant secretaries could appeal issues to the secretary
of state. At DoD, the deputy assistant secretaries in ISA
could appeal funding decisions to the assistant secretary of
defense for ISA. The assistant secretary for ISA heard
appeals to restore funding, but his decisions whether or not
to appeal to senior policymakers at the State Department to
alter the funding requests for specific programs were
usually final.181
State Department Bureau of Legislative Affairs
The State Department's Bureau of Legislative Affairs
played a reduced role during the Reagan years due to the
nature of the policy process within Congress. Legislative
Affairs has traditionally been focused on the foreign
assistance authorizing committees: the House Foreign Affairs
and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. With the frequent
failure of the authorizing bill, the undersecretary of state
for security assistance took an active role with the
appropriations committees. A division of labor was also
m Fonner Department of Defense official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 11 August 1994.
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established so that while the undersecretary of state for
security assistance worked with the appropriations
committees, legislative affairs continued to work with the
foreign affairs and foreign relations committees.182 As the
authorizing bill rarely became law, much of the work done by
legislative affairs was never incorporated into law.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Despite being established to assist in arms control
matters, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has
traditionally been bureaucratically marginalized in the arms
sales area. It suffers from its small size and from its
uncertain relationship with the State Department.183 It
enjoyed a brief resurgence in the Carter Administration as
the president increased its staff and endorsed a more robust
ACDA role in the policymaking process.184 During the Reagan
years ACDA lacked presidential support and did not play a
strong role in the interagency policy process.185
l82Fonner Reagan Administration official, interview by author, .tape recording, Arlington, Virginia, 8 August 1994.
l83Spear, 26.
1MIbid., 101-102.
18sInterview with Dr. Henry Gaffney, interview by author, tape recording, Alexandria, Virginia, 25 February 1993. See also Joseph Burke, "U.S. Anns Sales to the Kiddle East," 124.
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The Defense Department
There were four major actors in the Defense
Department for security assistance: the Defense Security
Assistance Agency (DSAA) ; the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for International Security Affairs and the
International Security Affairs regions; the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy; and
the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.
The secretary of defense is not on the list as a
major actor. While the secretary of defense was, of course,
important, security assistance was not an area in which he
had regular involvement. Nor did he have to clear security
assistance decisions, although he did testify in support of
the program on occasion. When the secretary traveled,
however, he would need to be briefed about security
assistance issues because, as one former official noted:
Military assistance was not at the top of our agenda when we talked to a country, but it was usually at the top of theirs. When Weinberger went to Turkey. . .he wanted to talk about continued base rights and coalition strategies and the Turks wanted to talk about military assistance.186
Defense_Securitv Assistance Agency
DSAA is the only agency in DoD whose primary missions
are security assistance and arms transfers issues. It is
18 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93 the principal staff element in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the management of security assistance.187 Said one DSAA official: What we did bring to the discussion was the best information in the system. We were a central repository of information on financial capabilities, how much money they [the recipients] had in the trust fund, what was the status of their program, what did they still need[ed]. . .188 DSAA brought technical expertise to the process, it was the player most attuned to what aid money could actually buy, and it guided aid recipients through the process. The agency was traditionally headed by a three-star Army or the Air Force general. When the Reagan Administration assumed office, General Ernest Graves, USA, was finishing his tour as head of DSAA. Two other officers headed the agency briefly until 1983, when Lt. General Philip Gast assumed command of the agency. He led the agency until 1987 and was succeeded in 1988 by Lt. General Charles Brown. 187As the DSAA Mission statement reads, "DSAA serves as the DOD focal point and clearinghouse for tracking arms transfers, budgetary, legislative, policy, and other security assistance matters through the analysis, coordination, decision and implementation process. It directs and supervises organization, function, and staffing of DOD elements in foreign countries responsible for managing security assistance programs." "Mission and Responsibilities of the Defense Security Assistance Agency," DISAM Journal 9, no. 4 (Sumner 1987): 40-54. lMGlen Rudd, former Deputy Director of DSAA, interview by author, tape recording, Falls Church, Virginia, 15 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94 General Gast's tenure was the most important. Gast saw his role as an implementer of policy# although he certainly had a role on policy issues.189 Indeed# with Richard Armitage and William Schneider# he coordinated the policy apparatus.190 During the Reagan Administration# the director of DSAA was also the deputy assistant secretary of defense for security assistance policy# and reported to the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs on questions of policy.191 DSAA aligned itself with the Office of the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance and the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department in the generalists camp. DSAA was involved in all stages of the process (explained below) and, most importantly# produced the first draft for allocational divisions of the final congressional appropriation. Generally# DSAA had its proposed military aid allocation levels for each nation accepted by the assistant secretary for international 1MFor a discussion of general implementation issues and DSAA see Lt. General Philip c. Gast# "The Implementation of the United States Security Assistance Program," DISAM Journal 9, no. 4 (Summer 1987): 41- 48. ““Internally DSAA tried to develop a policy perspective which it termed a 'worldview' to compliment its strength in data analysis. The agency asked "who needed the military equipment," and "what are they going to do with it?" Glen Rudd# former Deputy Director of DSAA, interview by author, tape recording. Falls Church, Virginia, 15 August 1994. m Former Department of Defense official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 11 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95 security affairs as the final DoD proposed military aid levels. Assistant. Secretary of Pefensa for International. Security Affairs The assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs was the DoD policy official responsible for determining recipient country military assistance requirements. He was in the peculiar position of being a generalist in charge of regional offices, and he had to negotiate suitable compromises regarding security assistance policy and funding with his regions (which included the non- communist world except Europe) . The DoD international security affairs regions align themselves closely with the State regional bureaus on issues of policy and funding. This office was held by two individuals in the Reagan years. In the first Reagan term this position was held by Francis West. He was succeeded by Richard Armitage in Reagan's second term. Assistants-Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy The assistant secretary of defense for international security policy was in a slightly different position than his ISA counterpart in that his region was Europe. Hence he pressed for more European aid (usually for Turkey) and had Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. no larger position to reconcile. Richard Perle held this position from 1981-1987. Perle was an active advocate for increasing assistance to Turkey, a posture also favored by the Administration. In 1987 he played a' pivotal role in having an amendment added to the defense authorization bill allowing the United States to supply excess defense equipment to NATO's southern region.192 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Formally, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. Fred Ikle, had ultimate responsibility within DoD for security assistance. The assistant secretaries for international security affairs and international security policy reported to him. But Ikle delegated that authority to the assistant secretary for international security affairs. As one participant noted, "Fred didn't get into the day to day. . .problems. He had overall guidance, five- year plans, the annual report, budget decisions. . .1,193 Joint Chiefs of Staff The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the unified 1,2Richard Perle is credited for working to enact the so-called Southern Region Amendment to the Defense Authorization in 1987, which allowed for large transfers of military equipment ^o Turkey deemed excess by U.S. military forces. Former Department of Defense official, Glen Rudd, former Deputy Director of DSAA, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 11 August 1994. W3Former Department of Defense official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 11 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 commands also wanted to have an input on military assistance decisionmaking. The Chiefs were handicapped, however, because they could not bargain with the other players for resources. The JCS did review assistance proposals and coordinate inputs with the unified commands around the world. Overall, the JCS impact on the process was limited. Summing Up: The Actors The central policy fissure in the executive branch was between the generalists, who sought tradeoffs among countries and programs, and the regionalists, who wanted to maximize aid to their countries or programs. In the Reagan Administration, the generalists had the advantage. The review system ensured that the generalist offices at State and Defense had the final say in assembling the budget. Moreover, the dominant player was the State Department, not the Defense Department. The secretary of state had ultimate responsibility for the program and the undersecretary of state for security assistance managed the process in close coordination with DoD. The State and Defense Departments had different perspectives. State was primarily interested in exerting political influence in many countries even if this resulted in dozens of small programs. DoD and DSAA preferred a select number of substantial programs in strategically Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98 important countries. During the Reagan Administration the program reflected elements from both perspectives. The majority of funds went to a small number of strategically placed (and often politically influential) nations. However, the Administration provided a small amount of funding to many other nations to build political and strategic relationships. Formulating Administration.Policy;^Process There were three major stages of executive participation in the security assistance budget process during the Reagan Administration: formulating a budget request to Congress, supporting that request in Congress, and distributing funds once legislation was passed by Congress.194 Besides these steps, the Reagan Administration often used three additional steps: supplemental requests, reprogramming of funds, and emergency drawdowns of equipment, to supplement the military assistance programs. Budget Formulation stage The formulation of the budget request to Congress was the most involved stage of the process for the executive branch during the Reagan years. It consisted of several u*Of course, the recipients have to spend the allocation. This can take a year or more. The details of that process are not dealt with in this study. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99 steps and took about a year to complete.195 The annual process began in April when DSAA gathered materials for the budget "mark" which it sent to the State Department.196 The regional bureaus at the State Department also assembled inputs to be sent to State's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. In the bureaucratic process, three factors affected the budget marks at this stage: the previous year's allocation; field inputs; and high-level policy changes or initiatives for each recipient nation. Processi.Fisst Steps The executive branch budgeting process began by using the previous year's budget and allocation levels as a basis for the upcoming years request. Policy toward most nations remained stable from year to year. In some cases—base- rights assistance, for example—the recipient country may have a multi-year plan that helps to shape its request for upcoming years.197 Sheer neglect (meaning a previous “’Information on the budget process comes from author interviews with former officials in the Departments of Defense, State, OMB and congressional staffers on the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Additional information is derived from unpublished materials provided by Dr. Henry Gaffney, former Director of Plans for DSAA, to the author. There is also a useful summary in Kramer, 103-104. 19‘A budget ''mark"' is a document containing proposed military assistance funding for countries and programs in the upcoming fiscal year. l97Base-rights nations are countries that have agreed to let the United States maintain military bases on their national territory. The United States usually provided them with security assistance. See discussion in Chapter 2. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 assistance package had been completed but no follow-on package had been prepared) or unanticipated political events could prevent the Administration from using the previous year's budget and allocations levels for the upcoming request. Receipt of military aid sent a strong political message from Washington of U.S. support for that nation and its government. The Administration was generally reluctant to decrease aid since it would send a message to the recipient of reduced importance to the United States. Thus, it was rare to see the executive's aid request decrease from one year to the next. Planning Groups. Joint planning mechanisms contributed to the process of budget development.198 For example, the High-Level Defense Group (HLDG) coordinated aid planning between the United States and Turkey. The HLDG included Turkish military representatives, and representatives of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, DSAA, the State Department, U.S. military services, and from the unified U.S. military command for the region. Turkish officials visited the United States annually and outlined their cost estimate for modernization of each element of the Turkish U(Glen Rudd, former Deputy Director of DSAA, interview by author, tape recording. Falls Church, Virginia, 15 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101 military plan. Following the formal meetings, there were additional meetings to discuss elements of the plan with the different Turkish armed services. Both assistance and commercial purchases of equipment were discussed. There was also a vigorous dialogue on the package between DSAA and the Security Assistance Offices (SAOs).l" Joint planning allowed the United States to understand recipient needs and provided a venue for aid recipients to make specific requests. For example, recipients such as Turkey wanted to receive a greater proportion of aid in grant form. The United States by 1988 had joint planning forums with the following countries: Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Morocco, Pakistani, Tunisia, Turkey, and Taiwan. Commercial purchasing plans could also be discussed at these planning meetings. Since Administration officials understood the planned purchases of recipients, they knew what levels of payments would be required for purchases. For example, Spain and Pakistani used some of their EMS loans l99Security Assistance offices (SAOs) were Defense Department officials stationed at U.S. embassies in countries that received security assistance. These officials assisted the recipient country and the embassy with the implementation of the U.S. security assistance program, and contributed to the policy dialogue between the embassy and Washington on security assistance planning for the recipient nation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102 to purchase American aircraft.200 The Administration wanted recipients to have these weapons systems and this doubtlessly has some effect on the setting of request levels. The Integrated Assessment. The Annual Integrated Assessment for Security Assistance (AIASA) , drafted by the SAOs located in the embassies, was an important tool in assessing assistance needs for nations with which the United States did not have formal joint military groups. In developing the AIASA, the embassy would consult with the recipient nation, the SAOs, and sometimes with the area Commander in Chief (CINC), to assess recipient military assistance requirements.201 Glenn Rudd, a former DSAA official stated that, the AIASA is the principal vehicle through which security assistance requirements are stated for budget preparation for those countries with which the U.S. does not have periodic formal planning mechanisms.202 The AIASAs contributed to the discussion between officials 2»°I did not probe the specific policy implications of coranercial sales on the setting of FMS levels and thus 'Cannot provide a full analysis. As funding levels declined in the later 1980s, Spain and other nations received less EMS financing for such purchases and thus needed to pay cash for the weapons systems. Z01The United States has several unified and specified comnands that integrate its armed forces around the world. For example, the Central Command, which has responsibility for the Middle East and Persian Gulf region and is based in Tampa, Florida, might be consulted on a military aid package to Oman. 202Glen Rudd, former Deputy Director of DSAA, interview by author, tape recording. Falls Church, Virginia, 15 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103 responsible for military assistance, although they were also considered by many to be 'wish lists' that had to be tempered by fiscal reality in Washington.203 As one senior DoD participant stated, "Those [AIASAs] were things that allowed you to justify a program. Everyone always had requirements to a much greater degree than our resources."204 Policy Initiatives. High-level policy initiatives and other political initiatives contributed to the formation of early baseline budgets. The Reagan Administration began aid programs with several African nations in order to build a stronger network of relations. Funding for Central American programs was another high priority item for Reagan policymakers. In other cases, base-access in nations such as Somalia was important for the Carter Administration's proposed Rapid Deployment Force for the Persian Gulf Region in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. Some requests reflected ongoing negotiations. The . United States and Israel discussed Israeli needs on a regular basis. Base-rights renegotiations with Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal and the Philippines also influenced 203Glen Rudd, former Deputy Director of DSAA, interview by author, tape recording, Falla church, Virginia, 15 August 1994. 20'Former Department of Defense official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 11 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104 the baseline, as pledges of 'best efforts' made by U.S. negotiators were factored into the budget process.265 Finally, military aid served as a sort of 'walking around money' for traveling officials, including the president, who would sometimes make promises of aid to countries on official visits.206 These promises had to be factored into the budget process. Upward Pressures on Budgets. Even in the earliest input stage, the fact that cuts were seen as diminishing the importance of a nation had a tendency to ratchet the budget upwards. As relations between the United States and the recipient improved, or as the United States wanted to encourage continued bilateral cooperation, aid was increased. The method by which the request was prepared also contributed to increased overall requests. The program was 20s"Best-efforts" pledges were amounts of security assistance agreed upon by the United States and the base host nation. The United States negotiators could not guarantee the base host government would receive a set amount of assistance, as final assistance amounts were determined by congressional appropriation. Rather, American negotiators pledged their 'best efforts' to get Congress to appropriate the agreed' upon amount. Administration officials, of course, did have to use the agreed upon amount in baseline budget planning. For a discussion of Base Rights, see Brandt, "U.S. Military Bases Overseas," 185-221; and Clarke and O' Connor, 441-457. 20*'Walking around money' is usually a term used to describe money given by campaigns to people to walk around on election day and encourage people to vote for a specific candidate. In this context, funds were used by American officials to support American foreign policy in the recipient country. Glen Rudd, former Deputy Director of DSAA, interview by author, tape recording, Falls church, Virginia, 15 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105 developed around the country programs and not around an aggregate figure. The aggregate resulted from cobbling together the various country requests. Thus, the aggregate request grew through the incremental rise in individual country budgets. Beginning in 1983, the State Department's Office of the Undersecretary for Security Assistance became increasingly involved in the early stages of the budget process in order to ensure that the aid numbers developed by State's bureaucracy did not lead to the creation of an unsustainable request. As one former State Department official noted, We tried to get involved at the early stages so we wouldn't get in the bind that DoD had in starting out with an unrealistic budget and got in trouble as they created a program around it.207 Interagency Process Once the early sets of inputs from DSAA, the embassies, and from joint planning groups were assembled, the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs wrote decision units (papers outlining assistance requests and requirements) on each country. Decision units combined internally generated fiscal and policy guidance on prospective recipients from DSAA and the State Department with the embassy's AIASA. The J07Fonner State Department official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 May 1993. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106 decision units, along with information from the State Department's regional bureaus, formed the basis for the Security Assistance Program Review Working Groups (SAPRWG) . SAPRWG. There was one SAPRWG for each region. The SAPRWG meetings were the first major interagency meetings for determining security assistance budget requests and included the relevant regional bureau from the State Department, representatives from the Office of the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, the relevant regional bureau from the DoD's Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (DoD-ISA), DSAA, QMB, and others208. These meetings, chaired by a representative from the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, reviewed the security assistance budget requests for the coming fiscal year. The participants defined the security assistance issues for the coming year at the SAPRWG meetings. The SAPRWG was the first forum to pit the regions—the State Department's regional bureaus and their counterparts in the Department of Defense's International Security Affairs Bureau-against the generalist offices: DSAA, the Office of the Undersecretary of State for Security “'Others who play a smaller role are the Agency for International Development, the Treasury Department, the Joint Chiefs of staff, and the Aims Control and Disazmament Agency. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107 Assistance, the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, and DOD-ISA. The regionalists took a parochial view of 'their' slice of the budget, while the generalists tried to integrate broader policy concerns with budgetary reality.209 In any case, much of the assistance would be set by the broader policy concerns of the Administration. In the Reagan years, after the funding was allocated for programs in Israel, Egypt, base-rights nations (Turkey, Greece, Portugal, the Philippines and Spain), El Salvador, and Pakistan, there was not much money left in the pot. Nevertheless, the scrapings were fiercely contested. The SAPRWG meetings allowed the players an early opportunity to discuss budgets for each country program. Most budgets remained stable or increased from year to year, reflecting Administration priorities, joint planning, and ongoing programs. As budgets expanded in the early years, the SAPRWG discussed priorities for budget increases. When funding declined in later years, discrepancies between agencies were defined at this stage for discussion among the senior policymakers. Issues were defined at the SAPRWG level, but made at the more senior level players in the *°*Aa one former DSAA. official noted, "They [regionalists] wanted some walking-around money so they would have some influence with the military in countries as part of overall pol-mil relations. . .We (DSAA) were interested in concentrating [military assistance resources] so we could make a dear-cut military impact." Glen Rudd, former Deputy Director of DSAA, interview by author, tape recording, Falls church, Virginia, 15 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108 State and Defense Departments. Franklin Kramer notes that the SAPRWG generally decided "to increase or maintain levels, not to decrease them."210 One participant stated, "the ultimately-proposed Administration numbers tend to be read like tea leaves abroad as messages of the direction of U.S. policy."211 Again, as at the initial stage, the bias in the process was to increase the size of the budget rather than to pit priorities against each other. Settling Details. Following this review, DSAA and Office of the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance would settle outstanding issues with the regional bureaus in DoD's Office of International Security Affairs and the State Department, respectively. In theory, issues eluding settlement at this stage could be sent to the next level. For DoD, this meant the undersecretary of defense for policy; for State, this was the undersecretary of state for policy. In practice, issues were not raised to the next level during most of the Reagan years because Richard Armitage and William Schneider were the de facto final arbiters on assistance issues before they reached the secretary of state's desk. 210Kramer, 106. m 2bxd. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109 Finally, any remaining unsettled issues were sent to the secretary of state for resolution. Generally, officials sought to have as few issues as possible go to the secretary of state for decision. A strong Undersecretary for Security Assistance, such as William Schneider, who had the secretary's support, found that fewer issues needed resolution. In any case, only one or two issues annually went to the secretary of state for resolution.212 Conclusion:. Budget-£q Emulation Fro cess The whole process took eight months, from April to December of each year. During this time, participants were also engaged in allocating the current-year budget, testifying to support the program for the next fiscal year, and preparing an out-year budget. For example, in April 1984, the executive branch was implementing the FY 1984 program, reprogramming certain FY 1983 funds, testifying in support of FY 1985 funds, (and possibly supplemental FY 1984 funds), and preparing the FY 1986 budget request. Thus, participants worked simultaneously on three or even four budgets. • 2UDr. Henry Gaffney, foxmer Director of Plana for DSAA, interview by author, tape recording, Alexandria, Virginia, 25 February 1993. Dr. Gaffney noted, "the process worked because you had a deciding authority in the secretary of State.” By this Dr. Gaffney meant that security assistance funding disputes could not drag on endlessly between agencies. The secretary of state could end the dispute by making a final decision. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The secretary of state subsequently approved the budget and sent it forward to OMB. After a review and small cuts, OMB would send the budget back to State. At this point, State would review the budget internally and make final decisions on funding levels. The budget would then be sent back to OMB for final adjustment. OMB developed its own draft of the budget and this led to clashes with State on specific items. The State Department usually overcame the OMB objections by using policy-based arguments to support its position.213 The budget figures were then placed in the president's budget and in the Congressional Presentation Document for _ Security Assistance, Programs (CPD), which was sent to the appropriations and authorizing committees. Administration officials were aware that some items requested in the CPD would have difficulty in gaining congressional approval. Sometimes the Administration would defer certain requests for military assistance funding and, instead, include them in a supplemental request. This strategy attempted to forestall congressional cuts of unpopular programs that would decrease the overall aggregate 2uFarmer Reagan Administration official, interview by author, tape recording, Arlington, Virginia, 8 August 1994. For example, if OMB argued for a cut in a specific line item, the State Department would argue that the cut would be deleterious to American foreign policy interests. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ill funding for military assistance.214 At other times, the Administration requested funding for countries for which funding was restricted by Congress. The appropriated funds became sources of funding for reprogramming to other nations in the fa.ce of overall budget cuts.215 Congressional Consideration of Requests The second major stage of the process involved requesting appropriations from Congress. Administration officials presented requests for legislative changes and budget authority to the House Foreign Affairs Committee (renamed the International Relations Committee in 1995), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House and Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittees on Foreign Operations in formal hearings, followed by a question answering session. Budget requests fell under the purview of the appropriations committees. The Administration had the advantage of taking the initiative. As Joseph White notes, The executive influence on the [House Appropriations] committee goes beyond its more technical advantages as m Former State Department official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 May 1993. 2UIn reprogramning, funds originally designated for one nation were given to another, provided Congress did not object. In two examples, funds for El Salvador in 1986 that could not be spent due to an amendment in the law and funds blocked from Pakistan in 1990 due to non-proliferation laws were good sources of funds for reprogramming to other nations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112 to information. By making the first move, the executive shapes the political environment of the committee's choice.21.6 The Administration attempted to construct a budget that would appeal to select elements of the Congress by inserting 'cut insurance.' Accordingly, it presented a budget 10-15 percent larger than what it thought Congress would approve, but portions of that 10-15 percent might attract some support on the committees or in the Congress as a whole. By presenting the budget this way, the Administration had a better chance of obtaining a higher overall budget mark from Congress.217 There was virtually continuous contact on aid questions between the foreign operations subcommittees and the Administration once the foreign assistance budget was submitted. However, there was no informal consultation on the upcoming year's foreign assistance budget prior to its being sent to Capitol Hill as part of the president's overall budget proposal for all federal programs. Thus, Congress (majority and minority alike) saw the assistance proposals for the first time when the overall budget 21*Joseph White, "The Functions and Power of the House Appropriations Committee" (Ph.D dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1989), 10. n7A major Administration goal was to maximize the aggregate appropriation level for the -foreign aid account. Former State Department official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 May 1993. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 proposal was submitted by the Administration. Therefore, Congress had no influence in shaping the proposals prepared by the executive branch.210 The executive branch was aware of congressional concerns, of course, and moved to address them on accounts such as Greece, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus. Hearings During formal congressional hearings, the secretary of state, the undersecretary of state for security assistance, and the director of DSAA typically gave overview presentations of the security assistance request to the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees and to the House and Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittees on Foreign Operations. Committee members' questions varied, but they usually concerned general foreign policy rather than specific questions about aid. While the Administration had to be prepared for questions, it usually had good intelligence about what would be asked and had prepared answers for the anticipated questions.219 During the hearings, the Administration often a,This fact was confirmed in many interviews with both congressional staffers and members of the Administration. Joseph White notes "neither the staff, members (including Republicans) nor OMB officials report any dealings before the markup of their bills." White, "Functions and Power," 259. a,Former Reagan Administration official, interview by author, tape recording, Arlington, Virginia, 8 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114 arranged courtesy calls between members of Congress and regional assistant secretaries so the latter would get a sense of issues that interested the members. These calls gave the Administration a chance to preview and highlight its areas of concern. The changes brought about by the 1985 Gramm-Rudman- Hollings deficit reduction law interposed a new actor in the congressional process— the House and Senate Budget Committees. The Administration provided material for testimony by the chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees to the budget committees. The budget committees would then consider the foreign assistance budget in the context of the larger federal budget and pass an overall budget resolution that set ceilings for each of the regular appropriations bills. The budget committees' resolution would then form the ceiling for foreign assistance spending in the upcoming fiscal year.220 Administration officials testified before the budget committees and provide material for the chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees testimony to the budget committees. The appropriations committees worked with the budget committees 220During the Reagan years foreign operations subcommittee chairman Rep. David Obey had significant influence in helping to set the budget committee ceiling for foreign operations. Former House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 informally on the aggregate funding total for foreign assistance.221 Congressional Strategy The Administration's strategy during the Reagan years focused on increasing military aid, with a larger concessional loan or grant element for assistance coupled with fewer restrictions on how that aid could be spent. As appropriations leveled off and declined after 1985, earmarks and the allocational balance between economic and military aid became more important.222 The reduction of earmarks and conditions on the allocation of aid became a critical concern of executive officials in dealing with the committees. The Administration's proposed aid packages represented its foreign policy and security interests, tempered by the realities of Congress. Thus, the Administration 'learned' to stop reducing the grant component of aid to Israel, just as it 'learned' where the politically acceptable range of aid to Turkey lay. It realized it could never propose as large an aid package for Turkey as it believed necessary to modernize its armed “ 'Ibid. '“Earmarks are explained in Chapter 1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116 forces.223 Administration strategy toward Congress did not focus heavily on the hearings stage. In fact. Administration officials often gave the same basic testimony year after year, with changes in some specific legislative and aid allocation requests. In part, this reflected a continuity in programs; it also reflected a belief that hearings did not sway votes in Congress.224 In presenting the program to Congress, the Administration was very reluctant to prioritize its request, fearing that this would invite cuts in areas it designated as low priority.225 This exasperated some members of Congress who sought guidance from the Administration in order to make intelligent choices on spending reductions.226 Yet, at the hearings, the Administration took an unyielding approach against reducing any element of the program. 222Constrictions on the program to Turkey steamed from several sources. Large aid increases to Turkey would reduce funds for other parts of the budget. Given Congress's adherence to granting aid to Greece and Turkey in a 7:10 ratio, increases aid to Turkey would have necessitated increases in funding for Greece. Even with the 7:10 ratio, the Greek lobby pressured Congress to resist large increases to Turkey. 2Z4In conmenting on the hearings process, one former Reagan official stated, "hearings are not the place that Congress gathers information." Former State Department official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 Hay 1993. 225Foreign aid was not alone in this regard. Secretary of Defense Weinberger resisted prioritizing among DoD programs for the same reason. 22 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117 Informal Relations. Once formal sessions ended, the appropriations committees began to mark-up the proposed legislation. At this point, the formal and informal relationships between the committee staff and the congressional liaison offices at DoD and State became very important.227 The Administration's strategy was to build a political bridge through a high-level political appointee for liaison with the committees. Between 1981-1986, the undersecretary of state for security assistance served as the Administration's liaison. In 1987 and 1988, the undersecretary of state for policy performed this function. This senior official negotiated with the committees and explained Administration positions on cuts, aid conditions, and programs. On specific issues, the executive branch sought to enlist the help of an important House member or Senator who had an interest in key countries. For example, Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-NY) and Senator Robert Byrd (D-W VA) worked together to increase the assistance program for Turkey. Rep. Charles Wilson (D-TX) had a strong interest in aid to Pakistan. The Administration worked particularly with representatives on the foreign operations subcommittees. 227During the mark-up stage, subconmittee members discussed and amended a draft of the foreign operations bill written by the subcommittee chairman and the subconmittee staff. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 The subcommittee mark was often the final mark, so influencing this mark was important.228 In the House, the Administration also worked closely with Rep. Jack Kemp (R-NY) as the ranking minority member on the foreign operations subcommittee. The House Republicans were of limited value, however, and the Administration concentrated on building bridges to House Democrats in order to ensure the bill passed. The appeal to members on specific interests was critical, especially in the years when the foreign operations subcommittee could be moved by swing votes such as Rep. Charles Wilson or Rep. Clarence D. Long (D-MD) ,229 When David Obey chaired the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee, he would sometimes seek Administration support for his bill and in those times supported higher allocations for nations favored by the Administration or key legislators in order to gain support for his bill on the House floor. Control of the Senate proved critical for the Reagan legislative strategy on military aid. Between 1981-1986, when the Republicans controlled the Senate, Sen. Robert Kasten, Jr. (R-WI) was instrumental in gaining passage of the appropriations bill. Undersecretaries Buckley and 22,See discussion in Chapter 5. S9See discussion in Chapter 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119 Schneider would seek as high a Senate mark as they could obtain, and then use that mark in negotiations with the House. When Republican control of the Senate ended in 1987, the Administration lost a major advantage in dealing with Congress. Still, even during Democratic control of the Senate in 1987 and 1988, the conservative nature of the Senate meant that the Administration generally worked more effectively with the Senate than the House. In the appropriations process, working with the committees, particularly the chairmen and important members of the House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees, was critical. When Rep. Clarence D. Long (D-MD) was chairman of the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee (1981- 1984), the Administration could work with some Democratic House subcommittee members for support of Administration priorities in the foreign aid bill. But when Rep. David Obey assumed the chairmanship in 1985, he held a much tighter grip on the subcommittee.230 In negotiating with Obey, the Administration sometimes traded lower budget figures for increases in concessionality.231 Undermining Authorizing Bills. Authorizing 230See discussion Chapter 5. 2nIncreasing concessionality meant decreasing the cost of the assistance to the recipient, either by providing more money in grants or by providing a higher percentage of low-interest loans. Former State Department official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 May 1993. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120 legislation serves two purposes for any administration: to begin new programs and to outline the rules governing the expenditure of funds. For Congress, of course, authorizing legislation provides a direct voice in and impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The Reagan Administration has been faulted for undermining the traditional process for authorizing and appropriating foreign aid by undercutting the authorizing process and supporting the incorporation of foreign aid into large continuing resolutions (CRs). Congressional procedure customarily requires that programs are first authorized by 'policy' committees which make judgements on policy issues. Following that process, the appropriations committees appropriate funds to finance the authorized programs. The Reagan Administration contributed to the problems of the authorizing committees by threatening to veto authorizing bills containing amendments that the Administration believed undermined presidential authority or severely limited aid to key allies such as Turkey.232 The Administration discovered that it could function fairly well without an authorizing bill and thus did not have to support foreign aid bills it found unacceptable. As one former Reagan Administration 232See Larry Q. Nowels, "Foreign Aid: The changing Legislative Process," in Conoresa and Foreign Policy. 1984. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 83. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121 official noted: Since foreign aid was already in declining popularity, all you had to do was make a veto threat against one house or the other. . .If it [the Administration] was going to veto the Senate bill, why should the House vote on a foreign aid bill that would be vetoed? All they would be is on record as supporting foreign aid. . .It was not hard to manage in this environment.233 When the Administration did need an authorizing bill, as in 1981 when it wanted to begin an assistance program in Pakistan and thus needed to modify nonproliferation legislation, it worked very hard to secure its passage.234 When it did not, as in 1984, it worked less hard. Only two authorizing bills became law during the Reagan Administration. The other bills languished in Congress. Some have said the Reagan Administration's lack of support for the process was responsible for this development. However, Reagan Administration officials have asserted that the authorizing committees declined because they did not command the respect of the Congress.235 Altered Appropriations Role. The power in Congress with respect to aid now moved to the appropriations committees. Key officials, such as Undersecretary of State 2MFormer State Department official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 May 1993. a4See discussion in Chapter 4. 23SFormer State Department official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 May 1993. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 Schneider, concentrated their efforts on these committees.236 The omnibus CRs that were seen during the Reagan years contained advantages and disadvantages from the Administration's perspective.237 The hugeness of CRs limited debate on any one portion and thus limited amendments from the floor, thereby avoiding what had been a serious problem for the executive in the 1970s.238 The disadvantage was that they often were passed after the fiscal year began, thus complicating policy planning. While one former official remarked that he "would have preferred an orderly process," CRs probably helped the Administration since they resulted in more aid with fewer strings.239 Allocating Military Aid The third major stage of the process was the actual allocation of funds once they had been approved by Congress. By law, aid allocation had to be completed within thirty days, and the deadline provided useful discipline for m *As one Reagan official noted, "We worked harder with appropriations committees and we let state legislative work authorizations harder because the likelihood of getting an authorization bill was so slim." Former Reagan Administration official, interview by author, tape recording, Arlington, Virginia, 8 August 1994. 237See Chapter 5 for more discussion of Continuing Resolutions. 23,Amendments to the foreign aid bill such as the one that cut off military aid to Turkey in 1975 were introduced on the House floor, not in committee. 239Former state Department Official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 May 1993. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123 executive branch participants in the process. The first decision to be made, especially in the second Reagan Administration, was whether or not to use Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to 'break' (i.e. ignore) the earmarks. Despite considering this option several times, Administration officials never broke the earmarks.240 Given Congress's likely negative reaction to the Administration infringing on its prerogatives and breaking the earmarks, the Administration made the prudent choice to not break them. Genexatiag-QBtiQas Thus the Administration accepted the basic appropriations stipulations as they came from Congress.241 In years when Congress cut the Administration request, DSAA provided State and Defense Department officials with a series of hypothetical allocational distributions of the remaining funds, based on several scenarios.242 The first illustration simply allocated funds proportionally to each M0Seetion 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act allows the president to break congressional earmarks if it is in the national security interest of the United States. The Administration feared the retribution of the appropriations eomnittees in both the House and ' Senate if it broke the earmarks. 2wIn the early years (1981-83)* the Administration did reprogram some funds and use the President's Emergency Drawdown Authority to secure funds for Somalia and El Salvador. ‘"Information on allocation scenarios comes from Dr. Henry Gaffney, former Director for Plans of DSAA, interview by author, tape recording, Alexandria, Virginia, 25 February 1993. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124 program, based on overall cuts made in the program by Congress. In outlining the impact of proportional cuts on programs, DSAA planners sought to ensure that each nation received the 'minimum-sustainment level' for the country; that is, what the country needed to maintain already- supplied American equipment. A second allocational option protected funds for base-rights and base-access, apportioning funds to them as close to the requested level as possible. If the Administration was involved in a base renegotiation, this approach to allocating funds would be very important in order to see how full-funding of base rights nations affected the rest of the program. The third option protected allocations for "hot spots," such as El Salvador, in response to Administration priorities. These options were then reviewed within DoD and specific allocational possibilities were debated. With respect to all three allocational options, important checks in the apportionment process included U.S. commitments to the recipient, the country's ability to pay cash for systems, recipients purchasing plans for U.S. * equipment, and the effect on U.S.-recipient relations. Since FMS loans often went to pay for ongoing orders for equipment, DSAA was cognizant of the payments required for the upcoming fiscal year on those orders. This may have Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125 affected the country funding options generated by DSAA.243 When budgets began to decline in 1985 and 1986, Administration officials spread the reductions among the non-earmarked recipients while maintaining programs in all of the countries receiving military aid. As funding declined in later years, base-rights countries, such as Spain, were eliminated (or to use the Administration's term, 'graduated') from the program, along with nations that could afford to pay cash for equipment, such as South Korea. Many African nations had their aid slashed or eliminated altogether because they simply were not strategic priorities.244 At the State Department the allocational spreads were sent to the regional bureaus which could then appeal them to PM. There was a similar process at DoD-ISA. State and Defense would then resolve the remaining issues and submit the final allocations to Congress. The process resembled a shorter version of the budget development process. Supplementals and Reprogrammings Supplemental appropriations requests and 2MWh±le DSAA no doubt made policymakers aware of purchasing plans and required payments, I did not pursue this line of questioning in my interviews with policymakers to determine its effect on the generation of specific options. Recipients were made aware that they military assistance levels were not guaranteed and that they would be required to pay for orders not covered by assistance. 244See discussion in chapter 2. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126 reprogramming actions became a large part of the Reagan military aid strategy. The Administration proposed supplemental requests or reprogramming actions every year except 1986 and 1988. Supplemental were either in response to an emergency that developed during the fiscal year or, more often, a second attempt to gain funding not received during the normal appropriations process. The latter were dubbed by one participant as "disappointments supplementals," and their chance for passage was viewed as slim even within the bureaucracy.245 The Administration sometimes also used supplemental requests for weak programs with little congressional support that it did not want to include in the regular request for fear of losing part of the aggregate if the weak program were cut.246 Foreign aid supplementals were placed within a larger supplemental being sent to Congress in the hope that they would be approved along with more popular items. This tactic failed at the subcommittee level, as military aid supplementals were sent to the foreign operations subcommittees for consideration. Once there, the request had to stand on its own merits. The House was generally 24SDr. Henry Gaffney, former Director for Plans of DSAA, interview by author, tape recording, Alexandria, Virginia, 25 February 1993. 24‘Fonner State Department official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 May 1993. Examples of weak program* included many African programs, such as Zaire and Sudan. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127 unsympathetic to Administration requests. A few times the Administration was able to broker a deal for security assistance in the full appropriations committee by trading support either for the non-military aid part of a package or a domestic policy request. Reprogramming actions and emergency drawdowns were used fairly regularly during Reagan's first term, particularly in the case of Central American programs. In reprogramming, the Administration would communicate to the House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees which nation(s) or program(s) would be funded over the level specified in the Congressional Presentation Document and which country(s) or program(s) would be cut to supply these funds. The subcommittees could reject the proposed reprogramming within 15 days of notification. Emergency drawdowns fell under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and authorized the president to use DoD stocks to supply military equipment to a recipient nation on an emergency basis. At the time of the action, the president should communicate a justification to Congress. In the following fiscal year, the president generally requested foreign assistance funds to repay the DoD for the equipment. Supplementals, reprogrammings, and emergency drawdowns were used much less frequently during Reagan's second term. Congress was much less willing to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128 approve supplementals and there were fewer funds to reprogram between accounts. Emergency assistance was also more criticized and scrutinized in the second term. Conclusion Foreign nations viewed military assistance as a barometer of their relations with the United States. More assistance indicated a warm relationship. Cuts were thought to signify declining importance, even if that was not, in fact, the case. Even if a nation displeased the United States, there was a reluctance to cut assistance, as aid might be useful as a carrot to induce better behavior. The bureaucratic process itself also militated against cutting aid levels. Hard-fought battles in the bureaucracy became more intense when requests and assistance levels fell. Therefore, if possible, a continued funding level from the previous year was preferable to an aid cut. Of course, there was a natural tendency in all but a few cases for assistance planning levels to rise from year to year. In the early 1980s, when budgets were rising, this was not a problem. The Administration was in the enviable position of not having to make trade-offs among countries and programs. When tradeoffs had to be made, especially in 1987 and 1988, the process became more fractious. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129 This examination of the process highlights, among other things, its hierarchical nature and the centrality of the State Department in the process. State made the final allocational decisions and spearheaded the Administration's congressional strategy. The undersecretary for security assistance became a linchpin in the entire Reagan process. The outcomes of Administration planning depended on congressional funding of its initiatives'. Fundamentally, the Administration's congressional strategy was to undermine the traditional processes for consideration of military aid. Three components of the strategy were particularly important: reliance on House and Senate allies; use of supplemental funding and reprogramming, and the skirting of the authorizing process. The importance of the Administration's reliance on critical allies in the House and Senate cannot be over emphasized. Control of the Senate was critical to Reagan's first-term military aid successes. The support of Republicans as well as some Democratic legislators enabled the Administration to prevail in some early battles in the House. The loss of its allies in the second term explained many of its problems during the second term. The aggressive use of supplemental funding and reprogrammings demonstrate the assertive nature of the Administration's approach to military assistance funding. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130 Supplementals, which, had been considered extraordinary measures prior to the Reagan Administration, became almost commonplace. Supplementals bogged down the regular consideration of military assistance appropriations and allowed the Administration to g ame r more military assistance resources by requesting those resources seriatim, rather than all at once. Most importantly, the Reagan Administration's congressional strategy contributed to the collapse of the authorizing process in Congress, thereby curtailing a critical congressional input into foreign policy. Earlier Administrations had problems with the authorizing committees, but they did not pursue an active strategy to undermine them. The demise of the authorizing process is a sad legacy of the Reagan years. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the dynamics of the authorization and appropriations committees during the Reagan Administration. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 4 CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY The foreign aid bill can be considered the principal vehicle by which Congress attempts to influence and make foreign policy.247 The dialogue between Congress and the president over military assistance is a subset of the larger struggle between the two branches about the proper role of Congress in U.S. foreign policy. Military assistance, because it involves both foreign policy and the allocation of resources, is one of the few issue areas that cuts across customary and constitutional prerogatives of both Congress and the president. Foreign aid policy offers Congress a vehicle into foreign policymaking. As Barbara Hinckley notes, foreign aid "suits the congressional character, always at its most skilled and comfortable using budgetary decisions as a means of policy control."248 This chapter first discusses the Constitutional prerogatives that affect the allocation and distribution of military assistance resources. It then 247Robert Pastor, Congress and the Polities of U.S. foreign Economic Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 253. 24*Hinckley, 102. 131 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132 examines congressional roles and values in the foreign policy and foreign assistance areas. Finally, the authorizing commit tees, traditionally responsible for defining congressional foreign policy positions through the foreign aid budget, are discussed. Constitutional Authority and Military Aid The president and Congress have sparred over control of the military assistance program since the 1950s. Authority over military assistance derives both from the Constitution and from the role each branch is able to play in foreign policy. Congress's constitutional powers with regard to military assistance rest principally in the areas of appropriations and the regulation of foreign commerce. Section 8, Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the authority "to regulate Commerce with foreign nations. . ." This includes U.S. defense goods and services by implication.249 Congress also has the power to dispose of and make rules for property belonging to the United States under Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution. Also critical for foreign aid funding is Article 1, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution which states that "no money shall be *4*For discussion, see Mortaolf and Sanelson, 161. See also Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Poliev. 3d ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1989), 47; and Meyer, 89-94. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133 drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by law." While, in practice, the president has generally been preeminent in the foreign affairs area, the Constitution grants Congress sweeping authority. It has the authority to direct the president in how congressionally-appropriated funds are spent. Congress can influence military assistance decisions through various means, such as earmarks, conditioning of assistance, reporting requirements and report language, and personal and political pressure on the executive branch policymakers. In addition to the appropriation and commerce powers, Congress also has several lesser known powers that influence the area of foreign assistance.250 The power to direct the allocation of resources using earmarks, however, does not translate into the ability to manage the foreign assistance program. Implementation is an executive branch function. Meyer states that: Congress is not an enforcement body; it has the power to prescribe processes, not to carry them out. Congress lacks not only the institutional competence to micro- 250"For example. Congress may restrict aid to nations seizing U.S. fishing vessels, by virtue of its power 'to define and punish Piracies committed on the high seas, ' to terrorist nations or human rights violators, by virtue of its power 'to define and punish — offenses against the Law of Nations,' and to countries that permit the mob destruction of U.S. government property, by virtue of its power 'to make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory and other Property belonging to the United States.'" Meyer, 93-94. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 134 manage foreign assistance, but also the constitutional authority to participate in day-to-day decision-making except through actions taken bicamerally and presented to the President.251 Meyer concludes that, The power to control presidential discretion is ultimately the power to review: both to set general policy guidelines and to disapprove particular presidential actions as inconsistent with those guidelines.252 While Congress's potential power is vast under the Constitution, its actual influence is limited partly because it usually lacks the ability, and often the desire, to manage programs or alter fundamentally the executive branch decisionmaking processes.253 Congressional control must occur through legislative processes, which, in the case of legislation, are subject to a presidential veto. This presents a significant hurdle to altering foreign assistance legislation without executive branch support; often legislators do not view squabbles on foreign assistance as worth the effort. Thus Congress does not generally make full use its constitutional authority. “lIbid., 95. see also Lindsay, Congress and the Polities of U.S. Foreign Policy. 12-13. “^ y e r , 96. ’“Harold Hongju Koh,_The National Security Constitution: sharing Power after, the Iran-Contra Affair (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 131-133. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 135 Influencing Policy Through Authorizing and Appropriations Legislation Congress influenced security assistance policy during * the Reagan Administration through the authorization and appropriations processes. The most effective means by which Congress influenced policy were: to use policy provisions to deny funds or to earmark money to specific countries or programs, to set conditions that had to be met before funds for an activity would be released, and to insert policy language into legislation and/or committee reports which detailed how Congress wants appropriated funds to be allocated. ' Reporting requirements were placed into authorizing and appropriation laws to encourage compliance with legislative provisions. Congress also inserted policy statements into foreign aid legislation to express concerns regarding specific countries or assistance programs. Congress may guarantee funding for a priority objective by using an earmark, a specifically mandated set- aside of funding for a country or program. Earmarks were, and are, one of the most effective tools Congress has for ensuring that appropriated funds are allocated for specific purposes. Earmarks for military assistance became an increasing headache for the Reagan Administration. By FY 1988, approximately 99 percent of the Foreign Military Financing Program funds (the largest military aid program) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136 was earmarked for specific countries.254 The Reagan Administration, complained that the earmarks limited its flexibility to provide aid to unearmarked countries. Congress responded that, in most cases, it earmarked accounts at the level requested by the Administration. The Senate was especially inclined to earmark.255 » The requirement that specified conditions be met prior to the release of assistance for a country or program was another policy tool utilized by Congress. Assistance to many countries, including Turkey, El Salvador, and Pakistan was conditioned on issues such as progress in resolving of the Cyprus dispute (Turkey), human rights (El Salvador), and nuclear non-proliferation (Pakistan) . Congress used this tool to force the Reagan Administration to focus on issues that Congress thought were slighted.256 Congress seeks to monitor the implementation of legislative conditions on foreign aid through reporting requirements. Before releasing certain funds, Congress required the executive branch to file reports, or certify 2MSee Mortsolf and Samelson, 157. 25SOne Senate staff member noted, "Congress's responsibility is to fund the U.S. Government and earmarks were part of that. . .no question it created problems for the Administration." Senate staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 23 August 1994. “‘See, for example, Arnson, 210-211. On conditionality, see also Warburg, chapter 8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 137 that certain conditions had been met regarding particular countries or issues. In theory, reporting requirements allowed Congress to monitor whether its proscriptions were being observed and followed. In 1988, there were approximately 288 reporting requirements for foreign aid.257 In practice, however, the Administration often made certifications to keep aid flowing to favored recipients such as Turkey and El Salvador. As Arnson noted with respect to El Salvador, once the survival of the government there was deemed "vital to U.S. interests, the certification amounted to little more than putting the best face on a bad situation."258 Congress invariably accepted these certifications and critics generally lacked the votes to end aid. The reports and certifications should not be altogether discounted; they did serve to keep issues of congressional concern before the executive branch and occasionally administrations have been unwilling to make certifications.259 “’Lindsay, Congress and the Polities of U.S. Foreign Policy. 108. For a discussion of reporting requirements in the case of El Salvador, see Arnson. “'Arnson, 211. “'For example, in October 1990, the congress withheld $352 million in military aid from Pakistan after President Bush indicated that he could not sieet the certification requirements concerning Pakistani development of nuclear weapons. See R. Jeffrey smith, "Administration Unable to Win Hill Support for Continued Aid to Pakistan. "Washington Post. 10 October 1990, A14. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 138 Congress also attached policy pronouncements to appropriations bills. Policy statements are binding, but the president is almost always given discretion with respect to policy implementation. The greater length and complexity of foreign aid appropriations bills during the late 1980s was due to proliferating congressional policy provisions.260 Congress also inserted "sense of the Congress" statements into resolutions or committee reports, which, while not binding, notified the executive branch of congressional concerns regarding aid programs. During the Reagan Administration, both the authorizing and appropriations bills for foreign assistance became more complex, as provisions were added to address congressional foreign policy concerns. As the authorizing process stagnated, appropriations legislation became the vehicle by which congressionally desired foreign policy provisions became law (discussed also in Chapter 5). Role of Congress Congressional use of the powers outlined in the Constitution or of the tools discussed above to influence military assistance policy depends on individual and institutional factors. Individually, members of Congress differ in their interests and expertise concerning foreign 260See Chapter 5 for further discussion. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139 policy matters. Some seek an active role in foreign policy debates, others do not. Institutionally, within the Constitutional parameters outlined above and the internal structures established by each chamber, Congress has established a set of formal and informal role guidelines that direct its participation in the foreign policy process. Individual Behavior The role that an individual member of Congress plays blends concrete policy concerns, such as U.S. policy toward Central America, with domestic political concerns, such as how a vote one way or the other will play in the district. Concerning values, former Congressman Matthew McHugh (D-NY) stated: "Each member had a goal orientation. . .in trends and values, not numbers. . .Some members did not like military aid, or voted against military aid all the time.*261 Ripley and Lindsay found that "electoral incentive is only part of the story. . .[regarding] Congress's handling of foreign and defense policy.''262 Individual members of Congress often have ideas about foreign policy and their ideas are often as influential as, say, constituent Z5IMatthew f . McHugh, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 4 August 1994. 2‘zRipley and Lindsay, 8-12. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 140 pressures.263 James Lindsay points out that when members decide what position to take within the broad band of constituent opinions, they first look to their personal policy preferences in deciding how to vote.264 Legislators' policy preferences will be strongly influenced by a legislator's personal ideology.265 The influence of chamber and party are also important considerations. In addition, when attentive constituents take an interest in specific issues, members of Congress have more at stake in foreign policy issues.266 In other cases, business interests will lobby Congressmen from their 263Lindsay, Congress and the Polities of U.S. Foreign Policy. 4. Lindsay later notes that other studies of congressional behavior indicate that in addition to constituent opinion, ideology also influences member behavior. Eileen Burgin, in an analysis of the vote in January, 1991, on the question of using force against Iraq, also found that "while the views of supporters mattered, members' own policy views were the most significant influence in determining how they voted." Ibid., 40. Z64Ibid., 45. 265See for example, William M. Leogrande and Philip Brenner, "The House Divided: Ideological Polarization Over Aid to the Nicaraguan 'Contras,Legislative Studies Quarterly 18, no. 1 (February 1993): 105-136; Robert A. Bernstein, Elections. Representation, and Voting Bfihavior (Englewood Cliff*, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989); and Ralph G. Carter, "Senate Defense Budgeting, 1981-1989,"' Politics Quarterly 17 (1989): 332-347. 26 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 141 districts on. issues concerning aid to certain nations.267 Constituent pressures tend to have more sway in cases where the member does not have strong views regarding a particular policy.268 Legislators are also concerned about garnering support for assistance initiatives. The odds of winning a controversial vote on an issue are important/ because a devastating negative vote can hurt a legislator's position on an issue for years to come.269 If a legislator cannot acquire the necessary votes for a position, there is little sense in proposing it. Orchestrating votes against organized interests or the president is a significant hurdle in proposing changes in assistance.270 Electoral interests are, of course, a key concern for members of Congress. However, simply looking at low public opinion support for foreign and military aid misses three salient factors for members of Congress. First, there can be tangible benefits for constituents or even the member of 2S7See Stephen R. Weissman, A Culture of Deference: Congress's Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1995), Chapter 3. 2“Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized interests and American nwnoeraev (New York: Harper fi Row, 1986), 252. 2<9Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. foreign Policy. 47. Also, Former House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 17 August 1994. 210Weissman, 59. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 142 Congress in foreign aid. Members may attempt to use select aspects of foreign aid legislation for their benefit, either with groups that favor the bill or with other groups by tying it to some larger issue of constituent interest. In an era of national fundraising for congressional campaigns, foreign policy activity may also result in an increase in campaign contributions from outside the district.271 Second, m a n y members of Congress support foreign and military aid and ignore constituent opinion, believing the public does not closely follow their voting record, or will not punish them electorally for it.272 Members sometimes balance their vote supporting the foreign aid bill by also voting to cut total aggregate aid or restrict aid to certain nations. Overall the relationship between constituency politics and activity on foreign affairs is complicated. Finally, many members want to create good public policy.273 In general, many members of Congress see their role as representing the people, including special 27lLindsay cites the case of Stephen Solarz. Lindsay, congress and the .Eslitica.of U.S..Foreign Policy, 4i. 272On aid to the Nicaraguan Contras, for instance, Leogrande and Brenner found that ideological leanings of legislators were more important than constituent opinion in legislators' voting decisions on the issue. Leogrande and Brenner, 117. 2T3Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. 42. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 143 interests, in foreign policy making.274 Congress also serves to educate the people on foreign policy and to provide a forum for public debate of foreign policy. Aside from specific interests and their own personal predilections, many legislators find little constituency reward for becoming deeply involved in foreign affairs work.275 The lack of constituent interest explains the strong influence that personal ideology and special interests can play in the consideration of foreign assistance by Congress. With regard to individual legislators, it is clear that, except for specific circumstances, most legislators are not wont to become deeply involved in foreign aid or foreign policy issues. Even if a legislator cares deeply about an issue, foreign affairs is viewed as an executive branch function, and there is a tendency to support the president in his actions. As former Representative Matthew McHugh stated, "There is a certain deference to the President and the State Department."276 This culture of deference, discussed by Stephen Weissman and others, manifests itself in several ways at the institutional level. m Lee H. Hamilton, "Congress and Foreign Policy," Presidential Studies Quarterly 7, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 135. 27SHeissman, 14. 27*Weissman, 17. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 144 Institutional Behavior Congress typically grants the executive branch substantial leeway in the legislation it passes governing aspects of foreign affairs.277 Loopholes in legislation are both designed and accidental. For example, reprogramming and emergency drawdown authority are written into the foreign assistance authorizing laws to provide presidents with the flexibility to use foreign assistance resources to react to changing circumstances. In other instances, loose or careless drafting of legislation allows the executive branch more freedom of action than perhaps Congress had intended.278 When the executive branch exceeds even the sweeping authorities often granted in foreign affairs legislation, neither Congress nor the courts generally act. Congress usually has little political will or incentive to challenge the president.279 Even tools within easy reach of Congress, such as the demanding of executive branch documents and swearing in of witnesses at hearings, are rarely used in the foreign affairs area.280 Passing of legislation in response 277ibid., 17. 27,Koh, 126-128. 27,Ibid., 131-133. 2*°Wexs3jnan, 18-19. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 145 to an executive action faces the formidable institutional obstacles of passing bills through Congress and, then, often faces a presidential veto.281 With congressional action so hampered, it is not surprising that scholars such as Barbara Hinckley have concluded that Congress is .not very effective in the foreign assistance realm, noting that little congressional activity devoted to foreign assistance actually becomes law.282 When Congress does act, the executive branch usually reacts sharply, accusing Congress of meddling in the details of policy.283 Representative Howard L. Berman stated, with respect to the congressional role in foreign aid, Some people would accuse us of micromanagement, but that stems from our frustration. This is the only vehicle on which we can do anything. Otherwise it's all talk.284 It is widely acknowledged that the president is generally better informed about foreign policy than are members of Congress. Despite the sharp increase in expertise on Capitol Hill since the early 1970s, the m Koh, 132. m Hinckley, 115. 2MAs one executive branch official said: "Rather than attempting to chart broad objectives in concert with the Administration, Congress seeks to enforce its will with respect to the details of policy execution. This is unhelpful— indeed, in the long run, it's self defeating." Mortsolf and Samelson, 176. ««Quoted in Steven V. Roberts, "Congress Has Its Ways of Influencing Foreign Aid," Mew York Tii— «. 7 April 1985, sec. IV, 3. For the effects of micro-management on the program, see Mortsolf and Samelson, 156-57. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 146 president and cabinet agencies still have far more substantive expertise on foreign policy than does Congress.285 This, of course, does not necessarily imply that the president's policy preferences are wiser than those of Congress. The president is also viewed, even by many members of Congress, as being responsible for foreign policy, while Congress is charged with appropriating funds for foreign affairs. To be sure, the power of the purse gives Congress substantial power in the foreign policy process. Still, given the accepted executive role in policy formulation and implementation, the congressional role is best realized with a cooperative executive branch. In the customary function as it evolved after World War II, the president proposed foreign assistance funding for programs to support his foreign policy. Congress then debated the funding request and, by extension, the policy.286 Congress then passed a foreign assistance authorization bill outlining broad policy guidance and recommended funding levels. A subsequent appropriations bill was passed that often cut funding from authorized levels but nevertheless supported the authorizing bill, and by extension the 2,ssee .Weissman, 20-21. 2,‘See Hinckley, 101-105. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 147 president's policy, by appropriating funding to support that policy. During the Reagan Administration there was an unprecedented breakdown in the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. The policy differences between the branches were such that the Administration and Congress could not agree in most years on an authorizing bill for foreign assistance. Without Administration support, Congress proved unable and unwilling to pass the authorizing bill in most years. The failure of the foreign aid authorizing bill has changed Congress's role in the foreign policy process. While the ability to debate policy continues, even the limited ability it possessed to translate debate on policy issues into legislation has been curtailed by the lack of an authorizing law. Lobbies for Security Assistance Lobbies and interest groups play an active role in the congressional process regarding security assistance.287 In the broad sense, strong lobbies are part of the process whereby Congress has asserted itself in the making of American foreign policy, particularly through the foreign “’Lobbying is a huge topic in its own eight. This section does not attempt to treat the topic comprehensively. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 148 assistance process. Lobbies and interest groups can provide information and alternative viewpoints to those of the executive branch. The success of lobbies depends to a great extent on the level of congressional activism on issues important to the lobbies in foreign policy. Lobbies use various means to try to influence the allocation of resources.208 First, they can directly contact legislators to argue their case, whether through private meetings or in testimony at open hearings.289 It can be particularly valuable for lobbies to provide useful information to those legislators predisposed to their respective positions. Second, lobbies can mobilize constituents to contact members of Congress. Some ethnic lobbies are particularly adept at this. Finally, interest groups, individuals, and political action committees can use donations to support candidates who support their positions or interests on security assistance. Again, ethnic lobbies are prominent in this regard. While the amount each group or individual can contribute directly to a candidate may be small, the cumulative effect of many people or groups donating to one candidate on the basis of a single issue can 2,,See David W. Dent, "Interest Groups," in U.S.-l^atin America Policymaking: A Reference Handbook, ed. David W. Dent (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1995), 151-156; and Schlozman and Tierney, 149. 2*9Schlozman and Tierney found almost all lobbies engage in this activity, Scholaan and Tierney, 149. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 149 be substantial.290 The influence that a lobby or political action committee (PAC) will have depends upon several factors.291 Issues having high visibility, expressed constituent preference, or that engage individual legislator conscience, will tend to have diminished lobby and PAC influence. The converse is also true.292 Low-visibility or technical issues of little interest to most constituents are ones where PAC and lobby influence tend to be more pronounced.293 At the very least, PAC money can buy access to legislators and their staffs to discuss issues of policy, lobbies doubtless benefit when the position they support closely resembles that of the administration and/or powerful members of Congress.294 Lobbyists contributed to the debate over the allocation of security assistance funds in the Reagan Administration. The major lobby interests were ethnic groups (such as the pro-Greece lobby), industry groups (such 290Schlozman and Tierney, 254. See also Larry J. Sabato, pac Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees (New York: Wtf Norton and Co., 1990), 135-140. 291Political action committees (PACs) ire groups that are formed to donate money to political candidates or causes. For a discussion of PACs, see Sabato. 292Schlozman and Tierney, 252. 293Sabato, 135. 294See Dent, 133. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 150 as the American League for Exports and Security Assistance or ALESA), and groups with specific geographic or functional interests (such as the Overseas Development Council or those interested in Central America). Of these three sets of groups, the ethnic lobbies representing ethnic diasporas are the best known. They "embrace their homeland. . .within the parameters of American pluralism, and they must always defend themselves against the charge of divided loyalties."295 Paul Watanabe points out the challenges that face ethnic groups lobbying Congress. Among the primary tasks that face ethnic groups attempting to nurture the support of policy makers are the need to build a credible case, to build legitimacy, and to provide services for policymakers.296 Ethnic groups, he notes, need to "have their views enter into the perceived reality of policymakers and regarded as legitimately promulgated and reasonable."297 Heading the list of ethnic lobbies is the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Founded in 1954, AIPAC has acted as a tireless proponent of American aid to Israel. It is commonly cited as the most effective 295Yossi Sbain, "Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Vinter 1994/95): 814. 2MPaul Watanabe, Ethnic Groups. Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 49. 2,1Ibid., 58. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151 foreign policy and foreign aid lobby. AIPAC's primary focus is Capitol Hill where it "works its will by [among other things] orchestrating aggressive, grassroots, pressure campaigns."298 AIPAC works for more than aid to Israel, however. Clarke and Woehrel note that: One of the most potent interest groups in the country, the Israel lobby, spearheaded by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, has worked hard raising the entire foreign assistance program. AIPAC is reportedly disturbed when legislators support aid to Israel but vote against other major aid programs.299 AIPAC cites professionalism, "grassroots organization" and "key contacts. . .in all 50 states" as key contributing factors in its effectiveness.300 AIPAC does not disabuse others of its image as a "heavyweight," and it is widely credited for helping to defeat the re-election bids of some members of Congress.301 In its testimony during the Reagan years, AIPAC took the approach that Israel was a strategic asset for the United States, that security assistance to 298John T. Tierney, "interest Groups Involvement in congressional Foreign and Defense Policy," in Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill, eds. Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 94. M9Duncan L. Clarke and Steven Woehrel, "Reforming United States Security Assistance," The American University Journal of International Law and Policy 6, no. 2 (Vinter 1991): 230. 300AIPAC, "What is AIPAC," Washington DC, undated. 30lTierney, "Interest Groups Involvement," 94. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152 Israel therefore was in America's national interest.302 The National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) lobbies on behalf of Arab causes in Congress.303 The group has been hamstrung, however, by the perception that to a significant degree "they are 'more anti-Israel than pro- Arab.'"304 In practice, then, there is no counter-lobby to AIPAC and associated pro-Israel groups. The American Hellenic Institute (AHI) Public Affairs Committee, Inc., lobbies for Greek interests in Congress.305 AHI was formally established in 1975 in the wake of the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. In the 1980s, AHI's main achievements were the preservation of the 7:10 aid ratio between Greece and Turkey, at a time when the Reagan Administration wanted to dramatically alter the ratio, and the winning of a variety of other security assistance benefits for Greece such as 10/20 financing terms, low 302For discussion, see Clarke, "U.S. Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel," 206-207. 303Robert B. Mahoney, Jr. and David L. Wallace, "The Domestic Constituencies of the Security Assistance Program," in u.s. security Assistance: The .Political Process, eds. Earnest Graves and Steven Hildreth (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1985), 146. 304see Shain, 817. 30SOn AHI and Greek lobbying, see Christopher Madison, "Effective Lobbying, Ethnic Politics, Preserve U.S. Military Aid for Greece," National Journal. 4 May 1985, 961-965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153 interest loans, and some aid grants.306 AHI's founder, Eugene Telemachus Rossides, a Treasury Department Assistant Secretary in the Nixon Administration, still headed the organization during the Reagan Administration. Paul Watanabe notes that: AHI-PAC proved to be especially adept at coupling its own unique resources, information, and leadership abilities with large-scale, grassroots activation network provided by AHEPA (American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association). By utilizing AHEPA's channels to and from the Greek American community at large, AHI- PAC was able to remain structurally small, professional, and tightly coordinated.307 Other countries, such as Turkey and El Salvador also lobbied for aid money during the 1980s. Lacking the strong organized lobbies that Greece and Israel enjoyed, these countries used professional Washington lobbying firms coupled with embassy staff.308 Turkey, for example, contracted with firms such as Hill and Knowlton, International Advisors Inc., and McAuliffe, Kelly, Rafaelli 306With 10/20 financing a nation received 10 years grace period followed by 20 years to repay EMS loans. Low interest concessional loans carried an interest rate of 5%. In 1988, the foreign assistance law was amended so that Greece received $30 million in MAP grants if Turkey received any grant aid, which it always did. 307Watanabe, 146. 30*See Tierney, "interest Group Involvement," 95. Tierney notes that "Visits to the Hill are now so conmonplace that members of Congress consider foreign emissaries a staple part of the retinue of lobbyists trooping through the corridors each week." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 154 and Seimens to lobby on its behalf.309 Foreign governments, of course, also lobbied directly during the Reagan years and today. For example, the personal efforts of President Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador were critical in getting assistance for his country during the 1980s.310 Foreign ambassadors also regularly lobbied Congress and the Administration for security assistance during the 1980s. In addition to, and often in conjunction with ethnic lobbies are the PACs that donate money to Senate and House member re-election campaigns. Leading the way in this regard were the pro-Israel PACS. The Almanac of Federal PACs: 1990. stated, "With near universality, the pro-Israel PACs. . .adopt names which do not convey their true political purpose."311 In the 1988 elections, pro-Israel PACs gave nearly $4.7 million to House and Senate candidates.312 The ability of the pro-Israel PACs to coordinate contributions for m a x i m u m effect gives them a 309Steven Pressman, "Countries Turn To Professionals for Lobbying," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 15 December 15, 3104- 3105. 310One House staff member described how Duarte won votes for military assistance to El Salvador in Kay 1984. House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. 3UEd Zuckerman, Alumna nf Federal PACs; 1990 (Clarendon, VA: flmward Publications, 1990), 547. 3UEd Zuckennan, Almanac Federal PACs: 1994-9S (Clarendon, VA: Antward Publications, 1995), 203. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 155 multiplier effect not available to most other interest groups.313 In the 1990 elections, pro-Israel PACs donated $4 million to House and Senate campaigns. Individuals who donated to pro-Israel PACs contributed another $3.6 million directly to the same candidates supported by the PACs— according to the Center for Responsive Politics.314 Further, "pro—Israel political donations are much larger than those given to other ideological groups such as gun control or abortion organizations."315 In addition to the ethnic lobbies, groups interested in foreign aid as a whole make their views known. Given their expertise, these groups4 views are taken seriously on Capitol Hill. One of the best-known is the Overseas Development Council (ODC). ODC's representatives testify before Congress each year and it issues public reports and materials.316 The ODC has consistently pushed for lower 3UI*arry Ma kins on. Open Secrets: The Dollar Power of BACa. in Congress (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1990), 76. n4Charles R. Babcock,"Israel's Backers Maximize Political Clout," The Washington Post. 26 September 1991, A21. 31sIbid. wsSee John W. Sewell and Christine Contee, "Foreign Aid and Gramm-Rudman," Foreign Affairs 65, no. 5 (Sumner 1987): 1015*1037; John W. Sewell, "Foreign Aid for a New World Order," Washington Quarterly 109 (Summer 1991): 35*45; and John W. Sewell and Peter Storm, Promoting National Security and Advancing America's Interests Abroad: US Budget for the New World Order (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1991). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 156 levels of security assistance, both during and after the Cold War. The thrust of its position is that in a rapidly changing world dominated by economic concerns, the United States has to shift its priorities more toward economic development and humanitarian aid. Military aid, in ODC's view, should come from the Department of Defense. The American League for Exports and Security Assistance (ALESA) represents firms and unions who depend on security assistance funds for part of their income. ALESA lobbies for increases in the security assistance budget as a whole. ALESA faces two disadvantages: "its corporate members' interests are sometimes divergent" and it has few trade union members.317 ALESA is not and rarely has been a particularly effective lobby for security assistance.318 In his examination of arms sales to the Middle East, Joseph Burke also found that the impact of industry groups was relatively insignificant "compared to the efforts of AIPAC and the administration."319 Committees in Congress Members of Congress can influence foreign aid by, 317Mahoney and Wallace, 143-44. ll,Barry Blechman states that "The aerospace lobby has made hardly a ripple in Washington and apparently even had trouble persuading defense companies to support its efforts to loosen export controls." See Blechman, 127. M*Burke, "Arms Sales to the Middle East," 130. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 157 among other things, amending the foreign aid bill on the House or Senate floor or in committee. Foreign aid is first considered in committee through the authorizing and appropriations processes. In the 1980s, through earmarking and conditionality, as expressed in annual amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or through the appropriations process, Congress used its power over appropriations to influence American foreign policy.320 As Gerald Warburg states, It is. . .in the debate over what strings the United States should attach to its foreign aid that the determination of Congress to influence international relations is most often felt by the President.321 Four congressional committees hold primary jurisdiction over foreign aid: the House Foreign Affairs (renamed "International Relations Committee" in 1995) and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, which consider the foreign aid authorizing bill that -sets the policy parameters for assistance, and the House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees, which decide 32aEarmarks are congressionally mandated "set asides” for specifio countries and or programs. Conditionality refers to requirements set by Congressional committees for the release of specific security assistance funds to the executive. 32lWarburg, 232. Warburg goes on to note that, "The key to understanding how congress exercises these important powers is...conditionality. By attaching restrictions, provisos, and presidential certification requirements to dozens of foreign assistance accounts, Congress has placed its imprimatur on virtually the entire sweep of U.S. foreign aid programs." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 158 the amount of funding to appropriate for various foreign aid accounts.322 The role a committee will play is determined by several factors, including: the provisions of the Constitution regarding the expenditure of funds; rules of the chambers regarding authorizing and appropriations and the rights of members to amend bills; the personality and interests of the subcommittee or committee chairman, and the role he/she believes the committee should play in the process and in U.S. foreign policy; the composition of the committee; and the general political climate in a given year. Authorizing Committees The authorizing committees have a long and distinguished history. The House Foreign Affairs Committee dates from 1822, while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee dates back to. 1816. Within Congress, authorizing committees are charged with examining the policy questions related to the provision of foreign assistance by the United 322other conmittees also influence the foreign aid and security aid processes. Following the passage of the Graran-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Law of 1985, the House and Senate Budget Conmittees decided the broad figure under which appropriations must operate. The Armed Services Conmittees report out bills which amend the foreign assistance act with regard to military assistance. See Lindsay, Congress..and.the. Politics .of U.S. Foreign Policy. 53. See also Mortsolf and Samelson, 151. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159 States.323 Authorizing legislation performs two principal functions: management of programs and signaling political shifts by Congress with respect to foreign policy. Authorizing committees stipulate conditions for the provision of aid and, in some cases, set aid ceilings and earmarks for countries. The authorization of aid does not mean that the aid will be provided, but, by law, more aid cannot be appropriated than is authorized.324 Thus, the authorizing committees are supposed to have a role distinct from that of the appropriations committees. One appropriations subcommittee chairman stated: The authorization committee ought to make the decisions about what programs you ought to have on the books. That doesn't mean you can afford those programs. They should set [monetary] goals that they think would be good to reach to make the programs work in their area. Then we should have a later discussion as to how to fit it in at that time, under the conditions of that Budget year. The authorizers should say what we need to fit changing social circumstances. Appropriators should say what we can afford at the time, what programs are working.325 James Lindsay notes that formally, "the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee occupy a central role" in foreign policy matters, 3aHinckley, 21. “‘Authorization requirements can be waived, however. This will be discussed later in the chapter. wsQuoted in White, "Functions and Power," 196. This holds, of course, unless the authorizing requirement is waived by Congress, which happened several times in the 1980s in the case of foreign aid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160 but in practice, "the two committees find themselves remarkably ineffective in shaping U.S. foreign policy."326 Through the late 1970s, foreign aid authorizations were common.327 In fact, there had been one every year (except 1972) following the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Since 1978, authorizing bills were passed only in 1981 and 1985. This has meant that during the Reagan Administration the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees lost much of the power they once had. In the other years, the bills stalled either in committee or on the floor of one of the chambers. The failure to pass the bills was both a cause and a consequence of the decline in power of the authorizing committees, and these committees lost the respect of their colleagues.328 Leadership.Woes The inability to pass the authorizing bills had 326 Lindsay, Congress and the Polities of U.S. Foreign Poliev. 55. 327 Technically, aid authorizations in the Reagan Administration were amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which, as amended, remains the legal cornerstone of most U.S. foreign aid programs, including military aid programs. Military assistance is dealt with in the Foreign Assistance Act, the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Technically, these latter two acts are amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 328For a general discussion of authorization committee woes, see Lawrence J. Haas, "Unauthorized Action," National Journal. 2 January 1988, 17-21. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 161 several sources. Lack of leadership was a major problem. Over the years, the chairmen, of the authorizing committees seemed unable to control the debates and conflicts within their subcommittees. Both the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committee were sharply divided. The former suffered in the early 1980s from the reforms of the 1970s, which moved substantial power to its subcommittees. In 1982 and 1983, the House failed to pass an authorization bill at all. In the early 1980s, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablocki (D-WI) (1977-1983) could not guell the conflicts on his committee. His successor, Dante Fascell (D-FL) (1984-1989), did a better job and House authorizing bills passed in 1984 and 1987, even when the Senate failed to do likewise.329 The House committee was traditionally difficult to manage given the diversity of members' goals regarding legislation other than the foreign assistance bill. In analyzing the 1950s and 1960s, Fenno notes that the subcommittees were less important, and that the critical arena for work was the full committee.330 Subcommittees became more important in the 1970s following congressional 329The House bills were two-year bills, so the 1985 and 1987 bills each covered the next two fiscal years. The bulk of the 1984 bill never passed. The 1984 Continuing Resolution (CR) contained "bare- bones" authorizations language inserted at the last minute. 330See Richard F. Fenno, Jr., congressman in cowwm»f»»« (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), 107-108. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 162 reforms, and they resolved many of the policy squabbles that used to go to the full committee.331 House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Fascell and others were attuned to the need to produce a bill to maintain the committee's standing in the process. Stated Fascell in 1987, "If we are going to stay in this process, we've got to act on legislation."332 Likewise, ranking member William Broomfield (R-MI) stated that year, "we'll help you get a bill out on the floor with the understanding that we'll keep negotiating."333 This sort of bipartisan pragmatism allowed the House to move bills along when the Senate was paralyzed. The House committee's work suffered, however, because the paralysis of its Senate counterpart. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee suffered from leadership problems under Chairman Charles Percy (R-IL) (1981-1984) and especially under Chairman Claiborne Pell (D-RI) (1987-1994) . Senator Percy guided a bill through the Senate with strong Administration support in 1981, but as this support declined m James M. McCormick, "Decision Making in the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Conmittees," in Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill, eds. Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 137. JMPat Towell, "Foreign Affairs Panel Approves a New Authorization Measure," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 8 August 1987, 1814. MJlbid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 163 Senator Percy proved unable to unite an increasingly polarized committee. With. much, less Administration support# Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), in his two-year chairmanship (1985-1986)# managed to produce a foreign aid bill and obtain passage on the Senate floor. Senator Pell’s difficulties stemmed from his leadership deficiencies and his inability to lead the committee on policy questions.33* His woes were compounded by having an assertive conservative Jesse Helms (R-NC) as ranking minority member. Pell could not even send a bill to the floor during the Reagan Administration. Ideological Splits The ideological chasm on the authorizing committees was another factor in the inability to pass authorizing legislation. In the 1960s# this gap was relatively small, but by the 1980s it had widened considerably# especially in the Senate. Lindsay observes that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been polarized between "dovish Democrats and hawkish Republicans# thereby making agreement hard to come by.''335 As James McCormick notes with respect to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee# M‘See McCormick, "Decision Making in the Foreign Affairs#" 143 and also Rochelle Stanfield# "Floating Power Centers#" National Journal. 1 December 1990# 2916. MSLindsay# Congress and-the. Politics. of v..s> .foreign.-Policy# 56. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164 By the 100th Congress, and the beginning of Claiborne Pell's committee chairmanship. . .the average score assigned by the liberal Americans for Democratic Action among Republicans was now 17, while it was 81 among Democrats.336 Another Senate observer noted with respect to the committee that, . . .through polarization of their members they just can't get anything done. They try to offer a sort of consensus, which means sort of a common denominator up there, which is pretty low.337 When the authorizing committees did pass a bill, they had difficulty persuading the House Speaker and Senate Majority Leader to schedule time for the authorizing bill to come to the floor. This was particularly a problem in the Senate. Bringing foreign assistance authorization bills to the floor of the House and Senate was difficult for two reasons. First, due to the full legislative calendar, finding time for the divisive foreign aid bill was difficult. The Reagan program absorbed much time, both in committee and on the floor. Furthermore, the foreign aid debate was typically fractious, with days of speeches and M6McConnick, "Decision Making in the Foreign Affairs," 131. 3,7senate staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 23 August 1994. See also Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. 56. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165 headaches that often, yielded no definitive result. Moreover, beginning in 1985, deficit reduction and the fights it provoked began to consume congressional time.338 Again, the House, under Fascell, did a better job than the Senate in assuring bills went to the floor and passed. Second, members of Congress did not like to go on record as having supported foreign aid. There was an unspoken fear that a series of public debates and votes supporting foreign aid could work against them at election time.339 This fear gave the House Speaker and especially the Senate Majority Leader even less incentive to schedule floor debate time. Administration Opposition The executive branch made the authorizing committees' jobs more difficult by withdrawing its traditional support for authorizing bills. Traditionally, coalitions for foreign assistance authorizing bills were executive-led.340 Administration support was important in getting authorizing bills passed. When the Reagan Administration entered office 33*ln addition, there were simply more authorization bills to bring to the floor than in previous years as the number of programs which required annual authorizations has steadily increased since the 1950s. See Haas, 18. 33*See Nowels, "Foreign Aid: The Changing Legislative Process," 80. 340See for example, Fenno, Congressmen in 27. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166 in 1981 it initially pressed for an authorizing bill, both to establish its foreign policy priorities and to implement certain programmatic initiatives that required changes in the Foreign Assistance Act. After 1981, however, the Administration withdrew its support for the process and began issuing veto threats against authorizing bills it found objectionable. The Administration's actions had the effect of undercutting consideration of the bill in Congress. A veto threat against the House bill left the Senate with a dilemma. If the Senate supported the objectionable House provision(s), it risked a veto. If the Senate removed the provision(s), it might lose the House support on the conference bill. Thus, members faced the possibility of voting for a foreign aid bill only to see the bill rejected in the other chamber or vetoed. Their votes could both hurt them politically and be rendered meaningless by a veto.341 For its part, the executive branch also discovered that it could manage foreign assistance without an authorizing bill. Authorizing language contained in appropriations bills, often embedded in continuing 3UThis calculus factored prominently into Administration strategy. See Chapter 3 for discussion. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167 resolutions (CRs), proved adequate.342 Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance William. Schneider, Jr. told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1984 that "the foreign assistance community is fairly well adjusted to dealing with continuing resolutions."343 When asked how a CR affected policy, Schneider replied, "I would have to say that depends on how the CR is written."344 As Larry Nowels of the Congressional Research Service observed that the executive branch probably has had "fewer restrictions imposed on it with the absence of authorizing legislation, and that's why it is less than enthusiastic about supporting foreign aid bills."345 The Reagan Administration seems to want only one vote annually on foreign aid, and the only necessary votes were in the appropriations committees. The executive branch argued during these years that "killer amendments" placed in the authorizing bills hindered presidential authority and thus no president would sign them.346 Executive branch 342Continuing Resolutions, stop-gap funding measures to fund programs lacking regular appropriations, are discussed in some detail in Chapter 5. 343Quoted in Nowels, "Foreign Aid: The changing Legislative Process," 82. In fact, the authorization conanittees became an encumbrance to the Administration's policy. 344Ibid. 345Haas, 20. 34*See Nowels, "Foreign Aid: The changing Legislative Process," 84. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168 officials also believed, with, reason., that the authorizing committees had lost the respect of their peers in Congress.347 Hence, (Chapter 3), undercutting authorizing legislation was part of the Administration's legislative strategy. Another problem facing these committees was that authorizing legislation is not required by the Constitution or by statute, but by the rules of each chamber. It is these rules which stipulate that no monies can be appropriated that are not authorized.348 The rule, however, can be waived in specific instances by a vote in each chamber. Once it became clear in a given year that the authorizing bill would not be passed, it was only a matter of time until the authorizing requirement was waived. This occurred despite the best efforts of the chairmen of the authorizing committees (especially in the House) to persuade Congress to act on the bill. “’Former State Department official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 May 1993. 34,This rule originally dates back to a dispute in 1837. The rule, the forerunner of House Rule XXI, states, "No appropriation shall be reported in such general appropriation bills, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized by law, unless in continuation of appropriations for such public works and objects as are already in progress for the contingencies for carrying on the general departments of the government." Quoted from Louis Fisher, "The Authorization-Appropriations Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices," Catholic University Law Review 29 (1979): 51-105. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169 Shifting of Power .to Appropriations Even with the passage of an authorizing bill, funds authorized are not always appropriated. For example, in 1981 the authorizing legislation sanctioned the creation of a Special Defense Acquisition Fund. The appropriations committees, however, declined to appropriate funds to capitalize that account, and the Reagan Administration had to appeal in a 1982 supplemental bill for. funding for the authorized account. In the late 1980s the appropriations committees overrode provisions of the authorizing law. Authorizing committee members, particularly in the House, sometimes approached the foreign operations subcommittee about putting authorizing language in the appropriations bill. The authorizing committees' chairmen resisted this practice because it undermined their authority. At times, however, the chairmen themselves solicited the appropriations committees on provisions when they could see the authorizing bill would not pass and wanted to include some language in the appropriations bill. In another adjustment to the lack of an authorizing bill, the House Foreign Affairs and Appropriations Committees "developed an informal arrangement" to bring foreign operations people into authorization deliberations.349 M»See McCormick, "Decision Making in the Foreign Affairs," 147. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170 Authorizing Process in the Reagan.Years Only two authorizing bills passed during the eight years of the Reagan presidency. The circumstances under which each bill passed differed significantly. In 1981, the Administration strongly supported the bill in order to enact changes in the law necessary to begin certain of its assistance programs. In 1985, both houses of Congress passed an authorizing bill and influential Republicans appealed to the president to sign the bill. No authorizing bill passed after that time. First Term Authorizing Efforts In 1981, the Administration made a strong and concerted effort to obtain passage of the foreign aid authorizing bill. The Administration worked harder to obtain passage of an authorization bill in 1981 than at any time in the next eight years because it needed legislative foundations for several of its high priority programs.350 The final FY 1982-1983 authorizing law, PL 97-113, provided the Administration with a solid base upon which to build its military assistance programs for the next several years. 350While the Administration could negotiate small deals with the appropriations committees, it needed the backing of the authorization committees to begin or enlarge programs to Pakistan and El Salvador, for the creation of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund, and for changing FMS financing and reporting thresholds. For requests see Richard Whittle, "Reagan Wants Looser Ties on Military Aid," CQnare«gion»i Quarterly Weekly Report. 21 March 1981, 523. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171 The law began the dramatic shift to military assistance funding from development assistance. It authorized forgiven loans for Sudan, a recipient without the powerful political support enjoyed by Egypt and Israel, thus setting a precedent for forgiven loans outside the Middle East. Important compromises and the agreement on a certification requirement enabled a dramatic expansion of the military assistance program-in El Salvador. The Administration also won a waiver for Pakistan of the so- called Symington amendment, which required a ban on aid to nations dealing in nuclear enrichment technology without international safeguards. This waiver allowed the Administration to move ahead with its multi-year $3.2 billion aid program to Pakistan. Special EMS loan repayment terms were authorized for favored recipients such as Greece, Turkey, Egypt and Somalia that allowed them 30 years to repay their FMS loans with an initial ten year grace period. This represented an important step in the Administration's approach of helping finance recipients' arms purchases. However, it also allowed recipients to accumulate large debts, some of which would never be repaid. Finally, the law authorized the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF), although no funds were appropriated to support it for FY 1982. SDAF would allow the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 172 Administration, to procure frequently requested military aid items in advance, thereby allowing for more rapid delivery of assistance, increasing its immediate impact. In 1983, the full FY 1984 authorizing bill failed as the chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tried in vain to get floor consideration for their bills.351 While the regular authorizing bill died in Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablocki (D-WI) did manage to insert an authorizing measure into the CR for Fiscal Year 1984, which authorized the funding already appropriated by Congress. In 1984, both chambers of Congress worked to pass an authorizing bill for FY 1985, in part to place the congressional imprimatur on foreign policy issues, in part to preserve the prerogative of the foreign affairs and foreign relations committees, and in part to conform with orderly congressional procedure. In the end, the desire of members to put their stamp on policy with respect to certain nations doomed the authorizing bill.352 The full House passed its foreign aid authorizing measure on May 10, 1984. In the Senate, Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-TN), and 35XSee John Felton, "Omnibus Bill Includes Foreign Aid Programs," Congressional Quarterly Weekly.Report. 19 November 1983, 2435. 352See Warburg, 234. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 173 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Charles Percy (R-IL), decided not to bring the foreign aid authorizing bill to the floor, fearing it would absorb too much time by provoking several filibusters and that it ultimately would not pass.353 Second Term Authorization Efforts In 1985, the chairmen of both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were determined to bring an aid authorization bill to the floor in order to reestablish their committees' reputations.354 In the Senate, Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) deftly moved the authorizing bill through his committee, avoiding amendments on sensitive issues that could hinder the bill or bring a veto threat.355 The Senate bill authorized $12.8 billion, some $400 million short of the Administration's request, with most of the shortfall ($344 million) in the military aid authorization.356 353John Felton, "Senate Leaders Give Up on Authorization Bill, " Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 4 August 1984, 1884. 3S4Ibid. 3S5John Felton, "Senate Panel, Moving Quickly, Marks Up a $12.8 Billion Aid Bill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 30 March 1985, 573-575. 3S‘In a key vote on military aid, the Senate rejected an amendment sponsored by Senator Jeff Bingham (D-NM) to cut $100 million from FMS and add it to the Food for Peace program. Senator MUrkowski (R-AK) sponsored an amendment to end the 30-year repayment program for FMS credits, but the amendment was defeated (27-70), and he withdrew a second amendment to end the concessional loan program. John Felton and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 174 The House passed its foreign aid authorizing bill in June, 1985.357 Among the provisions directly affecting military aid were: a 3.2 percent reduction in total foreign aid; a 10 percent reduction, to $6 billion, in military aid, and a limit on aid to Turkey of $711 million.358 The State and Defense Departments fought to have some of the requested funds restored because of the deep cuts that both bills made in the overall foreign aid account, but Senate leaders prevailed upon Administration officials not to push for more than the approved amounts.359 In the end, Secretary of State Shultz accepted the bill and urged the Senate to pass it. The final authorizing law demonstrated the degree to which the Reagan Administration's priorities had been accepted even by the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives.360 MAP was authorized at $805 million and FMS was authorized at $5.37 billion for FY 1986 and FY 1987, Nancy Green, "Senate, After 4 Years, votes a Foreign Aid Bill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 18 May 1985, 923. 357John Felton, "House Votes Amendment-Laden Foreign Aid Bill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 13 July 1985, 1359. “'"House Passes First Foreign Aid Bill Since *81," New York Times. 1 August 1985, A2. 359John Felton, "Politically Unpopular Aid Bill Faces a Tough Future in House," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 4 May 1985, 829. See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Foreign Aid Bill May Be Vetoed Over Structures," New York Time*. 13 July 1985, Al. 3S0The final law was signed on August 8, 1985. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 175 a figure several times greater than the FY 1981 authorization.361 The president signed the authorizing bill in August, 1985. While the bill embodied many of his priorities, signing it into law indicated the Administration's willingness to accept a lower aggregate ceiling for assistance. The presidential signature also signaled a willingness to cooperate with the authorizing committees on foreign aid, provided they did not impinge on executive branch prerogatives. In 1987, the House tried to enact a two-year authorizing measure, because the 1985 authorization expired at the end of fiscal year 1987. The Senate failed to act on an authorizing bill. The House, however, passed a bill in December 1987, though it did not become law due to Senate inaction.362 Neither the House nor the Senate acted on an authorizing bill in 1988. The Senate continued to be plagued by an inability to move authorizing legislation to the floor. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell decided not to hold hearings on an authorizing bill, as the House had passed a bill in December, 1987. Rather, 3“John Felton, "Congress Clears Foreign Aid Authorization," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 3 August 1985, 1540-1546. 382Janet. Hook and Pat Towell, "House Takes Up Foreign Aid Authorization Bill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 21 November 1987, 2869. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 176 he decided to commission a task force under Representatives Lee Hamilton (D-IN) and Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) to conduct an overall assessment of the foreign assistance program and to recommend modifications to the foreign assistance program consistent with' the thaw in superpower relations in the late 1980s. The Hamilton-Gilman Task Force, as it was called, held hearings throughout 1988 and released a report in February, 1989 recommending the most sweeping overhaul of foreign assistance legislation since 1961.363 Conclusion The authorizing committees labored under substantial handicaps during the Reagan years. Not only were they afflicted with internal problems, but the Administration actively conspired in their demise. A determined political will to produce an authorizing bill, particularly in the Senate, might have preserved the authorizing process in spite of the Administration's lack of support. Unfortunately, that will was absent and the process was moribund. While the authorizing committees were battered and disparaged during the Reagan years, their influence and 3S30n the Hamilton-Gilman Task Force, see Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Task Force on Foreian Assistance. Comm. Prt. 101 Cong., 1st sess., 1989; Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation Act of 1989. Report 101-90, 101st. Cong., 1st sess., 1989; and Clarke and Woehrel, 233-241. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 177 importance should not be completely discounted. The Reagan Administration had a regular authorizing bill for four of its eight years. (By contrast, Bush had none, and, Clinton, through FY 1997, had none) . Furthermore, the. authorizing bills that did pass made important policy changes, such as authorizing the Special Defense Acquisition Fund and aid for Pakistan. It can be said that the enacted authorizing bills represented the common ground between the Administration and Congress. Unfortunately for the authorizing committees, the area of common ground was rather small. In the end, the authorizing committees had some role in fostering dialogue both between Congress and the Administration and within Congress itself.364 The real problem in those years when authorizing acts were not produced was that the very committees with the most expertise on foreign policy were eliminated from the policy process. Thus, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, with approximately 40 members and 97 staff persons, and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with 18 members and 61 staff members, were replaced functionally by the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee with 12 members and three full-time 3<4The tasks normally performed by these comnittees to enact legislation authorizing new programs has been accomplished in recent years through special legislation such as the Freedom Support Act of 1992, which authorized aid to the former soviet Union and was passed outside of the normal Foreign Assistance Authorization Act process. Former House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 18 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 178 staff and the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee with 10 members and three full-time staff. Thus, foreign aid policy would be directed for several years by the appropriations committees and their powerful subcommittees on foreign operations. Table 13 outlines the staffing differences between the authorizing committees and the appropriations subcommittees. One Senator on the subcommittee noted, perhaps too sweepingly, After awhile it became routine, it was expected that we legislate all over the place. . .[I]t's the little old foreign operations [sub]committee which is never on TV, that sets the foreign policy of the United States.355 These subcommittees are the subject of the next chapter. TABLE 13 CONGRESSIONAL STAFFING: 1981-1989 Congressional Committee 1981 1985 1989 House Foreign Affairs Committee 84 97 98 House Appropriations Committee 2 3 3 Foreign Operations Subcommittee Senate Foreign Relations Committee 59 61 58 Senate Appropriations Committee 2 3 3 Foreign Operations Subcommittee Source: Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreion Policy; and author interviews. 3“White, "Decision Making on the Appropriations Committees," 197. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 5 APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE The Constitution, grants the appropriations committees of Congress tremendous power, since no money may be drawn from the Treasury save by appropriations "made by law." Within Congress, the House has the initiative as Article 1, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution stipulates that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." Tradition, based on this language, is that the House will not act on appropriations bills which originate in the Senate.366 Politically, the committees labor under two sets of constraints, one external and one internal to Congress. Externally, most of the forces that affect budgeting are "outside the normal patterns of budgeting; they are conditions to which the budgetary routines respond."367 In the area of foreign assistance, these forces include new Administration initiatives and developments, crises and opportunities in foreign policy. Therefore, the ’“Fenno, Power of the Purse. 1. 3CTWhite, "Functions and Power," 49. 179 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 180 appropriations committees must balance finite resources against an ever changing set of priorities. Within Congress, the appropriations committees must be careful not to impinge too greatly on the role of the authorizing committees. While in theory the appropriations committees are supposed to concentrate on resource questions and leave the policy issues to the authorizing committees, in practice the line between these two areas has become increasingly blurred, "to the point of disappearing entirely."368 Appropriations Committees A bedrock prerogative of the House Appropriations Committee is, of course, to cut executive budget requests. But it cannot generally cut requests too much or it risks jeopardizing its influence with the executive branch. The committee also needs to be responsive to the authorizers.369 Joseph White, in his extensive study of the House Appropriations Committee, summarizes committee authority as follows: 3MCrabb and Holt, 49. The blucring of the line has led to some shifting of power between the House and Senate. Traditionally, the Senate was the more important chamber with respect to foreign policy by dint of the treaty power. However, as Lindsay argues, the increased importance of appropriations, as opposed to the treaty power, has led to a more prominent role for the House of Representatives in foreign policy. Within the Senate, it has also led to a more important role for the Senate Appropriations Committee in the foreign policy arena. See Lindsay, Coagseag and, the.BollOf V.8. fQCClga Policy, 31. 3WOn these points see Fenno, Congressmen in CainwittMs. 48-49. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 181 Substantially simplified, House Appropriations authority depends on how it performs two tasks. Both tasks must be performed without violating (much) a crucial taboo: Thou shalt not turn budgeting into policy-making. . . Within that constraint, House Appropriations first task is to fit the House Ts preference about budget details into the majority sense of an acceptable total. Second, it must manage the details in a manner that preserves and projects Congress's power over federal activities vis-a-vis the President, while satisfying member demands for a rough fairness in the distribution of district benefits.370 The most basic objective of the House Appropriations Committee and its 13 subcommittees, of course, is to protect the notion of its own and "the House's notion of its constitutional role."371 The Senate Appropriations Committee has a different role than its House counterpart, due to the rules and composition of the Senate. The Senate committee tends to act as an appeals court from the House committee since it receives the appropriations bills after the House mark-up. The culture in the Senate committee is also to approve the "constituency-based requests of each member."372 Thus, in the case of foreign aid, the Senate committee bill generally has more earmarks than does the House bill. More members of the Senate are also involved in the work of that bodies committee. Thus senators are more likely to negotiate over " “White, "Functions and Power," 16-17. m Ibid., 29. 37ZFenno, Congressmen In 160. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 182 several appropriations issues.373 Unlike general foreign policy, where Congress has a clearly defined pattern of deference to the president, Congress has a strong sense of its role in the appropriations process and it does not defer to the president. Funds must be appropriated to the president by Congress. This represents the most basic prerogative of the legislative branch. The appropriations committees play a leadership role in this area. During the Reagan Administration the appropriations committees had to assume a new role, one which persists to the present day. In those years when the authorizing process failed, the appropriations bill became the only bill passed in any form by Congress that provided the Administration with congressional mandates on policy and management issues. Therefore, the appropriations bill became much more important in the policy area and appropriations bills contained policy language usually reserved for the authorizing bill. Foreign Operations Subgommittees• An Overview With the problems in passing authorizing legislation, the burden fell to the appropriations committees to pass annual legislation on foreign and military aid. The failure 313Ibid., 184. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 183 to pass authorizing legisiation has led, by default, to a blurring of the authorizing and appropriations committee distinctions in the foreign aid area.374 In the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the burden of the foreign aid bill devolved to the foreign operations subcommittees, which first reviewed the legislation for their respective House and Senate full committees. Subcommittees played an important role in both chambers in the consideration of foreign assistance appropriations bills. In both chambers, the bill that passed the subcommittee became, in substantial part, the bill passed by the full chamber. As Smith and Deering observe, "The extremely large workload and size of Appropriations requires a division of labor and a heavy dependence by the full-commi ttee on subcommittee recommendations."37S Frequently, the full committee chair allows the subcommittee chairs to take the lead on their portion of the bill in full markup.376 The power and effectiveness of the House and Senate 374Lind say, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. 62-63. 375Steven .S. Smith and Christopher 316Ibid., 175. Markup is the process whereby the subcommittee meets to discuss the bill and reach consensus on the final assistance numbers and other bill provisions. This was always true in the House. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 184 Subcommittees on. Foreign Operations depended upon several factors, including the following: (1)the fate of the authorization bill, (2) the role of subcommittees in each chamber, (3)the personalities and styles of the chairmen and members, (4)the political adeptness of the subcommittee - chairmen, (5)the rules and traditions of the chamber, (6)the political balance in the chamber, (7)the ideology of the committee members, (8) the relationship between the majority party in the House and Senate to the White House, (9) the substance of the issues being addressed, (10)the Administration's request, and (11)the budgetary situation faced by the Congress that year. The role of the subcommittee chairman is always critical. Other factors such as the issues facing the subcommittee, the balance in Congress, the Administration request and the budget situation vary from year-to-year. Fate of Authorizing Legislation. The policy role of the foreign operations subcommittees varies to some degree with the strength of the authorizing committees. If the authorizing committee was strong and passed its bills, this reduced some of the appropriations subcommittee power in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 185 setting policy for foreign aid in the appropriations bill.377 If the authorizing committees failed to pass a bill, then functions increasingly devolved to the appropriations committees. Similarly, the State Department and the White House concentrate more of their legislative efforts on the appropriations committees if the authorizing process falters.378 Chamber Rules and Worms. The rules and norms of each chamber also influence the subcommittees' roles. Subcommittees are less important in the Senate because both Senate rules and norms allow for Senators to effectively amend legislation on the floor. In the House, however, rules are much more restrictive and preclude the inclusion of policy provisions in an appropriations bill absent a waiver of the rules from the House Rules Committee. House norms also militate against floor amendments, although in the foreign assistance area there have been some notable exceptions.379 377See White, "Decision Making on the Appropriations Conmittees," 194-197 for his discussion of the defense appropriations subcommittees and its relation to the House and Senate Armed Services Comnittees. 37,See Nowels, "Foreign Aid: The Changing Legislative Process," 83. 379For example, in 1975 then-Representative Thomas Hariein (D-IA) introduced an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act mandating a cutoff of assistance to nations not respecting human rights. He introduced the amendment from the floor of the House and, surprisingly, it passed. See Franck and Weisband, 86-88. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 186 The Chairman's Role. In both chambers, the personality of the chairman and his conception of his role are critical. The distribution of authority or roles within a subcommittee depends on who has knowledge, who cares about particular issues, and how those distributions of facts and values interact with formal means of coordination.380 The chairman is the linchpin of this process. If the chairman is politically s a w y and sees himself as a leader, the subcommittee usually functions effectively. If he is not able to broker agreements among members, or does not see shaping the final product as his role, then the subcommittee is less effective.381 The chairman sets the tone for the annual budget process through his statement at the outset of the hearings. For example, David Obey (D-WI), chairman of the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee (1985-1994) set the tone and direction for his subcommittee's reaction to the Administration's request with a statement to the secretary of state or treasury at the start of the hearings each year.382 5<°White, "Functions and Power," 21. m As Fenno notes in his work on comnittees, "committee behavior all depends on the chairman and every chairman, of course, is different." Fenno, Conoreaaim»n in c«nmi. XIV. 3*2House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 187 Through the drafting of the 'chairman* s mark, * the subcommittee chair has the power to allocate values.383 The subcommittee chairman sees the full range of subcommittee interests and pressures. Joseph White notes that: The chair has an especially great advantage on member- interest matters. If the requester challenges the chair in markup, the other members have to decide whom to support. Since the chair can do them more good or harm later, members will support him unless he violates a norm of fairness or the challenger has a strong case on the merits.384 Another crucial job of the subcommittee chairman is to accurately count votes in subcommittee, in full committee, and on the chamber floor. The chairman has to be sure that he has the votes to sustain positions in all three arenas. Part of the chairman's power to broker deals is the implicit bargain that the agreement will be supported and that the chairman can secure the votes for the passage of the subcommittee bill on the floor. Subcommittees usually avoid votes, even if there is a clear division. Members are often hesitant to risk the wrath of the chairman by voting 3MThe "chairman's mark" is the bill written by the subcommittee chairman and staff that is debated and amended in subcommittee markup and then sent forward for consideration by the full appropriations committee. It represents the chairman's assessment of how the subcommittee should allocate foreign assistance resources and what stipulations should be placed on the provision of assistance. 3MWhite, "Decision Making in the Appropriations Committees," 191. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 188 against him.385 Votes are usually in response to a challenge to the subcommittee chair to prove that he had the votes to sustain his position. In the foreign operations subcommittees during the Reagan years only controversial issues prompted actual votes.386 Political -Balance. in .Congress. The political balance in Congress also had a strong impact on foreign aid policymaking. Given a split Congress during much of the Reagan Administration, with Democrats and Republicans each controlling a chamber, President Reagan worked more closely with the chamber his party controlled. Furthermore, during the Reagan Administration, the House Republicans gained added clout from their control of the Senate and White House. Ideological Splits in Congress. Ideological splits within parties created further opportunities for coalition building between the White House and Congress. Within Congress, both the House and Senate were polarized between liberals and conservatives, with a relatively small group of legislators acting as a swing vote. Both the While House and those strongly opposed to its policies competed for the 3,5Ibid., 38. 3,sRecorda of the votes were not kept in the House or Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees. Persons interviewed for this study indicated that few votes were taken in either subcomnittee. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 189 votes of the swing legislators. By modifying its rhetoric and, at times, its stated policy goals, the Reagan Administration sometimes won the support of the swing legislators. Ideological splits affected the subcommittees in two ways. First, ideological divisions created the potential for splits within the subcommittee. Thus the chairman had to take care not to allow his subcommittee to become divided. Second, ideological splits created the possibility that the subcommittee product would not be supported on the floor of the House or Senate. Some foreign aid issues transcended the usual ideological splits and the foreign operations subcommittees had to keep within the bounds of broad congressional support with respect to these foreign aid issues. For example, Israel and Egypt received consistent support. Any decrease in aid to them in the subcommittee bills led to a full committee or floor challenge to increase the amount. Aid to Greece and Turkey were also topics of broad interest and could evoke a floor challenge if the 7:10 ratio was broken.387 Substance of Issues. The substance of the issues 387The ”7:10" ratio was the accepted ratio for the amount of military that went to Greece and Turkey. Greece received $7 of military assistance for every $10 that Turkey received. Turkey received additional economic support outside of the 7:10 ratio. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 190 before the subcommittee was -naturally also a concern of lawmakers, both on the subcommittees and in the full Congress. Subcommittee members wanted to discuss U.S. policy toward different countries and regions during hearings. The subcommittees often probed how assistance affected regional politics. During the Reagan years, when Democrats controlled the House foreign operations subcommittee and Republicans controlled the White House, many subcommittee Democrats saw themselves as offering some alternatives to Reagan's foreign policy. As former Congressman Matthew F. McHugh stated: I think that the committee Democrats saw it as our responsibility to make our own judgement as to whether the foreign policy of the United States, as promulgated by the Reagan Administration, would advance the country's interest, and if not, we saw the foreign aid bill as one instrument by which we could affect that policy in ways that were more constructive.388 By contrast. Senate Republicans were more supportive, although they, too, made judgments on Reagan's policy priorities. Arimini stration Request. Another important element in military assistance decisionmaking is, of course, the president's request. Foreign assistance has traditionally been an executive-dominated arena and the foreign affairs 3"Matthew p. McHugh, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 4 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 191 and appropriations committees work within that arena.389 While, in subcommittee, legislators may propose new initiatives, the dominant behavior pattern has been to judge the president's request and to use it, along with the prior year's appropriation, as the basis for the subcommittee's actions. In the Reagan years, the subcommittees often had multiple requests from the Administration for supplemental funding and reprogramming actions.390 Most of the supplemental and reprogramming requests involved funding for base-rights nations, Central America, or Africa. These requests significantly increased the burden of producing bills in the appropriations committees and were part of the Administration's strategy to increase funding by spreading its requests over the whole fiscal year.391 The subcommittees' handling of the supplemental requests mirrored their handling of the regular request in that the Senate usually supported the full request while the House subcommittee substantially cut the request. Bargaining in the full committee and in conference sometimes M9See Fenno, C o n g r e s M M B in Camai++***- 22 and 27. ”°The Administration requested supplemental funds for military assistance in FY 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1987. It requested reprogramming of funds in FY 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984. MlFormer State Department official, interview by author, tape recording, Rosslyn, Virginia, 4 Hay 1993. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 192 allowed the Administration to gamer additional funds than recommended by the foreign operations subcommittees, since security assistance requests could be bargained along with more popular non-military aid or domestic items. Conservative legislators exchanged votes for domestic and non-military aid programs for increased security aid funding. External Factors. The state of the Cold War had a strong effect on foreign and security aid. Many legislators viewed military aid in Cold War terms, and the Reagan Administration did its utmost to foster this perception. Throughout its two terms the Reagan Administration used the Soviet threat to push for increases in military assistance. Changes in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev after 1985 and the thaw in superpower relations in the late 1980s provided a reason, as well as political cover, for a decrease in military aid to Cold War "hotspots" such as El Salvador, Thailand, and Pakistan. Budgetary Situation. The budgetary situation, particularly the deficit, was an increasing consideration for foreign and military assistance funding. The Gramm- Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Law of 1985 brought the budget committees into the process. Under this law, the budget committees had the authority to determine the ceiling that each appropriations subcommittee would have for its . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 193 overall appropriations. It also mandated sequestration (a mandatory cut of funds by a certain percentage in each appropriations account) if the deficit exceeded its target for that year. The foreign operations subcommittees did work with the budget committees on the ceilings for foreign assistance.392 Subcommittee members generally took one of three positions on the issue of foreign operations subcommittee's contribution to deficit reduction. One position, supported by many in the Senate, was that the foreign operations budget was simply too small a part of the federal budget (less than two percent) to influence the deficit and, therefore, should not be cut in deficit reduction exercises.393 A second position, supported by the Administration, was that the foreign operations account was too important to foreign policy to be cut for deficit reduction. The third position, supported by many in the House, was that foreign aid should share in the cuts if domestic programs were also being cut. As David Obey stated, "the country will not tolerate increasing foreign aid and paying for it by gutting cancer research, gutting M2House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. 3,3Senate staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 23 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 194 educational opportunities. . .here at home."394 In sum, many factors influenced the subcommittees action on the foreign operations bill each year. The subcommittee chairman was the linchpin of the process. The final impact of the aforementioned factors was largely determined by how the chairman approached the bill. The following sections discuss the House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees in more detail. The House Foreign Operations Subcommittee The House Foreign Operations Subcommittee was formed following World War II. As constituted in the 1980s, the subcommittee had 12 members. The chairman and the ranking minority member of the full House Appropriations Committee were also ex-officio members of the Foreign Operations (and other) Subcommittee(s). Traditionally, House Appropriations subcommittee membership allowed members to filter benefits back to their constituents, enhancing re-election prospects in the process. Thus, relative to the traditional interests of members of Congress, the foreign operations subcommittee is seemingly an oddity, as it is (or was) traditionally viewed ”nrarburg, 235. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 195 as having no district interests.395 Members of the * subcommittee, however, cite a strong interest in foreign affairs. Joseph White notes that, "the policy interest in foreign operations is a bipartisan phenomenon. It also is uncommon enough that getting on tdie subcommittee is not all that difficult."396 During the Reagan Administration, as a result of fierce policy disagreements and personality clashes, the foreign operations subcommittee was unusually partisan for an appropriations subcommittee. Key members such as Obey, Long, and Kemp did not get along well. Also, unlike other appropriations subcommittees, foreign operations lacked the cohesion which came from the ability to distribute benefits to a large number of constituents which traditionally held other subcommittees together.397 For example, on other subcommittees, members could trade support for projects in each other's districts. Partisanship also may have resulted from the symbolism of actions taken by the subcommittee 395This notion, while traditional, is less persuasive in an age where PAC money Clows from nationally-organized groups to individual candidates. Furthermore, members oCten found strong issue-oriented constituents in their districts on such issues as aid to Israel or Greece, one House staff member related to me that the member he worked for received considerable financial support (over 50 percent) from individual constituents in his district strongly supportive of Israel. Former House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 17 August 1994. 3, 397Ibid., 224. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 196 "involving decisions about which countries we like and how much."398 Most of the members had some interests in the bill and pursued those interests. Only two or three members had an interest in the whole bill. Foreign operations functioned in a sort of exchange relationship, with members trading support for the parts of the bill that interested them. One subcommittee member noted the way he handled the bill: [Foreign Operations] is a hefty document. Rather than attempt to understand all the parts, such as Foreign Military Sales Credits, I pay attention to what I'm concerned about most, military versus economic aid, bilateral versus multilateral. Within the economic, I put particular interest into AID and the Peace Corps. So [while] I have an interest in the overall structuring, I consider myself an advocate of economic versus military aid.399 The chairman's role was to see that the member interests are accommodated and, in exchange, he expected their support for the rest of the bill. The chairman needed to be an able negotiator and to take a broad view of the bill. The House Foreign Operations Subcommittee has had relatively few chairmen since its inception. The most infamous was the late Otto Passman (D—LA) . Congressman Passman equated foreign aid with wasteful spending. In 3**White, "Decision Making in the Appropriations Committees," 192-93. 399White, "Functions and Power," 321. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 197 1977, chairmanship of the foreign operations subcommittee passed to Clarence D. (Doc) Long (D-MD) who had served in Congress since 1963. Before being elected to Congress, Long had been a professor of labor economics at Johns Hopkins University. He was also well known for having had a son who served in combat in Vietnam. Long' s Chairmanship During Long's tenure as chairman, the subcommittee lacked strong leadership because of his inability to broker deals within the subcommittee, his eccentric ideas, and, in his last years, his increasing inability to concentrate on the full range of issues before the subcommittee. Chairman Long was a swing vote on Central America and other issues, occupying the middle ground between the extreme wings of his subcommittee. Long lacked effective accommodation and interpersonal skills and infuriated subcommittee members by enforcing a strict five-minute limit on questions, often bringing the gavel down during a member's question or a witness's answer.400 Also, Long was of a different generation than the younger subcommittee members and this also led to communications problems. * Long's Limitations Long has been universally 400House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 198 described as "irascible." He was difficult to abide, and this affected his chairmanship. As former Representative Matthew McHugh noted years later, Long was generally unable or unwilling to work out a pragmatic bill. He had his limitations in dealing with Obey and Kemp. He had the type of personality that was not conducive to coalition building.401. Long's impatience and his inability to compromise meant, in effect, that he was less of a leader than simply one of many warring parties on his own subcommittee. On Central American issues Long sometimes sided with the' Republicans.402 In a few instances, Long could not keep his fellow Democrats from abandoning him and siding with the Administration. During conference, the Administration could often negotiate deals with individual legislators. Long also had eccentric ideas which he would champion to the detriment of the overall bill.403 His leadership limitations made it difficult to hold the subcommittee's product together as it moved to the full committee and then to the House floor. In conference, especially in his last years as 401Matthew F. McHugh, House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 4 August 1994. “^Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs impropriations for Fiscal Year 1984. Hearings, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, 112. 403see Franck and Weisband, 252 for a brief discussion of Long's eccentricities. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 199 chairman in *1983 and 1984, Long had difficulty managing and concentrating on the full range of issues (50-75 usually) that needed to be negotiated with the Senate.40* Rather, he concentrated on issues about which he cared deeply. This was a problem because the Administration and the Senate negotiator, Senator Robert Hasten, Jr. (R-WI), chairman of the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee, often assumed a united position in conference. They negotiated with Long on some issues and brokered deals with individual House subcommittee members on others in the mini-conferences that were common in the continuing resolution (CR) process.405 Of course, the Senators and House members had to contend with the fact that Long would sit in conference for as much time as necessary to secure his priorities.406 Substantively, Long favored economic aid over military aid because he believed that many international 404House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. 40SLarry Nowels discusses the fact that the House Foreign Operations Subcomnittee chairman usually stood against the rest of the mini-conference. The mini-conference consisted of the chairman and ranking minority members of the House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees. See Nowels in U.S. congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1985, p. 79. See also David Obey and Carol Lancaster, "Funding Foreign Aid," Foreign Policy 71 (Sumner 1988): 148. 40*House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 200 problems were economic in nature.407 He, therefore, generally questioned the Reagan aid priorities. Yet Long supported many of the Reagan Administration's aid initiatives, particularly in Central America, although he had strong reservations about human rights violations in El Salvador. Long became alarmed at the Reagan Administration's use of aid in ways not intended by Congress.408 He had ideas, but little sense of strategy and little ability or desire to move the subcommittee to be an alternative force to Reagan's foreign policy. Under the more dynamic leadership of David Obey, the subcommittee would begin to assume a broader role of discussing Reagan's foreign policy priorities. subcommittee Republicans. The Republicans had a surprising degree of power on the subcommittee in the 97th Congress (1981-1982), when the committee balance was seven to five in favor of the Democrats, but less power in successive Congresses. Jack Kemp (R-NY) assumed the ranking minority position on the committee in 1981. Security assistance topped Kemp's subcommittee agenda. He worked closely with the Administration, although he did not support 407see bis discussion in U.S. Congress, Rouse, Comnittee on Appropriations, roreicm Assistance and Related Activities for Fiscal Year 1982. Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, 166. 40*Ibid., 170. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 201 it on all issues.409 The Republicans generally voted together on the subcommittee. Therefore, the defection of Long or Representative Charles Wilson (D-TX) to the Republican side deadlocked the subcommittee on many votes, giving the Republicans and the Administration bargaining opportunities. When the Democrats won additional seats in the 98th Congress, the Democratic majority on the subcommittee increased to eight from four, somewhat limiting the Republican's maneuvering room. McHugh's Role. Due to Long's inability to represent and lead the Democratic majority, Representative Matthew McHugh (D-NY) tried to fill the role of conciliator and to broker deals within the divided, partisan subcommittee. He had an interest in all the issues facing the subcommittee and took to drafting a shadow mark.410 While McHugh did not share this with other legislators during Long's tenure as chairman, it helped McHugh in his role as conciliator on the *°9Fonner House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Tysons Corner, Virginia, 3 August 1994. ‘“Former House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 17 August 1994, Washington, DC; and House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. The "shadow mark" was a term used by McHugh and others to describe a process whereby McHugh went through the Foreign Operations bill and developed an alternative budget mark for each item in the bill, just the way the chairman did. In doing so, McHugh gained the chairman's perspective on the bill. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 202 subcommittee.411 Obey worked with McHugh, a close personal friend, in influencing the Democratic product. However, despite the fact that Obey was the second-ranking Democrat on the subcommittee, he chose to focus his attention on his other subcommittee work. McHugh's ability to broker deals during Long's tenure was limited by the fact that he was not the chairman. He could not negotiate deals in conference, nor could he make the deals he negotiated stick. McHugh occasionally, however, did have some success.412 staff Role. During Long's tenure, the subcommittee staff, Edwin Powers and Bill Schuerch, drafted the chairman's mark. They would then discuss the mark with Long and other members and attempt to move Long to support the proposed chairman's. mark.413 Long cared about development issues, but lacked a strategic approach to the overall bill. Qbeyls.Chairmanship In 1985, following Long's failure to win reelection wlFormer House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 17 August 1994. McHugh did share the shadow mark with Obey when Obey became the subcommittee's chairman in 1985. *12For example, Kemp and McHugh negotiated a deal on supplemental military assistance funding for FY 1983 before a full House Appropriations Committee meeting on the topic in which $89 million in FMS loans were restored and Kemp agreed to support an increase in development assistance funding. <13House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 203 to the House, David Obey assumed the chairmanship of the foreign operations subcommittee. Obey had been elected to the House in 1969 to replace Melvin Laird, who became Richard Nixon's first Secretary of Defense. Before that he had been a Wisconsin state legislator and, in fact, had spent his whole career as a politician. Obey is known as a sharp debater and partisan liberal Democrat. Obey's Approach. Before 1985, Obey had not been deeply engaged on a continuing basis in the subcommittee's work, although he had been on the subcommittee for several years. Obey and Long did not get along, and Obey chose to be more engaged in his Labor, Health and Human Services subcommittee work during Long's tenure as chairman.'14 Upon becoming chairman, Obey became much more deeply involved, holding an unusual set of subcommittee hearings that included Administration officials, academics, former executive branch officials, and Congressional Research Service analysts in order to review the whole foreign aid program.415 As chairman, Obey took a much stronger interest in "his bill" and was willing to spend the effort to sustain '“House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. 415As one staff member noted with respect to the hearings, "Representative Obey wanted to do a complete review of foreign aid and foreign policy, no doubt to educate himself and the members and to get: a grasp of setting a course." Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 204 it on the House floor. Obey was more involved in the drafting of his mark than was Long. Under both chairmen, the mark was a combination of issues the chairmen wanted addressed, items the subcommittee Democrats wanted, particulars that the grateful Republicans would appreciate (that the Democrats were willing to give), and virtual requirements such as aid to Israel and Egypt (earmarked for full funding) that had to be in the bill.416 There was also a substantial difference between Long and Obey, with regard to the staff's role. Staff had more power in drafting the initial mark under Long. Obey was more involved in the drafting of his mark, reviewing every item in the bill through multiple rounds of drafting, but always listened carefully to staff advice in making decisions.417 E n s u r i n g Democratic Support. Obey understood what had happened during Long's tenure as chairman and was determined not to repeat the same mistakes. He moved to take firm control of the subcommittee. Obey did not want the Democrats voting issue by issue, as happened to Long during his tenure. In order to maximize their power against the Senate and Administration, the Democrats needed to vote u *Ibid. 417Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 205 together. One of his first actions was to ensure that subcommittee Democrats supported his positions on the bill. For example, Representative Wilson had often voted with the Republicans. As one former staffer noted, "He (Wilson) had specific issues he was interested in and he looked to see if he would get more dealing with Democrats or Republicans."418 Representative Wilson favored a large military aid program to Pakistan. This was an important issue to Wilson and he worked with whomever supported his priorities. Obey's desire to lead a unified Democratic majority led him to include a Pakistan earmark in the bill. In exchange, Wilson supported the rest of the bill and voted with the Democrats.419 Obey was also much more cautious politically than was Long.420 Within the subcommittee he organized consistent Democratic support for the chairman's bill. In the full House, he was careful to line up his votes and he began to obtain the passage of stand-alone foreign aid bills by 1988. Obev's Views and Strategy. Obey was consistently “‘Former House staff member, interview by author, tape recording. Falls Church, Virginia, 3 August 1994. 41*House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. “"Former House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 17 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 206 critical of the Reagan aid priorities. Under Reagan, Obey said, "we essentially are turning the aid program into a short term put-out-the-fire program.*421 Obey expressed support for increasing US aid to the World Bank and similar agencies with a long-term development focus. Yet Obey could not simply be tagged as an anti—military aid liberal. Rather, he seemed to take a practical stance toward military assistance, questioning whether the Administration's means fit its goals and whether the goals themselves were supported by the American people. Concerning the Administration's proposed aid to the Contras in 1985, Obey stated that although the Administration might be able to prevail in Congress, a narrow win would not be sufficient to sustain the policy unless, the country is agreed that not only are your goals correct, but also the process by which you are going to get those goals makes sense and is a reasonable application of resources to obtain a common goal. That’s what we have our doubts about.422 Concerning El Salvador, Obey stated during a 1983 hearing with Secretary Shultz, " Mr. Secretary, to me human rights is a consideration, but. . .to me the central consideration is whether or not your policy will in fact 421 John Felton, "Obey: Reagan's Aid Priorities Spur Doubts About program,w capgxcaaional Quarterly Weekly .Report, 16 March 1985, 498. ^Congress, House, Comnittee on Appropriations, Foreign Asaistancs-and Related Programs Appropriations for. Fiscal JCeax- 12.&7., Hearings, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess.,1986, 94. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 207 work."423 More important, though, was Obey’s conception of what his committee could and could not achieve. He did not share the Administration's priorities. As he stated in 1985, "These sure as hell are not my priorities, and anybody that knows me knows they are not. I would have more humanitarian aid and less in guns."424 When asked if he would try to rewrite the Administration bill over its opposition. Obey responded "hell no." Citing the GOP-controlled Senate, Obey stated, "Anybody who would try to do that [rewrite the bill over the Administration's objections] would be a damn fool. "425 Obey was politically savvy. He knew it would take time to change the priorities of the bill away from military aid and toward economic and development aid. It could not be done wholesale over the objections of the Administration. As one observer noted, "he came to understand over time that he was changing priorities at the margins. Over a period of years that can produce a change in real world priorities. "426 ^Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriatiaps, for, fiscal year 1984, Hearings, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, 78. 424John Felton, "Divided House Panel Approves Spending Bill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 20 July 1985, 1423. ttSFelton, "Obey: Reagan's Aid Priorities Spur Doubts," 498. “‘Former House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 17 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 208 David Obey was effective in using foreign aid in the context of the entire budget debate. The Gramm-Rudman- Hollings legislation passed during the first year of his chairmanship. Long had never tried to place foreign assistance within the broader budget debate. Obey's view was that if domestic spending was going to be cut, foreign aid would also be cut.427 Obey's position with respect to deficit reduction had two motivations. First, Obey believed deficit reduction was important and wanted his committee to lead on the issue; foreign operations needed to take its share of the burden, despite being one of the smallest parts of the federal budget.428 At the same time, however, deficit reduction was a useful tool to attack the Administration's priorities, and Obey cut heavily into security aid requests. As one observer noted, "foreign aid he considered as the Administration's money to spend around the world on world leadership."429 To the extent Obey could affect it, "he was not going to give them a lot of extra cash to pursue 427Ibid.; see also White, "Functions and Power," 191. ***See Congress, House,, Comnittee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs AnnroDriationa Bill. 1987. Report 99- 747, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1986, 9-14. <29House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 209 policies he did not support."430 The politics were also good, as foreign aid has never been a popular issue in Congress or with the American people.431 Obey also opposed the provision of assistance to nations that could afford to pay cash for weapons systems. He repeatedly questioned Administration officials about military assistance to nations such as Oman, which had a high per capita income level, or South Korea, which had a substantial annual growth rate in its gross domestic product. Administration officials cited the need for maintaining relations and the threat that such recipients faced in justifying assistance. Obey did not seem to accept the validity of these arguments. Relations with the Authorizing Committee. Obey chaired the committee at a time when the subcommittee' s power was increasing due to the ineffectiveness of the authorizing committees. The lack of an authorizing bill forced the foreign operations subcommittee well beyond the bounds of its normal role. Obey understood that it was "not a reasonable way to conduct policy." Consequently, said woibid. m See obey and Lancaster, 146. obey and Lancaster note, "The subcommittee compromise can be unraveled later by amendments passed in the full committee markup or in votes on the floor of the House, tfith the supporting coalition disintegrating and the bill lost in the process. With its limited constituency, foreign aid is especially vulnerable to demagoguery and destructive amendments." obey and Lancaster, 148. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 210 Obey, we try to see to it that what we do parallels as closely as possible the thoughts of the people in the authorizing committee who, after all, most of the time know more about these issues than we [Foreign Operations ] do.432 Stated one observer with regard to Obey's approach to the authorizing process, Obey has long favored the traditional procedure under which policy issues are settled by authorizing legislation, while the appropriations bill merely funds programs on the basis of those decisions.433 Obey's wanting an authorizing bill fit with the traditional role of the appropriations committee, which is oversight, not policymaking.434 During Long’s last two years as chairman there was no authorizing bill, yet the poorly-led House Foreign Operations Subcommittee failed to fill the vacuum and assert a broad alternative viewpoint to the Administration. By crafting a bill with few provisos on the allocation of aid, the Administration was given a much freer hand to allocate resources than it might have otherwise had if the subcommittee had been more aggressive. Obey sought to gain more control of foreign assistance resource allocations. To ‘32Stanfield, 2917. 433Towell, 1814. 434White, "Decision Making in the Appropriations Committees," 201. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 211 achieve this control at a time when the authorizing bill was moribund in the Senate, he wanted to include the House Foreign Affairs Committee more fully in the appropriations process. Reportedly, he- took special care to represent the foreign affairs committee in his own subcommittee's deliberations.435 Even when authorizing committees did set specific assistance ceilings, if the foreign operations subcommittee needed to increase an account, they would informally negotiate a deal with the authorizing committee and that account would be increased.436 Subcommittee Republicans. The Republicans had much less power under Obey than under Long. Part of this decrease in power may have been due to the strained personal relationship between Obey and Kemp. When Kemp was the ranking member, Obey "saw no prospect of winning any support 05The House Foreign Affairs Committee might not pass the foreign aid authorization, and obey's subcommittee members might have somewhat different priorities than their colleagues on the authorizing committee, but Obey both believed in the authorizer's role, and knew that if he lost their support he could hardly hope to pass his bill. Therefore, according to many reports, he consulted closely with Foreign Affairs - Chairman Dante Fascell, and emphasized Fascell's concerns in dealing with his subcommittee. White, "Functions and Power," 337. <36House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. The House Foreign Affairs and Foreign Operations committees worked more closely together as the authorizations process faltered. Each committee gained something from cooperation. The foreign affairs committee gained some input into the appropriations law, which always passed in some form, and the foreign operations subcommittee gained access to the expertise of the foreign affairs committee. The actual negotiations on increasing a proposed authorizing figures were informal. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 212 from the Republicans."437 Obey united the Democrats behind his position, and the White House, for its part, was willing to deal with Obey to gain its ends. The Republican position improved somewhat when Rep. Mickey Edwards (R-OK) assumed the minority leadership position in 1987.438 Despite Edwards past leadership of. the American Conservative Union, he and Obey could work together. Representative Edwards, however, took issue with the Administration’s approach to aid. Stated Representative Edwards, foreign aid funding will remain frozen or even decline over the next few years . . .[I]t does not seem possible to accommodate such large reductions using the normal ways we decide who gets what and how the aid is managed.439 Following two years of cuts, the Administration insisted that the 1987 budget summit also establish the total amount of foreign aid.440 This agreement somewhat limited Obey's ability to cut the bill and eliminated a major element of contention between the Republicans and the Democrats on the subcommittee for Reagan’s last year in “’White, "Functions and Power," 337. “•ibid., 339. “*Ibid., p. 413. ““House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 213 office.441 Obey was shrewd in dealing with the Republicans. As one staffer observed: Republican members liked the reductions [in assistance totals], and changes in priorities did not come all at once. They came over a number of years and bit by bit. It amazed me that he could get Edwards and Livingston to support these bills . . .1 think he treats them fairly and brings them into the process and makes some bows to their priorities.442 Many Republicans no doubt exchanged their support for the overall bill in exchange for Obey's support on selected items in the bill. Obey also was often effective in manipulating the Administration and the Senate, sometimes against each other. If the Administration wanted something from the House bill, Obey sometimes told the Administration that if it could persuade the Senate to change its position on an issue, he would then consider the Administration's issue in - conference.443 Relations with the Administration. Obey wanted the Administration .to set aid priorities, something the '“During the Reagan years there were two elements of contention, the balance between economic and military aid and the overall level of aid provided. A similar agreement between the Democratic congressional leadership and the Bush Administration was also negotiated for the years 1991-93, as part of an overall budget deal, fixing the overall level of foreign aid resources for those years. Discussions could then focus on allocations among accounts. '“Former House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 17 August 1994. '“House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 214 Administration did not need to do under the expanding budgets of the early 1980s and something it steadfastly refused to do in the next several years. In Obey's view, the Administration's emphasis on military aid was misguided. He believed more resources should be directed into development assistance.444 Thus, he questioned Administration officials on the substantial increases in Administration military aid requests from the base year of 1981.445 In terms of overall budget, Obey questioned the relative increases in overall aid year after year, given the Reagan Administration's cuts in other areas. Obey was not alone in questioning Administration priorities and tactics. Even moderate Republicans tired of Administration tactics that bordered on stonewalling. i Silvio Conte (R-MA.), ranking Republican on the House Appropriations Committee in the early 1980s, noted the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee's frustration on the point even before 1985: By consistently playing hardball with this subcommittee in your efforts to get as much security aid as possible, you have consistently wound up with less. . .Someone must be able to define the 'talking price' or this subcommittee will continue to make that determination. '“Congress, House, Conmitt.ee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Activities for Fiscal Year 1986. Hearings, 99th Cong.,1st Sess., 1985, 737. *4SObey notes in his 1988 article that security-related assistance was 50% of total U.S. aid in 1981, and 62% of total U.S. aid in 1987. See Obey and Lancaster, 150. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 215 And when this subcommittee makes that determination, you lose.446 Upon assuming the subcommittee chairmanship in 1985, Obey noted that the Administration used "budgetary stringency" rhetoric to justify its cuts in' programs it did not support, but then said that no money could be cut from military aid programs without serious consequences.447 If the Administration had been more balanced in approach between economic and military aid, the Democrats may have been able to accept higher levels of military assistance.448 Obey was willing to negotiate deals for the sake of obtaining bill passage in Congress. But the Administration seemed to believe that it benefitted from a more confrontational approach. Obey wanted to craft a bill that had bipartisan support, which he interpreted to be majorities on both sides of the aisle.449 Obey was not going to champion the ’“Congress, Rouse, Coranittee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appcgprifltioas fgg Fiacal year 1S84, Hearings, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, 156. M1See, for example. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Aaaigtancc and. Related Programs Apprgpciatioag for Fiscal Year 1986. Hearings, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 628 and Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Base Rights. Hearings, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985, 740. 4tfcongress, House, Coranittee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Activities for.Fiscal Year 1986. Hearings, 99th Cong.,1st Sess., 1985. ‘“Congress, House, Coranittee on Appropriations, Base Rights. Hearings, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 742. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 216 Administration's initiatives, but if the Administration could cobble together a bipartisan majority, .he offered, to support the bill. Of course, he did not believe the Administration's bill could command a bipartisan majority. In 1987 Obey noted: Now the bill is so oriented toward security assistance, that the traditional supporters of foreign assistance are in many cases less enthusiastic, to say the least. Many of the conservative would-be supporters of the security assistance never vote for the bill anyway. They like to jack up the military,_squeeze the economic, get the mix right as they see the world, and then vote against the whole package anyway. I hold the view that those who help row the boat should get a choice in deciding which way the boat goes, and those that do not, should not.450 Representative Obey seemed exasperated by the Administration's approach to the process; Administration officials refused to prioritize or provide strong justifications for its military aid requests. Information was critical to the committee in performing its oversight and appropriations function, and Obey became increasingly exasperated with what he perceived as inadequate information coming from the Administration on W0Congress, House, Coranittee on Appropriations, Hearings on Foreign Assistance and Related Programs tenroprintions fnr Year 1988. 100th Cong., 1st sess., part 3, 1987, 758. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 217 military aid programming.451 The Administration stonewalled subcommittee questions on priorities. This approach. Representative Obey believed, cost the Administration support for the whole foreign aid program. A House Appropriations Committee report stated: the lack of support for foreign assistance directly flows from the deep domestic budget cuts, recent substantial growth in foreign assistance programs, controversial foreign policy decisions, a strong trend towards increased security assistance, without regard to the necessity to make spending changes in an era of spending austerity, and the federal deficit growth which finally resulted in Gramm-Rudman legislation.452 For its part the Administration objected to Obey's broad cuts in the bill and took the position that the subcommittee should examine the requests line-by-line, on their own merits, instead of cutting the overall requests arbitrarily without specifically examining the individual components. 453 Overall, Obey's relationship with the Administration was strained. He strongly disagreed with its priorities and tactics regarding security assistance. While he knew he needed to work with the Administration, Obey was frustrated ‘"Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Annropriations for. Fiscal,Year 1988. 100th Cong., 1st sess., part 3, 1987, 904. ‘"congress, House, Conmittee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY 1987. Report 99-747, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1986, 16. ‘"Congress, House, committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Activities for Fiscal Year 1986. Hearings, 99th Cong.,1st Sess., 1985, 238. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 218 by the process. Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee The rules of the Senate give individual senators more power than their House counterparts. Senators, for instance, can affect legislation from the Senate floor much more easily than can members of the House. As Richard Fenno states, "decisionmaking in the Senate is much less of a committee dominated process than it is in the House."454 Committees in the Senate are not as important for the senators' individual bases of power.455 Thus senators have less need than House members to work through subcommittees and full committees to influence legislation.456 Senators on subcommittees may even choose to introduce an amendment from the floor on a bill that originated in a subcommittee on which they hold a seat, although a member's chances are better if he works through the committee structure.457 The recourse to filibuster also gives minority senators much more power than minority House Members and creates a strong incentive for the majority to cooperate <5 '“Ibid. w See Christopher J. Deering and Steven S. Smith, "Subcoamittees in congress,” in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. oppenheimer, congress Reconsidered. 3d ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985), 195 and 205. “’Fenno, Congressmen in Co-nit-tees. 1 4 9 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 219 with the minority. In addition, while the House majority changed hands three times between 1953 and 1995, the Senate majority changed hands in 1953, 1955, 1981, 1987, and 1995. More frequent changes of fortune have given senators greater incentive to work with the minority, since the majority is well aware that in two years it might be in the minority. Institutionally, the Senate Appropriations Committee functions somewhat differently than the House Appropriations Committee. While the House committee strives to cut executive requests, the Senate committee serves as a court of last resort for programs cut by the House. The Senate Appropriations Committee additionally strives to approve the "constituency-based appropriations requests of each member."458 Consequently, the Senate also tends to earmark more heavily than the House. Hasten's Chairmanship The foreign operations subcommittee markup is the most significant stage of the Senate process on the foreign aid bill. Except for special constituency requests, the full Senate Appropriations Committee follows the lead of the subcommittees in mark-up.459 When the Republicans gained ‘’•ibid., 155. 45*Ibid., 186. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 220 control of the Senate in 1981, they named freshman Senator Robert Kasten, Jr. (R-WI) as chairman of the foreign operations subcommittee. Kasten had been a member of the House prior to entering the Senate and had a record as a pragmatic, conservative legislator.460 Kasten and the Republican-controlled Senate proved crucial to moving the Reagan agenda in military aid, because the Administration could depend on solid support in the Senate in negotiations with the House. Kasten's Role. Kasten could also count on solid majorities for his bills, which enhanced his power. While the Republicans only held a four seat advantage in the Senate, Kasten garnered 60 or 70 votes for his bill. He could rely on almost all of the Republicans and conservative Democrats to support his bill.461 Kasten saw his role both as a leader of the foreign operations subcommittee and as an advocate for the Administration's bill.462 In the words of one observer, One of Kasten's major strengths on the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee has been his pragmatic centrism, his moderate voting record on aid issues as contrasted <<0In 1980, as parr of the Reagan landslide, Kasten defeated veteran Democratic Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI). Nelson had served as a mentor to David Obey. m Kasten's ability to gain these majorities was part political acumen and part due to the ideological leanings of individual senators. '“Senate staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 23 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 221 with his generally conservative views on politics.463 Kasten's Approach. In drafting of the chairman's mark, Kasten would use the Administration figures as a base. Subcommittee mark-ups were short during Kasten's tenure, as he usually negotiated with the senators on individual issues prior to the session. In his leadership role, Kasten shaped the issues defined by the bill, worked to shepherd the bill through the Senate and. conducted negotiations with the House in conference. Kasten's role was bolstered in conference because he enjoyed solid majority support for his bills in the Senate, and had Administration and House Republican backing for his positions. Subcommittee Relationships. Senators not on the subcommittee who wanted to amend the bill would generally wait until it reached the floor, unless they approached Kasten and convinced him to amend the bill. Only a handful of subcommittee roll call votes were taken in the six years of Kasten's chairmanship, all of which concerned either El Salvador or abortion.464 In subcommittee, Senator Kasten recognized the importance of reaching out to senior Democrats; in particular, he moved early to build bridges to '“Stanfield, 2919. '"Subcomnittee roll call votes were not recorded. Information comes from Senate staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 23 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 222 former chairman and ranking minority member Daniel Inouye (D—HI) .46S Kasten and Inouye shared little in common politically. However, they proved able to work together on the foreign aid bill. While Kasten generally favored increases in military aid, Inouye raised questions early on about the changing balance between economic and military aid.466 Yet, on many other issues, such as reducing the rising level of debt among EMS recipients and aid to Israel and Egypt, Kasten and Inouye were in general agreement, and the subcommittee pursued these goals under both chairmen.467 Similarly, the minority and majority staffs also worked well together.468 Kasten and Inouye, in fact, did' most of the work on the bill. As Senator Kasten stated in 1985, "Senator Inouye has been of invaluable service to me [on] foreign aid policy and legislation. . .1 value his counsel ‘“Significantly, Kasten went up to Inouye's office for their first meeting when he became chairman of the foreign operations subcommittee. Ibid. ‘“Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related ftBBEQBrifltiong- fog Fiscal Year 1983. Hearings, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1983. ‘67FMS is explained in Chapter 1. “*The majority staff members were James Bond and Juanita Riling, the minority staffer was Richard Collins. All three staff members stayed on when the Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1987. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 223 and friendship."469 This mutually supportive relationship remained when the senators switched roles in 1987, and Inouye became, the chairman and Kasten the ranking minority member. Kasten*s Policy Agenda. Kasten generally shared the views of the Reagan Administration in foreign policy. His primary personal concerns in the foreign aid bill related to security assistance, particularly to Israel, and funding for other countries in which the United States had a security interest, such as base-rights.470 Kasten tried to be innovative in financing military assistance. The subcommittee consistently pressed for increased loan forgiveness for allies burdened with EMS loan debt, and recommended "the option of providing the entire program on a concessional basis, rather than further loading down friends and allies with high interest rate loans.w47i The Senate also strove to save on outlays, which directly affected the budget, by proposing two-year appropriations and moving foreign aid funds to the EMS account only when “’Congress, Senate, Comnittee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986. Hearings, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 1-2. <10On non-military aid issues, Kasten promoted children's programs and, despite his pro-life stance, family planning programs. "‘Congress, Senate, Comnittee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Bill. 1986. Report 99-167, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 129. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 224 the recipient was ready to use the funds.472 In contrast to the House, the Senate also proposed to provide all military assistance as grants. Chairman Kasten stated that, "[w]e believe that having an all-grant program will enhance the quality of the program and will no longer force more and more debt on these countries."473 Representative Obey commented in 1986 that the Senate proposed giving better loan terms to military assistance recipients than to domestic borrowers, such as students and farmers in the United States.474 Budget Deficit Issue. ' The Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee saw the relationship between federal budget deficit reduction and foreign aid differently than did the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee. On one level, the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee's position was that the amount of aid was so small in terms of the overall federal budget, that no real dent in the deficit would be made by cutting foreign aid.475 On another level, the Senate subcommittee took a strategic approach to aid, arguing that «7*ibid. <73Quoted in Steven Pressmen, "Senate Panel Makes Major Shift in Anns Aid," congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 20 September 1986, 2204. <74Elizabeth Wehr, "Conferees Work to Finish Spending Package," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 11 October 1986, 2521. 475Senate staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 23 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 225 across-the-board cuts and heavy cuts in. bilateral assistance (under which security assistance fell) were not in the best interests of the United States.476 The Senate subcommittee further believed that funding programs based on their outlay rate (the rate at which appropriated funds are spent) was also misguided. The FY 1987 Senate Appropriations Committee report stated, "The Committee does not believe that control of apportionments by the Office of Management and Budget is the appropriate vehicle for foreign policy decisionmaking."477 Authorizing Bill. In the Senate there was also a frustration with the lack of an authorizing bill. As one staffer put it, when there is no authorization there is a certain amount of authorization that we have to do. Truth is that we would rather this not be the case. . .(we would rather] be doing what we are supposed to be doing which is figuring out where resources go instead of figuring out authorization legislation.478 Unlike the House, where members of the authorizing committee often came to the foreign operations subcommittee with amendments, in the Senate, amendments were often ^'Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Program* Appropriations Bill. 1986. Report 99- 167, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 27. <77Congress, Senate, Comnittee on Appropriations, Foreion Assistance and Related Program* Appropriations. 1987. Report 99-443, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, 27. <7,Senate staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 23 August 1994. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 226 offered on the floor. But senators would need to have the votes to carry their provisions, and it was prudent to approach Kasten and Inouye on a proposal before talcing it to the floor if a senator wanted to increase the chances of passage. Relations with the Administration. Kasten had a close working relationship with the Reagan Administration, in particular with the State Department officials responsible for military assistance. The Administration often asked Kasten to put items in his bill that it wanted, thereby giving the Administration bargaining leverage with the House. Nevertheless, relations between the Senate committee and the Administration were not always smooth due to their different roles. The Senate guarded its prerogatives closely. Despite the good relationship between the Republican-dominated Senate and the Reagan Administration, the Senate received the Administration's proposals at the same time as the House and had no advance notice of specific requests. While the Senate was strongly supportive of the Administration's program, it sometimes chaffed at the Administration's tactics. For example, in 1982 Kasten made it clear that he wanted to fully support the Administration's request, but he had experienced problems obtaining information on Administration policies from the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 227 State Department.479 Similarly, during conference, while the Senate was more friendly to the Administration, there were definitely limits. These limits stemmed both from institutional prerogatives and from the agendas of the subcommittee chairman and ranking member, which on some occasions did not agree with the Administration. For example, Kasten rejected a 1983 proposal by the Administration that would have granted the executive branch the authority to overturn future earmarks.480 By the same token, when Kasten and Inouye wanted to provide added benefits to Israel in 1986, a move that would have absorbed finite assistance»resources, the Administration successfully resisted. The majority members of the subcommittee were Republicans working closely with a Republican Administration, but they were Senators first and foremost. And as one Republican staff member noted, there were various ways the Administration could be helpful. I wasn't so concerned with the Administration as I was making sure that the concerns of members were m Congress, Senate, comnittee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and. Related Erogram AppraprlaUgas .for-Fiscal. JCcat-19.83> Hearings, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1983, 46. <(0congres8, senate, foreign. Assistance .and.Related Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984. Hearings, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1984, 121. Kasten somewhat understatedly noted, "I just do not think the appropriations comnittee is interested in that kind of permanent legislation, and I think it's a battle, at least in my opinion, that we might be able to avoid." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 228 satisfied.481 Inouve*s Chairmanship The Senate approach changed under Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI), who became chairman in 1987. Senator Inouye had grown more skeptical of Administration priorities in the early 1980s and in 1983 had complained that while development assistance under the Reagan Administration had grown by only $157 million, "military assistance has grown by $3.38 billion," and he questioned the American commitment to the "poor and impoverished of the world."482 Inouye sharply cut the Administration's requests in his first year as chairman, and moved his subcommittees figures much closer to the House subcommittee's figures. In his second year, a budget agreement between the Administration and Congress eliminated much of the budgetary contention between the branches of government. Inouye gave up the chairmanship of foreign operations in 1989 to assume the much more lucrative role as chairman of the appropriations subcommittee responsible for Defense. Inouve's Policy Agenda. As chairman Senator Inouye challenged the Reagan Administration's use of EMS funding, m Senate staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC, 23 August 1994. '“Congress, Senate, Comnittee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and. Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984. Hearings, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, 30-31. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 229 noting that EMS was being used as a political instrument and was adding to the debt burden of many countries.483 Under Inouye, the Senate subcommittee continued to recommend "an all Foreign Military Sales [EMS] Forgiven Program,■ in order to alleviate problems associated with recipient's debt burden.484 Senator Inouye, also took issue with base-rights funding and stated that the United States would not "become a party to a military aid bidding war involving base access nations."485 Although Senator Inouye criticized the military aid program in some areas, he enthusiastically supported military aid to Israel and Egypt. Conference between House and Senate In order to agree on a compromise bill, the House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees would meet in Conference to negotiate a joint foreign aid bill and report for presentation to the full House and Senate for final ‘“Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreion Assistance and Related Program* appropriations for FY 1988. Report 100- 236, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987. “‘Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,, Foreign Assistance, and Related ProgMimi appropriations for FY 1989. Report 100- 395, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, 162 and 169. Note the proposal by the Senate for zero funding for MAP in Tables 21 and 23. 4>sQuoted in John Felton, "Budget Deal Softens Blow to Foreign Aid,” congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 5 December 1987, 2981. The committee noted that the president could not pay or obligate one cent of aid for base rights countries; only Congress could do this. The committee also stated that assistance to each base-rights country would be considered on its individual merits*. Congress, Senate, Comnittee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for FY 1988. Report 100-236, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, 216. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 230 passage. For six of the eight years under review here, the conference was part of the CR process in which "mini- conferences'* would take place with the chairman and ranking minority member from the House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees.486 In the area of foreign aid, these conferences would be attended by the chairmen and ranking member of the foreign operations subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.487 Whatever was worked out in this mini-conference usually was inserted, without changes, into the CR.488 In the Reagan years, Kasten, the Senate ranking minority member (Inouye), and the ranking minority on the Rouse side (Kemp), supported most of the Reagan positions. The only member that the Administration had to win over was the chairman of the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee: Representative Long between 1981 and 1984 and David Obey between 1985-1988.489 In 1987 and 1988, the Administration's position was weakened by the loss of the Senate to Democratic control. In the CR context, the leadership styles of the 4,6 In 1981 and 1988, regular conference meetings with all members could be held. In those years, foreign aid appropriations were passed as free-standing bills, meaning that they were voted on by the House and Senate independently of and unattached to any other bill. 4r,See Nowels, "Foreign Aid: The Changing Legislative Process," 78; and Obey and Lancaster, 148. 4(tSee Obey and Lancaster, 148. 4,*Nowels, "Foreign Aid: The Changing Legislative Process," 79. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 231 foreign operations subcommittee chairmen became crucial. Clarence Long led the House subcommittee poorly, and thus the House lacked a single strong voice in dealing with the Administration and the Senate. David Obey, on the other hand, was an aggressive chairman who led the House subcommittee, thus offering a more energetic, unitary approach to the Senate and the Administration. Subcommittee chairmen could not negotiate compromises outside of what their colleagues in the House and Senate would support. The subcommittee chairmen were always aware that they would need the votes to support any deal made in conference. This was a particular concern in the House, since the Reagan Administration attempted to win the votes of conservative Democrats on specific issues. Prior to the members meeting for conference, House and Senate staff members met to negotiate as many issues as possible at their level. Generally, 20-30 issues needed to be resolved by the members. Most of them were such that an acceptable compromise is readily apparent. Most issues were successfully negotiated at the staff level. Staff members then put together packages of amendments containing slightly different aid mixes. The conference generally concluded with the acceptance of one or more amendment packages Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 232 covering the remaining outstanding issues.490 House and Senate staff participants interviewed for this study stressed that the deals negotiated at the staff level were in close accordance with member interests. In summary, the appropriations conferences on foreign aid were often the decisive venue for both funding and policy issues during the Reagan Administration due to the lack of authorizing legislation. The importance of the appropriations process was evident because it was this process that increasingly influenced Administration policies and preferences.491 Continuing Resolutions and Military Aid For six of the eight years of the Reagan Administration, foreign aid appropriations were handled through continuing resolutions (CRs). In the absence of authorizing measures, the CR became the only foreign aid legislation for two of the eight years of the Administration. Additionally, even when authorizing legislation was in effect, some funds were appropriated for specific programs that were not authorized in the t,0House staff member, interview by author, tape recording, Washington, DC. m For example, even between 1961 and 1984, when the Administration was stronger, the number of earmarks in the appropriations bill doubled, while the number of restrictions on prohibitions to presidential action increased from 33 to 55. Nowels, Foreign Aid: The Changing Legislative Process,~ 80. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 233 authorizing law. Table 14 shows which years the authorizing and appropriations laws were in effect and which years CRs were used. TABLE 14 CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS AND FOREIGN AID Fiscal Authorization Appropriation Appropriations Year contained in CR 1982 Yes Yes No 1983 Yes*** Yes Yes 1984 No Yes** Yes 1985 No Yes Yes* 1986 Yes Yes Yes 1987 Yes Yes Yes 1988 No Yes Yes* 1989 No Yes* No Source: Compiled by author. * - Only legislation for foreign aid that year. Bare bones authorization inserted into the CR. ***- certain funds appropriated that were not contained in the authorization legislation. As table 14 indicates, for two years the CR appropriation was the only legislation governing military aid, while in one year the regular appropriations bill was the sole legislative vehicle. In 1984, a 'bare-bones' authorizing section that met the minimum requirement that appropriated funds be authorized was inserted into the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 234 appropriations bill at the last minute, after appropriations i levels had been decided. In 1982, some funds Were appropriated that were not authorized by the FY 1982-83 authorizing bill.492 CRs, which are stop-gap measures until regular appropriations bills are passed, were common legislative measures long before the Reagan Administration came into office. However, the sharp split between Congress and the Reagan Administration over policies and budgetary priorities as well as problems related to the burgeoning federal budget deficit, led to a situation where CRs became increasingly common in the Reagan years. In 1986 and 1987, omnibus CRs replaced the passage of any of the 13 regular appropriations bills. It should be emphasized that, in the traditional process, CRs were emergency bills, not normal practice. Even when it appeared that a CR would be necessary, the subcommittees wrote bills and issued reports as if there would be a regular vote on a free-standing foreign aid bill. The House and Senate bills would form the basis for negotiations in conference. What the members agreed in 4”Larry Nowels discusses one such case in 1962 that he believes was precedental. "Congress funded the Caribbean Basin Initiative under the fiscal 1982 supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 97-257). Although the unauthorized portion of foreign aid spending was very small - $350 million out of $9 billion total appropriated— it established a precedent for bypassing the authorization comnittees." See Nowels, "Foreign Aid: The changing Legislative Process," 75. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 235 conference (or mini-conference) would then be inserted into the CR. Observers have noted that the use of CRs to fund foreign aid (and other programs) distorts, or can distort, the decision-making process by making it less democratic.493 Major complaints against omnibus CRs include: their unwieldy size so that no one knows everything that is contained in them, limited debate on controversial items, pork barrel spending provisions, concentration of power in the hands of subcommittee chairmen and ranking minority members, and diminished accountability of lawmakers on votes for these bills.494 In a 1988 letter to then-Speaker of the House Jim Wright, 49 Democratic members of the House protested the CR, stating that the CR had led to: . . .the effective disenfranchisement of many Members of Congress from the legislative process, and the failure by the Congress itself to give careful and adequate consideration to many critical issues. . .We believe that, in many cases, these issues would result in different outcomes through greater involvement of the House membership if they were considered through the normal legislative process rather than collectively in a CR.495 4#3The best analysis of this phenomena for foreign aid is contained in Nowels in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1985, pp. 70-100; Joseph White also reviews the CR and its use in the 1980s, see White, "Functions and Power," 488-547. <94See Stephen Guttinger, "Congress Returns to Tackle Biggest- ever 'CR,Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 16 September 1986, 2059-2063. 49SWhite, "Functions and Power," 494-495. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 236 The consequence of usinq CRs was greater in the House of Representatives where between 1982 and 1984 only five amendments to the foreign aid portion of the CR were considered.496 The Senate considered more amendments, but again debate was less than in earlier years. A CR is a powerful legislative and financial tool. There are no legislative points of order against a CR, meaning that legislators can place virtually any amendment into a CR without fear of having it removed due to procedural rules against placing authorizing language in appropriations bills. House Rule XXI, which bars appropriations for programs not previously authorized, does not apply to a CR. Therefore, through the CR, Congress can appropriate funds for new foreign aid programs in the absence of authorizing legislation. CRs can also be viewed as conservative actions. Often, a CR funded programs at the previous year's level of funding or at the president's request, whichever was lower. The Reagan Administration realized many of its foreign aid goals through the CRs, obtaining funding bills from Congress with fewer restrictions than contained in proposed authorizing bills. The lack of debate also preserved a higher aid figure since there was little time for individual bowels, Foreign Aid: The Changing Legislative Process," 77. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 237 members to propose cuts in the final bill. The CR did not allow the appropriations committees to override the sentiment on the floor when a provision of the bill was opposed by a majority of members. Each part of the CR would come to the floor, albeit briefly, in both chambers. A CR was difficult to attack, however, both because of the rules discussed above and because unpopular foreign aid was lumped in with more popular programs. Furthermore, the CR was voted up or down in a single vote, binding together all the programs contained in the CR. In a few cases, individual items might be modified on the floor, but the package was not going to be rejected due to a foreign aid provision. In short, the breakdown of the traditional process and the rise of the use of CRs for foreign aid helped the Administration to move its program through Congress. The CRs provided political cover for legislators to vote for foreign assistance. From the Administration's perspective, CRs provided an alternative to restrictive authorization bills. Changed Nature of Appropriations Legislation While in six of the eight years of the Reagan Administration funding was contained in CRs, the language in the appropriations resolutions governing military aid Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238 changed significantly. The appropriations committees added ever more policy language to the resolutions. In doing so, Congress used the appropriations bill increasingly for enacting policy provisions normally carried in the authorizing bill. The appropriations law changed in several respects. The total number of pages increased dramatically between 1981 and 1988. The legislation in 1988 was over five times longer than it was in 1981. The number of earmarks in the law increased, and the percentage of resources encompassed by those earmarks also grew. The major change in the legislation concerned the provisions for the use of funds. These provisions included such items as those found in Title III of PL 99-591 stating that the "concessional rate of interest on foreign military credit sales for countries other than Israel and Egypt shall be not less than 5 percent per year." Another general provision first inserted in the 1983 appropriations law and each year thereafter mandated that none of the funds appropriated in the foreign assistance appropriation legislation should be used for any nation which is found through its United Nations voting record, to be "engaged in a consistent pattern of opposition to the foreign, policy of the United States." Table 15 summarizes these trends. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 239 2 11 57 1988 6 4 5 15 12 64 53 56 100-202 100-461 1987 1 72 12 31 1986 99-591 i 8 9 2 31 24 28 1985 0 2 4 5 10 26 19 1984 98-473 99-190 TABLE 15 1901-1988 0 2 8 2 5 1983 98-151 1 6 0 1 1982 MEASURES OF CHANGE IN APPROPRIATIONS LEGISLATION 0 3 0 0 10 10 3 1981 97-121 97-377 Provisions Public Law Pages Policy st. Prohibits EarmarksCeilings 2 9 5 Policy Statements - statements made by CongressProhibitions affecting - adenotes foreign number policy of issue, countries country, prohibited or program. from receiving Provisions - specifications within the appropriations law for a report or concerninghow assistance is to be administered in general or to a specific nation or program. May alsocertifications. request Pages - total number of pages devoted to foreign assistance appropriations. Ceilings - number of countries for which funding is limited using the than"not more. . .* clause. Public Law - Number of the public lawcontaining the appropriations bill. military aid funds and general prohibitions for the use of military aid funds. Earmarks - number of countries for which funding is specified by usingless the than. "not . clause.." Source: Figures compiled by the author fromcongressional documents. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 240 Table 15 uses benchmark measures to demonstrate the significant increase din policy measures in the appropriations legislation during the Reagan Administration. Through the early 1980s, virtually all of these sorts of provisions were contained in the authorizing legislation. In 1985 and 1986 the appropriations committees moved assertively into policy territory and the number of such provisions rose. By 1987 and 1988 a dramatic increase in the number of policy provisions was evident. By the end of the Reagan Administration the appropriations and authorizing bill substantially resembled one-another. Hence, Congress had adjusted to compensate for the breakdown of the authorizing process. Administration Requests and Congressional Appropriations: 1981-1988 Traditionally, the appropriations committees reduce executive branch requests for military assistance by at least 10 percent. However, in Reagan's first term several developments combined to curtail congressional efforts to reduce military assistance. First, the Senate supported the Administration's full request. Therefore, of course, the compromise figure with the House was larger than if the Senate had reduced the Administration's request in committee. Second, much of the funding consisted of off- budget loans which did not count against the deficit. Thus Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 241 funding of these loans did not count as federal appropriations that affected the deficit. Third, the regular process for considering assistance was in transition with the breakdown of the authorizing process and the lack of leadership from the appropriations committees. The process was further changed by the Reagan Administration's repeated assertive requests for supplemental funding, which, piecemeal, added to total foreign and military assistance allocations each year. The Administration requested supplementals in Fiscal Years 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1987. In 1983, for example, the Administration received almost $400 million of a $672 million supplemental MAP and EMS request. A substantial percentage of the budget increase was for politically popular countries such as Greece and Israel (and because of Israel, Egypt). Base-rights assistance, primarily for Greece and Turkey, nearly doubled during the first four years of the Administration. As shown in chapter 2, overall base-rights assistance doubled in Reagan's first four years in office. Tables 16 - 19 outline the Administration's requests and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees marks as well as the final appropriations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 242 TABLE 16 FY 1982 FINAL APPROPRIATIONS (in millions) Program FY 1982* House Senate FY 1982 (revised) Approps Approps Final Request Committee Committee m s (g) $3,063.0 $2,846.0 $308.0 $3,083.0 FMS (d) $990.0 $650.0 $990.0 $750.0 MAP $63.5 $238.0 $63.5 $176.5 Source: FY 1982 request-congressional Presentation Document for Security Assistance Programs. FY 1982; House Appropriations Comnittee-H Rept. 97- 245; Senate Appropriations Connnittee-S Rept 97-266; Final FY 1982-PL 97- 121. 6 - Guaranteed Loans D - Direct Credits (all forgiven loans to Israel and Egypt) * On September 30, 1981, the Reagan Administration sent a revised budget request to Congress which cut military aid appropriations requests by $490 million. This was accomplished by moving $490 million to the off-budget portion of the military aid request. The Administration also cut the MAP request from $138.5 million to $63.5 million, and reduced the MAP contingency fund request to $25 million. The President recommended that repayment for the remaining $990.9 million in FMS direct credits be waived. TABLE 17 FY 1983 FINAL APPROPRIATIONS (in millions) Program FY 1982 FY 1983 House Senate FY 1983 Final Request Approps Approps Final EMS(g) $3,083 $4,323 $3,384 $3,973 $3,638 EMS (d) $800 $950 $1,175 $1,300 $1,175 MAP $178 $557 $176 $367 $290 Source: FY 1982 Final-PIi 97-121; FY 1983 reauest-Congreasional Presentation Document for Security Assistance Programs. FY I9fi3i House committee-no report issued, figures from "Foreign Aid Appropriations, Fiscal 1983," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 15 January 1983, 91; Senate Appropriations Committee-S Rept. 97-672; Final FY 1983-PL 97- 377. Figures include FY 82 supplemental. See also Larry Q. Nowels, "Foreign Aid Issues: Issue Brief IB82007," congressional Research Service Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1983). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 243 TABLE 18 FY 1984 FINAL APPROPRIATIONS* (in millions) Program FY 1983 FY 1984 House Senate FY 1984 Final Request Approps Approps Final Com. Com. FMS(g) $3,931 $4,656 $4,447 $4,356 $4,401 EMS(d) $1,175 $1,000 $1,315 $1,395 $1,315 MAP $383 $747 $420 $697 $510 Source: FY 1983 Final-PL 97-377; FY 1984 request-Congressional Presentation Document for Security Assistance .Program, FY 1984; House Committee-figures from "Foreign Aid Appropriations, Fiscal 1984” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 17 December 1983, 4.; Senate Committee-S Rept. 98-245; Final FY 1984-PL 98-151. *Note: Figures include supplemental funding for FY 1983. TABLE 19 FY 1985 FINAL APPROPRIATIONS (in millions) Program FY 1985 House Senate FY 1985 Request Approps Approps Final Committee Committee EMS(Total) $5,100 $4,809 $5,100 $4,939 EMS(g) $1,986 $1,667 FMS (grant) $2,575 $2,575 EMS(d) $538 $697 MAP $924 $653.1 $917 $805 Source: FY 1985 request-Conareaaional Presentation Document for Security Assistance Proprama. FY 1985; House Appropriations Committee-H Rept.98- 1021; Senate Appropriations Committee-S Rept.98-531; Final FY 1985-PL 98-473. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 244 In Reagan's second term there were various reasons why Congress was much less supportive of his military assistance requests. The budget deficit had become a major political issue and Congress found it politically unpalatable to continue to increase foreign and military assistance while domestic programs faced reductions. The Administration also lost the seemingly automatic support of Senate Republicans. Indeed, the Senate began to cut Administration requests. There was a sense among many Republicans that continued augmentation of military assistance was unrealistic in the stringent budgetary environment after 1985. The Republican loss of the Senate in 1986 deprived the Administration its major partner on Capitol Hill. After * i 1986 it had to bargain with both chambers for whatever funding it could attain. Figure 1 (below) demonstrates the Senate's reduced support of the Administration. The appropriations committees adapted to not having authorizing bills and began to more heavily earmark the foreign assistance bills. This proclivity magnified the effect of the overall reductions as aid to some nations had to be disproportionately reduced in order to meet these earmarks. Further, military assistance loans were placed "on- budget." While this action allowed loans to be provided at Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 245 subsidized interest rates, it also increased the amount of appropriated funds that counted toward the deficit. Reductions were made ip military aid in the name of deficit reductions. Finally, President Reagan's lame duck status, the Iran-Contra scandal, and the thaw in the Cold War severely weakened the Administration's bargaining position for increased military assistance resources on Capitol Hill. Members of Congress were less inclined to support high levels of military aid at a time when the United States and Soviet Union were making historic strides toward ending the Cold War. Administration requests and congressional appropriations are detailed in tables 20-23 below. TABLE 20 FY 1986 FINAL APPROPRIATIONS (in millions) Program FY 1985 FY 1986 House Senate FY 1986 Final Request Approps Approps Final Com. Com. m s $4,939.0 $5,655.0 $5,072.0 $5,371.0 $5,190.0 MAP $805.1 $949..4 $739.7 $805.1 $782.0 Source: FY 1985 Final-PL 98-473; FY 1986 recrueat-Conoregaional Presentation Document for Security Assistance Program*_ FY 1986; House Appropriations committee-H Rept. 99-252; Senate Appropriations Committee-S Rept 99-167; Final FY 1986-PL 99-190. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 246 TABLE 21 FY 1987 FINAL APPROPRIATIONS (in millions) FY 1986 FY 1987 House Senate FY 1987 Final request Approps Approps Final Com. Com. FMS $4,966.8 $5,611.0 $4,264.7 $4,992.5 $4,040.4 MAP $748.4 $1,046.5 $657.7 $0.0 $900.0 Source: FY 1986 Final-PL 99-190; FY 1987 request-congressional Presentation Document fax. Security Aagiatancc-Programa* f y 1987; House Appropriations Conmittee-H Rept. 99-747; Senate Appropriations Committee-S Rept. 99-443; Final FY 1987-PL 99-591. Note - FY 1986 figures differ between tables 20 and 21 due to a 4.3% sequestration under the Gramm—Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction law. TABLE 22 FY 1988 FINAL APPROPRIATIONS (in millions). Program FY 1987 FY 1988 House Senate FY 1988 Final Request Approps Approps Final Com. Com. FMS $4,040.0 $4,421.0 $4,423.0 $4,427.0 $4,049.0 MAP $900.0 $1,329.0 $712.5 $621.0 $701.0 GRF* $900.0 $0.0 x$532.0 y$ 532.0 *$ 532.0 Source: FY 1987 Final-PL 99-591; FY 1988 reaueat-Conqresslonal Presentation Document for Security Assistance Proar»ma. FY 1988; House Appropriations Conmittee-H Rept. 100-283; Senate Appropriations Committee-S Rept. 100-236; Final FY 1988-PL 100-202. *GRF - Guaranteed Reserve Fund which insured FMS loans against borrower default. x - GRF must come from the FMS total. y - GRF mandatory spending, does not come from FMS total. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 247 TABLE 23 FY 1989 FINAL APPROPRIATIONS (in millions) Program FY 1988 FY 1989 House Senate FY 1989 Final Request Approps Approps Final Com. Com. EMS $4,049.0 $4,600.0 $3,893.0 $4,779.0 $4,272.0 MAP $701.0 $467.0 $876.0 $0.0 $467.0 GRF $532.0 $939.0 $939.0 $939.0 $939.0 Source: FY 1988 Final-PL 100-202; FY 1989 reauaat-Conaresslonal gfcsgentatipp fofc. Security Aggjgfcance Programs/ fy 1989; House Appropriations Conmittee-H Rept. 100-641; Senate Appropriations Committee-S Rept. 100-395; Final FY 1989-PL 100-461. Summary of Requests and Appropriations Tables 24 and 25 summarize the Administration's requests, congressional recommendations, and the final military assistance funding figures (EMS and MAP combined) for the Reagan years. Three aspects stand out. Tables 24 and 25 summarize the funding data. TABLE 24 MILITARY ASSISTANCE REQUESTS AND CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING FY 1982-1985 (in millions) FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985 Request $4,117 $5,810 $6,403 $6,024 House $3,734 $4,735 $6,181 $5,462 Senate $4,138 $5,640 $6,430 $6,017 Final $4,060 $5,396 $6,226 $5,744 Source: Derived from Tables 16-19. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 248 TABLE 25 MILITARY ASSISTANCE REQUESTS AND CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING FY 1986-198.9 (in millions) FY 1986 FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 Request $6,604 $6,657 $5,750 $5,067 House $5,812 $4,923 $4,836 $4,769 Senate $6,176 $4,992 $5,048 $4,799 Final $5,972 $4,940 $4,750 $4,740 source: Derived from. Tables 20-23. First, the Senate and the Administration supported virtually the same funding level for military assistance between fiscal years 1982 and 1985. The rapid rise in military assistance in those years owes much to solid Senate support. Second, the divergence between the congressional committees and the Administration's requests can be seen from fiscal years 1986 through 1988. Despite having its budget cut in FY 1986, the Administration proposed an even larger funding request in FY 1987. In FY 1986 and FY 1987 even the Republican-controlled Senate cut over $1.4 billion from the Administration's request. Between FY 1982 and 1985 the Senate and Administration figures had closely corresponded, between FY 1986 and 1989 the Senate and House figures became much closer. Again, the convergence began Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 249 during the years when the Republicans were still in control of the Senate. Finally, Congress and the Administration reached an agreement in late 1987 that brought significant convergence between the Administration request and Congress for FY 1989. In essence, the Administration bowed to the reality that Congress was no longer willing to fund military assistance at the levels it did in the mid-1980s. The funding trends are depicted in Figure 1. $7,000 $6,000 « c o $4,000 $3,000 FY 62 FY 83 FY 84 FY 85 FY86 FY 87 FY 88 FY 80 Fiscal. Year R a q u e t t Houm 8enste Final Fig. 1. Military aid requests and funding between FY 1982 and FY 1989. The figure demonstrates the sharp divergence between Administration requests and congressional funding levels in the second term. This figure is derived from tables 24 and 25. Conclusion During the 1980s, the Foreign Operations Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 250 Committees grew in power and stature due to the problems experienced by the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees in passing their authorizing bills. By the end of the Reagan Administration the foreign assistance process had changed substantially as Congress adjusted to the demise of the authorizations process and substituted policy provisions contained in appropriations legislation for. authorizations bills. During Reagan's first term, the Administration was largely successful in the appropriations arena due to its aggressive strategy, problems in the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee, and a supportive Senate. The Administration's efforts resulted in the provision by Congress of higher levels of foreign assistance with fewer restrictions on that assistance. During Reagan's second term, however, the budget deficit, a less supportive Senate, and a more aggressive House Foreign Operations Subcommittee led to drastic reductions in Administration requests. The demise of the authorizing process, growing bipartisan concern about budget deficits and the thaw in the Cold War had changed the political landscape. The Administration failed to adjust to those changes until FY 1989. Yet the Reagan Administration's tactics and methods for dealing with Congress appear to have had a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. fundamental, long-term impact on the congressional management of foreign assistance. The appropriations process has acquired a much more overt policy role. The authorizing process, while still serving some useful purposes of dialogue, has remained moribund. A valuable congressional policy resource has been lost. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION: MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION This study began with two questions. Why was the Reagan Administration so successful in increasing military assistance in its first term and less successful in its second term? How did the executive branch and Congress make decisions regarding military assistance and how did this influence resource allocations? Approach This study relied on the use of public documents and off-the-record interviews to find the beliefs of the' policymakers discussed. Therefore, it was important to try to see if the public statements made by policymakers matched their beliefs as expressed in the interviews. The research data generally confirmed that the opinions and views expressed in private interviews with former Reagan Administration and congressional officials conformed to both their official public statements as well as the policies they pursued. Thus, the interviews and the written materials from hearings and reports reinforced 252 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 253 each other and demonstrated the actors' beliefs and role conceptions regarding military assistance. Beliefs Examining policymakers beliefs can also be useful for understanding policy. David Obey was not a strong supporter of military aid. He generally did not believe that military aid was the proper tool to use to approach American foreign policy problems. Consequently he used his position as House Foreign Operations Subcommittee Chairman to attack the Reagan Administration's aid priorities and to gradually reduce the military aid budget in Reagan's second term. Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance William Schneider, from his experience at OMB, came to believe that someone in the State Department needed to seize control of the foreign aid budget. Not surprisingly, he used his position in the State Department to gain much more control of the military aid budget and allocation process (and the other parts of the foreign aid budget) than had his predecessors. Senator Robert Hasten was a strong supporter of military aid and believed it furthered American foreign policy. He used his position as Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee Chairman to support the Administration's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 254 funding priorities. One of the findings of this study is that it confirmed the view that, while bureaucratic position ('where you stand depends on where you sit') will substantially determine policy stances at the lower levels, the shared values and assumptions of the more senior members of the Administration constitute the most important element for defining the range of acceptable policy choices. Especially within the Reagan Administration, the shared values of officials defined the starting point for approaching its military aid policy and budgetary requests to Congress. Roles In combination with the analysis of actors' beliefs, examining actors' policymaking roles and positions proved useful in understanding policymakers and their decisions. Roles are created both formally, through the positions the actors' occupy in government, and informally, by their actions and personalities. The importance of role is that is set the parameters in which the policymakers— in both Congress and the executive branch— actualize their beliefs concerning policy. Policymaking roles, or course, can both enable and constrain actors. Thus, David Obey could, of course, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. • 255 affect the Administration's military aid policy, but he was forced to work with the Administration and Senate Republicans, thus constraining his ability to reshape the legislation. Likewise, Senator Kasten had to balance his role as the Administration's chief negotiator in conference with his role as an individual senator with distinct beliefs and his position as foreign operations subcommittee chairman. Thus, Kasten did not support Administration initiatives that would infringe upon the prerogatives of Congress and he sometimes clashed with the Administration on specific policy initiatives. While policymaking roles are constraining, the behavior of individuals within role structures varies. The variance can result from factors internal to the individual, such as personality and beliefs, and external factors, such as the political balance in Congress and Administration policies. For example, David Obey was a much more aggressive chairman of the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee than was Clarence Long. William Schneider played a more active role in coordinating the foreign assistance budget than did Ed Derwinski. Individuals can and do shape the positions they occupy. In the executive branch, each administration establishes the parameters for officials' roles both informally and formally through the positions they occupy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 256 In the Reagan Administration, the position of undersecretary of state for security assistance was critical. The Administration formally empowered the undersecretary to coordinate assistance among various agencies with assistance programs. He consistently made security assistance a top priority item. The Defense Department, while critical in implementing military assistance, acknowledged that the State Department had the policy lead and that the secretary of state was the final arbiter of disputes concerning military aid. While this did not eliminate some bureaucratic disputes, it established clear lines of authority which eliminated many of the deep departmental rifts sometimes associated with bureaucratic politics. Coordination between the State and Defense Departments on security assistance issues was facilitated because of clear lines of authority. Explaining Administration Success: First Term The Administration's first term success can be attributed to the presence of four primary and four secondary factors. The absence of any of the primary factors would have notably reduced the chances of Administration success. The secondary factors were important but not sufficient to the success of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 257 Administration's agenda. Primary Factors of Success The Administration's successes in the first term can be attributed to: its consistent, high priority, approach toward security assistance requests, including the placement of competent officials to direct the program; weak leadership on the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee; Republican control of the Senate; and the breakdown of the legislative process for handling foreign, assistance (and other) legislation. Collectively, these factors were critical. Administration .Approach From 1981 through-1988, the Administration outlined a consistent policy with respect to military aid. When possible, it focused on goals that it and a significant portion of the Congress shared. The Administration stressed agreement with Congress on the goal of stability and preventing leftist forces from ousting U.S.-backed governments and supporting friendly governments against perceived Soviet aggression. With agreement on goals, the debate shifted to means. This debate worked to the Administration's advantage, especially in the first term, as the Administration argued that military assistance was the best means to ensure the achievement of common goals. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 258 Decisiveness of purpose also aided the Administration's cause. The Administration moved quickly to put the elements of its program in place in 1981. Reagan consistently made security assistance a high priority item, one he was willing to expend political capital to support. Secretaries of State Alexander Haig and George Shultz spent considerable time on assistance related issues, lobbied Congress vigorously, and made numerous public appearances throughout the United States in support of the program. Congress was under constant Administration pressure for higher levels of funding. In most years, in addition to its normal consideration of the budget, Congress also faced Administration requests for supplemental funding or reprogramming of approved funds. This pressure had an effect. To a degree, Administration pressure in the early years seemed to wear down resistance by some members of Congress who were otherwise critical of the program. Moreover, pressure/influence could be applied effectively in large part because the Administration was well- organized and competently staffed in this area. Republican Allies The Administration benefited tremendously from having strong allies in Congress and from Republican Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 259 control of the Senate. Senator Robert Kasten, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee, was a reliable ally and his subcommittee changed hardly any of the Administration's requests for military aid during its first term (see Table 24) . In conference, Kasten enabled the Administration to achieve higher levels of assistance than would have been possible if the Democrats controlled both the House and Senate. In the House, Republican Congressman Jack Kemp was also a reliable ally and proved himself important in promoting the Administration's position in House Appropriations Committee meetings and in conference with the Senate. In the critical first two years of the Administration, House Republicans had significant power. With the Democrats holding only a 7-5 House Foreign Operations Subcommittee majority during Reagan's first two years in office, a united Republican front meant that the defection of just one Democrat deadlocked the subcommittee. Democrat defections and the united Republican front behind Kemp greatly aided the Administration in moving the foreign aid bill through the Democratically-controlled House. Weak House Foreion Operations Subcommittee Another important factor in Reagan's early success Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 260 was the lack of strong, organized opposition to his programs from the House Appropriations Committee, particularly its Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. In the wake of Republican victories in the presidential and senatorial elections of 1981, only the House of Representatives remained controlled by the Democrats. The House was the only venue for the Democrats to challenge Reagan's policies. In the foreign aid arena/ any effective Democratic challenge needed to emerge from the House Appropriations Committee's Foreign Operations Subcommittee, the source of the only House foreign aid bill guaranteed to become law each year. House Foreign Operations Subcommittee Chairman Long lacked sufficient tactical skill or political savvy, however, to outmaneuver the Administration and his Senate counterpart. Long had a limited interest in the policy aspects of assistance and he did not seek to lead his subcommittee on policy issues. Indeed Long himself became one of many warring factions on the subcommittee. His deficiencies made him unable to convince even his fellow Democrats that economic and development assistance, as opposed to military assistance, could achieve the goals of preventing leftist victories and supporting governments friendly to the United States. Moreover, he further undercut subcommittee Democrats as a swing vote, and he Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 261 sometimes provided critical support to the Administration. With the faltering of the authorizing process, the critical lack of leadership from this subcommittee sharply weakened the venue from which opposition to Reagan policies could have been mounted. The failure of the House Appropriations Committee to oppose Reagan's policies was not entirely due to Representative Long. The Administration benefitted from support it received from the conservative Democrats on the appropriations committee, who accepted Reagan's argument that military assistance means held the best prospect for achieving foreign policy goals. Indeed, the Administration frequently cobbled together majorities on the subcommittee for votes on military assistance. House Appropriations Committee Chairman Jamie Whitten (D-MS) was more conservative them most Democratic House members; he opposed few of the Reagan's military aid initiatives. Moderate Republicans such as Silvio Conte (R-MA), despite their misgivings, also supported the Administration's policies in crucial foreign operations subcommittee votes on military assistance. / Breakdown of Traditional Processes The breakdown in the traditional authorizing and appropriations processes led to higher levels of military Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 262 assistance. The failure of the authorizing process as early as 1982, as well as the increasing use of continuing resolutions (CRs), stifled debate on foreign assistance. With the breakdown of the authorizing process, the work of many of the most informed members of Congress on foreign aid issues (who generally sat on authorizing committees) never became law. A key level of scrutiny was thus lost from the foreign aid process. Stand-alone appropriations bills were replaced in the Reagan years by CRs that encompassed many program's appropriations bills in a single bill. Foreign aid received less attention and scrutiny in these larger bills. Further, votes on annual foreign assistance were tied to votes on more popular programs in the CR process, thus allowing for passage of substantial increases in military assistance at low political risk. The foreign aid portion of the CR was negotiated by the House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees. Therefore, the CR process exacerbated the problems of weak leadership in the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee by placing the subcommittee in an even more central role in the foreign aid process. The Administration contributed significantly to the process breakdown after 1981. Since the Administration believed it could attain its priorities through the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 263 appropriations process, its strategy was to issue veto threats against foreign aid authorizing bills with which it disagreed. This action undermined the bills' consideration in Congress. A more determined, united congressional leadership might have thwarted this strategy. Supporting Factors Four supporting factors played an important role in Reagan's first-term success in increasing the military aid budget: Reagan's strong election showings in 1980 and 1984 and the effect his margins of victory had. on Congress; the low-cost nature of FMS loan guarantees; the diffuse views of members of Congress on the subject of military aid; and the advantage that the executive branch generally enjoys over the legislature in the area of foreign policy. Reaaan's.Electoral Victories Reagan's electoral victories, along with the loss of the Senate and many House seats in 1980, cowed many Democratic members of Congress and moved the center of the Congress toward the conservative side of the spectrum. In the early 1980s, an alliance of conservative Democrats and Republicans gave Reagan had a working majority in the House. Liberal Democrats lacked the numbers, and often the collective political will, to effectively oppose Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26.4 Reagan's policies. Reagan's 1984 election victory gave him some additional strength, at least until the budget deficit issue and Iran-Contra sapped support for his programs. When David Obey first assumed control of the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee in 1985 he acknowledged that he had to work within the broad framework of Reagan's priorities because the voters had resoundingly returned him to office. Reagan's electoral support helped him to keep his aid priorities at center stage. Low Cost of Assistance The accounting rules for military assistance before 1985 also contributed to its rise. During the first term, increases in Foreign Military Sales loans required no appropriations, were not counted as part of federal spending for purposes of calculating the budget deficit and, therefore, seemed very low cost in budgetary terms. Congress could agree to higher IMS loan totals without— on paper, at least— increasing the deficit. The only appropriated elements of the program before 1985 were MAP grants and EMS forgiven loans (which went only# to Egypt, Israel and Sudan). The low cost nature of the program encouraged higher military aid levels and diluted Congress's incentive to fight the Reagan aid increases. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 265 l Diffuse-Opinion-in Congress Legislators' views on military assistance were also important in determining their positions and votes, and these positions varied widely. Some members supported military aid wholeheartedly while others consistently opposed it. The beliefs of members revolved around factors such as their views of the critical problems facing American foreign policy and the best remedies for those problems. Most in Congress agreed with the broad anti communist goals of the Administration, but disagreed on the means to attain those goals. Clarence Long, for example, was convinced that Third World poverty was the underlying reason for instability; hence he was alarmed at the rise in military assistance budgets relative to economic assistance. Jack Kemp, on the other hand, felt that growth in military assistance was necessary. Many of the other 533 members did not have strong views on the subject of military aid., The divided nature of Congress gave some advantage to an Administration which was single- minded in supporting the use of military aid to attain its policy ends. In tbe early 1980s, the Reagan Administration also benefited from the fact that many in Congress did not want Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 266 the Presidency hobbled by setbacks in foreign policy after the trauma of the 1970s. Many members of Congress believed that, in most cases, Congress should defer to the president in the realm of foreign policy, particularly in instances when the president indicated that vital U.S. national interests were at stake. Lobbying Effective lobbying contributed to the first term growth in military assistance. Recipients such as Israel (and by extension Egypt) and Greece received their accustomed support from their respective ethnic interest groups. In other cases, individual members of Congress supported military aid programs in Turkey and Pakistan, fostering increases in those programs. Thus, there was significant congressional support for assistance increases to major recipients in the early 1980s, and those increases accounted for a large percentage of the overall increases in Reagan's first term. In this and other administrations, Congress pressured the president for increases in assistance to Israel beyond those proposed by the Administration. Reactive Position of Congress The predominantly reactive position of Congress vis- a-vis the executive branch in the foreign affairs and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 267 national security arenas represents another critical element influencing the Congress's role in the process. Since World War II, the executive branch has had broad freedom of action in area of national security affairs. At the same time, Congress maintained its strong role in the appropriation of funds. As a national security program that required annual appropriations of funds, military assistahce cut across customary prerogatives of both Congress and the executive branch. While Congress's ability to independently collect information in the foreign policy arena has grown tremendously in the last few decades, it still depends to a significant degree on the executive branch to provide timely and much-needed information. If the executive branch is unwilling to provide complete information, or stonewalls on congressional requests to make assessments of relative program merits, as in the Reagan years, members of Congress are left with the choice of using the blunt tools available to them (such as earmarks or conditionality) or allowing the executive branch to implement its proposed policy under whatever supervision Congress can muster. Congress plays no role in the initial military assistance budget formulation stage and only sees the final proposals when they are presented with the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 268 president's budget in February of each year. Hence, at a critical stage of planning where recipient expectations are not yet firmly set, Congress has no formal role in establishing priorities. Thus, Congress is left in the potentially awkward and difficult position of upending the Administration's priorities should it disagree with the president, instead of working with the Administration early-on to set priorities. During the 1980s the problem was particularly acute as the Reagan Administration undertook many controversial initiatives. While many administrations have undertaken controversial initiatives, the aggressive style of the Reagan Administration and its sometimes hostile posture toward Congress made even the Republican-controlled Senate occasionally uncomfortable. Administration First-Term Setbacks Reagan's setbacks with Congress in the first term came largely when he crossed a role or political threshold. Congress has a distinct sense of its prerogative in the process and it particularly resisted the Administration's efforts to bypass it or to create funds outside of congressional control. The power of the purse is paramount. Democrats and Republicans both rejected any. attempts to weaken this congressional Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 269 authority. Reagan's requests for proportional earmarking were rebuffed in his first term. Politically, the Administration lost battles to limit increases in aid to Israel and to increase aid to Turkey to a level the Administration believed necessary. In both cases, powerful special interests urged Congress to stand against the Administration. Evaluating Reagan's Second-Term Setbacks The second term can be evaluated in different ways. On the one hand, the Administration achieved considerable success in the first term, and thus even maintaining some of those gains could be considered a success. Appropriations increased substantially between 1981 and 1985, and the Administration enacted a program that reflected its values and approach to foreign policy. Grant aid increased as a percentage of overall military aid in Reagan's second term. Figure 1 demonstrates that overall military aid levels were higher in FY 1989 than FY 1982. On the other hand, the Administration sought, and failed, to build on those gains and to expand programs it had begun. By 1988, Congress had rolled back much of the military aid program developed in the first term in Europe, Africa and Asia. Although the percentage of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 270 military assistance grants increased each year, the amount of overall military aid resources decreased and the number of FMS and MAP country programs declined. Primary Factors The primary reasons for the Administration's lack of second term success in increasing or even maintaining the overall level of resources aiid country programs were: budgetary pressures and the increasing urgency of reducing the budget deficit, more vigorous leadership in the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee, the loss of the Senate to the Democrats following the 1986 elections, and a thaw in superpower relations following the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union in 1985. In addition, continued problems in the authorization process led to the emergence of a somewhat new legislative approach to foreign assistance in which the appropriations bills carried the policy provisions normally found in authorizing bills. Badg.sJt- Deficit By 1985, pressures to reduce the budget deficit had resulted in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act. The legislation led to tighter budgetary ceilings for all accounts, including foreign and military assistance. For example, in FY 1986, all accounts were Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 271 sequestered by 4.3% due to the failure to reach the budget deficit ceiling. With pressures on all budgets, increases, or even the maintenance of budgets for military aid, were politically impossible. In 1985 and 1986, even the Republican-controlled Senate, which had been a solid ally in the first term, questioned the ability of the Administration to continue to increase the military aid budget in the face of the mounting federal budget deficit and cuts in popular domestic programs. Republicans in the House such as Mickey Edwards (R-OK), ranking minority member on the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee, also questioned the requests to increase the foreign aid budget. Politically and budgetarily, Reagan's allies in Congress could no longer support program increases. Even before 1987, the Senate and House positions moved closer to each other and further from the Administration. Renewed House Vigor In the Administration's second term, House Foreign Operations Subcommittee Chairman David Obey managed to cut funding for some military aid programs. Obey sharply questioned Administration officials and openly challenged the Administration's focus on military assistance. As chairman, Obey took a leadership role on the subcommittee Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 272 and united the Democrats behind his position. He skillfully used pressures for budget deficit reduction to hammer at Administration priorities. As military aid programs had a larger impact on the deficit (because such programs obligated money more quickly them development assistance projects), Obey had a rationale for cutting them more deeply than development assistance. Obey's vigorous leadership and his willingness to compromise with the conservative Democrats on his subcommittee enabled him to unite the subcommittee. Therefore, Obey could sometimes win Republican votes by supporting some of their priorities. The result of his subcommittee maneuvering was that he secured a better position than had Chairman Long for negotiating with the Republican Senate and the Administration. Loss of Senate The loss of the Senate by the Republicans also hurt the Administration position in 1987 and 1988. Between 1981 and 1985, Senator Hasten had been a strong Administration ally, especially in conference negotiations with the House. Hasten began to move away from the Administration funding requests in 1985 and 1986. In 1987 and 1988, the chairmanship passed to Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI). While Inouye was more conservative than Obey, he Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 273 nevertheless cut funding for military programs, citing their large increase in the preceding years. For example, in FY 1988 the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee cut the Reagan Administration's MAP request by over 50%. Under Inouye, the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee also questioned such Administration priorities as base- rights funding. In these moves, Inouye accelerated the . trends begun in 1985. Improved Superpower Relations During the final two years of the Administration, the thaw in superpower relations also put downward pressure on military aid budgets. Congress was less inclined to support military assistance to remote places of the globe when by 1987 President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev were signing treaties to eliminate one whole class of nuclear weapons. Combined with budgetary pressures, the superpower thaw led to cuts in base-rights funding, military aid to Africa, the restriction of assistance to Central America, and eventually to the cutoff of aid to Pakistan.497 Instability no longer automatically meant an opportunity for Soviet influence. Non-military aid could support w The defense budget also experienced a decline over this same period. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 274 democratic transitions in places such, as the Philippines. Military aid could be cut-off to human rights violators in Africa. The superpower thaw did not, however, affect the largest of the military aid accounts, Israel and Egypt. Aid to those nations was divorced from Cold War rationales and continued unabated. Secondary Factors Several other factors were important yet secondary in the Administration's failure to build on its first-term successes: increased earmarking, loss of important leadership in the executive branch, and the Administration's loss of credibility in requesting increases in military aid budgets. Earmarking Congressional earmarking, combined with program cuts, drastically affected military assistance in Reagan's second term. While the earmarks often represented levels of assistance requested by the Administration for specific programs, they reduced the Administration's flexibility to move funds among programs. The increase in earmarking left little funding for smaller programs that had allowed the Administration to project U.S. influence into Africa and East Asia. Tradeoffs that had been virtually unnecessary in the first Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 275 term were mandatory in the second term. By FY 1988 many programs had been squeezed out by a combination of funding cuts and earmarkings. Cuts were particularly significant in Africa and East Asia, where whole programs vanished. The earmarks were in some ways a reaction to the Reagan Administration's hostile approach to the committees in its first term. The earmarks allowed Congress more control of the program priorities and spending. Loss of Executive Branch Leadership The executive branch also lost leadership in 1986 with the departure from government service of Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance William Schneider. His successor, Ed Derwinski, lacked Schneider's interest in budget issues and he was less effective in negotiating with legislators. Given the pressures on the program, the program cuts probably could not have been prevented, but Derwinski was less effective than others might have been in dealing with Congress. The remaining leadership was also distracted by the Iran- Contra scandal that enveloped the final two years of the Administration. Credibility Gaps Finally, the Administration continued to pressure Congress for increases in military assistance. In the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 276 first term, this was an advantageous strategy, as Administration pressure led to steady increases in the military aid budget. In the second term, however, this continued pressure for increased military aid in the face of a budget deficit, the superpower thaw, and the pressure on domestic programs, became a liability. Even those strongly supportive of the program such as Representative Mickey Edwards (R-OK) or Senator Robert Kasten (R-WI) would not support continued increases in the program over the FY 1985 base. In some ways, the Administration overreached itself in requesting large increases after 1985. By pressing for more resources while refusing to work with the appropriations committees on making rational program cuts, the Administration hurt its case in Congress . and further strained relations with the appropriations committees. Part of the problem lay in the 'base' that the appropriations committees and the Administration were using from 1985 to 1987. In 1985, the Administration began using its prior-year request as a base for its current-year request. The appropriations committees used the prior-year appropriation as a base for the current- year request. This approach cost the Administration credibility. The committees did not accept the argument that a request for funding increases from the prior-year's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 277 actual appropriation represented no-growth from the perspective of the prior-years' request. Another part of the problem was that Congress in the mid-and late-1980s was less willing to accept the Administration's arguments that military assistance was the best means of ensuring the shared goals of stability. Democrats wary of military assistance and who favored development and economic assistance found their voices and the votes to cut Administration military aid requests. The Republicans who clung to the belief that military aid was the best means for achieving many foreign policy goals could no longer garner support to preserve military aid funding levels. Military Assistance and Foreign Policy Military assistance has been a tool of U.S. foreign policy since World War II. This study reveals some of the difficulties of using foreign assistance to support foreign policy priorities. Many of these difficulties are rooted in or are exacerbated by the foreign policy and budgetary processes. Military Assistance Problems As a tool of foreign policy, military assistance suffers from (among other things) the following problems: difficulty in reacting to sudden developments, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 278 prioritization of recipients, fostering expectations among aid recipients that sometimes could not be met, and the disconnect between the Administration and Congress in the security assistance budget request process. Difficulty- .in. .Reacting to Sudden Developments During the Reagan years, budgets were developed over an 18-month period. The bargaining, program development and assessment that occurred during that period could not anticipate specific foreign policy developments or congressional concerns. Rapid developments in foreign policy had to be accommodated on an ad hoc basis by the Administration. In the first Reagan term, supplemental requests and emergency actions were used in part to meet urgent but unanticipated requirements, but those avenues became increasingly difficult to use in the second term due to budget pressures and political clashes with Congress. Generally, the assistance system has no effective way to handle sudden occurrences. Even when assistance is approved, its implementation and delivery can take weeks, months, or even longer. Prioritization Problems Problems arose during the Reagan years regarding the prioritization of programs. The Administration used Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 279 assistance to bolster its regional initiatives and support its general foreign policy. Members of Congress did not always share the Administration's priorities and they also had to confront pressure from interest groups. Further, the Administration refused to discuss prioritizing programs for fear of inviting cuts in low- priority areas. Dashed Expectations Many military aid requests supported ongoing programs that represented a commitment by both the United States and the recipient nation. In general, the United States supplied aid and the recipient nation improved its armed forces according a plan jointly developed with the United States. By the mid-1980s, these programs developed planning mechanisms that raised a sense of.expectation among recipient nations. The recipient nations viewed military aid cuts as a comment on the value placed on the relationship by the United States. Reductions in assistance disrupted, to some degree, both planning and relations. Process Disconnections The executive branch budget process for military aid during the Reagan Administration was remarkably detached from congressional consideration of the budget. The Administration's planning revolved around country Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 280 requirements and requests, ongoing programs, new starts, and, to a degree, sudden developments and opportunities. Military aid requests were built in increments by the regional bureaus at the State and Defense Departments. Budgets were integrated at the higher levels in the State and Defense Departments, and this brought strategic coherence to the process. But again, congressional concerns were not strongly considered, especially in the early years. When Congress received the results of the Administration's efforts, usually in February of each year, it began consideration of the budget request. Congress began its deliberations by using the previous year's appropriation baseline. Generally, if the base was expanding, conflicts concerning resources were not serious. In the early 1980s, Congress expanded the military aid resource base and allowed the Administration a relatively free hand in allocations between accounts. Therefore, internal Administration planning coincided with the base of funding as appropriated by Congress. Problems began when the resource base stopped expanding, and began to contract. In the mid- and late- 1980s, Congress began contracting the base level of military aid resources as part of deficit reduction. The planning base used by the Administration and the planning Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 281 base used by Congress began to substantially diverge. The problem between the Administration and Congress became acute in 1986 when the Administration based its 1986 (FY 1987) request on its 1985 (FY 1986) request, while Congress judged the 1986 request against its 1985 appropriation. Congressional cuts in the military aid program had created a growing gap between the Administration's budget development process and the congressional consideration process. Baseline differences amounted to over one billion dollars. The Administration's planning processes did not react well to the congressional request to prioritize the programs and cut non-essential programs. The process by which the Administration cobbled together its budget from the regional bureaus created a sclerosis that inhibited real discussions of priorities or planned cuts in programs between Congress and the executive branch. Subcommittee requests to outline large cuts created the specter of renewing bureaucratic battles in the State and Defense Departments. At the senior levels, policy initiatives, involving important foreign allies supported by military assistance, were threatened. Planning processes designed to make assistance allocations more efficient suddenly contributed to budgetary rigidity and foreign policy credibility problems. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 282 While the Administration faced rigidity problems stemming from executive branch processes and foreign policy considerations, members of Congress faced political rigidities. After 1985, earmarks to Israel and Egypt, which had become virtual entitlements, along with increases in funding to base-rights countries between 1981-1984, left only a small portion of the overall security assistance budget could be allocated to other strategic priorities. Even members who were sympathetic to the Administration' s requests for funding for other priorities found themselves hamstrung by the political realities of the powerful interests that backed assistance to Israel and Greece. Proposals to make small reductions % in assistance to earmarked nations in order to fund other priorities were dismissed. Underlying and exacerbating the process problems were substantial policy differences among members of the executive and legislative branches regarding the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Normal consideration of the foreign aid bill stopped and the policy committees in Congress were, to a degree, paralyzed. The Administration's hostile approach to Congress and its strategy to undermine the authorization process, along with congressional leadership woes, undercut the very policy committees in Congress that might have worked with Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 283 the Administration to bridge the policy gap. The upshot of these problems was the demise of the authorizing process and increased tension between the branches. One of Congress's most important inputs in shaping U.S. foreign policy had been lost. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the authorizing function was either absorbed by the appropriations committees or simply moved to other legislation. This has prevented a legislative reorganization of the foreign assistance program so that it aligns with the substantial changes in the world since the end of the Cold War. The lack of foreign aid authorization bills may portend a long term shift in the role of the authorizing committees away from passing foreign aid authorization legislation. Instead, the committees' new role will be: debating foreign policy initiatives; signaling congressional foreign policy concerns -to the Administration through the use of the hearings process; and influencing other legislative vehicles, such as appropriations bills and legislation that authorizes very specific foreign assistance programs, that impact foreign policy. The dramatic change in the appropriations legislation in the final two years of the Administration demonstrated the new role being played by the appropriators. The appropriations process had created a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 284 "policy bypass," by which foreign aid legislation flowed around the clogged arteries of the authorizing process and to the heart of Congress for consideration. Conclusion The Reagan Administration could look back in 1989 and see the substantial changes it had brought about. In FY 1981, assistance was chiefly disbursed in loans; by FY 1989, it was almost exclusively grants. Assistance supported many of its successful Third World policy initiatives, such as those in Afghanistan. The zenith of the program to provide grant military assistance to a large number of allies was reached during the Reagan years. Subsequently, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of many regional wars spawned and/or supported by the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, the military assistance program rapidly declined outside of the Middle East assistance to Israel and Egypt. Grants to base- rights nations were ended and loans were substituted in their place. By FY 1996 over 95 percent of the military assistance program went to Israel and Egypt. While sales of military equipment continued and expanded with the end of the Cold War, the era of global large scale grant military assistance programs had ended. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Reagan Administration's strength lay in its consistent policy approach and in its processes for considering assistance within the executive branch. The Administration's military aid policies, however, must be viewed as ephemeral and divisive both in terms of foreign policy and in terms of interbranch policy processes. The Reagan years also damaged the foreign policy committees in Congress, further reducing their role. Years later, the foreign assistance authorizing process continues to be stalled. The policy committees' loss of stature has doubtless contributed to the decline of foreign policy bipartisanship both during and after the Reagan years. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY Government Documents and Sources on Securit_v_Assistance Buckley, James L. statement, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, July 28, 1981, reprinted in The Department of State Bulletin. (September 1981): 60-62. Buckley, James L. "Arms Transfers and the National Interest." Department of .State Bulletin. (July 1981) . Grimmett, Richard F. An Overview of United States Military Assistance Programs. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. Washington D.C. 29 March 1988. Haig, Alexander M. Jr., "Security and Development Assistance." Department.q£ state.Bulletin• (April 1981) Special Section. Heginbotham, Stanley J. A n . fl.Y-SE-View JSt -U.-S.. Coceign Aid Programs. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, revised and updated, Washington D.C. 30 March 1988. Nowels, Larry Q. and Ellen Collier. Foreign Policy Budget.:__ Issues and Priorities for the 1990s. Congressional Research Service Issue Brief. Washington D.C., 15 January 1991. Nowels, Larry Q.. An Overview of the Economic Support Fund. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. Washington D.C. 1 April 1988. "Foreign Aid: The Changing Legislative Process." In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Congress and Foreign Policy. 1984. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985, pp. 70-100. 286 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 287 "Foreign Aid Issues: Issue Brief Number IB82007." Congressional Research Service Issue Brief. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1983. Reagan, Ronald. "National Security Strategy of the United States." Department of State Bulletin 88 (April 1988): 1-31. U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Series of Yearly Data. Obligations and Loan Authorizations. FY 1946-FY 1991. Volumes I- y. Washington D .C.:Government Printing Office, 1990. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Report of the Task Force on Foreign Assistance. Report, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Background Material.on Foreign Assistance. Committee Print, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. International-CoQceratiQO-Act,of 1989- Report 101- 90, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Bill. 1989. Report 100-641, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. foreign. Assistance .and Related -Erograms Appropriations Bill. 1989. Report 100-395, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Bill. 1988. Report 100-283, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 1987. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1988: Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations. 100th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 3, 1987. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreion Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Bill. 1988. Report 100-236. 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 1987. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 288 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, * 1987. Report 99-747. 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. FpreiflD Assistance and Related Appropriations, for Fiscal Year 1987; Hearings before the Committee, an Appropriations. 99th Cong., 2nd sess., pt. 3, 1986. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance Appropriations. Bill, Report 99-443. 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations.Bi 1.L,_ 1.9.86. Report 99-252. 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations_Bill^ 1986. Report 99-167. 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Base Rights: Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations. 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Activities.for Fiscal Year 1986: Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations. 99th Cong.,1st sess., 1985. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986: Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations - 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Bill. 1985. Report 98-1021. 98th Cong.,2nd sess., 1984. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Bill. 1985. Report 98-531. 98th Cong.,2nd sess., 1984. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984: Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations. 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1984. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 289 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Bill. 1984. Report 98-245. 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984: Hearings before .the Committee .on Appropriations. 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations Bill. 1.983. Report 97-672. 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982. U.S. Congress. House. 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Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 305 IntecYlew -Li&t Most of the interviews were conducted on a "not for attribution" basis. In those cases, the offices in which the interviewees presently or formerly were employed are listed. On-the-record interviews Gaffney, Henry H. Former Director of Plans, Defense Security Assistance Agency. Interview by author. Tape recording. Alexandria, Virginia. 15 Feburary 1993,. Rudd, Glen. Former Deputy Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency. Inteview by author. Tape recording. Falls Church, Virginia. 15 August 1994. Aheme, Richard. Former Foreign Service Officer, Office of the Undersecretary for Security Assistance. Interview by author. Tape recording. Washington, DC. 4 August 1994. McHixgh, Matthew F. Former Member of Congress. Interview . by author. Tape recording. Washington, DC. 4 August 1994. Off-the-record interviews Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Office of the Undersecretary for Security Assistance Bureau of African Affairs Department of Defense Bureau for International Security Affairs Defense Security Assistance Agency Office of Management and Budget United States House of Representatives House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff House Appropriations Committee Foreign Operations Subcommittee Staff Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Personal Staff of House Members United States Senate Senate Appropriations Committee Foreign Operations Subcommittee Staff Personal Staff of Senate Members Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.