Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)
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Philosophical Theory-Construction and the Self-Image of Philosophy
Open Journal of Philosophy, 2014, 4, 231-243 Published Online August 2014 in SciRes. http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojpp http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2014.43031 Philosophical Theory-Construction and the Self-Image of Philosophy Niels Skovgaard Olsen Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany Email: [email protected] Received 25 May 2014; revised 28 June 2014; accepted 10 July 2014 Copyright © 2014 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Abstract This article takes its point of departure in a criticism of the views on meta-philosophy of P.M.S. Hacker for being too dismissive of the possibility of philosophical theory-construction. But its real aim is to put forward an explanatory hypothesis for the lack of a body of established truths and universal research programs in philosophy along with the outline of a positive account of what philosophical theories are and of how to assess them. A corollary of the present account is that it allows us to account for the objective dimension of philosophical discourse without taking re- course to the problematic idea of there being worldly facts that function as truth-makers for phi- losophical claims. Keywords Meta-Philosophy, Hacker, Williamson, Philosophical Theories 1. Introduction The aim of this article is to use a critical discussion of the self-image of philosophy presented by P. M. S. Hacker as a platform for presenting an alternative, which offers an account of how to think about the purpose and cha- racter of philosophical theories. -
Kant's Categorical Imperative: an Unspoken Factor in Constitutional Rights Balancing, 31 Pepp
UIC School of Law UIC Law Open Access Repository UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship 1-1-2004 Kant's Categorical Imperative: An Unspoken Factor in Constitutional Rights Balancing, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 949 (2004) Donald L. Beschle The John Marshall Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law and Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Donald L. Beschle, Kant's Categorical Imperative: An Unspoken Factor in Constitutional Rights Balancing, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 949 (2004). https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs/119 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Kant's Categorical Imperative: An Unspoken Factor in Constitutional Rights Balancing Donald L. Beschle TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING: A BRIEF OVERVIEW III. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: TREATING PEOPLE AS ENDS IV. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AS A FACTOR IN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS CASES V. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION In 1965, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,' invalidating a nearly century old statute that criminalized the use of contraceptives, even by married couples, "for the purpose of preventing conception."2 Griswold injected new life into the largely 3 dormant notion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could effectively protect substantive individual rights, beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, against state legislative action. -
God As Both Ideal and Real Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics
God As Both Ideal and Real Being In the Aristotelian Metaphysics Martin J. Henn St. Mary College Aristotle asserts in Metaphysics r, 1003a21ff. that "there exists a science which theorizes on Being insofar as Being, and on those attributes which belong to it in virtue of its own nature."' In order that we may discover the nature of Being Aristotle tells us that we must first recognize that the term "Being" is spoken in many ways, but always in relation to a certain unitary nature, and not homonymously (cf. Met. r, 1003a33-4). Beings share the same name "eovta," yet they are not homonyms, for their Being is one and the same, not manifold and diverse. Nor are beings synonyms, for synonymy is sameness of name among things belonging to the same genus (as, say, a man and an ox are both called "animal"), and Being is no genus. Furthermore, synonyms are things sharing a common intrinsic nature. But things are called "beings" precisely because they share a common relation to some one extrinsic nature. Thus, beings are neither homonyms nor synonyms, yet their core essence, i.e. their Being as such, is one and the same. Thus, the unitary Being of beings must rest in some unifying nature extrinsic to their respective specific essences. Aristotle's dialectical investigations into Being eventually lead us to this extrinsic nature in Book A, i.e. to God, the primary Essence beyond all specific essences. In the pre-lambda books of the Metaphysics, however, this extrinsic nature remains very much up for grabs. -
Would ''Direct Realism'' Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?
NOU^S 38:2 (2004) 197–232 Would ‘‘Direct Realism’’ Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction? MARC LANGE University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill I Recently, there has been a modest resurgence of interest in the ‘‘Humean’’ problem of induction. For several decades following the recognized failure of Strawsonian ‘‘ordinary-language’’ dissolutions and of Wesley Salmon’s elaboration of Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication of induction, work on the problem of induction languished. Attention turned instead toward con- firmation theory, as philosophers sensibly tried to understand precisely what it is that a justification of induction should aim to justify. Now, however, in light of Bayesian confirmation theory and other developments in epistemology, several philosophers have begun to reconsider the classical problem of induction. In section 2, I shall review a few of these developments. Though some of them will turn out to be unilluminating, others will profitably suggest that we not meet inductive scepticism by trying to justify some alleged general principle of ampliative reasoning. Accordingly, in section 3, I shall examine how the problem of induction arises in the context of one particular ‘‘inductive leap’’: the confirmation, most famously by Henrietta Leavitt and Harlow Shapley about a century ago, that a period-luminosity relation governs all Cepheid variable stars. This is a good example for the inductive sceptic’s purposes, since it is difficult to see how the sparse background knowledge available at the time could have entitled stellar astronomers to regard their observations as justifying this grand inductive generalization. I shall argue that the observation reports that confirmed the Cepheid period- luminosity law were themselves ‘‘thick’’ with expectations regarding as yet unknown laws of nature. -
Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry
Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry Jaap van Brakel Abstract: In this paper I assess the relation between philosophy of chemistry and (general) philosophy of science, focusing on those themes in the philoso- phy of chemistry that may bring about major revisions or extensions of cur- rent philosophy of science. Three themes can claim to make a unique contri- bution to philosophy of science: first, the variety of materials in the (natural and artificial) world; second, extending the world by making new stuff; and, third, specific features of the relations between chemistry and physics. Keywords : philosophy of science, philosophy of chemistry, interdiscourse relations, making stuff, variety of substances . 1. Introduction Chemistry is unique and distinguishes itself from all other sciences, with respect to three broad issues: • A (variety of) stuff perspective, requiring conceptual analysis of the notion of stuff or material (Sections 4 and 5). • A making stuff perspective: the transformation of stuff by chemical reaction or phase transition (Section 6). • The pivotal role of the relations between chemistry and physics in connection with the question how everything fits together (Section 7). All themes in the philosophy of chemistry can be classified in one of these three clusters or make contributions to general philosophy of science that, as yet , are not particularly different from similar contributions from other sci- ences (Section 3). I do not exclude the possibility of there being more than three clusters of philosophical issues unique to philosophy of chemistry, but I am not aware of any as yet. Moreover, highlighting the issues discussed in Sections 5-7 does not mean that issues reviewed in Section 3 are less im- portant in revising the philosophy of science. -
Historical Tension Between the Holistic and Dualistic View of Man in the Church
Page 1 of 8 Original Research Historical tension between the holistic and dualistic view of man in the church Author: Dualism has continually plagued the Church, especially from the time when Greek philosophers 1 Herm Zandman articulated the dualistic view of man in an excellent, scholarly way. Even when the Reformers Affiliations: militated against this phenomenon theologically, it still dominated life in general and 1Theological Faculty Christian living in particular. This article considered the historical tension between the holistic North-West University, and dualistic view of man in the church. It strove to do this by setting forth certain examples Potchefstroom Campus, from history, showing how the Church wrestled with this tension. Furthermore, the author South Africa attempted to point out in which way the dualistic view of man was damaging to godly living, Correspondence to: and why a holistic view of man was conducive to life under God in an ethically meaningful Herm Zandman manner. Email: [email protected] Die historiese spanning tussen die holistiese en dualistiese beeld van die mens in die Postal Address: kerk. Dualisme het die Kerk nog altyd beinvloed, veral sedert die era toe Griekse filosowe die 25 Hay Terrace, Kongorong dualistiese siening van die mens op ‘n uitstekende akademiese wyse bekendgestel het. Selfs 5291, South Australia toe die Reformeerders teologies te velde getrek het teen hierdie fenomeen, het dit die lewe in Dates: die algemeen en die Christelike lewe in die besonder aangetas. Hierdie artikel oorweeg die Received: 28 Feb. 2011 historiese spanning tussen die holistiese en dualistiese sienings in die kerk. Sekere voorbeelde Accepted: 25 July 2011 uit die geskiedenis sal voorgehou word ter illustrasie van hoe die Kerk met hierdie spanning Published: 02 Oct. -
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning 1. Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Reasons Empiricism may be defined as the view there is no a priori justification for any synthetic claim. Critics object that empiricism cannot account for all the kinds of knowledge we seem to possess, such as moral knowledge, metaphysical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, and modal knowledge.1 In some cases, empiricists try to account for these types of knowledge; in other cases, they shrug off the objections, happily concluding, for example, that there is no moral knowledge, or that there is no metaphysical knowledge.2 But empiricism cannot shrug off just any type of knowledge; to be minimally plausible, empiricism must, for example, at least be able to account for paradigm instances of empirical knowledge, including especially scientific knowledge. Empirical knowledge can be divided into three categories: (a) knowledge by direct observation; (b) knowledge that is deductively inferred from observations; and (c) knowledge that is non-deductively inferred from observations, including knowledge arrived at by induction and inference to the best explanation. Category (c) includes all scientific knowledge. This category is of particular import to empiricists, many of whom take scientific knowledge as a sort of paradigm for knowledge in general; indeed, this forms a central source of motivation for empiricism.3 Thus, if there is any kind of knowledge that empiricists need to be able to account for, it is knowledge of type (c). I use the term “empirical reasoning” to refer to the reasoning involved in acquiring this type of knowledge – that is, to any instance of reasoning in which (i) the premises are justified directly by observation, (ii) the reasoning is non- deductive, and (iii) the reasoning provides adequate justification for the conclusion. -
Kant's Schematized Categories and the Possibility of Metaphysics
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by PhilPapers Metaphysics Renewed: Kant’s Schematized Categories and the Possibility of Metaphysics Paul Symington ABSTRACT: This article considers the significance of Kant’s schematized categories in the Critique of Pure Reason for contemporary metaphysics. I present Kant’s understanding of the schematism and how it functions within his critique of the limits of pure reason. Then I argue that, although the true role of the schemata is a relatively late development in Kant’s thought, it is nevertheless a core notion, and the central task of the first Critique can be suf- ficiently articulated in the language of the schematism. A surprising result of Kant’s doctrine of the schematism is that a limited form of metaphysics is possible even within the parameters set out in the first Critique. To show this, I offer contrasting examples of legitimate and illegitimate forays into metaphysics in light of the condition of the schematized categories. LTHOUGH SCHOLARSHIP ON KANT has traditionally focused on Kant’s ATranscendental Deduction of the a priori categories, the significance and de- velopment of his schematized categories is attracting more recent attention.1 Despite interpretive difficulties concerning the schemata and its place in the overall project of the Critique of Pure Reason (henceforth, CPR), it is becoming clear that Kant’s schematized categories offer a key insight into the task of the Transcendental Doc- trine of Elements and nicely connect these purposes with John Locke’s emphasis on experience-grounded knowledge.2 I want to echo the judgment that this curious and somewhat interpolated doctrine is valuable for grasping Kant’s attempt at carving out a niche between doggedly empirical and rational considerations. -
EDUA 7200 A01 — PHILOSOPHY of EDUCATION Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba Department of Educational Administration, Foundations, and Psychology
EDUA 7200 A01 — PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba Department of Educational Administration, Foundations, and Psychology PROFESSOR: Dr. David G. Creamer, S.J. Office: Room 124, St. Paul’s College Phone: 474-9141 Fax: 474-7613 E-Mail: [email protected] I am normally available before class on Thursday. Full office hours are posted on my door. Feel free to just drop by or arrange for an appointment. If I am not in the office, Gladys Broesky (474- 9165) — Jesuit Centre (room 118) — will be happy to set something up. (Gladys is here Tuesday, Wednesday, & Thursday — 8:30 am-4:30 pm.) COURSE TIME & LOCATION: Fall Session: Thursday evenings: 5:30–8:30 pm (R5) — St. Paul’s College, Room 123 (by Library, lowest level). COURSE OBJECTIVE: To introduce students to major movements, thinkers, issues and debates in Philosophy (Foundations) of Education. The focus question for this course is “What are the nature and aims of education?” The question will be addressed from a variety of and the thinkers I have selected for study represent both the diversity and unifying themes of the field. Readings will be drawn from Plato, Aristotle, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, Ignatius Loyola, John Amos Comenius, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Bernard Lonergan. TEXTBOOKS 1. Because of the variety of readings on the philosophy of education drawn from ancient and modern sources, no single textbook is appropriate for the course. A bound compilation of the readings from Plato, aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Ignatius Loyola, Comenius, Locke, Rousseau, and Wollstonecraft is available from the Jesuit Centre ($20.00). -
Immanuel Kant Was Born in 1724, and Published “Religion Within The
CHAPTER FIVE THE PHENOMENOLOGY AND ‘FORMATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS’ It is this self-construing method alone which enables philosophy to be an objective, demonstrated science. (Hegel 1812) Immanuel Kant was born in 1724, and published “Religion within the limits of Reason” at the age of 70, at about the same time as the young Hegel was writing his speculations on building a folk religion at the seminary in Tübingen and Robespierre was engaged in his ultimately fatal practical experiment in a religion of Reason. Kant was a huge figure. Hegel and all his young philosopher friends were Kantians. But Kant’s system posed as many problems as it solved; to be a Kantian at that time was to be a participant in the project which Kant had initiated, the development of a philosophical system to fulfill the aims of the Enlightenment; and that generally meant critique of Kant. We need to look at just a couple of aspects of Kant’s philosophy which will help us understand Hegel’s approach. “I freely admit,” said Kant , “it was David Hume ’s remark [that Reason could not prove necessity or causality in Nature] that first, many years ago, interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely differ- ent direction to my enquiries in the field of speculative philosophy” (Kant 1997). Hume’s “Treatise on Human Nature” had been published while Kant was still very young, continuing a line of empiricists and their rationalist critics, whose concern was how knowledge and ideas originate from sensation. Hume was a skeptic; he demonstrated that causality could not be deduced from experience. -
Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories
Kenneth R. Westphal Kenneth Kenneth R. Westphal mmanuel Kant’s ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Categories’ addresses issues centrally debated today in philosophy and in cognitive sciences, especiallyI in epistemology, and in theory of perception. Kant’s insights into these issues are clouded by pervasive misunderstandings of Kant’s Kant’s ‘Deduction’ and its actual aims, scope, and argument. The present edition with its fresh and accurate translation and concise commentary aims to Kant serve these contemporary debates as well as continuing intensive and ’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories the of Deduction Transcendental ’s Transcendental extensive scholarship on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Two surprising results are that ‘Transcendental Deduction’ is valid and sound, and it holds independently of Kant’s transcendental idealism. This lucid volume is interesting and useful to students, yet sufficiently detailed to be Deduction of the informative to specialists. Kenneth R. Westphal is Professor of Philosophy at Boğaziçi University, İstanbul. His research focuses on the character and scope of rational Categories justification in non-formal, substantive domains, both moral and theoretical. His books include several volumes on Kant. Critical Re-Examination, Elucidation and Corroboration Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Critical Re-Examination, Elucidation and Corroboration Kant’s Revised Second (B) Edition (1787), German Text with New Parallel Translation, for Students, Cognitive Scientists, Philosophers & Specialists. Kenneth R. WESTPHAL Department of Philosophy Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, İstanbul Kant’s Transcendental Deduction Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories of the Categories Critical Re-Examination, Elucidation Critical Re-Examination, Elucidation and Corroboration and Corroboration Kant’s Revised Second (B) Edition (1787), German Text with New Parallel Kant’s Revised Second (B) Edition (1787), German Text with New Parallel Translation, for Students, Cognitive Scientists, Philosophers & Specialists. -
Philosophy of Science and Educational Research: Strategies for Scientific Effectiveness and Improvement of the Education
Philosophy of Science and Educational Research: Strategies for Scientific Effectiveness and Improvement of the Education Omar a. Poncea, José Gómez Galánb and Nellie Pagán-Maldonadoc a Professor (Metropolitan University, AGMUS, Puerto Rico-United States). [email protected] b Research Professor and Director of CICIDE (Metropolitan University, AGMUS, Puerto Rico-United States & Catholic University of Avila, Spain). [email protected] & [email protected] c Professor (Metropolitan University, AGMUS, Puerto Rico-United States). [email protected] Abstract This article is a theoretical study on the effectiveness of educational research in the context of philosophy of science. This topic of discussion, in the area of educational research, has been the subject of intellectual debate and arises again at the beginning of the 21st century. This article outlines the challenges and opportunities for scientific effectiveness facing educational research if it aspires to contribute to the ideal of an education of excellence and quality. Nine strategies to improve scientific effectiveness in educational research are identified and discussed. As a conclusion, it is argued that the foundations of contemporary educational research need to be revisited and reformulated, parallel to the new concepts present in the philosophy of science, to face the new problems present in our society*. Keywords: Educational Research; Philosophy of Science; Scientific Knowledge; Scientific Effectiveness; Education. 1. Introduction Philosophical thinking centered on science has been an object of intense debate for centuries. Thus, when we speak today of philosophy of science, we refer fundamentally to any reflection produced around the scientific methodology and its results. It faces, from the point of view of reason, the nature of science and the philosophical problems generated around it, with a direct implication in its results and applications.