Stability: International Journal of Security & Development ISSN: 2165-2627 From to Bureau- cracy: Free Movement, and the New Face of Conflict Mohammad Hasan Ansori

Published: 1 November 2012 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ah

How to cite: Ansori, M H 2012 From Insurgency to Bureaucracy: , Aceh Party and the New Face of Conflict.Stability, 1(1): 31-44. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ah.

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Stability is published by Ubiquity Press and fully open access OPEN ACCESS Ansori, M H 2012 From Insurgency to Bureaucracy: Free Aceh Move- STABILITY ment, Aceh Party and the New Face of Conflict.Stability, 1(1): 31-44. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ah.

article From Insurgency to Bureaucracy: Free Aceh Movement, Aceh Party and the New Face of Conflict Mohammad Hasan Ansori*

The settling of the 32-year Aceh conflict not only transformed former members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) into administrators, constructing a new circle of elites, but also created opportunities and new spaces for economic and socio- political competition and contestation. Hence, this transformation sowed the seeds of an emerging conflict in Aceh. This study investigates the emerging conflict pat- terns along with their causes and the actors involved. Three patterns of conflict have emerged during the post- Peace Agreement period: (i) a conflict among the former GAM elites, (ii) a conflict between the former GAM elites and the for- mer GAM rank-and-file combatants, and (iii) a conflict between the ethnic Acehnese majority and the diverse ethnic minority groups. While the first and second conflicts are primarily induced by individual self-interest, the third is specifically triggered by social and political discrimination as well as by under-development.

Introduction in a large number of casualties, the dete- The story of Aceh is that of a human trag- rioration of infrastructure and psychological edy which unfolded over successive phases. harm. However, after a series of failed peace The Acehnese first fought against the Dutch efforts, the Government of and colonialists (1873–1903) and then against the GAM made a historic and dignified step the central government after Indonesian by signing a peace agreement on 15 August independence. The battle against the Indo- 2005 in Helsinki, ending the violent conflict nesian state involved the rebel- after more than three decades. lion (1953–1962) as well as the Free Aceh The biggest challenge for the GAM in the Movement (1976–2005), which is commonly post-Helsinki period involved transforming referred to as the GAM.1 The conflict resulted itself from a rebel movement into a .2 Given that the Helsinki Peace Agree- ment required the GAM to disband itself, * Director of the Center for Strategic former GAM rebels turned their separatist Transformation in Indonesia; organization into a democratic and peace- Assistant Professor, Islamic State University ful one3 called the Aceh Party (Partai Aceh), of Jakarta, Ir. H. Djuanda Street, Ciputat, Banten, Indonesia which was later re-named the GAM Party [email protected] (Partai Gerakan Aceh ) and, finally, 32 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

the Independent Aceh Movement Party (Par- process of establishing a sustainable peace tai Gerakan Aceh Mandiri).4 The party, which in the region. In this regards, this study ad- was founded in June 2007 in , dresses the following questions: What are the the provincial capital, is largely administered general patterns of conflict appearing in the by the former leaders of the independence post-Helsinki period? What is the root cause movement. For instance, Muzakkir Manaf, of each pattern of the conflict? And who are the former supreme commander of the Aceh the actors involved in each conflict pattern? National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasioanl In responding to these questions, I first il- Aceh/TNA), the GAM’s military wing, was lustrate the historical dynamic of the GAM, elected as the chairman of the party after providing the background to the protracted serving as the province’s deputy governor. Aceh conflict. Then, I examine how the Gov- Allowing GAM members to compete for ernment of Indonesia and GAM success- political power in the province – fully in- fully reached a historic deal by signing the dependent of existing Indonesian political Helsinki Peace Agreement. Finally, I explore parties – was one of the vital parts of the the emerging patterns of conflict which peace deal. Hence, combatants re-invented emerged as former GAM rebels transformed themselves as politicians, administrators, themselves into bureaucrats. The data pre- businessmen and contractors.5 This transfor- sented here is primarily drawn from several mation was facilitated by the victories of key open-ended interviews with former GAM candidates affiliated with Aceh Party, Irwandi members, Acehnese scholars and ethnic and Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar, in the succes- religious leaders. sive 2006 and 2009 provincial election; oth- er candidates nominated by the Party were Free Aceh Movement: The Emer- selected as the mayors of Acehnese regen- gence, Leadership, and Revival cies, including Aceh Jaya, Sabang, Pidie, Pidie The GAM came into being in December Jaya, Bireun, North Aceh, , East 1976, following the issuance of its “Decla- Aceh, West Aceh, and South Aceh.6 In addi- ration of Independence of Aceh-”. tion, the Party collected 33 seats (48%) out of The movement also became internationally the 69 available seats in the Aceh Parliament known as the ASNLF (Aceh Sumatra National (DPR Aceh).7 Liberation Front) or NLFAS (National Lib- Although peace has been attained and eration Front of Acheh-Sumatra). The GAM the have now returned to began when the movement’s “founding fa- a more normal life since the 2005 Helsinki ther”, Teungku Hasan di Tiro, declared Aceh’s Peace Agreement, levels of violence remain independence. Like other Acehnese people, high.8 Reaching the peace agreement did not Tiro was also a supporter of the Indonesian automatically cement the peace and elimi- nation and dreamed of an Indonesian fed- nate potential for further conflict. The tran- eration.9 Tiro moved to New York, where he sitional period in Aceh has produced a new worked part time at the Indonesian mission social arena for competition and created par- to the United Nations. However, he left his ticular patterns of conflict. post to support the in While a number of studies have been con- Aceh in 1953.10 He later served as an overseas ducted concerning the post-Helsinki peace- representative of the Islam-based rebellion.11 building process (e.g. Aguswandi 2008; Tiro’s active engagement in the Darul Islam Askandar 2007; Aspinall 2008, 2009; Barron rebellion had made him “become openly 2008; Feith 2007; Iyer & Mitchel 2007), less critical of Indonesia” and Indonesian forces, attention has been paid to the emerging con- which he later accused of genocide.12 flicts in the province. This article dissects those In addition to Tiro, the GAM’s leadership conflicts, which could seriously threaten the comprised relatively privileged elites, includ- Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 33 ing Mukhtar J. Hasbi, Husaini M. Hasan, and rhetoric, methods, and strategy.21 GAM then . The initial leadership of the experienced the first major revival by resur- movement mainly consisted of young profes- facing in 1989. sionals and intellectuals, such as doctors, en- The movement re-emerged with a greater gineers, politicians, and businessmen. Many number of better and more organized sol- of its followers had fought in the Darul Islam diers due to their military and ideological Rebellion (1953–1962).13 At the outset, the training in , which started in 1986.22 movement was weak and small, probably in- Upon their return to Aceh, the trained volving no more than 200 active members fighters vigorously renewed their activities, moving around in the mountains of Aceh.14 trained local volunteers, and purchased bet- The declaration of Acehnese independence ter military equipment, reportedly with Lib- in 1976 probably involved only 24 leaders.15 yan assistance.23 With weapons purchased During this period, the GAM’s activities were from Indonesian soldiers or, later on, taken primarily concerned with producing and dis- off of captured troops, the “Libyan gradu- tributing pamphlets which outlined their ates” started a military campaign by attack- aims and ideals.16 Since its establishment, a ing isolated police and military posts, camps, large number of Acehnese people had been and installations. The attacks were often con- members of the Diaspora, or were refugees, ducted to capture weapons from the Indo- abroad and contributed to the GAM. For in- nesian troops and to signal the movement’s stance, in 2001, the Acehnese Diaspora was resurgence.24 estimated to consist of between 2,000 and To counter this new threat, the Govern- 3,000 people in and another 8,000 ment of Indonesia quickly responded by de- permanently residing in , Australia, claring Aceh as Daerah Operasi Militer (a Mil- Europe, and North America.17 itary Operations Area, or DOM) in 1989. The The quickly re- declaration of Aceh as a DOM by the govern- sponded to Aceh’s declaration of independ- ment was a response to the sudden increase ence with the mass arrest and killing of GAM in GAM’s strength, and the classification was members.18 At this stage, since the GAM pos- intended to counter its renewed capacity and sessed few weapons and members, it was propensity for violence. It was claimed that very easy for the strong and well-equipped by the end of 1991, or somewhat later, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) to Indonesian troops had successfully crushed suppress the movement quickly.19 As a result, the rebellion and killed or captured most of by 1981, ten of the original 24 signatories to its top leaders and commanders.25 As of late the declaration of independence had been 1996, the Government of Indonesia official- killed by the TNI in an attempt to crush and ly announced that the counter-insurgency wipe out the movement before its ideals and operations had effectively destroyed GAM ideology could take hold. The 1976 crack- (Global Security 2006). The declaration of the down by the Indonesian military made GAM DOM in Aceh reportedly generated casual- members go underground or move abroad ties. The DOM status was accompanied by in- (Kingsbury & Fernandes 2008, p. 96). The terrogations, intimidation, arrests, and indis- movement seemed to have been crushed by criminate or mysterious civilians killings.26 1982, with most of its leaders either killed, in Despite such setbacks, the movement en- exile, or in prison.20 joyed its second revival in 1999 with a drastic While living in exile, Tiro and other GAM increase in membership and an expansion leaders consolidated and solidified the move- of its territorial base.27 The ending of Aceh’s ment by sending their members to Libya for DOM status in 1998 – largely due to the Asian military training, lobbying the international monetary crisis of 1997 – was accompanied community, and developing their ideological by the substantial withdrawal of Kopassus 34 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

(the Indonesian Special Armed Forces). The Mediation proved to be effective in peace- authoritarian regime in Indone- fully resolving the protracted Aceh conflict. sia collapsed in 1998, thus bringing about a The historic peace talks, which took place period of transition. Indonesia’s transitional in Helsinki between 28 January and 12 July period, which was marked by a relatively 2005, were mediated by the Crisis Manage- open political atmosphere, brought huge op- ment Institute. In particular, Marti Ahtisaari, portunities and enabled GAM members to the former Finnish prime minister and the express their discontents and unhappiness director of the institute, was appointed as with Jakarta, strengthen their demands for the principle mediator of the peace negotia- independence, and consolidate their activi- tion.34 Ahtisaari was convinced that the Aceh ties and strategies.28 However, it is important conflict should be treated as an asymmetric to underline that the GAM’s 1999 second re- conflict.35 Ahtisaari believed that the Gov- vival was also possible given the failure of the ernment of Indonesia would never accept central government to address the underly- the GAM’s demand for independence and ing economic and social grievances in Aceh urged the GAM negotiators to accept “real- by 1998.29 ism”. As a result, rather than discussing the GAM’s demand for independence, Ahtisaari The Dynamics of the Helsinki Peace was immensely engaged in realizing a pack- Agreement age of special autonomy.36 He openly pushed the GAM delegation to accept the package The signing of the Helsinki Peace Agreement and threatened them with the withdrawal of on 15 August 2005, ending the approximate- international support for the movement if ly 32 years of armed conflict in Aceh, was a they did not.37 Ahtisaari’s strong leadership crucial part of the history of the GAM and during the negotiation process played an offered a ray of hope for Acehnese people. important part in the overall success of the Diverse expressions, such as the “courageous peace negotiations. and constructive step”, the “peaceful solu- The issue of independence was not set tion with dignity for all”, and “the best and aside until the negotiation came to the third most effective vehicle to embody the dream round. During the five rounds of the peace of Acehnese”,30 have all been used to describe talks, the establishment of local political par- the peace agreement. ties for Aceh had grabbed most of the par- A number of prominent scholars have ticipants’ focus. The GAM delegation particu- recognized the effect of the Indian Ocean larly believed that the establishment of local tsunami of 26 December 2004 on the suc- political parties in Aceh was crucial since the cessful peace deal in Aceh.31 The natural Indonesian national parties are mostly con- disaster flattened the province, resulting trolled from Jakarta and thus cannot repre- in huge casualties and widespread destruc- sent their interests.38 It was strongly held by tion. Aceh was broadly known as the worst the GAM delegation that the establishment hit area by the earthquake-triggered tsu- of local political parties would not only sym- nami. It is reported that between 150,000 bolize their identity but would also safeguard and 200,000 Acehnese people died or went their dignity.39 missing, while the survivors were left in Relative to the previous failed peace ef- desperate need of food, shelter, and basic forts, the Helsinki Peace Agreement is often medical facilities.32 The natural disaster also seen as more comprehensive and reflective. It helped give rise to the 2005 Helsinki Peace offered a more comprehensive political solu- Agreement. The magnitude of suffering felt tion to the conflict rather than just focusing by the Acehnese people helped GAM and on the cessation of violence on the ground. the Indonesian government to agree to re- For instance, the disarmament, demobiliza- turn the negotiating table.33 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 35 tion, and reintegration of the ex-combatants GAM elites’ self-interests became more and emerged as an important element which was more manifest in the post-conflict environ- eventually captured in a Memorandum of ment. They greatly benefited from their po- Understanding (MoU). In addition, it estab- sitions in the movement’s hierarchical struc- lished complete special autonomy for Aceh ture.42 Through the Aceh Party, the elites within the Republic of Indonesia and allowed captured the top positions in Aceh province GAM’s transformation into a political party.40 and became active in various business sec- tors backed by their freshly acquired political Aceh Party and the Emerging New positions and connections. Pattern of Conflict This conflict emerged as the GAM sought to divide the spoils of war. For instance, Nur The Helsinki Peace Agreement had a tremen- Djuli, the senior GAM negotiator at the Hel- dous effect on the lives of the former GAM sinki peace talks, is currently chair of rebels. Through the new political Aceh Party, Badan (the Aceh Re-integration a number of the former rebels have occupied Reintegrasi Aceh Agency) and therefore receives a high in- various prestigious and strategic political and come and other special privileges provided social positions and won many lucrative con- by the Agency. Nurdin Abdur Rahman, an- tracts during the post-conflict reconstruction other GAM negotiator and the former GAM process in the province. The new emerging leader in Malaysia and Australia, is currently circle of power and the social structure in the acting as the director of Aceh World Trade province have given rise to internal antago- Center (AWTC). Muzakkir Manaf, the former nism and social conflict. In particular, the supreme commander of TNA (the armed establishment of Aceh Party by the former wing of GAM), became CEO of , a rebels is specifically viewed as also having Pulo Gadeng major contracting company. Sofyan Dawood, produced conflict among former GAM mem- the former TNA commander in North Aceh bers. In short, conflict in post-Helsinki Aceh and GAM’s spokesperson, has won several follows three common patterns. The first high-value contracts.43 This overt and self-in- pattern is related to the economic competi- terested competition has generated conflict tion and political contestation among the among the former elites. Mundhir, a former former GAM elites. The second one involves GAM elite, who became an important admin- antagonism and anger between former GAM istrator in Aceh, observed how the embed- combatants and elites. The third pattern in- ded self-interests generate conflict among volves ethnic hostility between the dominant the GAM elites: Acehnese , who were prominent supporter of the GAM, and the diverse non- “I could not deny that many also Acehnese ethnic groups, who were generally fought for their self-interests, which opponents of GAM. The following sections might take diverse forms, positions, delve further into the three conflict patterns properties, favorable economic activi- along with the causes of each. ties, etc. Many might also wish that they could become Pegawai Negeri Among the former GAM elites Sipil/PNS (the governmental civil The first conflict – struggle and rivalry servants), Camat (sub-district head), among the former GAM elites – originates in Bupati (district mayor), or Dewan the personal interests of the former top GAM Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh/DPRA (Aceh officials. The competition among the elites Provincial Parliament) and many oth- over political positions, privileges, facilities, ers. Whatever goals and intentions business activities, and contracts with major they had in their minds did not have state-owned enterprises41 have been a major to be a problem for GAM as long as source of factionalism and antagonism. The they struggled and made significant 36 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

sacrifices for GAM and finally brought younger members refused to support them about the victory for the movement. given that they had entered into a coalition The split and conflict among a few with a national political party, the United GAM elites after the peace agreement Development Party. Two other former GAM was probably just the ripple effect of elites took advantage of the division to an- the self-interest competitions among nounce their intent to contest the top posi- them. However, a large number of us tion. Ultimately Hamid and Abdullah were were ignorant about our self-inter- selected as the governor and the deputy gov- ests; and thereby were not really in- ernor of Aceh (2007–2012). While they have volved in the split.”44 been supported, even among younger and grassroots members, the incident showed Figure 1 summarizes some of the former the extent of competition among the former GAM elites’ currently collected rewards/ben- GAM elites.45 efits that are often considered to be equiva- The elite conflict does not only take place lent to their positions in the movement’s in the political sphere but also involves eco- past hierarchical structure. nomic competition over high-value tenders In addition, the appointment of the GAM- and contracts linked to the post-conflict re- aligned candidate running for the provincial- construction process. The competition for level executive election has caused a further the projects generates antagonism and even rift between the generations of GAM elites. hostility among the former GAM elites. As Ahmad Humam Hamid, a prominent lo- Sulaiman, one of the former GAM members cal academic affiliated with the national who used to get involved in competitions for (Indonesia-wide) lucrative post-conflict reconstruction pro- (Partai Persatuan Pembangnan), ran for the jects, stated: provincial executive position with Hasbi Ab- dullah, a fellow academic and former politi- “For example, there were five people cal prisoner. The men’s candidacy was widely backed by the GAM elites competing supported by the old GAM generation. How- for a project tender. The winner of ever, the GAM’s military commanders and the project tender was often opposed

Position in GAM Post-Helsinki Position GAM spokesperson The governor of Aceh (2007–2012) The GAM Minister of State and the GAM peace The governor of Aceh (2012–2017) talks delegation leader Civil/Ideological Trainer Deputy Governor of Aceh (2007–2012) Supreme Commander of TNA (Aceh National CEO of Pulo Gadeng Holding Company; re- Armed Forces) cently elected to be Deputy Governor of Aceh (2012–2017) GAM spokesperson Recipients of valuable contracts for post-con- flict reconstruction projects GAM negotiator Chair of Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (The Aceh Re- integration Agency) GAM negotiator Director of Aceh World Trade Centre GAM negotiator Prominent private sector figure Fig. 1: Translation of GAM Authority into Post-Helsinki Privilege Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 37

by the 4 losers. As a result, their GAM- Between the former GAM rank-and-file based friendship was further turned combatants and the former GAM elites to be an antagonism and resentment The next conflict pattern involves the emer- between the losing and the winning gence of resentment among former GAM GAM members. It was always the way combatants of the movement’s elites. The the project tender worked on the conflict is generally produced by the inequi- ground. Those who won the projects table distribution of the rewards between the often possessed close political or per- elites and the rank-and-file combatants in the sonal networking and connections post-Helsinki period. Former elites appear with specific GAM elites, such as Ga- ignorant of or unconcerned with the living jah Keng people or other command- condition of former rank-and-file combatants, ers, although their project proposals most of whom are unemployed and living in were not qualified enough. A Darus- poverty. The political economy of the post- salam person joining a project tender conflict period in Aceh has yielded rewards for in Sigli was supposed to be backed GAM elites but not for the former rank-and- by the GAM elites based in Sigli. file combatants. This gap in benefits has led to Otherwise, he/she would lose in bid- a newly emerging conflict rooted in inequal- ding for the project. Once somebody ity. As Masnan, a former combatant based in won a project, he/she was supposed East Aceh , stated: to share the revenues of the project with the GAM elites who previously “My former commander had some backed the project. It seemed to be a construction projects. Sadly, he never common rule for every project com- shared with me and other members. petition in Aceh. It was almost impos- He had already forgotten his mem- sible to win a project in Aceh without bers once he had the project. We all having the GAM elite’s support and together fought the TNI (the Indone- backing.”46 sian National Armed Forces) and lived in the same camp during our guerilla The entry of a large number of GAM mem- war. During the conflict, we all often bers into bureaucracy, following the incred- shared only one peace of cigarette ible winning of Aceh Party in the provin- and also shared the foods since we cial election, has created a new circle of had no more in the jungle. He en- power and lucrative patronage networks in joyed himself all the money, owned Aceh,47 thereby deconstructing the existing many exclusive homes and rode a lux- constellation of political power in the prov- urious car. He did not care about his ince. The newly crafted circle of power then members any longer. I think most of steers economic opportunities to former the commanders did the same thing. GAM elites. Moreover, the project bidding They did not care about the former system in Aceh, which reflects the local cul- GAM rank-and-file members. I was ture of nepotism and corruption (that long very sad and frustrated. If only the predated the Helsinki Peace Agreement), conflict happens again, the rank-and- has produced a new sort of horizontal con- file members would not be willing to flict and antagonism among former GAM go to war again since they had been elites. That is, the transition from war to very disappointed.”48 peace provided new economic and political resources for the Acehnese people and, in Some former GAM rank-and-file members, the process, generated a new structure of especially those who still illegally kept their conflict. weapons, engage in criminal acts such as kidnapping, intimidation of foreign workers, 38 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

and thievery. The criminal acts are primarily tried to normally mingle with the intended either to attract the elites’ atten- Acehnese people, we felt that we tions or to taint the elites’ public images and were not Acehnese because of their reputations.49 During the conflict with the discriminations. Other Alas peo- Indonesian government, solidarity among ple also felt the same thing when GAM members was maintained through they were in Banda Aceh, the capi- mutual support. However, once the conflict tal. When I was a child, I was often ended, the solidarity among the elites and told by my parents that we were not ordinary combatants broke down. Acehnese. If there were Acehnese people here, they would be isolated. Between the ethnic Acehnese majority The similar situation applied in Pidie. and the various ethnic minority groups Some of the Alas people were isolat- The last emerging conflict pattern in the ed there. We were always frustrated post-Helsinki period involves ethnic an- if we had some administrative duties tagonism and hostility between the ethnic to do in Banda Aceh. We were just ig- Acehnese, who were the major supporters nored and inappropriately welcome of the GAM, and the various ethnic minority if we could not speak Acehnese. The groups, including Gayo, Alas, Tamiang, An- officers there would not serve us if euk Jamee, Kluet, Singkil and Simeulue eth- we used Indonesian Bahasa. My Alas nic groups, who generally opposed the GAM friends often asked my help if they in the past. This conflict predates the sign- had some affairs to manage in Ban- ing of the peace agreement. Ethnic Acehnese da Aceh as I could speak a little bit make up about 80 % of the total population Acehnese.”51 of Aceh and are concentrated in the regen- The ethnic tensions have been transmitted cies located in the north coastal areas of the across generations in the province. They province. have also manifested themselves in politics. Ethnic stratification in Aceh, which also As Nurdin, one of the Gayonese ethnic lead- occasionally appears on other Indonesia’s is- ers and academics, pointed out: lands, has produced a specific situation that places one ethnic group as more privileged “When the Acehnese were betrayed and prioritized than the others. Ethnic division by Jakarta for the first time in the in Aceh has created some prejudices and, in 1950s, they started behaving discour- most of the cases, resulted in antagonism and teously and meanly towards the non- hostility between the ethnic Acehnese majori- Acehnese ethnic groups. They treated ty and the various ethnic minority groups. The us in the Aceh province like the way minority ethnic groups in Aceh, particularly Jakarta treated them. They obviously Gayo, Singkil, and Alas people, have long been adopted the way Jakarta discriminat- socio-politically marginalized and isolated by ed them for marginalizing us. Their the ethnic Acehnese majority,50 a fact which discriminatory measures and policies led them to oppose the GAM. Najmuddin, one especially included the restriction of the prominent leaders of Alas ethnic group, and/or the reduction of the budgets shared his experience: of the local governments of the vari- ous ethnic minority groups’ regen- “The Acehnese people often treated cies. They also often assigned the us like we were not part of Aceh ethnic Acehnese people as the district province. They often looked down heads or mayors of the [minorities’] and disvalued the ethnic minority regencies. The method was very much groups by using various methods. similar to the way Jakarta appointed When we were in Banda Aceh and Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 39

the as mayors in only the distribution of the economic and po- most of the Aceh’s regencies.”52 litical rewards among the GAM members but also gives rise to new patterns of conflict in Unfortunately, the issue of ethnic discrimi- the post-Helsinki period. Clearly, reaching a nation in Aceh is poorly covered either by peace deal does not automatically eliminate 53 the mass media or scholarly research. The all forms of conflict; rather, it brings “the old media’s coverage of the Aceh conflict con- conflict” to an end and marks the starting cealed the issue and used the word Acehnese point of new conflict patterns. Such conflicts to refer to residents of Aceh without differ- are potentially detrimental and costly and, in 54 entiating among the various ethnic groups. the long run, may undermine the process of Studies of Aceh tend to view Acehnese as a seeking a sustainable peace in the region if singular group of people living in the Aceh not managed well by the province’s leaders 55 province, thereby failing to portray the through existing democratic institutions. S ethno-political structure of conflict in the post-Helsinki period. NOTES Socio-political marginalization has frus- trated ethnic minority groups and, as a 1 A body of works have largely discussed the consequence, led them to demand for the nature, trajectory and the root cause of the establishment of administrative sub-units.56 conflicts, including Edward Aspinall, Islam The idea of Aceh Leuser Antara Province (ab- and nation: separatist rebellion in Aceh, breviated as ALA) is primarily designed to in- Indonesia, (Stanford: Stanford University clude Central Aceh, Bener Meriah, Gayo Lues, Press); and the historical and political back- Southeast Aceh, and Aceh ground to the Aceh conflict. In Askandar, K. Singkil Regencies, where the ethnic minori- & Chee, A.M. (eds.), Building peace in Aceh: ties of Gayo, Alas, and Singkil are concentrat- problems, strategies, and lessons from Sri ed. Moreover, the proposed Aceh Barat Sela- Lanka, and Northern Ireland, Proceedings tan Province (abbreviated as ABAS) includes of the International Symposium, (Bang- Aceh Jaya, West Aceh, Nagan Raya, South- kok: Mahidol University, 2004), p. 31–42.; west Aceh, Simeulue, and South Aceh Regen- Kamarulzaman Askandar, The Aceh con- cies, which are home to other ethnic minori- flict: phases of conflict and hopes for peace. ties. The increasingly emerging demand for In Tan, A.T.H. (ed.), A handbook of terrorism the regional partitions in Aceh is not a trivial and insurgency in Southeast Asia, (Massa- issue; it is indeed a serious challenge for the chusetts: Edward Eigal Publishing Limited, process of seeking a sustainable peace in the 2007), p. 249–265; Kirsten E. Schulze, The region.57 Demands for such provisions reveal Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a horizontal ethnic hostility – and the poten- Separatist Organization, in Policy Studies tial for conflict – between the majority and 2, (Washington: East West Center, 2004); the minority ethnic groups. Michael L. Ross, Resources and rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia, In Collier, P. & Sambanis, Conclusion N. (eds.). Understanding civil war: evidence and analysis, (Washington: The World Bank, Resolving the Aceh conflict resulted in the 2005), p. 35–58; Michelle Ann Miller, Re- emergence of new social and political op- bellion and reform in Indonesia: Jakarta’s se- portunities and competition over them. The curity and autonomy policies in Aceh, (New transformation of the GAM elites into an ad- York: Routledge, 2009); C. van Dijk, Rebel- ministrative, political, and private-sector elite lion under the banner of Islam: The Darul Is- has created a new circle of power in Aceh, lam Indonesia, (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut which situates the former GAM leaders at its Voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenhunde, 1981) center. This new circle of power enables not and many others. 40 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

2 Kamarulzaman Askandar, The Aceh con- 16 Jhon Martinkus, ibid., p. 44; Tim Kell, flict: phases of conflict and hopes for ibid., p. 66. peace. In Tan, A.T.H. (ed.). A handbook of 17 Michael L. Ross, Resources and rebellion terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia in Aceh, Indonesia, In Collier, P. & Sam- (Massachusetts: Edward Eigal Publising banis, N. (eds.). Understanding civil war: Limited, 2007), p. 257. evidence and analysis, (Washington: the 3 See Edward Aspinall, Pemilihan umum: kon- World Bank, 2005), p. 39. solidasi perdamaian. In Aguswandi & Large, 18 Damien Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandez, J. (eds.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses Indonesia: Aceh. In Fernandes, C. (ed.). damai Aceh (London: Conciliation Resources Hot Spot: Asia and Oceania. (Connecticut: Publication, issue 20, 2008), pp. 50–54. Green Wood Press, 2008), p. 91; Geoffrey 4 Berita Sore, May 22, 2008. Robinson, Rawan is as Rawan does: the 5 See Edward Aspinall, Combatants to con- origins of disorder in New Order Aceh, In tractors: the political economy of peace in Anderson, B.R. (ed.). Violence and state in Aceh. In Journal of Indonesia. (Cornell ’s Indonesia, (New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Vol. 87, April University Press, 2001), p. 216. 2009), pp. 1–34. 19 Edward Aspinall, The historical and po- 6 Aspinall, ibid., p. 9. litical background to the Aceh conflict. 7 Media Indonesia, May 4, 2009. In Askandar, K. & Chee, A.M. (eds.). Build- 8 See, for instance, International Crisis ing peace in Aceh: problems, strategies, Group, Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications, and lessons from Sri Lanka, and Northern (Asia Report, Number 139, October 4, Ireland. Proceedings of the International 2007); Patrick Barron, Getting reintegration Symposium. (Bangkok: Mahidol Univer- back on track: problems in Aceh and priori- sity, Chulalangkorn University, Tamma- ties for moving forward, a paper prepared sat University, etc), p. 35; Pushpa Iyer & for the conference “The Peace Process in Christopher Mitchell, The collapse of Aceh: the Reminders of Violence and the peace zones in Aceh. In Hancock, L.E. & Future of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam”, Mitchell, C. (eds.). Zones of peace. (West (Harvard University, October 24–24, 2007); Hartford: Kumarian Press, 2007), p. 139; International Crisis Group, Aceh: So Far So Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid. p. 251. Good, Asia Briefing, Number 44, December 20 Robinson, ibid., p. 216. 13, 2005); World Bank/DSF (Decentraliza- 21 Jhon Martinkus, ibid., p. 59; Damien tion Support Facility), Aceh Conflict Moni- Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandes, ibid., p. toring Update, (September 1–30, 2007). 96; Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid., 2007, p. 197. 9 Jhon Martinkus, Indonesia’s secret war in 22 See Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid., 2004, p. 4; Aceh, (Sydney: Random House Australia, Damien Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandes, 2004), p. 55. ibid., p. 96; Kamarulzaman Askandar, 10 Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid. 2007, p. 154; Jhon ibid., p. 251; Michael L. Ross, ibid., p. 43; Martinkus, ibid. p. 156. Jhon Martinkus, ibid., p. 62; Geoffrey 11 Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid., p. 250. Robinson, ibid., p. 217. 12 Jhon Martinkus, ibid., p. 56. 23 Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid., 2007, p. 201. 13 Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid. 2004, pp. 10–11; 24 See Jhon Martinkus, ibid., p. 62; ibid., 2007, p. 194; Edward Aspinall, ibid. Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid., p. 251; 2009, p. 61. Michael L. Ross, ibid., pp. 42–43; Kirsten 14 Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid. p. 250. E. Schulze, ibid., 2007, p. 201. 15 Tim Kell, The roots of Acehnese rebellion 25 Geoffrey Robinson, ibid., p. 217; Dam- 1989–1992. (New York: Cornell Modern ien Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandes, Indonesia Project, 1995), p. 65. ibid., p. 97. Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 41

26 Michelle Ann Miller, Konfilik di Aceh: policies in Aceh. (New York: Routledge, konteks, pemicu, katalis. In Aguswandi 2009), p. 2; Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid., 2007, & Large, J. Accord: rekonfigurasi politik pp. 216–218; Edward Aspinall, ibid., proses damai Aceh. (Issue 20. London: 2009, p. 221, and many others. Conciliation Resources Publication), pp. 32 Rizal Sukma, ibid., p. 5; Kamarulzaman 12–16; Majelis Pertimbangan GAM, Why Askandar, ibid., p. 255; Kirsten E. Schulze, Aceh Wants Independence from Colonial- ibid., 2007, p. 216. ism of the Republic of Indonesia. (A docu- 33 Hamid Awaluddin, ibid., p. 236. ment prepared by the Executive Council 34 Ibid., pp. 1–10. of the Free Aceh Movement, 1999); Dam- 35 Muhammad Nur Djuli & Nurdin Abdur ien Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandes, ibid., Rahman, Perundingan Helsinki: sebuah p. 96. perspektif dari juru runding Gerakan 27 Kirsten E. Schulze, ibid., 2004, p. 16. Aceh Merdeka. In Aguswandi & Large, J. 28 Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid., p. 252; (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses Konrad Huber, Jalan berliku menuju per- damai Aceh. (London: Conciliation Re- damaian Aceh. In Aguswandi & Large, J. sources Publication, 2008), p. 29. (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses 36 Hamid Awaluddin, ibid., p. 83. damai Aceh. (Issue 20. London: Concilia- 37 Ibid., pp. 239–253. tion Resources Publication), p. 17; Damien 38 See Damien Kingsbury, The best choice for Kingsbury & Clinton Fernandes, ibid., p. 97. Aceh and Indonesia. In the Jakarta Post, 29 Geoffrey Robinson, ibid., p. 239. July 13, 2005. 30 See Hamid Awaluddin, Peace in Aceh: 39 Hamid Awaluddin, ibid., p. 199. notes on the peace process between the Re- 40 Rizal Sukma, ibid., p. 3. public of Indonesia and the Aceh Freedom 41 Patrick Barron, Mengelola sumber daya Movement (GAM) in Helsinki. (Jakarta: untuk perdamaian: rekonstruksi dan pen- CSIS, 2009); Crisis Management Initia- ciptaan perdamaian di Aceh. In Aguswan- tive, 2006. di & Large, J. (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi 31 Those scholars include Rizal Sukma, Re- politik proses damai Aceh. (London: Con- olving the Aceh Conflict: the Helsinki Peace ciliation Resources Publication, 2008), Agreement. Retrieved from: http://www. pp. 65–66. hdcenter.org/datastore/Mediators%20 42 See Edward Aspinall, ibid., 2009, p. 11. Retreats/Background%20Paper%20 43 See Edward Aspinall, ibid.; Patrick Barron, 4a%20Aceh.doc, on January 12, 2009; ibid. Judith Large & Aguswandi, Penempaan 44 Confidential interview, Banda Aceh, Octo- identitas, keniscayaan suara politik dan ber 20, 2010. hak asasi manusia. In Aguswandi & Large, 45 See Edward Aspinall, ibid., 2008, pp. J. (eds.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik 50–51; Sidney Jones, Menjaga perdama- proses damai Aceh. (London: Conciliation ian: keamanan di Aceh. In Aguswandi & Resources Publication, Issue 20), pp. 6–7; Large, J. (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik Konrad Huber, Jalan berliku menuju per- proses damai Aceh. (London: Conciliation damaian Aceh. In Aguswandi & Large, J. Resources Publication, 2008), pp. 79–83. (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses 46 Confidential interview, East Aceh, Novem- damai Aceh. (London: Conciliation Re- ber 11, 2009. sources Publication, Issue 20), pp. 16–17; 47 See International Crisis Group, Aceh: post- Kamarulzaman Askandar, ibid., p. 248; conflict complications, (Asia Report, No. Hamid Awaluddin, ibid., p. 31; Michelle 139, October 4, 2007), p. i. Ann Miller, Rebellion and reform in In- 48 Confidential interview, East Aceh, Febru- donesia: Jakarta’s security and autonomy ary 10, 2010. 42 Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy

49 Zulfikar, one of the former GAM rank- damai Aceh (pp. 56–57). Issue 20. London: and-file members, confidential interview, Conciliation Resources Publication. Lhoksumawe, November 14, 2010. Ansori, M H 2011 Between self-interested and 50 See, for example, Stefan Ehrentraut, Di- socio-psychological motivations: the com- viding Aceh? Minorities, Partition Move- plexity and dynamic of ethnic conflict deci- ments and State-Reform in Aceh Province, sion in Indonesia. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Asia Research Institute Working Paper University of Hawaii at Manoa, USA. Series, No. 37, Aceh Working Paper Series, Askandar, K 2007 The Aceh conflict: phases No. 6, May 10. of conflict and hopes for peace. In Tan, A 51 Confidential interview, Southeast Aceh, T H (ed.) A handbook of terrorism and in- November 21, 2009. surgency in Southeast Asia (pp. 249–265). 52 Confidential interview, Central Aceh, De- Massachusetts: Edward Eigal Publishing cember 12, 2009. Limited. 53 Michelle Ann Miller, ibid., 2009, p. 142, Aspinall, E 2009 Islam and nation: separa- also noticed this issue as stating that “one tist rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia. Stanford: under-reported dimension of the con- Stanford University Press. temporary conflict in Aceh has been the Aspinall, E 2009 Combatants to contractors: sometimes strained relationship between the political economy of peace in Aceh. In Aceh’s ethnic minority groups and the Journal of Indonesia, Vol. 87, April 2009, ethnic Acehnese majority”. See also Ste- pp. 1–34. Cornell Southeast Asia Program. fan Ehrentraut, Dividing Aceh? Minorities, Aspinall, E 2004 The historical and politi- Partition Movements and State-Reform cal background to the Aceh conflict. In in Aceh Province, Asia Research Institute Askandar, K and Chee, A M (eds.) Building Working Paper Series, No. 37, Aceh Work- peace in Aceh: problems, strategies, and les- ing Paper Series, No. 6, May 10. sons from Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland 54 Edward Aspinall, Islam and nation: separa- (pp. 31–42). Proceedings of the Interna- tist rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia. (Stanford: tional Symposium. Bangkok: Mahidol Uni- Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 4. versity, Chulalangkorn University, Tamma- 55 Michelle Ann Miller, ibid. sat University, etc. 56 See International Crisis Group Report, Aspinall, E 2008 Pemilihan umum: konsoli- 2005; Michelle Ann Miller, ibid.; Matt dasi perdamaian. In Aguswandi and Large, Davies, Indonesia’s war over Aceh: last J (eds.) Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses stand on Mecca’s porch. (New York: Rout- damai Aceh (pp. 50–54). Issue 20. London: ledge, 2006), p. 52. It is also worth noting Conciliation Resources Publication. that the group often call themselves as Awaluddin, H 2009 Peace in Aceh: notes on Galaksi movement, an acronym of Aceh’s the peace process between the Republic of Gayo, Alas, Kluet and Sinkil indigenous Indonesia and the Aceh Freedom Movement ethnic minorities. (GAM) in Helsinki. Jakarta: CSIS. 57 See Aguswandi, Proses politik di Aceh: se- Azra, A and Salim, A 2003 The state and buah awal baru?. In Aguswandi & Large, shari’a in the perspective of Indonesian J. (ed.). Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses legal politics. In Azra, A and Salim, A (eds.) damai Aceh. (London: Conciliation Re- Shari’a and politics in modern Indonesia. Sin- sources Publication, 2008), pp. 56–57. gapore: Insitute of Southeast Asian Studies. Barron, P 2008 Mengelola sumber daya REFERENCES untuk perdamaian: rekonstruksi dan pen- ciptaan perdamaian di Aceh. In Aguswan- Aguswandi 2008 Proses politik di Aceh: se- di and Large, J (ed.) Accord: rekonfigurasi buah awal baru?. In Aguswandi and Large, politik proses damai Aceh (pp. 62–66). Is- J (eds.) Accord: rekonfigurasi politik proses Ansori / From Insurgency to Bureaucracy 43

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