Social Media Disinformation, and Democracy in Asia: Country Cases
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In 2019, Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) selected social media and disinformation as the common challenge that continue to plague and hinder democracy in Asia. Against this background, ADRN published this special report to evaluate the current state of social media and the spread of disinformation in the region by studying the phenomenon and its impact within different countries in Asia, as well as their responses. The report investigates pressing, contemporary questions such as: Who are the major disinformation disseminators? What are the primary issue areas and who are the main targets? What are the effects of disinformation? What current legal and political efforts have been placed by governments, lawmakers, media and CSOs to combat against disinformation? What are the methods of disinformation applied towards different linguistic communities? How do public figures use their personal social media accounts to engage with the public? Drawing on a rich array of resources and data, This report offers country-specific analyses, highlights areas of improvement, and suggests policy recommendations for ensuring the protection of social media and online platforms from the spread of disinformation. “Social Media, Disinformation and Democracy in Asia: Country Cases” ISBN (electronic) 979-11-6617-054-6 95340 ISBN (print) 979-11-6617-055-3 93340 This report is part of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) products for 2019-2020. The ADRN's Activities, including production of this report, were made possible by the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Each author is solely responsible for the content of this report. Social Media, Disinformation and Democracy in Asia: Country Cases Table of Contents I. Northeast Asia Country Case 1: Japan ······································································· 1 Japan Center for International Exchange Country Case 2: Mongolia ······························································· 30 Academy of Political Education Country Case 3: South Korea ·························································· 44 East Asia Institute & Sungkyunkwan University Country Case 4: Taiwan ··································································· 67 Asian Barometer & Taiwan Foundation for Democracy II. Southeast Asia Country Case 5: Indonesia ······························································· 96 Center for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences Country Case 6: Malaysia ······························································· 115 Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs Country Case 7: Myanmar ····························································· 131 Yangon School of Political Science Country Case 8: Philippines ··························································· 147 Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance & International Center for Innovation, Transformation, and Excellence in Governance Country Case 9: Thailand ······························································· 170 King Prajadhipok’s Institute III. South Asia Country Case 10: Bangladesh ························································ 188 Manusher Jonno Foundation Country Case 11: India ··································································· 204 Participatory Research in Asia & Digital Empowerment Foundation Country Case 12: Pakistan ····························································· 236 Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency Country Case 13: Nepal ································································· 253 Samata Foundation Country Case 14: Sri Lanka ··························································· 267 Verité Research Japan Country Case 1: Japan Influence Activities of Domestic Actors on the Internet: Disinformation and Information Manipulation in Japan Maiko Ichihara1 Japan Center for International Exchange External and domestic illiberal actors have been manipulating information at an unprecedented level in recent years. A large amount of the existing literature focuses on the activities of China and Russia and indicates that these countries operate disinformation campaigns and information manipulation through the internet globally (Cook, 2020; Diamond, 2019; Diamond et al., 2016; Diamond & Schell, 2019; Fried & Polyakova, 2018; Hamilton, 2018; NED, 2017; Puddington & Roylance, 2017; Weber, 2019; Woolley & Howard, 2017). An even greater issue in this age of information technology is the dissemination of disinformation by authoritarian political leaders toward their domestic audiences. Disinformation causes chaos in elections, makes truth hard to grasp, and polarizes people. Democracy and pro-democracy actors have been under constant threat by such disinformation campaigns (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019). Japanese scholars and commentators have paid attention to the sharp power exerted by China and Russia (Anami, 2018; Kawashima, 2019; Koizumi et al., 2018; Tokuchi, 2019), and many examine China’s influence activities especially in regions such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and the US (Ichihara, 2020; Kawashima, 2018a; Kawashima, 2018b; Matsumoto, 2019; Oki, 2018; Shuto, 2018; Watanabe, 2018; Wu, 2019). With limited exceptions such as Hsiao (2019) and Stewart (2020), there have been almost no studies on the influence activities of these foreign authoritarian countries within Japan. From such works as Bradshaw and Howard (2019), Stewart (2020), and Weber (2019), we can assume that this is because the use of sharp power by foreign actors is considered to have a relatively limited impact inside Japan. This is in stark contrast to the growth of research on the use of disinformation within the country by domestic political actors. Fact checkers, journalists, and scholars have conducted research on the state of disinformation and fact checks, especially around elections (Ichida, 2018; Matsumoto K., 2019; Ogasawara, 2019; Okuyama, 2019; Tateiwa, 2019; Tateiwa & Yanai, 2018). This aspect has been examined extensively over the past eight years, with the greatest focus being placed on the prime ministers and the governing party (Ichida, 2018; Minami, 2019; Minami & Mochizuki, 2018; Tsuda, 1 Associate Professor, Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University; Study Team Co-Director, Democracy for the Future project, Japan Center for International Exchange; Visiting Scholar, Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1 Japan Kayama, & Yasuda, 2013). However, there are three issues with the existing literature. First, existing literature on the state of disinformation in Japan is published in Japanese and does not reach a wider audience. Second, with limited exceptions such as Ogasawara (2019) and Schäfer et al. (2017), most studies fail to provide any scientific evidence. Third, studies on the sharp power of external actors fail to examine the influence activities of domestic news sites that potentially have links to external authoritarian countries, whose news articles are disseminated widely in Japan through aggregator sites. Thus, this study conducts a scientific analysis of the influence activities of domestic political actors, as well as private entities that disseminate information on China as Japan’s giant neighbor, focusing on both disinformation and information manipulation. The study employs quantitative text analysis using KH Coder. The data used for analysis comprise information on Twitter and articles from target news sites. The paper provides the following three discussions. First, albeit in a restrained manner, disinformation has been spread in Japan by both political actors and trolls. Second, Record China, a portal site which offers China-related news, has been backed by an agent linked with China’s United Front Work Department, and disseminates news to instigate anti-Korea sentiment while at the same time attempting to improve the image of China and spread Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda. Finally, while the Japanese government takes a democratic post-hoc approach to tackling disinformation, which is commendable, more support should be provided for private fact-checking activities. 1. Political Actors, Trolls, and Disinformation 1.1. The Restrained Spread of Disinformation Political maneuvering through disinformation has been somewhat restrained thus far in Japan. Ogasawara (2019, p. 146) highlights two reasons. First, the use of social media as a news source is relatively limited. According to a survey conducted in 2020, while the percentage of people who use TV and the internet as news sources is 60 percent and 62 percent, respectively, the percentage of those using social media as a news source is only 25 percent (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism & University of Oxford, 2020, p. 98). Okuyama (2019, pp. 166–167) notes that the usage of social media for election campaigns has been limited as well. According to a survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun on the House of Representatives election in 2017, for example, while 72 percent of the candidates used social media to announce the location of their speeches, only 21 percent used it to post their policies (Sudo, 2017). While the percentage of people who use the internet as a news source is on the rise, they tend to prefer using news platforms such as Yahoo! News. According to a study conducted by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism and the University of Oxford (2020, p. 98), 58 percent of Japanese respondents cited Yahoo! News as the