Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict

Pathways for Peace

Pathways for Peace Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conﬂ ict © 2018 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org Some rights reserved

1 2 3 4 21 20 19 18 This volume is a result of a study conducted by the staff of the World Bank and the United Nations, based on information, data, and materials that were provided to such staff members and that could not necessarily be processed or verified by such staff members. The United Nations and the World Bank do not guarantee the accuracy of the data collected and included in this work. The designations employed and the presentation of material on any map in this work do not imply the expression of any opinion what- soever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations or the World Bank concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Member States of the United Nations, or the Executive Directors of The World Bank. Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank, all of which are specifically reserved. Rights and Permissions

This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO) http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo. Under the Creative Commons Attribution license, you are free to copy, distribute, transmit, and adapt this work, including for commercial purposes, under the following conditions: Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: United Nations and World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1- 4648-1162-3. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO Translations—If you create a translation of this work, please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution: This translation was not created by The World Bank and should not be considered an official World Bank translation. The World Bank shall not be liable for any content or error in this translation. Adaptations—If you create an adaptation of this work, please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution: This is an adaptation of an original work by The World Bank. Views and opinions expressed in the adaptation are the sole responsibility of the author or authors of the adaptation and are not endorsed by The World Bank. Third-party content—The World Bank does not necessarily own each component of the content contained within the work. The World Bank therefore does not warrant that the use of any third-party- owned individual component or part contained in the work will not infringe on the rights of those third parties. The risk of claims resulting from such infringement rests solely with you. If you wish to reuse a component of the work, it is your responsibility to determine whether permission is needed for that reuse and to obtain permission from the copyright owner. Examples of components can include, but are not limited to, tables, figures, or images. All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; e-mail: [email protected]. ISBN (paper): 978-1-4648-1162-3 ISBN (electronic): 978-1-4648-1186-9 DOI: 10.1596/978-1-4648-1162-3

Cover design: Takayo Muroga Fredericks.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been requested. Contents

Foreword xi Acknowledgments xiii Executive Summary xvii Abbreviations xxxiii Introduction 1 Prevention of Violent Confl ict Works and Is Cost-Effective 2 Why, Then, Is There So Little Belief in the Prevention of Violent Confl ict? 4 What Is the Prevention of Violent Confl ict? 5 Can Prevention of Violent Confl ict Be Done Differently? 7 The Importance of Agency to Prevention 7 Notes 8 References 9 Additional Reading 9

1. A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 11 Violent Confl ict in the Twenty-First Century 12 Understanding Trends in Violent Confl ict 19 The Unacceptable Costs of Violent Confl ict 24 How Violent Confl icts End 35 Conclusion 37 Notes 37 References 40 Additional Reading 47

2. The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 49 An International System in Search of a New Equilibrium 50 Risk and Opportunity in an Increasingly Connected World 56 Conclusion 71 Notes 71

v References 72 Additional Reading 76

3. Pathways for Peace 77 A Framework for Peaceful Pathways 78 Path Dependency of Violence 83 The Centrality of Actors 85 Understanding Risk and Opportunity 93 Prevention and Sustaining Peace: Building Peaceful Pathways 97 Scenarios for Pathways to Peace or Violence 99 Conclusion 100 Notes 100 References 101 Additional Reading 107

4. Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 109 Inequality and Violent Conﬂ ict 109 The Multiple and Intersecting Dimensions of Exclusion 115 Exclusion, Identity, Grievances, and Mobilization to Violence 125 Conclusion 130 Notes 130 References 131 Additional Reading 138

5. What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 141 Risk and Opportunity in the Arenas of Contestation 142 The Arena of Power and Governance 144 The Arena of Land and Natural Resources 148 The Arena of Service Delivery 158 The Arena of Security and Justice 161 Conclusion 170 Notes 171 References 172 Additional Reading 181

6. Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conﬂ ict 183 Navigating Transition Moments 184 Changing Actors’ Incentives 188 Addressing Institutional Weaknesses 200 Investing in Structural Factors 214 Conclusion 219 vi Contents Notes 220 References 221 Additional Reading 228

7. The International Architecture for Prevention 231 Systemic Prevention 233 Regional Action 236 International Tools for Prevention 238 International Development Assistance 248 Areas of Convergence between Diplomatic, Security, and Development Instruments 256 Conclusion 261 Notes 262 References 266 Additional Reading 273

8. Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention 275 Principles for Prevention 276 An Agenda for Action: Prevention in Practice 277 Organizing for Prevention 283 A Call for Action 289 Notes 289 References 290 Additional Reading 291

Appendix A. Thematic Papers and Case Studies 295 Thematic Papers 295 Country Case Studies 299

Contents vii Boxes I.1 The Business Case for Prevention 3 5.1 Confl ict across Arenas of I.2 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Contestation: The Political Crisis Development 6 and Civil War in Côte d’Ivoire 143 1.1 The Decline of Violent Confl ict 5.2 Darfur: A Case of Land Management between States 12 Systems and Environmental Change 150 1.2 Adapting Confl ict Data to Today’s 5.3 Collaboration over Water: EcoPeace Violent Confl icts 16 Middle East 153 1.3 Crime and Violence in Latin 5.4 The Mediating Role of the State: America and the Caribbean 25 Peru’s Offi ce of the Ombudsman 157 1.4 The Impact of the Syrian Confl ict 26 5.5 Public Expenditure Analysis of 1.5 Confl ict Measures Do Not Capture the Security Forces 164 All of the Costs of Violent Confl ict 27 5.6 Human Rights as a Basis for 1.6 Famine and Fragility, Confl ict, and Normative Change 166 Violence 29 5.7 Traditional versus Formal Justice in 1.7 Limitations of the Data on Forced Somalia 168 Displacement 30 6.1 Political Inclusion in 1.8 Intimate Partner Violence and Violent Northern Ireland 186 Confl ict 31 6.2 Community-Based Approaches to 1.9 The Impact of Confl ict over the Preventing Violent Extremism 191 Life Cycle 32 6.3 Private Sector Contributions to 2.1 Examples of New Technologies Peacebuilding 196 Assessing Violent Confl ict Risks 59 6.4 Cost Savings of Investing in Women’s Grassroots Prevention: 2.2 Cyberspace, the Fifth Domain of Female-Led Peace Huts in Liberia 199 Warfare 61 6.5 Niger: An Example of Resilience in a 2.3 The Impacts of Climate Change on Troubled Neighborhood 201 the Lake Chad Region 67 6.6 Decentralization and Security 3.1 Applying the Framework to Reform as Prevention in the Northern Mali Confl ict, 2012–13 82 Practice: Indonesia 206 3.2 Violent Confl ict Emerges and Escalates 6.7 Inclusion for Security Reform: over Time 84 Burundi, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste 209 3.3 Alternatively Governed Spaces 87 6.8 Infrastructures for Peace: 3.4 The Interface of Violent Confl ict with Developing and Sustaining Exogenous Dimensions of Risk 93 National Capacity 212 3.5 Economic Shocks and Violent Confl ict 94 6.9 Peace Committees and Early Warning 3.6 Inclusion and Risk 96 Mechanisms: Kenya, Indonesia, 4.1 The Challenge of Causality for Policy and Ghana 212 Action 114 6.10 Land Protection for the 4.2 Mobilizing Women’s Leadership for Forcibly Displaced in Colombia 217 Peacebuilding 117 7.1 International Engagement through 4.3 Youth Aspirations and Exclusion 119 Military and Police Assistance 232 4.4 A Multiplicity of Motivations 7.2 Public International Law and Drives People to Join Violent Armed Confl ict 233 Extremist Groups 121 7.3 The Evolution of International 4.5 Measuring Collective Grievances Approaches to Confl ict Prevention 234 through Perceptions 123 7.4 Subregional Organizations 4.6 Identity and Mobilization to and Prevention: ECOWAS 238 Violence: The Demographics 7.5 Challenges in Predicting and the Dynamics of Difference 125 Violent Confl ict 241 4.7 State Violence and Confl ict Risk 128 7.6 Multiple-Actor Mediation 243

viii Contents 7.7 Preventive Peacekeeping 7.11 Recovery and Peacebuilding Deployment: The Case of the Assessment in the Central African UN Preventive Deployment Force Republic 253 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 7.12 Humanitarian Assistance 254 Macedonia 247 7.13 Aid Volatility in the Central African 7.8 Evolution of “Multiphase” Confl ict Republic 256 Prevention in Peace Operations 248 7.14 The Peacebuilding Commission 257 7.9 The New Deal for Engagement 7.15 Strengthening National Capacities in Fragile States 251 for Confl ict Prevention 258 7.10 UnitedN ations–World Bank 7.16 Iraq’s Facility for Stabilization 259 Partnership in the Republic of Yemen 252 Figures ES.1 Pathway between Sustainable 2.4 Global Flows of Foreign Direct Peace and Violent Confl ict xxii Investment, 1999–2016 55 1.1 Violent Confl ict Worldwide, by 2.5 Attitudes toward Globalization Type of Confl ict, 1975–2016 13 and Change in Gross Domestic 1.2 Number of Battle-Related Deaths Product per Person, Selected Worldwide, by Type of Confl ict, Countries, 2011–15 56 1989–2016 14 2.6 Global Mobile Network Coverage, 1.3 Number of Confl ict-Related 2007–16 58 Deaths Worldwide, by 2.7 Correlation between Country Country, 2016 15 Income Level and Stage of 1.4 Number of Nonstate Groups Demographic Transition, 2015 63 Active in Violent Confl ict 3.1 Pathway between Sustainable Worldwide, 1989–2016 16 Peace and Violent Confl ict 78 1.5 Number of Internationalized Violent 3.2 Actors, Structural Factors, Confl icts, Global, 1946–2016 18 Institutions 80 1.6 Average Duration of Confl ict 3.3 Transition Moments 84 Worldwide, 1970–2015 19 4.1 Masculinities in Noncrisis and 1.7 Confl ict Events Worldwide, by Crisis Settings 118 Type of Confl ict and Region, 1989–2016 20 4.2 Perceived and Objective Horizontal Inequality of Ethnic Groups in 1.8 Terrorism Prevalence and Reported Nigeria 124 Fatalities, Global, 1995–2015 24 4.3 A Typology of Social Mobilization 127 1.9 Number of Refugees and IDPs Worldwide, 1951–2016 30 B4.7.1 Risks to Onset and Escalation B1.9.1 Skill Formation Process over the of Violent Confl ict 128 Life Cycle 32 B6.6.1 Foreign Direct Investment Net 1.10 Termination of Violent Confl icts Flows as a Proportion of Gross Worldwide before and after the Domestic Product in Indonesia, Cold War, 1946–2014 36 1980–2015 207 1.11 The Onset and End of Armed 7.1 Overview of Deployment of UN Confl ict Worldwide, 1950–2013 37 Peacekeeping Forces, 1945–2015 246 2.1 Global Trends in Governance, 7.2 Aid Infl ows (2002–15) and 1946–2008 52 Confl ict-Related Fatalities 2.2 Polity and the Onset of Political (2000–16) in the Democratic Instability, 1955–2006 52 Republic of Congo 255 2.3 Global Gross Domestic Product 8.1 Siloed Approach to Prevention 284 per Capita and World Exports, 8.2 Sustained Approach to 1960–2014 54 Prevention 284

Contents ix Maps 1.1 Reported Civilian Fatalities in 2.3 Global Flows of Transnational Africa, 2002–16 28 Organized Crime 69 2.1 Percentage of Individuals Not 2.4 The Intersection of Transnational Using the Internet, by World Region 58 Organized Crime and Instability 70 2.2 Intraregional Migration within the Economic Community of West African States 65 Tables BI.1.1 Modeling the Returns to 8.2 Ensuring Productive Prevention under Three Scenarios 3 Contestation in Key Arenas 280 8.1 A New Paradigm for 8.3 Differentiated Approaches Prevention 277 across Levels of Risk 285

x Contents Foreword

In 2015, the United Nations Member States At the United Nations, we believe that set ambitious goals for the world with the prevention means doing everything we adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable can to help countries avert the outbreak of Development, which offers a unique crises that take a high toll on humanity, framework to come together around a undermining institutions and capacities renewed effort at preventing human to achieve peace and development. We suffering. The Agenda, which is universal, mean rededicating ourselves to the United integrated and indivisible in nature, not Nations Charter, the mandate of Agenda only aims to end poverty and hunger, to 2030, protecting and respecting human ensure healthy lives and quality education rights, and ensuring that our assistance and to protect the environment—but also goes to those who need it the most. to reduce inequalities and promote Prevention should permeate everything peaceful, just and inclusive societies. we do. It should cut across all pillars of the Violent confl ict is increasingly recognized United Nations’ work and unite us for as one of the big obstacles to reaching the more effective delivery. This study is a Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by contribution to our internal refl ection on 2030. Its dramatic resurgence over the last the broader challenges of prevention. few years has caused immense human At the World Bank Group, we believe suffering and has enormous global impact. that preventing fragility, confl ict and Violent confl icts have also become more violence is central to reducing poverty complex and protracted, involving more and achieving shared prosperity. Social and nonstate groups and regional and economic development have important international actors. And they are roles to play in this effort, so we are doubling increasingly linked to global challenges such the amount of resources to address issues of as climate change, natural disasters, cyber fragility, confl ict and violence as part of the security and transnational organized crime. 18th replenishment of the International It is projected that more than half of the Development Association (IDA), our fund people living in poverty will be found in for the poorest countries. We are ensuring countries affected by high levels of violence that all of our operations can contribute to by 2030. This is utterly contrary to the this effort in several ways: by introducing promise contained in the 2030 Agenda to more fl exibility and adaptability in our leave no one behind. programs; by increasing our focus on the As the human, social and financial risks of fragility, confl ict and violence, and costs and complexity of violent conflict on various crises faced by our clients; by and its global impact grow, we must ask improving our regional efforts; and by ourselves: how can the global community addressing some of the worst consequences more effectively prevent violent conflict? of confl ict such as forced displacement.

xi Each of our institutions brings a unique This study, principally based on and complementary set of expertise and academic research, benefi ted immensely tools to the table in accordance with its from consultations with a variety of actors mandate. We can already see the results including governments. It is therefore our of our intensifi ed collaboration around hope that some of the fi ndings will usefully confl ict, violence and fragility in several inform global policy making. countries. But we can achieve more together. This study is one element of a much We need to better harness our institutions’ broader partnership and a first step in instruments and resources to support this working jointly to address the immense shared agenda. challenges of our time. We look forward This joint study on the prevention of to continuing the pursuit of knowledge violent confl ict—a fi rst in the history of our together and to applying that knowledge institutions—was initiated in 2016 and together in support of the people we conducted by a team of staff members from serve. the United Nations and the World Bank Group, in a spirit of fostering closer António Guterres collaboration to deliver at the country level. Secretary-General It refl ects a process of research and intense United Nations global consultation aimed at providing ideas on how development approaches can better Jim Yong Kim interact with other tools to prevent violent President confl ict. World Bank Group

xii Foreword Acknowledgments

Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Kevin Carey, Spyros Demetriou, Qurat Ul Preventing Violent Confl ict was produced by Ain Fatima, Sarah Hearn, Emilie Jourdan, an integrated team from the World Bank Zainiddin Karaev, Joanna Kata-Blackman, and the United Nations, including the Anne-Lise Klausen, Chris Mahony, Department of Peacekeeping Operations Siobhan McInerney-Lankford, Vikram (DPKO), the Department of Political Raghavan, Alexandros Ragoussis, Irena Affairs (DPA), the Peacebuilding Support Sargsyan, Tracy K. Washington, and Offi ce (PBSO), and the United Nations Michael Woolcock. The communications Development Programme (UNDP). At the and outreach strategy was overseen by World Bank, the study was managed by the Chisako Fukuda, Anna Liudmilova Fragility, Confl ict, and Violence (FCV) Stoyanova, Cynthia R. Delgadillo, and Group in Global Themes. The study com- Justin Ticzon. The report was edited by bined the efforts of several staff from both Susan Sachs, Alys Willman, Michael organizations, with inputs and reviews from Harrup, Elizabeth Forsyth, and Sherrie dozens of experts and practitioners. Brown, and references were edited by Lauri The integrated core team was led by Scherer. The design of the cover and info- Alexandre Marc (chief technical specialist, graphics was completed by Takayo Muroga FCV Group, World Bank) and co-led by Fredericks. Nancy Kebe and Janice Rowe- Jago Salmon (adviser, United Nations/ Barnwell provided administrative support. World Bank Partnership on Confl ict and Special thanks are extended to Patricia Fragility, United Nations). The production Katayama and Aziz Gökdemir and the of the study was overseen by Benjamin World Bank’s Publishing Program. Petrini. Members of the joint core team The report was produced under overall included Lydiah Kemunto Bosire, Megan E. guidance of a Steering Committee, the Carroll, Bledi Celiku, Catalina Crespo- members of which also acted as peer Sancho, Djordje Djordjevic, Samhita reviewers. The Steering Committee was Kumar, Michael Lund, Corey Pattison, chaired by Oscar Fernandez-Taranco (assis- Neelam Verjee, and Alys Willman. Extended tant secretary-general for peacebuilding team members and other chapter authors support, United Nations), and Franck included Hannah Bleby Orford, Margherita Bousquet and Saroj Kumar Jha (respectively, Capellino, Nergis Gulasan, Eiko Ikegaya, current and former senior director, FCV Roudabeh Kishi, and Marco Zambotti. Group, World Bank). Members included Charles “Chuck” Call, Gary Milante, Seth Pedro Conceicao (director, Strategic Policy, Kaplan, and David Steven acted as senior UNDP), Shantayanan Devarajan (senior external advisers and provided critical con- director, Development Economics, World tributions to the report. Other contributors Bank), Renata Dwan (chief, Policy and Best included Ayham Al-Maleh, Holly Benner, Practices, Department of Policy, Evaluation,

xiii and Training, DPKO), Stephen Jackson Studies of Confl ict Project [ESOC], (chief, Policy and Planning, DPA), Princeton University); and Frances Stewart Carlos Felipe Jaramillo (senior director, (director, Centre for Research on Inequality, Macroeconomic and Fiscal Management, Human Security, and Ethnicity [CRISE], World Bank), Martin Rama (chief University of Oxford). economist, South Asia region, World Bank), The team warmly thanks donors for Lynne Sherburne-Benz (director, Social their critical support toward the realization Protection and Jobs, World Bank), and of this report and their generous contribu- Teresa Whitfi eld (director, Policy and tion, including fi nancial contribution, Mediation Division, DPA). technical assistance through background The team appreciates the support and research, and the hosting of seminars and detailed guidance of additional peer consultations. Donors included Norway reviewers, Edouard Al-Dahdah (senior (Ministry of Foreign Affairs); United public sector specialist, Governance, World Kingdom (Department for International Bank), Henk-Jan Brinkman (chief, Policy, Development [DFID]); Sweden (Ministry Planning, and Application Branch, PBSO), of Foreign Affairs); France (AFD; Ministry Helene Grandvoinnet (lead governance of Foreign Affairs); Switzerland (Swiss specialist, Governance Global Practice, Agency for Development and Cooperation World Bank), and Markus Kostner (lead [SDC]); the Netherlands (Ministry of social development specialist, Social, Urban, Foreign Affairs); the Government of the Rural, and Resilience Global Practice, World Republic of Korea; and Germany (German Bank). The offi ce of World Bank Group Federal Foreign Offi ce [AA]). Senior Vice President Mahmoud Mohieldin Consultations with partners, academia, provided valuable input and assistance, regional organizations, and civil society orga- including through the World Bank Group nizations were instrumental in formulating offi ces in Geneva and New York. The the report and provided critical feedback at International Finance Corporation (IFC) different stages of the study. Consultation provided substantive inputs to the report. events were held throughout the production The study benefi ted from the expertise of of the report in the following countries: its Advisory Committee, bringing together Belgium, the Arab Republic of Egypt, internationally renowned experts from Ethiopia, France, Germany, Jordan, Kenya, academia and leading organizations in Myanmar, the Netherlands, Norway, Senegal, the fi eld of confl ict and development. Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the Members include Haroon Bhorat (director, United Kingdom, and the United States. The Development Policy Research Unit, team thanks the following organizations that School of Economics, University of Cape were involved in consultations or that sup- Town); Sarah Cliffe (director, Center on ported the study in different capacities: International Cooperation [CIC], New York African Union, Berghof Foundation, University); Meenakshi Gopinath (founder Brookings Institution, CIC at New York and director, Women in Security, Confl ict University, Clingendael Netherlands Management, and Peace); Kristian Berg Institute of International Relations, Club de Harpviken (director, Peace Research Institute Madrid, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation Oslo [PRIO]); Mushtaq Khan (professor of (DHF), Economic Community of West economics, SOAS, University of London); African States (ECOWAS), ESOC at Andrew Mack (director, Human Security Princeton University, European Institute of Report Project, Simon Fraser University); Peace, European Union (EU), Freie Olivier Ray (head, Crisis Prevention and Post Universitat Berlin, Geneva Centre for the Confl ict Recovery, Agence Française de Democratic Control of Armed Forces Développement [AFD]); Ambassador Gert (DCAF), Geneva Peacebuilding Platform Rosenthal (chair, Advisory Group of (GPP), German Development Institute/ Experts on the Review of the United Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik Nations Peacebuilding Architecture); (DIE), Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative Jacob N. Shapiro (co-director, Empirical (IPTI) at the Geneva Graduate Institute of xiv Acknowledgments International and Development Studies, Graca, Michele Griffi n, Caren Grown, Sigrid Institute of Development Studies at Gruener, Thomas Guerber, Stephane University of Sussex, Institute for Economic Guimbert, Lobna Hadji, Maarten Halff, Analysis at Universitat Autònoma de Daniel Ham, Lucia Hammer, Annika S. Barcelona, Institute for Economics and Peace Hansen, Bernard Harborne, Malin Hedwig, (IEP), Institute for Security Studies, Inter- Fabrizio Hochschild, Elena Ianchovichina, Governmental Authority on Development Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez, Deborah Isser, (IGAD), League of Arab States (LAS), Alyssa Jackson, Regev Ben Jacob, Jenny North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Joelle, Bruce Jones, Steen Jorgensen, Patricia Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Justino, Mabruk Kabir, Takuya Kamata, (NUPI), Oslo Governance Center (OGC- Ellen Kang, Ethan Kapstein, Omer UNDP), Overseas Development Institute Karasapan, Michelle Keane, Mike Kelleher, (ODI), Organisation for Economic Patrick Keuleers, Henrike Klau Panhans, Co-operation and Development (OECD), Kate Almquist Knopf, Amara Konneh, Sahr Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Kpundeh, Aart Kraay, Marianne Krey- Quaker United Nations Offi ce (QUNO), Jacobsen, Nandini Krishnan, Kathleen Stockholm International Peace Research Kuehnast, Daniel Kull, Chetan Kumar, Institute (SIPRI), United Nations University, Heidi Kuttab, Romano Lasker, Marcus United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and Lenzen, Larisa Leshchenko, Nancy Wilton Park. Lindborg, Sarah Lister, Clare Lockhart, Ana The team acknowledges those individu- Paula Lopez, Gladys C. Lopez-Acevedo, als within the two institutions and outside Rachel F. Madenyika, Marie-Francoise who supported the study in different capac- Marie-Nelly, David Marshall, Phil Matseza, ities, including through enriching it with Cecile Mazzacurati, Patrick McCarthy, inputs, comments, or review of specifi c Clem McCartney, Odhran McMahon, sections. The team would like to thank the Oliver Meinecke, Erik Melander, Piers following individuals from the World Bank Merrick, Ivonne Astrid Moreno Horta, and the United Nations as well as external Hannes Mueller, Mamta Murthy, Ahmadou colleagues, including Husam Abudagga, Moustapha Ndiaye, Florian Neutze, Akihiko Andrea Aeby, Ozong Agborsangaya-Fiteu, Nishio, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, Martin Sakuntala Akmeemana, Fawah Akwo, Ochoa, Helen Olafsdottir, Ozonnia Ojielo, Betsy Alley, Amatalalim Alsoswa, David Lisa Orrennius, Thania Paffenholz, Utz Andersson, Diego Antoni, Jorge Araujo, Pape, Gina Pattugalan, Laura Pereira, Nadia Sakura Atsumi, Alexander Avanessov, Laura Piffaretti, Martin Ras, Sarah Rattray, Joel E. Bailey, Siaka Bakayoko, Salman Bal, Reyes, Noella Richards, Hugh Riddell, Daniel Kiernan Balke, Luca Bandiera, Mary Simon Ridley, Alberto Rodriguez, Paul A. Barton-Dock, Sara Batmanglich, Viktoria Romer, Benjamin Rubin, Janice Ryu, Nika Bechstein, Husam Mohamed Beides, Saeedi, Carolina Sanchez-Paramo, Shinta Rachid Benmessaoud, Sandra Bloemenkamp, Sander, Emanuele Sapienza, Livio Michel Botzung, Robert Bou Jaoude, Monique Sarandrea, Hartwig Schafer, Julia Rosa Bouman, Parminder Brar, Armand-Michel Schoepp, Lotta Segerstrom, Ole Jacob Broux, Margot M. Brown, Colin Bruce, Sending, Sajjad Ali Shah, Maryanne Sharp, Dominique Bush, Susanna Campbell, Alex Shoebridge, Urban Sjöström, Rubén Campos, Lars-Erik Cederman, Alexander Slater, Ayat Soliman, Richard Rodrigo Chaves, Nestor Coffi , Louise Cord, Spencer Hogg, Radhika Srinivasan, Victoria Sarah Cussen, Maitreyi Das, Pablo de Greiff, Stanley, Paul B. Stares, Endre Stiansen, Jessica de Plessis, Bénédicte de la Brière, Jos Marcel Stoessel, R. Sudharshan Canagarajah, De La Haye, Sascha Djumena, Sarah Isabelle Taylor, Tobias Techtenfeld, Jacobo Douglas, Dirk Druet, Sebastian von Tenacio, Hans Timmer, Nana Oumou Einsiedel, Marcelo Fabre, Faizaa Fatima, Toure-Sy, Maurizia Tovo, Carolyn Turk, Abderrahim Fraiji, Diarietou Gaye, Kristalina James Turpin, Veronika Tywuschik, Oliver Georgieva, Yashodhan Ghorpade, Maninder Ulich, Henrik Urdal, Jos Verbeek, Irene S. Gill, Bjorn Erik Gillsater, Ana Patricia Vergara, Eckhard Volkmann, Mariska van

Acknowledgments xv Beijnum, Henriette von Kaltenborn- Giessmann, Jorn Gravinghold, Patrick Stachau, Joao Pedro Wagner De Acevedo, Hagan, David Hammond, Wissam Harake, Victoria Walker, Asbjorn Haland Wee, Peter Haschke, Sarah Hearn, Solveig Achim Wennmann, Deborah L. Wetzel, Hillesund, Andreas Hirblinger, Nazia Alexandra Wilde, Ali Zafar, Giuseppe Hussain, Daniel Hyslop, Sana Jaffrey, Zampaglione, William Zartman, Alexander Patricia Justino, Suh Yoon Kang, Jocelyn Zuev, and Aly Zulﬁ car Rahim. Kelly, Farhad Khosrokhavar, Dana Landau, Finally, we give special thanks to the Igor Logvinenko, Louisa Lombard, Ingrid authors of background papers and case Magnusson, Chris Mahony, Aditi Malik, studies commissioned for this study, Brendan (Skip) Mark, Eric Min, Stephen including Daniel Arnon, Ghazia Aslam, Mogaka, Karina Mross, Hannes Mueller, Jonathan L. Austin, Mielna Bacalja Perianes, Robert Muggah, Luise Müller, Taies Nezam, Karim Baghat, Guy Banim, Gray Barrett, Havard Mokeiv Nygård, Ben Oppenheim, Laura Bernal-Bermudez, Michelle Betz, Carl Gudrun Østby, Thania Paffenholz, Leigh Black, Morten Bøås, George Bob-Milliar, Payne, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Marco Boggero, Hans Born, Louise Alexandra Pichler Fong, Kristiana Powell, Bosetti, Rebecca Brubaker, John Bruce, Olivia Rakotomalala, Andy Reiter, Simona Alexander Burian, Charles Call, Kevin Carey, Ross, Siri Aas Rustad, Cale Salih, Jon Harald David Cingranelli, James Cockayne, Nat J. Sande Lie, Irena L. Sargsyan, Christine Colletta, Virginia Comolli, Catalina Crespo- Seifert, Ole Jacob Sending, Jacob N. Shapiro, Sancho, Benjamin Crisman, Marianne Dahl, Manu Singh, Timothy D. Sisk, Lucy Adam Day, Catherine Defontaine, Spyros Stackpool-Moore, David Steven, Håvard Demetriou, Constance Dijkstra, Thomas Strand, Gizem Sucuoglu, Silvana Toska, Dorﬂ er, Elizabeth Drew, Kendra Dupuy, Henrik Urdal, Aly Verjee, Neelam Verjee, Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, Aissatou Fall, Sebastian von Einsiedel, Maurice Walsh, Quratul Ain Fatima, Charlotte Fiedler, Felix Barbara Walter, Asbjorn Haland Wee, Achim Fritsch, Tine Gade, Janel Galvanek, Scott Wennmann, Stephan Wolff, Reed Wood, Gates, Mark Gibney, Hans-Joachim and Jisun Yi.

xvi Acknowledgments Executive Summary

A surge in violent confl icts in recent years system. With confl ict today often simulta- has left a trail of human suffering, displace- neously subnational and transnational, sus- ment, and protracted humanitarian need. tained, inclusive, and targeted engagement In 2016, more countries experienced vio- is needed at all levels. lent confl ict than at any time in nearly This reality has accelerated momentum 30 years.1 Reported battle-related deaths in for countries at risk and for the interna- 2016 increased tenfold from the post–Cold tional community to focus on improving War low of 2005, and terrorist attacks and efforts at preventing “the outbreak, escala- fatalities also rose sharply over the past tion, recurrence, or continuation of con- 10 years (GTD 2017). fl ict” (UN General Assembly 2016; UN This surge in violence affl icts both low- Security Council 2016). Yet, at present, and middle-income countries with rela- spending and efforts on prevention repre- tively strong institutions and calls into sent only a fraction of the amount spent on question the long-standing assumption that crisis response and reconstruction.2 A shift peace will accompany income growth and away from managing and responding to cri- the expectations of steady social, economic, ses and toward preventing confl ict sustain- and political advancement that defi ned the ably, inclusively, and collectively can save end of the twentieth century (Fearon 2010; lives and greatly reduce these costs. Humphreys and Varshney 2004; World Economic Forum 2016). If current trends Pathways for Peace: Laying persist, by 2030—the horizon set by the the Groundwork for a New international community for the Sustainable Focus on Prevention Development Goals (SDGs)—more than half of the world’s poor will be living in Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to countries affected by high levels of violence Preventing Violent Confl ict is a joint study (OECD 2015). of the United Nations and the World Bank. The benefi t of preventive action, then, The study originates from the conviction on seems self-evident. Indeed, the global archi- the part of both institutions that the atten- tecture for peace and security, forged in the tion of the international community needs aftermath of World War II, is grounded in to be urgently refocused on prevention. the universal commitment to “save succeed- While the two institutions are governed by ing generations from the scourge of war” different, complementary mandates, they (United Nations Charter, preamble). Yet the share a commitment, founded in the 2030 changing scope and nature of today’s con- Agenda for Sustainable Development, to the fl icts pose a signifi cant challenge to that prevention of confl ict as a contribution to

xvii development progress, as expressed in the their tools and instruments to bear in an United Nations General Assembly and effective and complementary way. Security Council resolutions on sustaining • The human and economic cost of peace3 and the eighteenth replenishment of confl icts around the world requires the World Bank Group’s International all of those concerned to work more Development Association.4 collaboratively. The SDGs should be at This study recognizes that the World the core of this approach. Development Bank Group and the United Nations bring actors need to provide more support separate comparative advantages to approach to national and regional prevention the prevention of violent confl ict and that agendas through targeted, fl exible, they have different roles and responsibilities and sustained engagement. Prevention in the international architecture. Therefore, agendas, in turn, should be integrated while a holistic framework is essential to into development policies and efforts, implementing prevention, the fi ndings and because prevention is cost-effective, recommendations of this study do not apply saves lives, and safeguards development to all organizations in the same way. gains. This study seeks to improve the way in • The best way to prevent societies from which domestic development processes descending into crisis, including but interact with security, diplomatic, justice, not limited to confl ict, is to ensure that and human rights efforts to prevent con- they are resilient through investment in fl icts from becoming violent. Its key audi- inclusive and sustainable development. ences are national policy makers and staff For all countries, addressing inequalities of multilateral and regional institutions. and exclusion, making institutions more The background research and literature inclusive, and ensuring that development reviews, including 19 case studies, were pre- strategies are risk-informed are central pared in partnership with leading think to preventing the fraying of the social tanks and academic institutions. Regional fabric that could erupt into crisis. consultations were conducted throughout • The primary responsibility for preventive 2016–17 with policy makers, members of action rests with states, both through civil society, representatives of regional their national policy and their governance organizations, development aid organiza- of the multilateral system. However, in tions, and donor partners in Africa, Asia, today’s shifting global landscape, states Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, are often one actor among many. States and North America. are increasingly called to work with each other and with other actors to keep their Eight Key Messages countries on a pathway to peace. • Exclusion from access to power, for Prevention opportunity, services, and security creates The study’s fi ndings revolve around eight fertile ground for mobilizing group key messages: grievances to violence, especially in areas with weak state capacity or legitimacy or • Violent confl ict has increased after in the context of human rights abuses. This decades of relative decline. Direct study points to specifi c ways in which states deaths in war, numbers of displaced and other actors can seek to avert violence, populations, military spending, and including through more inclusive policies. terrorist incidents, among others, have • Growth and poverty alleviation are crucial all surged since the beginning of the but alone will not suffi ce to sustain peace. century. A rapidly evolving global context Preventing violence requires departing presents risks that transcend national from traditional economic and social borders and add to the complexity of policies when risks are building up or confl ict. This places the onus on policy are high. It also means seeking inclusive makers at all levels, from local to global, solutions through dialogue, adapted to make a more concerted effort to bring macroeconomic policies, institutional xviii Executive Summary reform in core state functions, and has increased since 2010. Furthermore, redistributive policies. high-intensity warfare in certain countries • Inclusive decision making is fundamental has increased the number of fatalities to sustaining peace at all levels, as are caused by these confl icts, with the number long-term policies to address economic, of reported battle-related deaths rising social, and political aspirations. Fostering sharply and in 2014 reaching the highest the participation of young people as well numbers recorded in 20 years (Allansson, as of the organizations, movements, and Melander, and Themnér 2017; Sundberg, networks that represent them is crucial. Eck, and Kreutz 2012). Women’s meaningful participation in all This increase in the number of confl icts aspects of peace and security is critical is a surge, but not yet a trend. Most battle to effectiveness, including in peace deaths occur in a small number of confl icts; processes, where it has been shown to the three deadliest countries in 2016 have a direct impact on the sustainability (Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Syrian Arab of agreements reached. Republic) incurred more than 76 percent of • Alongside efforts to build institutional all fatalities. However, even if battle deaths capacity to contain violence when it drop signifi cantly as fi ghting declines in does occur, acting preventively entails these countries, these confl icts are expected fostering systems that create incentives to be protracted and risks of new outbreaks for peaceful and cooperative behavior. remain high (Dupuy et al. 2017). In order to achieve more effective Much of this violence remains entrenched prevention, new mechanisms need to be in low-income countries; however, some of established that will allow greater synergy today’s deadliest and most complex confl icts to be achieved much earlier among are occurring in middle-income countries, the various tools and instruments of underscoring the fact that income and prevention, in particular, diplomacy and wealth are not a guarantee of peace mediation, security, and development. (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2015; OECD 2016). This study demonstrates that prevention Armed groups have grown in number, works. Many countries have successfully diversity, and scope. Many of these groups managed high-risk confl icts and avoided are not linked to states. They include rebels, descents into violence. These experiences militias, armed traffi cking groups, and vio- offer lessons in prevention that can be lent extremist groups that may coalesce applied to other contexts. There is no one around a grievance, an identity, an ideology, formula, as each situation is specifi c to the or a claim to economic or political actors, institutions, and structures of each resources. Membership and alliances tend society, but common threads can be teased to evolve over time, depending on resources out of these experiences. or leadership. This study also shows that prevention is Violence is increasingly spreading cost-effective. Analysis undertaken for this beyond national borders: 18 out of 47 state- study fi nds that a system for preventing the based violent confl icts were international- outbreak of violence would be economi- ized in 2016,5 more than reported in any cally benefi cial. Even in the most pessimistic year since the end of World War II, except scenario, where preventive action is rarely for 2015, when 20 were internationalized successful, the average net savings are close (UCDP 2017). to US$5 billion per year. In the most opti- The costs of these confl icts are enor- mistic scenario, the net savings are almost mous. Battle deaths tell only part of the US$70 billion per year (Mueller 2017). story of the damage infl icted. Civilians are increasingly vulnerable, and much recent violence has occurred in urban areas and The State of Violent Confl ict targeted public spaces (ICRC 2017). While interstate confl ict remains rare, the Between 2010 and 2016 alone, the number number of violent confl icts within states of civilian deaths in violent confl icts

Executive Summary xix doubled (UCDP 2017). Many more civilian on state capacity. Afghanistan’s per capita deaths result from indirect effects of con- income has remained at its 1970s level due fl ict, such as unmet medical needs, food to the continued war, and Somalia’s per insecurity, inadequate shelter, or contami- capita income has dropped by more than 40 nation of water (Small Arms Survey 2011; percent over the same period (Mueller and UNESCWA 2017). Tobias 2016). Such effects can spread to sur- Violent confl ict is forcibly displacing rounding countries in the region. On aver- people in record numbers. An estimated age, countries bordering a high-intensity 65.6 million people are now forcibly dis- confl ict experience an annual decline of 1.4 placed from their homes, driven primarily percentage points in gross domestic prod- by violence (UNHCR 2017). Between 2005 uct (GDP) and an increase of 1.7 points in and 2016, the number of internally dis- infl ation (Rother et al. 2016). placed persons increased more than fi vefold (UNDP 2016; UNHCR 2017). The number The Need for Prevention in of refugees nearly doubled over the same period, with the majority (55 percent) of an Interdependent World refugees coming from Afghanistan, the The nature of violent confl ict is not Republic of South Sudan, and Syria changing in isolation. The increase in vio- (UNHCR 2017). More than half of the lent confl icts has emerged in a global con- world’s refugees are children, and many of text where the balance of geopolitical them have been separated from their fami- power is in fl ux and a push for more inclu- lies (UNHCR 2017). sive governance is bringing new voices Violent confl ict affects men and women and new demands. Proxy wars are no lon- differently. While men make up the majority ger the exclusive purview of traditional of combatants during confl ict and are more great powers. At the same time, the num- likely to die from the direct effects of violence, ber of societies that have adopted more women also face a continuum of insecurity inclusive forms of political, economic, and before, during, and after confl ict (Crespo- cultural governance has grown rapidly Sancho 2017). Sexual and gender-based vio- over the last 30 years. While this transition lence tends to be higher in confl ict and has occurred peacefully in many countries, postconfl ict settings, as does recruitment of it can—when not managed carefully— girls into traffi cking, sexual slavery, and also create a space for contestation and forced marriage (Crespo-Sancho 2017; Kelly confl ict to emerge. 2017; UNESCWA 2017; UN Secretary- At the same time, fast-emerging global General 2015; UN Women 2015). In insecure trends are affecting the way people and contexts, girls’ mobility is often highly societies operate and interact. Advances in restricted, limiting their access to school, information and communication technol- employment, and other opportunities (UN ogy (ICT) represent great opportunities Women 2015). For children and youth, the for innovation, growth, and the unfettered long-term effects of exposure to violence and exchange of ideas. However, alongside the adversities of daily life in a high-violence opportunities are risks. ICT benefi ts and context are associated with a range of chal- access are not available to all, and the lenges (Miller and Rasmussen 2010). These so-called “digital divide” threatens to include increased risk of perpetrating vio- widen the gaps between high- and low- lence or being a victim of violence later in income countries. New technologies and life, psychological trauma, and negative automation are rapidly transforming effects on cognitive and social development industries, with the effect of reducing the (Betancourt et al. 2012; Blattman 2006; need for unskilled or semiskilled labor in Huesmann and Kirwil 2007; Leckman, industries. Interconnectivity also enables Panter-Brick, and Salah 2014; Shonkoff and transnational organized crime to fl ourish, Garner 2012). allows the rapid transmission of violent The costs associated with the economic ideologies, and leaves economies vulnera- losses caused by confl ict put a severe strain ble to cybercrime. xx Executive Summary Climate change, too, presents new chal- increase the tendency for groups to mobi- lenges, especially to poor and vulnerable lize for perceived grievances. countries and communities (Nordas and Gleditsch 2007). By itself, climate change does The Pathways for not cause violent confl ict. However, it does Peace Framework create major stress, especially in fragile situations where governments have limited means Prevention is about creating incentives for to help their populations adapt. Risks associ- actors to choose actions that resolve confl ict ated with climate change can combine with without violence. An important corollary is and exacerbate risks of violence through fac- that inclusive approaches to prevention tors such as food insecurity, economic shocks, should recognize and address group griev- and migration (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka ances early. Violence is highly path- 2015; Schleussner et al. 2016). dependent: once it takes hold, incentives This new global landscape features sig- and systems begin to reorient themselves nifi cant demographic shifts that may create in ways that sustain violence. Effective pre- new stresses, as well as opportunities, for vention requires acting before griev- global and national systems. Already there ances harden and the threat of violence are more young people in the world than at narrows the choices available for leaders any other time in history—1.8 billion peo- and elites, understood as groups who hold ple between the ages of 10 and 24—and the power or infl uence in a society. vast majority of young people live in A society’s ability to manage confl ict low-income countries, many of them constructively is tested continuously by already affected by confl ict (UN DESA risks that push it toward violence and by 2015). In Africa, 60 percent of the popula- opportunities to advance sustainable tion is under the age of 25 (UN DESA development and peace. To help to visual- 2015). Harnessing the potential of a grow- ize how these risks and opportunities act ing young population is an important chal- on and within a society, this book intro- lenge. In addition, population growth, while duces the term “pathway” for the trajec- a positive force for economies, also puts tory that every society shapes through the pressure on labor markets, which will have constant, dynamic interaction of its to absorb the estimated 600 million new actors, institutions, and structural factors workers entering the workforce in the next over time. As fi gure ES.1 illustrates, a soci- 10 years (ILO 2016). ety encounters many dimensions and lev- These demographic shifts are occur- els of risks and opportunities that affect ring against the backdrop of slow and its pathway. uneven global economic growth. World The pathway construct helps to con- trade value, merchandise exports, and ceptualize the temporal aspect of preven- commercial trade services all grew sub- tion. The behavior of domestic actors will stantially over the past 70 years, contrib- adjust to changing events and the deci- uting to consolidating peace in the sions of other actors. Reforming institu- aftermath of World War II. However, trade tions to sustain peace and addressing growth has been marked in recent years structural factors that underpin griev- by downturns and a prolonged period of ances can take longer. This temporal only modest improvement since the global aspect is important for international fi nancial crisis of 2007. In 2016, trade action. Development actors, for example, growth fell, for the fi fth consecutive year, tend to decrease their engagement or below 3 percent. Meanwhile, foreign withdraw altogether when risks escalate. direct investment has also been decreas- Political actors tend to engage only when ing, adversely affecting growth and pro- the risk of violence is high or violence is ductivity (Hale and Xu 2016). These already present. Instead, viable, sustained trends do not directly affect violent con- action in support of preventing violence fl ict; however, they do put additional is needed throughout policies and stresses on systems and people and can programs.

Executive Summary xxi FIGURE ES.1 Pathway between Sustainable Peace and Violent Conflict

Societies forge unique pathways as they negotiate competing peace. The figure illustrates how different forces pressures pushing toward violent conflict and sustainable can influence the direction of the pathway.

Sustainable peace

Inclusionary process Regional instability Center-periphery arrangement Mounting grievances and repression

Violent conﬂict

PRESENT 1 YEAR 5 YEARS 10 YEARS

Why People Fight: opportunity and power among groups, Inequality, Exclusion, including access to the executive branch and Injustice and the police and military. Political exclusion provides group leaders with the incen- Some of the greatest risks of violence today tive to mobilize collective action to force stem from the mobilization of perceptions (or negotiate) change. of exclusion and injustice, rooted in Exclusion that is enforced by state inequalities across groups (Collier and repression poses a grave risk of violent con- Hoeffl er 2004; Cramer 2003; Fearon and fl ict (Bakker, Hill, and Moore 2016; Piazza Laitin 2003; Lichbach 1989; Østby 2013). 2017; Stewart 2002). Countries where gov- When an aggrieved group assigns blame to ernments violate human rights, especially others or to the state for its perceived eco- the right to physical integrity, through nomic, political, or social exclusion, then practices such as torture, forced disappear- emotions, collective memories, frustration ances, political imprisonment, and extraju- over unmet expectations, and a narrative dicial killings, are at a higher risk for violent that rouses a group to violence can all play a confl ict (Cingranelli et al. 2017). In these role in mobilization to violence (Cederman contexts, repression creates incentives for Wimmer, and Min 2010; Justino 2017; violence by reinforcing the perception that Nygård et al. 2017; Sargsyan 2017). there is no viable alternative for expressing People come together in social groups grievances and frustration. for a variety of subjective and objective Societies that offer more opportunities reasons. They may share feelings, history, for youth participation in the political and narratives of humiliation, frustrations, or economic realms and provide routes for identities that motivate them to collective social mobility for youth tend to experi- action in different ways, at different times, ence less violence (Idris 2016; Paasonen and and in different situations. Perceptions of Urdal 2016). With the global youth popula- inequality between groups often matter tion increasing, the ability to harness the more in terms of mobilization than mea- energy and potential of youth presents a sured inequality and exclusion (Rustad strong opportunity for this “unique demo- 2016; Stewart 2000, 2002, 2009). This pat- graphic dividend,” as the 2015 United tern of exclusion includes inequality in the Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 distribution of and access to political notes (UN Security Council 2015). xxii Executive Summary Similarly, cross-country studies fi nd evi- The effects of climate change, population dence that high levels of gender inequality growth, and urbanization are intensifying and gender-based violence in a society are these risks. Disputes over resources have associated with increased vulnerability to spilled over into violent confl ict and instabil- civil war and interstate war and the use of ity across the world. Improving the sharing of more severe forms of violence in confl ict resources and benefi ts derived from them as (Caprioli et al. 2007; GIWPS and PRIO 2017; well as strengthening local confl ict resolution Hudson et al. 2009; Kelly 2017). Changes in mechanisms are important areas of focus. women’s status or vulnerability, such as an Service delivery does not have a direct increase in domestic violence or a reduction relationship with violence, but it affects in girls’ school attendance, often are viewed state legitimacy and the ability of the state to as early warnings of social and political inse- mediate confl icts (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, curity (Hudson et al. 2012). Prevention of and Dunn 2012; Sacks and Larizza 2012; violent confl ict requires a strong focus on Stel and Ndayiragiie 2014). The way in women’s experiences and on measures to which services are delivered and the inclu- ensure their participation in political, social, siveness and perceptions of fairness in ser- and economic life. Some evidence suggests vice delivery matter as much as—perhaps that when women take leadership roles and more than—the quality of services delivered are able to participate meaningfully in peace (Sturge et al. 2017). negotiations, the resulting agreements tend Security and justice institutions that to last longer and there is greater satisfaction operate fairly and in alignment with the with the outcomes (O’Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, rule of law are essential to preventing vio- and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2017; lence and sustaining peace. Accountability Stone 2015; UN Women 2015). of security forces to the citizen, stronger community policing approaches, and What People Fight Over: improved effi ciency of redress mechanisms Arenas of Contestation are among the responses often needed. Inequality and exclusion manifest most What Works: How starkly in policy arenas related to access to Countries Have Managed political power and governance; land, water, Contestation and Prevented and extractive resources; delivery of basic Violent Confl ict services; and justice and security. As the spaces where livelihoods and well-being are Drawing on the pathways framework, the defi ned and defended, access to these are- study describes the experience of national nas can become, quite literally, a matter of actors in three key areas: shaping the incen- life or death. The arenas refl ect the broader tives of actors for peace, reforming institu- balance of power in society, and as such, tions to foster inclusion, and addressing they are highly contestable and often resis- structural factors that feed into grievances. tant to reform. From the case studies analyzed for this Competition for power is an age-old report, common patterns emerge even if spe- source of confl ict. Power balances and cifi c prescriptions do not. Overall, the studies imbalances can put a society at risk of vio- suggest that effective prevention is a collec- lence. Experience shows that more inclu- tive endeavor—led domestically, built on sive and representative power- sharing existing strengths, and with international arrangements lower the risk of violent and regional support.6 confl ict. Decentralizing, devolving, or A central dilemma for all countries exam- allowing autonomy of subnational regions ined is that the incentives for violence are or groups can help to accommodate diver- often certain and specifi c to an individual or sity and lower the risk of violence at the group, while the incentives for peace are national level. often uncertain, and diffuse (World Bank Resources such as land, water, and 2017). To shape incentives, governments extractives are traditional sources of friction. took advantage of transition moments to

Executive Summary xxiii introduce both long-term reforms or invest- In these processes, formal political settlements targeting structural factors, while ments, or at least durable settlements, have implementing immediate initiatives that been important, but also rare events. buttressed confi dence in commitments to In some cases, political settlements have more inclusive processes. been applied only to address specifi c aspects The more successful cases mobilized a of confl ict, while underlying causes were coalition of domestic actors to infl uence targeted more comprehensively through incentives toward peace, bringing in the government action. In others, political set- comparative advantages of civil society, tlements were not used as part of the pre- including women’s groups, the faith com- vention process at all. munity, and the private sector to manage tensions. Decisive leadership provided A Global System for incentives for peaceful contestation, not least by mobilizing narratives and appealing Prevention under Stress to norms and values that support peaceful Since the end of the Cold War, the multilat- resolution (World Bank 2011).7 eral architecture for confl ict prevention and Nevertheless, before or after violence, postconfl ict peacebuilding has struggled to countries that have found pathways to sus- adapt to a fast-changing situation in the tainable peace have eventually tackled the fi eld and globally. Despite many challenges, messy and contested process of institutional there have been clear achievements. reform. Expanding access to the arenas of At a systemic level, comprehensive inter- contestation has been key to increasing rep- national normative and legal frameworks resentation and alleviating grievances are in place to regulate the tools and con- related to exclusion. Often, the transition duct of war; protect human rights; address moment that led to sustainable peace was global threats including climate change, ter- based on a shift away from security-led rorism, and transnational criminal net- responses and toward broader approaches works; and promote inclusive approaches to that mobilized a range of sectors in support development (the SDGs). of institutional reforms. Operationally, the United Nations and Alongside institutional reform, how- regional organizations such as the African ever, in many cases, governments invested Union and the European Union have pro- in addressing structural factors, launch- vided global and regional forums to coordi- ing programs targeting socioeconomic nate international responses to threats to grievances, redistributing resources, and peace and stability. The result has been addressing past abuses even while vio- important tools—including preventive lence was ongoing. diplomacy, sanctions, and peacekeeping— In these experiences, the greatest chal- that have proven instrumental in prevent- lenge lay not so much in accessing knowl- ing confl icts, mediating cease-fi res and edge, but in the contentious process of peace agreements, and supporting postcon- identifying and prioritizing risks. Part of fl ict recovery and transition processes. the reason for this diffi culty is that violence As confl icts have increasingly origi- narrowed the options for forward-looking nated from and disrupted the core institu- decision making needed to invest in institutions of states, international and regional tional or structural conditions for sustain- initiatives have accompanied these changes able peace. Confl ict did not bring a windfall with greater coordination and resource of resources; instead it brought a move to pooling among development, diplomatic, equip and support police, military, or secu- and security efforts. While this evolution is rity operations that strained national welcome, with confl icts becoming more budgets. Furthermore, preventive action was fragmented, more complex, and more at times unpopular, with popular demands transnational, these tools are being pro- for visible and tangible security mea- foundly challenged by the emergence of sures trumping longer-term, more complex nonstate actors, ideologies at odds with responses addressing the causes of violence. international humanitarian law, and the xxiv Executive Summary increased sponsorship of proxy warfare. an inclusive approach to prevention These conclusions increase the need to puts an understanding of grievances focus on the endogenous risk factors that and agency at the center of national and engender violence and on support for international engagement. It recognizes countries to address their own crises. the importance of understanding people and their communities: their trust in Building Inclusive institutions, confi dence in the future, perceptions of risk, and experience of Approaches for Prevention exclusion and injustice. Prevention is a long-term process of rein- • Prevention must proactively and forcing and steering a society’s pathway directly target patterns of exclusion and toward peace. This study amassed over- institutional weaknesses that increase whelming evidence that prevention risk. Successful prevention depends on requires sustained, inclusive, and targeted pro-active and targeted action before, attention and action. Deep changes are during, and after violence. Modern needed in the way national, regional, and confl icts arise when groups contest international actors operate and cooperate access to power, resources, services, and so that risks of violent confl ict are identi- security; alongside efforts to mitigate fi ed and addressed before they translate the impacts of violence and de-escalate into crisis. However, few incentives now confl ict, preventive action must actively exist for this coordination, collaboration, and directly target grievances and and cooperation. Instead, preventive action exclusion across key arenas of risk. often focuses on managing the accompanying crisis rather than addressing underlying Devising National Strategies risks, even when solutions to the underly- for Prevention ing risk are available. Pathways for Peace highlights three core The state bears the primary responsibility principles of prevention. for preventing confl ict and shaping a country’s pathway toward sustainable develop- • Prevention must be sustained over the ment and peace. The following are some time needed to address structural issues recommendations for effective national comprehensively, strengthen institutions, action in partnering for prevention. and adapt incentives for actors to manage confl ict without violence. It is easy, but Monitor the Risks of Confl ict wrong, to see prevention as a trade- Engaging early in preventive action requires off between the short and long term. a shift from early warning of violence and Sustainable results require sustained toward awareness of risk: investment in all risk environments, while development investments should • Identify real and perceived exclusion and be integrated into overarching strategies inequality, which requires strengthening with politically viable short-term and the capacity for identifying, measuring, medium-term actions. The need for and monitoring SDG indicators8 sustainability requires balancing effort • Strengthen national early warning and resources so that action does not systems and design systems that can reward only crisis management. effectively infl uence early response by • Prevention must be inclusive and build national actors at various levels broad partnerships across groups to • Harness technology to improve identify and address grievances that fuel monitoring, especially in remote and violence. Too often, preventive action confl ict-affected areas, including through is focused on the demands of actors application of ICT and real-time data that control the means of violence collection methods and positions of power. In complex, • Ensure that surveys and data collection fragmented, and protracted confl icts, measure inequality, exclusion, and

Executive Summary xxv perceptions and are conﬂ ict-sensitive whose exclusion poses a conﬂ ict risk may and capacity-sensitive.9 not be the poorest and may not be in areas of high potential for economic growth. Address Different Dimensions Where security interventions are warranted, of Risk social services and economic support should National actors often deal with multiple also be provided so that security forces are risks simultaneously with limited budgets, not the only interface between the state and political capital, and time: the population.

• Bring institutions and actors together Build Capacity and Allocate under a peace and development Resources to Ensure that Grievances framework that prioritizes the risk of Are Mediated Quickly and confl ict Transparently • Target risk spatially with investments and Capacity building can be addressed through other actions in border and peripheral training, development of guidance, and areas where grievances and violence may strengthening of institutions. Support for be more likely to exist national and local-level mediation can be • Manage the impact of shocks when integrated into planning and programming tensions are high at the local level (Rakotomalala 2017). • Target action and resources to identifi ed risks in arenas where exclusion and Engage Actors beyond the State grievances arise over access to power, in Platforms for Dialogue and resources, services, and security and Peacebuilding justice, and manage contestation and Many actors involved in confl ict today are confl ict by redistributive policies, among not directly accessible to state institutions other possible actions. or agents. Inclusive prevention entails a focus on strengthening the capacity of the Aligning Peace, Security, and society, not just the state, for prevention. Development for Prevention Inclusive prevention is a bottom-up process that should involve as broad a spectrum of One of the objectives of Pathways for Peace people and groups as possible. Coalitions is to stimulate new thinking about the should refl ect the importance of young relationship of development, peace, and people, women, the private sector, and civil security—a relationship that takes con- society organizations. crete form in inclusive approaches to preventing confl ict. A coherent strategy that Adopt a People-Centered Approach can be sustained over time demands levels A people-centered approach should include of integrated planning and implementa- mainstreaming citizen engagement in tion that are often challenging to develop- development programs and local confl ict ment, security, humanitarian, and political resolution to empower underrepresented actors. Each has comparative advantages at groups such as women and youth. Service different stages of risk but sustained, inclu- delivery systems should seek to make peo- sive, and targeted prevention requires that ple partners in the design and delivery of they coordinate more effectively. The fol- public services through mainstreaming par- lowing are some recommendations for ticipatory and consultative elements for all better alignment. planning and programming in areas at risk of violent confl ict. Ensure that Security and Development Approaches Overcoming Barriers to Are Compatible and Mutually Cooperation in Prevention Supportive Mutual support requires rebalancing growth Development organizations need to adjust and stability targets, as aggrieved groups incentives toward prevention. International xxvi Executive Summary development actors and multilateral devel- Explore New Investment opment banks are constrained by mandates, Approaches for Prevention intergovernmental agreements, and institu- Financing for prevention remains risk tional culture from engaging on sensitive averse and focused on crises. As a result, risks with governments. Development orga- current models are too slow to seize win- nizations should ensure that prevention has dows of opportunity and too volatile to sus- a higher priority in their programming. tain prevention. Complex and multilevel efforts are often constrained by the lack of Share Risk Assessments needed and readily available resources, In the absence of a coherent process to resulting in ad hoc resource mobilization share data, many organizations carry out attempts to generate fi nancing from donors, assessments of different risks using differ- often resulting in delayed and suboptimal ent indicators. These data mostly remain responses. Options include strengthening internal to these organizations and are not support for fi nancing national capacity for shared with the national government or prevention, combining different forms of other relevant national actors, mostly fi nancing, and strengthening fi nancing for because this information is often seen as regional prevention efforts. politically sensitive. Risk monitoring and assessment methodologies also must Conclusion become more widely shared, with specifi c A comprehensive shift toward preventing focus on developing shared metrics across violence and sustaining peace offers life- the various risks to development, peace, saving rewards. Pathways for Peace presents and security. national and international actors an agenda for action to ensure that attention, efforts, Commit to Collective Mechanisms and resources are focused on prevention. to Identify and Understand Today, the consequences of failing to act Risks at Regional, Country, together are alarmingly evident, and the call and Subnational Levels for urgent action has perhaps never been The absence of effective mechanisms trans- clearer. The time to act is now. lates into ad hoc and fragmented actions among international partners. Notes Ensure That Joint Risk Assessments 1. UCDP (2017). The UCDP/PRIO (Uppsala Articulate Jointly Agreed Priorities Confl ict Data Program/Peace Research Joint risk assessments should be based on Institute Oslo) Armed Confl ict Dataset 2017 agreed indicators that allow trends to be records all state-based confl ict in which at monitored over time. For example, the least one side is the government of a state and joint United Nations–European Union– which results in at least 25 battle-related World Bank Recovery and Peacebuilding deaths in a calendar year. It covers the years Assessment offers one such approach for 1946 to 2016. UCDP data that record nonstate aligning priorities. Currently used mostly and one-sided violence that results in at least during and immediately following confl ict, 25 confl ict-related deaths in a calendar year this approach could be used further cover the years 1989 to 2016. upstream and developed into joint plat- 2. For example, offi cial development assistance forms for prioritizing risk. to countries with high risk of confl ict averages US$250 million per year, only slightly Build Stronger Regional and Global higher than that to countries at peace, but Partnerships increases to US$700 million during open Efforts should include the strengthening of confl ict and US$400 million during recovery regional analyses and strategies for preven- years. Similarly, peacekeeping support aver- tion and the sharing of risk analyses to the ages US$30 million a year for countries at extent possible at a regional level. high risk, compared with US$100 million

Executive Summary xxvii for countries in open confl ict and US$300 practices and promoting appropriate legisla- million during recovery. See Mueller (2017). tion, policies, and action in this regard); and 3. UN General Assembly (2016); UN Security SDG16 (16.3: Promote the rule of law at the Council (2016). This study has been greatly national and international levels and ensure informed by and builds on recent reviews by equal access to justice for all; 16.7: Ensure the United Nations and the World Bank. responsive, inclusive, participatory, and repre- These include World Bank (2011, 2017); UN sentative decision making at all levels). (2015a, 2015b, 2016); UN Women (2015). 9. Implementing the monitoring of percep- 4. National governments and other local actors tions and issues such as horizontal inequal- are the foundation and point of reference for ity requires several important safeguards to preventive action (see UN General Assembly be in place. Governments and other actors 2016; UN Security Council 2016; Articles 2 can use questions on perceptions, identity, and 3 of the United Nations Charter). The and aspirations to identify certain groups, sustaining peace resolutions reaffi rmed this target them for security purposes, deny principle. UN Security Council Resolution people’s rights, or support implementation 2282 recognizes “the primary responsibility of exclusionary policies. It is essential that of national Governments and authorities in very strong attention be given to protecting identifying, driving and directing priorities, individual and collective rights of the popu- strategies and activities for sustaining peace lation interviewed and the people collecting … emphasizing that sustaining peace is a the information. shared task and responsibility that needs to be fulfi lled by the Government and all other References national stakeholders.” Allansson, M., E. Melander, and L. Themnér. 5. UCDP (2017) defi nes internationalized con- 2017. “Organized Violence, 1989–2016.” fl ict as those where one side is a state and Journal of Peace Research 54 (4): 574–87. one side is nonstate, and where an outside Bakker, R., D. W. Hill, and W. H. Moore. 2016. state intervenes on behalf of one of these. “How Much Terror? Dissidents, Governments, 6. The insights are drawn from the background Institutions, and the Cross-National Study of country case studies and research commis- Terror Attacks.” Journal of Peace Research sioned for this study and a review of broader 53 (5): 711–26. relevant literature. The case studies cover Betancourt, T. S., R. McBain, E. A. Newnham, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African and R. T. Brennan. 2012. “Trajectories of Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Arab Republic of Internalizing Problems in War-Affected Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, Sierra Leonean Youth: Examining Confl ict Kenya, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Morocco, and Postconfl ict Factors.” Child Development Nepal, Niger, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, 84 (2): 455–70. Republic of South Sudan, and Tunisia. Blattman, C. 2006. The Consequences of Child 7. In addition to transition moments like a Soldiering. Berkeley, CA: University of natural disaster or global economic shock, California. opportunities can arise when a society’s tol- Brinkerhoff, D., A. Wetterberg, and S. Dunn. erance for violence changes. 2012. “Service Delivery and Legitimacy in 8. Several SDG targets and indicators could have Fragile and Confl ict-Affected States.” Public relevance for assessing risks of horizontal Management Review 14 (2): 273–93. inequality. Specifi cally, key core targets include Caprioli, M., V. Hudson, R. McDermott, C. SDG5 (5.1: End all forms of discrimination Emmett, and B. Ballif-Spanvill. 2007. “Putting against all women and girls everywhere); Women in Their Place.” Baker Journal of SDG10 (10.2: By 2030, empower and promote Applied Public Policy 1 (1): 12–22. the social, economic, and political inclusion of Cederman, L.-E., A. Wimmer, and B. Min. 2010. all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, eth- “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data nicity, origin, religion, or economic or other and Analysis.” World Politics 62 (1): 87–119. status; 10.3: Ensure equal opportunity and Cingranelli, D., M. Gibney, P. Haschke, R. Wood, reduce inequalities of outcome, including by D. Arnon, and B. Mark. 2017. “Human Rights eliminating discriminatory laws, policies, and Violations and Violent Confl ict.” Background xxviii Executive Summary paper for the United Nations–World Bank Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive and the Security of States.” International Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Security 33 (3): 7–45. World Bank, Washington, DC. Huesmann, L. R., and L. Kirwil. 2007. Why Collier, P., and A. Hoeffl er. 2004. “Greed and Observing Violence Increases the Risk of Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Violent Behavior in the Observer. New York: Papers 56 (4): 563–95. Cambridge University Press. Cramer, C. 2003. “Does Inequality Cause Confl ict?” Humphreys, M., and A. Varshney. 2004. “Violent Journal of International Development 15 (4): Confl ict and the Millennium Development 397–412. Goals: Diagnosis and Recommendations.” Crespo-Sancho, C. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention Paper prepared for the Millennium and Gender.” Background paper for the Development Goals Poverty Task Force United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Workshop, Bangkok, June. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross). Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, 2017. City at War. Special Report. Geneva: Washington, DC. ICRC. Dupuy, K., S. Gates, H. M. Nygård, I. Rudolfsen, Idris, I. 2016. Youth Unemployment and S. A. Rustad, H. Strand, and H. Urdal. 2017. Violence: Rapid Literature Review. “Trends in Armed Confl ict 1946–2016.” Birmingham, UK: Governance and Social PRIO Confl ict Trends 02/2017, Peace Development Resource Centre, University of Research Institute Oslo. https://www.prio Birmingham. . org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1373& ILO (International Labour Organization). 2016. type=publicationfi le. World Employment and Social Outlook 2016: Fearon, J. D. 2010. “Governance and Civil War Trends for Youth. Geneva: ILO. http://www Onset.” Background paper for World . ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports Development Report 2011: Confl ict, Security, /---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication and Development, World Bank, Washington, DC. /wcms_513739.pdf. Fearon, J., and D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Justino, P. 2017. “Linking Inequality and Political Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Confl ict: The Role of Social Mobilization and Science Review 97 (1): 75–90. Collective Action.” Background paper for the Geneva Declaration Secretariat. 2015. Global United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Body Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Counts. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, GIWPS (Georgetown Institute for Women, Washington, DC. Peace and Security) and PRIO (Peace Kelly, J. 2017. “Intimate Partner Violence and Research Institute Oslo). 2017. Women, Peace, Confl ict: Understanding the Links between and Security Index 2017/18: Tracking Political Violence and Personal Violence.” Sustainable Peace through Inclusion, Justice, Background paper for the United Nations– and Security for Women. Washington, DC: World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for GIWPS and PRIO. Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing GTD (Global Terrorism Database). 2017. Global Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Terrorism Database. College Park: National Leckman, J. F., C. Panter-Brick, and R. Salah, eds. Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 2014. Pathways to Peace: The Transformative Responses to Terrorism, University of Power of Children and Families. Cambridge, Maryland. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. MA: MIT Press. Hale, G. and M. Xu. 2016. “FDI Effects on the Lichbach, M. I. 1989. “An Evaluation of ‘Does Labor Market of Host Countries.” Working Economic Inequality Breed Political Paper 2016-25, Federal Reserve Bank of San Confl ict?’ Studies.” World Politics 41 (4): Francisco. 431–70. Hudson, V., B. Ballif-Spanvill, M. Caprioli, and Marc, A., N. Verjee, and S. Mogaka. 2015. C. Emmett. 2012. Sex and World Peace. The Challenge of Stability and Security in New York: Columbia University Press. West Africa. Africa Development Forum Hudson, V., M. Caprioli, B. Ballif-Spanvill, series. Washington, DC: World Bank; Paris: R. McDermott, and C. Emmett. 2009. “The Agence Française de Développement.

Executive Summary xxix Miller, K. E., and A. Rasmussen. 2010. “War Momentum to Sustaining Peace.” Background Exposure, Daily Stressors, and Mental Health in paper for the United Nations–World Bank Confl ict and Post-Confl ict Settings: Bridging Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive the Divide between Trauma-Focused and Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Psychosocial Frameworks.” Journal of Social World Bank, Washington, DC. Science Medicine 70 (1): 7–16. Piazza, J. A. 2017. “Repression and Terrorism: Mueller, H. 2017. “How Much Is Prevention A Cross-National Empirical Analysis of Types Worth?” Background paper for the United of Repression and Domestic Terrorism.” Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Terrorism and Political Violence 29 (1): Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to 102–18. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Rakotomalala, O. 2017. “Local-Level Mechanisms Washington, DC. for Violent Confl ict Prevention.” Background Mueller, H., and J. Tobias. 2016. “The Cost of paper for the United Nations–World Bank Violence: Estimating the Economic Impact of Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Confl ict.” Growth Brief, International Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Growth Centre, London. https://www.theigc. World Bank, Washington, DC. org/wp -content/uploads/2016/12/IGCJ5023 Rother, B., G. Pierre, D. Lombardo, R. Herrala, Economic Cost_of_Confl ict_Brief_2211 v7 P. Toffano, E. Roos, G. Auclair, and _WEB.pdf. K. Manasseh. 2016. “The Economic Impact Nordas, R., and N. P. Gleditsch. 2007. “Climate of Confl icts and the Refugee Crisis in the Change and Confl ict.” Political Geography 26 Middle East and North Africa.” Staff (6): 627–38. Discussion Note SDN/16/08, International Nygård, H., K. Baghat, G. Barrett, K. Dupuy, Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. S. Gates, S. Hillesund, S. A. Rustad, H. Strand, Rustad, S. A. 2016. “Socioeconomic Inequalities H. Urdal, and G. Østby. 2017. “Inequality and and Attitudes toward Violence: A Test with Armed Confl ict: Evidence and Data.” New Survey Data in the Niger Delta.” Background paper for the United Nations– International Interactions 42 (1): 106–39. World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Sacks, A., and M. Larizza. 2012. “Why Quality Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Matters: Rebuilding Trustworthy Local Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Government in Post-Confl ict Sierra Leone.” OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation Policy Research Working Paper 6021, World and Development). 2015. States of Fragility Bank, Washington, DC. 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions. Paris: Sargsyan, I. L. 2017. “Narrative, Perception, and OECD. Emotion: A Review of Recent Political ———. 2016. States of Fragility Report 2016. Science Studies.” Background paper for the Paris: OECD. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, O’Reilly, M., A. Ó Súilleabháin, and T. Paffenholz. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to 2015. Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Roles in Peace Processes. New York: Washington, DC. International Peace Institute. Schleussner, C., J. F. Donges, R. V. Donner, and Østby, G. 2013. “Inequality and Political Violence: H. J. Schellnhuber. 2016. “Armed-Confl ict A Review of the Literature.” International Area Risks Enhanced by Climate-Related Disasters Studies Review 16 (2): 206–31. in Ethnically Fractionalized Countries.” Paasonen, K., and H. Urdal. 2016. “Youth Bulges, Proceedings of the National Academy of Exclusion, and Instability: The Role of Youth Sciences 113 (33): 9216–21. in the Arab Spring.” PRIO Confl ict Trends, Shonkoff, J. P., and A. P. Garner. 2012. The Peace Research Institute Oslo, March. http:// Lifelong Effects of Early Childhood Adversity fi les.prio.org/Publication_fi les/prio/Paasonen, and Toxic Stress. Technical Report. Elk Grove %20Urdal%20-%20Youth%20Bulges,%20Exc Village, IL: American Academy of Pediatrics. lusion%20and%20Instability,%20Conflict http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content %20Trends%203-2016.pdf. /pediatrics/early/2011/12/21/peds.2011-2663 Paffenholz, T., A. Hirblinger, D. Landau, F. Fritsch, .full.pdf. and C. Dijkstra. 2017. “Preventing Violence Small Arms Survey. 2011. Global Burden of through Inclusion: From Building Political Armed Violence. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. xxx Executive Summary Stel, N., and R. Ndayiragiie. 2014. “The Eye of UNDP (United Nations Development the Beholder: Service Provision and State Programme). 2016. Arab Human Development Legitimacy in Burundi.” Africa Spectrum 49 Report: Youth and the Prospects for Human (3): 3–28. Development in a Changing Reality. New Stewart, F. 2000. “Crisis Prevention: Tackling York: UNDP. http://www.arab-hdr.org/ Horizontal Inequalities.” Oxford Development PreviousReports/2016/2016.aspx. Studies 28 (3): 245–62. UNESCWA (UN Economic and Social ———. 2002. “Horizontal Inequalities: A Commission for Western Asia). 2017. “The Neglected Dimension of Development.” QEH Impact of Confl ict over the Life Cycle: Working Paper 81, Centre for Research on Evidence for the Arab Region.” Forthcoming Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity, in Trends and Impacts 5. Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. UN General Assembly. 2016. “Review of ———. 2009. “Horizontal Inequalities as a United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture.” Cause of Confl ict.” Bradford Development Resolution A/RES/70/262, adopted April 27, Lecture, University of Bradford. https://www New York. .bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/media/social- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner sciences/BDLStewart.pdf. for Refugees). 2017. Global Trends: Forced Stone, L. 2015. “Study of 156 Peace Agreements, Displacement in 2016. Geneva: UNHCR. Controlling for Other Variables, Quantitative http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcr Analysis of Women’s Participation in Peace stats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-dis- Processes.” In Reimagining Peacemaking: placement-2016.html. Women’s Roles in Peace Processes, by M. O’Reilly, UN Secretary-General. 2015. Report of the A. Ó Súilleabháin, and T. Paffenholz, annex I. Secretary-General: Confl ict-Related Sexual New York: International Peace Institute. Violence, UN Doc. S/2015/203. New York: Sturge, G., R. Mallett, J. Hagen-Zanker, and R. Slater. United Nations. 2017. Tracking Livelihoods, Services and UN Security Council. 2015. “Youth, Peace, and Governance: Panel Survey Findings from the Security.” Resolution 2250, adopted December Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium. London: 9, New York. Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium. ———. 2016. “Postconfl ict Peacebuilding.” Sundberg, R., K. Eck, and J. Kreutz. 2012. Resolution S/RES/2282, adopted April 27, “Introducing the UCDP Non-State Confl ict New York. Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 49 (2): UN Women. 2015. Preventing Confl ict, 351–62. Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: UCDP (Uppsala Confl ict Data Program). 2017. Global Study on the Implementation of United UCDP Confl ict Encyclopedia. Uppsala Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. University. www.ucdp.uu.se. New York: UN Women. UN (United Nations). 2015a. The Challenge of World Bank. 2011. World Development Report Sustaining Peace. Report of the Advisory 2011: Confl ict, Security, and Development. Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the Washington, DC: World Bank. United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. ———. 2017. World Development Report 2017: New York: UN. Governance and the Law. Washington, DC: ———. 2015b. Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: World Bank. Politics, Partnership, and People. Report of the World Economic Forum. 2016. The Future of High-Level Panel on Peace Operations. New Jobs: Employment, Skills, and Workforce York: United Nations, June 16. Strategy for the Fourth Industrial Revolution. ———. 2016. Too Important to Fail—Addressing Global Challenge Insight Report. Geneva: the Humanitarian Financing Gap. Report of the World Economic Forum. High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing to the Secretary-General. New York: UN. Additional Reading UN DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs). 2015. Aall, P., and C. A. Crocker, eds. 2017. The Fabric “Population by Age and Sex (Thousands).” of Peace in Africa: Looking Beyond the State. UN DESA, New York. https://esa.un.org Wateloo: Centre for International Governance /unpd/wpp/DataQuery/. Innovation.

Executive Summary xxxi Bøås, M., S. Sundstøl Eriksen, T. Gade, J. H. Sande Jaffrey, S. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making Lie, and O. J. Sending. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention Development Work for the Prevention of and Ownership: Limits and Opportunities for Violent Confl icts; Case Study: Indonesia.” External Actors.” Background paper for the Case study for the United Nations–World United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Washington, DC. Mogaka, S. 2017. “Competition for Power in Bob-Milliar, G. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making Africa: Inclusive Politics and Its Relation to Development Work for the Prevention of Violent Confl ict.” Background paper for the Violent Confl icts: Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Compared.” Case study for the United Nations– Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Washington, DC. Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Langer, A., and K. Smedts. 2013. “Seeing Is Not Brack, D., and G. Hayman. 2006. “Managing Believing: Perceptions of Horizontal Trade in Confl ict Resources.” In Trade, Aid, Inequalities in Africa.” Working Paper 16, and Security, edited by O. Brown, M. Halle, Centre for Research on Peace and S. Pena-Moreno, and S. Winkler. London: Development, Leuven, Belgium. Earthscan. Paffenholz, T. 2015. “Beyond the Normative: Can Call, C. 2012. Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Women’s Inclusion Really Make for Better Prevention of Civil War Recurrence. Washington, Peace Processes?” Policy Brief, Graduate DC: Georgetown University Press. Institute of Geneva and Centre for Confl ict Colletta, N., and B. Oppenheim. 2017. Development and Peacebuilding, Geneva. “Subnational Confl ict: Dimensions, Trends, Parks, T., N. Colletta, and B. Oppenheim. 2013. and Options for Prevention.” Background The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational paper for the United Nations–World Bank Confl ict and International Development Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Assistance. San Francisco: Asia Foundation. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, UN (United Nations). 2013. A New Global World Bank, Washington, DC. Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform DCAF (Geneva Center for the Democratic Economies through Sustainable Development. Control of Armed Forces). 2017. “The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Contribution and Role of SSR in the Persons on the Post-2015 Development Prevention of Violent Confl ict.” Background Agenda. New York: UN. paper for the United Nations–World Bank UN Secretary-General. 2013. Securing States and Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Societies: Strengthening the United Nations Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Comprehensive Support to Security Sector World Bank, Washington, DC. Reform. Report A/67/970. New York: United Drew, E. 2017. “Assessing the Links between Nations. Extractive Industries and the Prevention ———. 2017. Restructuring of the United Nations of Violent Confl ict: A Literature Review.” Peace and Security Pillar. Report A/72/525. Background paper for the United Nations– New York: United Nations. World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for UNDP (United Nations Development Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Programme) and Department of Political Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Affairs. 2016. Joint UNDP-DPA Programme Griffi n, M. Forthcoming. “The UN’s Role in a on Building National Capacities for Confl ict Changing Global Landscape.” In The Oxford Prevention: Annual Report. New York: UNDP. Handbook on the United Nations. 2d ed., http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en edited by T. G. Weiss and S. Daws. Oxford: /home/librarypage/democratic-governance Oxford University Press. /conflict-prevention/joint-undp-dpa-pro Gurr, T. R. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: gramme-on-building-national-capacities Princeton University Press. -for-con.html.

xxxii Executive Summary Abbreviations

3N Initiative The Nigeriens Nourish the Nigeriens ACLED Armed Confl ict Location and Event Data CDD community-driven development CEWARN Confl ict Early Warning and Response Mechanism CSO civil society organization DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration ECOWARN Early Warning and Response Network ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EU European Union EWS early warning system FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FDI foreign direct investment GCFF Global Concessional Financing Facility GDP gross domestic product GNI gross national income HACP Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix HIV/AIDS human immunodefi ciency virus/acquired immunodefi ciency syndrome I4P infrastructures for peace ICT information and communication technology IDA International Development Association IDP internally displaced person IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development IRA Irish Republican Army KPCS Kimberley Process Certifi cation Scheme MINUSCA Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSP National Solidarity Program ODA overseas development assistance OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PDA peace and development adviser PER public expenditure review PRIO Peace Research Institute Oslo RPBA Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment SDG Sustainable Development Goal SME small or medium enterprise

xxxiii SSR security sector reform TOC transnational organized crime UCDP Uppsala Confl ict Data Program UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNOCA United Nations Offi ce for Central Africa UNODC United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime UNOWA United Nations Offi ce for West Africa UNOWAS United Nations Offi ce for West Africa and the Sahel UNRCCA United Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia WTO World Trade Organization

xxxiv Abbreviations Introduction

Violent confl ict has surged in recent years.1 This suggests that economic development While this violence is concentrated in rela- alone is not a guarantee of peace. Armed tively few countries, its global impact is groups increasingly act across borders and enormous. The spread of violence across benefi t from cross-border illicit economies, previously stable regions, the increased triggering foreign intervention and underuse of terrorism as a tactic of war, and mining regional stability. the deployment of remote tactics of warfare An impediment to development and have exacted a terrible human toll. The prosperity today and in the future, violent global sense of security has been shaken far confl ict also curtails the ability of govern- beyond any specifi c battlefi eld. For the ments to reduce poverty. By 2030—the countries directly affected by civil war, the horizon set by the international community impact of violence is measured not only in for achieving the Sustainable Development direct casualties but also in economic col- Goals (SDGs)—more than 60 percent of the lapse, breaking apart of institutions, and world’s poor will live in countries affected tearing of the social fabric. The impacts of by fragility and high levels of violence violence also reverberate globally. The fl ow (OECD 2015; World Bank 2011). By the of refugees from violent confl ict has reached same year, the costs of humanitarian assis- historic proportions. Attacks on civilian tar- tance will be a staggering US$50 billion per gets have increased signifi cantly. Peace and year (UN 2016). security policies are changing dramatically The growing costs associated with vio- in reaction to new threats.2 lent confl ict, the increasingly global impact The majority of violent confl icts play out of many contemporary confl icts, and their within the border of the countries where resistance to established settlement mecha- they originate. Yet violence has become nisms make focusing on prevention a prior- increasingly complex, crossing borders and ity for the international community. becoming protracted and intractable. In This study originates from the convic- today’s highly interconnected world, violent tion on the part of the World Bank Group confl ict can evolve rapidly, making tradi- and the United Nations (UN) that the atten- tional preventive tools obsolete and ineffec- tion of the international community needs tive. Many armed confl icts today take to be urgently refocused on prevention. It place on the peripheries of states and do builds on the recognition that the end of not directly involve government soldiers. violence should be both an objective and an Violence remains entrenched in low-income enabler of development, as expressed in the countries, yet some of today’s deadliest con- 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, fl icts are occurring in countries with higher the recent commitments expressed in income levels and stronger institutions. the UN resolutions on sustaining peace

Introduction 1 (UN General Assembly 2016; UN evidence that the prevention of violent con- Security Council 2016) and the eighteenth fl ict is associated with enormous returns in replenishment of the World Bank Group’s terms of cost avoidance. These returns are International Development Association. This particularly high for confl ict-affected coun- study also builds on the fi ndings of the World tries, but are equally meaningful for the Development Report 2011: Confl ict, Security, international community as well. Existing and Development (World Bank 2011). patterns of spending on offi cial develop- This study seeks to improve the way in ment assistance and humanitarian aid— which domestic development processes strongly focused on countries in or after interact with security, diplomatic, justice, confl ict—suggest that the international and human rights efforts to prevent con- community could save substantial resources fl icts from becoming violent. It recognizes by refocusing its efforts on preventing vio- that the World Bank Group and the United lence. The scholarly literature concurs that Nations bring separate comparative advan- taking preventive action before the out- tages to the prevention of violent confl ict break of violence is considerably cheaper and have different roles and responsibilities for the international community than inter- in the international architecture. Therefore, vening during or after violence occurs while a holistic framework is essential to (Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce 2003; prevention, the fi ndings and recommenda- Mueller 2017). tions of this study do not apply to all orga- In their early attempt to estimate the nizations in the same way. cost-effectiveness of prevention, Brown and Rosecrance (1999) demonstrate that in Prevention of Violent Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia, among other Confl ict Works and Is situations, preventive action by the interna- Cost-Effective tional community would have saved considerable resources later on. Looking at a Prevention is a rational and cost-effective series of case studies, Chalmers (2007) sim- strategy for countries at risk of violence and ilarly estimates the cost-effectiveness ratio for the international community. Beyond of prevention to lie somewhere between 1:2 the moral value associated with saving and 1:7. These fi gures suggest that, over the human lives and preventing atrocity, pre- medium to long term, donors would save vention minimizes the costs of destruction between US$2 and US$7 for each US$1 generated by cycles of violence (Chang and invested in prevention-related activities. Luo 2013). By preserving a landscape free The cost-effectiveness of prevention, how- of large-scale armed violence, prevention ever, becomes even clearer if the actual costs also minimizes the indirect costs of vio- to confl ict-affected countries and their lence, such as the diversion of resources neighbors are considered. Looking at data toward military expenditures, international from Rwanda between 1995 and 2014, the spillovers to neighboring countries and Institute for Economics and Peace fi nds the regions, and losses of human capital (De cost-effectiveness ratio of peacebuilding to Groot, Brück, and Bozzoli 2009). Given the be 1:16. This means that US$1 invested in characteristic persistence of violence once it efforts to build peace and prevent the recur- starts and the likelihood of relapse, the rence of violence in Rwanda has saved benefi ts of prevention accumulate over US$16 in costs over the past two decades time (Mueller 2017). (IEP 2017). Several studies have developed method- An analysis carried out for this study by ologies to estimate the cost-effectiveness of Mueller (2017) presents a series of scenarios confl ict prevention (Brown and Rosecrance in which the costs and benefi ts of preven- 1999; Carnegie Commission on Preventing tion are calculated considering different Deadly Confl ict 1997; Chalmers 2007; IEP success rates of prevention efforts (see 2017; Mueller 2017). While the availability box I.1). In a conservative, neutral scenario and quality of data remain a major issue, where only 50 percent of efforts at preven- this recent body of literature provides tion prove successful, the net returns from

2 Pathways for Peace BOX I.1 The Business Case for Prevention

Using a model and a series of scenarios, The lost growth from a year of Mueller (2017) conducted a cost-benefi t confl ict means that every analysis of an effective system for subsequent year’s economic growth preventing violent confl ict. The expected starts from a lower base, so returns on prevention will be positive as prevention leads to compounded long as the costs of prevention are less savings over time. than the damages or losses attributable • Prevention is also good for the to violence. Considering the highly international community. It saves on destructive potential of war, this is almost postconfl ict humanitarian assistance always the case provided that prevention and peacekeeping interventions, is minimally effective. The returns on which are much more expensive than prevention vary in optimistic, pessimistic, preventive action itself. In the most and neutral scenarios (table BI.1.1). optimistic scenario, yearly savings for The negative effects of war on economic the international community could growth and expenditures on postconfl ict amount to US$1.5 billion per year. aid and peacekeeping need to be In the most pessimistic scenario, weighed against the expected costs and yearly savings for the international effi cacy of the three scenarios for community could amount to prevention. The effects of prevention for US$698 million. each scenario are described in terms of economic damages, loss of life avoided • The benefi ts of prevention increase (prevented damage), and cost savings in over time, while the costs fall. This postconfl ict reconstruction and means that the net savings (displayed peacekeeping (saved costs). in table BI.1.1) are much lower than Prevention benefi ts all actors involved: the total benefi ts reached after 15 years. • Prevention is economically benefi cial. Even in the most pessimistic scenario, The three scenarios are based on the average net savings is close to assumptions regarding lost gross domestic US$5 billion per year. In the most product (GDP) growth attributable optimistic scenario, the net savings is to confl ict (Lomborg 2013; Mueller almost US$70 billion per year. 2017), the costs of prevention, and the • The bulk of the savings accrue at the effectiveness of prevention (Dunne national level, where direct costs of 2012). The optimistic scenario assumes confl ict in terms of casualties and that the costs of prevention are low forgone economic growth are greatest. (US$100 million per intervention per year);

TABLE BI.1.1 Modeling the Returns to Prevention under Three Scenarios

Assumption Optimistic Neutral Pessimistic Lost GDP growth per conﬂ ict year (% points) 5.2 3.9 2.5 Cost of preventiona 100 500 1,000 Effectiveness of prevention (%) 75 50 25 Prevented damagea 68,736 34,251 9,377 Saved costsb 1,523 1,176 698 Additional costc −352 −2,118 −5,247 Net savings per year 69,907 33,309 4,828 Note: All ﬁ gures for spending, damages, and costs are in US$, millions per year. GDP = gross domestic product. a. The economic damage and deaths prevented. b. Costs saved from peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance that become unnecessary with prevention. c. Additional costs needed for prevention efforts.

(Box continued next page)

Introduction 3 BOX I.1 The Business Case for Prevention (continued)

prevention is highly effective (succeeds estimates that this simple model in avoiding a confl ict 75 percent of the suggests. This model does not factor time); and prevention avoids very high in many additional costs of war that losses attributable to confl ict (GDP may make prevention even more growth is 5.2 percent lower during cost-effective. Costs associated with confl ict). The pessimistic scenario, forced displacement, for instance, which uses the most conservative are not included. Military expenditure assumptions, assumes that prevention to fi ght civil wars, which is known is rarely effective (25 percent of the to divert critical resources from time); the costs of prevention are very productive activities in low-income high (US$1 billion per intervention per countries (Collier and Hoeffl er 2006), year); and war affects GDP with lower is not included either. The impact of growth of 2.5 percent per year. The “ungoverned spaces,” which contribute neutral scenario uses assumptions to opportunities for violent extremism, between these two extremes: prevention organized crime, and traffi cking, all have is effective 50 percent of the time; it is signifi cant cost implications that are not moderately expensive (US$500 million accounted for in the model. Some of per intervention per year); and GDP the persistent legacy effects of confl ict growth is 3.9 percent lower per year of due to refugees, interrupted trade, and active confl ict. illicit trade, among others, need to be Returns on prevention may be factored in to gauge the real impact of even greater than the conservative prevention in terms of cost avoidance.

Sources: Collier and Hoefﬂ er 2006; Dunne 2012; Lomborg 2013; Mueller 2017.

prevention are US$33 billion against an combination of effective policies, programs, average cost of US$2.1 billion per year over and political action. 15 years. Put another way, for each US$1 While countries can be successful at invested in prevention, about US$16 is reducing violence, the prevailing perception saved down the road. is that the international community’s ability to tackle the risk of violent confl ict effec- Why, Then, Is There So Little tively has been declining. Pessimism perme- Belief in the Prevention of ates the tone of public discourse when it Violent Confl ict? comes to preventing confl ict. Stories of successful prevention rarely receive the same The vast majority of countries manage con- public attention as confl icts that descend fl ict peacefully most of the time and can into violence. Prevention lacks positive prevent its violent manifestations. Both publicity, as the existence of a direct link individuals and societies tend to cooperate between specifi c policy actions and the to avoid the risk of violence. Many coun- resulting absence of violence is often hard tries have established institutions for to prove. Economists refer to this problem redistributive purposes, for security and as “lack of counterfactuals.” How can the justice, and for the management of political positive impact of preventing a violent con- competition. These institutions support fl ict be credited, if that confl ict did not societies in resolving confl ict peacefully and occur? It is diffi cult to prove that specifi c routinely provide effective governance actions have addressed the high risk of vio- (World Bank 2017), preventing confl ict and lent confl icts. Many factors may be at play, tensions in society from turning violent. and singling out specifi c causes and effects This study analyzes cases of countries at is often impossible. high risk of violent confl ict that have Doubts about the effectiveness of pre- successfully prevented violence through a vention refl ect the lack of clear information

4 Pathways for Peace on what does, and does not, seem to work. community has secured some degree of suc- The drivers of violent confl ict are complex cess in containing and ending confl icts, but and so is the identifi cation of the courses of its focus has been more on short-term crisis action needed to prevent violence and sus- management than on the upstream preven- tain peace. There is no single, simple for- tion of violence. International efforts at pre- mula for prevention. Preventing violent ventive diplomacy and peacekeeping are confl ict and building peace call for different aimed primarily at preserving international approaches in different circumstances and peace and security as well as preventing in different contexts. Redirecting invest- atrocities—the extremes of violence—while ments to a marginalized region, engaging scarce resources are targeted at delivering youth in meaningful activities, investing in tangible responses to the humanitarian cri- the education of women, and setting up ses that confl ict causes. International action, grievance-redress mechanisms are all exam- deployed when a crisis is looming or when ples of actions that can foster inclusiveness violence has escalated, is, arguably, over- and reduce the risk of violent confl ict. At whelming the capacity of the international times, such courses of action may appear system to respond. banal. Often, they do not even register as Development policies that could effec- prevention in the minds of common citi- tively address early risks of violence by zens and policy makers. promoting structural and institutional Furthermore, effective preventive action change are often designed with limited requires justifying preemptive investments consideration given to prevention. Risks of and allocating scarce resources to address violent confl icts are rarely integrated in risks before their potential impacts have their design. Holistic and sustained become evident. It is part of human nature approaches to maintaining peace and build- to hope, even in the face of clear risks, that ing local resilience are rare. When they suc- the worst will be avoided. One may wonder, ceed, they rarely attract attention. as a consequence, whether the political, economic, and social costs of early preventive What Is the Prevention of actions are worth incurring. Confl ict pre- Violent Confl ict? vention, seen in this perspective, is not dis- similar from preventive health care (Stares The UN twin resolutions on sustaining peace 2017). It may take considerable effort to defi ne prevention as the avoidance of “the convince people that a healthy lifestyle is the outbreak, escalation, recurrence, or continu- most effective prescription for a long life ation of violent confl icts” (UN General and that tertiary care, with its sophisticated Assembly 2016; UN Security Council 2016). hospitals and technologies, can treat but not This study uses this defi nition and under- prevent illness. stands prevention to be a central component Finally, incentives for acting collectively of what the United Nations Security Council to prevent a crisis are often weaker than and General Assembly describe “as a goal those for mobilizing a response to crisis. and a process to build a common vision of a Crises mobilize societies and government society, ensuring that the needs of all seg- much more effectively than early action. ments of the population are taken into Crisis exerts a powerful and self-reinforcing account … as a shared task and responsibil- attraction. Societies can become gripped by ity that needs to be fulfi lled by the a cycle where confl ict—and the response to Government and all other national stake- that confl ict—dominates the attention of holders … at all stages of confl ict” leaders and citizens. Policy becomes increas- (UN General Assembly 2016; UN Security ingly reactive, reducing space for preven- Council 2016). tion. Cycles of crisis-to-crisis, short-term As violent confl ict can potentially affect emergency responses create their own every society, risk needs to be a lens for the self-reinforcing appeal. framing of development policies and be These three dilemmas of prevention done routinely in each society and country. hold at a global level. The international Prevention is about fostering societies in

Introduction 5 which it is easier to choose peace and where development and peace. In most confl icts, people can confi dently expect to live with- these deeper risks create fertile ground for out being exposed to violence over long mobilization to violence. periods of time. It is about building societ- With the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable ies that offer opportunities and are inclu- Development, the United Nations member sive. In this sense, prevention is a long-term states committed to build peaceful, just, and approach in its time horizon, as it requires inclusive societies that are free from fear sustained efforts over time. and violence; to eradicate poverty and hun- This study presents a framework (pre- ger; to combat inequalities; and to protect sented in chapter 3) for conceptualizing and respect human rights (box I.2).3 The how societies forge unique pathways as they 17 SDGs and 169 targets are seen as “inte- navigate risks of violence and harness grated and indivisible, and balance the three opportunities for peace. The longer, and dimensions of sustainable development: the more intentionally, a society has worked to economic, social, and environmental” (UN foster incentives for peace, the harder it will General Assembly 2015, preamble). This be to derail progress. Violence, too, is agenda provides an overarching framework path-dependent. Once it takes hold, incen- for action for states and other actors to tives reconfi gure around the expectation work together toward confl ict prevention that it will continue. and peace. The SDGs contained in the 2030 Prevention, then, is not only about Agenda offer entry points for implementing avoiding or stopping repeated violent crises. the recommendations of this study.4 While it is necessary to avoid crisis by miti- Prevention is primarily an endogenous gating the impact of shocks, prevention also process, a responsibility of government and requires proactively addressing deeper, societies. In this sense, prevention enhances underlying risks that prevent sustainable sovereignty, empowering each country to be

BOX I.2 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

In September 2015, UN member states The 17 Sustainable Development adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Goals (SDGs) are integrated and Development and a new set of indivisible in nature. Efforts to achieve development goals as successors to the one goal are seen as instrumental to Millennium Development Goals. The achieving other goals. For example, 2030 Agenda is a universal agenda that actions to address goals such as commits all countries to work toward a eradicating poverty (SDG 1), reducing peaceful and resilient world through inequalities (SDG 10), promoting quality inclusive and shared prosperity and the education (SDG 4), achieving gender upholding of human rights. It puts people equality (SDG 5), addressing climate at the center and pledges to leave no one change (SDG 13), supporting peace and behind, to empower women, and to give strengthening institutions (SDG 16), and special attention to countries in promoting partnerships (SDG 17) can protracted crisis. have mutually reinforcing effects. The 2030 Agenda emphasizes that The SDGs provide a blueprint for peace, development, human rights, and scaling up investments to transform humanitarian responses are inextricably economies, build resilience, strengthen linked and mutually reinforcing. It institutions, and bolster capacities. By includes a focus on building peaceful, integrating sustainability in all activities just, and inclusive societies, not only as and promoting inclusivity, partnerships, an enabler but also as a fundamental and accountability, the 2030 Agenda can component of development outcomes. contribute to peace.

Source: UN General Assembly 2015.

6 Pathways for Peace in control of its own destiny and the state to complex global context. It, nonetheless, build positive relationships with its citizens. argues that states and the international International actors play a critical role in community can do a much better job of supporting endogenous preventive efforts. addressing the risks of violent confl icts and Their support is also instrumental in sus- reducing their occurrence. taining regional efforts by neighbors that Prevention of confl ict is a process whose have an interest in avoiding violence, the benefi ts to both society and the actors negative effects of which could spill over within society unfold over time. Early into their own countries. efforts at prevention are often hardly visible. Successful implementation of inclusive eco- Can Prevention of nomic and social policies rarely attracts Violent Confl ict Be much attention. Funds for humanitarian Done Differently? assistance and postconfl ict reconstruction will always be easier to mobilize than those This study is about the prevention of violent for long-term preventive efforts. They are confl ict. Confl ict is an essential component tangible. They can be broadcasted on of societal dynamics and an expression television and make the donor feel of human interaction. Negotiation among successful. They sell politically in the coun- groups over important issues, such as access try providing the funds. Effective, sustained to power, natural resources, and security, is a prevention is not very interesting to watch form of management of confl ict. The pro- on television. cess of contestation can be healthy. Confl ict often produces positive outcomes, as it The Importance of Agency brings about change. When confl ict becomes to Prevention violent, however, it imposes human and economic costs that can become enormous Violence is the product of many factors. It is and can strip away incentives for peaceful often diffi cult to attribute violence to a sin- confl ict resolution. gle root cause. Violence is like a fever in a Violence and violent confl ict have human body: it can be caused by many dif- accompanied political, social, and economic ferent illnesses. The question is not why change throughout history (Tilly 1990, societies have confl ict, but why some groups 2003). Monuments to nation builders and choose violence to resolve their differences war heroes often are the most visible and with other groups or with the state. This highly revered symbols in cities and com- study argues that a signifi cant proportion of munities across the world. Sacrifi ce and contemporary violent confl icts are rooted heroism in war are often celebrated as in group-based grievances around exclu- highly positive attributes of societies. Yet sion that forge deep-seated feelings of humans have constantly strived to avoid injustice and unfairness. Recent research violence, developing sophisticated institu- supports this argument. Whether based on tions to respond to its risk (Pinker 2012). facts or perceptions, groups who feel This deep contradiction is not likely to excluded, relatively disadvantaged, or left disappear any time soon. Under certain cir- out are much more likely to consider vio- cumstances, societies will always be tempted lence to be an acceptable response than to resort to violence to achieve their goals. those who do not. There is increasing recognition, however, Identity plays an important role in this that the human suffering and exorbitant context, as cohesive groups with a shared costs associated with violent confl ict can sense of historical grievance are more likely often be avoided, with positive change to unite in response. This does not mean resulting from peaceful contestation. that every group with grievances will turn This study is clear-eyed in its recognition violent. In fact, the opposite is true. Nor that absolute prevention of all confl icts is does it mean that other factors such as beyond reach, if not impossible. To be sure, external support, proliferation of weapons, it looks beyond reach in the present, and absence of deterrents are irrelevant.

Introduction 7 On the contrary, they can and do play a crit- Chapter 3 introduces the concept of ical role. Group-based grievances, nonethe- “pathways” to illustrate how societies shape less, are an important precursor to collective pathways toward violence, or sustainable mobilization to violence. They need to be peace, by the way they mitigate risk and tackled head on and made a central compo- navigate confl ict. Chapter 4 examines the nent of prevention. This is why this study association between violent confl ict and stresses the centrality of inclusion in pre- exclusion, inequality, and unfairness and vention approaches. discusses how resulting grievances may be The accumulation of grievances around mobilized to collective violence. Chapter 5 exclusion and how leaders and groups looks at the policy arenas where most con- choose to deal with them largely determine temporary violent confl icts have arisen and whether a society steers a pathway toward discusses approaches to lower the risk. violence or peace. Actors are constantly Chapter 6 summarizes lessons from success- faced with choices, weighing responses to a ful prevention at the country level and, in variety of pressures and changes along their particular, how successful prevention builds society’s pathway. Prevention, then, involves on coalitions, supports inclusive political identifying and creating incentives for arrangements, and addresses economic and actors to make choices that lead to peaceful social grievances. Chapter 7 reviews the outcomes. Structural change and institu- instruments that the international commu- tional reform within a society take time and nity has in place to prevent confl ict and its require sustained investment. Actors in a recent efforts to adapt these tools and society tend to behave and operate based on instruments to new conditions. Chapter 8 shorter timelines. They may need to show discusses recommendations for improving fast results, which prevention may not prevention at all levels. always provide. The need to balance actors’ short- and medium-term incentives with a Notes long-term time horizon is thus one of the crucial challenges of prevention. 1. Confl icts are inherent in all societies and are Once collective violence starts, incen- managed, mitigated, and resolved in nonvio- tives are reconfi gured in ways that sustain lent manners through, for example, political and possibly escalate violence, mak- processes (see, for example, UN General ing efforts to restore peace especially chal- Assembly 2015), formal and informal judi- lenging. Actors’ changing interests, societal cial systems, local dispute mechanisms, or dynamics, and social norms also may pro- dialogue. But sometimes confl ict may turn long violence and increase the likelihood of violent, causing enormous human and eco- recurrence. They play a strong role in the nomic loss. Violent confl ict can take various escalation and geographic expansion of vio- forms, including interstate war, armed lence. As violence spreads, it also creates confl ict, civil war, political and electoral incentives for more actors to engage in or violence, and communal violence, and can profi t from it. The result is a very complex include many actors, including states and situation that calls for a multifaceted nonstate actors, such as militias, insurgents, approach to restoring peace. terrorist groups, and violent extremists. This This study is divided into eight chapters. study—while looking at confl ict in general— Chapter 1 describes the new profi le of vio- focuses on confl icts that are becoming violent confl ict, which affects more countries, lent and explores pathways that prevent occurs more often within states and among confl icts from escalating. a proliferation of armed groups, and 2. While battle-related deaths will likely decline increasingly involves foreign intervention. after the spike of 2014–15, largely related to Chapter 2 looks at rapidly evolving global fewer casualties from the Syrian Arab trends and changing geopolitical balance Republic confl ict, the risks of violent confl ict that affect the risk of violent confl ict, includ- remain high at the global level. Many of the ing climate change, movements of people, underlying issues that are triggering confl ict and a push for more inclusive governance. in different regions, such as Africa and

8 Pathways for Peace the Middle East, for example, are not chang- Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, ing drastically. This study demonstrates that Washington, DC. the complexity of today’s violent confl ict OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and the risks associated with it go beyond and Development). 2015. States of Fragility yearly trends and warrant long-term attention. 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions. Paris: 3. UN General Assembly (2015), including the OECD. preamble, para. 3, and SDGs 10 and 16. Pinker, S. 2012. The Better Angels of Our Nature: 4. UN General Assembly (2015), including Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Viking. SDGs 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16. Stares, P. 2017. Preventive Engagement: How America Can Avoid War, Stay Strong, and Keep the Peace. New York: Columbia References University Press. Brown, M. E., and R. N. Rosecrance. 1999. The Tilly, C. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European Costs of Confl ict: Prevention and Cure in States, AD 990–1992. Cambridge, U.K.: the Global Arena. New York: Carnegie Blackwell. Commission on Preventing Deadly Confl ict. ———. 2003. The Politics of Collective Violence. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Confl ict. 1997. Preventing Deadly Confl ict: Press. Report. New York: Carnegie Commission on UN (United Nations). 2016. Too Important to Preventing Deadly Confl ict. Fail—Addressing the Humanitarian Financing Chalmers, M. 2007. “Spending to Save? The Gap. Report by the High-Level Panel on Cost-Effectiveness of Confl ict Prevention.” Humanitarian Financing to the Secretary- Defence and Peace Economics 18 (1): 1–23. General. Geneva: United Nations Offi ce for Chang, Y., and Z. Luo. 2013. “War or Settlement: the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. An Economic Analysis of Confl ict with http://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents Endogenous and Increasing Destruction.” /[HLP%20Report]%20Too%20important%20 Defence and Peace Economics 24 (1): 23–46. to%20fail—addressing%20the%20humanitar Collier, P., and A. Hoeffl er. 2006. “Military ian%20fi nancing%20gap.pdf. Expenditure in Post-Confl ict Societies.” UN General Assembly. 2015. “Transforming Our Economics of Governance 7 (1): 89–107. World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable De Groot, O. J., T. Brück, and C. Bozzoli. 2009. Development.” Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted “How Many Bucks in a Bang: On the September 25, New York. Estimation of the Economic Costs of Confl ict.” ———. 2016. “Review of United Nations Economics of Security Working Paper 21, Peacebuilding Architecture.” Resolution Economics of Security, Berlin. A/RES/70/262, adopted April 27, New York. Dunne, J. Paul. 2012. “Third Copenhagen UN Security Council. 2016. “Post-Confl ict Consensus: Armed Confl ict Assessment.” Peacebuilding.” Resolution S/RES/2282, Assessment Paper, Copenhagen Consensus adopted April 27, New York. Center, Tewksbury, MA. World Bank. 2011. World Development Report Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce. 2003. 2011: Confl ict, Security, and Development. The Global Confl ict Prevention Pool: A Washington, DC: World Bank. Joint U.K. Government Approach to ———. 2017. World Development Report 2017: Reducing Confl ict. London: Foreign and Governance and the Law. Washington, DC: Commonwealth Offi ce. World Bank. IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace). 2017. Measuring Peacebuilding Cost-Effectiveness. Additional Reading Sydney: IEP. Lomborg, B., ed. 2013. Global Problems, Smart Coleman, P. T., and R. Ferguson. 2014. Making Solutions: Costs and Benefi ts. Cambridge, Confl ict Work: Harnessing the Power of U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Disagreement. New York: Houghton-Miffl in- Mueller, H. 2017. “How Much Is Prevention Harcourt. Worth?” Background paper for the United Cramer, C., J. Goodhand, and R. Morris. 2016. Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Evidence Synthesis: What Interventions Have Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Been Effective in Preventing or Mitigating

Introduction 9 Armed Violence in Developing and Middle- ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross). Income Countries? London: Department for 2008. “How Is the Term ‘Armed Confl ict’ International Development. Defi ned in International Humanitarian Law?” Giessmann, H. J., J. B. Galvanek, and C. Seifert. Opinion Paper, ICRC, Geneva, March. 2017. “Curbing Violence: Development, IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace). 2013. Application, and Sustaining National Capacities The Economic Cost of Violence Containment: for Prevention.” Background paper for the A Comprehensive Assessment of the Global United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Cost of Violence. Sydney: IEP. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to ———. 2016. The Economic Value of Peace: 2016. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Sydney: IEP. Washington, DC. Mueller, H. 2013. “The Economic Cost of Geneva Convention (IV). 1949. Geneva Confl ict.” ICG Working Paper, International Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Growth Centre, London. Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, UN (United Nations). 2004. “Promotion of Religious August 12. http://www.un.org/en/genocide and Cultural Understanding, Harmony, and prevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc Cooperation.” A/RES/59/201, note by the .33_GC-IV-EN.pdf. Secretary-General, United Nations, New York. Goodhand, J. 2004. “From War Economy to Peace ———. 2017. “Secretary-General, in First Address Economy? Reconstruction and Statebuilding to Security Council since Taking Offi ce, Sets in Afghanistan.” Journal of International Restoring Trust, Preventing Crises as United Affairs, Special Edition on International Nations Priorities.” Security Council 7857th Institutions and Justice 58 (1): 155–74. Meeting SC/12673, January 10.

10 Pathways for Peace CHAPTER 1 A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conﬂ ict

The threats facing the world today are bipolar international order. A window of different from those of decades ago. Violent opportunity opened to focus on intrastate confl ict is now occurring in middle-income confl icts. Despite the escalation of some eth- countries as well as in both low-income coun- nic confl icts and prompted by the atrocities tries and fragile contexts, opening space for that took place in Rwanda and the former violent extremist groups and spilling over Yugoslavia, a surge in peacekeeping and pre- borders. vention, among other factors, reduced violent This chapter surveys the state of violent confl ict to unprecedented levels by the mid- confl ict across several indicators, showing 2000s (Human Security Report Project 2005; that, in recent years, more countries are Pinker 2011). That more peaceful lull was affected by violent confl ict, more armed broken in 2007, when violent confl ict began groups are fi ghting, and more outside actors to increase in scope and number of fatalities, are intervening. The chapter also examines particularly beginning in 2010. trends beyond the numbers both to under- What makes people fi ght and what they stand factors contributing to the new confl ict fi ght over are not new, but the fi ghting is hap- dynamics and to adapt prevention policy on pening in a new context. Violent confl ict has national, regional, and international levels. spread to middle-income countries that have, The cost of not preventing violent confl ict or had, functioning institutions (such as Iraq, is extremely high. Beyond its incalculable Syria, and Ukraine), upending assumptions human cost, violent confl ict reverses hard- that violent confl ict is an exclusive problem won development gains, stunts the opportu- of low-income countries. In a world where nities of children and young people, and communications, fi nance, crime, and ideas robs economies of opportunities for growth. fl ow across borders, many confl icts have Preventable diseases become more diffi cult to evolved into complex systems with interna- treat in and around violent confl ict, and there tional, regional, national, and communal is a higher risk of famine. Forced displace- links. Such confl icts are resistant to resolu- ment has reached a level not seen since the tion through negotiated settlement, tending immediate aftermath of World War II. Violent to play out in regions where other countries confl ict and the humanitarian crises it spawns are already at risk of violent confl ict (Walter cost the world billions of dollars a year, out- 2017b). The proliferation of nonstate armed pacing the capacity of states to respond. groups has also resulted in confl icts with less From roughly 1950 to 1990, parts of Africa state involvement, making them impervious and Asia experienced anti- and postcolonial to the settlement mechanisms deployed in violent confl icts and superpower proxy wars the past. More external countries are inter- over infl uence and control of the state. vening in violent confl icts, which could The end of the Cold War brought a pause in present opportunities for mediation, yet also the interstate tensions that characterized the complicates confl ict dynamics.

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 11 Violent Confl ict in the While much of today’s violence is Twenty-First Century entrenched in low-income countries, neither wealth nor income renders countries Until recently, the world was becoming more immune. Some of the deadliest and seem- peaceful (Pinker 2011). Following the end of ingly most intractable confl icts are occurring 1 the Cold War, the number and intensity of in middle-income countries, reversing hard- most types of violent confl ict steadily won human development gains. In addition, declined. That trend stalled in 2007 and has violence in various forms has reached epi- reversed since 2010. The incidence of violent demic proportions in countries not consid- confl ict between states is still low (see ered fragile (Geneva Declaration Secretariat box 1.1), but confl ict within states—among 2015; OECD 2016). The highest rates of a ballooning number of armed groups, homicide and violent crime in the world are between nonstate armed groups and the found in Latin America and the Caribbean, state, and increasingly involving some form where urban gang violence and drug-related of external intervention—is spreading. More crime are features of everyday life. countries were experiencing some form of A few of these violent confl icts—whether violent confl ict in 2016 than at any time in in low- or middle-income countries—produce the previous 30 years (Allansson, Melander, the preponderance of fatalities, and most con- and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002; fl icts are broadly concentrated in a few regions Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012). (Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia).

BOX 1.1 The Decline of Violent Conflict between States

Interstate violent confl ict has been at the perceptions of their domestic historically low levels since the end of constituents and less willing to risk the Cold War. The Uppsala Confl ict Data their soldiers’ lives or engage in warfare Program (UCDP) reported just two active when it can be avoided. Today, outright interstate violent confl icts in 2016, one military victory has become less feasible. between India and Pakistan and the other Increasing economic interdependence between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 1987, may also contribute to the declining fi ve interstate wars were recorded, but trend in interstate confl ict because it since 1992, no more than two interstate creates mutual vulnerabilities that act wars were recorded in any given year, as disincentives to going to war. In this and several years experienced no calculus, “The opportunity costs of such wars. confl ict greatly outweigh any potential The reasons for these low levels economic gains” (Thompson 2014), are varied. The end of the Cold War which is one of the reasons why trade marked a shifting disposition of the linkages between countries help to great powers from conducting proxy promote peace (Hegre, Oneal, and warfare to preventing confl icts around Russett 2010). the world. Enhanced cooperation The decline in interstate confl ict does translated into a greater role for the not mean that disagreements between United Nations (UN) Security Council states have disappeared. Real interstate as a mechanism for resolving disputes. tensions also persist, leaving open the In parallel, “International norms, legal possibility for a potentially devastating regulations, and treaties [have created] violent confl ict to come. The number of a situation today where invasion and unresolved boundary issues across the conquest are not only outlawed, world is a further cause of persistent but also actively proscribed through interstate tensions. The South China deterrence” (Thompson 2014). Casualty Sea is but one of these. The African avoidance has become a factor, with Union alone is involved in mediating national leaders acutely sensitive to 19 separate contested border claims.

Sources: Haass 2017; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett 2010; Human Security Report Project 2005; Pinker and Mack 2014; Thompson 2014; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002.

12 Pathways for Peace Violent extremist groups also contribute to forces within the boundaries of a state— the increase in confl icts, feeding off local griev- has risen sharply.2 After peaking at 50 in ances and exploiting transnational fi nancial 1991, the number of these conflicts and crime networks. declined for some years but then shot up Today’s violent confl icts are not con- again. In 2016, 47 internal state-based fi ned to national borders. Energized by violent conflicts were recorded—the regional and international links among second-highest number in the post– groups, violent confl icts often spill across Cold War era after 2015, when UCDP borders or refl ect the transnational aims recorded 51 violent state-based conflicts and organization of such groups (OECD (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; 2016, ch. 1). At the same time, countries are Gleditsch et al. 2002; see figure 1.1).3 The increasingly intervening in another coun- number of conflicts that reach the thresh- try’s confl ict in support of a party or par- old of war, resulting in at least 1,000 bat- ties, giving these confl icts an additional tle deaths a year, has more than tripled regional or international dimension. These since just 2007 (Allansson, Melander, and new dynamics have signifi cant implications Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002; for preventing violent confl ict and building Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012).4 The sustainable peace. number of lower-intensity conflicts (both state-based and nonstate), meaning those Number of Violent Confl icts resulting in between 25 and 999 battle within States deaths a year, has risen by more than 60 percent since 2007 (Allansson, Melander, The number of internal state-based and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002; conflicts—involving state and nonstate Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012).5

FIGURE 1.1 Violent Conflict Worldwide, by Type of Conflict, 1975–2016

30 Number of conﬂicts 20

1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Type of conﬂict State-based (state vs. non-state) Non-state (non-state vs. non-state) Interstate (state vs. state)

Sources: For interstate and state-based confl icts, data from Uppsala Confl ict Data Program (UCDP) and Peace Research Institute Oslo (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002); for nonstate confl icts, data from UCDP (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017).

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 13 Number of Fatalities Associated intensity (number of confl ict-related fatali- with Violent Confl ict ties) or duration alone, but also by its human, social, and economic impact. Violent confl ict is resulting in more fatali- Minor confl icts within countries may be ties. The number of reported battle-related less visible to outside observers and may deaths has risen sharply since 2010 to the result in relatively fewer battle-related highest numbers recorded in 20 years (see deaths; their costs also may be harder to 6 fi gure 1.2). From the post–Cold War low in measure. But they are just as destructive 2005, reported battle-related deaths have and can have devastating consequences increased tenfold (Allansson, Melander, and for people and economies, not least con- Themnér 2017; Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz tributing to instability and fragility within 2012). A few confl icts are largely responsi- countries and fueling other intrastate or ble for the overall increase and result in regional confl icts. the greatest proportion of battle-related deaths; the three deadliest countries in 2016 Number of Armed Groups and (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria) incurred Violent Confl ict more than 76 percent of all fatalities recorded that year (Sundberg and Melander Violent confl ict between nonstate armed 2013; Croicu and Sundberg 2017; also see groups has been rising, as has the number fi gure 1.3). However, the true cost of a vio- of armed groups. The number of violent lent confl ict should be measured not by its confl icts between nonstate armed groups7

FIGURE 1.2 Number of Battle-Related Deaths Worldwide, by Type of Conflict, 1989–2016

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000 Reported number of battle-related deaths

20,000

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Type of conﬂict Non-state vs. non-state State vs. non-state

Source: Uppsala Conﬂ ict Data Program (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012).

14 Pathways for Peace FIGURE 1.3 Number of Conflict-Related Deaths Worldwide, by Country, 2016

Yemen, Rep.

Turkey South Libya Sudan

Nigeria

Afghanistan Mexico Sudan

Somalia

Iraq Syrian Arab Republic

Source: Uppsala Confl ict Data Program (UCDP) (Sundberg and Melander 2013; Croicu and Sundberg 2017). Note: This fi gure is based on the UCDP defi nition of confl ict (Sundberg and Melander 2013; Croicu and Sundberg 2017). has more than doubled since 2010, as shown Box 1.2 outlines the limitations of current in fi gure 1.1 (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz data sets, including the fact that categoriza- 2012; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér tions of “nonstate” and other actors have 2017). In 2016, 60 violent confl icts were not yet become as nuanced as current reali- reported between nonstate armed groups, ties. The composition and alliances of these and 73 were reported in 2015, compared armed groups are fl uid and may evolve over with only 28 in 2010 (Sundberg, Eck, time, depending on resources or leadership. and Kreutz 2012; Allansson, Melander, and Some nonstate armed groups have been Themnér 2017). In 1950, there were an able to seize and hold terrain from state average of eight armed groups in a civil war; militaries, despite a lack of sophisticated by 2010 the average had jumped to 14 weaponry. (Walter 2017b). The proliferation of such groups, which The proliferation of nonstate actors— may fi ght each other and the state in differ- armed groups that are not formally state ent confi gurations at different times, com- actors—has been rising steadily especially plicates violent confl icts and efforts to end since 2010 (see fi gure 1.4). These groups them. One example is the confl ict in Syria, include rebels, militias, armed traffi cking which was responsible for the greatest num- groups, and violent extremist groups, ber of fatalities of any single war or country among others, that may coalesce around in 2016 (UCDP 2017). It has involved the a grievance, an identity, an ideology, or a government of Syria, Syrian opposition claim to economic or political resources. groups, violent extremist groups including

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conﬂ ict 15 FIGURE 1.4 Number of Nonstate Groups Active in Violent Conflict Worldwide, 1989–2016

150

140

130

120

110

involved in conﬂict 100

Distinct count of non-state actors 90

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Uppsala Conﬂ ict Data Program (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017).

BOX 1.2 Adapting Conflict Data to Today’s Violent Conflicts

The shift in trends of violent confl ict is state, and militias doing the bidding of diffi cult to quantify with the measures elites yet not seeking formal state power, used or available now. The structure of among others—confl ates these groups. many of the quantitative data sets relied These groups exhibit different patterns on to understand confl ict dynamics are of confl ict as a result of their diverse better suited for understanding the goals, capacities, incentives, and other confl icts of decades ago, when confl icts factors. The Armed Confl ict Location predominantly involved fi ghting between and Event Data (ACLED) project makes the state militaries of two countries or some distinctions among nonstate when confl icts occurring within a state armed groups. (as opposed to between states) Data sets are organized according consisted largely of rebel groups seeking to the perpetrator of violence, and the to overthrow a government. Today’s perpetrator is not always evident. When a confl icts are increasingly complex and perpetrator is not or cannot be identifi ed, multidimensional, and available the violence often goes unrecorded, measurements may not be capturing and the data may depict a region as their true extent and costs. nonviolent when in fact it is very violent. Both the number of nonstate confl icts UCDP data dramatically undercount that do not involve a country’s formal fatalities related to nonstate confl ict, as forces and the number of nonstate it is often diffi cult, if not impossible, to armed groups have been rising. Yet data identify the victims and the perpetrators. sets—for example, the Uppsala Confl ict Armed groups may exploit anonymity to Data Program (UCDP)—often lump all carry out violence on behalf of others. nonstate groups into a single category. Confl icts are coded as dyadic Such armed groups are increasingly events, pitting two sides against each diverse and have varied goals. Putting all other, despite the fact that confl icts of them into one overarching category— are becoming increasingly complex one that includes rebel groups seeking and multidimensional. The goals, to overthrow a state, armed traffi cking capacities, and incentives of actors may groups, violent extremist groups with shift as confl icts become reframed or goals beyond the overthrow of a single internationalized. Alliances can form and (Box continued next page)

16 Pathways for Peace BOX 1.2 Adapting Conflict Data to Today’s Violent Conflicts (continued)

disband or shift among various actors of these data sets have been refi ned within a single confl ict. Especially in over the years to respond to new needs cases where confl icts are coded as full and contexts, they should continue to campaigns of violence that can last years, adapt. it can be diffi cult to capture these shifts Not all data sets code conflicts as and nuances accurately—resulting in a full campaigns of violence. ACLED, for much simpler view of a very complex example, relies on an atomic format, context. coding only a single day of conflict at As confl icts adapt, data sets a time, which can later be aggregated should adapt and anticipate their into a larger context. However, ACLED complexity. The structure of data sets also r elies on a dyadic format where today corresponds to the dynamics of two sides are coded as being in combat confl icts in previous eras. While many with one another.

foreign fi ghters, and the so-called Islamic (Raleigh and Dowd 2013). Some groups State,8 with the state fi ghting these groups may explicitly reject international humani- and these groups fi ghting each other. Their tarian law as well as the international insti- interplay contributes to the intractability of tutions established to uphold it, placing the Syrian confl ict and overall instability in themselves outside the ambit of traditional the region. peacemaking processes (Walter 2017b). Violent conflict between nonstate Many groups thrive in environments of armed groups does not indicate the weak rule of law or profi t from illicit strength or weakness of such groups, nor economies; they have little incentive to does it preclude indirect state involvement. end violence. Progovernment militias, for example, fall More external actors are intervening under the umbrella of nonstate actors, as more often. Proxy wars with international- governments recruit militias to carry out ized involvement from the Soviet Union violence on their behalf.9 Communities or or the United States were commonplace powerful actors (for example, gangs and during the Cold War. Today, emerging pow- drug cartels) may also create militias or ers are also intervening in violent confl icts armed groups when state security forces are in pursuit of regional or strategic interests. absent or to protect their trade routes or In 2016, 18 violent confl icts were interna- control territory. These groups can be used tionalized,10 more than reported in any year to carry out violence on behalf of a regime since the end of World War II and second seeking to distance itself from particularly only to 2015, when 20 confl icts were inter- shameful acts; militia violence may even be nationalized (Allansson, Melander, and used to exercise infl uence in competitive Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002; see democratic contexts, aggravating grievances fi gure 1.5). and exacerbating local and subnational The involvement of outside countries confl icts (Alvarez 2006; Raleigh 2016; can also provide additional avenues to infl u- Ron 2002). ence combatants, whether a state or an This proliferation of nonstate armed armed group, in favor of a settlement. groups challenges state-based models of Current studies, which have largely focused confl ict prevention, mediation, and peace- on the impact of direct intervention, fi nd keeping. Many of today’s armed actors that it extended the duration of violent con- operate in areas where state presence is fl icts and can complicate peace negotiations too limited and fragmented or diffuse (Regan 2002; Walter 2017a). Less focus has for traditional, leader-based approaches to been placed on indirect intervention, such as negotiated political solutions to be effective nonmilitary involvement by outside actors.

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conﬂ ict 17 FIGURE 1.5 Number of Internationalized Violent Conflicts, Global, 1946–2016

22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 Number of internationalized violent conﬂicts 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Source: Uppsala Conﬂ ict Data Program and Peace Research Institution Oslo (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002).

The rise of private external funding may most confl icts have been recurrences of old play a role in confl ict dynamics. In the con- confl icts rather than new confl icts (Gates, text of Syria, for example, private funding Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). On average, complicates the dynamics of the confl ict peace lasts only seven years after a confl ict and any potential settlement. ends. In the post–World War II era, 135 Engagement by outsiders, however, does countries experienced the recurrence of not necessarily have a negative impact. confl ict, with 60 percent of all confl icts According to Walter (2017a, 3), “Outside recurring (Gates, Nygård, and Trappeniers intervention that occurs after a peace treaty 2016). In many violent confl icts, gray zones has been signed has a strong positive effect appear, where a confl ict becomes less on the successful resolution of these [vio- intense, yet is not fully resolved (National lent confl icts]. . . . External intervention also Intelligence Council 2017). tends to have a positive effect on reducing The average duration of violent confl icts the risks of an additional [violent confl ict] involving state forces has been trending once the fi rst [violent confl ict] has ended” upward since 1971. Violent confl icts involv- (see also Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna ing state forces that ended in 2014 lasted, on 2002). In cases where an outside state or average, 26.7 years, and those that ended in international organization has been willing 2015 lasted, on average, 14.5 years.12 By to enforce or verify the terms of a peace comparison, confl icts that ended in 1970 treaty, “negotiations almost always lead to lasted, on average, 9.6 years (Allansson, peace”; when external actors do not do so, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch “negotiations almost always result in et al. 2002; see fi gure 1.6). renewed [confl ict]” (Walter 2017a, 1).11 The longer a confl ict lasts, the more diffi - Violent confl icts have become more pro- cult it becomes to resolve (Fearon 2004), tracted and more diffi cult to resolve, with given that the involved parties tend to many violent confl icts relapsing. Even vio- fragment and mutate with time (ICRC lent confl icts that may seem to stop (that is, 2016). Prolonged violent confl ict may where few or no battle-related fatalities are become more complex and multidimen- reported in the following year) often involve sional. Also, as a confl ict continues, the orig- neither peace agreements nor ceasefi res inal drivers are more likely to transform and nor victories, meaning that fi ghting could require different solutions (Wolff, Ross, and begin again. The Peace Research Institute Wee 2017).13 Protracted confl icts also tend Oslo reports that, since the mid-1990s, to vary over the course of their life cycle,

18 Pathways for Peace FIGURE 1.6 Average Duration of Conflict Worldwide, 1970–2015

10 Average conﬂict duration (years) 5

1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

Source: Uppsala Conﬂ ict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002).

both spatially (that is, where confl ict occurs violent confl icts in Africa in 2016 (33 vio- within countries) and in intensity (for exam- lent confl icts). The largest proportion, or ple, number of battle-related fatalities). The more than 24 percent of these, occurred implications for prevention are signifi cant. in Somalia, followed by the Democratic Once a country or society is on a violent Republic of Congo (more than 12 percent) path, changing the trajectory becomes more and Nigeria (more than 11 percent) (ACLED diffi cult and gets more diffi cult with time. 2016; Raleigh et al. 2010). Confl ict between nonstate actors is also the primary form of violent confl ict occurring in the Middle East Understanding Trends in 14 Violent Confl ict and in the Americas, where it makes up more than 63 percent (17 violent confl icts) The regional concentration of violent con- and 80 percent (8 violent confl icts) of all fl ict is shifting. Most violent confl icts today violent confl icts in the region, respectively are occurring in Africa, the Middle East, and (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012; Allansson, South Asia (see fi gure 1.7); the number of Melander, and Themnér 2017). violent confl icts in other parts of Asia and Subnational confl ict, or “violent contes- Europe, previously epicenters of confl ict, tation aimed at securing greater political has been decreasing (Allansson, Melander, autonomy [often] for an ethnic minority and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002; group” (Colletta and Oppenheim 2017, 1), Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012). In affects nearly every part of the world, but 2016, more than 24 percent of all violent some regions more than others. It is the confl icts occurred in the Middle East, an most common form of violent confl ict in increase from 2010, when the region experi- Asia, yet it has also been on the rise in enced less than 11 percent of the total. These Europe, the Middle East, and in recent years trends are predicted to continue (National in Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2000 and Intelligence Council 2017). 2015, subnational confl ict affected 24 coun- There are variations, however, in the kind tries, resulting in more than 100,000 battle- of violent confl ict that is most prevalent in a related deaths in the period. Several region. Confl icts between nonstate actors countries faced multiple clusters of separat- represented more than 63 percent of the ist confl icts (Colletta and Oppenheim 2017).

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conﬂ ict 19 FIGURE 1.7 Conflict Events Worldwide, by Type of Conflict and Region, 1989–2016

Number of conﬂicts 20

0 1989 2016 1989 2016 1989 2016 1989 2016 1989 2016 Africa Asia Middle East Americas Europe Type of conﬂict Non-state vs. non-state Interstate (state vs. state) State vs. non-state Internationalized conﬂict

Sources: For interstate and state-based confl icts (including internationalized confl icts), data from Uppsala Confl ict Data Program (UCDP) and Peace Research Institute Oslo (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002); for nonstate confl icts, data from UCDP (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017).

Each of the many varieties of confl ict in Factors Contributing to the the world today has different implications Increase in Violent Confl ict for prevention approaches. Some of the deadliest confl icts are over control of the Three broad, interrelated factors have con- central state or over internal power arrange- tributed to the increased number, resulting ments, as in Iraq, South Sudan, and Syria.15 fatalities, and reach of violent confl ict: Protracted subregional confl icts might not disrupt the functionality of the central state • The eruption of violent confl ict in the in most of its territory—as in Myanmar, the Middle East and North Africa in the Philippines, and Thailand, among others— wake of the Arab Spring yet these confl icts still have an impact on • The spread of violent extremism the operation of the state (Parks, Colletta, • The increase in power contestation in and Oppenheim 2013). Moreover, a large Sub-Saharan Africa. number of intercommunal confl icts over extractive or natural resources or land can Each, separately and in combination with fl are up before declining in intensity. Other the other underlying factors, can have differ- events of political violence may occur ent implications for prevention. This is espe- around electoral periods, such as in Jamaica cially evident in the case of violent extremism, and Kenya (Malik 2017). Chapter 5 dis- which has expanded rapidly by exploiting cusses in greater detail these arenas of con- preexisting violent confl icts related to sectar- testation, where societies negotiate access to ian grievances and power struggles that may resources and political power and where the have nothing to do with extremism, yet pro- risk of violence is intensifi ed. vide a space for these movements to grow.

20 Pathways for Peace Violent Confl ict in the Wake of the (Devarajan and Ianchovichina 2017). This Arab Spring mechanism became less and less sustainable Increased levels of violent confl ict have starting in the 2000s, as persistent fi scal most affected the Middle East and North imbalances undermined the ability of gov- Africa (Gleditsch and Rudolfsen 2016). ernments to keep their part of the social Arab countries are home to only 5 percent bargain. Once mass protests sparked the of the world’s population, but in 2014 they political transition in Tunisia, contagion to accounted for 45 percent of the world’s the rest of the region was quick, enabled by terrorist incidents, 68 percent of its battle- technology and a common language and related deaths,16 47 percent of its internally rooted in economic problems and popular displaced population, and 58 percent of its grievances that were common through- refugees (UNDP 2016a). The United Nations out the Middle East and North Africa Development Programme’s Arab Human (Ianchovichina 2017).17 Development Report 2016 predicts that by Worsening polarization between groups 2020, “Almost three out of four Arabs could recurred across different contexts, whether be living in countries vulnerable to violent between Islamists and their opponents in confl ict” (UNDP 2016a). the Arab Republic of Egypt and Tunisia; The violent confl icts emerging after politicization of cross-sectarian divides the Arab Spring—in Libya, Syria, and involving Sunnis and Shi’ites in Iraq18 and the Republic of Yemen, in particular— some of the Gulf states; or tribal and local originated in domestic unrest infl uenced by forces in Libya and the Republic of Yemen the regional upheavals of 2011. These con- (Lynch 2016, 37). The lack of institutional fl icts quickly drew in regional and global confi dence and the failure to secure a powers, which may “infl uence or support— predictable transition toward new stable but rarely fully control—those fi ghting institutions further exacerbated social and on the ground” (Guéhenno 2016). Coupled political polarization. External interven- with their internal nature, some of these tions stoking sectarian or ethnic hatred confl icts have become proxy wars in which infl amed intergroup polarization. both regional and international players pur- Countries that managed to stay peace- sue their geopolitical rivalries, and in some ful distinguished themselves from those cases nonstate armed groups linked with that were affected by violence in terms transnational criminal networks embrace of the quality of governance institutions, ideologies of violent extremism that cannot the ability to use redistribution to address be accommodated in peace agreements grievances, and the presence or absence of (International Peace Institute 2016). external military interference (Devarajan One of the factors contributing to the and Ianchovichina 2017). The difference in Arab Spring of 2011 and to the destabiliza- how governments responded to demon- tion of long-standing Arab autocracies was strations and memories of past violence the broken social contract between govern- (in the case of Algeria) were also contrib- ments and citizens (Toska 2017). Challenges uting factors (Brownlee, Masoud, and to state legitimacy across the region also Reynolds 2015). played an important role and emanated from shortcomings in economic opportu- The Spread of Violent Extremism nity, social mobility, democracy, rule of One of the most signifi cant recent develop- law, human rights, and gender equality. The ments is the proliferation and transnational social contract between several Arab gov- reach of violent extremist groups. While the ernments and citizens that had persisted twentieth century is full of examples of vio- since independence consisted of the state lent extremist groups, violent extremism providing public sector jobs, free education presently displays some new features. and health care, and subsidized food and Contemporary violent extremist groups, fuel. In return, citizens were expected to often making use of twenty-fi rst-century keep their voices low and to tolerate some technology, embed themselves into com- level of elite capture in the private sector munities while simultaneously forming

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 21 strategic alliances with transnational net- traffi cking networks—in particular, human works (World Bank 2015). This allows them traffi cking networks—has also been a to spread across borders, hooking into local source of income. Finally, ransom and hos- grievances and connecting them to a global tage taking have been a source of revenue identity. Many also have proven adept at for some groups. exploiting local violent confl ict to expand A few violent extremist groups, espe- and recruiting well beyond confl ict-affected cially over the last decade, have tried to countries.19 They tend to thrive in areas establish a de facto state presence in large with political disorder and at heightened areas of territory. For example, groups like risk of violence. Indeed, the growing reach Al Shabaab, Boko Haram, and the Islamic of violent extremist groups in recent years State claim to be recreating a caliphate with “is more a product of instability than its some of the elements of state structure. primary driver” (ICG 2016a). They differ Looking for territorial control, these groups from their predecessors in at least three make much stronger efforts to connect with ways (World Bank 2015). local communities, who at times support First, some of today’s violent extremist them out of fear or economic opportunity groups have greater global appeal than (ICG 2016a).20 This suggests that focusing violent extremist groups of earlier times. solely on the recruitment of violent extrem- Some are adept at connecting very local ist groups is shortsighted.21 Overall, “pre- grievances—frustration with a discrimina- venting crises will do more to contain tory or predatory state, for example—with violent extremists than countering vio- a global identity that posits youth as heroes lent extremism will do to prevent crises” in ostensibly a movement for global justice. (ICG 2016a, v). Such groups harness technology to promote their narrative and recruit globally in ways Violent Confl ict in the Midst of that are often far ahead of state efforts to Rapid Transformation in rein them in (World Bank 2015). Sub-Saharan Africa Second, many of today’s violent extrem- Violent confl ict in Sub-Saharan Africa has ist groups form strategic alliances with dif- increased against the backdrop of the conti- ferent groups in the areas in which they nent’s fast-paced economic and political operate. This engagement can take different changes (Williams 2017). Poverty, and to forms. There have always been some true some extent inequality, is decreasing, and believers, some who join for material or economic growth has enabled several coun- political gain, and others who condone such tries to graduate to middle-income status groups but do not actively participate. (Beegle et al. 2016). Democratization has However, today’s violent extremist groups expanded at the same time, although with are taking advantage of local divisions some reversals in 2015 (Mogaka 2017). among groups and building opportunistic Against this positive background, rapid alliances to an unprecedented degree changes are also creating tensions. Three (ICG 2016a). dynamics play out in this context: violent Third, some violent extremist groups competition for political power and associ- today have been able to use transnational ated electoral-related violence; the spread of networks to facilitate fi nancing. This violent extremism that in most cases derives includes mobilizing fi nancing from states from confl icting identity; and the persis- and private donors to an unprecedented tence of violent intercommunal confl ict in level. For example, oil revenue has contrib- many parts of East and Central Africa that uted a great deal of fi nancing for the Islamic often does not involve states. State (Heibner et al. 2017). Drug traffi cking Confl ict around weak political settle- has been an important resource for ments in the region and power contestation both insurgent and extremist groups in is clearly exemplifi ed by the dramatic devel- Afghanistan and northern Mali (Comolli opments in South Sudan. Since 2013, the 2017). Extracting rents in exchange for pro- violent confl ict that resulted from a leader- viding protection to many other types of ship division within the Sudan Peo ple’s

22 Pathways for Peace Liberation Movement, antagonized by deep confl ict-related sexual violence as a weapon ethnic structural divisions, has taken a disas- of war since the 1990s (Stearn 2011; UN trous turn. By March 2016, at least 50,000 2017). To a lesser degree, the Central African people had reportedly been killed (Reuters Republic presents a similar situation involv- 2016), and millions of people had been forcing the multiplication of intercommunal ibly displaced both as refugees and as inter- confl ict and the incapacity of the state to nally displaced persons (IDPs).22 Since South project a positive presence (Lombard 2016). Sudan’s independence in 2011, enormous This is the case as well in many subregions challenges have constrained the effort of of African states, such as in Sudan’s Darfur building institutions. The absence of legiti- region and parts of South Sudan, among mate political institutions beyond liberation others (De Waal 2007). politics, which was masked during the years In addition to these three factors, other of the common struggle against the Sudanese rising trends include the following. central government—combined with the lack The tactics of violence are evolving. The of a security apparatus apart from the rebel number of weapons in circulation around movements that had led the fi ght for the world has dramatically increased since independence—was at the origin of the the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century outbreak of the confl ict (ICG 2016b). (Pavesi 2016). The Small Arms Survey Mali and Nigeria are two examples reports that an estimated 875 million small of identity-based confl icts that have turned arms are in circulation worldwide. This is into violent extremist insurrections, as seen certainly a conservative estimate, given in other parts of the world. These confl icts that accurate assessments are diffi cult. grew out of tensions that had little to do From 2001 to 2011, the value of the trade with ideology and were built up over time. in small arms and light weapons nearly For example, the Boko Haram insurrection doubled globally, from $2.38 billion to in northern Nigeria, which started in the $4.634 billion (Small Arms Survey 2014). 1990s, developed slowly, building on a sen- From 2012 to 2013 the global small arms timent of marginalization fueled by large trade rose to US$6 billion—an increase of inequalities between regions that left the US$1 billion, or 17 percent, in a single year population of the poorest state (Borno) (Dutt 2016). feeling excluded from the country’s over- Remote violence tactics are also becoming all relative prosperity (Comolli 2015). increasingly common and deadlier in confl ict Similarly, the spread of violent extremism zones around the world. This type of violence in northern Mali in 2012 started as a nation- refers to instances in which a spatially removed alist Tuareg rebellion, a recurrent phenome- group determines the time, place, and victims non since colonial times, that turned into a of an attack using an explosive device such as a violent extremist insurrection involving bomb, an improvised explosive device (IED), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the or missiles, among others (ACLED 2016; Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Raleigh et al. 2010). For non-state-armed Africa, Harakat Ansar Al-Dine, and others actors that may control a limited amount of (ICG 2015). territory compared to government forces, The high level of violence in the eastern “remote violence is an ideal tactic to either Democratic Republic of Congo is a clear damage state forces with minimal risk or to illustration of intercommunal confl ict con- coerce the state without controlling it. This nected to the absence of a positive state tactic also fi ts into a strategy of groups resort- presence. In this region, many forms of coning to so-called ‘weapons of the weak’ after fl ict overlap. External infl uence has played a losing territory and infl uence,” or being in an role in sustaining violent confl ict in the objective disadvantageous position compared region. Yet eastern Democratic Republic of to state forces (Kishi, Raleigh, and Linke 2016, Congo has experienced a relentlessly 30; see also McCormick and Giordano 2007; high number of both battle and other Merari 1993; and Denselow 2010). deaths and a particularly high number of Drone strikes also have become increas- civilian casualties, coupled with the use of ingly prevalent and deadly and are likely to

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 23 become even more so (Action on Armed political competition (for example, election Violence 2017). Cyberattacks may begin to periods) or when there are external shocks. have kinetic effects in the contexts of violent In some confl icts, the sale of drugs can confl icts, and weaponizable biotechnologies provide a ready stream of revenue for non- too may become a reality. At the same time, state actors in their battles against more many confl icts are waged with few sophisti- powerful and resource-rich state forces.24 cated weapons, and many events featuring Examples include the links between terrorist tactics rely on artisanal bombs, Colombia’s illegal armed groups and differ- trucks, or knives. The genocide in Rwanda ent stages of the illegal drug industry was carried out using machetes. (including taxation, production, and traf- The tactic of terror. Terrorist incidents fi cking), and the sale of illegal amphet- have risen sharply over the last 10 years, as amines in the Middle East by groups have the number of resulting fatalities (see involved in confl ict (Otis 2014; NPR 2013). fi gure 1.8).23 Violence that may stem from these Interpersonal and gang violence and vio- exchanges is therefore at least indirectly lent confl ict. Interpersonal, gang, and linked to larger ongoing confl icts, can result drug-related violence may refl ect or exacer- in the destabilization of the state, and can bate grievances that ultimately lead to vio- contribute to cycles of persistent violence. lent confl ict. Confl icts may degenerate into violence more rapidly in societies with high The Unacceptable Costs of levels of interpersonal violence or with a Violent Confl ict culture of resolving interpersonal issues violently, especially along the lines of gen- “A full accounting of any war’s burdens der (see boxes 1.3 and 1.8). Political fi gures cannot be placed in columns on a ledger” or groups can fi nance or co-opt gangs to (Crawford 2016, 1). It is clear, however, foment targeted violence against oppo- that violent confl ict exacts an incalculably nents, particularly in periods of intense high cost in direct and indirect damage to

FIGURE 1.8 Terrorism Prevalence and Reported Fatalities, Global, 1995–2015

16,000 45,000

14,000 40,000

35,000 12,000 30,000 10,000 25,000 8,000 20,000 6,000 Number of events 15,000 Reported fatalities

4,000 10,000

2,000 5,000

0 0 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Year Measure names Number of events Reported fatalities

Source: Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2016).

24 Pathways for Peace BOX 1.3 Crime and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean

While the rate of homicides seems to be media report, “Brazil reached a new peak declining (Pinker and Mack 2014), of violence [in 2014] with more than it remains very high in some regions, 58,000 violent deaths” (Reuters 2015). specifi cally in Latin America and the Homicides in Brazil can be attributed Caribbean. A 2017 World Bank study calls to the prevalence of the drug trade the problem “staggering and persistent” and the activity of violent gangs in in “the world’s most violent region” certain neighborhoods, exacerbated by (Chioda 2017), which houses 42 of the 50 “corruption and poor training among most violent cities in the world. Homicide police forces and ineffectiveness in the rates in Latin America are driven largely by court system” (Bevins 2015). Violence in increasing rates in Brazil (UNODC 2016). the República Bolivariana de Venezuela The number of deaths from homicide in is also on the rise, with the capital particular countries can rival or exceed the Caracas ranked the most murderous city fatalities in war zones. The Human in the world (Citizens Council for Public Security Report Project notes, “The Security and Criminal Justice 2016; almost 13,000 deaths from organized Tegel 2016; UNODC 2016). In Mexico, crime in Mexico in 2011 were greater than despite efforts in the security sector, the 2011 battle-death tolls in any of the violence driven largely by drug cartels three countries worst-affected by armed remains very high. On the other hand, confl ict and violence against civilians homicide rates in Colombia have declined between 2006 and 2011—Afghanistan, signifi cantly in the last decade as a result Iraq, and Sudan” (Human Security Report of targeted violence prevention strategies Project 2013, 52). According to a 2015 (UNODC 2016).

societies, economies, and people (see atrocities committed worldwide—defi ned box 1.4 on the impacts of the Syrian con- as “the deliberate killing of noncombatant fl ict). It kills and injures combatants and civilians in the context of a wider political civilians alike and infl icts insidious damage confl ict” (Schrodt and Ulfelder 2016)26— to bodies, minds, and communities that can has increased rapidly since 2010, as has the halt human and economic development for number of civilians reportedly killed in such many years. Violent confl ict has a major contexts (Eck and Hultman 2007; Allansson, impact on the ability of the world to Melander, and Themnér 2017; see also improve the well-being of populations and Action on Armed Violence 2017). to reduce poverty, disease, and other cata- About twice as many civilians were strophic risks. Its long-term effects on the reportedly killed by one-sided violence countries involved, and on their neighbors, during confl ict in 2016 than in 2010. include monetary costs such as reduced These numbers were even higher in 2014, economic growth, minimized trade and driven largely by attacks carried out by investment opportunities, and the added Boko Haram and the Islamic State (Eck cost of reconstruction.25 and Hultman 2007; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017). In some instances, The Direct Human Cost of nonstate actors may have an incentive Violent Confl ict to target civilians—for example, “as a cheaper strategy of imposing costs on the Today’s violent confl icts do not necessarily adversary”—especially at times when a play out within the confi nes of a distinct settlement may be imminent (Hultman battleground. Nor are their impacts con- 2010).27 States are also responsible for fi ned to the combatants. Civilians over- high rates of civilian deaths, although they whelmingly bear the brunt of today’s violent may often “contract” this violence out to confl icts (see box 1.5). The number of militias (Raleigh 2012).

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conﬂ ict 25 BOX 1.4 The Impact of the Syrian Conflict

The Syrian confl ict is one of the of confl ict—caring for injured or defi ning crises of the contemporary era. orphaned family members—but also of At least 400,000 persons have been providing humanitarian assistance and killed, about 5 million have fl ed the participating in processes to resist and country, and, according to the United transform the confl ict. Nations Offi ce for the Coordination of The economic impacts of the Humanitarian Affairs, 6.3 million have confl ict are enormous. In real terms, been internally displaced. Many of the Syria’s gross domestic product (GDP) individuals remaining in the country contracted an estimated 63 percent cannot access the help they need, as between 2011 and 2016. In cumulative more than 50 percent of hospitals terms, the loss in GDP amounted to an have been partially or completely estimated US$226 billion between 2011 destroyed, and the supply of and 2016—approximately four times the doctors, nurses, and medical supplies is country’s 2010 GDP. According to the woefully inadequate (UNICEF World Bank, even if the confl ict ends 2015; UNOCHA 2017; this year, the cumulative losses in GDP World Bank 2017a). will reach 7.6 times the preconfl ict GDP Children have been intensely by the twentieth year after the beginning affected: the United Nations Children’s of the confl ict. If the confl ict continues, Fund reports more than 1,500 grave this loss will stand at 13.2 times the human rights violations against children country’s preconfl ict GDP (World Bank in 2015 alone, of which more than 2017a). one-third occurred while children were The impacts of the confl ict have in or on their way to school (UNICEF spread to neighboring countries, which 2015). The proportion of children under feel the brunt of the crisis acutely. 15 being recruited by armed groups Jordan, for example, has registered increased from 20 percent in 2014 to 654,903 Syrian refugees, while more than 50 percent in 2015, and Lebanon has registered 997,905 (as there has been an alarming increase in of December 2017; UNHCR 2017). child marriage: a 2017 United Nations Neighboring Turkey has registered Population Fund survey estimates that 3,400,195 Syrian refugees (as of the number of child brides (under 18 December 2017; UNHCR 2017). The years of age) in Syria has quadrupled quality of care for basic public services since the war began (UNFPA 2017). in health care and education has also Women have taken on a large burden declined, for both refugee and host not only of dealing with the impacts communities.

Much of the violence occurs in urban such as unmet medical needs, food insecu- areas and often targets civilian spaces, rity, inadequate shelter, or contamina- including those considered sanctuaries tion of water (Geneva Declaration on under international humanitarian law, Armed Violence and Development 2011; such as schools, hospitals, and places of UNESCWA 2017). worship (ICRC 2017).28 This impact is Vulnerable populations, such as facilitated by the increasing use of “remote children, are at particularly high risk violence”29 both in civil wars and in acts of (Economist 2015; Guha-Sapir and van terrorism in countries far from confl ict. In Panhuis 2004). Nearly one-third of the addition to the doubling of the number of 11,418 noncombatants killed or wounded civilian deaths in violent confl icts between in Afghanistan in 2016 were children 2010 and 2016, many more civilian deaths (UNAMA 2017).30 This is due to the result from the indirect effects of confl ict, nature of the indiscriminate tactics used,

26 Pathways for Peace BOX 1.5 Conflict Measures Do Not Capture All of the Costs of Violent Conflict

Not all confl ict-related deaths occur in when often they are not. Particularly direct battles between combatants on a regarding countries where violent battlefi eld. Confl ict-related deaths occur confl ict is occurring, country-year because of raids, massacres, measure assumes “that increases skirmishes, and other types of or decreases in the risk of war can hostilities, as well as through disease be explained solely in terms of and food insecurity, among others. socioeconomic and other changes Confl ict can affect food security by within countries. This assumption decreasing production and diminishing is often unrealistic because the access to land (Seddon and Adhikari confl ict dynamics of civil war do not 2003). Food insecurity can result in stop at national boundaries—the deaths from starvation and interconnections between political malnourishment. Confl ict can damage violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan health infrastructure within a country, being an obvious case in point” (Human leaving a population vulnerable to future Security Report Project 2011). health pandemics, as was the case in Using battlefi eld deaths to quantify Liberia. Deaths can also result at or confl ict can reinforce a gender bias before birth. Ahuka, Chabikuli and in measuring violent confl icts. “From Ogunbanjo (2004) note how “war a gender perspective, quantifying exacerbates social factors contributing armed confl ict on the basis of battle- to maternal stress and adverse related deaths is biased towards men’s pregnancy outcomes” in their study of experiences of armed confl ict to the the effects of war on pregnancy detriment of those of women and girls. outcomes in the Democratic Republic of While more men tend to get killed on Congo between 1993 and 2001. the battlefi eld, women and children Data for low-income countries are are often disproportionately targeted often poor or inadequate, and most with other forms of potentially lethal confl ict models use the country- violence during confl ict” (Bastick, year as the standard unit of analysis. Grimm, and Kunz 2007). Also, women This is problematic: it assumes that and children tend to die more often observations in successive country- after the violent phase of the confl ict years are independent of each other, ends (Ormhaug 2009).

such as suicide bombings, IEDs, and The deliberate targeting of civilians over- urban terrorist attacks by the Taliban and all may be creating a perverse corollary. It other groups, as well as the increased use is becoming more accepted that civilians of air support by Afghan and interna- in conflict zones are an inevitable part of tional military forces. It is important to violent conflict casualties. Although a note that “when children are targeted or majority of people still say that it is wrong killed, it is often in an attempt to instill to violate the international norms regard- terror in populations or to reaffirm bru- ing the rules of war, support for these tality and gain (global) notoriety, given norms has dropped from 68 to 59 percent that the targeting of children is meant to since 1999 (ICRC 2016). send a message to (adult) adversaries and/ or the international community at-large. Regional Trends in Civilian Fatalities In addition to attacks, there are also and Atrocities numerous instances in which children are Between 1980 and 2016, Africa had by far abducted and forced to fight in violent the highest proportion of civilian fatalities, conflict” (Kishi 2015; see also Economist with nearly 87 percent (676,625 fatalities 2015; SOS Children’s Village 2015). in the region) of all reported civilian

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 27 fatalities (Eck and Hultman 2007; Allansson, civilian fatalities reported in 2016 (Eck and Melander, and Themnér 2017). Some Hultman 2007; Allansson, Melander, and 500,000 of these fatalities were a direct result Themnér 2017). This increase has been of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, although driven by an increase in the rate of confl ict the estimates vary among sources (Eck and involving nonstate armed groups, which Hultman 2007; Allansson, Melander, and spiked in 2012 in confl icts following the Themnér 2017).31 Arab Spring. Map 1.1 shows reported civilian fatalities in Africa between 2002 and 2016 (ACLED Confl ict, Famine, and Displacement 2016; Raleigh et al. 2010). Countries experi- Violent confl ict scatters populations and encing the most civilian fatalities during disrupts livelihoods. Confl ict, famine, and this time period include the Democratic displacement are deeply interrelated (see Republic of Congo (especially the eastern box 1.6). Famine and food crises further region), Nigeria (where Boko Haram was contribute to the involuntary mass move- responsible for almost half of all reported ment of people, especially in cases where civilian fatalities in the country), Sudan violent confl ict, mismanagement, and insuf- (especially in the Darfur region), and South fi cient responses to previous disasters have Sudan (especially in recent years during its exacerbated the negative impact of a food civil war). While nonstate armed groups crisis (Raleigh 2017). Violent confl ict dis- were responsible for the majority (more rupts trade routes and markets for food and than 86 percent) of civilian fatalities in other necessities, causing further direct and Africa during this time period (ACLED indirect costs. IDPs are particularly vulnera- 2016; Raleigh et al. 2010; Kishi, Raleigh, and ble to the effects of famine and dispropor- Linke 2016), state forces were involved as tionately affected by food insecurity, often well, even if indirectly in some cases. Raleigh due to barriers to accessing labor markets and Kishi (2017) estimate that, in Africa, and reliance on humanitarian assistance progovernment militias commit more for survival. violence against civilians, with at least An estimated 65.6 million people are cur- 10 percent more of their activities targeting rently forcibly displaced from their homes, civilians than other militias. driven primarily by violence (UNHCR In recent years, civilians also have been 2017). Between 2005 and 2016, the number at heightened risk in the Middle East, of IDPs increased more than fi vefold accounting for around two-thirds of all (UNDP 2016b; UNHCR 2017; World Bank

MAP 1.1 Reported Civilian Fatalities in Africa, 2002–16

2002–06 2007–11 2012–16

Iraq Iraq Iraq

Algeria Libya Egypt, Algeria Libya Egypt, Algeria Libya Egypt, Arab Rep. Saudi Arab Rep. Saudi Arab Rep. Saudi Arabia Arabia Arabia

Sudan Yemen, Sudan Yemen, Sudan Yemen, Rep. Rep. Rep.

Congo, Congo, Congo, Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Reported fatalities 0 1,000 2,000 3,375

South South South Africa Africa Africa

Source: Raleigh et al. 2010.

28 Pathways for Peace BOX 1.6 Famine and Fragility, Conflict, and Violence

The four-decade declining trend of displaced persons and refugees often famine and famine-related deaths has rely on host communities, placing a reversed since 2011. Throughout history, strain on already-scarce resources famines have been associated with and heightening the risk for tension. violent confl icts, particularly in recent The 2008 and 2011 global food crises decades as our knowledge of how to triggered more than 40 food riots across prevent famine and instruments for doing the world: it arguably contributed to the so in peaceful contexts have improved breakdown of the social contract that dramatically. Yet famines and severe food led to the Arab Spring, to the fall of the insecurity have resulted in hundreds of government of Haiti in 2008, and to thousands of deaths in Nigeria, Somalia, the fueling of grievances underpinning South Sudan, and Yemen, with millions the 2009 coup in Madagascar. For more people left food insecure, partly each added percentage point in because of violent confl icts. undernourishment, the likelihood for In fragile situations, shocks such violent confl ict increases by 0.24 percent as drought, confl ict, and economic per 1,000 population. insecurity can lead to increased food Famine and food insecurity particularly insecurity and famine. Drought destroys affect rural and agriculture-based agricultural output, and violent confl ict workers, women, and children, partly disrupts agriculture and trade of food because social safety nets might be crops between areas of surplus and more prevalent. In addition to short-term defi cit. The Global Report on Food suffering, famine victims are more likely Crises 2017 reports that in 2016, violent to experience serious health problems confl ict and civil insecurity left more than and have signifi cantly worse fi nancial 63 million people acutely food insecure prospects over the long term. and in need of urgent humanitarian Modern famines are largely man- assistance in 13 countries (Food Security made and avoidable. In fragile contexts, Information Network 2017). alleviating poverty, strengthening social Food insecurity can increase the risk safety nets, and preventing violent of confl ict, particularly when caused confl ict lower the risk of famine and by rising food prices, by displacing food insecurity. Long-term stability populations, by exacerbating grievances, also increases these states’ chances and by increasing competition for scarce of weathering shocks that potentially food and water resources. Internally cause famines.

Sources: World Bank 2017a, 2017b; World Food Programme 2017a, 2017b; von Uexkull et al. 2016; Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011.

2016a; see fi gure 1.9). Approximately 40.3 Extreme poverty is now increasingly million IDPs were recorded in 2016 concentrated in vulnerable groups dis- (UNHCR 2017).32 These are likely conserva- placed by violent confl ict, and the presence tive estimates given the diffi culty of collect- of these populations can affect developing accurate data (see box 1.7). The number ment prospects in the communities hosting of refugees nearly doubled over the same them (World Bank 2016a). Often host period, with the majority (55 percent) of ref- countries and countries with internally ugees coming from just three countries: displaced persons may be fragile them- Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Syria selves, and housing additional vulnerable (UNHCR 2017). More than half of the populations can impose an added strain. world’s refugees are children, many of Indeed, 95 percent of refugees and IDPs whom have been separated from family live in low- and middle-income countries (UNHCR 2017). (World Bank 2016a).

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conﬂ ict 29 FIGURE 1.9 Number of Refugees and IDPs Worldwide, 1951–2016

40,000 40,000

35,000 35,000

30,000 30,000

25,000 25,000

20,000 20,000 IDPs

15,000 15,000 Number of refugees 10,000 10,000

5,000 5,000

0 0

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Year

Measure names Refugees IDPs

Source: UNHCR 2017. Note: IDP = internally displaced person.

BOX 1.7 Limitations of the Data on Forced Displacement

Insecurity can constrain direct access to fi eld offi ces, and nongovernmental displaced populations, making it diffi cult, organizations compile and collect data if not impossible, to verify reported using mainly registers, surveys, registration numbers. It can be especially diffi cult to processes, or censuses. Each method compile accurate data, as crisis of data collection has both strengths and situations resulting in large displaced weaknesses. populations are often dynamic and The use of different methodologies changing rapidly, making static and inconsistent sharing of information, snapshots quickly out of date. however, can weaken systematic data Various sources are used to collect data collection. Logistically, it is also diffi cult on displaced populations. Within protracted to know when displacement ends. For crises, large numbers of assessments example, should internally displaced and surveys often are undertaken for persons (IDPs) who have lived in an both protection and assistance purposes. area for several years and who have Government agencies, United Nations achieved a durable solution still be High Commissioner for Refugees considered IDPs?

Sources: IDMC 2016; UNHCR 2013.

The Gender Impacts of higher in men, especially in young adult Violent Confl ict males, but women tend to experience vio- The impacts of violent confl ict on civilians lence and its effects in signifi cantly greater are gendered. Women and men experience proportions. Women often face a contin- confl ict and violence differently, and there uum of violence before, during, and after are both direct and indirect effects on each confl ict. Sexual and gender-based vio- group. Mortality rates on the battlefi eld are lence tends to be higher in confl ict and

30 Pathways for Peace BOX 1.8 Intimate Partner Violence and Violent Conflict

Violent confl ict may exacerbate all forms were 50 percent more likely to of violence against women and girls and experience intimate partner violence than rebound particularly on them. In a women in districts without reported comparative study looking at cross- fatalities. When levels of confl ict are split sectional variation in self-reported into low, medium, and high levels, Côte intimate partner violence before and after d’Ivoire and Kenya had signifi cantly confl ict in three Sub-Saharan African higher levels of intimate partner violence countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and in high- compared to low-confl ict Liberia), Kelly (2017) fi nds that, despite districts. Using Demographic and Health differences in the nature of violent Survey data for periods before and after confl ict in each country, there is a confl ict in Kenya, Kelly (2017) also fi nds signifi cant relationship between intimate that districts with higher levels of partner violence and previous violent intimate partner violence before the confl ict in all three countries. In Kenya confl ict were 30 percent more likely to be and Liberia, women living in a district associated with fatal violence after the with reported deaths from violent confl ict confl ict broke out.

postconfl ict settings, as does recruitment of on cognitive and social development girls into traffi cking, sexual slavery, or forced (Betancourt et al. 2012; Blattman 2006; marriage (Kelly 2017; UN Secretary-General Calvete and Orue 2011; Huesmann and 2015; UN Women 2015; UNFPA 2017; Kirwil 2007; Leckman, Panter-Brick, and UNESCWA 2015). Girls’ mobility is often Salah 2014; Shonkoff and Garner 2012; highly restricted, limiting their access to Weaver, Borkowski, and Whitman 2008). school, employment, and other opportuni- The experience of traumatic events can ties, and this can be exacerbated during and lead to serious mental health and behav- after violent confl ict (UN Women 2015). ioral problems that hinder people’s ability Intimate partner violence—whose victims to function in life. The World Bank has are more often women—can also be linked found that 30–70 percent of people who to violent confl ict more largely (see box 1.8). have lived in confl ict zones suffer from symptoms of post-traumatic stress disor- The Lifetime Impacts of der and depression (CDC 2014; Murthy Violent Confl ict and Lakshminarayana 2006; World Bank Exposure to confl ict can generate impacts 2016b). Children who are orphaned or sep- all along the life cycle. As illustrated in arated from family often experience pres- box 1.9, living in a setting where violence is sure to provide for themselves or become present can have myriad impacts, some of heads of households, which can make them which continue to manifest throughout the vulnerable to exploitation by traffi cking life cycle. These impacts can be generated networks or armed groups (World Vision both by the direct exposure to violence or International 2017). The impacts on human by the witnessing of violence. For children capital can extend over generations (Mueller and youth, the long-term effects of expo- and Tobias 2016). sure to violence, combined with the adver- The harmful effects of violent confl ict sities of daily life in a high-violence are especially insidious for children’s poten- context, are associated with a range of chal- tial development. According to Save the lenges (Miller and Rasmussen 2010). These Children (2013), “Almost 50 million children include increased risk of perpetrating or and young people living in confl ict areas are being a victim of violence later in life (Child out of school, more than half of them pri- Trends 2017; Finkelhor et al. 2009; Margolin mary age, and reports of attacks on educa- and Elana 2004) as well as negative effects tion are rising” (reported in Tran 2013).

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conﬂ ict 31 BOX 1.9 The Impact of Conflict over the Life Cycle

Confl ict causes disruption and destruction far beyond Even if confl ict across the region came to an end the loss of life. Famine and disease, the closure of today, the effects of confl ict on human development public services, and the collapse of labor market would likely be felt for generations to come. opportunities create lasting impacts that affect the The impact of confl ict on the nutritional status of overall pathway of a society and the development children is of particular concern. Stunting, through opportunities of its citizens. Figure B1.9.1 shows how which nutritional disadvantages translate into weaker confl ict can affect the skill formation process. physical and cognitive health in childhood and The rise in violent confl ict in the Middle East, adulthood, is associated with cognitive development, for example, has interrupted critical investments long-term productivity, and overall adult health. in the development of human capital. Children These risks produce a lifetime of lower productivity exposed to confl ict will carry the effects of confl ict and opportunity. The persistence of economic and throughout their lives, as the destruction of family educational inequalities, which often manifest in assets has devastating long-term consequences on low educational attainment and low employment future possibilities and the destruction of education opportunities for a large fraction of the population, halts critical interventions designed to enhance the may contribute to grievances that pose a risk of opportunities of individuals and improve society. future violence.

FIGURE B1.9.1 Skill Formation Process over the Life Cycle

Inputs Inputs Inputs Inputs (i) Genes (i) Cognitive skills (i) Cognitive skills (i) Cognitive skills (ii) Environment (ii) Non-cognitive skills (ii) Non-cognitive skills (ii) Non-cognitive skills (iii) Health status (iii) Health status (iii) Health status

CONFLICT Health care system Child care School system School system School system School system Family environment Family environment Family environment Family environment Disrupts the skill formation process by affecting familial and social environments, and the health care and Outputs Outputs Outputs Outputs school systems (i) Cognitive development (i) School attainment and (i) Final schooling level (i) Physical and mental health (ii) Non-cognitive development performance (ii) Labor market outcomes (ii) Social behaviors (iii) Physical and mental health (ii) Physical and mental health (iii) Physical and mental health (iii) Social behaviors (iv) Social behaviors Birth

1 2 3 Childhood Adolescence Adulthood Old age Conception

Source: Based on Urzúa 2016.

Source: UNESCWA 2017.

Years of violent confl ict in Syria “have of the hardships of violent confl ict may reversed more than a decade of progress in never resume their education or acquire children’s education. Today over 2 million of needed workforce training after the confl ict Syria’s 4.8 million school-aged children are (World Vision International 2017). These not in school” (SOS Children’s Village 2014). impacts underscore the need for investment Children who have to leave school as a result in human capital development, which can

32 Pathways for Peace help build a country’s future workforce and of the year. When you consider that accord- thereby enhance its competitiveness in the ing to the most recent World Bank estimates global economy. 10.7 [percent] of the world’s population are living on less than US$2 per day, it shows The Health Impacts of an alarming market failure” (IEP 2016; Violent Confl ict Schippa 2017). Violent confl icts affect health in direct and Prolonged violent confl ict increases eco- indirect ways. In Liberia, 354 of 550 medical nomic costs. Violent confl ict can also result facilities were destroyed during the Liberian in opportunity costs that have long-term Civil War, affecting how it coped with the ramifi cations for countries. The resources Ebola epidemic (Murphy and Ricks 2014). and money spent fi ghting wars can result in In the Democratic Republic of Congo, vio- lost employment opportunities, creating lent confl ict worsened pregnancy outcomes pressures and grievances that pose risks (Ahuka, Chabikuli, and Ogunbanjo 2004). for future violent confl ict (Garrett-Peltier Confl ict can also exacerbate the spread of 2014). The adverse economic cost of violent infectious diseases. For example, the onset confl ict increases with the length of expo- of recent confl ict has resulted in a resur- sure to violence; with the duration of con- gence of polio in Syria, a disease that had fl icts increasing over time, these economic been nearly eradicated worldwide (Tajaldin costs will have an increasingly adverse effect et al. 2015). The World Health Organization on affected countries and their futures has called the recent cholera outbreak in the (Röther et al. 2016). Beyond the impacts on Republic of Yemen “unprecedented” due to countries at the macro-level, violent con- its quick appearance in the confl ict zone fl ict also has economic impacts at the (Al Jazeera 2017). Tuberculosis is also a micro-level; loss of livelihoods and assets of major health problem, and confl ict-affected households are essential in understanding countries have lower capacity to run tuber- the dynamics of confl ict traps. culosis control programs (Waldman 2001). Violent confl ict is a major cause of the reversals in economic growth that many The Economic Costs of low- and middle-income countries have Violent Confl ict experienced in recent decades. Indeed, recessions experienced during periods of The economic costs of violent confl ict are violent confl ict in fragile countries are a staggering. However, the overall costs of key reason for much lower average growth confl ict are unevenly distributed, contribut- rates over time (Mueller and Tobias 2016). ing to global inequality between countries. The consequences are hugely negative for In the absence of violent confl ict, global fragile contexts. Afghanistan’s per capita income inequality would be signifi cantly income, for example, has barely changed lower. In fact, violent confl ict is an integral since 1970 as the result of multiple violent part of the world economic structure confl icts, while Somalia’s per capita income (De Groot, Bozzoli, and Brück 2012), result- dropped by more than 40 percent in the ing in certain high-income countries’ bene- same period (IEP 2015). Recurrent and fi ting from the prevalence of violent protracted violent confl ict, therefore, deci- confl ict, while certain low- and middle- mates the ability of states to rebuild their income countries bear a disproportionate economies and thus potentially prevent amount of the costs. future violent confl ict. The Institute for Economics and Peace The macroeconomic costs of violent states in a 2016 report that the cost of con- confl ict are also high. Violent confl ict can taining violence is US$13.6 trillion a year undermine confi dence in an economy by globally, a fi gure “equivalent to 13.3 [percent] altering investors’ expectations about politi- of world GDP or US$1,876 PPP [purchas- cal risks, particularly the risk of violence ing power parity] per annum, per person.33 recurrence (Mueller and Tobias 2016). To further break it down, that fi gure is Investors seek political stability for their US$5 per person, per day, every day investments because it entails lower risk.

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 33 Following violent confl ict, states can have a or increasing access to social services like diffi cult time attracting new investors who education (Garrett-Peltier 2014). are willing to incur the higher risks of doing Violent confl ict usually exacts a very business in a postconfl ict environment. high toll on infrastructure and production The impacts on the overall economy can systems (Mueller and Tobias 2016). For be substantial. Mavriqi (2016) fi nds that example, electoral violence surrounding the countries experiencing violent confl ict suf- 2007 Kenyan presidential election drove up fer a reduction in annual GDP growth of labor costs by 70 percent (Ksoll, Rocco, and 2–4 percent and up to 8.4 percent if the Morjaria 2009); insecurity stemming from confl ict is severe. Violent confl ict is also the Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and associated with an acceleration of infl ation; the Indian Ocean increased shipping costs on average, the consumer price index by about 10 percent (Besley, Fetzer, and increases by 1.6 percentage points during Mueller 2012; Mueller and Tobias 2016). years of violent confl ict (Röther et al. 2016). Neighboring countries often shoulder Economic growth can be severely affected the burden of spillover effects from violent in countries relying on trade or natural confl ict. On average, countries that border a resources, if these resources are destroyed high-intensity confl ict zone experience an during confl ict; a country relying on tour- annual decline of 1.4 percentage points in ism may lose or have limited growth in that their GDP and an acceleration in infl ation potential source of income as a result of of 1.7 percentage points (Röther et al. 2016). violent confl ict. In the Middle East, the confl icts in Iraq and Political, social, and economic risks are Syria are associated with a drop in economic rife in postconfl ict periods. Postconfl ict growth of 1 percentage point in Jordan in economies often exist in power vacuums 2013. Similar dynamics were at work in that allow organized crime to fl ourish and Lebanon, where GDP growth slowed from create black market economies, which can 2.8 percent in 2012 and 2.6 percent in 2013 include both drug and human traffi cking. from an average of 9.2 percent in 2007–10. Human traffi cking explodes during violent Prices for basic needs such as food or hous- confl ict, spilling into neighboring states, ing also increased at the beginning of the but the situation persists once the confl ict confl icts (Röther et al. 2016). ends. Grievances can fester and grow in this environment. The Costs of Responding Many countries affected by violent con- to Confl ict fl ict also have had enormous diffi culties rebuilding institutions. A principal reason In 2017, an estimated 141.1 million people is that trust and capacity must fi rst be built living in 37 countries were in need of interna- up before new institutions can succeed tional humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA in fragile situations (Chen, Ravallion, and 2017). The costs of this assistance are high Sangraula 2008; World Bank 2011). Mueller and rising. They include the cost of increas- and Tobias (2016) fi nd that countries with a ing humanitarian assistance during confl ict history of intrastate confl ict collect a smaller and postconfl ict aid to assist reconstruction share of taxes relative to GDP than coun- and recovery and to support resilience as tries that have not experienced violent con- well as prevention and intervention strate- fl ict, which can make rebuilding after a gies (Dancs 2011; Demekas, McHugh, and confl ict that much more diffi cult. Kosma 2002; Ndikumana 2015).34 The esti- Societies also pay the costs of confl ict in mated economic cost of efforts to contain their security structures. Military costs, violence in 2012 was US$9.46 trillion or especially for large armies, can be very 11 percent of world gross product (IEP high (Nordhaus 2002), hurting opportunity 2015). To put this into perspective, spending costs in particular. When resources are on confl ict containment is 2.4 times the total diverted toward security costs, states may GDP of Africa; the majority of this spending forgo opportunities to invest in other sec- goes to militaries, with just 0.1 percent spent tors, such as manufacturing, clean energy, on UN peacekeeping (IEP 2015).

34 Pathways for Peace The costs of responding to confl ict in missions had nearly tripled from have climbed signifi cantly in parallel with 34,000 in 2000 to 94,000 in August the rapid growth and changing nature of 2017.37 By 2016, the total cost of confl ict. maintaining peacekeeping missions in the fi eld had climbed to almost US$8 • Total funding requirements for billion a year, also refl ecting the fact that humanitarian action in 2016 reached missions today “last on average three US$22.1 billion, an increase of US$2.2 times longer than their predecessors”38 billion over the previous year and (United Nations 2015, 11). At the same a staggering US$13.3 billion (nearly time, the number, size, and responsibilities 70 percent) over 2012.35 This upward of smaller civilian political missions have trend seems bound to continue in the grown; 21 political missions are now in future, with estimated requirements for place, with more than 3,000 personnel.39 2017 reaching new highs at US$23.5 • Costs for humanitarian action not billion. Funding secured for humanitarian directly linked to confl ict have risen as action has gradually adjusted in response well. In 2015, for instance, roughly to growing demand. The gap between 1.5 million refugees sought asylum in requested and secured funding, however, Organisation for Economic Co-operation has widened steadily over time. In 2016, and Development countries, nearly total funding secured fell short of requests twice as many as in the previous by US$9 billion or more than 40 percent year. Funding for the immediate of the total.36 response to this crisis came in large part • A large majority of resources requested from offi cial development assistance. for humanitarian action are directed Development aid spent on refugees in to areas of violent confl ict. A report by host countries doubled between the UN Secretary-General states that, 2014 and 2015 and increased sixfold between 2002 and 2013, US$83 billion since 2010, reaching a total of US$12 out of US$96 billion (or 86 percent) billion (9.1 percent of total overseas of total requests for humanitarian development assistance).40 assistance through UN appeals was to assist people affected by confl icts The evolving geography of conflict is (United Nations 2014). Since then, driving these cost increases as much as the mega-crises such as in Iraq and Syria escalation of violence. Conflict is becom- have further reinforced the link between ing more concentrated in middle-income confl ict and humanitarian action. In countries, presenting a unique set of diffi- 2015, approximately 97 percent of total culties from those of lower-income humanitarian action targeted complex countries. emergencies—situations in which a total or considerable breakdown of authority results from internal or external confl ict How Violent Confl icts End (UNOCHA 2016). Violent confl icts tend either to end in vic- • In the last two decades, peacekeeping tory for one side or another or to fade into a operations expanded in mandate, state of chronic but low-intensity armed size, and length. So-called “traditional” hostilities. Permanent settlements through peacekeeping missions involving mediation, particularly for intrastate con- observational tasks performed by military fl icts, have been rarer. In the decades after personnel have evolved into what the World War II, the bipolar international United Nations Capstone Doctrine order focused on interstate wars. The end of referred to as complex “multidimensional” the Cold War ushered in a new era of coop- enterprises (United Nations 2008). As of eration among global powers and a renewed mid-2017, 16 peacekeeping operations effort to peacefully resolve violent confl icts were deployed and operational, while the that were previously seen only through the number of police and military personnel prism of the competition between the

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 35 Soviet Union and the United States. negotiated settlement result in signifi cantly Between 1946 and 1991, more than fewer fatalities relative to the presettlement 23 percent of confl icts were brought to an death toll. This was the case in 10 out of 11 end by means of permanent peace settle- cases in which peace agreements collapsed ments or ceasefi re agreements; the propor- between 1989 and 2004 (Mack 2012). The tion increased to almost 29 percent between average annual death toll of intrastate con- 1991 and 2014 (Kreutz 2010; see fi gure 1.10). fl icts drops by more than 80 percent if they The use of mediation declined in the recur after a peace agreement (Human early 2000s, yet remains well above Cold Security Report Project 2012). War levels (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014). Notwithstanding its positive impacts, the While the long-term effectiveness of the use of mediation to negotiate the peaceful mediation of violent intrastate confl ict has resolution of confl icts has not become a sta- been challenged (Beardsley 2008, 2011; ble feature of the international system. A Fortna 2003), recent research suggests that recent analysis suggests that the prolifera- negotiated settlements are effective at reduction of negotiated settlements has ended, ing violence in at least the fi rst few years with the violent confl icts in today’s world after an agreement is signed (De Rouen and challenging existing international mecha- Chowdhury 2016; see fi gure 1.11). nisms and hence being increasingly diffi cult Indeed, negotiated settlements can have to resolve with agreements (Walter 2017a). a transformative effect on confl ict dynamics Indeed, many of the intrastate con- even when they fail. For example, violent fl icts and civil wars that have erupted since confl icts that restart after collapse of a 2007 share characteristics that make them

FIGURE 1.10 Termination of Violent Conflicts Worldwide before and after the Cold War, 1946–2014

0.40

0.35

0.30

0.25

0.20

0.15

0.10

0.05 Proportion of all state-based violent conflicts

0 Peace Ceaseﬁre Government Rebel Low activity Actor ceases Conﬂict still agreement agreement victory victory to exist ongoing

1946–1991 1991–2014

Source: Uppsala Confl ict Data Program (Kreutz 2010). Note: The Cold War period extends from 1945 to 1991; the post–Cold War period extends from 1991 to 2014. Peace agreement = an agreement concerned with resolving or regulating the incompatibility (completely or a central part of it) that is signed or accepted by all or the main parties active in the last year of confl ict. Ceasefi re agreement = an agreement typically concerned with ending the use of force by the warring sides. It can also offer amnesty for participation in the confl ict. It does not include any resolution of the incompatibility. Government victory = the state manages to defeat comprehensively or eliminate the opposition. Rebel victory = the rebel group manages to oust the government. Low activity = confl ict activity continues but does not reach the Uppsala Confl ict Data Program threshold with regard to fatalities. Actor ceases to exist = confl ict activity continues, but at least one of the parties ceases to exist or becomes another confl ict actor.

36 Pathways for Peace FIGURE 1.11 The Onset and End of Armed Conflict Worldwide, 1950–2013

6 Number of conflicts 4

0 1950–59 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–09 2010–13 Average number of onsets per year Average number of terminations per year

Source: Uppsala Conﬂ ict Data Program (Kreutz 2010).

particularly resistant to negotiated settle- it is challenged on many fronts in a world ments.41 For example, international con- where communication, fi nance, crime, sensus on how they should end is lacking, as and ideas fl ow seamlessly across borders. demonstrated in the absence of UN Security Responding to violence after it has broken Council action (UN Security Council 2017). out is more expensive than ever, underscor- Moreover, the nature of these wars—with ing the need to move beyond crisis response multiple fi ghting factions, signifi cant and recovery to a focus on prevention. involvement of outside states, and the deep This chapter has reviewed current trends societal divisions that the confl icts feed and in violent confl ict, the nature of the risks, refl ect—challenges the existing interna- and the opportunities for prevention. The tional and state-based confl ict-resolution study turns next to an exploration of the mechanisms (Walter 2017a). context in which violent confl icts are happening, focusing on some of the key sys- Conclusion temic risks posed by global trends, and the implications for prevention. Violent confl ict remains the exception, not the rule, in today’s world. But it remains a Notes signifi cant threat to the stability of countries and regions. Violent confl ict has 1. Intensity is defi ned as the number of become more complex, more international- confl ict-related deaths and injuries. ized, and more multidimensional. It affects 2. Most of the numbers referred to in this more middle-income countries, but is also chapter are based on the UCDP and Peace stubbornly entrenched in low-income Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) defi nitions countries. In both cases, violent confl icts of state-based armed confl ict as “a contested are contagious. incompatibility which concerns government The international system created after and/or territory where the use of armed World War II is rooted in the collective force between two parties, of which at least desire to prevent violent confl ict through one is the government of a state, results in at norms, values, and peace mechanisms. But least 25 battle-related deaths” and nonstate

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 37 violent confl ict as a confl ict between non- and the Levant, the Islamic State of Iraq and state (that is, not state-based) armed groups, Syria, and its Arabic language acronym with which may have ties to one or more states. a negative connotation, Daesh. The data on state-based confl icts cover the 9. The use of progovernment militias does not years 1946–2016 (Allansson, Melander, and necessarily signify that a state lacks the capac- Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002), while ity to carry out violence using its own forces. the data on nonstate violent confl icts cover In fact, the use of such militias is often a sign the years 1989–2016 (Sundberg, Eck, and of strong state capacity (see Kishi, Aucoin, Kreutz 2012; Allansson, Melander, and and Raleigh 2016; Raleigh and Kishi 2017). Themnér 2017). UCDP is the source for the 10. UCDP/PRIO defi nes internationalized con- majority of trends on the character and fl ict as those where one side is a state and intensity of violent confl icts in this chapter. one side is a nonstate and where an outside Figure 1.1 includes confl icts that have state intervenes on behalf of one of these resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths in (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; a given year. Gleditsch et al. 2002). 3. Pinker and Mack (2014) note, “The end of 11. “This appears to be because credible guaran- the Cold War … saw a steep reduction in the tees on the terms of an agreement are almost number of armed confl icts of all kinds, impossible to design by the combatants including civil wars.” While it is true that the themselves” (Walter 2017a, 1). rate of violent confl icts between state forces 12. UCDP does not report any violent confl icts and a nonstate actor had been decreasing involving state forces ending in 2016 since the end of the Cold War, it has been (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; increasing in recent years, as has the rate of Gleditsch et al. 2002). As this study was being confl icts between nonstate actors—although prepared, it was too early to say which con- the latter is not explored in Pinker and Mack fl icts that were active in 2016 might or might (2014), given the low number of battle not be active in 2017. Hence, fi gure 1.6 deaths reported by these confl icts. extends only to 2015. Several factors account 4. UCDP reports four confl icts with more than for the stark difference in the duration 1,000 fatalities each for 2007 and 13 for 2016 (number of years, on average) of violent (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; confl icts involving state forces that ended in Gleditsch et al. 2002; Sundberg, Eck, and 2014 versus those that ended in 2015. In Kreutz 2012). 2014, 56 percent of violent confl icts had 5. UCDP reports 63 state-based and nonstate lasted more than 20 years and 44 percent had confl icts with between 25 and 999 battle- lasted less than 10 years. In 2015, in contrast, related deaths for 2007 and 101 for 2016 31 percent had lasted more than 20 years and (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; 69 percent had lasted less than 10 years. Gleditsch et al. 2002; Sundberg, Eck, and 13. “Confl ict duration is [also] likely to change Kreutz 2012). power balances that need to be refl ected in 6. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 use the best estimate for the institutional designs of political settle- battle-related deaths in violent confl icts, ments; [as such] stability can only be including those that involve state forces and achieved if underlying causes are suffi ciently those that do not; fi gure 1.3 also includes addressed as well. Otherwise, confl ict is fatalities stemming from one-sided violence. likely to recur” (Wolff, Ross, and Wee 2017). 7. Nonstate armed groups include rebel organi- 14. Gang violence, which is prevalent in the zations and violent extremist groups; political Americas, is not systematically included here, militias or “armed gangs” operating on behalf as it was mentioned previously in the analysis of political actors; and communal and ethnic of armed groups. militias, which can act as local security pro- 15. Political-religious divides and territorial viders or can engage in intercommunal con- claims are also major drivers, both of which fl ict, often not engaging with the state (for may confl ate with issues related to political example, the Fulani ethnic militia in Nigeria). power. 8. The Islamic State is known by several other 16. In 2015, approximately 19 percent of battle- names, including the Islamic State of Iraq fi eld deaths occurred in the Arab world.

38 Pathways for Peace 17. These states also had highly repressive of economic activity problematic . . . [and so human rights policies and practiced capital numbers] ought to be interpreted with this punishment, among other commonalities in mind. . . . [Regardless of the estimate (see Gleditsch and Rudolfsen 2016). used,] the impact of civil war on output is 18. In Iraq, long-standing grievances are disastrous” (Mueller 2013). increasingly manifesting themselves in the 26. Defi nitions and data set are available creation of cross-sectarian alliances as an at http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data expression of widespread and diverse popu- .dir/atrocities.html. lar dissatisfaction with the ruling elites. Iraq 27. Hultman (2010) suggests three mechanisms also has a history of long-standing tensions that may result in this behavior: “First, if an between Arabs and Kurds. intervention makes the warring parties 19. For example, the global recruitment of expect a settlement of the confl ict, they Western foreign fi ghters through technology might target civilians as a last-minute strat- and other means (ICG 2016a). egy to establish territorial control. Second, if 20. While the international recruitment of the intervention alters the balance of power young people by groups such as the Islamic between the warring parties or hinders mili- State has received much attention, the tary clashes, the warring parties might turn strength of such groups in Iraq, for example, to violence against civilians as a cheaper has come from the local co-optation of the strategy of imposing costs on the adversary. old Ba’athist apparatus as well as from col- Third, if an intervention challenges the laboration with tribes that have been fright- warring parties’ ability to extract natural ened by a formal state structure they perceive resources or to engage in criminal economic to be serving as an instrument of retribution activity, it might trigger them to increase for the years of Sunni domination in Iraq. violent looting behavior in order to main- Al Shabaab has also co-opted many people tain control over resources.” who had been excluded by the domination 28. Attacks on schools and hospitals are consid- of clans in Somali politics, especially ered one of the six grave violations under many youths. the August 1999 UN Security Council 21. Chapter 4 presents the fi ndings of studies of Resolution (S/RES/1261) on Children the motivations of individuals who join and Armed Confl ict (see also ICRC 2017; violent extremist groups (see box 4.4). Sassoli 2004). 22. See the United Nations High Commissioner 29. See ACLED for definitions and discussion, for Refugees (UNHCR) data portal, http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/category “South Sudan Situation,” http://data.unhcr. /remote-violence/. org/SouthSudan/regional.php; Internal 30. This was also the highest number of civilian Displacement Monitoring Centre database, casualties that the UN has ever recorded “South Sudan,” http://www.internal over the protracted confl ict in the country. -displacement.org/countries/south-sudan. 31. Other estimates put the fi gure in excess of 23. Terrorism is understood here as “the threat- 800,000, suggesting that UCDP underesti- ened or actual use of illegal force and vio- mates the scale of the genocide. No genocide lence by a non-state actor to attain a political, has been comparable in scale to that of economic, religious or social goal through Rwanda for more than 20 years. However, fear, coercion or intimidation” (National several massive genocides occurred between Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 1955 and 1994. Responses to Terrorism 2016). This defi ni- 32. The numbers reported here refl ect the num- tion renders it diffi cult to distinguish bers released in UNHCR’s report, Global events from warfare during violent confl ict Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016 (Hoffman 2006). (UNHCR 2017). The trends depicted in 24. Illicit fi nancing of nonstate actors is not fi gure 1.9 are based on data downloaded limited to the sale of drugs. from UNHCR. The numbers reported in the 25. “An exact estimate for the economic cost of UNHCR report differ because IDP numbers violent confl ict is hard to derive. The very come from the Internal Displacement existence of a confl ict makes measurement Monitoring Centre and refugee numbers

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 39 come from the United Nations Relief and Action on Armed Violence. 2017. “Explosive Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Truths: Monitoring Explosive Violence Near East in addition to UNHCR. in 2016.” https://aoav.org.uk/2017/explosive 33. This fi gure is based on the Global Peace -truths-monitoring-explosive-violence-2016/. Index, which includes 16 separate categories Ahuka, O. L., N. Chabikuli, and G. A. Ogunbanjo. with estimated costs, including the losses 2004. “The Effects of Armed Confl ict from crime and interpersonal violence on Pregnancy Outcomes in the Congo.” ($2.5 trillion) and losses from confl ict International Journal of Gynecology and ($742 billion), as well as the costs of contain- Obstetrics 84 (1): 91–92. ing violence through internal security Al Jazeera. 2017. “WHO: Speed of Yemen spending ($4.2 trillion) and military spend- Cholera Outbreak ‘Unprecedented.’” May ing ($6.2 trillion) (IEP 2015). 19. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05 34. Does the outcome of prevention and inter- / speed-yemen-cholera-outbreak-unprecede vention justify its cost? In cases where it is nted-170519110837434.html. not deemed “successful,” arguing its justifi - Allansson, M., E. Melander, and L. Themnér. cation can be more diffi cult. Valentino 2017. “Organized Violence, 1989–2016.” (2011), for example, argues, “Intervening Journal of Peace Research 54 (4): 574–87. militarily to save lives abroad often sounds Alvarez, A. 2006. ‘‘Militias and Genocide.’’ good on paper, but the record has not been War Crimes, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity 2 (1): 1–33. promising. The ethical calculus involved is Bastick, M., K. Grimm, and R. Kunz. 2007. Sexual almost always complicated by messy realities Violence in Armed Confl ict: Global Overview on the ground, and the opportunity costs of and Implications for the Security Sector. such missions are massive. Well-meaning Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control countries could save far more lives by help- of Armed Forces. ing refugees and victims of natural disasters Beardsley, K. 2008. “Agreement without and funding public health.” Peace? International Mediation and Time 35. See http://interactive.unocha.org/publica Inconsistency Problems.” American Journal of tion/globalhumanitarianoverview/, section Political Science 52 (4): 723–40. on funding requirements. ———. 2011. “Peacekeeping and the Contagion 36. See http://interactive.unocha.org/publica of Armed Confl ict.” Journal of Politics 73 (4): tion/globalhumanitarianoverview/, section 1051–64. on funding requirements. Beegle, K., L. Christiaensen, A. Dabalen, and 37. See https://www.unmissions.org/#block-views I. Gaddis. 2016. Poverty in a Rising Africa. -missions-peacekeeping-missions. Washington, DC: World Bank. 38. Based on the planned closure of peacekeeping Besley, T., T. Fetzer, and H. Mueller. 2012. missions in Haiti and Liberia, peacekeeping “One Kind of Lawlessness: Estimating the missions’ budgets have been reduced to Welfare Cost of Somali Piracy.” Working approximately US$6.8 billion in 2017. Paper 626, Barcelona Graduate School of 39. See https://www.unmissions.org/#block-views Economics. -missions-political-missions. Betancourt, T. S., R. McBain, E. A. Newnham, 40. See http://www.oecd.org/dac/development and R. T. Brennan. 2012. “Trajectories of -aid-rises-again-in-2015-spending-on-refu Internalizing Problems in War-Affected gees-doubles.htm. Sierra Leonean Youth: Examining Confl ict 41. With the notable exception of some new and Postconfl ict Factors.” Child Development wars in the Middle East, for instance, most 84 (2): 455–70. confl icts initiated in the twenty-fi rst century Bevins, V. 2015. “In Brazil, Homicide Rate Still represent a relapse of confl ict (Walter 2010). High Despite Increased Prosperity.” Los Angeles Times, May 22. http://www.latimes References . com/world/brazil/la-fg-ff-brazil-crime -2015 0522-story.html. ACLED (Armed Confl ict Location and Event Blattman, C. 2006. The Consequences of Data Project). 2016. ACLED-Africa, v.7. Child Soldiering. Berkeley: University of http://www.acleddata.com. California Press.

40 Pathways for Peace Brinkman, H.-J., and C. S. Hendrix. 2011. Paper, Watson Institute for International “Food Insecurity and Violent Confl ict: Studies, Brown University, Providence, RI. Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Croicu, M., and R. Sundberg. 2017. UCDP GED Challenges.” Occasional Paper 24, World Codebook, version 17.1. Department of Peace Food Programme, Rome. and Confl ict Research, Uppsala University, Brownlee, J., T. Masoud, and A. Reynolds. 2015. Uppsala, Sweden. The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Dancs, A. 2011. “International Assistance Reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Spending due to War on Terror.” Costs of Calvete, E., and I. Orue. 2011. “The Impact of War Working Paper, Watson Institute for Violence Exposure on Aggressive Behavior International Studies, Brown University, through Social Information Processing Providence, RI. in Adolescents. American Journal of De Groot, O. J., C. Bozzoli, and T. Brück. 2012. Orthopsychiatry 81 (1): 38. “The Global Economic Burden of Violent CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Confl ict.” HiCN Working Paper 199, Institute Prevention). 2014. “Mental Health in of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Conflict-Affected Populations: Fact Sheet.” Falmer, UK. ERRB Scientific Publications, CDC, De Rouen, K., and I. Chowdhury. 2016. Atlanta. “Peacekeeping and Civil War Peace Chen, S., M. Ravallion, and P. Sangraula. Agreements.” Defence and Peace Economics 2008. “Dollar a Day Revisited.” World Bank (May 9): 1–17. Economic Review 23 (2): 163–84. De Waal, A. 2007. War in Darfur and the Child Trends. 2017. “Children’s Exposure to Search for Peace. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Violence.” https://www.childtrends.org/indi University Press. cators/childrens-exposure-to-violence/. Demekas, D. G., J. McHugh, and T. Kosma. 2002. Chioda, L. 2017. Stop the Violence in Latin “The Economics of Post Confl ict Aid (Vol. 2).” America: A Look at Prevention from Cradle to IMF Working Paper 02/198, International Adulthood. Washington, DC: World Bank. Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Citizens Council for Public Security and Denselow, J. 2010. “Roadside Bombs: Weapons Criminal Justice. 2016. “Caracas, Venezuela, of the Weak. The Guardian, June 18. http:// the Most Violent City in the World.” www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010 Seguridad, Justicia, y Paz. http://www.seguri /jun/18/roadside-bombs-afghanistan. dadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/biblioteca/prensa Devarajan, S., and E. Ianchovichina. 2017. /download/6-prensa/231-caracas-venezuela “A Broken Social Contract, Not High -the-most-violent-city-in-the-world. Inequality, Led to the Arab Spring.” Review of Colletta, N., and B. Oppenheim. 2017. Income and Wealth [online version of record]. “Subnational Confl ict: Dimensions, Trends, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111 and Options for Prevention.” Background /roiw.12288/abstract. paper for the United Nations–World Bank Doyle, M. W., and N. Sambanis. 2000. Flagship Study Pathways for Peace: Inclusive “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, and Quantitative Analysis.” American Political World Bank, Washington, DC. Science Review 94 (4): 779–801. Comolli, V. 2015. Boko Haram, Nigeria Islamist Dutt, A. 2016. “UN-Backed Findings Reveal Insurgency. London: Hurst. Startling Small Arms Trade Increase.” Inter ———. 2017. “Transnational Organized Crime Press Service News Agency, June 8. http://www and Confl ict.” Background Paper for the .ipsnews.net/2016/06/un-backed -findings United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, -reveal-startling-small-arms-trade-increase/. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Eck, K., and L. Hultman. 2007. “One-Sided Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Violence against Civilians in War: Insights Washington, DC. from New Fatality Data.” Journal of Peace Crawford, N. C. 2016. “US Budgetary Costs of Research 44 (2): 233–46. War through 2016: $4.79 Trillion and Economist. 2015. “War Child.” June 3. Counting: Summary of Costs of the US Wars Fearon, J. 2004. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and So Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Homeland Security.” Costs of War Working Peace Research 41 (3): 275–301.

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 41 Finkelhor, D., H. A. Turner, R. Ormrod, Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade S. Hamby, and K. Kracke. 2009. Children’s and Confl ict.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (6): Exposure to Violence: A Comprehensive 763–74. National Survey. Washington: U.S. Department Heibner, S., P. Neumann, J. Holland-McCowan, of Justice. and R. Basra. 2017. “Caliphate in Decline: Food Security Information Network. 2017. An Estimate of Islamic State’s Financial Global Report on Food Crisis 2017. Fortunes.” Ernst & Young. Brussels: European Union, World Food Hoffman, B. 2006. Inside Terrorism. New York: Programme, and Food and Agricultural Columbia University Press. Organization, March. Huesmann, L. R., and L. Kirwil. 2007. Why Fortna, V. P. 2002. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Observing Violence Increases the Risk of Peace after Civil War? And If So How?” Violent Behavior in the Observer. Cambridge, Unpublished paper, Columbia University, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. New York. Hultman, L. 2010. “Keeping Peace or Spurring ———. 2003. “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace the Durability of Peace.” International Operations on Violence against Civilians.” Organization 57 (2): 337–72. Civil Wars 12 (1–2): 29–46. Garrett-Peltier, H. 2014. “The Job Opportunity Human Security Report Project. 2005. Human Cost of War.” Costs of War Working Paper, Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the Watson Institute for International Studies, 21st Century. Burnaby, BC: Simon Fraser Brown University, Providence, RI. University Press. Gates, S., H. M. Nygård, and E. Trappeniers. ———. 2011. Human Security Report 2009/2010: 2016. “Confl ict Recurrence.” PRIO Confl ict The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of Trends 2/2016, Peace Research Institute Oslo. War. Burnaby, BC: Simon Fraser University www.prio.org/Confl ictTrends. Press. Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and ———. 2012. Human Security Report 2012: Development. 2011. Global Burden of Armed Sexual Violence, Education, and War; Beyond Violence 2011. http://www.genevadeclaration the Mainstream Narrative. Burnaby, BC: .org/measurability/global-burden-of- armed Simon Fraser University Press. -violence/global-burden-of-armed-violence ———. 2013. Human Security Report 2013: -2011.html. Small Arms Survey, Geneva. The Decline in Global Violence; Evidence, Geneva Declaration Secretariat. 2015. Global Explanation, and Contestation. Burnaby, BC: Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Simon Fraser University Press. Body Counts. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Ianchovichina, E. 2017. Eruptions of Popular Secretariat. Arab Anger: The Economics of the Arab Spring, Gleditsch, N. P., and I. Rudolfsen. 2016. “Are Its Aftermath, and the Way Forward. Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?” Washington, DC: World Bank. Research and Politics 3 (2): 1–9. ICG (International Crisis Group). 2015. “The Gleditsch, N. P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm.” Africa M. Sollenberg, and H. Strand. 2002. “Armed Report 227, ICG, Brussels. Confl ict 1946–2001: A New Dataset.” Journal ———. 2016a. “Exploiting Disorder: Al-Qaeda of Peace Research 39 (5): 615–37. and the Islamic State.” Special Report 1, ICG, Guéhenno, J.-M. 2016. “The Transformation of Brussels. War and Peace.” Carnegie Corporation of ———. 2016b. “South Sudan: Rearranging the New York. www.carnegie.org/news/articles Chess Board.” Africa Report 243, ICG, /international-day-peace/. Brussels. Guha-Sapir, D., and W. G. van Panhuis. 2004. ICRC (International Committee of the Red “Confl ict-Related Mortality: An Analysis of Cross). 2016. People on War: Perspectives from 37 Datasets.” Disasters 28 (4): 418–28. 16 Countries. Geneva: ICRC. Haass, R. 2017. A World in Disarray: American ———. 2017. I Saw My City Die: Voices from the Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order. Front Lines of Urban Confl ict in Iraq, Syria New York: Penguin. and Yemen. Geneva: ICRC. Hegre, H., J. R. Oneal, and B. Russett. 2010. “Trade IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Centre). 2016. “Somalia IDP Figures Analysis.”

42 Pathways for Peace IDMC, Geneva. http://www.internal-dis- Leckman, J. F., C. Panter-Brick, and R. Salah, eds. placement.org/sub-saharan-africa /soma- 2014. Pathways to Peace: The Transformative lia/fi gures-analysis. Power of Children and Families. Cambridge, IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace). 2015. MA: MIT Press. Global Peace Index 2015: Measuring Peace, Lombard, L. 2016. State of Rebellion, Violence, and Its Causes, and Its Economic Value. Intervention in the Central African Republic. Sydney: IEP. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 2016. The Economic Value of Peace: Lynch, M. 2016. The New Arab Wars: Uprisings Measuring the Global Economic Impact of and Anarchy in the Middle East. New York: Violence and Confl ict. Sydney: IEP. http://eco PublicAffairs. nomicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads Mack, A. 2012. “Even Failed Peace Agreements /2016/12/The-Economic-Value-of-Peace Save Lives.” Political Violence at a Glance, -2016-WEB.pdf. August 10. https://politicalviolenceataglance International Peace Institute. 2016. Lost in .org/2012/08/10/even-failed-peace -agreements Transition: UN Mediation in Libya, Syria, -save-lives/. and Yemen. New York: International Peace Malik, A. 2017. “Electoral Violence and the Institute. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb Prevention of Violent Confl ict.” Background .int/files/resources/1611_Lost-in-Transi paper for the United Nations–World Bank tion.pdf. Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Kelly, J. 2017. “Violence: From the Public to the Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Domestic; Examining the Relationship World Bank, Washington, DC. between Political Instability and Intimate Margolin, G., and B. G. Elana. 2004. “Children’s Partner Violence.” Background paper for the Exposure to Violence in the Family United Nations–World Bank Flagship and Community.” Current Directions in Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches Psychological Science 13 (4): 152–55. http:// to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20182938.pdf. Washington, DC. Mavriqi, R. R. 2016. “Global Economic Burden Kishi, R. 2015. “The Targeting of Children in of Confl ict.” Unpublished manuscript. Confl ict Zones, Part 1: General Trends.” McCormick, G. H., and F. Giordano. 2007. ACLED Crisis Blog, March 13. http://www “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence .crisis.acleddata.com/the-targeting -of -children and Guerrilla Mobilization.” Third World -in-confl ict-zones-part-1-general-trends/. Quarterly 28 (2): 295–320. Kishi, R., C. Aucoin, and C. Raleigh. 2016. “Are Merari, A. 1993. “Terrorism as a Strategy of Pro-Government Political Militias Evidence Insurgency.” Terrorism and Political Violence of a Strong State?” Angle Journal, March 13. 5 (4): 213–51. https://anglejournal.com/article/2015 -12 -con Miller, K. E., and A. Rasmussen. 2010. “War fl ict -data-and-policymaking -in-the-era-of -the Exposure, Daily Stressors, and Mental Health -sustainable-development-goals/. in Confl ict and Post-confl ict Settings: Kishi, R., C. Raleigh, and A. M. Linke. 2016. Bridging the Divide between Trauma-Focused “Patterns and Trends of the Geography of and Psychosocial Frameworks.” Journal of Confl ict.” In Peace and Confl ict, edited by Social Science Medicine 70 (1): 7–16. D. Backer, R. Bhavnani, and P. Huth, 25–41. Mogaka, S. 2017. “Competition for Power in New York: Routledge. Africa: Inclusive Politics and Its Relation to Kreutz, J. 2010. “How and When Armed Confl icts Violent Confl ict.” Background paper for the End: Introducing the UCDP Confl ict United Nations–World Bank Flagship Termination Dataset.” Journal of Peace Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches Research 47 (2): 243–50. to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Ksoll, C., M. Rocco, and A. Morjaria. 2009. Washington, DC. “Guns and Roses: The Impact of the Kenyan Mueller, H. 2013. “The Economic Cost of Post-Election Violence on Flower Exporting Confl ict.” IGC Working Paper, International Firms.” CSAE Working Paper 2009/06, Centre Growth Centre, London. for the Study of African Economies, Oxford Mueller, H., and J. Tobias. 2016. “The Cost of University, Oxford, UK. Violence: Estimating the Economic Impact of

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 43 Confl ict.” Growth Brief, International Growth Pavesi, I. 2016. Trade Update 2016: Transfers and Centre, London. Transparency. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Murphy, M., and A. Ricks. 2014. “After Graduate Institute of International and Ebola: Rebuilding Liberia’s Health Care Development Studies. http://www.small Infrastructure.” Boston Globe, September 17. armssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014 -Update/SAS-Trade-Update.pdf. /09/17/ebola-outbreak-liberia-health -care Pinker, S., 2011. “Violence Vanquished.” Wall -infrastructure-underdeveloped/lTN5s8n77 Street Journal, 24. https://www.wsj.com/arti- upOQkMclDIseK/story.html. cles / SB1000142405311190410670457658320 Murthy, R. S., and R. Lakshminarayana. 2006. 3589408180. “Mental Health Consequences of War: A Pinker, S., and A. Mack. 2014. “The World Is Brief Review of Research Findings.” World Not Falling Apart.” Slate, December 22. Psychiatry 5 (1): 25–30. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ National Consortium for the Study of politics / foreigners/2014/12/the_world_is_ Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. not_fall ing _apart_the_trend_lines_reveal_ 2016. Global Terrorism Database. National an_increasingly_peaceful.html. Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Raleigh, C. 2012. “Violence against Civilians: Responses to Terrorism, Department of A Disaggregated Analysis.” International Homeland Security, University of Interactions 38 (4): 462–81. Maryland, College Park. https://www.start. ———. 2016. “Pragmatic and Promiscuous: umd.edu/gtd. Explaining the Rise of Competitive Political National Intelligence Council. 2017. Global Militias across Africa.” Journal of Confl ict Trends: Paradox of Progress. Washington, DC: Resolution 60 (2): 283–310. National Intelligence Council. ———. 2017. “The Links between Food Crises Ndikumana, L. 2015. “The Role of Foreign Aid in and Violence in East, South, and West Africa: Post-Confl ict Countries.” CRPD Working An ACLED Briefi ng Note.” ACLED Crisis Paper 30, Center for Research on Peace Blog, March 23. http://www.crisis.acleddata and Development, Katholieke Universiteit .com/the-links-between-food -crises-and Leuven, Leuven, Belgium. -violence-in-east-south-and-west-africa-an Nordhaus, W. D. 2002. “The Economic -acled-briefi ng-note/. Consequences of a War in Iraq.” NBER Raleigh, C., and C. Dowd. 2013. “Governance Working Paper w9361, National Bureau of and Confl ict in the Sahel’s ‘Ungoverned Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Space.’” Stability: International Journal of NPR (National Public Radio). 2013. “Syrian Security and Development 2 (2). Drug Sales Fuel Country’s Civil War.” All Raleigh, C., and R. Kishi. 2017. “Hired Guns: Things Considered, October 29. http://www Using Pro-government Militias for Political .npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId Competition.” Working Paper, Armed =241667347. Confl ict Location and Event Data Project OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation (ACLED), University of Sussex. and Development). 2016. States of Fragility Raleigh, C., A. Linke, H. Hegre, and J. Karlsen. Report 2016. Paris: OECD. 2010. “Introducing ACLED—Armed Confl ict Ormhaug, C. M. 2009. “Maternal Health in the Location and Event Data.” Journal of Peace Aftermath of Civil Confl ict.” Book chapter, Research 47 (5): 651–60. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo. Regan, P. M. 2002. “Third-Party Interventions Otis, J. 2014. The FARC and Colombia’s Illegal and the Duration of Intrastate Confl icts.” Drug Trade. Washington, DC: Wilson Center Journal of Confl ict Resolution 46 (1): 55–73. Latin American Program. https://www.wil Reuters. 2015. “Violent Deaths in Brazil Surge to soncenter.org/sites/default/fi les/Otis_FARCD Peak of 58,000 amid Olympic Safety Fears.” rugTrade2014.pdf. Guardian (Manchester), October 9. https:// Parks, T., N. Colletta, and B. Oppenheim. www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09 / vi 2013. The Contested Corners of Asia: olent-deaths-in-brazil-surge-to-peak-of-58000 Subnational Conflict and International -amid-olympic-safety-fears. Development Assistance. San Francisco: ———. 2016. “U.N. Offi cial Says at Least 50,000 Asia Foundation. Dead in South Sudan War.” Reuters, March 2.

44 Pathways for Peace https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan www.sos-childrensvillages.org/publications -unrest-un/u-n-official-says-at-least-50000 /news/syria-war-denying -children -right -to -dead-in-south-sudan-war-idUSKCN0W503Q. -education. Ron, J. 2002. Territoriality and Plausible Deniability: ———. 2015. “Children in Confl ict: Child Serbian Paramilitaries in the Bosnian War. In Soldiers.” SOS Children’s Village. http://www. Death Squads in Global Perspective, edited by B. child-soldier.org’. B. Campbell and A. D. Brenner, 287–312. New Stearn, J. 2011. Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. York: Palgrave Macmillan. New York: PublicAffairs. Röther, B., G. Pierre, D. Lombardo, R. Herrala, Sundberg, R., K. Eck, and J. Kreutz. 2012. P. Toffano, E. Roos, G. Auclair, and “Introducing the UCDP Non-state Confl ict K. Manasseh. 2016. “The Economic Impact Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 49 (2): of Confl icts and the Refugee Crisis in the 351–62. Middle East and North Africa.” IMF Staff Sundberg, R., and E. Melander. 2013. Discussion Note SDN/16/08, International “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 50 (4): Sassoli, M. 2004. “Legitimate Targets of Attack 523–32. under International Humanitarian Law, Tajaldin, B., K. Almilaji, P. Langton, and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative.” Background A. Sparrow. 2015. “Defi ning Polio: Closing paper prepared for the Informal High-Level the Gap in Global Surveillance.” Annals of Expert Meeting on the Reaffi rmation and Global Health 81 (3): 386–95. Development of International Humanitarian Tegel, S. 2016. “Venezuela’s Capital Is World’s Law, Cambridge, MA, January 27–29, 2003. Most Murderous City.” USA Today, January Save the Children. 2013. Attacks on Education: 29. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news The Impact of Confl ict and Grave Violations on / world/2016/01/29/venezuelas-capital -worlds Children’s Future. London: Save the Children. -most-murderous-city/79508586/. Schippa, C. 2017. “Confl ict Costs Us $13.6 Thompson, P. G. 2014. Armed Groups: The 21st Trillion a Year. And We Spend Next to Century Threat. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Nothing on Peace.” World Economic Forum, Littlefi eld. Geneva, January 5. https://www.weforum. org Toska, S. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making /agenda/2017/01/how-much-does -violence Development Work for the Prevention of -really-cost-our-global-economy/. Violent Confl icts Cases; Egypt, Tunisia, Schrodt, P. A., and J. Ulfelder. 2016. Political Morocco, and Jordan.” Case study for the Instability Task Force Atrocities Event Data United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Collection Codebook, Version 1.1b1. Washington, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to DC: Political Instability Task Force. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Seddon, D., and J. Adhikari. 2003. “Confl ict and Washington, DC. Food Security in Nepal: A Preliminary Analysis.” Tran, M. 2013. “War Denying Millions RN Report Series, Rural Reconstruction Nepal, of Children an Education.” Guardian Kathmandu. (Manchester), July 11. https://www.theguard Shonkoff, J. P., and A. P. Garner. 2012. “The Lifelong ian.com/global-development/2013/jul/12/war Effects of Early Childhood Adversity and Toxic -denying-children-education. Stress.” Technical Report, American Academy of UCDP (Uppsala Confl ict Data Program). 2017. Pediatrics, Elk Grove Village, IL. http://pediat- UCDP Confl ict Encyclopedia. Uppsala rics.aappublications.org/content /pediatrics/ University. http://www.ucdp.uu.se. early/2011/12/21/peds.2011-2663 .full.pdf. UN (United Nations). 2008. United Nations Small Arms Survey. 2014. “Small Arms Survey Peacekeeping Operations Principles and 2014.” Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute Guidelines. New York: UN. http://www.un of International and Development Studies, . org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone Geneva. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/de _eng.pdf. /publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms ———. 2014. “Strengthening of the -survey-2014.html. Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian SOS Children’s Village. 2014. “Syria: War Has Assistance of the United Nations.” Report of Denied Children Their Right to Education.” the UN Secretary-General (A/69/80 – SOS Children’s Village, October 21. http:// E/2014/68), New York.

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Confl ict 45 ———. 2015. Report of the High-Level Online Population Database: Sources, Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Methods, and Data Considerations.” Operations: Uniting Our Strengths for Peace— UNHCR, Geneva. http://www.unhcr.org/ en Politics, Partnership, and People. New York: -us/statistics/country/45c06c662/unhcr-sta United Nations. tistical-online-population-database-sources ———. 2017. “Report of the Secretary-General -methods-data-considerations.html #OTHER on Confl ict-Related Sexual Violence.” Report _DATA_CONSIDERATIONS. S/2017/249, United Nations, New York. ———. 2017. Global Trends: Forced Displacement UN Secretary-General. 2015. “Report on Women in 2016. Geneva: UNHCR. http://www.unhcr and Peace and Security.” Report of the Secretary- .org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34 General S/2015/716, United Nations, New York, / global-trends- forced-displacement-2016.html. September 16. UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). UN Security Council. 2017. “Can the Security 2015. No Place for Children: The Impact of Council Prevent Confl ict?” Research Report 1. Five Years of War on Syria’s Children and Their UN Security Council, New York. Childhoods. New York: UNICEF. UN Women. 2015. Preventing Confl ict, UNOCHA (United Nations Offi ce for the Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Global Study on the Implementation of United 2016. World Humanitarian Data and Trends Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. 2016. New York: UNOCHA. New York: UN Women. ———. 2017. “Global Humanitarian Overview UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in 2017.” June Status Report, UNOCHA, Afghanistan). 2017. Afghanistan: Protection of New York. Civilians in Armed Confl ict; Annual Report UNODC (United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and 2016. Kabul: UNAMA. https://unama.unmis Crime). 2016. “Global Homicide Data.” sions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of UNODC, Brussels. _ civilians_in_armed_confl ict_annual_report Urzúa, S. 2016. “Do Skills/Abilities Matter? _2016_fi nal280317.pdf. The Life Cycle Approach.” Keynote address UNDP (United Nations Development at “Conference on the Socio-economic Programme). 2016a. Arab Human Ramifi cations of Confl ict: A Life Cycle Development Report: Youth and the Prospects Approach,” UN ESCWA and the American for Human Development in a Changing University of Beirut, Beirut. Reality. New York: UNDP. http://www.arab Valentino, B. A. 2011. “The True Costs of -hdr.org/PreviousReports/2016/2016.aspx. Humanitarian Intervention.” Foreign Affairs ———. 2016b. “Development Approaches to 90 (6): 60–73. Migration and Displacement.” Position Paper, von Uexkull, N., M. Croicu, H. Fjelde, and UNDP, New York. http://www.undp.org/con- H. Buhaug. 2016. “Civil Confl ict Sensitivity tent/undp/en/home/librarypage/pov erty-re- to Growing-Season Drought.” Proceedings of duction/position-paper-for-the-2016 the National Academy of Sciences 113(44): -un-summit-for-refugees-and-migrants -.html. 12391–96. UNESCWA (United Nations Economic and Waldman, R. J. 2001. “Public Health in Times of Social Commission for Western Asia). 2017. War and Famine: What Can Be Done? What The Impact of Confl ict over the Life Cycle: Should Be Done?” Journal of the American Evidence for the Arab Region. Trends and Medical Association 286 (5): 588–90. Impacts 5. New York: United Nations. doi:10.1001/jama.286.5.588. UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). Wallensteen, P., and I. Svensson. 2014. “Talking 2017. “New Study Finds Child Marriage Peace: International Mediation in Armed Rising among Most Vulnerable Syrian Confl icts.” Journal of Peace Research 51 (2): Refugees.” UNFPA, New York. http://www 315–27. . unfpa.org/news/new-study-fi nds -child -mar Walter, B. 2010. “Confl ict Relapse and the riage-rising-among-most-vulnerable-syrian Sustainability of Post-Confl ict Peace.” -refugees. Background paper for the World Development UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner Report 2011: Confl ict, Security, and for Refugees). 2013. “UNHCR Statistical Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.

46 Pathways for Peace ———. 2017a. “External Intervention and Civil ———. 2017b. “At the Root of Exodus: Food Wars.” Unpublished paper, University of Security, Confl ict and International California, Berkeley. Migration.” http://documents. wfp.o rg/stel- ———. 2017b. “The New Civil Wars.” Annual lent/groups/public/documents Review of Political Science 20 (May): 469–86. /communications/wfp291884.pdf. Weaver, C. M., J. G. Borkowski, and T. L. Whitman. World Vision International. 2017. “Children in 2008. “Violence Breeds Violence: Childhood Confl ict.” World Vision International, Exposure and Adolescent Conduct Problems.” New York. http://www.wvi.org/disaster Journal of Community Psychology 36(1): 96–112. -man agement/children-confl ict. Williams, P. 2017. “Continuity and Change in War and Confl ict in Africa.” PRISM 6 (4): 33–45. Wolff, S., S. Ross., and A. Wee. 2017. “Subnational Additional Reading Governance and Confl ict.” Background paper Alesina, A., and R. Perotti. 1995. “Income for United Nations–World Bank Flagship Distribution, Political Instability, and Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches Investment.” Department of Economics to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Discussion Paper 751, Columbia University, Washington, DC. New York. World Bank. 2011. World Development Report Ghobarah, H. A., P. Huth, and B. Russett. 2003. 2011: Confl ict, Security, and Development. “Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long Washington, DC: World Bank. after the Shooting Stops.” American Political ———. 2015. “Preventing Violent Extremism Science Review 97 (2): 189–202. with Development Interventions: A Strategic Jensen, N. 2008. “Political Risk, Democratic Review.” Unpublished, World Bank, Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment.” Washington, DC. Journal of Politics 70 (4): 1040–52. ———. 2016a. Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Kishi, R. 2015. “Rape as a Weapon of Political Development Approach Supporting Refugees, Violence, Part 2: Where, When, and by Whom the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts. Is This Tactic Used?” ACLED Crisis Blog, Washington, DC: World Bank. February 25. http://www.crisis.acleddata. com ———. 2016b. “Psychosocial Support in Fragile /rape-as-a-weapon-of-political -violence -part and Confl ict-Affected Settings.” World Bank, -2-where-when-and-by-whom-is-this -tactic Washington, DC, May 9. http://www.world -used/. bank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence Security Council Report. 2017. Can the Security / brief/psychosocial-support -in-fragile -and Council Prevent Confl ict? Research report -confl ict-affected-settings. 2017 1. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org ———. 2017a. The Toll of War: The Economic /atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3 and Social Consequences of the Confl ict in -CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/research_report_con Syria. Washington, DC: World Bank. fl ict_prevention_2017.pdf. ———. 2017b. “Toward Zero Tolerance for Famine: UN (United Nations). 2016. “Violence, Confl ict Fragility and Famine Response and Prevention.” Cost World $13.6 Billion Annually, Secretary- World Bank and United Nations Discussion General Says, Urging Member States to Shore Draft, World Bank, Washington, DC. Up Financially Strapped Peacebuilding World Food Programme. 2017a. “Global Report Fund.” Press Release, September 21. https:// on Food Crises 2017.” https://www.wfp.org www .un .org/press/en/2016/sgsm18113.doc /content/global-report-food-crisis-2017. .htm.

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conﬂ ict 47

CHAPTER 2 The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World

The changing profi le of violent confl ict in The geopolitical balance in the world the world today is not taking place in isola- is shifting. The rise of new global pow- tion. This chapter explores how the trend ers affects not only political and eco- of violence without borders has emerged in nomic equilibriums but also peace efforts a global context where the balance of geo- (Call and de Coning 2017). Rising ten- political power is in fl ux and transnational sions among great powers affect the mul- factors like advances in information and tilateral system at its core, most notably communication technology (ICT), popu- in the United Nations (UN) Security lation movements, and climate change cre- Council, and increasingly tend to spill ate risks and opportunities to be managed over into proxy wars. Proxy wars, more- at multiple levels.1 It highlights the central- over, are not the exclusive purview of ity of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable traditional or emerging great powers. A Development as an organizing template for multipolar international system is con- prevention and examines patterns of gov- solidating, where regional powers easily ernance, pressures at all levels for more find room to pursue their own strategic inclusive forms of political organization, interests independently. and changing economic structures. It also A push for political inclusion is clearly reviews the complexity of these global visible within nations as well as in the inter- trends that form the landscape against national system. The number of societies which states and other actors navigate that have adopted more inclusive forms of change in pursuit of sustainable peace. political and economic governance over the The international system designed to last 30 years has grown rapidly. Inclusive save the world from “the scourge of war” at societies, this study argues, are better the conclusion of World War II was formed equipped to develop the incentives that give in the context of still-pressing threats and momentum to prevention and to peace. dark memories of war between nations However, the transition toward inclusion (UN 1945, 1). The adoption of global norms can itself increase the risks of violence, at and values, including those pertaining to least in the short term, if not handled care- human rights, further embodied the collec- fully. As chapters 4 and 5 discuss in more tive commitment to managing problems detail, this transition can open space for through international governance institu- new contestation among groups demand- tions. As noted in chapter 1, those systems ing or resenting a change in their relative and norms are being called on to respond to status. a resurgence of violent confl ict that is test- The shifts in the international balance ing the postwar order. of power are taking place against a

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 49 backdrop of changes in the way people It is widely argued that a transition to a and societies operate and interact. Rapid multipolar world is underway (Guterres advances in ICT present opportunities 2017), with new centers of political, eco- for innovation, growth, and the unfet- nomic, and military power emerging. tered exchange of ideas and inclusive nar- Today, growing economic power for emerg- ratives. But these advances have negative ing economies and the achievement by aspects too. Interconnectivity enables many countries of middle-income status transnational organized crime to flourish, bring demands for the redistribution of allows the rapid transmission of violent global political infl uence. Pressure to redraw ideologies, and leaves economies vulnera- normative boundaries in key areas of inter- ble to cybercrime. Climate change, mass national law (such as human rights or the movements of people, and the unmet status of women) is mounting. Many coun- expectations of a growing population of tries seek to renegotiate power sharing in young people in low- and middle-income multilateral forums, such as the UN and countries also present risks that challenge international fi nancial institutions (Griffi n, governments on all levels. The ability of forthcoming; Haass 2017). The pressure for global systems to distribute the opportu- greater inclusion and wider representation nities equitably and to manage the risks in global governance is marked by the that accompany these rapid changes is emergence of informal and more fl exible increasingly in question. forums such as the G-20, which facilitates Changes in the global landscape as well economic and financial cooperation as within societies have major implications among countries representing more than for the prevention of violent confl ict. 80 percent of the world’s gross domestic Prevention, as elaborated throughout this product (GDP) and almost two-thirds of study and in line with the joint UN the world’s population.2 Sustaining Peace Resolutions (UNSC The growing need for fl exible instru- 2016; UN General Assembly 2016), is a pro- ments is also apparent when it comes to cess aimed at minimizing incentives for preventing violent confl ict and sustaining violence, while boosting incentives for peace. On the one hand, the United Nations peace. In such a process, actors continually remains the pivotal institution in this adjust to changes in the local landscape and sector. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable beyond in ways that solidify social cohesion Development, including its 17 Sustainable and ultimately peace. Countries and the Development Goals (SDGs), not only con- international community urgently need to fi rms that sustainable development is the leverage global trends and better manage overaching goal in its own right, but also the associated risks, building on new and provides a universal framework for address- existing approaches that enhance collabora- ing the root causes of confl ict, recognizing tion, inclusiveness, and confl ict prevention. the deep complexity and interconnectedness on the path to peace and progress. On the other hand, regional organiza- An International System tions play an increasingly central role in in Search of a New preventing confl ict (Verjee 2017).3 As vio- Equilibrium lent confl ict has evolved, with a decline in A Transition in the World Order wars between states and a sharp increase in intrastate confl icts, some regional orga- The framework of multilateralism, interna- nizations in Sub-Saharan Africa are taking tional law, and treaties dedicated to manag- a distinctive, more active role in ensuring ing peace and security has weathered many peace and security in their neighborhoods. storms over the past 70 years, and global Even when their initial purpose was to fos- institutions continue to adapt to new chal- ter economic integration and trade links, lenges. The global balance of power and the as in the case of the Economic Community environment in which global institutions of West African States (ECOWAS), some operate are also shifting. of these organizations have become the

50 Pathways for Peace lynchpin of stability and security in their Center 2015). The World Values Survey, a regions, working also in the fi eld of con- global survey of basic values and beliefs, fl ict prevention, resolution, and peace- similarly concludes, “Democracy has an keeping. Regional responses to the risk of overwhelming positive image throughout violent confl ict, however, have been the world” (Freedom House 2004, 5) and uneven in their ability to sustain peace. has become, over the last decade, “virtually Furthermore, regional competition can the only political model with global appeal, fuel unilateral action, prolonging and no matter what the culture” (Freedom aggravating confl icts and weakening the House 2004, 5). The sixth round of the capacity of regional organizations to play World Values Survey, which collected data a role in preventing violent confl icts. from 2010 to 2014, fi nds that on average The international law on confl ict has people ranked living in a democratically evolved as well, becoming increasingly sophis- governed country as “highly important,” ticated (see box 7.2). Commitment to preven- with the lowest average of the distribution tion has also been renewed, including at the being 6.4 out of 10 (World Values Survey 2005 World Summit. The United Nations and Association 2014). its partners have built consensus around chal- This recent push for more inclusive pol- lenging issues, producing major international itics has been driven partly by the availabil- agreements such as the 2015 Paris Accord on ity of social media and communication Climate Change. A series of high-level reports tools. The growth in interconnectivity and have consistently recognized the need for a transparency in the world has opened win- stronger focus on prevention. This analytical dows, showing people how others live, rais- effort has been consolidated into important ing awareness of global inequality, and resolutions, including the twin Security providing a platform for expression. These Council and General Assembly resolutions on tools have been important factors in many sustaining peace (UNSC 2016; UN General political transformations, coming more Assembly 2016). from the middle class and educated youth than from the poor or marginalized Global Drive for More Inclusive (Devarajan and Ianchovichina 2017). Societies While this push for more inclusive and transparent government is a positive sign Some states are becoming progressively for long-term, sustainable peace (Doyle more open to sharing power and including 1986; Russett 1993; Tomz and Weeks 2013) citizens in political participation. This has and has occurred peacefully in many coun- been happening in extended waves since the tries, it also carries increased risk. Chapters eighteenth century and continues today. A 4 and 5 explore in more detail some of these new wave began in the 1970s and broad- risks and opportunities and their implica- ened after the end of the Cold War with a tions for prevention. strong increase in the number of countries Data from the Polity IV project with more democratic forms of govern- (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2015) clearly ment (Strand et al. 2012). The number of illustrate changing trends in national gover- states with democratic forms of govern- nance (see fi gure 2.1) and the risk of insta- ment grew from 45 among 150 states in bility associated with political systems with 1974 to 121 among 193 states in 2003 varying degrees of openness (see fi gure 2.2). (Menocal, Fritz, and Rakner 2007). As fi gure 2.1 shows, The 2015 Global Attitudes Survey fi nds support for democratic values in countries • The number of autocracies across the across all regions, although the support world has been declining since 1984. varies. Large majorities tend to value reli- • The number of democracies has increased gious freedom and an impartial judicial since 1980. system, while smaller majorities tend to • Many countries can be defi ned as support multiparty elections, free speech, anocracies, meaning that they are and censorship-free media (Pew Research either highly imperfect democracies or

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 51 FIGURE 2.1 Global Trends in Governance, 1946–2008

100

40 greater than 500,000

20 Number of countries with populations

0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Democracies Anocracies Autocracies

Source: Center for Systemic Peace 2014.

hybrid regimes. As countries that are authority patterns could be observed” transitioning or stationed between one (Center for Systemic Peace 2014). mode of governance and another, anocracies present situations where “odd com- Figure 2.2 illustrates the annual likeli- binations of democratic and autocratic hood of political instability (y-axis) plotted

FIGURE 2.2 Polity and the Onset of Political Instability, 1955–2006

0.16 Autocracy Democracy

0.14

0.12

0.10

0.08

0.06

0.04 Annual likelihood of political instability 0.02

Anocracy 0 –10 –9 –8 –6 –7 –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 012345678910 Polity scores Annual likelihood of instability event onset (PITF events plus democratic transitions) Annual likelihood of instability event onset (PITF: adverse regime or political violence) Annual likelihood of political instability onset (PITF consolidated cases)

Source: Center for Systemic Peace 2014. Note: PITF = Political Instability Task Force.

52 Pathways for Peace against the polity scores of 167 independent capita GDP growth at the global level is countries.4 The fi ve categories of instability fi rmly established (see fi gure 2.3). events are adverse regime change, revolu- While trade and technology have pro- tionary war, ethnic war, genocide or politi- vided “ladders” for rapid growth, individual cide, and major democratic transition countries’ ability to benefi t fully from (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2015). The fi g- advances in trade and technology critically ure plots the annual likelihood for the depends on their own characteristics following: (Bartley Johns et al. 2015). Trade and technology have acted in a complementary way, • Onset of any of these fi ve categories in large part due to several technological • Onset of all categories excluding major and logistical advances that have improved democratic transition mobility, communications, and fi nancial • A period of political instability or “con- systems, such as containerization and infor- solidated cases.” mation technology. There are also fewer barriers to global Across all plots, “anocracies have the trade and fi nance. Trade agreements and greatest risk of instability, while autocracies trade and fi nancial deepening have multi- and unconsolidated democracies have a plied in tandem, with the World Trade lesser, yet still substantial, risk” (Center for Organization (WTO) playing an import- Systemic Peace 2014). The rising number of ant role in advocating and managing an anocracies and the high degree of instability inclusive global trading system and setting associated with periods of anocracy have the “rules of the game” for regional trade important implications for prevention, in agreements. Overall, trade dynamics since that they intensify the risk of confl ict that 1990 have been one of the contributors to might escalate to violence. the historic improvement in living stan- Political transitions can be bidirectional. dards across the world and to a reduction Freedom House suggests that in 2016, in the share of the world population living scores for freedom declined in 67 countries in extreme poverty (below $1.90 a day, in but rose in 36 and that 2016 was the 2011 dollars at purchasing power parity) eleventh consecutive year in which declines from 35 percent in 1990 to around 11 per- in freedom outnumbered improvements cent in 2013 (Ferreira, Joliffe, and Prydz (Puddington and Roylance 2017). Most 2015). striking is that, as opposed to earlier years, The global economy, nonetheless, con- established democracies5—not autocracies tinues to face many challenges. While global or dictatorships—dominated the list of trade has grown, growth has not been countries suffering setbacks as measured by evenly spread. Rather, trade growth has the Freedom House rankings (Freedom been marked by downturns and a pro- House 2017). This alludes to the fact that longed period of only modest improvement democracies are not homogenous and that since the global fi nancial crisis of 2007, fall- issues like inequality are on the rise even in ing, for the fi fth consecutive year, below democratic systems. 3 percent in 2016. These values are well below the average of 7 percent between 1987 Changing Economic Structures and 2007. Although the volume of global trade has increased, the value of global trade The global economy has grown substan- has fallen as a result of shifting exchange tially since the end of Wor ld War II. Global rates and lower commodity prices (WTO GDP growth has been associated with 2017). Meanwhile, foreign direct invest- increasing trade openness and poverty ment (FDI) to developing countries, which reduction. Between 1990 and 2014, for has been empirically found to contribute to instance, the share of world GDP encom- higher wages, productivity, and employ- passing international trade grew from ment, has also been decreasing since 2011 US$3.5 trillion to US$18.9 trillion. The cor- (United Nations 2017a), adversely affecting relation between trade openness and per growth and productivity (Hale and

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 53 FIGURE 2.3 Global Gross Domestic Product per Capita and World Exports, 1960–2014

9,000 35

8,000 30 7,000 25 6,000

5,000 20

4,000 15 Percent of GDP 3,000

Constant 2005 U.S. dollars 10 2,000 5 1,000

0 0 1960 1966 1972 1978 1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 GDP per capita Exports of goods and services

Sources: World Bank Group and World Trade Organization 2015; data from World Bank, World Development Indicators. Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

Xu 2016). From 2015 to 2016, global FDI Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDG fl ows decreased by 7 percent to US$1.625 10) identifi es the reduction of inequality, billion and stayed below their precrisis both within countries as well as globally, as peak, representing approximately 2.2 per- a priority of the international community cent of global GDP compared with 3.6 per- (UN 2015). Recent analysis by the cent in 2007 (OECD 2017; see fi gure 2.4). Int ernational Monetary Fund shows that These trends and others create addi- the labor share of income has been on a tional challenges for development. For downward trend in high-income economies example, the reduction in the incidence of since the 1980s and in low- and middle-in- extreme poverty since 1981 has relied heav- come countries since the early 1990s (IMF ily on the strong and rapid growth of the 2017).6 This decline in the labor share of global economy. But given the current slow income has been associated with an increase pace of global economic growth and the in income inequality in many parts of the potential for this trend to persist, many world. In addition, unemployment rates countries face issues in sustaining poverty remain high in many regions, especially in reduction at the same rhythm as in previous those with high populations of youth. decades. This trend may jeopardize progress Challenges to reducing in-country toward attainment of the SDGs (SDG 1), inequality include technological change, such calling on the international community to as the increase in automation and routiniza- intensify its efforts to combat extreme tion of tasks. Although technological progress poverty. and the globalization of trade and capital have Despite the fact that inequality between contributed strongly to overall global growth countries has decreased globally, inequality and prosperity as well as to income conver- within countries remains high (World Bank gence in low- and middle- income countries, 2016b) because economic interdependence they have had disproportionate and and globalization have increased without asymmetric impacts across countries, indus- equal distribution of the gains. The 2030 tries, and workers of different skill groups.

54 Pathways for Peace FIGURE 2.4 Global Flows of Foreign Direct Investment, 1999–2016

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000 Billions of U.S. dollars 500

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Data from OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics database.

Moreover, technological change happens about receiving one’s fair share of national or quickly, requiring fast adaptation on the part global wealth and being able to achieve indi- of industries and people to new markets and vidual aspirations has led to mixed feelings jobs. The speed of change leads many to regarding the benefi ts of globalization. A poll believe that technological change, including of 19 countries shows that globalization is met automation shifts, is, in the long term, “the with increasing skepticism, with mixed views most important force shaping the labor mar- on immigration and trade (see fi gure 2.5). ket and income inequality” (Hallward- While enthusiasm for economic globalization Driemeier and Nayyar 2017). is high among people from lower- and mid- While all of these recent trends pose dle-income countries that are experiencing challenges, they do not directly affect vio- higher growth rates, people from high-income lent confl ict. Instead, they put additional countries with modest growth are more stresses on systems and people and can apprehensive (Pew Research Center 2007). increase the tendency for groups to mobi- Thus, while changing economic struc- lize to address perceived grievances, which tures and the reduction of the role of labor can culminate in violence. In a world where as an economic factor of production in the interconnectivity is stronger than ever and postindustrial age are not a direct cause of transparency is possible through an ever- violent confl ict, they generate stress while increasing number of ICT platforms, in systems and people adapt. The problem is most societies the growth of the global particularly complex in low- and lower- economy has generated greater expecta- middle-income countries that have only tions and aspirations for the future. When partially gone through an industrial transi- these expectations and aspirations are tion and that have a labor force with low unmet, because of the weak capacity of skills. These countries now face the ques- governments to provide for their constitution of whether a path of convergence to ents, the inability of labor markets to pro- higher income levels through manufactur- vide jobs, or the uneven distribution of ing is viable. In turn, these countries place global wealth, frustration and tensions immense pressure on job creation and associated with job creation, employment, employment, and many people are not able and wages can rise (Piketty 2013). to acquire skills for the higher-quality jobs It is at this moment that the threat of pro- that are being generated (such as in modern tectionism weighs heavily. Rising uncertainty services).

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 55 FIGURE 2.5 Attitudes toward Globalization and Change in Gross Domestic Product per Person, Selected Countries, 2011–15

Vietnam 90 Philippines India 80 Thailand Malaysia Singapore Indonesia 70 Denmark Hong Kong SAR, China United Arab Sweden Emirates GDP (trillions of 2015 US$) 60 Germany 20 Finland 10 Saudi Arabia 50 1 United Kingdom Norway Australia 0.2 United 40 % foreign-born population France States

force for good,” October–November 2016 0 10 20 40 80 80+ % agreeing with statement “Globalization is a 0 –5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 % change in GDP per person at purchasing-power parity, 2011–15

Source: Economist 2016b. Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

Such adjustments would likely require fast- evolving trends are altering the envi- countries to work together at global and local ronment that international and domestic levels to ensure that their capacities are lever- actors must negotiate. Many of these trans- aged to realign jobs and reskill workers and to national processes will pose risks to individ- provide training for different tasks and skills ual societies and the institutions in place. that complement jobs for which machines are But, if well managed, they will also create substitutes (Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar opportunities for greater inclusion and 2017; Economist 2016a). As with previous peace. Collective and collaborative action is waves of technological change, automation needed by all countries to address these and related technologies enhance overall pro- trends in the interest of preventing violent ductivity growth and therefore increase the confl ict. resources available to redistribute to adversely affected groups. Key elements of the social Challenges of the Revolution in safety net and distributive policies such Information and Communication as unemployment insurance and progres- Technology sive taxation remain integral to mitigating the social confl ict arising from these poten- Societies have transformed over centuries tial changes. Addressing changing eco- with the help of technology, but the nomic structures and associated inequality unprecedented pace and reach of techno- through global collaboration also supports logical innovation in recent decades make attitude changes toward an integrated global this phenomenon a defi ning global trend. economy. Technological advancements in food and water security, health, education, climate Risk and Opportunity in action, disaster response, and economies an Increasingly Connected have saved lives and helped to lift many people out of poverty. Not only has their World role as an important means for imple- Against this backdrop of geopolitical fl ux menting the Sustainable Development and the charged movement regarding Goals been underscored in the 2030 inclusive governance, some new and Agenda, but their potential for advancing

56 Pathways for Peace peace has also been widely recognized by vary among men and women: Internet pen- the global community. etration rates are higher among men than Fast-moving advancements in ICT, women in all regions of the world, with the however, also have problematic conse- gender gap in global Internet use rising quences. While more people are connected from 11 to 12 percent from 2013 to 2016 to ICT than ever before—with an esti- (ITU 2016). In many contexts, the uncon- mated 3.2 billion now using the Internet nected are often the poor and excluded. (ITU 2015)—access remains uneven, Data that show income levels as a critical exacerbating tensions related to exclusion barrier to Internet access also point to the (World Economic Forum 2015). ICT tools fact that countries with low GDP per capita for monitoring and managing confl ict often have low Internet penetration. For such as early-warning systems and crowd- example, Internet penetration is fi ve times sourcing technologies can improve the lower in India than in Europe (Deloitte fl ow of information and, in some ways, 2014). Additionally, many people are unable facilitate direct communication between to access or use available ICTs because elec- state and society. Similarly, new ICT tools, tricity is minimal or absent or because they like social media, offer new platforms for lack technological literacy. This digital expressing grievances and fi nding com- divide cuts people off from the potential mon ground or potentially channeling cross-cultural exchange and discourse that those grievances toward violence (Mor, come with increasing interconnectivity. Ron, and Maoz 2016). By lowering the Internet penetration has direct implica- cost of collective action, advances in ICT tions for economic progress. Every enable armed groups, and violent extrem- 10 percent increase in broadband penetra- ist groups in particular, to recruit globally tion in low- and middle-income countries is on an unprecedented scale (Smith et al. estimated to have a 1.38 percent increase in 2015). GDP (Independent Commission on Multilateralism 2016). The digital divide The Digital Divide can aggravate exclusion and inequality, since Technology has increased global inter- “some segments of the population may be connectivity and access to opportunities exposed differently than others to labor that improve well-being. There has been a market shifts induced by technological massive increase in the number of mobile innovation, which can aggravate inequali- devices with cameras, mobile network ties across groups with different skill levels. coverage, and quantity of data available In the absence of close monitoring, ICTs from so-called “smart” technologies could contribute to inequality, thus (Pew Research Center 2017). Mobile cel- exacerbating tensions rather than mitigat- lular subscriptions worldwide jumped ing them” (World Economic Forum 2015). from less than 1 billion in 2000 to more than 7 billion in 2016 (ITU 2015). By The Potential Role of ICT in 2020, it is projected that 70 percent of the Peacebuilding world’s population, or 5.5 billion people, The international community and the will be using mobile technology (CISCO multilateral system increasingly recognize 2017). With the advent of Web 2.0, social the role of ICT in preventing violent con- media platforms, and other ICT tools, the fl ict. The 2005 Tunis Commitment, a state- number of people using the Internet ment from the World Summit on the globally has risen steeply (figure 2.6). Information Society (2005), highlights ICTs Nevertheless, 3.9 billion people in low- as “effective tools to promote peace, secu- and middle-income countries, equivalent to rity, and stability and to enhance democ- 53 percent of the world’s population, are racy, social cohesion, good governance, and not connected (see map 2.1). The penetra- the rule of law, at national, regional, and tion rate in the poorest countries is only international levels.” In addition, it argues 9.5 percent, or 89 million out of 940 million that ICTs can and should be used for multi- people (ITU 2015). ICT use continues to ple purposes along the confl ict prevention

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 57 FIGURE 2.6 Global Mobile Network Coverage, 2007–16

8 World population 7

5 2G

Internet users

Billions of people 3

3G LTE or higher 1

0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: UNITU 2016. Note: 2016 data are estimates. “Mobile network coverage” refers to population covered by a mobile network. LTE = long-term evolution.

MAP 2.1 Percentage of Individuals Not Using the Internet, by World Region

CIS 33.4%

EUROPE 20.9%

ASIA and PACIFIC 58.1%

THE AMERICAS ARAB STATES 35.0% AFRICA 58.4% 74.9%

0–25 26–50 51–75 76–100 no data IBRD 43433 | DECEMBER 2017

Source: UNITU 2016. Note: CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States.

58 Pathways for Peace arc, including identifying confl ict situations legitimacy” (Independent Commission on through early-warning systems, preventing Multilateralism 2016). Many nongovern- confl icts, promoting peaceful resolution, mental and civil society organizations, such and assisting postconfl ict peacebuilding as those that tracked postelection violence and reconstruction (see box 2.1). in Kenya in 2008, use these technologies Indeed, early-warning systems are useful (World Economic Forum 2016). for collecting data, analyzing risk, and pro- Recent analyses of the application of ICT viding information with recommendations to peacebuilding and peacekeeping high- to targeted stakeholders on the escalation light the examples of Kenya’s violence pre- and potential occurrence of violent confl ict. vention network, Uganda’s election Greater capacity to mine and manage big monitoring, Sudan’s low-tech adapta- data provides opportunities to improve tions for community communications, and confl ict analysis as well as to test the effec- Cyprus’s civil society empowerment to tiveness of early-warning systems and refi ne illustrate that “ICTs can facilitate peace, not program selection, design, and implemen- because they directly empower the local tation accordingly. Geographic information over the national and international, or the systems, crisis mapping, and crowdsourcing marginalized over the elites, but because are just some of the tools that can generate they can be used for the mobilization of data to identify risk and patterns of confl ict grassroots actors, which may affect peace- and violence. Techniques like crowdsourc- building’s balances of power” (Tellidis and ing can promote inclusion and transpar- Kappler 2016, 80). Participatory peacekeep- ency regarding decision-making processes ing is another example that enables local and enable citizens to “better assess residents to share their observations, alerts, their outcomes, indirectly increasing their and insights. This process helps to foster

BOX 2.1 Examples of New Technologies Assessing Violent Conflict Risks

Information and communication risk and tension after the Comprehensive technologies (ICT) and the data they Peace Agreement. During the 2015 generate can support efforts to prevent elections in Nigeria, a team used Artifi cial crisis and tackle the causes of violence Intelligence for Monitoring Elections using cell phones and tablets, social (AIME), a free and open source solution media, crowdsourcing and crowd seeding, that combines crowdsourcing with crisis mapping, blogging, and big data Artifi cial Intelligence to automatically analytics. ICT help collect quantitative and identify tweets of interest during major qualitative data more frequently in remote elections. Crowdsourcing systems such areas, through digital surveys, SMS- as Ushahidi have the potential to be used administered polling, geo-spatial mapping, in early warning if the system is designed photographs, videos, and satellite imagery. to produce consistent and complete data For instance, in Sudan and South frequently. Sudan, the Crisis and Recovery Mapping Technologies have also changed the and Analysis project (CRMA) undertook way people respond to crisis. Following participatory mapping of threats and the 2010 Haiti earthquake, for the fi rst risks. For that purpose, UNDP developed time, thousands of people volunteered a GIS-enabled desktop database tool, online to support rescue operations. This and used geo-referenced analysis to has given rise to “Digital Humanitarians,” work with state governments, as well who, through crowdsourcing, created a as national security, development, and digital crisis map that showed the real- informal actors to identify preemptive time evolution of the situation on the interventions based on perceptions of ground.

Sources: Blattman 2014; Letouzé 2012a, 2012b; Letouzé, Meier, and Vinck 2013; Mancini 2013; Meier 2013, 2015; Morel 2016; Scharbatke-Church and Patel 2016; and Puig Larrauri 2013.

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 59 confi dence and trust between peacekeep- fl ows, with varying effects on violent activ- ers and local populations (Independent ity (Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013). For Commission on Multilateralism 2016). example, one analysis fi nds that the diffusion of cell phones affected the propensity ICT as a Means to Achieve the for political violence in Iraq, where the Unfi ltered Exchanges of Views location of cell phone towers was negatively Tools like social media can mitigate the risk associated with violence (Shapiro and of violent confl ict through online platforms Weidmann 2015); another shows that the for dialogue and conciliation (Mor, Ron, availability of cell phones substantially and Maoz 2016). A study of Israelis and increased the probability of violent confl ict Palestinians using the Facebook platform and can amplify the effect of economic showed that Facebook posts emphasizing downturns on political mobilization moderate Palestinian voices promoting (Manacorda and Tesai 2016). peace elicited higher sympathy and acceptance (Mor, Ron, and Maoz 2016). Social ICT and the Reach of Violent media can encourage and enable back and Extremist Groups forth communications among people, dif- It is broadly recognized that violent extremist ferentiating them from traditional media ideologies have harnessed the “technological communications and mass media outreach revolution,” adversely affecting international, that are typically one way and susceptible to regional, and state stability (Boggero 2017). power control. Social media are a means, Social media have played multiple roles in therefore, to mobilize people collectively to violent extremism (Smith et al. 2015), includ- nonviolent or violent action. Social media ing allowing violent extremist groups to use messaging services like Twitter also can the online space to coordinate group behavior serve as outlets for people to express their on a large scale and catalyze grassroots action views and discontent peacefully, by provid- from anywhere in the world (Veilleux-Lepage ing access to larger networks and freedom 2016). Groups, including but not limited to to speak or associate (Davison 2015). They violent extremist groups, can use social media can present an opportunity for whis- platforms to mobilize support among persons tleblowing on corrupt, unethical, or other whose grievances and anxieties about the practices contrary to the public interest. future have already reached or are close to However, they potentially also can consti- reaching a critical level. Excluded identity tute a harmful instrument for spoilers seek- groups and youth are prime targets (Allan ing to procure and disclose communications et al. 2015; Crenshaw 1981; Fjelde and Østby selectively for divisive purposes. Chapters 3 2014; Miodownik and Nir 2016; Ross 1993). and 4 discuss in greater detail collective Logistically, technology platforms are used for mobilization in terms of the risk and pre- data mining, networking, recruiting, mobili- vention of violent confl ict. zation, instruction, planning, and fundraising, among others. ICT and the Risk of Violence ICTs can put inequalities into sharp relief The Cyber Security Threat and create a space for inciting violence. Overall, the systemic challenges posed by Recent research on the effect of ICTs on ICT suggest that action is needed at violence indicates that the most important national, regional, and global levels. impact is through collective action International collaboration is needed on (Weidmann 2015). But traditional media issues such as governing cyberspace and can play signifi cant roles as well. In addressing cybercrime (see box 2.2), as the Rwandan genocide, approximately well as providing international support to 10 percent of the participation in the vio- countries that are not able to afford lence was attributed to the effects of radio equitable access to these technologies. broadcasts (Boggero 2017; Yanagizawa- The answer is not to restrict the use of Drott 2014). Mobile long-distance commu- ICT. Instead, countries could ensure that nication also changes the way information mechanisms for equitable access are in

60 Pathways for Peace BOX 2.2 Cyberspace, the Fifth Domain of Warfare

Cyber insecurity is a new threat to in addressing transnational cybercrime” stability. The increased use of (Council of Europe 2001). However, cyberspace as a domain for hostilities the UN Working Group on Countering has been increasingly apparent (Singer the Use of the Internet for Terrorist and Friedman 2014), and the North Purposes has concluded thus far that Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has cyber terrorism is “not yet a threat declared it the fi fth domain of warfare. serious enough to warrant separate Research suggests, “As the barriers to legislation” (Independent Commission entry in the cyber domain are low, on Multilateralism 2016). cyberspace includes many and varied Privacy rights play a prominent actors—from criminal hackers to terrorist role in developing legal frameworks networks to governments engaged in around cyber security. Big data can be cyber espionage” (Independent a severe risk not just to privacy but also Commission on Multilateralism 2016). to individual security. This is a critical Moreover, cybercrime and cyberattacks area for attention, as privacy in confl ict- can “undermine the safety of Internet affected areas can be a question of life users, disrupt economic and commercial or death. What constitutes a cybercrime activity, and threaten military and how existing international law is effectiveness” (Independent to be applied are heated elements Commission on Multilateralism 2016). of this debate. Some initiatives have Many have argued for a treaty aimed to provide clarity in this matter, addressing cyber security that is resulting in an emerging consensus that more comprehensive than those international law, and specifi cally the that govern nuclear, chemical, and UN charter, is applicable to cyberspace. biological weapons. In 2001, the These include a report by the Group of Budapest Convention—or Convention Governmental Expertsa as well as the on Cybercrime—required “parties to Tallinn Manual created by the NATO harmonize domestic criminal legislation Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of and promote international collaboration Excellence.

aThe third Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.

place at the local level, in line with the Demographic Change and SDGs, and that strong normative frame- Populations on the Move works for the prevention of cyber security threats exist. This may entail enforcement Population Growth, Youth, of existing norms or creation of new norms and Aging where needed (G7 2017). Demographic shifts may create new stresses Additionally, they should ensure that on global and national systems that carry technology is leveraged in the many ways implications for prevention. The good that it can be for building peace, addressing news is that more than 1 billion people risks of confl ict, and communicating nar- exited extreme poverty between 1990 and ratives that create incentives for peace 2015, even as the world’s population rather than violence. This will allow societ- increased by 2 billion (UNDP 2017). ies to realize the potential of ICT as an Looking ahead, half of the world’s popula- instrument for sustaining peace and miti- tion growth during 2015–50 is expected to gate the risks of violent confl ict that are too be concentrated in just nine countries, often easily exploited. Indeed, navigating including several confl ict-affected coun- change by fostering inclusiveness and, thus, tries such as the Democratic Republic of social cohesion is the essence of prevention, Congo and Nigeria (UNDESA 2015b). as this study argues throughout. The shift is already striking in some areas.

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 61 One of the fastest- growing areas in the economies, also puts pressure on labor world, for example, is the Sahel in Africa, markets, which will have to absorb the esti- which is also one of the most challenged mated 600 million new workers entering because of the direct impact of climate the markets in the next 10 years (ILO 2016). change, violent extremism, and illegal traf- Similarly, increasing levels of educa- fi cking (World Bank 2014). tional attainment create greater aspira- Already there are more young people in tions; compounded with increasing the world than at any other time in history— transparency of the world via the ICT rev- 1.8 billion people between the ages of 10 olution, young people are more aware of and 24—and the vast majority of young how others live and succeed. The middle- people live in low- and middle-income class dream has become universal. These countries (UNDESA 2015b). In Africa, 60 rising expectations are diffi cult for many percent of the population is under the age societies to meet, creating the risk that of 25 (UNDESA 2015a), compared with people will grow dissatisfi ed with the around 40 percent in Asia and in Latin social contract in their country because America and the Caribbean (UNDESA they have come to expect services and 2015c). opportunities that are not provided to Populations are also aging in parallel them. For instance, research on aspirations with this population growth: 12 percent of and well-being in the Middle East shows the global population is now 60 years or that many young people, better educated older. Rapidly aging populations create than their parents and previous genera- pressures on societies with low fertility tions, aspire to meet social and economic rates. Europe has the largest percentage of milestones like fi nding a good job after older persons (24 percent), but by 2050, all school, getting married, and being socially regions except for Africa will have around recognized as important (Devarajan and one-quarter or more of their population Ianchovichina 2017). However, they are 60 years of age or older (UNDESA 2015c). often unable to do so because of a lagging Having more old and young people rely on economy, skills mismatch, and lack of a disproportionately smaller working-age mobility, and so they grow increasingly population places a heavy burden on the frustrated (Cammett and Diwan 2013). share of the population that is of working Addressing these challenges requires age (Griffi n, forthcoming). The varying not only creating a societal framework that stages of demographic transition are also integrates people successfully, but also correlated with the income level of coun- investing directly in children and youth. tries (see fi gure 2.7). Education is key for poverty reduction and sustainable development. It gives individ- Greater Expectations and Pressures uals access to information and the knowl- Due to Demographic Shifts edge to use it. The 2030 Agenda for Major demographic shifts are creating Sustainable Development, specifi cally potential vulnerabilities and risks. While SDG 4, makes access to inclusive and equi- demographic change in itself does not cause table quality education a global priority. confl ict, it can potentially put pressure on Furthermore, it promotes lifelong learning systems and societies, increasing the risk for opportunities for all, focusing on the need confl ict. A large youth population puts huge to provide citizens with skills that are valu- pressure on education systems to provide able and valued on the labor market. decent learning and skills that will allow Investing in the right skills is particularly young people to become more meaning- critical, as the demands of the labor mar- fully engaged and included in their societies. ket are changing rapidly and proving to be Many countries with high demographic a risk for tension. A survey of nine broad growth are seeing their education system industry sectors in 15 economies at vari- struggle to provide even quality basic ous stages of development shows that by education (World Bank 2018). Pop- 2020 more than a third of the core skills ulation growth, while a positive force for that will be considered essential in most

62 Pathways for Peace FIGURE 2.7 Correlation between Country Income Level and Stage of Demographic Transition, 2015

a. 70 percent of the world’s population lived b. As of 2015, most predividend countries were low-income in early- and late-dividend countries as of 2015. and most postdividend countries were high income. 45 70

40 60 35 50 30

25 40

20 30 15 Number of countries

% of global population 20 10 10 5

0 0 Pre- Early- Late- Post- Pre- Early- Late- Post- dividend dividend dividend dividend dividend dividend dividend dividend countries countries countries countries countries countries countries countries Low-income countries Lower-middle-income countries Upper-middle-income countries High-income countries

Source: World Bank and IMF 2016. Note: See appendix C.5 of World Bank and IMF 2016 for classiﬁ cations of country groupings.

occupations were not yet considered contribute to reducing the pace of population crucial to the job in 2015 (World Economic aging and, hence, old-age dependency ratios. Forum 2016). With these challenges in Migration can be important for home mind, many individuals migrate to other communities as well. For instance, since places in search of better socioeconomic 2000 remittances sent to low- and middle- opportunities. income countries have increased by more than 500 percent, reaching US$441 billion Record-Breaking Migration in 2015 (Dugarova and Gulasan 2017). Migration and the historic movement of peo- These funds constitute important sources ple in recent years is a defi ning trend in today’s of foreign exchange earnings and help world (UNDESA 2016). In 2015, there were recipient households to increase con- approximately 250 million international sumption, invest in education and health, migrants throughout the world (World Bank and support small businesses. In origin 2016a), up from 173 million in 2000 countries, emigration can often lead to (UNDESA 2016), and women constituted 48 the loss of valuable human resources such percent of the total (World Bank 2016a). Well- as doctors, nurses, and teachers, but it can managed migration can offer many benefi ts also lower unemployment and facilitate and is an alternative to enduring the con- trade, investment, and technology trans- straints felt by demographic transitions. fers. Moreover, some migrants who Migrants contribute to their host countries by become successful abroad invest in their fi lling critical labor shortages, paying taxes home countries, bringing home capital, and social security contributions, and creating trade, ideas, skills, and technology (UN jobs as entrepreneurs. Globally, a vast major- 2017b). ity of migrants (72 percent) are of working In particular, the global community age (UNDESA 2016). Migration also can needs to address the challenge presented by

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 63 rapidly growing younger populations and countries and local communities during populations on the move. This requires and after the civil war (McGovern 2011). providing urgent help to countries that In places like the semiarid regions of have not yet undergone a demographic northern Kenya and the Sahel region of transition, especially those with scarce West Africa (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka resources. Giving children security and the 2015), confl icts are endemic between opportunity to receive a quality education nomadic herders moving southward and is vital and a core element of early confl ict farmers in the southern areas. Pastoral and prevention. Moreover, migration needs bet- agricultural livelihoods depend on mutu- ter management, within countries, intra- ally benefi cial and negotiated, nonexclusive regionally, and internationally. Better access to water and reciprocal land use management cannot be achieved without agreements. Confl icts arise when access to the right legal frameworks and processes for water points, grazing lands, and pastoral migrants, such as the provision of identity corridors are restricted and crops are dam- cards and papers. Along with improving aged. Increased herd sizes and environmen- legislation on asset ownership, such as land tal degradation have increased the frequency and housing (see chapter 5 on land), con- and intensity of these confl icts. fl ict management systems at the local level Migration also has impacts on the areas need to be strengthened. left behind. If a large proportion of the While much attention is focused on working-age population migrates, they migration across continents, intraregional often leave behind family members of migration and rural-urban migration either younger or older generations. This constitute the bulk of the population may create a gap in the labor force and movements. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for social fabric. Resulting low-density areas example, intraregional migration is higher may experience challenges with service pro- (67 percent) than migration to other vision and local governance mechanisms, regions (World Bank 2016a). Often this dynamics that some armed groups could migration has benefi cial aspects because see as an opportunity. it brings people closer to resources and livelihoods. In West Africa, for The Flow of Forcibly Displaced instance, where a large amount of intra- Persons regional migration takes place among Another major challenge today is the large- ECOWAS states (see map 2.2), 70 percent scale forced displacement across countries of migration is linked to employment and regions as well as the fl ow of internally (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). displaced persons (IDPs). As noted in Intraregional migration can be a source chapter 1, confl ict, generalized violence, of major tension and can give rise to civil and persecution are forcibly uprooting war or severe cases of violence. Growing people on a large scale. At the end of 2016, numbers of people looking for resources 65.6 million individuals were forcibly dis- and livelihoods can exacerbate tensions placed (UNHCR 2017). These individuals across fault lines, as in the confl ict in include 40.8 million I DPs, 21.3 million ref- Mindanao, one cause of which is thought ugees, and 3.2 million asylum seekers to have been the mass migration of (UNHCR 2017). Christian populations to ancestral Muslim Low- and middle-income countries host lands (Parks, Colletta, and Oppenheim the great majority of forcibly displaced 2013), or in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, which persons: by the end of 2015, these countries was caused mostly by nomadic herders hosted 99 percent of IDPs and 89 percent searching for water and fodder in areas of refugees, including Palestinian refugees largely populated by sedentary farmers (World Bank 2017). Africa and the Middle (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). In Côte East accounted for almost 60 percent of all d’Ivoire, confl icts over land management forcibly displaced persons by the end of were ignited between migrants from the 2015 (World Bank 2017). The 10 coun- north of the country as well as from other tries hosting the largest numbers of

64 Pathways for Peace MAP 2.2 Intraregional Migration within the Economic Community of West African States

IBRD 41628 | MAY 2015

Canary Islands (Sp.)

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

Mali Cabo Niger Verde Senegal TheThhee GaGambiaGa Burkina Faso Guinea-BissauGGuinuinuiuine Guinea Number of immigrants: Benin Nigeria 2,400,000 Ghana Togo 1,850,000 Côte Sierra Leone d’Ivoire 1,128,000 1,040,000 Liberia < 1,000,000 Flow of immigrants > 1,000,000 Gulf of Guinea Flow of immigrants < 1,000,000

Source: Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015. refugees by the end of 20157 were all low- often have a net positive effect on govern- and middle-income countries, and fi ve ment budgets (World Bank 2017). of these were in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNHCR 2016). The Trend of Increasing Urbanization While these fl ows can strain the eco- An estimated 66 percent of the world’s pop- nomic resources and capacities of many ulation will live in urban areas by 2050, up host countries, including confl ict-affected from 54 percent in 2014 (UNDESA 2014). countries, forcibly displaced persons rarely Population growth projections for this spread confl ict to host communities and period estimate that 2.5 billion people will countries (World Bank 2017). A review of be added to urban centers, with almost 82 countries that received more than 25,000 90 percent of the increase concentrated in refugees for at least a year between 1991 and Africa and Asia (UNDESA 2014). Between 2014 fi nds that about 68 percent of these 2014 and 2050, just three countries (China, countries did not experience any confl ict India, and Nigeria) are expected to account (World Bank 2017). In the 32 percent of for 37 percent of the growth of the world’s hosting countries that did experience con- urban population (UNDESA 2014). fl ict, refugees were determined to have a Rapid urbanization raises an array of role in causing confl ict in only 0.8 percent risks and challenges. Many armed confl icts of cases (World Bank 2017). In addition, the are now taking place in cities rather than wage and employment effects were small rural areas, as in many past confl icts. The because refugees and natives did not com- International Committee of the Red Cross pete for the same jobs. Instead, refugees (ICRC) estimates that 50 million people are

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 65 affected by war in cities around the world melting glaciers and polar ice caps, and (ICRC 2017). The increasing trend of con- increased pollution that affects both animal fl ict taking place in urban centers, including and human health (National Intelligence violent extremism, which can fi nd fertile Council 2017). Increasing pressure on envi- breeding ground in cities, will have impor- ronmental systems also affects the avail- tant implications for the risk of violence ability of water and biodiversity, threatening and the number of civilian casualties that livelihoods and intensifying competition result from confl ict. for natural resources such as farm and Still, urbanization offers many opportu- grazing land. Economically, climate change nities for confl ict prevention. Historically, can affect household consumption by lead- the development of urban centers has ing to spikes in food prices, decreasing pro- helped to facilitate contact across different ductivity, and eroding fi nancial, physical, identity groups, creating a stronger sense human, social, and natural capital assets of citizenship, building social networks, (Burke, Hsiang, and Edward 2015). and stimulating trade and exchange. Social Climate change unevenly affects certain systems have also evolved the fastest in places and people, including fragile and urban centers. Such potential needs to be confl ict-affected settings. A largely uncon- leveraged for peacebuilding to a much tested evidence base indicates that, regard- greater extent than it is currently, including less of the exact nature and magnitude of through urban planning that, in line with change, climate change has a dispropor- SDG 11, refl ects risks in full and identifi es tionate impact on poor and vulnerable factors of increased vulnerability to vio- countries and communities (Nordas and lence, making cities inclusive, safe, resil- Gleditsch 2007). This is especially true for ient, and sustainable. people who are more dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods and jobs and The Stress of Climate Change who cannot easily adapt to fl uctuations in their supply. For example, a decline in pre- The ability of climate change to disrupt cipitation can be dangerous for people societies has become increasingly evident around the world already working at sub- with more extreme weather events, water sistence levels. In Timor Leste, 85 percent and soil stress, and food insecurity (National of the population relies on agriculture as Intelligence Council 2017). Climate change the main source of income, with most of poses immense threats to sustainable devel- the population being subsistence farmers opment, affecting people through changes (Barnett and Adger 2007). A lack of rainfall in mean conditions such as temperature, in the dry season can reduce crop produc- precipitation, and sea level (Barnett and tion by up to one-third, increasing the risk Adger 2007) over long periods of time and for pervasive hunger and famine as well as through greater frequency and severity of migration and competition for resources extreme weather events (Hallegatte et al. (Barnett and Adger 2007). 2016). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Climate change increases the frequency Development (SDG 13) commits the inter- and intensity of extreme weather events, national community to take urgent action thus increasing the risk of complex crises to combat climate change and its impact. In and human insecurity (USAID 2014). It the absence of preventive action, global may reduce access to natural resources warming may exceed 4°C by the end of the important for sustaining livelihoods, or it twenty-fi rst century, facilitating “severe, may degrade the quality of those resources. widespread, and irreversible” impacts on In such contexts, direct resource competi- poverty reduction and development tion from relative scarcity or abundance of (Hallegatte et al. 2016; IPCC 2014, 17). a specifi c natural resource can create ten- The impacts of climate change cut sions within and among groups. Schleussner across both the short and long term. et al. (2016) examine data on outbreaks of Environmentally, climate change leads to violent confl ict and climate-related natural rising sea levels, ocean acidifi cation, disasters for the 1980–2010 period, fi nding

66 Pathways for Peace that climate-related disasters coincided climate shocks (which can trigger violent with approximately 23 percent of the out- confl icts in tense environments, as dis- breaks of armed confl ict in ethnically frac- cussed in chapter 5) to investing in and tionalized countries. building up social and economic resilience. There is also strong evidence that cli- In some countries—in particular, those mate change acts as a threat multiplier, on the fringes of the Sahara Desert— indirectly escalating the risk of confl ict addressing climate change remains at the through mechanisms such as food insecu- core of early confl ict prevention strategies rity, economic shocks, and migration. (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). Evidence in a growing body of literature on the impact of climatic variability on violent Transnational Organized Crime confl ict shows that low water availability and very high and low temperatures are Traffi cking and transnational organized associated with organized political con- crime (TOC) contribute directly and indi- fl icts. Studies using country-level data rectly to violent confl ict. The detrimental show a correlation between changes in tem- impacts of TOC are increasingly recog- perature and precipitation associated with nized,8 as are the negative ripple effects of economic contraction and destabilization various illicit fl ows such as drug, human, of the political balance (Hsiang, Burke, and and natural resource traffi cking, smuggling Miguel 2013). of migrants, illicit trade of fi rearms and Overall, climate change does not auto- wildlife, counterfeit medicines, and cyber- matically cause violent confl ict. However, crime. The United Nations High-Level there is no doubt that climate change Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change creates major stress, especially in fragile sit- has identifi ed TOC as a top priority, on par uations where governments have limited with civil wars, nuclear weapons, and ter- means to help their population to adapt rorism (Comolli 2017; UN 2004). (see box 2.3). Climate change requires The fi nancial consequences of TOC are global collaboration, from reducing the serious. The United Nations Offi ce on Drugs emission of carbon dioxide to preparing for and Crime (UNODC) (n.d.) estimates that

BOX 2.3 The Impacts of Climate Change on the Lake Chad Region

Since 1970, temperatures across the Lake Chad is one such example Sahel have increased by almost 1°C, that highlights the links between which is nearly double the global environmental, social, and political average. The Inter-Governmental Panel vulnerability. Situated between on Climate Change expects temperatures Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, in the Sahel to increase by 1°C over the Lake Chad is a vital resource for more next 20 years, 2.1°C by 2065, and 4°C by than 50 million people. The lake and the end of the twenty-ﬁ rst century. its drainage basin provide not only jobs Despite limited data on changes in through food production and a rich environmental conditions, the Sahel has trading economy, but also water and experienced more severe and recurrent land for agriculture. The region itself is droughts and ﬂ oods in past years. a focal point for agricultural production, Combined with political, economic, and encompassing both expanses of shallow social instability; poverty; historical water, vegetation, and rich soil used for a grievances; poor governance; and weak variety of purposes. institutions, Sahelian states face many In recent years, the ability of the challenges in managing the detrimental lake region to be a net exporter of impacts of climate change. food and a source of employment has (Box continued next page)

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 67 BOX 2.3 The Impacts of Climate Change on the Lake Chad Region (continued)

come under threat. Climate change related to these climatic changes. challenges the biodiversity growing in Pastoralists from the northern the lake, creating a fragile ecosystem and fringes of the Sahara, who have to increasing the vulnerability of the Sahel, use transhumance to sustain their which relies heavily on the resources herds, increasingly move southward of Lake Chad. Rising population growth in search of pasture. In these areas, rates have also generated an increasing agriculturists are already struggling with number of incoming migrants, such as less predictable rainfall. Pastoralists refugees and displaced persons fl eeing also tend to stay in these areas over a Boko Haram. Although these groups longer period of time, including when have historically been welcomed into crops are ready to be harvested. These the area, food, water, job insecurity, and situations have created serious confl ict land saturation have created tensions and destruction of both crops and cattle. over access to available resources. With Herders increasingly form militias to 2.8 million displaced people in the Sahel, protect their cattle, look for protection these tensions may rise between host and from various armed groups, and get displaced communities over competition drawn into violent confl ict. In the Central for scarce resources. Traditional confl ict African Republic and Mali, for instance, resolution mechanisms may no longer be militia groups were created for protection adequate to help residents to cope with purposes and have played a strong role the scale of the growing challenge. in local confl ict dynamics. Nigeria has The Sahel has experienced major also seen this dimension of confl ict tensions and violent confl icts directly increasingly in the north of the country.

Sources: Crawford 2015; Ferdi 2016; Guichaoua and Pellerin 2017; Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015.

in 2009, TOC generated US$870 billion, today and the global impacts of illicit traf- equivalent to 1.5 percent of the global GDP. fi cking (see map 2.3). As UNODC (2010, v) Traffi cking of drugs, arms, and people—the notes, “Most TOC fl ows begin on one conti- most lucrative manifestations of transna- nent and end on another, often by means of tional organized crime—generates large a third.” For instance, drug production and criminal proceeds. Illicit drugs alone trade have an impact not only on countries account for 17–25 percent of the total gen- of origin but also on consumer markets, as erated by TOC. It is diffi cult to measure in the case of the Andean region, where illicit fi nancial fl ows, such as money that is drugs are transmitted through West and illegally earned, transferred, or used and North Africa and into Europe (Marc, Verjee, that crosses borders, including transfer pric- and Mogaka 2015). West Africa also pro- ing and tax avoidance by multinational cor- vides an example of how drug traffi cking porations. Still, Global Financial Integrity undermines stability, governance, develop- estimates that 15 low- and middle-income ment, and health in transit regions countries lose almost US$1 trillion per year (UNODC 2008, 35–48). and lost US$7.8 trillion from 2004 to 2013 The scale and reach of illicit traffi cking (Spanjers and Salomon 2017). The yearly contribute to many elements that can amount of illicit fi nancial fl ows from low- increase the risk of confl ict or allow it to and middle-income countries exceeded the persist. Its transnational nature means sum of FDI and offi cial development assis- that it can generate or perpetuate instabil- tance that those countries received in 2013 ity across borders (see map 2.4). Illicit traf- (Spanjers and Salomon 2017). fi cking activities can make it more likely The magnitude of TOC also puts the sta- for local confl ict to spill into surrounding bility of many countries at risk, given areas and countries, thus contributing to increased mobility and interconnectedness its regionalization. The Balkans provide a

68 Pathways for Peace good illustration of the regional dimen- fi ghters and purchase more sophisticated sion of traffi cking networks and their ram- weapons (Felbab-Brown 2009) and thus to ifi cations (Grillot et al. 2004). Criminal fi ght longer. Analyzing 128 civil wars between networks are actors, with agency, that 1945 and 1999, Fearon (2004, 284) fi nds, should be taken into account in assessing “Contraband has clearly played a role in sev- the risk of violent confl ict. They may act to eral of the longest-running civil wars since undermine the legitimacy and capacity of 1945, such as Colombia (cocaine; 37 years to their rivals, including the state. (Chapter 3 2000 as coded here), Angola (diamonds; 25 discusses actors and their interrelationship years to 2000), Myanmar (opium; off and on in greater detail.) Drug cartels in Latin for many years, especially in Shan State), and America changed their behavior to avoid Sierra Leone (diamonds; 9 years to 2000). In confrontation with the state and seek alter- 17 cases where there was major evidence of native markets, shifting cocaine traffi cking rebel groups relying on production or traf- to West Africa (Cockayne 2013, 14–16; fi cking on contraband, the estimated median 2016, 267–89). By establishing parallel and mean civil war durations were 28.1 and structures that provide economic opportu- 48.2 years, respectively, as compared to 6.0 nities and services to the local population, and 8.8 years for the remaining civil wars.” criminal networks (like other actors) can Violent confl ict also opens up opportu- also degrade the image of the state in the nities for criminality. Illicit activities tend to eyes of the population. thrive in contexts of weak rule of law and Criminal activities can underwrite parties where other forms of violence are present in violent confl ict, prolonging or changing the (World Bank 2011). In confl ict settings, nature of the confl ict. Revenues from these goods and supplies may not be easily acces- activities can enable parties to attract more sible, and criminals adapt to fi ll the demand.

MAP 2.3 Global Flows of Transnational Organized Crime

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEST AND UKRAINE CENTRAL EUROPE CENTRAL ASIA UNITED STATES SOUTH- OF AMERICA EAST JAPAN EUROPE AFGHANISTAN CHINA NORTH GULF AREA, AFRICA MIDDLE EAST INDIA MEXICO CARIBBEAN MYANMAR CENTRAL AMERICA HORN OF EAST SOUTH- CENTRAL AFRICA AFRICA EAST WEST AFRICA AFRICA ASIA

ANDEAN CONGO, DEM. REP. REGION

BRAZIL

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Heroin Female trafﬁcking victims Wildlife (main sources) Cocaine Counterfeit consumer goods Timber

Firearms Counterfeit medicines Gold

Smuggling of migrants Piracy off the Horn of Africa Cassiterite IBRD 43434 | DECEMBER 2017

Source: UNODC 2010.

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 69 MAP 2.4 The Intersection of Transnational Organized Crime and Instability

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

WEST AND SOUTHEAST CENTRAL EUROPE CENTRAL ASIA EUROPE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GULF AREA, CARIBBEAN MIDDLE EAST

SOUTHEAST WEST AFRICA HORN OF ASIA AFRICA

EAST AFRICA ANDEAN CENTRAL REGION AFRICA

Cocaine trafficking Heroin trafficking Conflict resulting in 1,000 or Piracy off the Horn of Africa more battle deaths in 2008 Main source countries Main source countries Trafficking from eastern Democratic Conflict resulting in 25-999 High homicide rates linked battle deaths in 2008 Republic of the Congo to cocaine trafficking Area of instability with presence Gold of UN peace missions Cassiterite UN regional peace mission

IBRD 43435 | DECEMBER 2017

Source: UNODC 2010.

In this regard, more attention should be important factors in assessing the potential paid to the traffi cking of illicit commodities escalation of violence (IISS 2011). versus “survival smuggling” of basic goods Like other trends discussed in this chapter, such as food that have long been the lifeline TOC needs to be addressed at national, of nomadic communities in the Sahel- regional, and global levels. Globally, UNODC Sahara region (Reitano and Shaw 2015). and other institutions have made important In spite of these dynamics, the existence advancements, including the United Nations of criminal economies and illicit traffi cking Convention against Transnational Organized networks in confl ict situations does not Crime adopted by General Assembly automatically translate into higher levels of Resolution 55/25, which has been ratifi ed by violence. Certain criminal groups may 170 parties. This convention provides “a uni- choose instead to operate by coercion and versal legal framework to help identify, deter, intimidation, especially where markets are and dismantle organized criminal groups” stable and a clear hierarchy is identifi ed. For (UNODC 2012, 3). In addition, the global instance, despite the large size of the narcot- community has adopted specifi c frame- ics economy in Afghanistan, drug-related works, such as the Protocol against the Illicit violence remains relatively low and sizably Manufacturing of and Traffi cking in lower than in Latin American drug markets Firearms, Their Parts and Components, and such as in the Northern Triangle (Byrd and Ammunition. These agreements represent Mansfi eld 2014, 75). In addition, state the commitment of states to address a com- responses to crime and preconditions, like plex global challenge in partnership with the the nature of local gang culture, are international community.

70 Pathways for Peace As discussed in chapter 3, prevention Specifi cally, it requires working at national, rests on the incentives of actors to choose regional, and international levels together, as behavior leading toward peace rather than no country alone can manage the risks that violence and to limit the harm done by arise from these trends. actors who choose violence. This under- In this challenging global framework, the standing is particularly relevant in relation 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to the risks posed by TOC. At the country provides an organizing framework for achiev- and regional levels, focus should be placed ing global development goals that are sustain- not only on changing the incentives of able in part because they recognize the deep actors operating in areas where transna- complexity and interconnectedness on the tional organized crime is present, but also path to peace and progress. on fi ghting corruption within the state and reinforcing its accountability prerequisites for action to be effective. The security and Notes justice sector is particularly crucial in this 1. The concept of risk is discussed in more regard. It is also important to ensure that detail in chapter 3. It is understood in no geographic areas are left out of an this study as a combination of the probabil- accountable and positive governance sys- ity of an event and the severity of the event tem, because TOC preys on vulnerable if it does occur and is strongly mediated by areas, including those far from the center the capacity of a society to manage its or diffi cult to reach regions with low den- impacts. sity, urban slums where the state is absent, 2. See https://www.g20.org/en/g20/faqs. and any area with weak governance. 3. Regional organizations include, among oth- Addressing TOC requires working with the ers, the European Union, League of Arab community, as many organized crime net- States (1945), Organization of American works are entrenched in the communities States (1948), Association of Southeast themselves. Asian Nations (1967), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (1969), Economic Conclusion Community of West African States (1975), and Southern African Development The scale and pace of change in the world Community (1992). today are striking. The world is at once 4. The Center for Systemic Peace (2014) notes more interconnected and interdependent that these countries had total populations than ever, which means that many countries greater than 500,000 in 2015 along a acutely feel the stresses of global changes 21-point scale. Polity scores range from −10 like population movements, climate change, (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated advancements in new technologies, and democracy). Countries can also be grouped shifting patterns of governance. into three categories of regime: autocracies Now there is pressure on global institu- (−10 to −6), anocracies (−5 to +5), and tions and individual societies to improve their democracies (+6 to +10). management of the risks and opportunities 5. The United Nations does not have a spe- that arise as a result of so many concurrent, cific definition of “democracy.” The interlinked, and impactful global trends. The General Assembly asserts that “democracy current international system, both states and is a universal value based on the freely multilateral institutions, has been dedicated to expressed will of the people to determine preventing interstate war and, increasingly, their own political, economic, social and intrastate confl ict. But the changing nature of cultural systems and their full participa- warfare and violence (as shown in chapter 1) tion in all aspects of their lives. . . . [W]hile and the changes in transnational phenomena democracies share common features, and the global landscape (described here) there is no single model of democracy and warrant a different approach. With several . . . democracy does not belong to any opportunities for peace, as well as risks for country or region, and reaffirming fur- violence, global collaboration is critical. ther the necessity of due respect

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 71 for sovereignty and the right to self- 1955–2006.” Center for Systemic Peace, determination” (UN General Assembly Vienna, VA. 2015). CISCO. 2017. “Visual Networking Index Global 6. Labor share of income is defi ned as the share Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Report, of national income paid in wages, including 2016–2021.” White Paper, CISCO, San Jose, benefi ts, to workers. CA, February 7. 7. Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cockayne, J. 2013. “Chasing Shadows.” RUSI Ethiopia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Journal 158 (2): 10–24. Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, ———. 2016. The Hidden Power: The Strategic and Uganda. Logic of Organized Crime. London: C. Hurst. 8. UNODC broadly defi nes TOC as encom- Comolli, V. 2017. “Transnational Organized passing all criminal activities motivated by Crime and Confl ict.” Background paper for profi t and with international scope. the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, References World Bank, Washington DC. Allan, H., A. Glazzard, S. Jesperson, S. Reddy- Council of Europe. 2001. “Convention on Tumu, and E. Winterbotham. 2015. Drivers of Cybercrime, Budapest, 23.XI.2001.” ETS185, Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Council of Europe, Budapest. Review. London: Royal United Services Crawford, A. 2015. “Climate Change and State Institute (RUSI). Fragility in the Sahel.” Policy brief no. 205, Barnett, J., and W. N. Adger. 2007. “Climate FRIDE, Madrid. Change, Human Security, and Violent Crenshaw, M. 1981. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Confl ict.” Political Geography 26 (2): 639–55. Comparative Politics 13 (4): 379–99. Bartley Johns, M., P. Brenton, M. Cali, M. Hoppe, Davison, S. 2015. “An Exploratory Study of and R. Piermartini. 2015. The Role of Trade in Risk and Social Media: What Role Did Ending Poverty. Geneva: World Trade Social Media Play in the Arab Spring Organization. Revolutions?” Journal of Middle East Media Blattman, C. 2014. “Can We Use Data and 11 (Fall): 1–33. Machine Learning to Predict Local Violence Deloitte. 2014. “Value of Connectivity: Economic in Fragile States? As It Turns Out, Yes.” https:// and Social Benefi ts of Expanding Internet chrisblattman.com/2014/10/02/can-use-data Access.” Deloitte, London, February. -machine-learning-predict-local-violence Devarajan, S., and E. Ianchovichina. 2017. “A -fragile-states-turns-yes/. Broken Social Contract, Not High Inequality, Boggero, M. 2017. “Technologies for Confl ict.” Led to the Arab Spring.” Review of Income Background paper for the United Nations– and Wealth, online version of record, World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for February 20. doi:10.1111/roiw.12288. Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Doyle, M. 1986. “Liberalism and World Politics.” Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. American Political Science Review 80 (4): Burke, M., S. M. Hsiang, and M. Edward. 2015. 1151–69. “Climate and Confl ict.” Annual Review of Dugarova, E., and N. Gulasan. 2017. “Global Economics 7 (1): 577–617. Trends: Challenges and Opportunities in the Byrd, W. A., and D. Mansfi eld. 2014. “Afghanistan’s Implementation of the Sustainable Opium Economy: An Agricultural, Livelihoods, Development Goals.” United Nations and Governance Perspective.” Report prepared Development Programme and United for the Afghanistan Agriculture Sector Review, Nations Research Institute for Social World Bank, Washington, DC. Development, Geneva. Call, C. T., and C. de Coning. 2017. Rising Powers Economist. 2016a. “Automation and Anxiety: and Peacebuilding. London: Palgrave. Will Smarter Machines Cause Mass Cammett, M., and I. Diwan. 2013. A Political Unemployment.” Special report, June 25. Economy of the Arab Uprisings. Polity IV User ———. 2016b. “Global Politics: League of Manual. Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace. Nationalists—All around the World, Center for Systemic Peace. 2014. “Polity and the Nationalists Are Gaining Ground. Why?” Onset of Political Instability by Polity Score, November 19. https://www.economist.com

72 Pathways for Peace /news/international/21710276-all -around Guterres, A. 2017. “Remarks to Munich Security -world-nationalists-are-gaining-ground-why Conference.” United Nations Secretary- -league -nationalists. General, February 18. Fearon, J. D. 2004. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Haass, R. 2017. A World in Disarray: American Last So Much Longer Than Others?” Journal Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order. of Peace Research 41 (3): 275–301. New York: Penguin Press. Felbab-Brown, V. 2009. Shooting Up: Hale, G. and M. Xu. 2016. “FDI Effects on the Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs. Labor Market of Host Countries.” Working Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Paper 2016-25, Federal Reserve Bank of San Ferdi (Fondation pour les études et recherches sur Francisco. le développement international). 2016. “Linking Hallegatte, S., M. Bangalore, L. Bonzanigo, Security and Development—A Plea for the M. Fay, T. Kane, U. Narloch, J. Rozenberg, D. Sahel.” Ferdi, Clermont-Ferrand, France. http:// Treguer, and A. Vogt-Schilb. 2016. Shock www.ferdi.fr/sites/www.ferdi.fr/fi les/publication Waves: Managing the Impacts of Climate /sahel_anglais-_vol1-fi nal.pdf. Change on Poverty. Climate Change and Ferreira, F., D. M. Joliffe, and E. B. Prydz. 2015. Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. “The International Poverty Line Has Just Hallward-Driemeier, M., and G. Nayyar. 2017. Been Raised to $1.90 a Day, but Global Trouble in the Making? The Future of Poverty is Basically Unchanged. How Is That Manufacturing-Led Development. Washington, Even Possible? World Bank, Washington DC. DC: World Bank. Fjelde, H., and G. Østby. 2014. “Socioeconomic Hsiang, S. M., M. Burke, and E. Miguel. 2013. Inequality and Communal Confl ict: A “Quantifying the Infl uence of Climate on Disaggregated Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa, Human Confl ict.” Science 341 (6151): 1212. 1990–2008.” International Interactions 40 (5): ICRC (International Committee of the Red 737–62. Cross). 2017. I Saw My City Die. Special Freedom House. 2004. Freedom in the World report. Geneva: International Committee of 2004: The Annual Survey of Political Rights the Red Cross. and Civil Liberties. Lanham, MD: Rowman IISS (International Institute for Strategic and Littlefi eld. Studies). 2011. “West Africa’s ‘Cocaine ———. 2017. Freedom in the World 2017: Coast.’” Strategic Comments 21 (May 11). Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to ILO (International Labour Organization). 2016. Global Democracy. Washington, DC: Freedom “World Employment and Social Outlook House. https://freedomhouse.org/report 2016: Trends for Youth.” ILO, Geneva. / freedom-world/freedom -world-2017. IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2017. G7 (Group of Seven). 2017. “On Responsible World Economic Outlook, April 2017: Gaining States Behavior in Cyberspace.” Lucca, April 11. Momentum? Washington, DC: IMF. Griffi n, M. Forthcoming. “The UN’s Role in a Independent Commission on Multilateralism. Changing Global Landscape.” In The Oxford 2016. “The Impact of New Technologies on Handbook on the United Nations, 2d ed., Peace, Security, and Development.” edited by T. G. Weiss and S. Daws, ch. 45. Independent Commission on Multilateralism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. New York. Grillot, S. R., W. Paes, H. Risser, and S. O. IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Stoneman. 2004. A Fragile Peace: Guns and Change). 2014. Synthesis Report, edited by Security in Post-confl ict Macedonia. Geneva: R. K. Pachauri and L. A. Meyer. Contribution United Nations Development Programme of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Fifth and the Small Arms Survey. Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Guichaoua, Y., and M. Pellerin. 2017. “Faire la Panel on Climate Change. Geneva: IPCC. paix et construire l’etat: Les relations entre ITU (International Telecommunications Union). pouvoir central et périphéries sahéliennes au 2015. “ICT Facts and Figures.” ITU, Geneva. Niger et au Mali.” Study 51, Institute de ———. 2016. “ICT Facts and Figures.” ITU, Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire Geneva. (IRSEM), Paris. http://www.defense.gouv.fr Letouzé, E. 2012a. “Big Data for Development: /content /download/509288/ 8603319/file Challenges and Opportunities.” UN Global /Etude_IRSEM_n51_2017.pdf. Pulse, New York.

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 73 ———. 2012b. “Can Big Data from Cellphones Morel, A. 2016. Violent Incidents Monitoring Help Prevent Confl ict?” IPI Global Observatory, Systems: A Methods Toolkit. San Francisco: International Peace Institute, New York. https:// Asia Foundation. theglobalobservatory.org/2012/11/can-big National Intelligence Council. 2017. “Global -data-from-cellphones -help-prevent-confl ict/. Trends: Paradox of Progress.” National Letouzé, E., P. Meier, and P. Vinck. 2013. “Big Data Intelligence Council, Washington, DC. for Confl ict Prevention: New Oil and Old Nordas, R., and N. P. Gleditsch. 2007. “Climate Fires,” in New Technology and the Prevention of Change and Confl ict.” Political Geography Violence and Confl ict, edited by F. Mancini. 26 (6): 627–38. New York: Insternational Peace Institute. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation Manacorda, M., and A. Tesai. 2016. Liberation and Development). 2017. “FDI in Figures.” Technology: Mobile Phones and Political OECD, Paris. Mobilization in Africa. Princeton, NJ: ———. Various years. International Direct Princeton University Press. Investment Statistics. Paris: OECD. Mancini, F., ed. 2013. New Technology and the Parks, T., N. Colletta, and B. Oppenheim. Prevention of Violence and Confl ict. New York: 2013. The Contested Corners of Asia: International Peace Institute. Subnational Conflict and International Marc, A., N. Verjee, and S. Mogaka. 2015. The Development Assistance. San Francisco: Challenge of Stability and Security in West Asia Foundation. Africa. Africa Development Forum series. Pew Research Center. 2007. “Global Views on Washington, DC: World Bank; Paris: Agence Life Satisfaction, National Conditions, and Française de Développement. the Global Economy: Highlights from the Marshall, M. G., T. Gurr, and K. Jaggers. 2015. 2007 Pew Global Attitudes 47-Nation Survey.” Polity IV Project: Political Regime Pew Research Center, Washington, DC. Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015; ———. 2015. “Global Support for Principle of Dataset Users’ Manual. Vienna, VA: Center Free Expression, but Opposition to Some for Systemic Peace. Forms of Speech.” Pew Research Center, McGovern, M. 2011. “Popular Development Washington, DC. Economics: An Anthropologist among the ———. 2017. “The Internet of Things Connectivity Mandarins.” Perspectives on Politics 9 (2): Binge: What Are the Implications?” Pew 345–55. Research Center, Washington, DC. http://www. Meier, P. 2013. “Artifi cial Intelligence for pewinternet.org/2017/06/06/the-internet-of Monitoring Elections (AIME).” iRevolutions. -things-connectivity-binge-what-are-the https://irevolutions.org/2013/04/17/ai-for -implications/. -election-monitoring/. Pierskalla, J. H., and F. M. Hollenbach. 2013. ———. 2015. Digital Humanitarians: How Big “Technology and Collective Action: The Data Is Changing the Face of Humanitarian Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Response. New York: Routledge. Violence in Africa.” American Political Science Menocal, A., V. Fritz, and L. Rakner. 2007. “Hybrid Review 107 (2): 207–24. Regimes and the Challenges of Deepening and Piketty, T. 2013. Capital in the 21st Century. Sustaining Democracy in Developing Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Countries.” Background Note 2 prepared for Puddington, A., and T. Roylance. 2017. Freedom the Wilton Park Conference on Democracy in the World 2017: Populists and Autocrats: and Development, October 10–12. The Dual Threat to Global Democracy. Miodownik, D., and L. Nir. 2016. “Receptivity to Washington, DC: Freedom House. Violence in Ethnically Divided Societies: Puig Larrauri, H. 2013. “New Technologies and A Micro-Level Mechanism of Perceived Confl ict Prevention in Sudan and South Horizontal Inequalities.” Studies in Confl ict Sudan.” In New Technology and the Prevention and Terrorism 39 (1): 22–45. of Violence and Confl ict, edited by F. Mancini. Mor, Y., Y. Ron, and I. Maoz. 2016. “Likes for New York: Insternational Peace Institute. Peace: Can Facebook Promote Dialogue in Reitano, T., and M. Shaw. 2015. Fixing a Fractured the Israeli-Palestinian Confl ict?” Media and State: Breaking the Cycles of Crime, Corruption Communication 4 (1): 15–26. and Confl ict in Mali and the Sahel. Geneva:

74 Pathways for Peace Global Initiative against Transnational ———. 2004. “A More Secure World: Our Shared Organized Crime. Responsibility.” Report of the High-Level Ross, J. I. 1993. “Structural Causes of Oppositional Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Political Terrorism.” Journal of Peace Research 30 New York: U nited Nations. (3): 317–29. ———. 2015. “Transforming Our World: The Russett, B. 1993. Grasping the Democratic 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War (A/RES/70/1). Resolution adopted by the World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University General Assembly on September 25. Press. ———. 2017a. World Economic Situation and Scharbatke-Church, C., and A. Patel. 2016. Prospects 2017. New York. “Technology for Evaluation in Fragile and ———. 2017b. Report of the Special Confl ict Affected States: An Introduction for Representative of the Secretary-General on the Digital Immigrant Evaluator.” Working Migration. Report A/71/728. New York: UN. Paper, Fletcher School, Tufts University, UN General Assembly. 2015. “Strengthening the Medford, MA. Role of the United Nations in Enhancing Schleussner, C., J. F. Donges, R. V. Donner, and Periodic and Genuine Elections and the J. H. Schellnhuber. 2016. “Armed-Confl ict Promotion of Democratization.” Resolution Risks Enhanced by Climate-Related Disasters A/RES/70/168, adopted February 17, in Ethnically Fractionalized Countries.” New York. Proceedings of the National Academy of ———. 2016. “Review of United Nations Sciences 113 (33): 9216–21. Peacebuilding Architecture.” Resolution Shapiro, J. N., and N. B. Weidmann. 2015. “Is the A/RES/70/262, adopted April 27, New York. Phone Mightier Than the Sword? Cellphones UNDESA (United Nations Department of and Insurgent Violence in Iraq.” International Economic and Social Affairs). 2014. World Organization 69 (2): 247–74. Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision. Singer, P. W., and A. Friedman. 2014. New York: UNDESA. Cybersecurity: What Everyone Needs to Know. ———. 2015a. “Percentage of Total Population Oxford: Oxford University Press. by Broad Age Group, Both Sexes (per 100 Smith, C., H. Burke, C. de Leiuen, and G. Jackson. Total Population).” UNDESA, New York. 2015. “The Islamic State’s Symbolic War: ———. 2015b. “Population by Age and Sex Da’esh’s Socially Mediated Terrorism as a (Thousands).” UNDESA, New York. Threat to Cultural Heritage.” Journal of Social ———. 2015c. World Population Prospects: The Archaeology 16 (2): 164–88. 2015 Revision. New York: UNDESA. Spanjers, J., and M. Salomon. 2017. “Illicit ———. 2016. International Migration Report Financial Flows to and from Developing 2015. New York: United Nations. Countries: 2005–2014.” Global Financial UNDP (United Nations Development Integrity, May 1. Programme). 2017. Human Development Strand, H., H. Hegre, S. Gates, and M. Dahl. 2012. Report 2016. New York: UNDP. “Why Waves? Global Patterns of UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner Democratization, 1816–2008.” Paper presented for Refugees). 2016. Global Trends: Forced at third International Conference on Displacement in 2015. Geneva: UNHCR. Democracy as Idea and Practice, Oslo, January ———. 2017. Global Trends: Forced Displacement 12–13. in 2016. Geneva: UNHCR. http://www.unhcr. Tellidis, I., and S. Kappler. 2016. “Information org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34 and Communication Technologies in /global-trends-forced-displacement-2016 Peacebuilding: Implications, Opportunities .html. and Challenges.” Cooperation and Confl ict 51 UNITU (United Nations International (1): 75–93. Telecommunication Union). 2016. UN ITU Tomz, M., and J. Weeks. 2013. “Public Opinion Facts and Figures 2016. Geneva: UNITU. and Democratic Peace.” American Political UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs Science Review 107 (4): 849–65. and Crime). 2008. “Drug Trafficking as a UN (United Nations). 1945. “Charter, June 26, Security Threat in West Africa.” UNODC, 1945.” UN, New York. Vienna.

The Need for Prevention in an Interdependent World 75 ———. 2010. “The Globalization of Crime: A ———. Various years. World Development Transnational Organized Crime Threat Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank. Assessment.” UNODC, Vienna. ———. 2018. World Development Report 2018: ———. 2012. “Transnational Organized Crime: Learning to Realize Education’s Promise. The Globalized Illegal Economy.” Fact Sheet, Washington, DC: World Bank. UNODC, Vienna. World Bank and IMF (International Monetary ———. n.d. “Transnational Organized Crime: Fund). 2016. Global Monitoring Report The Globalized Illegal Economy.” https:// 2015/2016: Development Goals in an Era of www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/organized Demographic Change. Washington, DC: -crime.html. World Bank. UNSC (United Nations Security Council). World Bank Group and World Trade Organization. “Review of United Nations Peacebuilding 2015. The Role of Trade in Ending Poverty. Architecture.” 2016. Resolution S/RES/2282, Geneva: World Trade Organization. adopted April 27, New York. World Economic Forum. 2015. Global IT Report. USAID (U.S. Agency for International Geneva: World Economic Forum. Development). 2014. “Climate Change and ———. 2016. The Future of Jobs: Employment, Confl ict in the Sahel.” Policy Brief, USAID, Skills, and Workforce Strategy for the Fourth Washington, DC. Industrial Revolution. Global Challenge Insight Veilleux-Lepage, Y. 2016. “Retweeting the Caliphate: Report. Geneva: World Economic Forum. The Role of Soft Sympathizers in the Islamic World Summit on the Information Society. 2005. State’s Social Media Strategy.” Turkish Journal of “Tunis Commitment.” ITU, Geneva. Security Studies 18 (1): 53–69. World Values Survey Association. 2014. “World Verjee, N. 2017. “Regional Economic Values Survey Round 6.” World Values Survey Communities in Confl ict Prevention and Association, Vienna. Management.” Background paper for the WTO (World Trade Organization). 2017. “World United Nations–World Bank Flagship Trade and GDP Growth in 2016 and Early Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive 2017.” Chapter 3 in World Trade Statistical Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Review 2017. Geneva: World Trade Organization. World Bank, Washington, DC. https://www.wto.org/english/res _e/statis_e Weidmann, N. B. 2015. “Communication, / wts2017_e/WTO_Chapter _03_e.pdf. Technology, and Political Confl ict: Yanagizawa-Drott, D. 2014. “Propaganda and Introduction to the Special Issue.” Journal of Confl ict: Evidence from the Rwandan Peace Research 52 (3): 263–68. Genocide.” Quarterly Journal of Economics World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 129 (4): 1947–94. 2011: Confl ict, Security, and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. Additional Reading ———. 2014. “Africa: Sahel Demography and Development.” Report ACS 11786, World Collier, P., and A. Hoeffl er 2006. “Military Bank, Washington, DC, November 10. Expenditure in Post-confl ict Societies.” ———. 2016a. “Migration and Development: Economics of Governance 7 (1): 89–107. A Role for the World Bank Group.” Dunne, J. P. 2012. “Third Copenhagen Washington, DC: World Bank. Consensus: Armed Confl ict Assessment.” ———. 2016b. Poverty and Shared Prosperity Assessment Paper, Copenhagen Consensus 2016: Taking on Inequality. Washington, DC: Center, Tewksbury, MA. World Bank. Lomborg, B., ed. 2013. Global Problems, Smart ———. 2017. Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Solutions: Costs and Benefi ts. Cambridge: Development Approach Supporting Refugees, Cambridge University Press. the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts. World Bank. Various years. Povcalnet. Washington, Washington, DC: World Bank. DC: World Bank.

76 Pathways for Peace CHAPTER 3 Pathways for Peace

A society’s ability to manage confl ict con- constitute the overall environment in which structively is tested continuously by risks actors make decisions. that push it toward violence and opportuni- Violent confl ict cannot be adequately ties to move toward sustainable peace. understood using state-centric perspectives These challenges emerge from the fast- because, as discussed in chapters 1 and 2, shifting global and regional landscape, as many of the world’s violent confl icts take highlighted in chapter 2, and they refl ect place on the peripheries of, or outside, the each society’s unique composition. community of states and do not involve This study views prevention, in line with government soldiers. Instead, confl icts the United Nations (UN) sustaining peace involving a variety of actors, structures, and resolutions (UN General Assembly 2016a; processes are playing out at multiple levels, UN Security Council 2016a), as “activities with governments and partners increasingly aimed at preventing the outbreak, escala- challenged with identifying and addressing tion, continuation, and recurrence of con- risks, simultaneously, but to varying degrees, fl ict, addressing root causes, assisting parties at local, national, regional, and global levels. to confl ict to end hostilities, ensuring The concept of pathways for peace helps national reconciliation, and moving towards to illustrate how the risk of violence and the recovery, reconstruction, and development.” opportunities for peace emerge and change This chapter presents a framework for over time. It is possible for a single event to understanding prevention as part of a com- cause an abrupt shift in a society’s pathway; prehensive strategy for sustaining peace. however, in most cases pathways change rel- Societies are complex systems in which atively slowly, as risks intensify, accumulate, change follows nonlinear trajectories cre- or are mitigated. Underlying risks related to ated by the interaction, decisions, and the exclusion of particular groups—for actions of multiple actors. The framework is example, based on identity or geography— based on the concept of pathways for peace tend to play a role in most violent confl icts. and focuses on three core elements of soci- While the calculus of actors is driven ety: actors, the individuals and groups strongly by incentives in the short term, the whose decisions ultimately defi ne the incentives to use violence may accumulate pathway a society takes; institutions, which or dissipate over months, years, or even shape the incentives for peace or violence decades. Often violence exists in different and therefore infl uence the society’s overall forms before being recognized and labeled capacity to mitigate confl ict; and structural as a violent confl ict. In some cases, actions factors, which are the foundational elements result in violence even when this is not the of a society that defi ne its organization and preferred outcome of any single actor.

Pathways for Peace 77 The pathways for peace framework Pathways move through a myriad of allows for the identifi cation of entry points situations. The ideal state of affairs, shown over time for efforts to address risks and as the darker shade of green in fi gure 3.1, take advantage of opportunities for peace. can be understood as sustainable peace, a In line with the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable situation without violence and built on sus- Development and the UN sustaining peace tainable development, justice, equity, and resolutions, prevention in this model protection of human rights as defi ned in the requires a constant process of mitigating 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.1 shocks, while making sustained investments The opposing situation, shown as the darker to reduce underlying structural and institu- shade of red, is one of overt, collective tional risks. violence. Between sustainable peace and overt vio- A Framework for Peaceful lence is a range of situations where risks to peace and violence manifest together. Some Pathways of these situations can be quite stable and A society’s pathway moves through a vari- predictable, in the sense that a certain power ety of situations that present risks and equilibrium is maintained (Galtung 1969) opportunities for maintaining a peaceful and there is an apparent absence of tension path (fi gure 3.1). These pathways are never (King 1963, 1). Yet, such situations do not linear. In the words of North, Wallis, and constitute sustainable peace as long as Weingast (2009, 12), “The dynamism of underlying tensions remain unaddressed or social order is a dynamic of change, not a actively suppressed (World Bank 2011). dynamic of progress. Most societies move At times, temporary bargains have backward and forward with respect to polit- helped to stave off overt violence in the ical and economic development.” Because short term, potentially buying time for they are shaped by the complex relation- broader reforms that can direct a pathway ships among the core elements of society, toward more sustained peace. For example, the pathways are extremely diffi cult to the increase in public sector employment in predict. the Arab Republic of Egypt and Tunisia in

FIGURE 3.1 Pathway between Sustainable Peace and Violent Conflict

Sustainable peace

Inclusionary process Regional instability Center-periphery arrangement Mounting grievances and repression

Violent conﬂict

PRESENT 1 YEAR 5 YEARS 10 YEARS

78 Pathways for Peace the period after the Arab Spring has The pathways concept is applicable at achieved some stability in the immediate multiple levels—that is, to specifi c areas term, although its long-term sustainability within a country or areas that extend is unclear (World Bank 2017, 16). Some beyond the borders of a single country. It societies have exited violent confl ict and aids in understanding the risks and oppor- transitioned into long periods during which tunities around subregional confl ict and in confl icts are suppressed by force more than regions like the Sahel, where risks and resolved. Yet, this relative stability does not opportunities are linked across countries. equate with sustainable peace. Thus, the These different levels, although often lack of open violence should not be con- treated as separate, are in reality fl uid and fused with peace but rather understood as interlinked. In an increasingly interdepen- conditions of varying risk. dent world, risks intersect across levels. In Sudden changes in a pathway are rela- the same way, pathways, in principle, also tively rare. Instead, cross-country studies of exist at different levels. A key analytical violent confl ict have consistently demon- challenge is to defi ne the boundaries strated that some societies appear particu- between the levels and the relative weight larly vulnerable to violence, with histories that should be assigned to them, which characterized by either prolonged violence Williams terms the “level of analysis prob- or repeated episodes of violence, while lem” (Williams 2016, 43). others tend to be resilient and experience Recognizing this challenge, the frame- protracted periods of peace (Jones, Elgin- work presented in this study takes the Cossart, and Esberg 2012). Min et al. (2017), national-level pathway as the dominant relying on the Armed Confl ict Dataset of path, highlighting the centrality of the state Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), in determining national outcomes. The reviewed data for 161 countries during the framework underscores that the different 1995–2015 period and found that violent levels formally intersect through the rights confl ict is often cyclical or episodic and that and responsibilities of the state. The state vulnerability to violence relates less to has local, national, and international specifi c shocks than to slow-changing insti- responsibilities, and the failure of the state tutional and structural factors. Similarly, in those responsibilities can fuel the spread Fearon and Laitin (2013) examined data for of confl ict across borders. The focus on all countries over the 1816–2007 period, national pathways does not mean a focus fi nding that violent confl ict tends to con- solely on state institutions, but rather a centrate and persist in certain countries2 focus on the national level of analysis, in and, conversely, that a large set of countries, which the state is a key actor, as discussed roughly 60, did not experience violent later in this chapter. A key variable in this confl ict at all. analysis is, therefore, the capacity of a state Given the global trends discussed in to govern risks across levels within its chapter 1, this pattern can be expected to territory. continue. A relatively small number of The framework for this study under- countries experience violent confl ict at any stands societies as comprising three core given time. That said, risks of confl ict will elements—actors, institutions, and struc- remain high in many countries as long as tural factors—whose interactions infl uence underlying drivers are not addressed and the pathway a society takes (fi gure 3.2). systemic risks continue to intensify, with The pathway that a society takes is a the potential for new confl icts to break out product of the decisions of critical actors, and existing confl icts to become protracted who are enabled or constrained by struc- or internationalized (Dupuy et al. 2017). tural factors and infl uenced by the institu- Efforts to encourage peaceful pathways tions that help to defi ne the incentives for continue to be critical both in ending vio- their behavior. To understand how path- lence as well as in reducing the risk to these ways are forged, it is critical to examine the countries of violence breaking out. interactions among these three elements.

Pathways for Peace 79 FIGURE 3.2 Actors, Structural Factors, Institutions

ACTORS are individuals, social groups, or small organizations who make decisions, in cooperation or competition with one another, that determine the pathway.

ACTORS

STRUCTURAL FACTORS STRUCTURAL INSTITUTIONS INSTITUTIONS provide are the foundational FACTORS the “rules of the game,” elements of society that both formal, legal determine its essential frameworks and informal organization. social norms and values that can determine actors’ behavior, incentives, and capacity to work together.

Because they operate in relationship to one and can usually be changed only over lon- another, a shift in one will have impacts on ger periods of time (Blattman and Miguel the others. 2010; Collier and Hoeffl er 2004; OECD Structural factors are the foundational 2016). In the social realm, structural factors elements of society that determine its essen- such as legacies of violence, trauma, and the tial organization. They include, for example, societal divisions left by violence, can per- geography, economic systems, political sist over generations and often take signifi - structures, demographic composition, or cant effort and time to change (Hegre and distribution of resources. In general, struc- Sambanis 2006; Volkan 2004; World Bank tural factors do not change easily, and when 2011). Conversely, societies that possess they do, they do so only over relatively long more cohesion, higher income levels, more periods of time. Structural factors shape the inclusive economic and political regimes, a overall environment in which actors make more diversifi ed economy, and a history of decisions. As highlighted in chapter 2, they peaceful cooperation across groups and may include systemic stresses, such as the that are located in more stable regions expe- infl uence of transnational illicit markets or rience less violence (Collier et al. 2003; the impacts of climate change. Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock 2006; Østby Some structural factors are more mallea- 2008; Parks, Colletta, and Oppenheim 2013; ble than others. For example, geography can Stewart 2004, 2008, 2010). rarely be altered, although societies can fi nd While structural factors are clear infl u- ways to mitigate its impacts (Fearon and ences on the overall health of a society, Laitin 2013; Raleigh and Urdal 2007), as institutions have been described as the refl ected in Sustainable Development Goal “immune system,” charged with defending (SDG) 13 of the 2030 Agenda. High levels a society from pressures toward violence of aid dependence and excessive reliance on and promoting overall resilience (World natural resources for economic growth tend Bank 2011, 72). Just as a healthy immune to be associated with greater risk of violence system mounts a quick, targeted response to

80 Pathways for Peace a pathogen, effective institutions can political systems, they raise expectations respond and contain the actions of individ- about access to certain freedoms and uals or groups that threaten overall societal services. As discussed in more detail in well-being. chapter 4, grievances across groups can Institutions provide the “rules of the arise if expectations remain unmet due to game”—both formal legal frameworks and constrained resources or lack of political informal social norms and values—that will (Brinkerhoff 2011). govern actors’ behavior and limit the dam- Effective institutions are impersonal. age that individual actors can do (North Rather than being confi ned to the infl uence 1990, 3). Formal law enforcement institu- of individual leaders or special interest tions do this directly, by capturing and con- groups, they possess suffi cient depth to taining individuals who behave violently. include diverse groups in a society and have Informal social norms also perform this the staying power to outlast political terms role, by infl uencing people’s expectations or temporary agreements between elites about how other people will behave. If indi- (World Bank 2011). This generates trust in viduals believe that others are obeying the the institutions themselves, even when peo- laws and rules of society, they are more ple do not feel trust or legitimacy toward a likely to do so as well. However, if an indi- particular leader representing that institu- vidual does not have solid reason to expect tion. In this way, the impersonal nature of that rules will be enforced, the payoffs to effective institutions can produce a legiti- violence are higher. In these cases, ineffec- mizing effect, which is itself an incentive for tive institutions can enable—rather than maintaining peace and stability. Effective, contain—behavior that threatens societal accountable, and inclusive institutions at all well-being. The larger a society, the greater levels are an explicit goal within the 2030 the number of institutions (as “enforcers” Agenda. of rules) needed (North, Wallis, and To some degree, inclusive institutions Weingast 2009). can also protect against the impact of unfa- In defi ning the “rules” for actors’ vorable structural factors, for example, by behavior, institutions shape the overall embodying greater voice and accountability incentive structure for peace. In high-risk in decision making or redistribution of situations or in the presence of violent con- resources (Fearon and Laitin 2013; Raleigh fl ict, capable institutions provide commit- and Urdal 2007). Social norms that pro- ment mechanisms for armed groups to hold mote gender inclusion, for instance, can to a cease-fi re by raising the costs of reneging help to equalize power relations in on the agreement. In “Somaliland,” trusted decision-making processes and lead to governing bodies that encompass actors more optimal outcomes; as detailed in from various sectors, including clan leaders chapter 6, women’s participation in peace and elders, have contributed to more than negotiations has improved the quality and two decades of relative stability and peace, staying power of peace agreements across despite ongoing violent confl ict in southern a range of countries (Anderlini 2007; Somalia (World Bank 2017). The longer O’Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz peace endures, the greater the disincentives 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2017; Stone 2015). for any of the groups to resort to violence. Actors are the central component of this Institutions also structure incentives by framework. Actors can include individuals managing the expectations of actors. One (especially infl uential leaders), social of the key tasks of institutions is to temper groups, or small organizations who make the sense of relative deprivation and frus- decisions in competition or cooperation trated expectations of groups who do not with one another. Capable institutions and see themselves as benefi ting fairly from favorable structural factors can make peace- overall economic advancement and ensur- ful pathways more likely and easier to main- ing that these frustrations are addressed tain; but, at the end of the day, it is peacefully (Gurr 1970; Huntington 1968). actors—working together or individually— As more countries shift toward open who determine the direction society will

Pathways for Peace 81 take (Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur of actors becomes an institution when it 2004; Faustino and Booth 2014; MacGinty establishes norms and rules that go beyond 2010). Actors’ behaviors, in turn, shape the the immediate infl uence of one or a few incentives for other actors to choose vio- members. Some organizations and even lence or peace. For example, as chapter 4 some states are in reality not institutions if highlights, leaders may develop narratives they are effectively controlled by a small that increase the incentives for violence or group of individuals or the rules or norms promote peace. are not endorsed or followed by the major- The boundaries between organizations ity of citizens. They do not provide what an of actors and institutions are diffi cult to institution is supposed to provide, and the defi ne. At what point does a group of people, small group of individuals may not repre- acting together, become an institution? For sent the interests of all social groups, deep- the purposes of this framework, institutions ening the perception that an organization is are understood as possessing a level of exclusionary by design. Box 3.1 illustrates structure that transcends personal relation- how this framework can be applied to a par- ships, with rules and norms that apply ticular society—in this case, Mali—to aid in broadly to all constituents. An organization understanding how pathways are formed.

BOX 3.1 Applying the Framework to the Northern Mali Conflict, 2012–13

Structural factors Institutions

• Some of the populations of the • Although it is a democratic state with extreme north of Mali have historically an active political life, Mali has been connected more with the Sahara struggled with accountability, and Northern Africa than with the corruption, clientelism, and population of the south, through personalization of institutions.

commercial routes and cultural ties. • The military was terribly weakened • Some of the populations of the during prior regimes by fear of military extreme north have a long history of coup and reliance on ethnic militias. conﬂ ict with the south, including The army has been poorly trained and raiding for slaves, and during equipped and lacks cohesiveness and colonization and after independence leadership. This has created a security have been in regular rebellion against vacuum in various parts of the the central government. country, especially the border region.

• The extreme north has been deeply • Decentralization, a central factor in affected by climate change, drought, giving the regions more autonomy, and the collapse of Saharan trade. has been marred by corruption and

• The civil war in Algeria (1991–2002) lack of accountability of local and collapse of the central Libyan state politicians. It has also upset the ethnic have brought about the installation of balance. Additionally, political small violent extremist groups in the decentralization has never been well region and increased illicit trafﬁ cking of accepted by the central government arms, people, and weapons. bureaucracy.

• There are few economic opportunities • Competition among clans and families aside from illicit trade and some limited has weakened traditional institutions herding and agriculture activities. regulating the Tuareg and Fulani groups. Youth, in particular, do not • The low population density of the have effective means of participating north makes the provision of services in these institutions, contributing to a and infrastructure development very loss in moral authority. costly and difﬁ cult. (Box continued next page)

82 Pathways for Peace BOX 3.1 Applying the Framework to the Northern Mali Conflict, 2012–13 (continued)

Incentives for actors peace across the country. Politicians and leaders of armed groups have • Ineffective governance, corruption, little incentive to push for a and elite capture have caused a loss comprehensive peace deal. of trust in formal and traditional institutions and a desire for moral • Persistent instrumentalization of authority that violent extremist groups ethnicity through the use of and rebels exploit. Perceptions of community-based militias triggers injustice and marginalization in the intercommunal conﬂ icts and fuels north, even if not supported by resentment toward the central state. poverty and human development • Daily insecurity, terrorism, and lack of data, create an incentive for identity- trust toward regular security forces push based violent mobilization. people to take responsibility for their

• Unaddressed trauma from past violent own security and justice and to seek conﬂ icts and identity politics deepen protection from various armed groups. polarization and result in very little • Weapons have become more available political support for a negotiated since the 2011 crisis in Libya.

Sources: Antil 2011; Bøås et al. 2017; Grémont 2012; Guichaoua and Pellerin 2017; ICG 2014.

Path Dependency many of today’s confl icts are more pro- of Violence tracted and involve an increasing number of armed groups, including self-defense All societies experience some violence. Yet, militias, rebel groups, illicit traffi cking high-intensity violent confl ict is a relatively networks, and urban gangs. The “original rare phenomenon; most societies are at causes” often evolve and transform as new peace most of the time. Being at peace generations of actors get involved and as brings a certain inertia; societies at peace war economies become more entrenched tend to remain at peace. The longer and (Bøås 2015; Wolff, Ross, and Wee 2017). more intentionally a society has worked to Over time, violent confl ict can deepen address structural factors and create the grievances and divisions between groups. incentives for peace, the harder it is to derail These emotional legacies can be transferred that society from a peaceful path. from generation to generation to justify Episodes of violence, nevertheless, can continued violence. In addition, social happen at any point along the pathway, norms meant to limit violence often relax, even when the path is headed in the direc- as violence becomes normalized as a means tion of peace. Violence tends to emerge of resolving confl ict or enforcing power more gradually than is often assumed, with relationships. Women and children are par- risks building up over periods of months ticularly affected by these dynamics, as vio- and years (box 3.2). lence against them tends to become more Like peace, violence is highly path- common and more brutal as confl ict con- dependent. As violent confl ict continues, tinues (Boudet et al. 2012; Crespo-Sancho societies can get caught in a “confl ict trap,” 2017; Kelly 2017; Slegh, Barker, and Levtov where incentives are reconfi gured in ways 2014). Because of the way these psychoso- that sustain confl ict, and many actors—the cial impacts accumulate, even building the state, private sector, communities—start “right” institutions cannot ensure a linear to organize themselves with the view path out of confl ict (World Bank 2017). that violent confl ict will continue (Collier The path dependency of violence is rein- et al. 2003, 1). As discussed in chapter 1, forced by the damage it often infl icts on

Pathways for Peace 83 BOX 3.2 Violent Conflict Emerges and Escalates over Time

Overall, outbreaks and cycles of violence likely to escalate to either a high-risk are rare. This is demonstrated using a confl ict (in which an early warning model developed for this study and system warns of an outbreak of drawing on Uppsala Confl ict Data violence) or a low-intensity confl ict in a Program (UCDP) data for the 1975–2014 given year. Of countries already at high period (Mueller 2017). The model risk, 11 percent are likely to transition to predicts that the average likelihood of a a high-intensity confl ict (1,000 or more country at peace transitioning to an battle deaths a year). outbreak is 2.3 percent for a lower- Once violence takes root, however, intensity confl ict (defi ned as 25–999 the likelihood it will continue is relatively battle deaths a year) and just high. In 78 percent of cases, the fi rst 0.09 percent for a civil war. year of civil war is followed by a second As risks build and accumulate, the year of war. Risk continues to be high probability of violence increases, but even after violence has stopped; in the not as quickly as often assumed. Only fi rst year of recovery after civil war, the 4 percent of countries at peace are likelihood of relapse is 18 percent.

institutions (Jones, Elgin-Cossart, and talent and skills, as those with the means to Esberg 2012). During protracted confl ict, do so look for opportunities elsewhere. political systems reorient around wartime Even after violence has taken root, it is dynamics. The need to prioritize security still possible for societies to change course. often results in large security forces that are Intermittently along the pathways, oppor- diffi cult to demobilize and reintegrate later. tunities appear when actors’ decisions have Trust and legitimacy in state institutions more impact to defi ne a pathway. These can be eroded, as people lose faith in insti- “transition moments” are events that open tutions that cannot protect them or provide up the possibility for a marked change in the basic services they need. Protracted con- direction (fi gure 3.3)—for example, a fl ict also fuels the brain drain of national national political transition, a new leader in

FIGURE 3.3 Transition Moments

The graphic illustrates the way transition moments can shift toward sustainable peace, via a power-sharing agreement, the direction of the pathway, Here, a change in leadership or toward greater risk of conﬂict, via increased competition provides an example of an event that can shift the pathway for power and grievances.

Sustainable peace

Change in leadership Power sharing and reform

External policies of support

Elite competition Grievance formation

Violent conﬂict

PRESENT 1 YEAR 5 YEARS TRANSITION MOMENT 10 YEARS

84 Pathways for Peace power, a new international alliance—or consequences for society. In some cases, just smaller-scale shifts such as policy reform in one or a few actors can derail progress one sector (World Bank 2011, 12). During toward peace. To draw on the public health transition moments, coalitions can be analogy (Stares 2017) used in the study formed, leadership demonstrated, and introduction, individuals can make reforms launched. In most cases, a peaceful unhealthy choices—to smoke or engage in pathway results from actions taken in many unprotected sex, for instance—that threaten transition moments, rather than a single not only their health but also the health of event. However, as risks escalate—and others. This can occur even in people with especially after violence has begun— strong immune systems and favorable envi- opportunities for transition moments are ronmental conditions that facilitate healthy less frequent. As explored further below, choices. One terrorist attack by a small early monitoring of risks helps in identify- group of individuals can abruptly shift the ing potential transition moments. overall political, security, and economic trajectory of a country or a region. The Centrality of Actors Likewise, the decisive actions of particular leaders and small groups can create As noted throughout this study, the deci- incentives for peace, helping to push a soci- sions, calculations, and leadership shown ety out of a cycle of violence. Leaders can (or not) by actors ultimately determine the spearhead initiatives that can change a pathways societies take. Actors can shape pathway quickly, such as activating coali- structural factors and infl uence the way tions and invoking or shaping norms and institutions are built and reformed. values for prevention. They may provide a Understanding the central role that differ- long-term vision of a society’s peaceful ent actors play in driving confl ict is espe- future that engages a large audience. Taking cially crucial now, given the multiplicity such actions often involves risk, especially and complexity of the actors involved in for political leaders, because political capital violent confl ict today. or even survival may be at stake in the short Actors can change their behavior rela- term. As chapter 6 illustrates, in high-risk or tively abruptly. In contrast, although insti- violent situations, it most often falls to indi- tutions can sometimes change course vidual leaders to weigh and act on the inev- quickly, in most cases they take several itable political, social, economic, and years, even decades, to reform—thus chang- security trade-offs that prevention entails ing the rules of the game and the incentives and to balance the effects of other actors, for action. It may take a generation or more institutions, and structural factors. to achieve the deeper institutional transfor- It is now broadly acknowledged that mations needed to reach recognized stan- actors do not always behave “rationally”— dards of governance like civilian oversight considering all possible contingencies and of the military, anticorruption measures, or making a calculated decision based on a functioning state bureaucracy (Pritchett self-interest—as economic models would and de Weijer 2010). predict (World Bank 2015). People and In most settings, actors tend to make groups are rarely able to process all of the decisions that privilege visible benefi cial available information or to consider every impact in the short to medium term over possible contingency when making a deci- actions that may only bear fruit in the lon- sion. Actors “think automatically” rather ger term. This is often as true in contexts than deliberately (World Bank 2015). Stress with democratic systems that require a and tension limit agency further by con- periodic transfer of power between parties straining the capacity for deliberative think- as in less democratic settings where leaders ing (Mani et al. 2013; Mullainathan and often feel a strong need to maintain popu- Shafi r 2013; Narayan et al. 2000). For exam- lar support. ple, the experience of poverty can stress The actions of one individual, or a small mental resources, simply through the many group, can bring enormous, often swift, decisions that need to be made to meet

Pathways for Peace 85 basic needs—keeping children safe or In addition, these groups do not always rep- obtaining food, for example. The stress of resent the interests of the people whom poverty focuses attention on the present, they claim to represent. This is particularly making it hard to plan for the future, like evident in the emergence of criminal net- investing in education, or opening a small works operating in contexts of violence. business. This “cognitive tax”3 is exacer- Domestic actors hold the highest stake in bated in confl ict-affected environments, mitigating and preventing violent confl ict, where the threat or experience of violence even when a confl ict has global signifi cance; combines with the daily challenges of meet- possess the deepest understanding of their ing basic needs (World Bank 2015, 81). history and causes (although that under- Actors also “think socially,” that is, they standing may be deeply biased); and have are heavily infl uenced by social norms that the most legitimacy, whether formal or determine their expectations about how informal, to act (Mcloughlin 2015). External others will respond to a decision they actors can play critical and sometimes deci- make. Instead, the behavior of actors is sive roles (see chapter 7) in high-risk and shaped by their social and emotional envi- violent situations, but ultimately internal ronment (Halliday and Shaffer 2015; actors can go beyond preventing imminent Simon 1997 [1947]). In this way, social or existing violence itself to address under- norms help to shape the incentives of lying grievances or causes, including by actors because they help actors to antici- engaging international support and mobi- pate how others will behave. Expectations lizing domestic coalitions, including around of shame or loss of reputation, for example, the 2030 Agenda. can be more powerful enforcers of con- The range of domestic actors is too vast tracts than legal regulations. to treat exhaustively. Here, the chapter focuses on some of the key domestic actors Domestic Actors that matter for understanding violence and violence prevention: the state, civil society The pathway a society takes depends greatly and community organizations, and the pri- on the way actors in that society—what this vate sector. report calls “domestic actors”—cooperate or compete with one another. Domestic The State actors may be part of the state or outside it, including groups or individuals, members In most societies, the state is the central of civil society, and the private sector, and domestic actor infl uencing a society’s they may be formal, informal, or traditional pathway. While the extent of its agency leaders. Most often, the state is central and power vary vis-à-vis other actors in among them, but a constellation of actors society, the state ultimately holds respon- plays roles in various combinations at dif- sibility for many of the decisions that ferent times. shape the pathway and has the authority Domestic actors can promote a virtuous to negotiate and navigate agreements or cycle of long-term peace and development. political settlements, reform institutions, For example, community or religious and direct policy. On top of this, the state groups and nongovernmental organiza- also has the legal responsibility to imple- tions have played pivotal roles in promot- ment international treaties that it has rati- ing and sustaining peace. They can also fi ed, including in relation to human rights, push a society toward violence. As men- and international agreements such as the tioned in chapter 1, violent confl ict in 2030 Agenda and the sustaining peace res- recent years is characterized by a prolifera- olutions. The state’s role is not always pos- tion of nonstate actors such as militias, itive; history is full of examples of states rebel groups, criminal groups, violent perpetrating violence directly through extremist groups, and many others. state forces or failing to quell violence Oftentimes the stated grievances used to within their borders (Elias 1982; Tilly justify their movements evolve over time. 1985, 2003).

86 Pathways for Peace As an abstract concept, the “state” com- infl uence key state institutions.4 More prises not only the institutions that repre- authoritarian states may strike a bargain sent its more formal and “visible” structure, with society in which the state distributes but also the social interactions that create resources in exchange for limits on civil and sustain that structure. The state is not a freedoms. Others essentially contract out unitary actor, but an organization of het- the delivery of basic services to nonstate erogeneous individuals, all of whom bring actors, such as nonprofi t organizations and varying motivations, interests, and degrees external partners. of commitment to shaping the character Many states—including many in and functioning of the state. For example, fragile and confl ict-affected contexts— the bureaucrats that make up state institu- garner support and ensure their existence tions are driven by a variety of motivations, through informal patronage networks from a vocation for public service, desire to that distribute resources and privileges to advance their careers, need to provide for key constituencies (Evans 2004).5 In these their families or accumulate wealth, as well cases, political authority is diffuse and as political interests. All of these motiva- informal, rather than formalized through tions and interests are constantly negoti- state institutions (Bøås et al. 2017). The ated; they shape, and are shaped by, the relationship between these networks and institutions that result from them (Marc the state may be quite stable, as long as the et al. 2012). power balance is maintained (Brinkerhoff The state is a product of its interaction and Goldsmith 2005). Attempts to reform with society and continually evolves in the institutions will inevitably bump up against context of that relationship. Predatory states this reality and can lead to instability when prey on social groups, extracting resources the balance of power across groups is dis- with little or no compensation. States can rupted (Hameiri 2007). be captured or work in collusion with pow- Where the state has not established its erful interests that undermine peaceful presence in a convincing way, nonstate pathways. For example, some drug cartels actors often step into the breach and provide now command fi nancial fl ows that rival alternative forms of governance (box 3.3). those of national governments and heavily Most policy makers and academics now

BOX 3.3 Alternatively Governed Spaces

The concept of ungoverned spaces, never been meaningfully integrated defi ned as “areas of limited or anomalous into state-building projects. Where the government control inside otherwise state is absent or unwilling to assert functional states,” emerged out of the its presence, other actors step into policy debates following the September 11, the void. These can include a range of 2001 terrorist attacks in the United actors, from tribal leaders and elders to States (Keister 2014, 1; Nezam 2017). criminal networks, insurgent groups, and These spaces are not necessarily limited extremist groups. In a study of the Sahel to a defi ned geographic area. The region, Raleigh and Dowd (2013) argue Internet, for instance, has been described that the challenges faced by political as an ungoverned space because it offers and geographic peripheries are a result an unregulated, virtual haven and a not of too little governance but of many platform for recruiting to violent extremist overlapping forms of governance. groups (Patrick 2010). Rabasa et al. (2007) defi ne three main In reality, ungoverned spaces are not forms of alternate governance: so much ungoverned as alternatively • With contested governance, a territory governed. In many cases, they represent does not recognize the legitimacy of populations on the political or geographic the government and is loyal to another peripheries of a country that have (Box continued next page)

Pathways for Peace 87 BOX 3.3 Alternatively Governed Spaces (continued)

type of social organization such as groups (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; an identity group or insurgent Keister 2014; Nezam 2017). While movement. These groups or weak state presence is often an movements usually want to establish attractive condition for these actors, their own state. it is insufﬁ cient on its own. Criminal

• With incomplete governance, a state and extremist groups require a certain wants to project its authority over its level of infrastructure (transport and territory and provide public goods communications, in particular) as well and services for its population but as some support from local populations, lacks the competence and resources in order to operate effectively. For this to do so. Where ofﬁ cials are present, reason, weak states may be more they are often intimidated, inept, or vulnerable than failed states to these corrupt. types of networks (Menkhaus and Shapiro 2010). • With abdicated governance, the All three forms of alternative government refuses to extend its governance ultimately undermine state authority or provide security, capacity and legitimacy, even though infrastructure, and services because they may bring some stability over doing so is not cost-effective. Instead, the short term. The presence of these authority for delivering basic services spaces also offers varying degrees is ceded to subnational groups such of opportunity to integrate them into as local tribes. broader society by increasing the The chief concern has been that representation of local populations in alternatively governed spaces may the arenas where access to power, facilitate the entry and operations of resources, and security are negotiated. nonstate actors such as illicit trafﬁ cking Chapter 5 discusses these issues in networks, gangs, or violent extremist greater detail.

agree that what have often been called When these groups are able to establish “ungoverned spaces” are not actually ungov- control and set up parallel state struc- erned; rather, they are “differently governed” tures, especially when they deliver secu- by alternative authorities or nonstate rity that the state cannot, or will not, actors—traditional or customary, tribal or deliver, the state loses credibility and its clan, religious, criminal, and insurgent, capacity is undermined. When elites among others (Keister 2014; Nezam 2017). accept bribes or participate directly in These actors may provide state-like services trafficking networks, legitimacy suffers, such as security, employment, and educa- and resources that could go to deliver tion, as armed groups have done in contexts basic services are diverted (Kemp, Shaw, ranging from the Philippines to Afghanistan, and Boutellis 2013; Stearns Lawson and Jamaica, and cities in Brazil (Arias 2013; Dininio 2013). Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; Keister 2014; In general, states based on open access Sacks 2009). and contestation tend to forge more peace- Alternatively governed spaces can pres- ful pathways (North, Wallis, and Weingast ent a challenge to sustainable peace when 2009). Conversely, states that employ coer- the presence and activities of nonstate cive tactics that limit people’s agency in actors undermine state capacity and legiti- expressing identity and accessing opportu- macy (Nezam 2017). Illicit trafﬁ cking net- nities for social and economic mobility tend works are a good example. These networks to see a hardening of identities and can have a variety of relationships with the increased risk of violence (Benford and state and with society (Cockayne 2016). Snow 2000; Fearon 2010).

88 Pathways for Peace Countries experiencing fragility are cooperation among members of society often hard-pressed to act preventively. In and creates incentives for collective action. some cases, elites may discount actions Where trust is forged across groups, it can whose consequences, while grave, are not apply to society more broadly (Boix and immediate and clear, in order to ensure Posner 1996; Yamagishi and Yamagishi regime survival. In other cases, the state 1994). This ability to build bottom-up trust may lack the requisite legitimacy in the eyes gives civil society an instrumental role in of particular groups to address underlying forming coalitions for peace. risks. Capacity is another factor; states that Civil society and community-based are unable to formulate and implement actors, in particular, are central to both the policies, collect taxes, provide basic services, resolution and prevention of confl ict or ensure a minimum of security are often (Giessmann, Galvanek, and Seifert 2017). limited in the extent to which they can At the most basic level, civil society actors monitor and address risks. A particular may help to provide basic services to local effort is needed to support the capacity of communities, an important function in countries experiencing situations of fragil- maintaining stability during a crisis. Civic ity so that they can more effectively under- associations, such as neighborhood or com- take prevention policies and programs and munity organizations, often contribute to implement the 2030 Agenda, which pro- cohesion that helps to buffer against risk of vides a pathway to sustainable development violence, especially when they build rela- and peace. tionships across different social groups (Aslam 2017; Varshney 2002). Civil society Civil Society and Community- groups also play an important role in pro- Based Organizations moting social norms that discourage violence, for example, by increasing awareness Civil society actors comprise a wide range of the costs of violent confl ict and showcas- of associations and nonstate entities, ing opportunities that can come from including charities, nongovernmental orga- engagement across rival groups (Barnes nizations, community groups, faith-based 2009). organizations, trade guilds and unions, Beyond these roles, civil society organi- professional associations, and advocacy zations (CSOs) play a crucial part in medi- groups, among others (Aslam 2017; Marc ating the state-society relationship by et al. 2012). The category also includes maintaining space for dialogue and expres- informal decision-making bodies, such as sion of dissent (Marc et al. 2012). CSOs, in tribal councils or elders, that provide many many cases, play a role in holding the state of the basic services to people in transition accountable, which becomes increasingly or postconfl ict settings (UNDP 2012). important in high-risk situations, when While civil society is often seen as consist- the space for dialogue often narrows ing of organizations that may be competing (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), including for the same pool of resources, their under- to ensure that the state implements interna- lying norms and values have been assumed tional agreements such as the 2030 Agenda. to be largely shared, facilitating potential They may help to mediate confl ict directly, broad-based solidarity. With an increasing through local peace committees, or by par- multiplicity and diversity of actors engag- ticipating in national peace processes ing in the civic space, this space is also (Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew becoming a more contested domain of 2008). They can also work indirectly, by public life (Poppe and Wolff 2017). In addi- helping to shift norms and behaviors to tion, civic space has received a digital increase commitment to peace (Barnes dimension, which provides space for differ- 2009). Once violence takes hold, civil soci- ent modes of both solidarity and contesta- ety actors can help to prevent further esca- tion (Dahlgren 2015). lation (Dahl, Gates, and Nygård 2017). Over Civil society actors can promote confi - the longer term, they can help to build more dence and build trust, which encourages responsive state institutions, contributing

Pathways for Peace 89 to sustaining peaceful pathways (Dahl, fl exibility to provide jobs, services, and tax Gates, and Nygård 2017). Chapter 6 covers revenue, as well as public goods such as the experiences of civil society actors in infrastructure and enhanced environmen- shaping societies’ pathways in more detail. tal and governance standards, all of which As with all actors, the role of CSOs has shape incentives for maintaining peace. its limitations and is not uniformly posi- In addition, by supporting markets, the tive or effective. Many actors make a transi- private sector enables interaction across tion from civil society to operate in state social groups and communities that helps institutions or move to civil society after to build trust—a critical ingredient for their role in the government. These career prevention. A thriving private sector paths often facilitate better relations mitigates tensions and remedies their con- between state institutions and communi- sequences by increasing economic oppor- ties, but can also damage the perception of tunity and helping to address exclusion independence. Where CSOs are insuffi - (IFC 2018). ciently independent or represent narrow Both large corporations and small and interest groups, they can cause more harm medium enterprises may play crucial roles than good in the absence of appropriate in prevention. Small fi rms provide ser- countervailing forces. vices and jobs to the local population, CSOs can also contribute to division including the most marginalized. Small when they exclude other groups, either and medium enterprises can be collec- unintentionally or by design. CSOs can use tively powerful in shaping peace incen- their grassroots appeal and convening tives by contributing to social and power as a way to mobilize for violence economic interactions and attracting and against other groups. For instance, before making investments that are conducive to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, CSOs includ- peace. They play an important role as ing the Hutu Power groups excluded parts fl exible, adaptable entities. Large domes- of the population and tended not to cross tic and multinational fi rms can act as a group divides, and some community orga- major force for peace too. Leadership nizations were active in the genocide (Aslam from businesses—setting examples of 2017; Human Rights Watch 1999; UN conduct, developing standards, negotiat- General Assembly and UN Security Council ing concessions, and consolidating inter- 1999). By building intergroup cohesion and national partnerships—can go a long way “perverse social capital” that isolates them toward mitigating tensions. Global com- from other social groups, CSOs can also panies, for example, have made positive work to counter positive social goals contributions to stability and peace (Posner 2004). This methodology is present around problems such as confl ict miner- in groups as diverse as urban gangs, para- als or oil spills, by developing new rules military organizations, and student associa- and investing in social programs. tions that became the fi rst vigilante groups The leadership potential of private fi rms active during the 2002 confl ict in Côte is exemplifi ed by private companies’ direct d’Ivoire (Sany 2010). participation in peacebuilding processes, refl ecting their understanding that a stable Private Sector Actors operating environment is essential for a prosperous business community. This has Private enterprises have been an integral been seen in many contexts, such as in Kenya, part of society for millennia and play an where the Kenya Private Sector Alliance, important role in shaping peaceful path- together with other civil society groups, ways. The private sector is a primary swiftly mobilized to help end election-related source of livelihoods for the majority of violence in 2007–08 and worked to prevent a the population today as well as an import- recurrence of violence during the 2013 gen- ant avenue by which to foster inclusion eral elections (Goldstein and Rotich 2008). and social cohesion. Private enterprises, Some of these experiences are described in both formal and informal, have the more detail in chapter 6.

90 Pathways for Peace However, the role of the private sector, stands to aggravate local tensions uninten- like that of all other actors, is nuanced and tionally by disproportionally employing not uniformly positive. Just as private sector staff from one community or another, pro- actors can help shape peaceful pathways, viding revenue or capacity that can later be they can also contribute to and benefi t from deployed in confl icts. Businesses can also violent confl ict (Peschka 2011). When con- actively engage to stabilize the environment fl ict starts, individual companies or groups in high-risk contexts. To that end, the for- of companies may seek to profi t from the mer UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon opportunities that confl ict provides, for launched the United Nations Global instance, by traffi cking or trading in weap- Compact “Business for Peace” platform, ons and other goods with various armed which boosts the participation of the pri- factions (Comolli 2017). In some cases, private sector in support of peace and supports vate companies have become embroiled local actors to adopt responsible business directly in confl ict by supporting trade in practices (UN Global Compact 2017). The minerals that may be traffi cked by armed UN Global Compact’s “Guidance on groups (Campbell 2002; Rettberg 2015). Responsible Business and in Confl ict- Corporations can also contribute to griev- Affected and High-Risk Areas” (UN Global ances and tensions through land grabs for Compact 2010) helps companies to operate agriculture, extractives, or commercial in challenging contexts and seeks to aid projects, while large-scale mining compa- their operations to contribute positively to nies have fed into confl icts in Bougainville peace and development. and Samoa. The proliferation of private security companies and private military International Actors fi rms in recent decades has also raised questions of confl icts of interest, as in some While domestic actors drive change on the cases these fi rms have contributed to under- ground, international actors have a strong mining state capacity to control violence role to play, primarily in helping to shape and citizen trust in state law enforcement the incentives and actions of national (Singer 2010). In Papua New Guinea, for actors. International actors include national example, the private security sector has governments external to the confl ict, grown to be larger than the state law regional organizations, the private sector,6 enforcement forces, supplanting the state’s and the multilateral system of political, monopoly on violence (Lakhani and security, and development institutions. Willman 2014). Their actions can be decisive, especially The interaction of businesses with where domestic actors are too fractured, other actors in a given institutional con- inclined by their own interests or history, or text determines to a large extent their incapable of acting. The most constructive impact on confl ict dynamics. For this rea- external role has usually been to create son, transparency, on the one hand, and space and, in some cases, safety nets—fi scal accountability, on the other hand, are crit- and economic, security, human and social ical for fostering a positive contribution of capacity, or political—into which domestic the private actors to peace; these issues are actors can step forward and direct their elaborated in chapter 6. society on a peaceful pathway. International Voluntary standards play a similarly crit- actors can also play a role in setting and ical role in that respect. Confl ict-sensitive enforcing norms and supporting the imple- business practices have gathered momen- mentation of international treaties and tum as a way for private companies to agreements, including the 2030 Agenda. carry out their activities with a commit- The very presence of international actors ment to do-no-harm principles (UN has an infl uence on the pathway a society Global Compact 2017). Operating in a takes. In the more extreme cases, interna- confl ict-sensitive manner is a preventive tional actors manipulate violence to further strategy deeply rooted in understanding the their own interests. Chapter 1 describes the local context. Lack of such understanding growing trend of internationalization of

Pathways for Peace 91 confl icts, as outside states fi nance or send toward certain actors. Chapter 7 discusses military support for proxy wars in other these experiences in more detail. countries. International organizations face particu- In other cases, international actors con- lar constraints in supporting national actors tribute indirectly to the forces pushing for violent confl ict prevention, but nonethe- toward violence, by failing to understand less have found effective means to do so in their own role in confl ict dynamics. some cases, working in concert with regional International actors bring their own expec- partners. Following on the principle of state tations and ideas of what domestic action sovereignty, as enshrined in the mandates should look like, which are in turn shaped and procedural rules of international orga- by their individual experiences and back- nizations, international actors require an grounds. It can be diffi cult for international interlocutor at the national level in order to actors to “see” domestic institutions and operate in any environment. This is almost relationships, especially if they are cultur- always the national government. In turn, ally and socially different from their own. national governments may depend on inter- This tension between formal struc- national actors to supply the resources and tures, which are often more visible and in some cases technical capacity to ensure understood by international actors, and the regime survival. This support can take many (usually) informal institutions and norms forms, including strengthening the security that govern daily life for much of society apparatus or targeted delivery of public ser- infl uences every aspect of the involvement vices to certain constituencies on which the of international actors: from who gets regime depends. invited to the table for decision making to The terms of this mutually dependent the information international actors receive relationship represent constraints on the and how international support is priori- agency of both parties, to differing degrees tized and directed. International actors can (Barnett and Zurcher 2010; Bøås et al. 2017). help to neutralize the impact of their pres- National governments encounter limits on ence by being aware of the biases they bring the degree to which they can maintain stabil- and the makeup of the society they are enter- ity through coercion and repression, lest they ing (Barron, Woolcock, and Diprose 2011). risk losing the external fi nancial or military In recent years, regional organizations support that allows them to sustain power. have emerged as important international Additionally, they must balance the demands actors for peacebuilding. Regional actors of the constituencies that keep them in power have provided channels for navigating the with the requirements for international effects of systemic risks such as broader support. This dual accountability represents political and economic trends and global a critical dilemma for many states, especially issues such as trade, climate change, trans- when the nature of the demands makes it national crime or terrorism, or natural impossible to satisfy expectations from both disasters. They also are taking more active international and domestic consistencies roles in confl ict mitigation and prevention. simultaneously (Englebert and Tüll 2008; Regional actors are likely to have deeper Ghani and Lockhart 2008). interests in the outcomes, to have greater In turn, international actors’ reliance on understanding of and interest in regional states as interlocutors for confl ict preven- stability, and therefore to be seen as more tion limits their room for maneuver, since legitimate mediators or conveners than their presence depends on the discretion of multilateral actors. Countries at risk of vio- national governments. Any support they lent confl ict also are often more receptive to provide happens relative to the state’s rela- talking to neighbors and governments from tionship with the constituencies that main- the same region. However, regional actors tain it. Thus, international actors are often are not without challenges. Regional orga- constrained in the degree to which they can nizations’ mandates, capacity, and resources engage nonstate actors who may be strong do not always match the demand for their infl uences on the pathway. In cases where support, or they may be perceived as partial states derive support and legitimacy from

92 Pathways for Peace BOX 3.4 The Interface of Violent Conflict with Exogenous Dimensions of Risk

The experience of the Syrian Arab collapsed. In 2008, during the driest winter Republic helps to illustrate how a shock in the country’s recorded history, wheat can contribute to more intense disruption production failed and almost all the livestock when other risks are present. Recent was lost. Food prices more than doubled studies have looked at the intersection of between 2007 and 2008. Unable to afford risks related to climate change and violent food, the population in the northeast confl ict (Schleussner et al. 2016; von provinces of Syria experienced a dramatic Uexkulla et al. 2016). Some authors have increase in nutrition-related diseases, and drawn a relation between the drought in school enrollment dropped by 80 percent Syria and the beginning of the uprising. in some areas. It is claimed that as many as Beginning in 2005 and intensifying 1.5 million people were internally displaced through the winter of 2006–07, the in Syria as a result of the drought. Fertile Crescent region witnessed the Along with many Iraqi refugees worst drought in its recorded history fl eeing from the war across the border, (Kelleya et al. 2015). There is very strong the population gravitated to peripheral evidence that the drought resulted from urban areas. By 2010, 20 percent of anthropogenic climate change. The Syria’s urban population was composed drought, which lasted more than fi ve of internally displaced persons and Iraqi years with peak intensity during the fi rst refugees. Bereft of options other than three, was an extreme event; however, illegal settlement and confronted by a longer-term trends toward warming, combination of overcrowding, an absence reduction of soil moisture, and decreases of access to basic services, and rampant in precipitation in the Fertile Crescent crime, these peripheral urban areas are also consistent with climate change became the locus of grievances against dynamics in the region. the state. Dissatisfaction focused on the The drought affected Syria with lack of decisive action on the part of the particular intensity. Agriculture in the Syrian government to address the food northeastern region of Syria—the crisis (Lynch 2016). It was also in these breadbasket of the country, producing poor, urban areas that Syria witnessed its two-thirds of its total cereal output— fi rst demonstrations of the Arab Spring.

Sources: Kelleya et al. 2015; Lynch 2016; Pearlman 2013; Schleussner et al. 2016; von Uexkulla et al. 2016.

patronage systems that distribute favors and opportunities. The concept of risk has been privileges to informal networks of elites well developed in the fi elds of disaster risk rather than from formal institutions, inter- management and fi nance. It is generally national support may simply maintain these understood as the probability of an event systems at the expense of broader institu- combined with the severity of its impact if tional reform. In the process, international it does occur (Hammond and Hyslop 2017, actors frequently opt for reinforcing these 17–18; UN General Assembly 2016b). Risk networks—especially when the state main- is mediated by the capacity to manage it. tains them with minimal repression—over A central premise of the World Development pressuring for the long-term reforms Report 2011 is that the capacity of institu- needed to ensure greater inclusion. tions provides the necessary buffer for soci- Chapter 6 explores this dilemma further. eties to manage risk and navigate confl ict without violence (World Bank 2011). Understanding Risk Sometimes, risks can be relatively isolated. More often than not, however, risks and Opportunity are multidimensional and interconnected Different points along the pathways (box 3.4)— that is, they interact with other exhibit varying degrees of risk and present risks, which can increase not only the

Pathways for Peace 93 probability of their occurrence, but also consequences of some kind (Hammond their impact if they do occur (Hammond and Hyslop 2017). A shock may occur sud- and Hyslop 2017; OECD 2016). A drought denly, in the form of a price spike, for can exacerbate food insecurity, which by example, or could unfold over time, such itself may be manageable. However, if the as a drought. risk posed by the drought combines with Most of the time, capable institutions other risks—loss of livelihoods, perceived weather shocks and a society stays on a discrimination in the state response, or the peaceful path. However, in situations presence of armed groups who can mobilize where risk is already high or multiple risks grievances—the overall risk of violence are present, shocks can act as triggers by increases. The more risks are present or the causing a particular effect, such as violence. more intense the risks are, the more they In these cases, the presence of multiple can strain the capacity of a society to risks—or very intense risks—and a sudden respond effectively. shock overwhelms the capacity to manage All along the pathways, societies expe- them and triggers violence (box 3.5). For rience shocks of different types. A shock is example, rainfall variability in certain a neutral event. It can be understood sim- climates may pose little risk by itself, but ply as a change in the world that brings when it coincides with other risks,

BOX 3.5 Economic Shocks and Violent Conflict

If not mitigated effectively, economic especially capital-intensive products shocks can act as triggers for violence, such as extractives, sparks violence especially in settings that are already at because the benefi ts of the increase high risk. Studies examining the can be more easily appropriated (Bazzi relationship between economic shocks and Blattman 2014). Calì and Mulabdic and violent confl ict yield mixed fi ndings. (2017) fi nd support for this theory, as Min et al. (2017) reviewed data for 161 violence in their sample is more likely countries during the 1995–2015 period to be associated with increases in the and found a signifi cant relationship price of natural resource exports. Others between economic downturns and the have argued that whether increased onset of confl ict. Similarly, in a study of rents provide incentive for violence 44 countries in Africa, Aguirre (2016) depends on the extent to which the found that commodity price shocks had state can control access to them (the a signifi cant effect on the onset of “state-deterrence theory”). If the state confl ict. Similarly, Calì and Mulabdic exerts control over resources, a price (2017), in a study of developing rise generates increased tax revenue, countries between 1960 and 2010, whereas if state control is weak, nonstate found that an increase in a country’s armed groups have greater incentive export prices increased the risk of to appropriate resources (Dube and intrastate confl ict. However, Bazzi and Vargas 2013; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Blattman (2014), in a global, longitudinal According to the “opportunity cost” study of all low- and middle-income theory, economic shocks lower the risk of countries from 1957 to 2007, found that confl ict by increasing the opportunity cost price shocks—even intense shocks in of participating in violence (Collier and high-risk countries—had no signifi cant Hoeffl er 2004; Dal Bo and Dal Bo 2011). effect on outbreak of confl ict, but did This is especially the case with changes have a mild, negative impact in countries in the price of agricultural products, which where violent confl ict was ongoing. are more labor-intensive. For example, Three main theories guide the in Colombia, falling coffee prices were literature in this area. The “rapacity associated with increased violence in effect” theory posits that a sharp regions producing more coffee, while increase in the price of exports, increasing oil prices coincided with higher (Box continued next page)

94 Pathways for Peace BOX 3.5 Economic Shocks and Violent Conflict (continued)

levels of violence in municipalities where In some cases, economic shocks put landowners sought to appropriate oil increased pressure on governments to rents (Dube and Vargas 2013). make up for lost resources. The state Economic shocks are more likely may struggle to pay civil servants or to trigger violence when they are not security forces or may need to make accompanied by mitigation measures. fi scal adjustments by slashing subsidies, For example, Calì and Mulabdic (2017) which can cause a rapid increase in the fi nd that countries with strong trading price of basic goods. Accordingly, cuts relationships with neighbor countries in subsidies can be accompanied by a are less likely to experience violence properly considered and communicated associated with price shocks. These safety net program to buffer the benefi ts can be enhanced when impacts. Additionally, special provisions accompanied by measures to facilitate or protections may be needed for trade across borders, such as easing vulnerable groups, such as internally logistics or reducing transaction costs. displaced people or minority groups.

it can undermine the ability of institutions of trade, and sudden and heavy fl ows of refu- to cope. A study of the relationship between gees across borders, among others (Min et al. rainfall and civil confl ict in 41 African 2017; World Bank 2011). These risks are more countries between 1981 and 1999 con- likely to overwhelm the capacity to mitigate cludes that civil confl ict is more likely to them when other endogenous risks are pres- occur following years of poor rainfall ent. In Central Africa, armed groups have (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004). If exploited areas of weak governance to set up shocks occur when confl ict is already bases, recruit new members, and take advan- under way, they can exacerbate or prolong tage of looting opportunities (Raleigh et al. it (Bazzi and Blattman 2014). 2010). Likewise, extremist groups have often The risks that societies face along their exploited the existence of internal divisions pathways can be exogenous or endogenous. between identity groups and the lack of con- Some exogenous risks arise from the sys- sistent or credible state presence to gain terri- temic trends detailed in chapter 2, including tory and support from local populations climate change, advancements in informa- (ICG 2016). As another example, interna- tion and communication technology (ICT), tional illicit traffi cking networks often capital- demographic shifts, or the increase in illicit ize on internal instability, buying off elites or traffi cking. While these risks may originate offering fi nancing to armed groups in outside national borders, they exert power- exchange for the freedom to operate with ful impacts on national dynamics. impunity (Comolli 2017). As noted in chapter 1, a key exogenous Institutional capacity can mitigate the risk is that an increasing number of con- impact of exogenous risks. For example, in fl icts are internationalized, involving the Nicaragua, security reforms and relatively direct assistance of an external state actor. inclusive institutions built during the war In these situations, the knowledge that out- and postwar period have been credited with side actors can, or might, intervene at any stemming the infl uence of international time infl uences the incentives of domestic drug traffi cking networks in that country actors to commit to peace or to disrupt sta- compared with its neighbors (Cruz 2011).7 bility (World Bank 2011). As another example, Calì and Mulabdic Spillover effects of confl ict from neighbor- (2017) show that price shocks are less likely ing countries pose additional risks, including to coincide with violence when the country direct incursions from armed groups, enjoys strong trade relationships with neigh- increased availability of arms, disruption boring countries. This effect is enhanced

Pathways for Peace 95 when governments take measures to facili- of confl ict recurrence in 15 countries, identi- tate trade—for example, by easing tariffs or fying exclusionary policies and behavior as logistics costs—and when trade policy is the most important causal factor in 11 cases informed by analysis of the distribution of and chronic exclusion as important in 2 of gains and losses across society, with specifi c the 15, concluding that exclusion is the “con- focus on whether trade exacerbates existing sistently most important” factor in violence societal cleavages. relapse. Hegre et al. (2016) examined data Endogenous risks to peaceful pathways from all countries between 1960 and 2013, tend to emanate from relationships among drawing on the UCDP data set and on a set actors and often involve the state in some of fi ve scenarios for policy choices drawn way. Perhaps not surprising, grievances from the Shared Socio-Economic Pathways tend to arise in arenas where access to initiative (O’Neill et al. 2014), predicting that power, resources, and security is negotiated. countries with higher levels of inequality Chapter 5 includes a rich discussion of face greater challenges in mitigating the risk these arenas and the risks and opportunities of confl ict as well as those associated with present in them. climate change. Similarly, Min et al. (2017) Some of the most powerful endogenous fi nd that countries with policies to increase risks relate to social, economic, and political the participation of previously excluded exclusion of different social groups (box 3.6). groups, to infl uence government policy, and Exclusionary systems that are perceived to to increase political engagement during eco- privilege some groups at the expense of nomic downturns experience less confl ict. others8 create fertile ground for violence. These fi ndings build on prior work by This is underscored by a growing body of lit- Fearon (2010) and Fearon and Laitin (2013) erature arguing that policies promoting emphasizing the importance of inclusive inclusion are a source of stability and legiti- governance to mitigating the risk of confl ict. macy (Barnett 2006; Brinkerhoff 2007; Call Gender inclusion, in particular, shows a 2008; Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur robust, empirical relationship with peace, 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Ghani and Lockhart from the local to the international level 2008; Keating and Knight 2004; Stewart et al. (Caprioli and Tumbore 2003; Caprioli et al. 2006). 2007; Herbert 2017; Hudson et al. 2009). Cross-country studies consistently iden- Governments of countries with more equi- tify policies to promote inclusion as a key table gender relations, as measured by levels factor reducing the risk of violence. Collier of violence against women, labor market and Hoeffl er (2004) fi nd that stronger eco- participation, and income disparities, for nomic performance has a pacifying effect on example, are signifi cantly less likely to initi- countries by creating greater economic inter- ate interstate confl ict or escalate civil con- dependence across groups. Call (2012, 99) fl ict (Hudson et al. 2012). In contrast, applied mixed methods to study the causes countries with higher levels of gender

BOX 3.6 Inclusion and Risk

Inclusion defi es easy measurement. This drawing on the work of Stewart (2000, study follows the World Bank’s defi nition 2002, 2009), which notes that the more of inclusion as “the process of improving rigid identities are in a society, the harder the ability, opportunity, and dignity of it is for an individual to move across iden- people, disadvantaged on the basis of their tity groups and the greater the chance for identity, to take part in society” (World group-based discrimination and thus for Bank 2013, 7). This defi nition privileges grievances to accumulate. This subject is identity as the source of discrimination, explored further in chapter 4.

96 Pathways for Peace inequality are associated not only with ethnic identity (Parks, Colletta, and increased risk of international or civil war, Oppenheim 2013). but also with higher levels of violence in Exclusion along center-periphery lines confl ict (Caprioli and Boyer 2001). not only fuels confl ict with the state, but Inclusion of youth also strongly affects also creates fertile ground for other forms a society’s pathway. Societies that offer of violence to emerge and escalate, includ- youth opportunities to participate in the ing localized intercommunal and intra-elite political and economic realms and routes violence. In some cases, center-periphery for social mobility tend to experience less confl icts have become interlinked with violence (Idris 2016; Paasonen and Urdal cross-border violence and large-scale inter- 2016). With the youth population increas- nationalized confl icts as well (Colletta and ing globally, the ability to harness the Oppenheim 2017; Parks, Colletta, and energy and potential of youth presents a Oppenheim 2013). strong opportunity to realize a “demo- Many peripheral regions fall into the cat- graphic dividend” (UN Security Council egory of “alternatively governed spaces” as 2016b). This topic is explored in depth in discussed in box 3.3. In these cases, integra- chapter 4. tion efforts can exacerbate instability if they Other forms of exclusion that heighten disturb the existing power balances between the risk of confl ict relate to relationships the vested interests in peripheral regions between central states and populations (Keister 2014). located on geographic or political peripheries within a state. Subnational confl icts of Prevention and Sustaining this nature are on the rise in various regions, Peace: Building Peaceful especially Asia, Europe, and the Middle East Pathways as well as Sub-Saharan Africa (Colletta and Oppenheim 2017; Parks, Colletta, and Understanding the pathways and the ways Oppenheim 2013). These confl icts tend to in which risk and opportunity manifest revolve around center-periphery tensions, along them helps to better defi ne prevention. with a subregion opposing a state-building At its core, prevention is the process of project or responding to exclusion from infl uencing systems so that it is easier for political and economic systems. They are actors to forge a pathway toward peace, by increasingly common in middle-income reinforcing the elements of the system pull- countries (World Bank 2016). ing toward peace and mitigating the ele- Center-periphery tensions tend to be ments that push it toward violent confl ict. rooted in historical patterns of exclusion This proactive approach is in line with the and are therefore heavily entrenched in 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development state institutions. For a variety of reasons, and the UN sustaining peace resolutions. states often deem the costs of integrating Consistent with the framework of the World peripheral regions via improved infrastruc- Development Report 2017, prevention ture or services to be too high for the poten- requires a rethinking of the process in which tial benefi ts it could bring (Keister 2014). state and nonstate actors make decisions Some peripheral regions continue to receive and negotiate different outcomes to create minimal investment as part of colonial leg- the mechanisms needed for them to com- acies of neglect of certain areas that were mit, cooperate, and coordinate along peace- previously buffer zones between rival ful pathways (World Bank 2017). powers. In many cases, populations in Effective prevention requires a delicate peripheral areas are minorities with strong, balancing of efforts to address risks that separate cultural identities, who were forci- may provoke crises in the short term, while bly incorporated into national structures maintaining the necessary attention to during moments of state consolidation. In deeper structural and institutional risks. these cases, populations may resist efforts Many times, immediate measures are by the state to forge a national identity or to needed to manage shocks or alter the calcu- consolidate power as existential threats to lus of actors—a cease-fi re, an elite bargain,

Pathways for Peace 97 or sanctions to prevent violence from esca- have sent strong messages of change by lating. The challenge for all societies is to announcing power-sharing arrangements monitor and mitigate these risks, while not or nominating a member of an opposition losing sight of the sustained investments in party to the governing administration, institutional reform and addressing the adopting reforms that equalize spending underlying risks, especially those associated across geographic regions, or launching with inequalities and exclusion. These new grievance-redress mechanisms (World underlying risks are taken up in more detail Bank 2011). Chapter 5 develops this argu- in chapter 4. ment in more detail. Addressing underlying risks and Third, actions that infl uence short-term enhancing the capacity to mitigate shocks decisions by actors are a very important entail tackling institutional reform. Risk part of a prevention strategy. Decisions by and opportunity tend to accumulate in actors alter incentive structures. Mediation critical spaces, which this study calls arenas efforts can immediately infl uence the calcu- of contestation, where access to power, lus of armed actors, encouraging them to resources, services, and security are deter- commit to a cease-fi re or peace settlement, mined. Institutional reform is the entry for example. These are especially important point for addressing risk in the arenas; this in conveying a change in direction in situa- issue is discussed in detail in chapter 5. As tions where violence has already escalated chapter 6 explains, all countries that sig- and addressing the short-term incentives nifi cantly reduced violent confl ict eventu- for violence during a crisis. Promoting ally undertook institutional reform to peaceful narratives can also play a big role manage risk. in creating incentives for peace, as chapter 4 Drawing on the framework presented explains. Chapter 6 explores how domestic here, fi ve key implications are evident: actors have mobilized incentives for First, prevention entails promoting peacebuilding. favorable structural conditions, where pos- Fourth, shaping incentives for peace also sible, by fostering a social and political envi- requires a strong focus on arenas where ronment where the deeper drivers of access to power, resources, and security are confl ict can be addressed (Giessmann, contested. These arenas defi ne who has Galvanek, and Seifert 2017). As chapter 4 access to political power and representa- argues, many of today’s confl icts are rooted tion, natural resources (in particular, land in perceptions of exclusion related to and extractives), security and justice, and inequalities across groups. Addressing these basic services. Because existing power and the narratives that often form around dynamics determine access to these arenas, them is critical. The 2030 Agenda provides a prevention means making the arenas more framework for addressing some of these inclusive, particularly to groups that have issues. traditionally been left out of decision- Second, prevention means shaping making processes, especially women and incentives for peace. This can happen both youth. However, as chapter 5 notes, reform through institutions, as they change their in the arenas is often fraught with setbacks rules and policies, and through key deci- and backlashes, as groups who hold power sions by infl uential actors. As noted earlier, do not often relinquish it easily. broad institutional changes often take Fifth, systemic prevention is very years, if not decades. That said, sometimes important. In today’s globalized world, measures that signal bigger changes can systemic trends like climate change, send powerful messages to the population demographic shifts, advancements in and infl uence the behavior of actors ICT, and the rise of transnational criminal quickly, even if the reforms take much lon- networks present risks and opportunities ger to take full effect. Domestic institu- that must be managed carefully. It is nections play a central role here, both in essary to energize global coalitions to mitigating confl ict and in sanctioning vio- tackle systemic risks and take advantage lent behavior. For example, governments of the opportunities posed by today’s

98 Pathways for Peace global trends. This subject is discussed potentially, the creation of new ones are further in chapter 8. needed to bolster resilience against risk of violence. Institutional safeguards can Scenarios for Pathways to enable the monitoring of grievances and Peace or Violence their potential for mobilization as well as efforts to address violence and norms that Effective prevention has a strong tempo- tolerate it, especially against at-risk ral dimension. Not everything can—or groups, such as women, children, and should—be done at once. Rather, the scale minorities. However, prevention may be and nature of prevention changes along a more diffi cult to sell politically because society’s pathway. Prevention requires fl exi- actors see the payoffs as relatively low. bility, adaptability, and a good sense of the Among the international actors, devel- right timing and sequencing. Prevention opment actors have the widest space to also relies on systematic monitoring of risks maneuver in environments with emerging and their potential interactions, in order to risks because the security situation has not address underlying and emerging risks and deteriorated to the extent that it limits preempt and manage shocks. their activities. To address underlying and Every decision point along the pathway emerging risk, indicators of confl ict risk presents trade-offs that must be managed can be embedded within broader moni- carefully. For example, stability and a cease- toring of macroeconomic trends, paying fi re today can open the space for movement special attention to countries with struc- toward a sustainable peace in the future. tural factors associated with risk of vio- Likewise, short-term crisis prevention to lence, such as high dependence on aid or avert violence may postpone, or even natural resources. In these moments, undermine, efforts to make the structural confl ict-sensitive development policies changes for sustained peace. Long-term will have the most impact in mitigating efforts to develop institutions and mecha- the risk of violence. International political nisms that will systematically address previ- and security actors have a smaller presence ously identifi ed social, economic, and in these environments. political factors contributing to confl ict and In high-risk contexts, risks have intensi- create resilience toward outbreaks of collec- fi ed or compounded to the point that they tive violence should be done in parallel with are picked up by early warning systems. For identifying and providing timely response domestic actors, the incentives for violence to emerging risks. Ideally, prevention efforts are tangible, and the opportunity costs for represent a continuum of mutually rein- engaging in violence are decreasing. forcing actions, from early monitoring and Meanwhile, the incentives to reverse course action on risks, to consistent strengthening are less evident, contributing to an overall of social resilience to invest in peace for environment of uncertainty. In these situa- future generations. tions, a failure to prevent violence can lead In environments of emerging risks, the to permanent losses in social and economic greatest number of options are still on the development. This is where diplomatic table, and medium- to long-term policies efforts and local-level mediation are central, can have an important impact. For domes- but development action can also play a tic actors, dealing with underlying and strong role by signaling willingness by the emerging risks entails development plan- state to change its stance and restore confi - ning that will address structural imbal- dence among the population. Do-no-harm, ances contributing to social polarization confl ict-sensitive approaches take on and establishing inclusive systems of risk greater salience in these situations. assessment and response. The 2030 In contexts of open violence, preventing Agenda provides multiple entry points to escalation of violence takes priority. In address several risks. To ensure sustain- many cases, efforts are focused on mitigat- ability of these efforts, the reform of existing the impact of violence on civilians, the ing legislation and institutions and, economy, and state institutions—once a

Pathways for Peace 99 state has collapsed or atrocities have been entry points. The organizing framework committed, violence is often irreversible presented here helps to defi ne how societies in the short term. In these situations, shape unique pathways toward different development actors often halt or cease outcomes as they manage the forces push- operations in high-risk areas; yet, main- ing for peace or violence. The pathway is taining development projects is critical for formed by the decisions of actors, who buffering populations against the risk of respond to the structural factors and incen- violence. In these moments, it is critical tives present in society. for development actors to identify ways to Within this framework, prevention is a work through local partners and to process of building systems where actors are employ more fl exible delivery systems, in more likely to choose peaceful pathways, by order to ensure a minimum of basic ser- taking advantage of favorable structural vice delivery. factors or mitigating the impacts of unfa- Finally, in contexts where violence is vorable ones, building incentive structures halted, preventing recurrence is paramount. that encourage peace, and containing vio- This is the time where the window of lence when it does occur. The longer and opportunity reopens, providing some space more intentionally a society has built a path for structural factors to be addressed and toward peace, the higher the probability institutions to be rebuilt. However, the that it will stay on that path. The scope and forces of path dependence remain strong. nature of possible actions changes along the During this time, it is essential to restore pathway, in response to the risks and trust and confi dence by rebuilding the core opportunities that are present at different functions of the state. Often, reforms are moments. needed in arenas of contestation where con- Drawing on this understanding of vio- fl ict has played out (for example, land or lence, prevention of violence, and risk, the security sector reform). Attention needs to study turns next to a deeper discussion of be given to addressing the grievances of some of the factors and processes that often particular groups, especially those mobi- push actors toward violence. In particular, lized during the confl ict, including former understanding the relationships among combatants, as well as to the processes of groups in a society and their perceptions of accountability and reconciliation, including whether they are treated fairly is key to the prosecution of war crimes. Taking on understanding the risk of violence. Chapter illicit economies that can fuel the resur- 4 looks deeply at what makes people fi ght gence of confl ict is also essential, though and the importance of exclusion, inequality, more likely to be effective through global and perceptions of unfairness. coalitions. Preventing recurrence in conflict- Notes affected environments requires sustained attention and resources from interna- 1. See UN General Assembly (2015, 2016a) and tional actors, because conflict has, in most UN Security Council (2016a). cases, overwhelmed the capacity and 2. Comparing the historical periods of pre- legitimacy of many domestic actors to and post-1945, Fearon and Laitin (2013) take the actions needed to address conflict fi nd that the experience of an “extra-state” drivers. Preventing recurrence is where (imperial or colonial) war pre-1945 is asso- special financing facilities can have an ciated with an increase in the occurrence of important impact. intrastate war in later years. Intrastate war pre-1945 was not associated with violent Conclusion confl ict after 1945. 3. A cognitive tax is a metaphor for stresses Investing in prevention of violent confl ict that compromise mental resources. requires a long-term view of how violent 4. On Latin America, see Briscoe, Perdomo, confl ict emerges and evolves in societies in and Burcher (2014); on Afghanistan, see order to identify and act on appropriate Felbab-Brown (2017).

100 Pathways for Peace 5. In Peter Evans’ formulation, “informal and Local Confl ict Dynamics in Indonesia. structures of power and practice render the New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. formal structures ineffectual” (Evans 2004). Bazzi, S., and C. Blattman. 2014. “Economic 6. For sake of convenience, international pri- Shocks and Confl ict: Evidence from vate sector actors are discussed together with Commodity Prices.” American Economic domestic private sector actors in the “private Journal: Macroeconomics 6 (4): 1–38. sector” section of this chapter. Benford, R. D., and D. A. Snow. 2000. “Framing 7. Drug fl ows have increased through Nicaragua Processes and Social Movements: An in recent years, calling the long-term sustain- Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of ability of this situation into question. Sociology 26 (August): 611–39. 8. Galtung (1969) defi nes these conditions as Blattman, C., and E. Miguel. 2010. “Civil War.” “structural violence.” Journal of Economic Literature 48 (1): 3–57. Bøås, M. 2015. The Politics of Confl ict Economies: References Miners, Merchants and Warriors in the African Borderland. New York: Routledge. Aguirre, A. 2016. “Fiscal Policy and Civil Bøås, M., S. S. Eriksen, T. Gade, J. H. S. Lie, and Confl ict in Africa.” Paper prepared as part O. J. Sending. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention and of the World Bank Regional Study, Africa’s Ownership: Limits and Opportunities for Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities, World Bank, External Actors.” Background paper for the Washington, DC. http://alvaroaguirre United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, . weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/9/13298570/pf Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to _confl ict.pdf. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Anderlini, S. N. 2007. Women Building Peace: Washington, DC. What They Do; Why It Matters. Boulder, CO: Boix, C., and D. Posner. 1996. “Making Social Lynne Rienner. Capital Work: A Review of Robert Putnam’s Antil, A. 2011. “Mali et Mauritanie, pays sahéliens ‘Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions fragiles et Etats résilients.” Revue Politique in Modern Italy.’” Weatherhead Center for Etrangère 2011/1 (Spring): 59. https://www International Affairs, Harvard University, .cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2011- Cambridge, MA. https://wcfi a.harvard.edu 1-page-59.htm. / publications/making-social-capital-work Arias, E. D. 2013. “The Impacts of Differential -review-robert-putnams-making-democracy Armed Dominance of Politics in Rio de -work-civic. Janeiro, Brazil.” Studies in Comparative Boudet, A. M. M., P. Petesch, C. Turk, and International Development 48 (3): 263–84. A. Thumala. 2012. On Norms and Agency Aslam, G. 2017. “Civic Associations and Conversations about Gender Equality with Confl ict Prevention: Potential, Challenges, Women and Men in 20 Countries. Washington, and Opportunities—A Review of the DC: World Bank. Literature.” Background paper for the Brinkerhoff, D. W. 2007. Capacity Development United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, in Fragile States. European Centre for Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Development Policy Management, Maastricht. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, ———. 2011. “State Fragility and Governance: Washington, DC. Confl ict Mitigation and Subnational Barnes, C. 2009. “Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Perspectives.” Development Policy Review Mapping Functions in Working for Peace.” 29 (2): 131–53. International Spectator 44 (1): 131–47. Brinkerhoff, D., and A. Goldsmith. 2005. Barnett, M. 2006. “Building a Republican Peace: “Institutional Dualism and International Stabilizing States after War.” International Development. A Revisionist Interpretation of Security 30 (4): 87–112. Good Governance.” Administration and Barnett, M., and C. Zurcher. 2010. “The Society 37 (2): 199–224. Peacebuilder’s Contract.” In The Dilemmas of Briscoe, I., C. Perdomo, and C. U. Burcher, eds. Statebuilding, edited by R. Paris and T. Sisk, 2014. Illicit Networks and Politics in Latin 23–52. London: Routledge. America. Stockholm: International IDEA; Barron, P., M. Woolcock, and R. Diprose. 2011. The Hague: Clingendael Institute; and The Contesting Development: Participatory Projects Hague: Netherlands Institute for Multiparty

Pathways for Peace 101 Democracy. https://www.idea.int/sites/default Development Policy. Washington, DC: World /files /publications/illicit-networks-and Bank and Oxford University Press. - politics-in-latin -america.pdf. Collier, P., and A. Hoeffl er. 2004. “Greed and Calì, M., and A. Mulabdic. 2017. “Trade and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Civil Confl ict: Revisiting the Cross-Country Papers 56 (4): 563–95. Evidence.” Policy Research Working Paper Comolli, V. 2017. “Transnational Organized 7125. World Bank, Washington, DC. Crime and Confl ict.” Background paper for Call, C. 2008. “Knowing Peace When You See it: the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success.” Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Civil Wars 10 (2): 173–94. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, ———. 2012. Why Peace Fails: The Causes and World Bank, Washington, DC. Prevention of Civil War Recurrence. Crespo-Sancho, C. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention Washington, DC: Georgetown University and Gender.” Background paper for the Press. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Campbell, B. 2002. Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Deadly Path of the World’s Most Precious Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Stones. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Washington, DC. Caprioli, M., and M. Boyer. 2001. “Gender, Cruz, J. M. 2011. “Criminal Violence and Violence, and International Crisis.” Journal of Democratization in Central America: The Confl ict Resolution 45 (4): 503–18. Survival of the Violent State.” Latin American Caprioli, M., V. Hudson, R. McDermott, Politics and Society 53 (4): 1–33. C. Emmett, and B. Ballif-Spanvill. 2007. Dahl, M., S. Gates, and H. M. Nygård. 2017. “Putting Women in Their Place.” Baker “Securing the Peace.” Background paper for Journal of Applied Public Policy 1 (1): 12–22. the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Caprioli, M., and P. F. Tumbore. 2003. “Ethnic Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Discrimination and Interstate Violence: Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Testing the International Impact of World Bank, Washington, DC. Domestic Behavior.” Journal of Peace Dahlgren, P. 2015. “Internet as Civic Space.” In Research 40 (1): 5–23. Handbook of Digital Politics, edited by Chenoweth, E., and M. Stephan. 2011. Why Civil S. Coleman and D. Freelon. Cheltenham: Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Elgin. Nonviolent Confl ict. New York: Columbia Dal Bo, E., and P. Dal Bo. 2011. “Workers, University Press. Warriors, and Criminals: Social Confl ict in Chesterman, S., M. Ignatieff, and R. Thakur. General Equilibrium.” Journal of the European 2004. Making States Work: State Failure and Economic Association 9 (4): 646–77. the Crisis of Governance. Tokyo: United Dube, O., and J. Vargas. 2013. “Commodity Price Nations University Press. Shocks and Civil Confl ict: Evidence from Clunan, A., and H. A. Trinkunas. 2010. Colombia.” Review of Economic Studies 80 Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State (4, October 1): 1384–421. Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Dupuy, K., S. Gates, H. M. Nygård, I. Rudolfsen, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. S. A. Rustad, H. Strand, and H. Urdal. 2017. Cockayne, J. 2016. The Hidden Power. The “Trends in Armed Confl ict 1946–2016.” Strategic Logic of Organized Crime. London: PRIO Confl ict Trends 02/2017. Peace C. Hurst. Reaearch Institue Oslo. https://www.prio Colletta, N., and B. Oppenheim. 2017. . org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1373 “Subnational Confl ict: Dimensions, Trends, &type=publicationfi le. and Options for Prevention.” Background Easterly, W., J. Ritzen, and M. Woolcock. 2006. paper for the United Nations–World Bank “Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth.” Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Working Paper 94, Center for Global Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict. Development, Washington, DC. World Bank, Washington, DC. Elias, N. 1982. The Civilizing Process. Vol. 2: State Collier, P., V. L. Elliott, H. Hegre, A. Hoeffl er, Formation and Civilisation. Oxford: Blackwell. M. Reynal-Querol, and N. Sambanis. 2003. Englebert, P., and D. Tüll. 2008. “Postconfl ict Breaking the Confl ict Trap: Civil War and Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about

102 Pathways for Peace Failed States.” International Security 32 (4): of Northern Mali.” In Saharan Frontiers, 106–39. edited by J. McDougall and J. Scheele. Evans, P. 2004. “Development as Institutional Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping and Guichaoua, Y., and M. Pellerin. 2017. “Faire la the Potentials of Deliberation.” Studies in paix et construire l’etat: Les relations entre Comparative International Development pouvoir central et périphéries sahéliennes 38(4): 30–52. au Niger et au Mali.” Study 51, Institute de Faustino, J., and D. Booth. 2014. Development Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire Entrepreneurship: How Donors and Leaders (IRSEM), Paris. http://www.defense.gouv.fr Can Foster Institutional Change. London: /content/download/509288/8603319/file Overseas Development Institute. http://www /Etude_IRSEM_n51_2017.pdf. .odi.org/publications/9118-development Gurr, T. R. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: -entrepreneurship. Princeton University Press. Fearon, J. 2010. “Governance and Civil War Onset.” Halliday, T. C., and G. Shaffer. 2015. Transnational Background paper for World Development Legal Orders. Cambridge Studies in Law Report 2011: Confl ict, Security, and and Society. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Development, World Bank, Washington, DC. University. Fearon, J., and D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Hameiri, S. 2007. “Failed State or a Failed Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Paradigm? State Capacity and the Limits of Science Review 97 (1): 75–90. Institutionalism.” Journal of International ———. 2013. “How Persistent Is Armed Relations and Development 10 (2): 122–49. Confl ict?” Working Paper, Empirical Studies Hammond, D., and D. Hyslop. 2017. of Confl ict. Stanford University, Stanford, CA. “Understanding Multi-Dimensional Risks and Felbab-Brown, V. 2017. “How to Break Political- Violent Confl ict Lessons for Prevention.” Criminal Alliances in Contexts of Transition.” Background paper for the United Nations– Crime-Confl ict Nexus 7, United Nations World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for University, Centre for Policy Research Crime, Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Tokyo. Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Fukuyama, F. 2004. State-Building: Governance Hegre, H., H. Buhaug, K. V. Calvin, J. Nordkvelle, and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca: S. T. Waldhoff, and E. Gilmore. 2016. Cornell University Press. “Forecasting Civil Confl ict along the Shared Galtung, J. 1969. “Violence, Peace and Peace Socioeconomic Pathways.” Environmental Research.” Journal of Peace Research 6 (3): Research Letters 11 (5): 054002. 167–91. Hegre, H., and N. Sambanis. 2006. “Sensitivity Ghani, A., and C. Lockhart. 2008. Fixing Failed Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War States. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Onset.” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 50 (4): Press. 508–35 Giessmann, H. J., J. Galvanek, and C. Seifert. 2017. Herbert, S. 2017. Links between Women’s “Curbing Violence Development, Application, Empowerment (or Lack of) and Outbreaks of and the Sustaining of National Capacities for Violent Confl ict. Birmingham, U.K.: University Confl ict Prevention.” Background paper for of Birmingham. the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Hudson, V., B. Ballif-Spanvill, M. Caprioli, and Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches C. Emmett. 2012. Sex and World Peace. to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, New York: Columbia University Press. Washington, DC. Hudson, V., M. Caprioli, B. Ballif-Spanvill, Goldstein, J., and J. Rotich. 2008. Digitally R. McDermott, and C. Emmett. 2009. “The Networked Technology in Kenya’s 2007–2008 Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women Post-Election Crisis. Cambridge, MA: Berkman and the Security of States.” International Klein Center for Internet and Society. http:// Security 33 (3): 7–45. doi:10.1162/isec.2009 cyber.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.harvard.edu .33.3.7. / files/Goldstein&Rotich_Digitally_Net Human Rights Watch. 1999. Leave None to Tell worked_Technology_Kenyas_Crisis.pdf.pdf. the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. https://www. Grémont, C. 2012. “Villages and Crossroads. hrw . org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno4-7-03. Changing Territorialities among the Tuareg htm.

Pathways for Peace 103 Huntington, S. 1968. Political Order in Changing Lynch, M. 2016. The New Arab Wars. Uprisings Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. and Anarchy in the Middle East. New York: ICG (International Crisis Group). 2014. Reform Perseus Group. or Relapse. Africa Report 201. Brussels: ICG. MacGinty, R. 2010. “Hybrid Peace: The Interaction https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/mali between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace.” -reform-or-relapse.pdf. Security Dialogue 41 (4): 391–412. ———. 2016. “Exploiting Disorder: Al-Qaeda Mani, A., S. Mullainathan, E. Shafi r, and J. Zhao. and the Islamic State.” Special Report 1, ICG, 2013. “Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function.” Brussels. Science 341 (6149): 976–80. Idris, I. 2016. Youth Unemployment and Violence: Marc, A., A. Willman, G. Aslam, M. Rebosio, and Rapid Literature Review. Birmingham, U.K.: K. Balasuriya. 2012. Societal Dynamics and GSDRC, University of Birmingham. Fragility: Engaging Societies in Responding to IFC (International Finance Corporation). 2018. Fragile Situations. New Frontiers of Social Private Enterprises in Confl ict-Related Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank. Situations. Washington, DC: World Bank. Mcloughlin, C. 2015. “When Does Service Jones, B., M. Elgin-Cossart, and J. Esberg. 2012. Delivery Improve the Legitimacy of a Fragile Pathways Out of Fragility: The Case for a or Confl ict-Affected State?” Governance: An Research Agenda on Inclusive Political International Journal of Policy, Administration, Settlements in Fragile States. New York: Centre and Institutions 28 (3): 341–56. for International Cooperation. Menkhaus, K., and J. N. Shapiro. 2010. “Non- Keating, T. F., and W. A. Knight. 2004. Building State Actors and Failed States: Lessons from Sustainable Peace. Tokyo: United Nations Al-Qa’ida’s Experiences in the Horn of University Press. Africa.” In Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to Keister, J. 2014. “The Illusion of Chaos: Why State Authority in an Era of Softened Ungoverned Spaces Aren’t Ungoverned, and Sovereignty, edited by A. Clunan and Why that Matters.” Policy Analysis 766, Cato H. A. Trinkunas. Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute, Washington, DC. University Press. Kelleya, C. P., S. Mohtadib, M. A. Canec, Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti. 2004. R. Seagerc, and Y. Kushnirc. 2015. “Climate “Economic Shocks and Civil Confl ict: An Change in the Fertile Crescent and Instrumental Variables Approach.” Journal of Implications of the Recent Syrian Drought.” Political Economy 112 (4): 725–53. Proceedings of the National Academy of Min, E., M. Singh, J. N. Shapiro, and B. Crisman. Sciences 112 (11): 3241–46. 2017. “Understanding Risk and Resilience to Kelly, J. 2017. “Intimate Partner Violence and Violent Confl icts.” Background paper for the Confl ict: Understanding the Links between United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Political Violence and Personal Violence.” Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Background paper for the United Nations– Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Washington, DC. Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Mueller, H. 2017. “How Much Is Prevention Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Worth?” Background paper for the United Kemp, W., M. Shaw, and A. Boutellis. 2013. The Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Operations Deal with Organized Crime? New Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, York: International Peace Institute. Washington, DC. King, M. L., Jr. 1963. “Letter from a Birmingham Mullainathan, S., and E. Shafi r. 2013. Scarcity: Jail.” Stanford University, Stanford, CA. Why Having Too Little Means So Much. https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king New York: Times Books. -papers/documents/letter-birmingham-jail. Narayan, D., R. Chambers, M. K. Shah, and Lakhani, S., and A. Willman. 2014. “Gates, Hired P. Petesch. 2000. Voices of the Poor: Crying Out Guns and Mistrust—Business Unusual: The for Change. Washington, DC: World Bank. Cost of Crime and Violence to Businesses in Nezam, T. 2017. “Alternatively Governed Spaces.” Papua New Guinea.” Working Paper 88544, Background paper for the United Nations– World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for

104 Pathways for Peace Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Peschka, M. 2011. “The Role of the Private Sector Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. in Fragile and Confl ict-Affected States.” Nilsson, D. 2012. “Anchoring the Peace: Civil Background paper for World Development Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Report 2011: Confl ict, Security, and Peace.” International Interactions 38 (2): 258. Development, World Bank, Washington, DC. North, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, Poppe, A. E., and J. Wolff. 2017. “The Contested and Economic Progress. Cambridge, U.K.: Spaces of Civil Society in a Plural World: Norm Cambridge University Press. Contestation in the Debate about Restrictions North, D. C., J. J. Wallis, and B. R. Weingast. 2009. on International Civil Society Support.” Violence and Social Orders. Cambridge, U.K.: Contemporary Politics 23 (4): 468–88. Cambridge University Press. Posner, D. 2004. “Civil Society and the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation Reconstruction of Failed States.” In When and Development). 2016. States of Fragility. States Fail: Causes and Consequences, edited Geneva: OECD. by R. I. Rotberg. Princeton, NJ: Princeton O’Neill, B. C., E. Kriegler, K. Riahi, K. L. Ebi, University Press. S. Hallegatte, T. R. Carter, R. Mathur, and Pritchett, L., and F. de Weijer. 2010. “Fragile States: D. P. van Vuuren. 2014. “A New Scenario Stuck in a Capability Trap?” Background Framework for Climate Change Research: The paper for the World Development Report 2011: Concept of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways.” Confl ict, Security, and Development, World Climate Change 122 (3): 387–400. Bank, Washington, DC. O’Reilly, M., A. Ó Súilleabháin, and T. Paffenholz. Rabasa, A., S. Boraz, P. Chalk, K. Cragin, 2015. Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles T. W. Karasik, J. D. P. Moroney, K. A. O’Brien, in Peace Processes. New York: International and J. E. Peet. 2007. Ungoverned Territories: Peace Institute. Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks. Østby, G. 2008. “Inequalities, the Political Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Environment, and Civil Confl ict: Evidence Raleigh, C., and C. Dowd. 2013. “Governance from 55 Developing Countries.” In Horizontal and Confl ict in the Sahel’s ‘Ungoverned Inequalities and Confl ict: Understanding Space.’” Stability: International Journal of Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, edited Security and Development 2 (2): Art. 32. by F. Stewart, 252–81. London: Palgrave Raleigh, C., A. Linke, H. Hegre, and J. Carlsen. Macmillan UK 2010. “Introducing ACLED: An Armed Paasonen, K., and H. Urdal. 2016. “Youth Confl ict Location and Event Dataset.” Journal Bulges, Exclusion and Instability: The Role of Peace Research 47 (5): 651–60. of Youth in the Arab Spring.” PRIO Confl ict Raleigh, C., and H. Urdal. 2007. “Climate Change, Trends. Prevention Research Institute Oslo, Environmental Degradation, and Armed March. Confl ict.” Political Geography 26 (6): 674–94. Paffenholz, T., A. Hirblinger, D. Landau, F. Fritsch, Rettberg, M. 2015. Gold, Oil and the Lure of and C. Dijkstra. 2017. “Preventing Violence Violence: The Private Sector and Post-Confl ict through Inclusion: From Building Political Risks in Colombia. The Hague: Clingendael. Momentum to Sustaining Peace.” Background Sacks, A. 2009. “Non-State Actor Provision of paper for the United Nations–World Bank Services, Government Legitimacy, and the Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Rule of Law.” Paper presented at the annual Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl icts, meeting of the American Sociological World Bank, Washington, DC. Association, San Francisco, CA. Parks, T., N. Colletta, and B. Oppenheim. 2013. The Sany, J. 2010. Education and Confl ict in Côte Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Confl ict d’Ivoire. Special Report 235. Washington, DC: and International Development Assistance. San United States Institute of Peace. Francisco, CA: The Asia Foundation. Schleussner, C.-F., J. F. Donges, R. V. Donnera, and Patrick, S. M. 2010. “Are Ungoverned Spaces a H. J. Schellnhuber. 2016. “Armed-Confl ict Threat?” Foreign Affairs, January 11. Risks Enhanced by Climate-Related Disasters Pearlman, W. 2013. “Emotions and the in Ethnically Fractionalized Countries.” Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Perspectives on Politics 11 (2): 387–409. Sciences 113 (33): 9216–21.

Pathways for Peace 105 Simon, H. 1997 [1947]. Administrative Behavior: Centre for Research on Inequality, A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Human Security, and Ethnicity, Oxford Administrative Organization. 4th ed. New University. York: The Free Press. Stone, L. 2015. “Study of 156 Peace Agreements, Singer, P. W. 2010. “Private Military Firms: The Controlling for Other Variables, Quantitative Profi t Side of VNSAs.” In Violent Non-State Analysis of Women’s Participation.” In Peace Actors in World Politics, edited by K. Mulaj. Processes in Reimagining Peacemaking: New York: Columbia University Press. Women’s Roles in Peace Processes, by Slegh, H., G. Barker, and R. Levtov. 2014. Gender M. O’Reilly, A. Ó Súilleabháin, and Relations, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence T. Paffenholz, annex II. New York: and the Effects of Confl ict on Women and Men International Peace Institute. in North Kivu, Eastern Democratic Republic of Tilly, C. 1985. “War Making and State Making as the Congo: Results from the International Men Organized Crime.” In Bringing the State Back and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES). In, edited by P. Evans, D. Rueschmeyer, and Washington, DC: Promundo-US and Sonke T. Skocpol, 169–91. Cambridge, U.K.: Gender Justice. Cambridge University Press. Stares, P. 2017. Preventive Engagement: How ———. 2003. The Politics of Collective Violence. America Can Avoid War, Stay Strong, and Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Keep the Peace. New York: Columbia Press. University Press. UNDP (United Nations Development Stearns Lawson, B., and P. Dininio. 2013. The Programme). 2012. Informal Justice Systems. Development Response to Drug Traffi cking in New York: UNDP. http://www.undp.org/con- Africa: A Programming Guide. Washington, tent/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic DC: USAID. -governance/access_to_justiceandruleoflaw Stewart, F. 2000. “Crisis Prevention: Tackling /informal-justice-systems.html. Horizontal Inequalities.” Oxford Development UN General Assembly. 2015. “Transforming Our Studies 28 (3): 245–62. World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable ———. 2002. “Horizontal Inequalities: A Development.” Resolution A/RES/70/1, Neglected Dimension of Development.” adopted September 25, New York. QEH Working Paper 81, Centre for Research ———. 2016a. “Review of United Nations on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity, Peacebuilding Architecture.” Resolution Queen Elizabeth House, University of A/RES/70/262, adopted April 27, New York. Oxford. ———. 2016b. “Report of the Open-Ended ———. 2004. “Development and Security.” Intergovernmental Expert Working Group Confl ict, Security and Development 4 (3): on Indicators and Terminology Relating 261–88. to Disaster Risk Reduction.” Resolution ———. 2008. Horizontal Inequalities and A/RES/71/644, adopted December 1, Confl ict: Understanding Group Violence in New York. Multiethnic Societies. London: Palgrave UN General Assembly and UN Security Council. Macmillan UK. 1999. Report of the International Criminal ———. 2009. “Horizontal Inequalities as a Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Cause of Confl ict.” Bradford Development Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Lecture, University of Bradford. https://www Violations of International Humanitarian Law .bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/media/social- Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and sciences/BDLStewart.pdf. Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide ———. 2010. Horizontal Inequalities as a and Other Such Violations Committed in the Cause of Confl ict. Washington, DC: World Territory of Neighbouring States between Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org 1 January and 31 December 1994. Report /EXT WDR 2011/Resources /6406082 A/54/315 S/1999/94. New York: United -1283882418 764/WDR_Background Nations, September 7. http://www.un.org _Paper_Stewart . pdf. /ga/54/doc/tcir.pdf. Stewart, F., M. Barron, G. Brown, and UN Global Compact. 2010. “Guidance on M. Hartwell. 2006. Social Exclusion and Responsible Business in Confl ict-Affected and Confl ict: Analysis and Policy Implications. High-Risk Areas: A Resource for Companies.”

106 Pathways for Peace UN Global Compact and Principles for Additional Reading Responsible Investing, New York. ———. 2017. “Take Action: Business Advancing Bloom, M. 2011. Bombshell: Women and Peace.” UN Global Compact, New York. Terrorism. Philadelphia, PA: University of https://www.unglobalcompact.org/take Pennsylvania Press. -action/action/peace. Bøås, M. 2014. “Guns, Money, and Prayers: UN Security Council. 2016a. “Postconfl ict AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of Peacebuilding.” Resolution S/RES/2282, Northern Mali.” CTC Sentinel 7 (4): 1–7. adopted April 27, New York. Botha, A. 2013. “Assessing the Vulnerability ———. 2016b. “Youth, Peace, and Security.” of Kenyan Youths to Radicalism and Resolution S/RES/2250, adopted December 9, Extremism.” ISS Paper 245, Institute for New York. Security Studies, Pretoria. http://www. Varshney, A. 2002. Ethnic Confl ict and Civic Life: issafrica.org/uploads/Paper245.pdf. Hindus and Muslims in India. New Haven, Brown, K. 2014. “Why Are Western Women Joining CT: Yale University Press. Islamic State?” BBC News Online, October 4. Volkan, V. 2004. Blind Trust: Large Groups and http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-29507410. Their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror. Byrd, W. A., and D. Mansfi eld. 2014. Durham, NC: Pitchstone Publishing. “Afghanistan’s Opium Economy. An von Uexkulla, N., M. Croicua, H. Fjelde, and Agricultural, Livelihoods, and Governance H. Buhaug. 2016. “Civil Confl ict Sensitivity Perspective.” Report, Afghanistan Agriculture to Growing-Season Drought.” Proceedings of Sector Review, World Bank, Washington, DC. the National Academy of Sciences 113 (44): Colletta, N. J., and M. L. Cullen. 2000. Violent 12391–96. Confl ict and the Transformation of Social Wanis-St. John, A., and D. Kew. 2008. “Civil Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Guatemala, and Somalia. Washington, DC: Exclusion.” International Negotiation 13 World Bank. (2008): 11–36. Colletta, N., T. G. Lim, and A. Kelles-Viitanen. Williams, P. 2016. War and Confl ict in Africa. 2001. Social Cohesion and Confl ict Prevention Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press. in Asia. Washington, DC: World Bank. Wolff, S., S. Ross, and A. Wee. 2017. Subnational Cramer, C., J. Goodhand, and R. Morris. 2016. Governance and Confl ict. Washington, DC: Evidence Synthesis: What Interventions Have World Bank. Been Effective in Preventing or Mitigating World Bank. 2011. World Development Report Armed Violence in Developing and Middle- 2011: Confl ict, Security, and Development. Income Countries? London: Department for Washington, DC: World Bank. International Development. ———. 2013. “Inclusion Matters: The Curle, A. 1971. Making Peace. Durham, NC: Foundation for Shared Prosperity.” Tavistock. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Easterly, W. 2001. “Can Institutions Resolve ———. 2015. World Development Report 2015: Ethnic Confl ict?” Economic Development and Mind, Society, and Behavior. Washington, Cultural Change 49 (4): 687–706. DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge Fiedler, C., J. Gravinghold, and K. Mross. 2017. .worldbank.org/handle/10986/20597 License: “Identifying Pathways to Peace: How Post- CC BY 3.0 IGO. Confl ict Support Can Help Prevent Relapse of ———. 2016. Independent Evaluation Group War.” Background paper for the United (IEG), World Bank Group Engagement in Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways Situations of Fragility, Confl ict, and Violence: for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing An Independent Evaluation. Washington, DC: Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. Haggard, S. 2004. “Institutions and Growth in ———. 2017. World Development Report 2017: East Asia.” Studies in Comparative Governance and the Law. Washington, DC: International Development 38 (4): 53–81. World Bank. Hegre, H., J. Karlsen, H. M. Nygård, H. Strand, Yamagishi, T., and M. Yamagishi. 1994. “Trust and and H. Urdal. 2013. “Predicting Armed Commitment in the United States and Japan.” Confl ict, 2010–2050.” International Studies Motivation and Emotion 18 (2): 129–66. Quarterly 57 (2): 250–70.

Pathways for Peace 107 Ladbury, S. 2015. “Women and Extremism: The Resolution S/RES/55/25, adopted November Association of Women and Girls with Jihadi 10, New York. Groups and Implications for Programming.” Urdal, H. 2006. “A Clash of Generations? Independent paper prepared for the Department Youth Bulges and Political Violence.” of International Development (DFID) and the International Studies Quarterly 50 (3): Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁ ce. January 23. 607–30. Lederach, J. P. 1997. Building Peace. Washington, Wallensteen, P., and I. Svensson. 2014. “Talking DC: United States Institute of Peace. Peace: International Mediation in Armed Leftwich, L. 2005. “Politics in Command: Conﬂ icts.” Journal of Peace Research 51 (2): Development Studies and the Rediscovery of 319–20. Social Science.” New Political Economy 10 (4): Warschauer, M. 2003. Technology and Social 573–607. Inclusion: Rethinking the Digital Divide. Moser, C., and C. McIlwaine. 2004. Encounters Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. with Violence in Latin America: Urban Poor WHO (World Health Organization) and World Perceptions from Colombia and Guatemala. Bank. 2011. World Report on Disability. London: Routledge. Geneva: World Health Organization. UN General Assembly. 2000. “UN Convention http://www.refworld.org/docid/50854a322 against Transnational Organized Crime.” . html.

108 Pathways for Peace CHAPTER 4 Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice

Many of today’s violent confl icts relate to natural resources into grievances that would group-based grievances arising from mandate violence” (Aspinall 2007, 968). inequality, exclusion, and feelings of injus- Prevention efforts need to pay special atten- tice. Every country has groups who believe tion to perceptions of inequality and injus- they suffer one or all of these ills in some tice (Nygård et al. 2017). The 2030 Agenda measure. Most of the time, the attendant for Sustainable Development provides a tensions and confl icts may simmer for long framework through which various social periods without boiling over into violence. and economic inequalities can be addressed, It is when an aggrieved group assigns blame not only through Sustainable Development to others or to the state for its perceived Goal (SDG) 10, which is focused on inequal- economic, political, or social exclusion that ities, but also through other SDGs. its grievances may become politicized and This chapter is organized around a com- risk tipping into violence. prehensive review of the multiple strands On their own, inequality among groups of research into the relationship between and group-based exclusion do not generate inequality and exclusion and the risk of vio- violence. But they can create fertile ground lent confl ict. It looks at how social groups upon which grievances can build. In the coalesce—around identity, status, feelings of absence of incentives to avoid violence or humiliation, and the perception they address grievances, group leaders may are being politically shortchanged, among mobilize their cohort to violence. Emotions, others—and the conditions under which their collective memories, frustration over unmet grievances can be mobilized. The chapter expectations, and a narrative that rouses a also highlights the important roles the state group to violence can all play a role in this may play and reviews evidence that reducing mobilization. inequality and exclusion, particularly of The chances of violence are higher if women and young people, is fundamental to leaders in a group can both frame the inter- forging pathways for sustainable peace. group inequality as unfair and assign blame to another actor, usually a different identity Inequality and Violent group or the state. Elites, as discussed later Confl ict in this chapter, can play a signifi cant role in collective mobilization by shaping narra- The link between inequality and violent tives. In Indonesia, confl ict escalated in one confl ict is one of the oldest issues in politi- of three resource-rich provinces where elites cal economy. “At least since Aristotle, theo- engaged in “hard ideological work […] to rists have believed that political discontent transform unfocused resentments about and its consequences—protest, instability,

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 109 violence, revolution—depend not only on differences in individuals’ access to power the absolute level of economic well-being, and opportunity or social exclusion (Stiglitz but also on the distribution of wealth” 2013; Krishnan et al. 2016). Rising income (Østby 2013, 4). Two dimensions of and wealth inequality seems to be due largely inequality are relevant here: inequality to these factors of unequal access and oppor- among individuals or households (vertical tunity (Stewart 2002b). Persistent inequality inequality) and inequality among groups driven by these factors could impede eco- (horizontal inequality) (Stewart 2002a). nomic growth; it also may sometimes lead to The evidence that horizontal inequality is social and political instability and violent linked to a higher risk of violent confl ict is confl ict (Justino and Moore 2015). stronger than that for vertical inequality Numerous studies have looked at the (Østby 2013). Nevertheless, although the relationship between vertical inequality, relationship between inequality and confl ict such as individuals’ relative wealth or pov- is not clear or direct, there is reason to erty, and confl ict, with mixed fi ndings believe that reducing inequality may help (Lichbach 1989; Cramer 2003; Østby 2013; ease confl ict between groups and thereby Nygård et al. 2017). As Cramer (2003) lower the risk of violence. notes, links between vertical inequality and violent confl ict are elusive. Various studies Vertical Inequality fi nd that higher inequality increases the likelihood of confl ict, decreases it, or has no As noted above, scholars have long argued impact at all (Russett 1964; Sigelman and that economic inequality is fundamentally Simpson 1977; Lichbach 1989; Bartusevičius linked to violent confl ict (Muller 1985). 2014). Some studies have found a positive Lichbach (1989, 432) fi nds that “it often relationship between inequality in income appears that the principal political contest (or land tenure) and confl ict (Nagel 1976). and debate in a nation involves a polariza- Others argue for a positive relationship tion of social groups around distributional between income inequality and the likeli- issues.” This view is refl ected in confl ict the- hood of popular rebellion (Bartusevičius ory, which argues that confl ict arises between 2014) or the risk of violence, particularly the “haves” who wish to maintain the sta- under semi-repressive regimes (Schock tus quo distribution of resources and the 1996). In some studies, particular forms of “have-nots” who seek to challenge the exist- inequality are found to matter—for exam- ing system and its resource distribution. For ple, household asset inequality that decades, the notion that prosperous societies increased the propensity of civil strife in will be peaceful societies has underpinned Uganda (Deininger 2003)—and vertical development programming and spending. inequality is found to have a different Indeed, the gap between “haves” and impact on different confl ict and violence “have-nots” remains at the center of much types (Besançon 2005; Nepal, Bohara, and heated contemporary political and aca- Gawande 2011). Recent cross-country stud- demic discussion on the growing income ies fi nd no signifi cant relationship between and wealth inequality in some developing income inequality measured by the Gini and developed countries (Lichbach 1989; coeffi cient and violent confl ict (Fearon and Piketty 2013; Justino 2017). The gap has Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffl er 2004). widened to the point where the top 9 per- It should be noted, however, that cent of the world’s population earns half of cross-country studies that examine the all global income, while the bottom half effect of vertical inequality on the onset of controls only about 7 percent of global violent confl ict are constrained by major income (Milanovic 2016). data limitations, both in the availability and Some income and wealth inequality is reliability of vertical inequality data and in inevitable because people start out with dif- the way confl ict onset is measured.1 In addi- ferent natural endowments of physical, tion, little empirical testing has been under- social, and human capital and abilities. taken of the causal mechanisms that have However, these differences do not explain the been put forward by the theoretical and

110 Pathways for Peace qualitative literature on the relationship groups, with relative deprivation defi ned as between vertical inequality and confl ict. actors’ perceptions of discrepancy between what they think they are rightfully entitled Horizontal Inequality to achieve and what they are actually capable of achieving.3 Additionally, while Horizontal inequalities are differences in most of the focus in this line of research to access and opportunities across culturally date has been on the impact of objective defi ned (or constructed) groups based on inequality among groups, some recent stud- identities such as ethnicity, region, and reli- ies have tried to address perceived griev- gion. They create fertile ground for grievances as well.4 ances, especially when they accumulate across multiple realms, such as economic Economic Inequality among Groups and political, and social (Østby 2008a; Most of the cross-country literature that Justino 2017).2 discusses horizontal inequality examines The hypothesis that horizontal inequal- economic inequality that occurs along eth- ity makes countries more vulnerable to nic and religious lines. Ethnicity is broadly confl ict derives from the idea that political, defi ned along ethnoreligious and ethnolin- economic, and social inequalities are likely guistic groups (Østby, Nordås, and Rød to create grievances among a relatively dis- 2009; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug advantaged group whose members can 2013). Issues related to measuring and mobilize along ethnic (or other identity- defi ning ethnicity, including questions based) lines to cause violent confl ict. Much related to endogeneity, are discussed research has been done on measurement throughout this chapter. and quantitative evidence related to this Scholars have tried to understand the hypothesis. relationship quantitatively by building Horizontal inequality as an explanatory summary indices of economic horizontal factor for violent confl ict rests on three inequality and by measures of relative posi- points (Nygård et al. 2017). First, there is a tion. Cross-country studies that construct positive relationship between horizontal summary indices of economic horizontal inequality and the onset of violent confl ict. inequality generally fi nd a positive and sta- Second, this positive relationship is due to tistically signifi cant relationship between the presence of group identity and of a sub- horizontal inequality and confl ict (Østby jective, collective sense of inequality that 2008a, 2008b). These studies mostly use creates group grievances. Third, group data from a range of countries, such as data grievances can lead to violent confl ict when from the Demographic and Health Survey, the group has the opportunity to collec- to measure the difference in asset owner- tively mobilize around its feeling of injus- ship between each country’s two largest eth- tice (Gurr 1993; Østby 2013). nic groups and to study its relationship with For horizontal inequality to spur collec- violent confl ict (Østby 2008a, 2008b). tive action—which may or may not involve Nepal, Bohara, and Gawande (2011) use violence—objective inequality must be trans- village-level data to evaluate the relation- lated into an “inter-subjectively perceived ship between intergroup inequalities and grievance” (Nygård et al. 2017, 12); that is, violence during the Maoist armed confl ict the grievance is experienced collectively in Nepal, which began in 1996 and has by the group. Gurr’s (1970) pioneering the- killed 10,000 people and displaced more ory of relative deprivation builds a concep- than 200,000 people. They fi nd that inter- tual model to provide an understanding of group horizontal inequalities—measured the conditions under which individuals according to religion, caste, and language— resort to violence. He argues that relative are associated with Maoist killings. deprivation will lead to frustration and In a study measuring horizontal inequal- aggression that will motivate individuals to ity, Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou rebel. As this chapter discusses, this reason- (2016) take a new approach. They combine ing could arguably apply as well to social satellite images of nighttime luminosity with

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 111 historical homelands of ethnolinguistic the executive branch and the police and groups and fi nd that ethnic inequality has a military. It also relates to the ability of indi- signifi cant and negative association with viduals to participate in political processes. socioeconomic development. Celiku and Theories of political horizontal inequality Kraay (2017) fi nd that this measure of hori- draw on literatures of ethnonationalism zontal economic inequality is a good predic- and self-determination, as well as on the tor of the outbreak of confl ict. idea that ethnic capture of the state provides Other cross-country studies focus on politically excluded groups with motivation measures of the relative position an identity to challenge the state (Wimmer, Cederman, group holds within the wealth distribution in and Min 2009; Cederman, Wimmer, and a geographic area (Cederman, Weidmann, Min 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, and and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug 2013). and Buhaug 2013). These studies allow the Early empirical investigations used data likelihood that each group will take part in from the Minorities at Risk project, which confl ict in a given area to be examined. One considers indices of political discrimination important advantage these studies have in among ethnic groups and political differen- comparison with the summary indices men- tials measured by political status between tioned above is that they create the opportu- groups. Results using the Minorities at Risk nity to disentangle the effect of relative data set were mixed, in part because of the deprivation from the effect of relative privi- quality of the data (Gurr 1993). lege. This is an important distinction that More recent quantitative studies have relies on different theoretical underpinnings used the Ethnic Power Relations data set, for why certain groups would want to incite which includes measures of the exclusion of violent confl ict. These studies fi nd robust evi- ethnic groups from executive power dence of a positive relationship between (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014; relatively disadvantaged groups and vio- Vogt et al. 2015).5 Several of these studies lent confl ict (Cederman, Weidmann, and fi nd that group-level exclusion from the Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch, executive branch increases the risk that and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, these groups will participate in confl ict; an and Bormann 2015). Deprivation is measured ethnic group’s recent loss of power also as the distance between the deprived group’s increases that risk (Cederman, Wimmer, estimated gross domestic product (GDP) per and Min 2010; Cederman, Weidmann, and capita and the average GDP per capita of all Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch, groups. However, there is evidence that some- and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, times relatively privileged groups are the ones and Bormann 2015). When aggregated to the that initiate violence, a fi nding discussed at country level, political inequality has been greater length later in this chapter. found to increase the risk of violent confl ict (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). Political Inequality among Groups By disaggregating confl ict types into territo- Recent quantitative studies and qualitative rial and governmental confl ict, Buhaug, analysis support a strong and positive link Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014) fi nd that between political exclusion of certain the presence of large groups that are discrim- groups and violent confl ict, making politi- inated against boosts the probability of gov- cal inclusion a particularly signifi cant goal ernmental civil wars. They attribute this to for prevention of violence (Jones, Elgin- the discrepancy between a group’s demo- Cossart, and Esberg 2012; Cederman, graphic power and its political privileges. Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). This is a key message of this study and is discussed in Social Inequality among Groups greater detail in chapters 5 and 6. Political While most of the quantitative literature on horizontal inequality can be broadly defi ned horizontal inequalities has focused on the to include inequalities in the distribution economic and political dimensions, social and access to political opportunity and inequality among groups is also import- power among groups, including access to ant to any discussion of confl ict risk.

112 Pathways for Peace Social inequality can be broadly defi ned to when the level of horizontal social inequal- include inequalities in access to basic ser- ity rises to the 95th percentile. Horizontal vices, such as education, health care, and social inequality is measured by the total benefi ts related to educational and health years of education completed. Murshed and outcomes, which could be monitored Gates (2005) fi nd that horizontal inequali- through the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable ties were signifi cant in explaining violent Development. Education is particularly rel- confl ict in Nepal. Specifi cally, they fi nd that evant, given that it is strongly connected to higher life expectancy and educational future economic activity and well-being attainment, the latter measured by average and plays an important role in national years of schooling, were associated with a identity and social cohesion. Although lower risk of civil war. However, reverse quantitative evidence on the social dimen- causality can be a potential problem because sion of horizontal inequality is rather confl ict can sometimes increase horizontal limited,6 studies have sought to examine the social inequality. Box 4.1 elaborates on the association between social inequality and issue of reverse causality. confl ict (Omoeva and Buckner 2015). A district-level study of Indonesia fi nds Omoeva and Buckner (2015), for exam- that horizontal inequality in child mortality ple, build a cross-country panel data set of rates was positively associated with ethnic- educational attainment and fi nd a robust based communal violence (Mancini, relationship between higher levels of hori- Stewart, and Brown 2008). Other measures zontal inequality in education among eth- of horizontal inequality include civil service nic and religious groups and the likelihood employment, unemployment, education, of violent confl ict. They fi nd that a one and poverty among farmers. The study standard deviation increase in horizontal fi nds these factors were also linked to the inequality in educational attainment more incidence of confl ict, but that the effects than doubles the odds that a country will were much less pronounced. In another experience a confl ict in the next fi ve years; analysis, Østby et al. (2011) fi nd that in this relationship was statistically signifi cant Indonesian districts with high population in the 2000s and was robust to multiple growth, horizontal inequality in infant specifi cations while not being present in mortality rates is related to violence. earlier decades (Omoeva and Buckner 2015). The authors hypothesize that in the Relatively Privileged Groups and 1970s and 1980s, high levels of education Violent Confl ict inequality were not perceived as a suffi cient While there is robust evidence that high lev- reason for grievances to build. It could also els of horizontal inequality among the rela- be that large differences between ethnic or tively deprived increase the likelihood of religious groups in educational attainment confl ict, evidence on relatively privileged signal higher levels of exclusion of specifi c groups is mixed. Relatively privileged groups groups (Omoeva and Buckner 2015). Social may initiate violence to preserve their power differences between ethnic groups can and their access to important resources sometimes represent group discrimination. (Stewart 2002a). A privileged group that Education policies have been used to dis- produces wealth may develop a sense of criminate against minorities or other ethnic injustice if it sees a redistribution of that groups, as has been shown in postapartheid wealth as an unfair benefi t to another region South Africa and Sri Lanka, for example or group. Asal et al. (2016) fi nd that ethnic (Gurr 2000; Stewart 2002b). groups that face political exclusion and live Using Demographic and Health Survey in an area that produces oil wealth are more data on a set of developing countries, Østby likely to experience violent confl ict than (2008b) fi nds that for a country with low groups that experience only exclusion. levels of horizontal social inequality (5th Economically privileged groups have more percentile), the probability of onset of civil resources with which to sustain violent con- confl ict in any given year is 1.75 percent. fl ict, but their higher opportunity cost means This probability increases to 3.7 percent they also have more to lose by participating

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 113 BOX 4.1 The Challenge of Causality for Policy Action

Studies of the relationship between Endogeneity can lead to over- or inequality and violent confl ict are subject underestimating the causal impact in a to the issue of endogeneity, and specifi c country with more exclusionary specifi cally reverse causality, with policies. Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and implications for prevention policy. Greater Cederman (2016) argue that empirical inequality may increase the likelihood of analysis that does not correct for violent confl ict, and violent confl ict may endogeneity will overestimate the effect worsen inequality. Collier et al. (2003) of political exclusion on the risk of violent call this “development in reverse,” where confl ict. They suggest that governments violent confl ict may deepen the problems then may strategically exclude confl ict- that led groups to take up arms in the prone ethnic groups or regions. If fi rst place. However, overall case study confl ict-prone groups are included in a evidence is mixed on whether confl ict government, empirical analysis that does indeed widens or reduces horizontal not correct for endogeneity will artifi cially inequality. In fact, Bircan, Bruck, and underestimate this effect. A few studies Vothknecht (2017) fi nd that confl ict have used an instrumental variables increases vertical inequality, but the approach to correct for endogeneity, impact is not permanent. but this remains an area for further Fearon (2010) includes variables that exploration and research. Improving measure the extent of the population the link between different types of that is excluded or discriminated against horizontal inequality and higher risk of in regression analysis and argues that violent confl ict would contribute to better including such variables effectively informing prevention policies. However, results in the running of a “policy drawing policy recommendations and regression.” This means that a variable entry points from associations between that is a direct policy choice is used as two different phenomena is challenging an independent variable in regression because evidence of an association is not analysis, thus allowing the researcher enough to draw specifi c causal inference to explore the effect of specifi c policy and policy entry points. Hence, policies choices. Policy makers who anticipate that address the potential risks of violent that a particular group is likely to mobilize confl ict have to be context specifi c and for violence can enact policies that informed by evidence that tries to go reduce certain inequalities. beyond simple association.

in violence (Nygård et al. 2017). There is also confl ict and economic change, Mitra and evidence that in the case of separatist move- Ray (2014) show that increasing a specifi c ments, relatively privileged groups some- group’s income lowers the chances of that times initiate violence (Brown 2010). group’s participating in violence. Meanwhile, Whether relatively wealthier groups are it is worth noting that they also fi nd that more likely to participate in confl icts is raising one group’s income may increase debatable. Several authors fi nd that this is the chance that that same group will be the the case by conducting studies comparing a target of violence because other privileged group’s GDP per capita to the GDP per cap- groups would perceive that increase as los- ita of all groups (Cederman, Weidmann, ing their own comparative advantage. and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Weidmann, As explored in more detail below, steep and Bormann 2015), but other studies fail changes in the relative status of groups can to fi nd a signifi cant relationship (Buhaug, foment new grievances that increase the Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014; Fjelde and risk of violence, even if the change reduces Østby 2014). In their theoretical model of inequalities.

114 Pathways for Peace The Multiple and Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug Intersecting Dimensions (2013) show that politically excluded of Exclusion groups experience confl ict at a much higher frequency in comparison with Inequality among groups is not a suffi cient included groups. They also show that the condition for collective action toward vio- less included a group is politically, the lence. A deep-rooted sense of exclusion and more likely it is to fi ght the incumbent gov- a perception of injustice seem to be present ernment. This effect is even more pro- in many violent confl icts. These factors are nounced when groups have experienced a key in grievance formation. Changes in sta- change of power. tus and political exclusion are especially The size of the politically incumbent potent. The perception of exclusion is also group makes little to no difference to the persuasive, even when it is at odds with a probability of confl ict. But size has a strong group’s objective situation in relation to positive effect toward violence for excluded other groups’. Although exclusion and groups. This fi nding is interpreted as evi- inequality based on gender and age are not dence that confl ict is to a large extent linked to confl ict risk in a direct way, the driven by grievances, since one would participation and inclusion of women and expect the perceived injustice to increase young people strengthen a country’s capac- with the size of the excluded population, ity to manage and avert confl ict (Paffenholz rather than group size being regarded as et al. 2017). simply a proxy for resource endowment (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). The Importance of Political Other evidence suggests that excluded Exclusion in Confl ict Risks groups will be more likely to engage in collective violent action when they perceive Some qualitative case studies and quantita- the political system to be completely closed tive evidence suggest that political exclusion to their group, as opposed to when they is very important in fostering between-group believe they have minimum representation tensions that can lead to violence. Political (Jost and Banaji 2004). exclusion provides leaders of deprived A group may well suffer exclusion in sev- groups with an incentive to act to change the eral dimensions at once, and the overlap of situation. Some have argued that political different types of exclusion can heighten exclusion is more visible—and therefore the risk of violent confl ict. Cederman, groups can more easily assign blame, one of Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) fi nd that the steps considered essential in stirring groups excluded both economically and grievances to violence—than economic dis- politically will be more likely to participate advantage (Jones, Elgin-Cossart, and Esberg in violent confl ict than groups excluded in 2012; Vogt et al. 2015). only one dimension. They conclude that the Data limitations regarding political effect of economic horizontal inequality on exclusion, however, are even more severe violent confl ict is conditional on political than they are for economic exclusion. exclusion. In fact, economic horizontal Some recent work tries to address the lim- inequalities can be compensated for by a itations. The latest Ethnic Power Relations politically inclusive society. Østby (2008a), data set compiles data for the period in a study at the country level, fi nds a strong 1946–2013 that includes all “politically link between asset inequality and violent relevant ethnic groups”7 in 141 countries confl ict, especially for countries with higher and their access to power in the executive levels of political discrimination. branch, including cabinet positions and Different types of exclusion tend to rein- control of the army (Cederman, Wimmer, force each other. Political exclusion often and Min 2010).8 The indicator for SDG leads to social and economic exclusion. target 16.7, which is being developed, will Social exclusion is related to power relations provide additional possibilities for mea- and tends to involve discrimination against suring political inclusion. or exclusion of groups from the regular

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 115 activities of society. There are causal con- Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Caprioli and nections between educational access and Tumbore 2003; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; income: lack of access to education, lack of Hudson et al. 2012). In a global, longitudi- education, or both, lead to fewer economic nal study relying on the WomanStats data- opportunities, which is correlated with low base,9 which includes data from 175 countries income. At the same time, the low income (1960–2001), and using fertility rates and of certain groups leads to lower educational labor force participation as proxies for attainment, which creates a vicious cycle for gender equality, Caprioli and Boyer (2001) relatively deprived groups. Exclusion in rec- fi nd a signifi cant and positive relationship ognition of culture, especially related to lan- between levels of gender inequality in a guage use, can also affect educational and country and the likelihood of that country’s economic opportunities and outcomes as a being the fi rst to use military force in dis- result. It also reinforces group identities. putes with other countries. Hudson et al. Stewart (2009) suggests that confl ict is (2012), also relying on the WomanStats data- less likely when a particular group that is base, compares indicators of gender-based relatively deprived in one dimension is priv- violence with macro-level indicators of peace ileged in another. In cases in which a group and stability, as well as legislation protecting is economically or socially excluded (or women’s rights. They fi nd that the higher the both), but the group’s elite holds power or level of violence against women, the more participates in the government, the elite are likely a country may be not to comply with less likely to organize or lead a rebellion. She international norms and treaty agreements, cites the examples of Malaysia and Nigeria, and the less peacefully it will operate in the suggesting that after their civil wars the international system. group that was economically disadvantaged Changes in women’s experiences can be held a numerical majority and was also viewed as early warning signs of social and politically advantaged. Having political political insecurity. These signs may include power reduces the elites’ motives to rebel an increase in domestic violence, increased and gives them an opportunity to correct risk of gender-based violence outside the the inequalities faced by their group. home, an increase in the number of female- headed households, a decrease in girls’ Inclusion of Women and attending school because of security con- Gender Equality cerns, and an increase in pregnancy terminations (Hudson et al. 2012). This fi nding The degree to which women are included in underscores the importance of monitoring political, economic, and social life is a key indicators of gender equality within broader factor infl uencing a society’s propensity for systems to prevent violence. confl ict. Gender inequality is often a refl ec- Gender inclusion offers important tion of overall levels of exclusion in a soci- potential for reducing the risk of violence. ety and its tendency to resort to violence as Caprioli (2005) fi nds that countries with a means of resolving confl ict (GIWPS and 10 percent of women in the labor force PRIO 2017; Tessler and Warriner 1997; compared with countries with 40 percent Caprioli and Tumbore 2003; Caprioli 2005; of women in the labor force are nearly 30 Melander 2005; Caprioli et al. 2007; Hudson times more likely to experience internal et al. 2009; O’Reilly 2015; UNSC 2015a; confl ict. She also fi nds that a 5 percent Crespo-Sancho 2017; Kelly 2017; Nygård increase in females in the labor force is et al. 2017). associated with a fi vefold decrease in the Several large-sample, quantitative studies probability that a state will use military have explored the relationship between gen- force to resolve international confl ict. der exclusion and violent confl ict, fi nding Caprioli and Boyer (2001) fi nd that states that women’s status relative to men’s, espe- with higher levels of gender inequality cially their vulnerability to violence, is a sig- (using labor force participation as a proxy) nifi cant predictor of the country’s propensity also tend to use more extreme forms of for violent confl ict overall (Caprioli 2000; violence in confl ict.

116 Pathways for Peace Mobilizing women’s leadership and par- In some cases, violent confl ict can relax ticipation in peace processes and in confl ict rigid gender norms, at least temporarily. resolution has also been instrumental in Women may join armed groups, move into shifting toward peaceful pathways in many new livelihood opportunities, and take countries (UN Women 2015) (see box 4.2). leadership roles as peacemakers. In many Some of these experiences are discussed cases, however, the potential to take advan- further in chapter 6. tage of these roles is limited, especially in However, gender equality by itself is not the postconfl ict period. In a study of six a panacea or absolute bulwark against the confl ict and postconfl ict countries, Justino risk of violent confl ict. Even countries et al. (2012) fi nd that although women where women enjoy relatively solid access increased their participation in new labor to the political, social, and economic markets during confl ict, and in some cases spheres may be affected by violent confl ict. overall household welfare improved in eco- Indeed, in one of the trends in contempo- nomic terms, they earned less than male rary violent confl ict discussed in chapter 1, colleagues and often lost their jobs in the confl ict has spread to middle-income postconfl ict period. In addition, the countries with relatively developed institu- increased participation in new jobs was not tions. Among these countries is the Syrian accompanied by any reduction in their Arab Republic, where women, or at least household labor; on the contrary, these urban women, had relatively wide educa- responsibilities tended to increase as tional and professional opportunities women took over as heads of household (UNICEF 2011). while male partners and family members Gender exclusion is maintained by social were recruited or abducted into armed norms that prescribe certain roles for groups. Once confl ict ended, they faced women and men. These norms affect not pressure to return to more traditional roles, only the propensity for confl ict, but the and were often tasked with caring for male experience of confl ict by women and men, relatives injured during confl ict or as discussed in chapter 1. orphaned children.

BOX 4.2 Mobilizing Women’s Leadership for Peacebuilding

In October of 2000 the UN Security Council • Women’s inclusion in peace adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, processes has a positive impact on Peace, and Security. Recognizing women’s the durability of peace agreements important role in peace and the (O’Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, and disproportionate effects of violence on Paffenholz 2015).

women during confl ict, Resolution 1325 • Stone (2015) shows that the inclusion urges states to ensure increased of women as negotiators, mediators, representation of women at all decision- signatories, and witnesses increases making levels in national, regional, and the probability of an agreement’s international institutions as well as in lasting at least two years by 20 mechanisms for the prevention, percent, and the probability of an management, and resolution of confl icts agreement’s lasting at least 15 years (UN Women 2015). Empirical studies have by 35 percent. documented the positive role women • Increasing the number of women can play: at the negotiating table, • Paffenholz (2015) establishes that although necessary and helpful, meaningful participation of women in is not enough; rather, increasing peace negotiations results in the number of women with participants being more satisfi ed with quality participation should be the outcomes, and thus, agreements the target (Anderlini 2007; that tend to be longer lasting. Paffenholz 2015).

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 117 Gender norms affect the experience of Important differences in men’s abilities to confl ict for men as well. The perpetrators of assert these roles appear in a noncrisis set- violence are predominantly men, as are most ting as compared with a crisis setting (see members of violent extremist groups, gangs, fi gure 4.1). In a crisis setting, men are militias, and armies. Even so, the vast major- unable to assert their roles of provider and ity of men do not perpetrate violence, young procreator and to acquire social standing. A men are not inherently violent, men actively demand for traditional, patriarchal mascu- participate in peace building, and men are linities that advocates for the use of violence the primary direct victims of violent confl ict can surge within young men who seek to (with more men dying on the battlefi eld) reassert their threatened masculinity. (Spiegel and Salama 2000; Reza, Mercy, Although men’s roles are challenged in con- and Krug 2001; Obermeyer, Murray, and fl ict settings, not all men will develop vio- Gakidou 2008). All this suggests that mascu- lent behaviors. linity is in large part a social construct, and Norms do not change quickly or easily. that men create violent identities because of Indeed, although formal, institutional social, cultural, and political expectations changes, such as legislation protecting and pressures placed upon them (Bannon women’s rights, can occur relatively and Correia 2006; Vess et al. 2013). A corol- quickly, norms require much more time to lary explored below is that masculinity does change, and tend to be more resistant to not drive violence so much as do environ- change (Petesch 2012). When they are in ments where men are unable to assert and fl ux, those who step outside the older, fulfi ll other nonviolent masculine identities. more rigid norms into new roles—from In a study of nine violence-affected women who leave their households or countries UNDP (forthcoming) identifi es communities to study or work in the city, four common and interrelated roles associ- to men who take on more domestic respon- ated with manhood. These “four Ps of man- sibilities—face a heightened risk of hood” follow: violence if their communities persist in enforcing more traditional norms (Boudet • Provider for his family et al. 2012). As discussed further in • Procreator or father chapter 6, this entrenchment of norms • Prestige through being respected in the underscores the importance of focusing community, which also brings social status not only on the objective of equality but • Protector of family and community. also on the processes that lead there.

FIGURE 4.1 Masculinities in Noncrisis and Crisis Settings

a. Noncrisis b. Crisis

Provider

Provider Prestige through community/social Procreator responsibility or Prestige through position community/social responsibility or position Procreator Father/mentor

Protector/warrior Father/mentor Protector/warrior

Source: UNDP, forthcoming.

118 Pathways for Peace Youth Inclusion risk of violent confl ict, as well as the question of what drives a minority of young Young people are productive workers, people to participate in violence. These engaged citizens, and peace builders. The questions are particularly salient in light of 2015 United Nations Security Council reso- the global trends described in chapter 2, lution on Youth, Peace and Security (SCR such as the historically high number of 2250) was groundbreaking on this score, young people in the world today, the high recognizing the role of youth in the preven- levels of youth unemployment, and the tion of violence and the resolution of con- growing transnational reach of violent fl icts for the fi rst time, and calling for extremist groups that actively recruit youth. increased representation of youth in 10 While many have hypothesized that a decision-making at all levels (see box 4.3). demographic “youth bulge” is a structural At the same time, a growing fi eld of risk of confl ict (Collier 2000; Urdal 2006), study for researchers and policy makers more recent, cross-country work fi nds that alike is the relationship between youth and whether a large youth population constitutes violence, particularly the role that youth a threat or, to the contrary, a “demographic exclusion may play in increasing a country’s

BOX 4.3 Youth Aspirations and Exclusion

Half of the global population is age 24 (Idris 2016; Devarajan and Ianchovichina years or younger (World Bank 2017a). 2017). Although it is true that the majority Young people face a wide array of of fi ghters in all types of armed groups development challenges. They are often are young men, they only ever represent victims of multiple and interlocking forms a minority of the youth population in any of discrimination that can lead to an given country. At the same time, youth imbalance of power that excludes young groups are important parts of civil society people from being recognized socially as and are forces for effective prevention of adults, undermining their needs and violent confl ict. aspirations. Intergenerational inequality, Empowering youth is essential for and youth perceptions of lower status and violence-prevention and peacebuilding fewer opportunities than their parents had efforts. In 2015, the UN Security Council at the same age, can also contribute to unanimously adopted its Resolution frustration (Ginges et al. 2007; Atran and 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security, Ginges 2012; Höhne 2013; Honwana recognizing the important and positive 2013; Idris 2016; UNDP 2017b). contribution of young people in efforts for Youth exclusion is often highlighted as the maintenance and promotion of peace a key factor in violent confl ict. Programs and security. The Security Council called around the world have focused on for active engagement of youth because increasing employment opportunities for they represent “a unique demographic youth, but they have had mixed results. dividend that can contribute to lasting Evidence shows that employment can, peace and prosperity” if inclusive in some cases, contribute to protecting policies are put in place. These policies youth against mobilization to violence, include, for example, those related to but that the motivations for joining armed youth employment, vocational training, groups are not limited to economics. educational opportunities, and promoting They often stem from frustration with youth entrepreneurship and meaningful the rigidity of intergenerational social participation in decision making. The structures (Ginges et al. 2007; Atran and Security Council highlighted that the Ginges 2012; Höhne 2013; Idris 2016), disruption of young people’s access to frustrated aspirations for social and educational and economic opportunities economic mobility, discrimination, and has a dramatic impact on durable peace unmet needs for recognition and respect and reconciliation.

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 119 dividend” (UNSC 2015b), depends largely Recruitment of Youth by Violent on the degree to which youth are included in Armed Groups economic, social, and political life (Paasonen In recent years, much attention has turned and Paasonen and Urdal 2016). More micro- to recruitment of youth by violent groups, level analysis fi nds that economic, social, and especially violent extremist groups. The political exclusion prevents young peoples’ research suggests that the motivations and transition into adulthood in countries at all experiences of people in violent extremist income levels, and is often cited as a risk fac- groups is similar to that for other types of tor for joining armed groups (Ginges et al. armed groups. Empirical work on youth 2007; Atran and Ginges 2012; Höhne 2013; motivations, and on extremist groups’ Honwana 2013; Mercy Corps 2015; Idris recruiting strategies, is scarce—although 2016). Indeed, studies from various contexts increasing in some areas—because of sev- show that youth’s motivations to join armed eral important limitations (World Bank groups extend beyond more practical needs 2015; UNDP 2017b). These constraints for employment or income to a broader frus- include, fi rst, the diffi culties of accessing tration with the rigidity of intergenerational members of clandestine groups, resulting social structures, frustrated aspirations for in a bias toward people who have left such social and economic mobility, discrimination, groups or who have been imprisoned for and unmet needs for recognition and respect crimes committed while members (Barrett (Ginges et al. 2007; Atran and Ginges 2012; 2011; Atran and Stone 2015; Mercy Corps Botha 2013; Höhne 2013; Mercy Corps 2015; 2015; Stern and Berger 2015; ISS 2016). A Idris 2016, 40; Devarajan and Ianchovichina strong bias toward male fi ghters contrib- 2017). These motivations vary somewhat by utes to a limited understanding of women’s gender; generally speaking, male youth are involvement (Ladbury 2015) as well as of more likely to be motivated to join armed the various roles that people can play in groups out of a need for economic or social these groups. Most studies tend to focus on mobility, whereas young women may join for one group in one setting, which has given protection, the chance for greater autonomy rise to some rich case studies, but often than allowed by mainstream society, to avenge offers little in the way of generalizability for the loss of a loved one, or perceptions of injus- orienting policy in other contexts or toward tice and frustration (Bloom 2005, 2011; other groups (ISS 2016; Mercy Corps 2016; Brown 2014; Ladbury 2015). As noted earlier CeSID 2017; EIP 2017). A small number of in this chapter, unequal access to education studies have been able to interview mem- and the quality of education can become bers of extremist groups—the Islamic sources of frustration, feelings of injustice, State, or ISIS, in particular—to offer a and grievances that can all increase a society’s glimpse into the group’s internal organiza- risk of violent confl ict. tion (Atran and Stone 2015; Stern and Barriers to meaningful and inclusive Berger 2015; Weiss and Hassan 2015), and youth participation in governance are also some journalist reports offer some detail important risk factors. The disenfranchise- on the profi les of recruits, particularly for- ment of young people from formal political eign fi ghters (Weaver 2015). However, systems leaves them not only frustrated but many violent extremist groups, such as also mistrustful of political systems and Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, do not keep institutions (UNDP 2017a). In countries formal records of their members. There is with more rigid, conservative power struc- little information on members’ sociodemo- tures and social hierarchies, youth tend to graphic profi les or on the roles they play express their dissatisfaction by blaming once recruited. older generations, thus creating an inter- No single characteristic, identity, or generational drift. In these settings, youth motivation appears to draw individuals to feel disempowered and frustrated and assert become part of violent groups. In a study of that they receive little attention from those violent extremism in six countries across in power, including teachers, elders, and Africa, including interviews with 718 people, politicians (Abbink 2005). of which 495 were former or current

120 Pathways for Peace self-identifi ed members of extremist groups, against security actors: 78 percent of the UNDP (2017b) fi nds that certain vulnera- sample reported low levels of trust in the bilities tended to be present in those who police or military, and 71 percent said that joined extremist groups, especially a lack of the killing or arrest of a family member or exposure to people of other religious and friend prompted them to join an extremist ethnic identities, low levels of literacy or group (UNDP 2017b). quality of education, and a perceived lack of Far from all members join armed groups parental involvement during childhood. voluntarily; groups also use violence and Grievances against the state were an import- threats to coerce people to join. For extrem- ant motivating factor; frustration with per- ist groups, coercion as a means of recruit- ceived corruption or lack of access to ment and payment for services become political representation was key. One of the much more common when such a group most striking fi ndings relates to grievances controls territory (see box 4.4).

BOX 4.4 A Multiplicity of Motivations Drives People to Join Violent Extremist Groups

Individuals who join violent extremist or friend as the incident that motivated groups do not ﬁ t a single proﬁ le or follow them to join an extremist group.

a single trajectory. A growing body of • Desire for a sense of community, empirical research on violent extremism social belonging, and recognition is a across different regions and groups fi nds motivation, particularly when family that motivations are complex and context members or friends already are specifi c, and that coercion by armed members of a group. Alternatively, the groups plays a strong role as well. group may fi ll a gap in social belonging, especially for individuals Motivations when individuals who report low parental involvement join voluntarily during their childhood, a lack of friends, and poor integration with • Perception of injustice at the hands of peers and the community at large. the state is suggested to be a strong Recruiters often appeal to this desire motivation, along with a sense of for social membership and social frustration with the state. These recognition by portraying the group as grievances toward the state may a fellowship. revolve around elite corruption and perceptions that the state is • Prospects for earning income and illegitimate. Members of social groups economic empowerment are rarely who feel marginalized or excluded the main reason for joining, but in experience such grievances most some cases may motivate poor youth acutely. The narrative offered by some and educated middle-class youth with violent extremist groups of an higher expectations of social mobility. egalitarian and moral order, marked by • The need for physical protection is justice and fairness, may appear to be cited as a motivating factor. In a an attractive alternative. confl ict context that is dangerous and

• Experience of violence, persecution, unstable, and notably when the and repression from the state, notably presence of the state is weak, by its police and military forces against individuals may join an extremist family members and friends, is a group to protect themselves or their documented tipping point for family, broader group, or property. individuals to voluntarily join violent • Women or girls may seek other extremist groups. In UNDP’s (2017b) ways to assert their identity and study, 71 percent of respondents cited independence as a result of the killing or arrest of a family member gender-based inequality, (Box continued next page)

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 121 BOX 4.4 A Multiplicity of Motivations Drives People to Join Violent Extremist Groups (continued)

discrimination in society, and education, that is, higher-than-average domestic abuse, by assuming years of religious schooling, was found different roles in groups. to be a source of resilience against

• A sense of greater purpose and recruitment for violent extremist causes. sacriﬁ ce for a transcendental— When individuals join involuntarily religious, ethnic, or ideological—cause perceived to be under threat is a • Extremist groups use physical powerful motivator. coercion such as torture, rape, and kidnapping. • A lack of religious literacy may increase the propensity to buy into religious • Such groups also use threats to kill, extremist narratives. Whether injure, and rape. Individuals may also attributable to a purely secular feel that they or their family, friends, or education, or no or low-quality community are threatened, for education, a lack of religious literacy example, with starvation or other increases susceptibility to extremism deprivation. As a militant group more broadly, because an individual establishes social or territorial control may not be equipped with a thorough over a community, community understanding of religious tenets or members may feel themselves trapped critical thinking skills. In Africa, religious into joining or supporting a group.

Sources: McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Christmann 2012; Sjoberg and Wood 2015; Atran 2016; Devarajan et al. 2016; ISS 2016; Mercy Corps 2016; Sjoberg and Gentry 2016; UN Women 2016; World Bank Group IEG 2016; Bhatia and Ghanem 2017; UNDP 2017b.

Perceptions of Exclusion Recent studies have shifted from mea- and Unfairness in Violent suring group-level grievances expressed by Confl ict Risk leaders to measuring individual-level perceptions assessed from survey questions. Perceptions play a powerful role in creating The shift refl ects the view that objective feelings of exclusion and injustice that may inequality results in violent confl ict only if a be mobilized toward violence. Indeed, evi- suffi cient number of group members view dence suggests that perceptions of exclusion the inequality as unjust and can cast blame and inequality often matter more for their on another group or on the state (Cederman, potential for mobilization than do mea- Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). sured inequality and exclusion (Gurr 1970). Most studies that use these various Studies that fi nd a relationship between types of perception measures fi nd a posi- objective horizontal inequality and violent tive correlation between perceptions and confl ict assume that the relationship is behavior or attitudes that would favor vio- mediated through perceptions (Østby lence. For example, respondents’ percep- 2008a; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; tion that the government was treating their 11 Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). group unfairly was found to be associated However, the correlation between objective with an increased rate of participation in and perceived horizontal inequality is not as demonstrations and also higher levels of high as might be expected (see box 4.5). support for violence. Hillesund (2015) Better data are needed to provide more confi nds that Palestinians were more likely to clusive evidence on perceptions and their support violent over nonviolent actions importance in relation to objective inequal- when they assessed the political and ity and exclusion measures. human rights situation as poor (Kirwin and

122 Pathways for Peace BOX 4.5 Measuring Collective Grievances through Perceptions

One strand of the literature is built on identifi cation because the question survey questions about individuals’ living specifi cally refers to the ethnic group conditions, which are aggregated into to which respondents belong and with group- or regional-level measures and which they identify. compared across groups, regions, or Finally, a third strand of the literature national averages (Must 2016; Rustad focuses on answers to survey questions 2016). This approach has been criticized about how frequently individual group on a number of grounds. One argument members feel their group is treated is that individuals may view their own unfairly by the government (Kirwin and living conditions differently than do other Cho 2009; Miodownik and Nir 2016). members of their group. Another is that This approach is more comprehensive this measure does not account for group because the question, in principle, identifi cation, which is key in comparing covers various dimensions of injustice.b the aggrieved group and other groups. However, the pertinent question also An additional criticism is that it is not forces the respondent to evaluate the clear which reference group to use as a situation as fair or unfair and also to comparison—the national average, the assign blame for the situation to the largest group in the country, or the government, while in many cases the largest group in the region. Rustad situation is more complex than that. (2016) argues that the reference group The second strand of literature tries should be the largest group in the region to capture perceptions of inequality, because people most likely compare whereas this third strand captures the themselves to groups that are near them level of collective grievance of certain geographically. She applies this in a ethnic groups. Indicators to measure study of perceived horizontal inequalities Sustainable Development Goal targets in the Niger Delta. 16.6 and 16.7 are being developed along A second strand of the literature the third strand (proportion of population, uses questions about perceived by sex, age, disability, and population horizontal inequalitya or groups’ relative group, who believe decision making is political infl uence in surveys, such as inclusive and responsive; and proportion Afrobarometer (Miodownik and Nir of the population satisfi ed with their 2016; Must 2016). This strand alleviates last experience of public services, some of the issues regarding group respectively).

a. One such question from Afrobarometer is “Think about the condition of [respondent’s ethnic group]. Are their economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country?” b. The question from the Afrobarometer third round is “How often are [respondent’s ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government?”

Cho 2009; Miodownik and Nir 2016). satisfaction, driven by perceived declining Cross-country studies fi nd support for the living standards related to a shortage of idea that perceptions affect people’s will- formal sector jobs, corruption, and dissat- ingness to engage in confl ict. Using all isfaction with the quality of public the measures described in box 4.5 as well services. as data from Afrobarometer and the World Not all empirical results point to the Values Survey, Must (2016) fi nds that per- same conclusion, however. Miodownik and ceptions of political inequality and unfair Nir (2016) construct a measure of hori- treatment by the government also motivate zontal inequality from survey questions in people toward violence. Devarajan and the third and fourth Afrobarometer12 Ianchovichina (2017) fi nd that the Arab rounds that asked respondents whether Spring uprisings can be explained in part they considered their ethnic group’s eco- by subjective feelings of a decline in life nomic and political condition to be worse,

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 123 the same, or better than that of other direct or aggregate measures of perceived groups in their country. The authors fi nd material inequality. the following: The Gap between Objective and • Perceptions of group political depriva- Perceived Inequalities tion were associated with a lower risk of As discussed earlier, perceptions are cru- participation in demonstrations among cial in explaining the effect of inequality African individuals, along with lower and exclusion on conflict. However, in the support for violence. absence of data, it is commonly assumed • Perceptions of group economic depriva- that perceptions of inequality will likely tion had no discernable effect. A study correspond to objective measures of across four states in Nigeria (Rustad inequality (Stewart 2002a; Cederman, 2016) fi nds evidence that individuals Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). Studies who rated their conditions as poor were therefore have focused on the relationship more likely to express support for vio- of the objective inequality to violent con- lence in their attitudes. However, the flict—with mixed conclusions. Some find fi ndings were different when aggregated support for the argument that there is a to the group level: belonging to a dis- correspondence (Gurr 1993; Holmqvist trict or ethnic group where the average 2012); yet other studies find instead that score of self-reported conditions was often perceptions do not correspond to much poorer than that in the richest or the objective reality (Langer and Smedts largest group was associated with lower 2013). In a survey that includes Nigeria support for violence. This fi nding could and Ghana, Langer and Ukiwo (2008) be evidence that members of relatively find a discrepancy between objective privileged groups are more likely to sup- actual conditions and group members’ port violence. perceptions of access to political power and education. Rustad’s (2016) study in There is more evidence of a robust rela- the Niger Delta also finds little overlap tionship between perceptions and violent between the objective and perceived confl ict when perceptions are couched as income levels of different ethnic groups unfair government treatment rather than in (see figure 4.2).13

FIGURE 4.2 Perceived and Objective Horizontal Inequality of Ethnic Groups in Nigeria

3.9 0.6 3.8 0.4 3.7 0.2 3.6 0 3.5 –0.2 3.4 –0.4 3.3 –0.6 Horizontal inequality 3.2 –0.8 3.1 –1.0 3.0 –1.2 Ogoni Nigerian Igbo Others Yoruba Edo Itsekiri Urhobo Ijaw Isoko Ethnic groups Perceived horizontal inequality Actual horizontal inequality

Source: Rustad 2016.

124 Pathways for Peace Exclusion, Identity, Exclusion based on identity is at the Grievances, and heart of many confl icts. It is generally recog- Mobilization to Violence nized that identity is fungible, neither static nor exclusive (Woolcock 2014). Different Violent confl ict is not the inevitable outcome identities tend to become salient at different in a society or state in which there is horizon- times and in different circumstances, and tal inequality among groups, exclusion, and thus are context specifi c in their importance perceived exclusion. Many social groups may to mobilization to violent confl ict (see feel excluded or may objectively suffer from box 4.6). For example, castes became politi- exclusion; inequality is present in most, if not cally salient in India only after the British all, countries. But only in very few countries began conducting national censuses, which will these circumstances lead fi rst to group- required respondents to be placed into fi xed based grievances and then to violent confl ict. demographic categories that were deter- Despite the relatively little in-depth research mined by the British themselves (Dirks around these transformations, this section 2001; Woolcock 2014). Similarly, Posner explores evidence that has emerged on the (2007) documents how leaders in Zambia progression from exclusion to grievance, and and Kenya emphasized national-level ethnic then from grievance to violent confl ict. cleavages to incite violence.

BOX 4.6 Identity and Mobilization to Violence: The Demographics and the Dynamics of Difference

Many studies on the association of are increasingly studying what might horizontal inequality with violent confl ict be called the dynamics of difference— use social factors such as ethnicity, the conditions under which particular religion, and language as group aspects of people’s identities can be identifi ers. For example, contrary to mobilized for large-scale collective action, prevailing belief, recent evidence whether for constructive or harmful suggests that confl ict may be more likely purposes (Weber 1976; Mamdani 1996; within linguistic dyads than within Marx 1998; Baiocchi 2010). Needless religious ones. Moreover, Bormann, to say, this juxtaposition—between Cederman, and Vogt (2015) fi nd no the demographics and the dynamics support for the thesis that Muslim of difference—is perhaps overly groups are particularly confl ict prone. simplifi ed (indeed, students of ethnicity Social identity, however, is not a static seem to revel in creating ever-fi ner demographic characteristic. Individuals distinctions when locating themselves have multiple, overlapping forms and in the theoretical landscape), but for sources of identity that only become present purposes it is a fruitful one for politically salient under particular elucidating the key differences between conditions. For example, Kingston, most economists and many other social Jamaica, is essentially monoethnic from scientists studying ethnicity and violence. a demographic perspective, is vibrantly For example, careful micro-level democratic, and does not have unduly studies of the conditions under which high economic inequality. Yet it is one of ethnicity can or cannot be mobilized for the most violent cities in the world. the purposes of violence (Varshney 2002; Why? Because political leaders are able Posner 2004) suggest, as McGovern to mobilize politically salient (but (2011, 350) notes, “that participants in statistically unobservable) forms of violent politics are operating according social identity to protect their space and to rational and irrational choice models expand their markets (Duncan-Waite and at once. Such ‘irrational choice’ models Woolcock 2008). must account for the presence and Rather than looking at demographics signifi cance of actors’ desires for of difference, some social scientists respect, honor, adulation, and revenge.”

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 125 The existence of diverse identity groups of two large groups of similar size—for does not, by itself, move people to collective example, when a large minority is in confl ict action. Nor does the prevalence of inequali- with a large minority—presents the highest ties across those groups. There are plenty of likelihood of violent confl ict. examples of diverse societies with distribu- Exclusion and grievances can result in tional differences on various dimensions collective mobilization; however, collective that do not create frustration and that are mobilization does not always result in vio- accepted by people. lence. Some movements take a nonviolent The process of grievance formation approach, using tactics such as boycotts, around inequalities appears to be the link marches, sit-ins, strikes, and silent vigils. between the existence of those inequalities Societies in which people feel the system is and whether they generate some kind of col- just and responsive to their grievances are lective action. Cederman, Gleditsch, and societies most likely to be able to peacefully Buhaug (2013) explore this process, arguing express grievances. In turn, social move- that inequalities have to be politicized to ments that do not use violence tend to be become grievances. They identify three nec- more successful. Chenoweth and Stephan essary steps for this politicization of griev- (2011) fi nd that nonviolent movements with ances: First, there must be well-defi ned and political aims are twice as successful, on aver- separate identifi able groups in society.14 age, in achieving their objectives than those Second, a group must be able to compare that use violence, and pave the way to more itself and its status to other groups, either by durable and internally peaceful societies. objective measures or perceptions. Finally, What, then, are the factors that infl uence groups must frame the intergroup inequality whether collective mobilization involves as unfair and assign blame to another group violence? Justino (2017, 3) argues that The wider literature on social move- “whether social mobilization motivated by ments includes some similar discussion of inequalities may turn violent is ultimately grievance formation. For example, a feeling conditional on how people, individually or of injustice and assignment of blame have in groups, perceive themselves in relation to been identifi ed as necessary to the transfor- others in society” (see fi gure 4.3). She dis- mation of inequality and exclusion into tinguishes four types of collective mobiliza- grievance (Tarrow 2011). However, group tion ranging from peaceful to violent: perceptions may differ in different contexts, and what one group perceives as just at one • Peaceful social mobilization is a feature time may be perceived as unjust by the same of democratic settings in which citizens group at a different time.15 and groups express their grievances and The severity of polarization among demands through peaceful means, includ- groups in a society also infl uences how or ing legal demonstrations, petition signing, whether inequalities and perceived exclu- and contacting government offi cials.16 sion translate into grievances, and then into • Covert social resistance tends to take place violent confl ict. Scholars generally agree in settings of weak democratic institu- that ethnic polarization is a strong predictor tions in which power rests mainly in the of violent confl ict (Montalvo and Reynal- hands of strong elites and less privileged Querol 2012; Bader and Ianchovichina groups are excluded. Mobilization tends 2017). Some studies suggest a strong rela- to be informal or less organized and tionship between polarization and the risk refl ects some sort of agreement among of genocide (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol less privileged groups at the bottom of the 2008). Horowitz (2000) argues that more distribution to resist the power of elites. homogeneous societies tend to be less vio- • Fragmented social mobilization occurs lent than highly heterogeneous societies, when social agreements are not possible. and that more confl icts occur in societies in • Violent social mobilization occurs when which a large ethnic minority faces an eth- different groups engage in violent action nic majority. Similarly, Easterly, Ritzen, and to resolve disputes with other groups or Woolcock (2006) fi nd that the polarization with the state.

126 Pathways for Peace FIGURE 4.3 A Typology of Social Mobilization

Within-group coordination

High Low

Cooperation Peaceful social mobilization Convert social resistance Between-group relations Antagonism Violent social mobilization Fragmented social mobilization

Source: Justino 2017.

Most often, collective mobilization recruitment and resources to sustain driven by grievances is channeled toward their cause (McCarthy and Zald 1977; confl ict with the state rather than against Cederman, Buhaug, and Rød 2009). another group or groups (Stewart 2002a). For example, Posner (2004) fi nds that This occurs especially if the state is seen as the main reason Chewas and Tumbukas “captured” for the economic benefi t or are allies in Zambia and adversaries in interest of a specifi c socioeconomic group, Malawi stems from the different size of or when the state is seen as acting solely to each group relative to each country’s protect its own interests. Cederman, national political arena. In Malawi, he Wimmer, and Min (2010) suggest confl ict notes, Chewas and Tumbukas are large with the government is more likely when groups, and thus serve as viable bases for the following three conditions prevail: political coalition building. In Zambia, both groups are relatively small com- 1. A group or its representatives are excluded pared with the country as a whole, thus from executive power, especially after a making it more diffi cult and less useful loss of power. The recent loss of power to mobilize for political support. or prestige of excluded groups produces 3. The group has experienced violent con- feelings of anger and resentment and fl ict in the past. Historical memories of increases the impulse to fi ght to change past confl icts infl uence the likelihood the situation. Call (2012) fi nds that per- of current confl ict. They enable group ceived exclusionary behavior after inter- members to see violence as a possibility, nal armed confl icts correlates highly in that they have already experienced with confl ict recurrence. Ghatak (2016) violence. Narratives of past confl icts also fi nds that exclusion of small numbers of play an important role in the likelihood people from state power likely results in of present confl ict. Having a group his- domestic terrorism; civil war is highly tory that narrates a one-sided story and likely when the number of politically that perpetuates past violent experiences excluded groups increases. Cederman, through oral histories, public rituals, or Wimmer, and Min (2010) fi nd that the in offi cial textbooks can create structures likelihood of violent confl ict decreases and identities that can be reactivated for when social or cultural group leaders violent purposes. gain access to state power. 2. The group can mobilize large numbers of The way the state relates to different people. Mobilization and violent contes- groups in society greatly determines how tation require both motivation and orga- and whether grievances form against it (box nizational capacity (Gurr 2000). Larger 4.7). The literature has long examined the groups not only enjoy more legitimacy relationship between abuse by the state and but also can draw on their networks for popular dissent, and it is quite clear on how

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 127 BOX 4.7 State Violence and Conflict Risk

An analysis developed for this study (Cingranelli et al. analysis, based on samples of nearly 150 nation-states 2017) considers how torture, disappearance, political during the period 1990–2015, shows that countries imprisonment, and extrajudicial killing contributed to with fewer violations of physical integrity rights the risks of onset and escalation (or de-escalation) of witnessed, on average, 37 percent fewer violent three types of violent conﬂ ict within states: violent protests, 79 percent fewer terrorist attacks, and 86 protests, domestic terrorism, and civil war. This percent fewer civil war deaths (see ﬁ gure B4.7.1).

FIGURE B4.7.1 Risks to Onset and Escalation of Violent Conflict

a. Violent protests b. Terrorist attacks 2.0 200

1.5 150

1.0 100 Number Number 0.5 50

0 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Year Year c. Civil war deaths 1,500

1,000

Number 500

0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Year High-respect countries Low-respect countries

Source: Cingranelli et al. 2017.

government abuse increases both the scope escalation of existing political confl icts. and intensity of the population’s grievances Work by Mason and Krane (1989) and by and the risk of onset and escalation of vio- Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) shows how lent confl ict. Goodwin (2001) concludes indiscriminate state violence against civilian that government abuse creates the belief populations generates grievances and among the population that armed revolt pushes civilians into violence. Cederman against an unjust and abusive regime is the et al. (2017) fi nd evidence that the state-led only alternative. Thoms and Ron (2007) civilian victimization of particular ethnic show that violations of physical integrity groups increases the likelihood that the by state actors are associated with the group becomes involved in ethnic civil war.

128 Pathways for Peace Furthermore, studies by Piazza (2017) and collective memories can trigger emotional Bakker, Hill, and Moore (2016) note that as and violent reactions. For example, during state actors engage in higher levels of violent the confl ict in Chechnya in the 1990s, coercion and physical repression against the Chechen leaders evoked collective memo- population, the risk of terrorist violence ries of past wars and mass deportations, directed against the state and its population recalling feelings of humiliation to justify a increases steeply. violent struggle for self-determination (Campana 2009). The Role of Emotions in Collective feelings of humiliation and Mobilizing Groups injustice, as indicated in the Chechen People come together in social groups for a case, can be especially potent motivating kaleidoscope of subjective and objective factors. Khosrokhavar (2017) suggests reasons. They may share feelings, history, that collective mobilization is more likely narratives of pain, frustrations, or identi- when feelings of injustice are coupled ties that motivate them to collective action with resentment. in different ways, at different times, and in Unmet expectations and thwarted aspi- the face of different situations. A body of rations can be a source of frustration that scholarly literature argues that these rea- drives mobilization to violence. As dis- sons may contribute, alone or in combina- cussed in chapter 2 and earlier in this tion with inequality and exclusion, to the chapter, limited access to employment and mobilization of groups to violent action. livelihood opportunities can affect the rites Understanding how emotions, among of passage to adulthood, including marriage other causes, play a role in the production and starting families, and leaves many of violent confl ict can also provide policy young people feeling frustrated, uncertain, makers with an understanding of how and angry (Kraetsch 2008). Some authors emotions can also play a role in the cre- suggest that radicalism can emerge among ation of more peaceful societies. the highly educated young people that go Emotions are intertwined with griev- through these experiences (Al-Azmeh ances, both triggering and sustaining col- 2006). However, these same frustrations can lective violence (Horowitz 2001; Petersen lead some, including young people, to 2002; Sargsyan 2017). Fear, for instance, become activists and peace builders.18 can bond people into a group that mobi- lizes for violence, as when an attack or The Power of Elites and Narratives shock from outside results in a collective Elites and leaders play a critical role in mobi- response to the perceived threat. Petersen lizing grievances and shaping narratives that (2002) suggests that fear, rage, hatred, and may steer groups toward, or away from, vio- resentment all play a role in ethnic violent action. Elite theories of confl ict suggest lence, but that different emotions result in that collective violence is not a result of different outcomes. He argues that resent- spontaneous eruptions of anger, but rather, ment over loss of political power or a in some cases, that elites plan and organize decline in status is especially potent, while violence with the objective of increasing violent experiences result in fear and anger, group cohesion and maintaining a loyal sup- and prejudice and stigma bring about con- port base (Demmers 2016). Fearon and tempt and hatred. For example, Serbs’ Laitin (2000, 853) argue that “elites foment change in status in Kosovo resulted in feel- ethnic violence to build support [and that] ings of resentment that fueled repression this process has the effect of constructing against Kosovo-Albanians.17 more antagonistic identities, which favors Collective memory, too, plays into more violence.” When elites feel threatened, the mobilization of group grievances often because of “past oppression,” they tend (Durkheim, Pocock, and Peristiany 1953; to organize and defend themselves, giving Le Goff 1992). As Ross (2007) argues, inter- rise to internal security stresses (World Bank pretations of events are as important as the 2011). Horowitz (2000) suggests that elites events themselves, and in confl ict situations, may initiate confl ict along ethnic lines to

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 129 deepen ethnic divisions—thus increasing provide evidence of a straightforward path polarization—to strengthen their position between the two. Nevertheless, this study in society and to exploit power. Failing to argues that inequality and exclusion—even act can also be an elite tactic: in some merely the perception of exclusion—can cases, elites decide not to act or not to imple- evolve into group-based grievances. ment certain benefi cial policies because Whether collective mobilization becomes doing so would challenge the status quo violent depends on a variety of factors, but (World Bank 2017b). is greatly infl uenced by whether aggrieved Elites exert strong infl uence on collective groups perceive themselves to have viable, mobilization through the narratives they cre- peaceful alternatives for expressing griev- ate around their group’s experiences. ances. Risks are heightened if leaders are Narratives are stories that represent “the ways able to hook into grievances and assign in which we construct disparate facts in our blame to another group. Oftentimes emo- own worlds and weave them together cogni- tions are called upon in narratives that tively in order to make sense of our reality” incite violence. (Patterson and Monroe 1998, 315). They Very often the state is perceived to be the appeal to emotions, and an especially charis- source of grievance, and becomes the target matic leader can invest the narrative with great of collective mobilization. An aggrieved power. Elites and other actors can use narra- group may see the state as acting in its own tives to build social cohesion, as described in interest or as controlled by a group that is chapter 6. A narrative around inclusion, such using the state for its exclusive benefi t. The as around the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable state also may be incapable of dealing with Development, could avert mobilization to intergroup grievances or, in the worst-case violence when there is risk of confl ict. scenario, may aggravate these tensions Elites also may use narratives to manipu- through abuses or discriminatory behavior late perceptions and memories to mobilize toward specifi c groups. Addressing exclusion individuals toward collective violence. and horizontal inequality is therefore Shesterinina (2016), for example, fi nds that important as a prevention strategy. Chapter a narrative can lead civilians to fi ght and 5 now turns to key spaces where exclusion is others to freeze or fl ee, and that the response felt most acutely, and where grievances tend depends upon how local elites translate to concentrate. national threats and on how populations perceive such narratives. Collective experiences of injustice or Notes violence and coercive measures by the state 1. Chapter 1 of this report assesses the limita- that are perceived as targeting certain tions and challenges of measuring violent groups only reinforce the power of narra- confl ict. tives and harden group boundaries. Media, 2. On education, see UNICEF (2015). On both private and government controlled, infant mortality (for Indonesia only), see play a large role today in shaping narratives Østby et al. (2011); Cederman, Gleditsch, that can either reduce or infl ame grievances and Buhaug (2013). (Sargsyan 2017), a role that is more salient 3. See the subsection “Perceptions of Exclusion than ever with the rapid growth of informa- and Unfairness in Violent Confl ict Risk” in tion and communication technology, as this chapter for more discussion. discussed in chapter 2. 4. This is addressed in the “The Multiple and Intersecting Dimensions of Exclusion” Conclusion section. 5. See “Ethnic Power Relations Dataset Family Horizontal inequalities and exclusion are 2014” at https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/. important factors in modern violent con- 6. Most quantitative studies use education as a fl ict, although in and of themselves they are proxy for inequality generally and do not not suffi cient to mobilize groups to vio- distinguish between the impacts of eco- lence. The available research does not nomic and social inequalities. It is diffi cult

130 Pathways for Peace in this case to assess the importance solely of Africa, edited by J. Abbink and I. Kessel, 1–34. social inequalities. Boston, MA: Brill. 7. “Politically relevant groups” are defi ned as Al-Azmeh, A. 2006. Making Governance Work those that are active in national politics or against Radicalisation. Copenhagen: Danish discriminated against by the government. Institute for International Studies. They comprise a subset of all groups Alesina, A., S. Michalopoulos, and E. observed, and are potentially subject to bias Papaioannou. 2016. “Ethnic Inequality.” because, for example, excluded groups that Journal of Political Economy 124 (2): 428–88. are not active are not represented in the data. Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi. 2007. Women 8. The data set produces 32,567 “group-years.” Building Peace: What They Do, Why It Matters. 9. WomanStats (n.d.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 10. The United Nations uses the range of 15–24 Asal, V., M. Findley, J. A. Piazza, and J. I. Walsh. years of age for statistical reasons when dis- 2016. “Political Exclusion, Oil, and Ethnic cussing youth, and recognizes national and Armed Confl ict.” Journal of Confl ict regional defi nitions of youth. However, Resolution 60 (8): 1343–67. SCR 2250 (UNSC 2015b) uses 18–29 years Aspinall, E. 2007. “The Construction of to avoid overlap with resolutions on chil- Grievance: Natural Resources and Identity in dren in armed confl ict. a Separatist Confl ict.” Journal of Confl ict 11. The assumption is that objective inequality Resolution 51 (6): 950–72. Atran, Scott. 2016. “The Devoted Actor: leads to perceived deprivation, which Unconditional Commitment and Intractable increases the likelihood to take part in Confl ict across Cultures.” Current confl ict. Anthropology 57 (S13): S192–S203. 12. Afrobarometer is a pan-African, nonparti- Atran, Scott, and J. Ginges. 2012. “Religious and san research network that conducts public Sacred Imperatives in Human Confl ict.” attitude surveys on democracy, governance, Science 336 (6083): 855–57. http://www economic conditions, and related issues in .princeton.edu/~acoman/Projects_files more than 35 countries in Africa. /Science-2012-Scott-Jeremy.pdf. 13. Objective horizontal inequality is measured Atran, Scott, and Douglas M. Stone. 2015. “The as a wealth index of items that the survey Kurds’ Heroic Stand against ISIS.” New York respondent owns. Times, March 16. http://www.nytimes 14. As Stewart (2000) notes, the presence of .com/2015/03/16/opinion/the-kurds-heroic horizontal inequalities already, to a certain -stand-against-isis.html. extent, assumes the existence of well-defi ned Bader, S. A., and E. Ianchovichina. 2017. groups. “Polarization, Foreign Military Interventions, 15. Marc et al. (2012) discuss different criteria and Civil Confl icts.” Working Paper, World for assessing fairness. Bank, Washington, DC. http://siteresources 16. Nonviolent movements use tactics such as .worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources marches, consumer boycotts, sit-ins, labor / PolarizationForeignMilitaryInterventions strikes, and silent vigils. Examples of nonvi- andCivilConfl ictspaper.pdf. olent movements in history include the U.S. Baiocchi, G. A. 2010. “The Politics of Habitus: civil rights movement and the Yellow Publics, Blackness and Community Activism Revolution in the Philippines. in Salvador, Brazil.” Qualitative Sociology 33 17. All references to Kosovo shall be understood (3): 369–88. in the context of UN Security Council Bakker, Ryan, Daniel W. Hill, and Will H. Moore. Resolution 1244 (1999). 2016. “How Much Terror? Dissidents, 18. For most, feelings of frustration do not lead Governments, Institutions, and the Cross- to violence. National Study of Terror Attacks.” Journal of Peace Research 53 (5): 711–26. References Bannon, Ian, and Maria Correia. 2006. The Other Half of Gender: Men’s Issues in Development. Abbink, Jon. 2005. “Being Young in Africa: The Washington, DC: World Bank. https:// Politics of Despair and Renewal.” In Vanguard openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Confl ict in /10986/7029.

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 131 Barrett, Robert S. 2011. “Interviews with Killers: Call, Charles T. 2012. “UN Mediation and the Six Types of Combatants and Their Motivations Politics of Transition after Constitutional for Joining Deadly Groups.” Studies in Confl ict Crises.” International Peace Institute Policy and Terrorism 34 (10): 749–64. Papers, International Peace Institute, Bartusevicˇius, H. 2014. “The Inequality-Confl ict New York. https://www.ipinst.org/2012/02 Nexus Re-examined: Income, Education and / un -mediation-and-the-politics-of-transition Popular Rebellions.” Journal of Peace Research -after-constitutional-crises-2. 51 (1): 35–50. Campana, A. 2009. “Collective Memory and Besançon, Marie L. 2005. “Relative Resources: Violence: The Use of Myths in the Chechen Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions, and Separatist Ideology, 1991–1994.” Journal of Genocides.” Journal of Peace Research 42 (4): Muslim Minority Affairs 29 (1): 43–56. doi: 393–415. 10.1080/13602000902726756. Bhatia, Kartika, and Hafez Ghanem. 2017. “How Caprioli, M. 2000. “Gendered Confl ict.” Journal Do Education and Unemployment Affect of Peace Research 37 (1): 51–68. Support for Violent Extremism? Evidence ———. 2005. “Primed for Violence: The Role of from Eight Arab Countries.” Global Economy Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal and Development Working Paper 102, Confl ict.” International Studies Quarterly Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 49 (2): 161–78. doi: 10.1111/j.0020-8833 Bircan, C., T. Bruck, and M. Vothknecht. 2017. .2005.00340.x. “Violent Confl ict and Inequality.” Oxford Caprioli, M., and M. Boyer. 2001. “Gender, Development Studies 45 (2): 125–44. Violence, and International Crisis.” Journal of Bloom, M. 2005. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Confl ict Resolution 45: 503–18. Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia Caprioli, M., V. Hudson, R. McDermott, C. University Press. Emmett, and B. Ballif-Spanvill. 2007. “Putting ———. 2011. Bombshell: Women and Terrorism. Women in Their Place.” Baker Journal of Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Applied Public Policy 1 (1): 12–22. Press. Caprioli, M., and P. F. Tumbore. 2003. “Ethnic Bormann, Nils-Christian, Lars-Erik Cederman, Discrimination and Interstate Violence: and Manuel Vogt. 2015. “Language, Religion, Testing the International Impact of Domestic and Ethnic Civil War.” Journal of Confl ict Behavior.” Journal of Peace Research 40 (1): Resolution 61 (4): 1–28. 5–23. Botha, Anneli. 2013. “Assessing the Vulnerability Cederman, Lars-Erik, Halvard Buhaug, and Jan of Kenyan Youths to Radicalism and Ketil Rød. 2009. “Ethno-Nationalist Dyads Extremism.” ISS Paper 245, Institute for and Civil War: A GIS-Based Analysis.” Journal Security Studies, Pretoria. http://www.issaf of Confl ict Resolution 53 (4): 496–525. rica.org/uploads/Paper245.pdf. doi:10.1177/0022002709336455. Boudet, A. M. M., P. Petesch, C. Turk, and A. Cederman, Lars-Erik, K. Gleditsch, and H. Thumala. 2012. On Norms and Agency: Buhaug. 2013. Inequality, Grievances, and Conversations about Gender Equality with Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Women and Men in 20 Countries. Washington, Press. DC: World Bank. Cederman, Lars-Erik, Simon Hug, Livia I. Brown, G. 2010. “The Political Economy of Schubiger, and Francisco Villamil. 2017. Secessionism: Identity, Inequality and the “Civilian Victimization and Ethnic Civil State.” Bath Paper in International War.” Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting Development 9, University of Bath, Bath, UK. of the American Political Science Association, Brown, K. 2014. “Why Are Western Women San Francisco, CA, August 31–September 3. Joining Islamic State?” BBC News Online, Cederman, Lars-Erik, N. B. Weidmann, and October 4. http://www.bbc.com/news N.-C. Bormann. 2015. “Triangulating /uk-29507410. Horizontal Inequality: Toward Improved Buhaug, H., L.-E. Cederman, and K. S. Gleditsch. Confl ict Analysis.” Journal of Peace Research 2014. “Square Pegs in Round Holes: 52 (6): 806–21. Inequalities, Grievances, and Civil War.” Cederman, Lars-Erik, N. B. Weidmann, and K. S. International Studies Quarterly 58 (2): Gleditsch. 2011. “Horizontal Inequalities and 418–31. Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global

132 Pathways for Peace Comparison.” American Political Science Demmers, J. 2016. Theories of Violent Confl ict. Review 105 (3): 478–95. Milton, UK: Taylor and Francis. Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Devarajan, S., and E. Ianchovichina. 2017. “A Brian Min. 2010. “Why Do Ethnic Groups Broken Social Contract, Not High Inequality, Rebel? New Data and Analysis.” World Politics Led to the Arab Spring.” Review of Income 62 (1): 87–119. and Wealth 18 (2): 1–4. Celiku, B., and A. C. Kraay. 2017. “Predicting Devarajan, Shantayanan, Lili Mottaghi, Quy-Toan Confl ict.” Policy Research Working Paper Do, Anne Brockmeyer, Clement Jean Edouard 8075, World Bank, Washington, DC. Joubert, Kartika Bhatia, Mohamed Abdel Jelil, CeSID (Center for Free Elections and Radwan Ali Shaban, Isabelle Chaal-Dabi, and Democracy). 2017. “Survey of the Drivers of Nathalie Lenoble. 2016. MENA Economic Youth Radicalism and Violent Extremism in Monitor: Economic and Social Inclusion to Prevent Serbia.” Report prepared in cooperation with Violent Extremism. Washington, DC: World UNDP Serbia, Belgrade. Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org Chenoweth, E., and M. J. Stephan. 2011. Why /curated/en /409591474983005625/Economic Civil Resistance Works. New York: Columbia -and -social-inclusion-to-prevent-violent University Press. -extremism. Christmann, Kris. 2012. “Preventing Religious Dirks, N. 2001. Castes of Mind: Colonialism and Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A the Making of Modern India. Princeton, NJ: Systematic Review of the Research Evidence.” Princeton University Press. Research Report. Youth Justice Board for Duncan-Waite, I., and M. Woolcock. 2008. England and Wales. “Arrested Development: The Political Origins Cingranelli, D., M. Gibney, P. Haschke, R. Wood, and Socioeconomic Foundations of D. Arnon, and B. Mark. 2017. “Human Rights Common Violence in Jamaica.” Brooks World Violations and Violent Confl ict.” Background Poverty Institute Working Paper 2008/6/1, paper for the United Nations–World Bank University of Manchester. Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Durkheim, E., D. Pocock, and J. Peristiany. 1953. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Sociology and Philosophy. London: Routledge. World Bank, Washington, DC. Easterly, W., J. Ritzen, and M. Woolcock. 2006. Collier, P. 2000. “Doing Well Out of War: An “Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth.” Economic Perspective.” In Greed and Working Paper 94, Center for Global Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Development, Washington, DC. edited by M. Berdal and D. M. Malone, EIP (European Institute of Peace). 2017. 91–111. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. “Molenbeek and Violent Radicalization: ‘A Collier, P., V. L. Elliot, H. Hegre, A. Hoeffl er, M. Social Mapping.’” EIP, Brussels. Reynal-Querol, and N. Sambanis. 2003. Breaking Fearon, James. 2010. “Governance and Civil the Confl ict Trap: Civil War and Development War Onset.” Background paper for World Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank. Development Report 2011: Confl ict, Collier, P., and A. Hoeffl er. 2004. “Greed and Security, and Development, World Bank, Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Washington, DC. Papers 56 (4): 563–95. Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 2000. Cramer, Christopher. 2003. “Does Inequality “Violence and the Social Construction of Cause Confl ict?” Journal of International Ethnic Identity.” International Organization Development 15 (4): 397–412. 54 (4): 845–77. Crespo-Sancho, Catalina. 2017. “Confl ict ———. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil Prevention and Gender.” Background paper War.” American Political Science Review 97: for the United Nations–World Bank Flagship 75–90. Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Fjelde, H., and G. Østby. 2014. “Socioeconomic Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Inequality and Communal Confl ict: A World Bank, Washington, DC. Disaggregated Analysis of Sub-Saharan Deininger, Klaus. 2003. “Causes and Africa, 1990–2008.” International Interactions Consequences of Civil Strife: Micro-Level 40 (5): 737–62. Evidence from Uganda.” Oxford Economic Ghatak, S. 2016. “The Role of Political Exclusion Papers 55 (4): 579–606. and State Capacity in Civil Confl ict in

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 133 South Asia.” Terrorism and Political Violence Security of States.” International Security 33 (3): 1–23. doi: 10.1080/09546553.2016.1150840. 7–45. doi: 10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.7. Ginges, Jeremy, Scott Atran, Douglas Medin, and Idris, I. 2016. Youth Unemployment and Violence: Khalil Shikaki. 2007. “Sacred Bounds on Rapid Literature Review. Birmingham, UK: Rational Resolution of Violent Political GSDRC, University of Birmingham. Confl ict.” Proceedings of the National Academy ISS (Institute for Security Studies). 2016. “Mali’s of Sciences 104 (18): 7357–60. Young ‘Jihadists’—Fuelled by Faith or GIWPS (Georgetown Institute for Women, Circumstance?” Policy Brief 89, ISS, Pretoria. Peace and Security) and PRIO (Peace Jones, B., M. Elgin-Cossart, and J. Esberg. 2012. Research Institute Oslo). 2017. Women, Peace Pathways Out of Fragility: The Case for a and Security Index 2017/18: Tracking Research Agenda on Inclusive Political Sustainable Peace through Inclusion, Justice, Settlements in Fragile States. New York: Center and Security for Women. Washington, DC: on International Cooperation. GIWPS and PRIO. Jost, J., and M. Banaji. 2004. “A Decade of System Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. No Other Way Out: States Justifi cation Theory: Accumulated Evidence and Social Movements, 1945–1991. of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University the Status Quo.” Political Psychology 25 (6): Press. 881–919. Gurr, T. R. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Justino, Patricia. 2017. “Linking Inequality and Princeton University Press. Political Confl ict: The Role of Social ———. 1993. “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Mobilization and Collective Action.” Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Background paper for the United Nations– Confl ict since 1945.” International Political World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Science Review 14 (2): 161–201. Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing ———. 2000. Peoples versus States: Minorities at Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, Risk in the New Century. Washington, DC: DC. United States Institute of Peace Press. Justino, Patricia, Ivan Cardona, Rebecca Mitchell, Hillesund, S. 2015. “A Dangerous Discrepancy: and Catherine Müller. 2012. “Quantifying the Testing the Micro-Dynamics of Horizontal Impact of Women’s Participation in Post- Inequality on Palestinian Support for Armed Confl ict Economic Recovery.” HiCN Working Resistance.” Journal of Peace Research 52 (1): Paper 131, Households in Confl ict Network, 76–90. University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. Höhne, Markus. 2013. “Minorities in Somalia.” Justino, Patricia, and M. Moore. 2015. Inequality: In Somalia: Security, Minorities and Trends, Harms and New Agendas. IDS Migration, edited by Alexander Schahbasi Evidence Report 144. Brighton, UK: Institute and Thomas Schrott, 63–86. Vienna: Austrian of Development Studies. Federal Ministry of the Interior. Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Matthew Adam Kocher. Holmqvist, G. 2012. “Inequality and Identity: 2007. “How ‘Free’ Is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Causes of War.” Discussion Paper 72, Nordic Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. Problem.” World Politics 59 (2): 177–216. Honwana, Alcinda. 2013. The Time of Youth: Kelly, Jocelyn. 2017. “Intimate Partner Violence Work, Social Change and Politics in Africa. and Confl ict: Understanding the Links Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. between Political Violence and Personal Horowitz, D. L. 2000. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Violence.” Background paper for the United Berkeley, CA: University of California Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Press. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to ———. 2001. The Deadly Ethnic Riot. Berkeley, Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, CA: University of California Press. Washington, DC. Hudson, V., B. Ballif-Spanvill, M. Caprioli, and Khosrokhavar, Farhad. 2017. “Humiliation and C. Emmett. 2012. Sex and World Peace. New Its Multiple Dimensions.” Background paper York: Columbia University Press. for the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Hudson, V., M. Caprioli, B. Ballif-Spanvill, R. Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive McDermott, and C. Emmett. 2009. “The Heart Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, of the Matter: The Security of Women and the World Bank, Washington, DC.

134 Pathways for Peace Kirwin, M., and W. Cho. 2009. “Weak States and Engaging Societies in Responding to Fragile Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Situations. New Frontiers of Social Policy Working Paper 111, Afrobarometer. http:// Series. Washington, DC: World Bank. afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publica Marx, A. 1998. Making Race and Nation: A tions/Working%20paper/AfropaperNo111.pdf. Comparison of South Africa, the United States Kraetsch, M. 2008. “Middle East Youth Initiative.” and Brazil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Paper presented at the Peace Research University Press. Institute Oslo, “Youth Exclusion and Political Mason, T. David, and Dale A. Krane. 1989. “The Violence,” Oslo, December 4–5. Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Krishnan, N., C. Ibarra, A. Narayan, S. Tiwari, Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned and T. Vishwanath. 2016. Uneven Odds, Terror.” International Studies Quarterly 33 Unequal Outcomes: Inequality of Opportunity (2): 175–98. in the Middle East and North Africa. McCarthy, J., and M. Zald. 1977. “Resource Washington, DC: World Bank. Mobilization and Social Movements: A Ladbury, Sarah. 2015. Women and Extremism: Partial Theory.” American Journal of Sociology The Association of Women and Girls with 82 (6): 1212–41. doi: 10.1086/226464. Jihadi Groups and Implications for McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalenko. 2008. Programming. Independent paper prepared “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: for the Department of International Pathways toward Terrorism.” Terrorism and Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Political Violence 20 (3): 415–33. Commonwealth Offi ce. https://www.gov.uk McGovern, M. 2011. Making War in Côte d’Ivoire. /dfi d-research-outputs/women-and-extremism Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. -the-association-of-women-and-girls Melander, E. 2005. “Gender Equality and -with-jihadi-groups-and-implications Intrastate Armed Confl ict.” International -for-programming. Studies Quarterly 49 (4): 695–714. doi: Langer, A., and K. Smedts. 2013. “Seeing Is Not 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00384.x. Believing: Perceptions of Horizontal Mercy Corps. 2015. Youth & Consequences: Inequalities in Africa.” Working Paper 16, Unemployment, Injustice and Violence. Centre for Research on Peace and Portland, OR: Mercy Corps. Development, Leuven, Belgium. ———. 2016. “Motivations and Empty Promises:” Langer, A., and U. Ukiwo. 2008. “Ethnicity, Religion Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and and the State in Ghana and Nigeria: Perceptions Nigerian Youth. Portland, OR: Mercy Corps. from the Street.” In Horizontal Inequalities and Milanovic, B. 2016. Global Inequality: A New Confl ict: Understanding Group Violence in Approach for the Age of Globalization. Multiethnic Societies, edited by F. Stewart, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 205–26. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Miodownik, D., and L. Nir. 2016. “Receptivity to Le Goff, J. 1992. History and Memory. New York: Violence in Ethnically Divided Societies: A Columbia University Press. Micro-Level Mechanism of Perceived Lichbach, M. I. 1989. “An Evaluation of ‘Does Horizontal Inequalities.” Studies in Confl ict Economic Inequality Breed Political Confl ict?’ and Terrorism 39 (1): 22–45. Studies.” World Politics 41 (4): 431–70. Mitra, A., and D. Ray. 2014. “Implications of an Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Economic Theory of Confl ict: Hindu- Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Muslim Violence in India.” Journal of Political Colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Economy 122 (4): 719–65. University Press. Montalvo, J., and M. Reynal-Querol. 2008. Mancini, L., F. Stewart, and G. K. Brown. 2008. “Discrete Polarisation with an Application to “Approaches to the Measurement of the Determinants of Genocides.” Economic Horizontal Inequalities.” In Horizontal Journal 118 (533): 1835–65. doi: 10.1111/j. Inequalities and Confl ict: Understanding Group 1468-0297.2008.02193.x. Violence in Multiethnic Societies, edited by F. ———. 2012. Inequality, Polarization, and Stewart, 85–105. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Confl ict. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marc, Alexandre, Alys Willman, Ghazia Aslam, Muller, E. 1985. “Income Inequality, Regime Michelle Rebosio, and Kanishka Balasuriya. Repressiveness, and Political Violence.” 2012. Societal Dynamics and Fragility: American Sociological Review 50: 47–67.

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 135 Murshed, S. M., and S. Gates. 2005. “Spatial– Østby, G., R. Nordås, and J. Rød. 2009. “Regional Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Inequalities and Civil Confl ict in Sub-Saharan Insurgency in Nepal.” Review of Development Africa.” International Studies Quarterly 53 Economics 9 (1): 121–34. (2): 301–24. Must, E. 2016. “When and How Does Inequality Østby, G., H. Urdal, M. Z. Tadjoeddin, S. M. Cause Confl ict? Group Dynamics, Murshed, and H. Strand. 2011. “Population Perceptions and Natural Resources.” PhD Pressure, Horizontal Inequality and thesis, Department of Government, London Political Violence: A Disaggregated Study School of Economics. of Indonesian Provinces, 1990–2003.” Nagel, J. H. 1976. “Erratum.” World Politics 28 Journal of Development Studies 47 (3): (2): 315. 377–98. Nepal, M., A. Bohara, and K. Gawande. 2011. Paasonen, K., and H. Urdal. 2016. “Youth Bulges, “More Inequality, More Killings: The Maoist Exclusion and Instability: The Role of Youth Insurgency in Nepal.” American Journal of in the Arab Spring.” PRIO Confl ict Trends. Political Science 55 (4): 886–906. http://files.prio.org/Publication_files/prio Nygård, Havard Mokeiv, Karim Baghat, Gray /Paasonen,%20Urdal%20-%20Youth%20 Barrett, Kenra Dupuy, Scott Gates, Solveig Bulges,%20Exclusion%20and%20 Hillesund, Siri Aas Rustad, Håvard Strand, Instability,%20Conflict%20Trends%20 Henrik Urdal, and Gudrun Østby. 2017. 3-2016.pdf. “Inequality and Armed Confl ict: Evidence Paffenholz, Thania. 2015. “Beyond the and Data.” Background paper for the United Normative: Can Women’s Inclusion Really Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Make for Better Peace Processes?” Policy Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Brief, Graduate Institute of International and Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Development Studies, Centre for Confl ict Washington, DC. Development and Peacebuilding, Geneva. Obermeyer, Z., C. Murray, and E. Gakidou. 2008. Paffenholz, Thania, Andreas Hirblinger, Dana “Fifty Years of Violent War Deaths from Landau, Felix Fritsch, and Constance Dijkstra. Vietnam to Bosnia: Analysis of Data from the 2017. “Preventing Violence through Inclusion: World Health Survey Programme.” British From Building Political Momentum to Medical Journal 336 (7659): 1482–86. http:// Sustaining Peace.” Background paper for the dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.a137. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Omoeva, C., and E. Buckner. 2015. Does Horizontal Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Education Inequality Lead to Violent Confl ict? Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, A Global Analysis. New York: UNICEF. Washington, DC. O’Reilly, M. 2015. Why Women? Inclusive Security Patterson, M., and K. Monroe. 1998. “Narrative and Peaceful Societies. Washington, DC: in Political Science.” Annual Review of Inclusive Security. Political Science 1 (1): 315–31. doi: 10.1146/ O’Reilly, M., A. Ó Súilleabháin, and T. Paffenholz. annurev.polisci.1.1.315. 2015. “Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Petersen, R. D. 2002. Understanding Ethnic Roles in Peace Processes.” International Peace Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Institute, New York. Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe. Østby, Gudrun. 2008a. “Inequalities, the Political Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Environment and Civil Confl ict: Evidence Petesch, P. 2012. “Unlocking Pathways to from 55 Developing Countries.” In Horizontal Women’s Empowerment and Gender Inequalities and Confl ict: Understanding Equality: The Good, the Bad and the Sticky.” Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, edited Ethics and Social Welfare 6 (3): 233–46. by F. Stewart, 252–81. London: Palgrave Piazza, James A. 2017. “Repression and Macmillan UK. Terrorism: A Cross National Empirical ———. 2008b. “Polarization, Horizontal Analysis of Types of Repression and Domestic Inequalities and Violent Civil Confl ict.” Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence Journal of Peace Research 45 (2): 143–62. 29 (1): 102–18. ———. 2013. “Inequality and Political Violence: Piketty, T. 2013. Capital in the Twenty-First A Review of the Literature.” International Century. Translated by A. Goldhammer. Area Studies Review 16 (2): 206–31. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.

136 Pathways for Peace Posner, Daniel. 2004. “The Political Salience of Washington, DC. http://www.tinyurl.com/ Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and lbhunw9. Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Spiegel, P., and P. Salama. 2000. “War and Mortality Adversaries in Malawi.” American Political in Kosovo, 1998–99: An Epidemiological Science Review 98 (4): 529–45. Testimony.” Lancet 355 (9222): 2204–09. doi: ———. 2007. “Regime Change and Ethnic 10.1016/s0140-6736 (00)02404-1. Cleavages in Africa.” Comparative Political Stern, J., and J. M. Berger. 2015. ISIS: The State of Studies 40 (11): 1302–27. Terror. New York: HarperCollins. Regan, P., and A. Paskeviciute. 2003. “Women’s Stewart, Frances. 2000. “Crisis Prevention: Access to Politics and Peaceful States.” Journal Tackling Horizontal Inequalities.” Oxford of Peace Research 40 (3): 287–302. doi: Development Studies 28 (3): 245–62. 10.1177/0022343303040003003. ———. 2002a. “Horizontal Inequalities: A Reza, A., J. Mercy, and E. Krug. 2001. Neglected Dimension of Development.” “Epidemiology of Violent Deaths in the QEH Working Paper Series 81, Queen World.” Injury Prevention 7 (2): 104–11. doi: Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. 10.1136/ip.7.2.104. ———. 2002b. “Roots of Violent Confl ict in Ross, M. 2007. Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Developing Countries.” British Medical Confl ict. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Journal 324 (7333): 342–45. University Press. ———. 2009. “Horizontal Inequalities as a Cause Russett, B. M. 1964. “Inequality and Instability.” of Confl ict.” Bradford Development Lecture, World Politics 16 (3): 442–54. University of Bradford, West Yorkshire, UK. Rustad, S. A. 2016. “Socioeconomic Inequalities Stiglitz, J. 2013. The Price of Inequality: How and Attitudes toward Violence: A Test with Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future. New Survey Data in the Niger Delta.” New York: Norton. International Interactions 42 (1): 106–39. Stone, Laurel. 2015. “Study of 156 Peace Sargsyan, Irena L. 2017. “Narrative, Perception Agreements, Controlling for Other Variables, and Emotion: A Review of Recent Political Quantitative Analysis of Women’s Science Studies.” Background paper for the Participation in Peace Processes.” In United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, “Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to in Peace Processes,” by M. O’Reilly, A. Ó Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Súilleabháin, and T. Paffenholz, International Washington, DC. Peace Institute, New York. Schock, Kurt. 1996. “A Conjunctural Model of Tarrow, Sidney. 2011. Power in Movement: Social Political Confl ict: The Impact of Political Movements and Contentious Politics. Opportunities on the Relationship between Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Economic Inequality and Violent Political Tessler, M., and I. Warriner. 1997. “Gender, Confl ict.” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 40 Feminism, and Attitudes toward International (1): 98–133. Confl ict: Exploring Relationships with Shesterinina, A. 2016. “Collective Threat Framing Survey Data from the Middle East.” World and Mobilization in Civil War.” American Politics 49 (02): 250–81. doi: 10.1353/wp.1997 Political Science Review 110 (3): 411–27. .0005. Sigelman, L., and M. Simpson. 1977. “A Cross- Thoms, O., and J. Ron. 2007. “Public Health, National Test of the Linkage between Confl ict and Human Rights: Toward a Economic Inequality and Political Violence.” Collaborative Research Agenda.” Confl ict and Journal of Confl ict Resolution 21 (1): 105–28. Health 1 (11). doi: 10.1186/1752-1505 -1-11 Sjoberg, Laura, and C. E. Gentry. 2016. “It’s UNDP (United Nations Development Complicated: Looking Closely at Women in Programme). 2017a. Fact Sheet: Youth Violent Extremism.” Georgetown Journal of Political Participation and Decision-Making. International Affairs 17 (2): 23–30. doi: New York: UNDP. http://www.un.org/esa 10.1353/gia.2016.0021. / socdev / documents/youth/fact-sheets/youth Sjoberg, Laura, and Reed Wood. 2015. “People, -political-participation.pdf. Not Pawns: Women’s Participation in Violent ———. 2017b. Journey to Extremism in Africa: Extremism across MENA.” United States Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Agency for International Development, Recruitment. New York: UNDP.

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 137 ———. Forthcoming. “Vulnerable and Violent, Weber, E. 1976. Peasants into Frenchman: The Agency and Aspirations: Men as Perpetrators Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. and Victims of Violence; A UNDP Framework Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. for Dialogue, Policy and Programming on Weiss, Michael, and H. Hassan. 2015. ISIS: Inside Engaging Men in Fragile and Confl ict- the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts. Affected Settings.” UNDP, New York. Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman, and UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). Brian Min. 2009. “Ethnic Politics and Armed 2011. MENA Gender Equality Profi le. New Confl ict: A Confi gurational Analysis of a York: UNICEF. New Global Data Set.” American Sociological ———. 2015. Does Horizontal Education Inequality Review 74 (2): 316–37. Lead to Violent Confl ict? New York: UNICEF. WomanStats. n.d. “The WomanStats Project.” https://www.fhi360.org/sites / default/files/ http://www.womanstats.org/aboutoverview media/documents/resource-ed ucation-in- .html. equality_0.pdf. Woolcock, Michael. 2014. “Culture, Politics and UNSC (UN Security Council). 1999. “Resolution Development.” Policy Research Working on the Situation in Kosovo.” Resolution Paper 6939, World Bank, Washington, DC. S/RES/1244, adopted June 19, New York. World Bank. 2011. World Development Report ———. 2015a. Report of the Secretary-General on 2011: Confl ict, Security, and Development. Women and Peace and Security. New York: UN Washington, DC: World Bank. Security Council. http://www.un.org/ga ———. 2015. “Preventing Violent Extremism /search /view_doc.asp?symbol =S/2015/716 with Development Interventions: A Strategic &Lang=E. Review.” Briefi ng Note, World Bank, ———. 2015b. S/RES/2250 (2015) [on Youth, Washington, DC. Peace and Security]. New York: UN Security ———. 2017a. Atlas of Sustainable Development Council. Goals. Washington, DC: World Bank. http:// UN Women. 2015. Preventing Confl ict, www.datatopics.worldbank.org/sdgatlas. Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: ———. 2017b. World Development Report 2017: Global Study on the Implementation of United Governance and the Law. Washington, DC: Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. World Bank. New York: UN Women. World Bank Group IEG (Independent ———. 2016. “Women and Violent Evaluation Group). 2016. World Bank Group Radicalization in Jordan.” Technical Report, Engagement in Situations of Fragility, UN Women, New York. Confl ict, and Violence. Washington, DC: Urdal, H. 2006. “A Clash of Generations? Youth World Bank. Bulges and Political Violence.” International Wucherpfennig, J., P. Hunziker, and L.-E. Cederman. Studies Quarterly 50 (3): 607–30. 2016. “Who Inherits the State? Colonial Rule Varshney, Ashutosh. 2002. Ethnic Confl ict and and Postcolonial Confl ict.” American Journal of Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. New Political Science 60 (4): 882–88. Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Vess, J., G. Barker, S. Naraghi-Anderlini, and A. Additional Reading Hassink. 2013. The Other Side of Gender. Special Report. Washington, DC: United Cramer, Christopher. 2010. Unemployment and States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip Participation in Violence. Washington, DC: .org/publications/2013/12/other-side-gender. World Bank. Vogt, M., N.-C. Bormann, S. Rüegger, L.-E. Fair, C., R. Littman, N. Malhotra, and J. Shapiro. Cederman, P. Hunziker, and L. Girardin. 2016. “Relative Poverty, Perceived Violence, 2015. “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence Geography, and Confl ict: The Ethnic Power from Pakistan.” Political Science Research Relations Dataset Family.” Journal of Confl ict and Methods 6 (1): 1–25. doi: 10.1017/ Resolution 59 (7): 1327–42. psrm.2016.6. Weaver, Mary Anne. 2015. “Her Majesty’s Hegre, H., G. Østby, and C. Raleigh. 2009. Jihadists.” New York Times, April 14. http:// “Poverty and Civil War Events: A www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine Disaggregated Study of Liberia.” Journal of /her-majestys-jihadists.html. Confl ict Resolution 53 (4): 598–623.

138 Pathways for Peace Holmes, R., A. McCord, and J. Hagen-Zanker. Findings.” Proceedings of the National Academy 2013. What Is the Evidence on the Impact of of Sciences 103 (10): 3510–17. Employment Creation on Stability and Poverty Pearlman, W. 2013. “Emotions and the Reduction in Fragile States. London: Overseas Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings.” Development Institute. https://www.odi.org Perspectives on Politics 11 (02): 387–409. doi: /publications/7447-what-evidence-impact 10.1017/s1537592713001072. -employment-creation-stability-and-poverty Piazza, James A. 2006. “Rooted in Poverty? -reduction-fragile-states. Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, ICG (International Crisis Group). 2013. Women and Social Cleavages.” Terrorism and Political and Conﬂ ict in Afghanistan. Asia Report 252. Violence 18 (1): 159–77. doi: 10.1080/095465 Brussels: ICG. https://d2071andvip0wj. 590944578. cloudfront.net/women-and-conflict-in-af- Sargsyan, Irena L., and Andrew Bennett. 2016. ghanistan.pdf. “Discursive Emotional Appeals in Sustaining Interpeace. 2016. Beyond Ideology and Greed— Violent Social Movements in Iraq, 2003–11.” Understanding New Forms of Violence in Security Studies 25 (4): 608–45. Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. Executive Summary. UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2000. Geneva: Interpeace. http://3n589z370e6o- “On Women and Peace and Security.” 2eat a9wahfl4.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com Resolution S/RES/1325, adopted October 31, /wp-con tent/uploads/2016/11/2016-Au-del New York. %C3%A0 -de-lid%C3%A9ologie-et-de-lap- World Bank. 2001. Social Protection Strategy: p%C3%A2t -du-gain-ExecSum-ENG-002. From Safety Net to Springboard. Washington, pdf. DC: World Bank. Krueger, A. 2008. What Makes a Terrorist. ———. 2011. Violence in the City: Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Understanding and Supporting Community Nordhaus, W. 2006. “Geography and Responses to Urban Violence. Washington, DC: Macroeconomics: New Data and New World Bank.

Why People Fight: Inequality, Exclusion, and a Sense of Injustice 139

CHAPTER 5 What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation

Maintaining a peaceful pathway entails the population growth, urbanization, and the constant management of underlying griev- expansion of large-scale agriculture. The ances and the monitoring of shocks that service delivery arena is critical because could trigger violence. Where risks accu- state legitimacy hinges, in part, on whether mulate or intensify, they can overwhelm a the population deems that the processes of society’s coping resources, with violence as service delivery are fair. In this arena, again, a frequent result. As chapter 4 argues, cer- inclusiveness and perceptions of fairness tain risks deserve special attention because matter as much—perhaps more—than the they underlie most violent confl ict. These quality of services. Finally, security and jus- risks relate to perceptions of injustice tice institutions that operate fairly and in deriving from social, economic, and politi- alignment with the rule of law are funda- cal exclusion. mental. Confl ict in this arena that is not This chapter explores the accumulation managed can have long-term impacts on a and intensifi cation of risks and opportuni- society’s pathway. ties in critical spaces, called arenas of contes- The salience of these arenas is demon- tation. These arenas involve what groups strated by the changing profi le of violent care about in their relationships with each confl ict, as described in chapter 1, and by other and with the state and thus what they infl uential global trends that may increase tend to fi ght over—access to power, land, risk or open opportunities in these arenas, and resources, equitable delivery of services, as discussed in chapter 2. Moreover, contes- and responsive justice and security. tation in these arenas is shaped by the These four broad arenas are by no means degree of inequality, exclusion, and unfair- an exhaustive list, but they have been ness in a society, as noted in chapter 4, and selected because they have consistently can increase the risk of violence. recurred in violent confl ict in various con- The arenas of power, resources, services, texts.1 Competition for power, for example, and security are defi ned by the interaction is an age-old source of confl ict, while bal- of the unique structural factors, institu- ances and imbalances of power can put a tions, and actors in a society. The state is society in danger of violence. Experience critical in each of the arenas. While the shows that more inclusive and representa- state may not exercise full authority in all tive power-sharing arrangements increase the arenas, it does bear ultimate responsi- the likelihood of peaceful pathways. Land bility for coordinating the actions of other and resources, too, are traditional sources of actors there. Through its actions or inac- friction, and this arena is now under more tion, the state can reinforce a broad-based stress with the effects of climate change, belief that social, economic, and political

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 141 arrangements and outcomes are accessible summarized, with examples drawn from to all. Alternatively, it can reinforce percep- the case studies where appropriate. tions of exclusion that deepen tensions Chapter 6 contains a more detailed among groups. description of the experiences of different The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable societies in managing risks and opportu- Development includes various goals and nities in the arenas. targets related to these four arenas. For example, Sustainable Development Goal Risk and Opportunity in the (SDG) target 10.2 addresses political inclu- Arenas of Contestation sion, while target 16.7 addresses responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative Confl ict that arises in the arenas of contes- decision making at all levels. With regard to tation is especially prone to escalate to vio- access to services, targets 1.4, 5.4, and 11.1 lence. Risk is high chiefl y because the address basic or public services, targets stakes are high. As the sites where, ulti- 3.7 and 3.8 address health, and targets 4.2, mately, people and groups bargain for 4.3, and 4.5 address education. Targets 5.2, access to the basic means of livelihoods 16.1, and 16.2 address security and violence. and well-being, exclusion from one or In the area of resources, targets 1.4, 2.3, and more arenas can, often literally, become a 12.2 address land, target 6.5 addresses water, matter of life or death. SDG 14 addresses oceans, seas, and marine Moreover, the broader balance of power resources, and SDG 15 addresses terrestrial in society is defi ned and defended in these ecosystems. arenas (World Bank 2017c). This balance Targeted, fl exible, and sustained atten- of power has an impact on the incentives tion to these arenas is an important com- that are so critical for prevention. Actors ponent of governance in general (World who are already at the table must agree to Bank 2017c) and is particularly critical to change the rules, institutions, or structural prevention. The more strategically that factors that defi ne the balance of power in risks are addressed and shocks are man- the arenas, and they may see little benefi t in aged, the better the chances for peaceful altering the status quo. Leaders who per- pathways. Policy changes alone are insuffi - ceive reform as an unfair loss of power for cient; even the most technically sound themselves or their group, then, have few actions often fall short because they can- incentives to propose or support any not, by themselves, address the underlying change in the existing arrangements. incentive structures that drive behavior. Exclusion and inequality often persist, not Measures are needed to assess and address because leaders lack the technical knowl- risk, especially by fostering incentives and edge or capacity for reform, but because norms for peaceful bargaining and negoti- they have insuffi cient incentives to allow ation within the arenas. greater access to the arenas. This chapter begins by introducing the Contestation here is fraught, too, concept of arenas of contestation as areas because exclusion and inequality among for risk and opportunity. Next, it dis- groups, the precursors of grievance, often cusses each of the arenas of contestation manifest most visibly in the arenas. As the in more detail, exploring the risks of vio- evidence presented in chapter 4 suggests, lence and opportunities for peace that an identity-based group that perceives can build up there, the trade-offs that are itself unfairly deprived relative to other present when managing them, and the groups—whether because of unequal conditions that may amplify risk (for access to political representation, unequal example, attempting major reform during distribution of basic services, insecure ten- the transition to a more inclusive political ancy of land, exclusion from justice and system). As substantially broad fields in security, or some other exclusionary themselves, it is impossible to treat the situation—may develop grievances. Both arenas in a comprehensive manner here. perceived exclusion and objective exclu- Instead, key messages and ideas are sion are important.

142 Pathways for Peace Finally, the arenas overlap substan- The state plays a key role in governing tially, such that any shift in one arena can the arenas by embodying constraints and trigger ripple effects in others. An elec- opportunities to inﬂ uence different actors. tion that upsets the political balance of The state bears ultimate responsibility for power can trigger a land reform, or judi- setting the rules that govern relationships cial reforms aiming to address legal dis- and access in these important policy are- crimination against one group may nas, which it does through laws and the increase their claim on political power. system of formal institutions. Its overall Measures to mitigate a crisis in the short legitimacy in the eyes of citizens is deter- term can affect the conditions needed for mined by how well it does this. In this way, lasting reforms. For example, the reloca- governance of the arenas is central to the tion of a community after a natural disas- social contract. ter can complicate efforts for land reform This does not mean that, in practice, over the long term. Côte d’Ivoire illus- the state must be active and present in all trates how conflict can spill over from the arenas. As chapters 2 and 3 note, non- one arena and activate conflict in another state actors generally fill the void where (box 5.1). the state is unable or unwilling to provide At the same time, the overlap of the are- needed services. In many cases, commu- nas means that actions taken in one arena nity organizations, traditional leadership, can mitigate risks in another. For example, the private sector, and civil society are more inclusive political arrangements have better placed than the state to mediate been shown to decrease the risk of violence and address risks as they manifest. In oth- associated with the “resource curse” around ers, armed groups and organized criminal extractives, as discussed in detail in this networks may supplant the state and chapter (Drew 2017). In West Africa, there undermine its legitimacy. Ultimately, is evidence that power sharing has had a however, the state needs to exert a mini- “mediating effect” on the relationship mum presence as a credible facilitator in between natural resources and stability the arenas if it is to maintain a modicum (Vogt 2012). of legitimacy.

BOX 5.1 Conflict across Arenas of Contestation: The Political Crisis and Civil War in Côte d’Ivoire

During the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire resentments related to an infl ux of between 2002 and 2011, confl ict in the migrants and the contestation of their political arena spilled over to the arena of rights to access, own, and benefi t from land and natural resources. While some land and its related resources. Rents localized land confl icts were prevailing in from trade in natural resources, from the country, they have been exacerbated coffee production to timber and by the confl ict in the political arena. diamonds, provided sources of fi nancing Violence came about initially in response to all sides of the confl ict. A fall in the to attempts to exclude specifi c groups price of the country’s main export crops, from central power by denying a particularly cocoa, exacerbated northerner the opportunity to participate competition for these resources and in presidential elections. These attempts further fueled confl ict. Regional aggravated long-standing resentments disparities in poverty and access to related to the political exclusion of services between the north and south northerners. The confl ict quickly revived also played an important role.

Sources: Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015; McGovern 2011.

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 143 The Arena of Power represent or if it includes only elites and and Governance excludes the rest of the population. While political settlements are a very Since the beginning of recorded history, important component of any peace process, blood has been spilled over who holds the their ability to contribute to sustained peace proverbial keys to the castle. Political power is more elusive. Many recent peace processes gives individuals and the groups they rep- appear to have produced an uncertain— resent those keys or at least a seat at the sometimes transitory—peace that features table inside the castle. Political power recurrence of violence, absence of security, largely determines how economic and and political stalemate (Bell 2017). Many of other resources are distributed, and there- today’s peace agreements are characterized fore, it is diffi cult for actors to increase as a “formalized political unsettlement,” access to the other policy arenas unless they where the root causes of the confl ict are have some presence (and relative power) in carried into the new institutional arrange- the political realm. ments without being resolved (Bell and Greater inclusion and representation Pospisil 2017, 1). The preeminent focus on of different groups in the political arena a narrow set of elites reinforces this ten- tend to be associated with reduced vio- dency of many peace agreements to create lence over the longer term. However, as highly unsustainable political settlements. discussed in chapter 2, the transition to a The absence of a discussion of longer-term more open and democratic political sys- development issues as a key dimension of tem is often fraught with risk of violence these settlements is also often part of the because it can disrupt power dynamics problem. Translating a political settlement and bring forth new groups seeking into a more sustainable process of constitu- infl uence. tional change, institutional reform, and modifi ed legal frameworks is complicated Political Settlements and and often requires multiple iterations (Bell Mitigation of Risk and Zulueta-Fülscher 2016). Ensuring that a political settlement is Political settlements help to manage con- genuinely inclusive is essential to steering a fl icts over political power that risk becom- society on a peaceful pathway, as it consti- ing violent, particularly in transitional tutes an important part of the process of settings. A political settlement can be an renegotiating access to power among differ- explicit or an implicit bargain among elites ent groups. Democratic instruments and over the distribution of rights and entitle- the electoral process are often insuffi cient to ments. It is often viewed as a prerequisite to bring about the inclusion of excluded avoiding violence in situations of high risk groups, especially excluded minority or to reducing the intensity of violent con- groups, in a sustainable manner. Often, new fl ict (Lindemann 2008). A peace agreement political settlements are needed as institu- is a political settlement whose objective is to tions and political frameworks change. A manage the risks of violence and reach political settlement can rarely be a one-off some form of stability. effort. It requires sustained, long-term The risk of relapse into confl ict is ele- attention and periodic renegotiation, even vated where elites have not sought to as institutions are undergoing reform and accommodate or include former opponents development policies are being adapted, so in a political settlement, but have instead that the reach of the settlement extends moved to exclude rivals on the basis of eth- beyond a small elite. Otherwise, the sustain- nicity, religion, or other dimension of iden- ability of the settlement will be uncertain tity (Call 2012; Elgin-Cossart, Jones, and (Bell 2015). Esberg 2012). An agreement among elites is Power-sharing arrangements2 allocate a likely to be unsustainable if it is not under- share of political power to different groups in pinned by policy that addresses the griev- society and can be an important aspect of ances of the populations that these elites political settlements. They can regulate offi ces,

144 Pathways for Peace territorial governance, or decision making in risks associated with exclusion. It has lim- the arenas of contestation to ensure that no itations and cannot easily adapt to chang- single group or party has a monopoly over ing realities, for instance, such as when a all government functions and branches change in structural factors prompts one (McEvoy and O’Leary 2013).3 group to seek an increase in its share of Political power sharing can take several power (Call 2012). Colombia’s National forms. At the national level, these forms Front Pact between 1958 and 1974 helped include creating so-called “grand coalitions” to alleviate tensions between the Liberal of all major parties, as in Austria (Lijphart and Conservative parties, but its exclusion 2008); reserving political positions such as of other groups contributed to the armed president and prime minister for certain confl ict there (Felter and Renwick 2017). religious communities, as in Lebanon As demographics or allegiances shift, actors (Bahout 2016); alternating the presidency might be reluctant to adapt power-sharing between parties every four years, as in arrangements accordingly, as in Lebanon, Colombia (Mazzuca and Robinson 2009); where power sharing has contributed to a and setting quotas for marginalized groups deadlock in the implementation of poli- in institutions, as in India (Gates et al. cies, along with sectarian-based allocation 2016). Inclusive elite bargains and the dis- of power and the resistance of political tribution of positions of state power among leaders to cede power (Bahout 2016; Rosiny different groups in Zambia since indepen- 2016). If power is distributed according to dence has helped to avoid violent confl ict group identity, the power-sharing arrange- over the last decades in spite of the existence ment can reinforce certain identities rela- of multiple fi ssures in society (Lindemann tive to others and thus can negate the 2008). Other types of power sharing include potential of these arrangements to mini- security (military, police, or security forces), mize violent confl ict. economic (access to resources or processes Translating a power-sharing arrange- of decision making), and territorial (forms ment into a new constitution after a con- of territorial autonomy) arrangements fl ict can lower the risk of violence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2006; Hoddie and recurrence. A cross-country study using Hartzell 2005). These arrangements are not the Comparative Constitutions Project static. Rather, they involve continual negoti- database, which includes data on constitu- ating, bargaining, and contestation of relations from all independent states over the tions between elites over time and years 1789–2015, fi nds that the process of mediation of relations between elites and creating a new constitution after the con- the broader society (Putzel and Di John clusion of violent confl ict is associated 2012; World Bank 2011). with an approximately 60 percent reduc- While the long-term effects of power tion in potential recurrence of violence sharing on peace and stability are hard to (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014). The discern, a substantial body of evidence sug- amendment of an existing constitution has gests that power sharing helps to prevent no statistically signifi cant impact, suggest- recurrence of violent confl ict (Putzel and ing that the process of writing a constitu- Di John 2012; World Bank 2011) and is tion and the existing postconfl ict political, associated with greater stability overall security, economic, or other conditions (Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Linder that enable this process are important for and Bächtiger 2005; Vreeland 2008). For sustaining peace (Elkins, Ginsburg, and example, in Africa, between 1970 and 1990, Melton 2014). rulers faced a 72 percent chance of being Other factors that could be infl uential forced out of offi ce under violent circum- include the makeup of coalitions that par- stances, but after 1990 and owing in part to ticipate in the process, how representative multiparty elections, the chance fell to they are of the groups they head up, and 41 percent (Reno 2002). the duration of constitutional negotia- However, power sharing is not a guar- tions. Many studies show that the process anteed means of addressing the underlying of writing a constitution—particularly the

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 145 extent to which different groups are con- cases in reducing local violent confl ict sulted in a genuine fashion—is at least as where there is horizontal inequality important as the content of the document among groups, such as in Bangsamoro in produced. This work also suggests that a Mindanao in the Philippines (Colletta and constitutional process can serve as a means Oppenheim 2017). The effectiveness of of addressing intergroup grievances and self-rule is greatly enhanced when inequality, as in the peace process after self-governance arrangements are paired the end of apartheid in South Africa with a proportional representation system (Samuels 2005). The chance of peace is that ensures that power is shared across enhanced when multiple forms of power groups (Neudorfer, Theuerkauf, and Wolff sharing are adopted together (Jarstad and 2016) and when they are supported by Nilsson 2008). suffi cient guarantees against the recentral- ization of power (Lake and Rothchild Federalism, Decentralization, 2005). Territorial self-governance in com- and Devolution bination with a proportional representation system “can improve the quality of Power-sharing arrangements often extend governance, make government more across multiple levels of governance responsive to minorities and disgruntled through the transfer of power and resources groups, and guarantee minority groups’ to the subnational level. Some of the most physical security and identity survival” common mechanisms for this are decen- (Nygård et al. 2017, 14). tralization, devolution, and federalism, dis- Power-sharing arrangements between cussed here in general terms. Chapter 6 national and subnational levels carry their provides more specifi c examples of coun- own risks. Just as concentrating power in a tries that have overcome violent confl ict by centralized system can raise tensions, means of devolution and government decentralizing or devolving power to the restructuring. local level raises the stakes among local Decentralization refers to the process groups and creates new avenues for vio- and result of structuring a system so that lence. Devolution can exacerbate the risks multiple layers share authority and deliver of violence where local political parties goods and services (Wolff, Ross, and Wee reinforce ethnic identities, foster interethnic 2017). It denotes territorial-based autono- and intergroup tensions, and mobilize mous political authority and decentralized groups for violent confl ict (Wolff, Ross, and political systems. Where ethnic, linguistic, Wee 2017). Chapter 6 focuses more specifi - religious, and cultural groups concentrate cally on the experience of decentralization in distinct geographic regions, decentraliza- as a peacebuilding strategy. tion can reduce the potential for violence by addressing center-periphery tensions and The Risk of Election-Related accommodating diversity (USAID 2009). Violence Subnational governance arrangements proposed as part of peace negotiations can sig- The peaceful transfer of power is regarded nal moderation by the majority and temper as a cornerstone of democratic and inclu- fears of the minority (Lake and Rothchild sive governance (Diamond 2006). Elections 2005). When further institutionalized in are a means to accomplish this transfer national law, such arrangements can help openly and transparently. In this way, they to protect the rights and interests of can strengthen the legitimacy of govern- both minority and majority groups, to ments and, over time, consolidate democ- manage regional horizontal inequalities, racy, especially in postconfl ict states and to ensure a balance of power (Diamond 2006). By nature a high-stakes among groups, thereby reducing the risk of contest, elections can bring forth demands, violent confl ict. grievances, and expectations and are a fre- Self-governance arrangements such as quent focus for mitigating the risks of vio- federalism have proven effective in many lence (Malik 2017).

146 Pathways for Peace While publicly linked to elite contesta- semipresidential systems, which some tion of outcomes or confi dence in the studies show demonstrate greater risks of result, elections can also trigger violence, violence (Malik 2017). especially in the presence of multiple preex- In contrast, electoral systems based on isting risks. Electoral violence is associated proportional representation are sometimes with long-standing and unresolved griev- associated with fewer incidents of violence ances (real or perceived). As elections, by (Fiedler 2017; Mukherjee 2006). In Sub- defi nition, produce winners and losers, Saharan Africa, for example, countries with they can fuel concerns that political or con- majoritarian (that is, so-called “fi rst past stitutional order will not respond to the post”) electoral rules have a higher inci- demands for reform. dence of election-related violence (number As discussed in chapter 2, the risk of of incidents) than countries with propor- election-related violence is amplifi ed in tional electoral rules (Fjelde and Höglund fl edgling democracies (Bates 2008; Gagnon 2016). Power-sharing agreements have also 1994; Snyder 2000), where winner-take-all been shown to help to ensure that groups outcomes, real or perceived, can leave that lose an election nevertheless have groups outside the circle of power (Chabal meaningful representation in government, and Daloz 1999; Mamdani 1996). In certain access to state resources, and some degree of cases, even attempts to amend the rules can autonomy (Brancati and Synder 2012). lead to violence, as in Niger in 2010, when a However, such power-sharing agreements, military coup followed an attempt by the often struck between elites to manage a spe- president to remain in power beyond the cifi c crisis, can undermine popular will and terms set by the constitution. trust in the political system. The overriding responsibility for a suc- Beyond individual leaders and forms cessful election lies with political leaders, of institutions, electoral processes matter. from both government and opposition par- Often, election-related violence is infl u- ties. Incumbents and challengers can see enced by perceptions of unfairness in how elections as a chance to manipulate the sys- elections are managed and held. Elections tem and structures to exclude rival groups are most likely to succeed when citizens have and can use violence as a tactic to infl uence confi dence that electoral results refl ect their the outcome, with different actors and choices. When there are perceived inconsis- mechanisms appearing in pre- and post- tencies in the process or when the results are election violence. Studies suggest that pre- contested, particularly when perceptions election violence is more frequent than evoke memories of historical injustices postelection confl ict and is usually mobi- and elites or group leaders mobilize around lized by actors in favor of an incumbent, these memories, the risk of election-related often using the coercive apparatus of the violence may be heightened. The effective- state to retain power (Arriola and Johnson ness and legitimacy of the institutions that 2012, 10; Straus and Taylor 2012). manage the electoral process are very Ensuring peaceful elections depends on important—in particular, transparent and how risks are managed. First, it is critical to trusted electoral commissions. foster conditions that avoid zero-sum poli- Protecting people’s right to vote is tics well before an election. This often equally critical. In many cases, women or requires managing exclusionary dynamics minority groups are vulnerable to intimi- across arenas and beyond elections—for dation or exclusion from elections and example, in the distribution of natural face adversity when running for political resources—as well as placing a premium offi ce (Berry, Bouka, and Kamuru 2017). on national leadership, to refrain from Special measures to protect voting threats of violence or harassment of politi- rights—including increasing access to cal opponents. Managing such dynamics voter registration, remote or early voting may be particularly important when legal options, and physical security at polling authority and political power are heavily stations—can help to ensure the full concentrated and in presidential and participation of marginalized groups in

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 147 elections. SDG target 5.5 recognizes the This risk has to be weighed against the ben- importance of women’s full and effective efi t of elections, which is that that they tend participation and equal opportunities for to confer legitimacy on a new government leadership at all levels of decision making when they are based on a suffi ciently robust in political, economic, and public life, and inclusive political settlement. These while SDG target 16.7 recognizes the experiences point to the need to foster cre- importance of responsive, inclusive, par- ative forms of electoral support and moni- ticipatory, and representative decision toring as part of comprehensive preventive making at all levels. strategies. The potential for violence around elections can also be managed through mechanisms for dialogue and transparency as part The Arena of Land and of a broader approach to promoting peace Natural Resources and stability. Responses to electoral violence Land-Related Disputes in are not necessarily, or exclusively, contin- Today’s Confl icts gent on the quality of the electoral process itself. Most elections produce results that Land is deeply evocative. It is essential to lead to acceptance even in the face of vary- personal and communal economic well- ing degrees of imperfections. being, livelihoods, and identity. A major Nonstate actors and new media can play resource for most economies, land is part of a role in defusing tensions. Civil society the social fabric. Social control of land is and private sector actors in Kenya during central to most systems of governance. Even and after the violence of 2007–08 lobbied in cases where land has not played a direct the warring parties to come together and role in violent confl ict, the breakdown of acted as a channel for the views of the pub- institutions and societal structures during lic (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009). These confl ict can revive latent frustrations or a actors also provided a pressure valve to sense of unfairness around land and ease tensions in subsequent elections. resources (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). Social media and communications strate- In the wake of confl ict, land-related dis- gies can help to educate and inform the putes can center on a clash of rights between population ahead of elections. Technology returnees and current occupiers of the land can support early warning systems as well (Maze 2014). Scholars have argued that as efforts to counter hate speech and to confl icts fought over land tend to be more improve communication between the gov- prolonged, more stubborn to negotiation, ernment and citizens (IDS 2017). Again, in and thus more likely to recur than confl icts Kenya, policy makers, citizens, and the related to other arenas (Maze 2014). government have used the Internet and Violent confl ict around land is typically communications tools, which played a stoked by grievances related to land scar- destructive role in postelection violence in city, insecurity of tenure, and historical 2013 (IDS 2017), to raise awareness of, injustices. These grievances can play out monitor, and respond to violence. individually or in combination. They pose The fi ndings of electoral fraud may also a higher risk where they overlap with create opportunities for violence in protest exclusion along identity lines and when of the results, and independent electoral ethnic groups that compete over land call observers may announce aspects of elec- on exclusionary narratives to justify their toral conduct that were previously not pub- claims. Scarcity is often the symptom of a lic, as in the 2005 legislative elections in larger problem of access and distribution Ethiopia. Similarly, studies highlight that of land, with smaller numbers of people the timing of elections infl uences the risk of owning larger pieces of property, leaving violence. Holding elections early in a politi- much of the population to live on cal transition may increase the chance of degraded land (UNDP 2003, 2013). violence because institutions are weak and Confrontations around land are set to trust is low (Brancati and Synder 2012). increase in the coming years because of

148 Pathways for Peace demographic pressures, growing demands often have access to land only through a for land from large-scale agricultural pro- male intermediary. Women also have diffi - duction and conservation, deterioration of culty retaining land in the event of divorce land quality, displacement through war and or after the death of their husbands subsequent attempts to regain lost land, and (Deininger and Castagnini 2006). SDG 5 the adverse effects of climate change. This recognizes women’s equal rights to own and projected rise in violent confl ict around control land and other forms of property land will be most evident across Africa, and natural resources. which already sees the bulk of land-related Nevertheless, there are examples of suc- confl ict (Bruce 2017). cessful efforts to increase women’s access to Urbanization is another global trend land. In Rwanda, land-related issues con- that may fuel confl ict over land. Many soci- tributed to the 1994 genocide (Gillingham eties are already struggling to extend basic and Buckle 2014). Consequently, to prevent services and governance to rapidly growing further cycles of violence and to address populations in urban and peri-urban areas. grievances such as those related to ethnic This urbanization puts a strain on land and division and gender discrimination in land service delivery (ICRC 2016a, 2016b; World access, the government moved to clarify Bank 2010). The civil unrest in Ethiopia land rights and launched a program of land that began in late-2015 was underscored by tenure regularization (Gillingham and tensions between the Oromian population Buckle 2014). An assessment found that and the seat of power in Addis Ababa. The participants in the program doubled their expansion of the city into surrounding investment in soil conservation, with a farmland reignited concerns among the larger increase for females (Ali, Deininger, Oromo population over their lack of con- and Goldstein 2014). In addition, the pro- trol in managing the suburbs that lie in gram increased the tenure security of legally Oromia and regarding fair compensation married women. In Peru, land titling pro- for land (Global Voices 2015). grams have enabled women to join the for- Tenure insecurity can take the form of a mal labor market, increasing income levels lack of transparency in transactions, the and reducing child labor (F ield 2007). risk of land loss for groups with secondary As chapter 2 notes, the global trends of rights, a lack of clarity in agreements, an migration and climate change may exacer- increase in formalized land grabbing by the bate tensions related to land. While migra- state of land held under customary and tion can be a source of resilience, migrants informal tenure for the large-scale commer- often fi nd themselves at the center of com- cial production of food crops and biofuels, petition over land and resources. Political and displacement (Marc, Verjee, and manipulation, weak mechanisms for inte- Mogaka 2015). In Liberia, numerous dis- gration, and unclear property rights can putes over local landownership, com- deepen tensions over land and power pounded by the loss of land records during between indigenous communities and the civil war, remain unresolved (World migrants. Disputes over access to, owner- Bank 2008). The recent surge in state sales ship of, and use of land often emerge from a of land is exacerbating tensions between clash of identities. The scarcity of formal local communities and the state and agri- documentation (identity cards, national business companies (Brown and Keating passports) among migrant populations, 2015). Tenure insecurity also refl ects the especially in rural areas, poses a further failure of the state to recognize customary challenge to achieving security of tenure. or informal property rights. It adds complexity to the already precarious Women can be especially vulnerable to situation facing migrants, which includes insecurity of tenure. Although women have corruption, poverty, and illiteracy (Adepoju, legal entitlement to own land in some Boulton, and Levin 2007). Competition regions, they often continue to be denied between migrants and host communities land rights for political and cultural rea- can be especially pronounced when coupled sons. Under customary systems, women with political and social marginalization

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 149 and the spillover from regional ethnic, reli- violent confl ict there (Brown and Keating gious, and political tensions (Marc, Verjee, 2015; box 5.2). and Mogaka 2015). Land reform has rarely taken place with- Pastoralists face particular challenges out incurring “a high degree of confl ict” related to the right of passage. They rely on ranging from nonviolent confl ict to sys- mobility to cope with variations in rainfall. temic violence that seeks to overthrow the Pastoral and agricultural livelihoods depend government (Bruce 2017, 43). Land reform on mutually benefi cial and negotiated non- is high risk and often has unintended conse- exclusive access to water and reciprocal land quences. It is rarely effective when underuse agreements. Confl icts arise when access taken in so-called “shock-therapy” style. To to waterpoints, grazing lands, and pastoral be implemented and accepted, such corridors are restricted and crops are dam- far-reaching reforms require time, patience, aged. Larger herd sizes and environmental and the buy-in of the various interested degradation, as well as larger farms, espe- groups and actors. Reforms can benefi t cially large agribusinesses, have increased the from consultations with communities and frequency and intensity of these confl icts. In other interested actors such as the private the Darfur region of Sudan, tensions between sector. Institutions and structural factors nomadic pastoralist herders and settled within a society are often resistant to change, farmers over livestock migration routes and as noted in chapter 3. Vested interests often waterholes have become a fl ashpoint for hold sway; in some countries, corruption wider differences and have contributed to can help to entrench the status quo.

BOX 5.2 Darfur: A Case of Land Management Systems and Environmental Change

The Darfur confl ict originated in the to waterpoints remained communal. impact of drought on African settled Nomads were given temporary access farmers and Arab nomadic herders and in to land to enable them to reach grazing the breakdown of agreements over the routes but were obligated to prevent right of passage for pastoralists. crop damage. Migrants were also given Previously amicable relationships among land, and the terms of their stay were groups unraveled as drought and famine negotiated by the village sheik. created new migration patterns, including The decline of central government the migration of camel-owning Zaghawa control over the region stripped pastoralists of North Darfur southward customary rulers of their authority to beyond their traditional grazing ranges. manage grazing patterns. Historically, As they moved south, they displaced once annual rainfall patterns became others, including Masalit cattle herders clear, customary authorities would meet and farmers. to negotiate adjustments in the grazing Farmers from the Fur group, whose patterns of different tribal groups. lands the pastoralists traversed, had Comity was a key principle. A tribe traditionally accommodated these herds. struggling with poor rainfall would be A local governance system had evolved allowed to use land in the territory (dar) to mediate confl icts over resources, of another tribe, which in return had facilitate farming and grazing on the a reasonable expectation of receiving same plots of land, and to accommodate the same assistance in case of need. new arrivals. The Native Administration The vacuum in effective local authority and offi cials appointed by the ruling caused the collapse of intertribal social tribes administered this system. Each control of land use and eliminated the man received a hut and a plot of land to best hope of peaceful mediation of the farm, while grazing rights and access climate crisis.

Sources: Charney 1975; Edwards 2008; Giannini, Biasutti, and Verstraete 2008; Null and Risi 2016.

150 Pathways for Peace For prevention, reforms are most valu- of a range of legitimate forms of land tenable before the onset of violence. However, ure as being on a continuum of land rights the experience of reform and its success in can help to overcome tensions between for- preventing violent confl ict vary by type of mal and informal tenure systems (UN reform and context. Early experiences of Human Settlements Programme 2016). land reform in East Asia were quite positive, Titling and registration can increase secu- while the experience in Latin America in the rity of tenure and provide protection by 1970s was more complex (Bruce 2017). recognizing full rights for communities Efforts to manage confl ict and to prevent under customary law. “Formalizing” the violent confl ict related to land tend to be rights of informal settlers and customary most effective where they combine the landholders is widely accepted as being reform of land with more immediate con- important for preventing confl ict, although fl ict and dispute resolution measures. there is little agreement on when and how it Supports involving the empowerment of should be implemented (Bruce 2017). The communities, the improvement of land signifi cant potential of these programs to governance and administration, and the prevent confl ict relies on careful planning, more effective resolutions of land disputes implementation, and targeting. Experiences fall short of addressing the structural causes from Cambodia show that, while titling can of confl ict, yet they can manage tensions bring about security of tenure, corruption and help to avoid violence (Bruce 2017). in implementation can exclude vulnerable These initiatives have often been used in groups from the benefi ts (Sekiguchi and lieu of longer-lasting reforms or better- Hatsukano 2013). In Cambodia, the pro- directed reform efforts. These initiatives are gram was ineffective where the risks of vio- valuable in their own right and can improve lence were greatest (Cambodian Center for security of tenure, but more than that they Human Rights 2013). Titling and registra- pave the way for deeper reforms. In tion can also facilitate land grabs by making Afghanistan, dispute resolution councils land more valuable. This has been a recur- that bring tribal leaders and government rent risk in urban land reform, especially in offi cials together in the two eastern prov- slum-upgrading efforts. inces of Kunar and Nangarhar demonstrate Land tenure reform prevents confl ict by the potentially positive role of local leaders providing new land rights, but usually only in solving local land-related disputes as part of a broader package of reforms. It is (Coburn 2011). particularly relevant in contexts where land The effi cacy of each reform needs to be is mostly held under customary law. Land examined individually. One type of reform that is not formally titled under statutory is the resettlement of citizens onto public law is considered public land. Effective land lands as a way of alleviating land pressure tenure reform needs to be accompanied by in densely populated areas (Bruce 2017). a program of systematic titling and registra- This often brings brief, if any, respite from tion of rights to give these new rights some competition over land and can be a signifi - sense of reality and grounding. cant cause of confl ict in itself, with new So-called “land to the tiller” reforms tensions emerging on the periphery in an make land available to the people working attempt to address grievances at the center. it. These reforms either take land from Another type of reform is the regulation landlords and provide tenants with titles to and reform of tenancy, which uses legisla- the land they have been farming or break up tion to improve the situation of tenants. large farms. Such reforms usually come in Tenancy reform can be an important step response to escalating tenant demands for toward more meaningful reform, but on its land and can be applied where tenancy own, it has largely failed as a comprehen- reforms have failed. They have been effec- sive reform strategy. tive in some countries, including China; Programs of land titling and registration Japan (under U.S. military occupation after can be effective peacebuilding tools in post- World War II); the Republic of Korea; and confl ict contexts. The increasing acceptance Taiwan, China. In all cases, they took place

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 151 under great external pressure, with external Tensions around Access support, and often where the state was seek- to Water ing to defuse the risks of violent confl ict (Dorner and Thiesenhusen 2005). Access to water, which Fergusson (2015) Market-mechanism redistribution and describes as the “petroleum of the next cen- community-based land reform rely on the tury,” is a factor in both intra- and interstate government to facilitate the purchase and confl ict where threats have accumulated sale of land. The government provides and where the failure to achieve water secu- credit to buyers; when the credit has been rity multiplies the risk (World Bank 2017b). repaid, the land is titled to benefi ciary Water-related contestations can take place households. This model is being imple- at multiple levels: between herders and mented in Brazil, Malawi, and South Africa farmers over a shared waterpoint, between (Bruce 2017). This model presents less risk communities over allocation of irrigation of confl ict because it does not compel land- water, between citizens and the state over owners to sell land. the displacement impact of a new dam, and In addition, agricultural land reform holds between neighboring states over the sharing a much higher chance of success when of transnational waters. These disputes may accompanied by increased access to credit also interconnect at different levels. For and markets for new landholders. In areas instance, local disputes over water may mir- where this has not been the case, land reforms ror, contribute to, and complicate wider have been effectively reversed, as new land- disputes over water allocation (Brown and owners face diffi culties in maintaining liveli- Keating 2015). Managing local-level dis- hoods or keeping up with property taxes. putes is thus as critical as resolving inter- In El Salvador, unequal access to land was an state water-related confrontations. important structural driver of the 12-year Improving access to water can help to civil war and a critical area for the eventual promote women’s safety. In many societ- peace accords (Binford 1993; Seligson 1995; ies, gender-based divisions of work leave Thiesenhusen 1995). The failure to increase women with the primary responsibility access to credit and markets was an important for organizing and undertaking domestic factor limiting the sustainability of the land work, including cooking, cleaning, and reform process (Binford 1993; Seligson 1995; taking care of children and elderly family Thiesenhusen 1995).4 members—all of which require access to Managing land as an arena of contesta- water (Cleaver and Elson 1995). Women tion is not limited to agricultural reform. are at risk of harassment and violence In urban areas, access to housing enables when fetching water. Girls are more likely broader access to livelihoods. There are to miss school because of the responsibil- many and diverse examples of efforts ity of obtaining water for the family, and to increase access to affordable housing. both women and girls are more likely to The state may provide low-cost housing be punished if they are not able to bring directly, as in Brazil up until the 1980s, or back water (in a drought, for instance) or it may offer subsidies to facilitate the return home late after waiting in line at purchase or rental of housing (Magalhaes the well. The prevalence of these chal- 2016). Many countries throughout Latin lenges has prompted international guide- America, including Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, lines to include safety and protection El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru, adopted measures for women and girls within these market-based approaches during humanitarian efforts and broader water the 1970s and 1980s, all with the strong and sanitation projects (IASC 2015; UN participation of the private sector Women 2015). (Magalhaes 2016). Results have been Climate change, population growth, mixed, with some countries experiencing a urbanization, and large-scale agriculture virtual reversal of the intended reforms combine to strain limited water resources. toward even stronger segregation in slums It is predicted that, by the middle of the (Magalhaes 2016). twenty-fi rst century, global water demand

152 Pathways for Peace will be up 55 percent over 2012 levels (Global than at the national level (Gleick 1993; Postel Water Forum 2012). Water scarcity is and Wolf 2001). However, relatively few expected to cost some regions up to 6 percent mechanisms are available for managing sub- of their gross domestic product (GDP) by national contestations around water. One 2050 (World Bank 2016). The effects of scar- local option is dialogue among stakeholders city are felt most keenly in the Middle East facilitated by civil society (OECD 2005). and North Africa, which has only 1 percent Where dialogue occurs, actions should of the world’s renewable water resources situate the confl ict in the broader context of despite hosting about 5 percent of the world’s prevailing power and political arrangements. population (Pedraza and Heinrich 2016). Increasing women’s participation in gover- Often, it is not the scarcity of water that leads nance of water is particularly important, to tensions, but the way in which it is gov- given the links between access to water and erned and administered. Ineffi cient use and women’s safety and the improved sustain- management of water, outdated infrastruc- ability of projects that involve women as key ture, and inappropriate legal, political, and stakeholders (UN Water 2006). economic frameworks all exacerbate ten- An understanding of shared needs and sions arising from the scarcity of water mutual concern over water supplies may (Pedraza and Heinrich 2016). encourage cooperation in water sharing Climate change is a “threat multiplier between different communities or coun- which exacerbates existing tensions and tries. An attempt to impose a technical solu- instability” and magnifi es the challenge of tion on warring parties in the Ferghana managing the resource (EU 2008). The Valley in Central Asia failed because it dis- impacts of climate change will be detected regarded the wider socioeconomic context primarily through water use, creating and viewed irrigation disputes simply as uncertainty in food, energy, urban, and local issues between communities of differ- environmental systems (World Bank 2016). ent ethnic origins (Brown and Keating Shifts in the availability and variability of 2015). Strengthening institutions and local water can induce migration and ignite civil confl ict resolution mechanisms may help to confl ict. The confl ict that has torn the manage contestations (box 5.3). Syrian Arab Republic apart is an example of At the international level, several mech- how water insecurity can multiply risk anisms can help to ease water-related ten- (Gleick 2014; World Bank 2017b). sions between states. These mechanisms Risks of violence around water are more include transboundary cooperation princi- pronounced at the local or subnational levels ples, shared data, information systems,

BOX 5.3 Collaboration over Water: EcoPeace Middle East

EcoPeace Middle East adopts grassroots common solutions [and] gain a broader and community approaches, as well as understanding of their long-term impact advocacy, to create cooperative on nature and on future generations.” management of water resources in Israel, EcoPeace Middle East bases its approach Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza. It on the belief that solutions in natural works with individuals and communities resource management and water security to build relationships between typically require long-term collaboration. communities and to foster trust and It complements government-to- cooperation at a local level. The government water diplomacy efforts and environmental peacebuilding organization cultivates local capacity to deal with the hosts camps, organizes activities such as complexity of interdependent regional role playing, and brings together people environmental resources at the of all ages “to develop long-term community, national, and regional levels.

Source: EcoPeace Middle East (http://ecopeaceme.org).

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 153 water management institutions, and legal competition that, if well managed, can be frameworks. Disputes between riparian directed toward broader society. If not well states can be resolved through consulta- managed, the benefi ts concentrate among tions, mediation, negotiation, and judicial specifi c groups, with the potential to fuel means, such as recourse to the International violent confl ict. Research suggests that Court of Justice (Strategic Foresight Group 40–60 percent of intrastate armed confl icts 2013). Technology can also help to manage over the past 60 years have been triggered, the risks around the scarcity of water by funded, or sustained by natural resources fi nding innovative ways in which to reuse (Brown and Keating 2015, 4; Drew 2017; and recycle water. Desalination and repro- Matthew, Brown, and Jensen 2009).5 cessing of sewage water are two examples of Violence related to extractive resources how technology can help to manage the can take place at the national and subna- supply of water. tional levels. It can take many forms, rang- However, confl ict over water is infre- ing from community-based contestations quent at the international level, and in most over the access to profi ts from extraction or cases, countries share transboundary water its environmental impacts to civil war that resources without violence (Wolf et al. is funded by resources open to being 2006). Relations among riparian states tend looted. The degree of risk of confl ict over to be more cooperative in the presence of natural resources depends, in part, on the international water institutions that can type of resource, its location, and the mode accommodate changing political, hydrolog- of exploitation (Lujala 2010; Ross 2012). ical, or other basin conditions (Ho 2017). The connection between minerals, includ- The Indus Waters Treaty, which codifi ed the ing alluvial diamonds (Lujala 2009; Ross sharing of water from the Indus River 2003, 2006), other alluvial gemstones between India and Pakistan in 1960, is often (Fearon 2004), and other nonfuel minerals cited as a successful case of resource sharing (Besley and Persson 2011; Collier, Hoeffl er, between countries in a constant state of ten- and Rohner 2009; Sorens 2011), and the sion (Strategic Foresight Group 2013). risk of violent confl ict has been especially It also underscores the effectiveness of hav- pronounced. ing a third party in the dialogue, in this case The destructive potential of misappro- the World Bank. The treaty has continued priated, misused, and poorly managed to be honored even through times of war, extractive resources has been under scru- and disputes are resolved within the frame- tiny since the beginning of the so-called work of the treaty. “greed versus grievance” debate of the last decade and even before (Drew 2017). Greed The Challenge of was argued to provide both the opportunity Extractive Resources and the cause of confl ict (Collier and Hoeffl er 2004), while grievance as a motiva- Extractive resources have developed a repu- tion was said to derive from a sense of injus- tation as being a poisoned chalice for eco- tice and the complex interplay of factors nomic and institutional stability and peace. that led to violent confl ict (Homer-Dixon While resources such as oil, natural gas, and 1999). While this debate has since become minerals have the potential to confer signif- more nuanced, extractive resources can icant benefi ts onto populations and to contribute to the risk of violence, both improve development outcomes, they can directly and indirectly, in several ways. also fuel tremendous instability and vio- Whether a society rich in natural lence. This combination of risks of violence resources follows a peaceful pathway or not together with the opportunity for increased depends on how the associated risks are revenue and development, known as the managed. The role of the state and the inter- “resource curse,” has a large infl uence on action of institutions with the extractives the pathway a society takes (Drew 2017). industry and affected communities are Simply put, the economic benefi ts of natu- important mediating factors. Extractives ral resource extraction create incentives for can create incentives for corruption and can

154 Pathways for Peace enable elite co-option or suppression of with relatively little access to technology or political opposition, leading to the capital, such as alluvial diamonds, gem- entrenchment of undemocratic, klepto- stones, or hydrocarbons (Drew 2017). Such cratic regimes (Drew 2017). Extractives may resources may become the focus of armed be both a structural facilitator of such movements searching for sources of reve- regimes and a focal point for group-based nue to fi nance their operations (Brack and grievances where the perception of an Hayman 2006). Some armed movements unfair distribution of benefi ts is felt to are primarily rent seeking; others are pri- refl ect an unjust social contract (Drew marily political, religious, or ideological; 2017). This is especially the case in the and many have mixed or shifting motives, absence of fair, robust, and competent gov- for example, when economic incentives erning institutions that are able to deter cor- supplant a group’s original aims. The exis- ruption or respond to the seizure of tence of these sources of income for armed resources by powerful actors. groups and organized crime networks can The capture of resources by elites, which prolong and entrench violent confl ict. deprives the general population of revenues At the local level, land and natural and the potential development opportuni- resources often constitute the primary ties they may have derived from these means of income and livelihood for com- revenues, is a major source of grievance. munities. This creates high stakes for con- Diverting revenues from resources can fuel testation over resources. Often, confl ict tensions, especially when combined with stems from grievances where communities corruption and mismanagement or where are excluded from decisions about revenues benefi t only certain groups and extraction or where the distribution of exclude others. In this case, the “unrealized project benefi ts is perceived to be unfair or potential” of extractives revenues to increase unequal. opportunities for all and contribute to Grievances can coalesce around the envi- development can feed into preexisting ronmental impacts of extraction, especially grievances (Le Billon 2014). if these are perceived to fall disproportion- The resource curse can be particularly ately on certain groups. In Nigeria, environ- acute in oil-, gas-, and mineral-rich coun- mental degradation associated with oil tries (Drew 2017). Oil-dependent states extraction has impinged on the livelihoods sometimes become rentier states charac- of local fi shermen and farmers in the Niger terized by authoritarianism, repression, delta and contributed to oil-related violent poor governance, and high levels of confl ict over the last two decades (Marc, corruption. Oil, in particular, makes Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). In Bougainville, corruption more entrenched and authori- Papua New Guinea, environmental damage tarian regimes more durable (Ross 2015). caused by mining activities at the Panguna In countries where political elites have copper mine in the 1980s helped to trigger a captured resources, the exclusion of specifi c civil war, which evolved into a secessionist ethnic communities from patronage net- confl ict (Brown and Keating 2015). works can deepen economic inequalities, Grievances can also relate to the distri- create distortions in the political process, bution of benefi ts, including compensation, and weaken political systems (Sargsyan investment, or preference toward contracting 2017). States can also use extractives as workers or businesses from the surround- concessions to fi nance violent confl ict, ing areas, known as “local content” (Vasquez while royalties and bonus payments made 2016).6 Often, the jobs created by extractives to repressive or unaccountable govern- projects are insuffi cient in number and are ments by transnational companies can very technical or require a different skill support counterinsurgency or suppress set than that held by local communities and dissent (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2004). thus are unable to appease the local popula- The risk of violent confl ict tends to rise tion and offset the negative impacts of the in the presence of so-called “lootable” industry (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). resources and those that can be extracted These projects affect men and women in

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 155 different ways, including in relation to contestations by managing company- access to employment, decision making, community confl ict. Here too, the govern- disruption of established social patterns, ment has a role to play in ensuring that and changes in the environment (World communities are consulted. Bank 2013). In some cases, however, com- Although international instruments munities have been able to win important and other voluntary frameworks generally concessions from extractives companies. have made a positive contribution to the In Papua New Guinea’s North Fly District, governance of extractives, there are chal- women leaders organized to negotiate com- lenges in assessing their impact, including munity mine continuation agreements with the absence of agreement on key dimen- the Ok Tedi mine. Their seat at the negotiat- sions. Their drawbacks also include the ing table eventually won them an agreement fact that, as voluntary arrangements, they guaranteeing their community 10 percent are by nature nonbinding and their instru- of all compensation, 50 percent of scholar- ments are sometimes too abstract and the- ships, cash payments to families (including oretical to have a real impact or are only women as co-signatories), and a quota of effective in concert with other initiatives. seats on the bodies charged with imple- Moreover, frameworks that only deal with menting the agreement (Menzies and national governments, reinforce the status Harley 2012). quo, or undermine an ongoing process of Several instruments and mechanisms change risk creating new forms of violence have been developed to respond to the chal- (Drew 2017). Insuffi ciently inclusive EITI lenge of extractives-related violent confl ict. government representation can reinforce These include international frameworks of confl ict dynamics, especially in highly voluntary standards and principles, such as divided societies with preexisting percep- the Extractive Industries Transparency tions of exclusion. Initiative (EITI)7 and the Kimberley Process At the subnational level, where the risk of Certifi cation Scheme (KPCS).8 The 2030 confl ict is often pronounced, subnational Agenda also calls for accountable and trans- implementation of EITI is currently being parent institutions and includes specifi c piloted in six countries as a way to foster targets to reduce illicit fi nancial fl ows sig- greater inclusivity for confl ict prevention. nifi cantly by 2030 (target 16.4) and reduce The theory is that EITI facilitates the corruption and bribery substantially (target empowerment of regional institutions or 16.5). Other mechanisms include interna- local actors, while providing greater trans- tional and national legal instruments that parency through project-level reporting mandate compliance from states and com- (Wilson and Van Alstine 2014). However, panies, including section 1504 of the U.S. decentralized extractive management can Dodd-Frank Act and the European Union also expose regions to boom-and-bust cycles Transparency Directive (Drew 2017). and deepen regional inequalities. Brazil’s Companion initiatives also call for greater revenue-sharing system “disproportionately transparency and accountability across the benefi ts oil-rich Rio de Janeiro, the nation’s industry, including the Publish What You third wealthiest state in terms of GDP per Pay initiative and the Revenue Watch capita” (NRGI 2016). It can also create con- Institute (Drew 2017). Other initiatives testations over control of mines and include due diligence schemes in supply extractives sites, as in Peru (NRGI 2016). chain management and government-led Furthermore, windfalls for local govern- initiatives by producing nations toward the ments do not inevitably lead to better devel- equitable and peaceful management of opment outcomes or lessen grievances, as in resources, such as the creation of the Offi ce Brazil, Colombia, and Peru (Drew 2017). of the Ombudsman in Peru (Vasquez 2016; For greater effi cacy, decentralized revenue box 5.4). At the community level, corporate management or revenue transfers could be social responsibility initiatives introduced coupled with capacity support to local gov- by extractives companies have had some ernment and checks and balances in the success in offsetting the risk of local-level form of active civil society and community

156 Pathways for Peace BOX 5.4 The Mediating Role of the State: Peru’s Office of the Ombudsman

The Peruvian Offi ce of the Ombudsman While mediation is not specifi ed as one is an important example of a national of its roles, its mandate is broad enough institution working to mitigate to allow it to mediate oil- and gas-related hydrocarbon confl icts. Created in 1996 confl icts. Of the 347 social confl icts as an autonomous organization in which it intervened in 2009, around mandated by the 1993 National half were related to natural resources. Constitution, its role is to protect the The Ombudsman’s structure enables fundamental and constitutional rights of agility and accessibility. It has offi ces persons and communities, to supervise across the country, and mobile units state acts and responsibilities, and to travel to remote areas. Citizens’ claims ensure that public services are provided. can be presented for free and verbally, Its confl ict-related interventions fall into meaning that no resources or prior three main groups: support for dialogue legal knowledge are required. Its ability between actors, including through its to present cases to the Constitutional convening power; preventative action Court or directly to the Inter-American prior to confl ict; and mediation to Court of Human Rights and Inter- de-escalate active confl icts. Its American Commission on Human resolutions are not legally binding, but its Rights contributes to its effectiveness. legitimacy provides moral authority. Its Being able to bypass domestic legal fi ndings are disseminated through daily, procedures helps the Ombudsman weekly, and monthly reports to the to expedite the resolution of cases media. and distance itself from corruption Since its creation, the Offi ce of associated with the legal system. the Ombudsman has enjoyed a high This accessibility, transparency, and degree of popular legitimacy by effectiveness reinforce its legitimacy acting as a check on corruption and among the population, especially among as a confl ict management institution. vulnerable groups.

Sources: Drew 2017; Vasquez 2016.

participation. This, along with transparency devolution and the transfer of wealth to systems promoted by the private sector and subnational entities has been mooted as a international organizations, could help to potential prevention mechanism (Cordella increase the success of decentralization and Onder 2016). A recent investigation of approaches (Vasquez 2016). Well-structured the devolution of oil windfalls fi nds that community development planning processes redistributing oil revenues does prevent can constructively channel devolved revenue confl ict in some cases, but can stoke vio- for confl ict prevention benefi ts and can help lence in other cases by decreasing the to address risks around horizontal inequali- opportunity cost of mobilization (Cordella ties. Gradualism in the decentralization of and Onder 2016). Even small transfers in development planning to producing regions countries with large oil wealth can have this can also help to build institutional capability effect. Furthermore, the same research and local ownership, as in Peru (Vasquez shows that the transfer of oil wealth directly 2016), while participatory development to people is more effective as a means of planning processes can help to calibrate cor- preventing violent confl ict than fi scal trans- porate social responsibility initiatives to local fers to subnational governments, even priorities. though the latter typically generates greater Ultimately, the idea of addressing the welfare through higher levels of consump- risks of extractives-related confl ict through tion (Cordella and Onder 2016).

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 157 The Arena of In Colombia, Liberia, and Nepal, unequal or Service Delivery exclusionary access to public goods has also been detrimental to perceptions of state legit- Service delivery can affect the risk of vio- imacy (Dix, Hussmann, and Walton 2012). lence in that it affects state legitimacy In these cases, uneven service delivery (Omoeva and Buckner 2015; World Bank can stoke grievances against the state or 2017a). While service delivery is not the against groups that are seen to be receiving 9 only determinant of state legitimacy, it is a unfairly disproportionate access. Perceived primary way by which many citizens favoritism toward one group may boost the directly encounter the state and shapes their favored group’s trust in the state, but also it overall perception of it. In the hierarchy of may undermine other groups’ trust in the political goods, the relevance of services has state (Mcloughlin 2015a). Reforms of ser- been referred to as giving “content to the vice delivery can generate grievances that social contract between the ruler and ruled” lead to violent confl ict “when the rules and (Rotberg 2004). Specifi cally, the delivery of patterns of distribution are perceived by education, health care, water, sanitation, some to be unjustifi able and unfair” (Sturge and even justice and security have been et al. 2017, ix). described as “the glue” that binds state and The legitimizing effect of service delivery society together (Milliken and Krause also depends heavily on how services are 2002). These services are the most tangible delivered. A fi ve-country study of citizen expression of the basic minimum that citi- perceptions and service delivery in confl ict- zens expect from the state in exchange for affected contexts fi nds that, with regard to their deference to the state’s rule over them state legitimacy, fairness and inclusiveness (Gilley 2009). in the service delivery process matters as However, the relationship between ser- much as, if not more than, the quality of vice delivery and legitimacy is neither sim- services or who delivers them (Sturge et al. ple nor direct (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and 2017). Similarly, other research across dif- Dunn 2012; Fisk and Cherney 2016; ferent contexts fi nds that “the perceived Mcloughlin 2015b; Sacks and Larizza 2012; fairness of the process by which authorities Stel and Abate 2014; Stel and Ndayiragiie and institutions make decisions and exer- 2014; Sturge et al. 2017). The degree of legit- cise authority is a key aspect of people’s imacy that the state enjoys depends on peo- willingness to comply with it” (Mcloughlin ple’s expectations, which are, in turn, shaped 2015a; Tyler 2006). by their prior experiences (Nixon, Mallett, When services are not delivered appro- and McCullough 2017), geography, identity, priately, state legitimacy suffers. Service and culture (Sturge et al. 2017). In South delivery that falls short can undermine per- Africa, perceptions of state legitimacy vary ceptions of government and can have a according to age, race, and gender; along delegitimizing effect (Sturge et al. 2017). rural-urban divides; and by their experi- Legitimacy is grounded in justifi able rules ences of apartheid (Carter 2011). and can unravel when power is used in Uneven coverage of services can under- ways that are not justifi ed (Mcloughlin mine state legitimacy, when it is viewed as a 2015a). Delegitimation can happen when manifestation of group exclusion. Perceptions institutions or individuals charged with of unequal or exclusionary access to services exercising authority breach social norms or infl uence the way citizens regard the “right- when these norms change in relation to fulness” of the state (Dix, Hussmann, and governing rules and practices (Mcloughlin Walton 2012). According to one study, 2015a). patronage politics in Sri Lanka has meant that poorer and less well-connected individu- Corruption Related to als fail to access social protection transfers as Basic Services a result of a bargain forged among wealthier and more powerful members of society Where ineffi cient or inappropriate service (Nixon, Mallett, and McCullough 2017). delivery overlaps with corruption, it can

158 Pathways for Peace exclude certain populations within society, delivery, despite the presence of corrup- particularly those who are already margin- tion. In the midst of armed confl ict in alized. This can lead to civil unrest, protests, Nepal, Maoists allowed health services to and even outright violence, as in South operate in exchange for rents, and district- Africa’s informal settlements in 2009 level offi cials understood that they needed (Burger 2009; Corruption Watch 2014). to maintain the fl ow of medicine to villages In Nepal, corruption, lack of information to enhance their local legitimacy (World about the availability of services, and the Bank 2017a). exclusion of some groups from their share undermined the credibility of the state Service Delivery in Alternatively institutions (Ndaruhutse et al. 2012). Where Governed Spaces corruption is endemic, political legitimacy is weakened and the risk of confl ict rises As discussed in chapter 3, nonstate actors (Baker 2017). often provide alternative forms of gover- At its simplest, corruption is defi ned as nance, especially in areas where the state has the misuse of public offi ces and resources not established its presence in a convincing for private gain (Sargsyan 2017). However, way. These actors may be traditional or corruption can occur at different levels communal leaders and institutions that step and in many different forms. Corruption in to fi ll the vacuum, or they may include has an indirect connection to violence criminal networks, traffi ckers, militants, in that it can fuel grievances between groups and extremists. While not all of the latter that are seen to be benefi ting and those may directly oppose the state, they may that are not. Additionally, corruption ulti- undermine the state, either indirectly by mately undermines national institutions supplanting the state’s authority or more and social norms because some are seen directly by using these spaces to launch to be above the rules set by those institu- attacks, build up operations, and traffi c nar- tions (World Bank 2011). In combination cotics, arms, and contraband. with weak rule of law and where the insti- The dominant narrative across such tutions charged with delivering services contexts is to “securitize” these spaces, to are politicized or captured, corruption link them to multiple emerging security can generate popular “distrust, dissatis- threats, and to view them as safe havens for faction, and grievances with the existing rogue elements (Abrahamsen 2005; Keenan political system” (Taydas, Peksen, and 2008). While one of the state’s primary James 2010). These feelings can contrib- responsibilities is to provide security, a ute to delegitimizing the state and invali- purely security-focused approach in such dating disincentives for violent protest contexts is often ineffective. It fails to (Sargsyan 2017). In Afghanistan, endemic address the core reason that such spaces corruption and elite impunity under- emerge in the fi rst place: namely, poor gov- mined the image of the government and ernance and weak state presence (Keister was one of the factors that enabled the 2014). To assert its presence and gain the resurgence of the Taliban in the country- trust of citizens, which is a prerequisite for side (World Bank 2017a). legitimacy, the state needs to maintain a Some research suggests that corruption positive, visible presence. Delivery of ser- can have a stabilizing role, depending on vices provides the means to do so and can the context and the form it takes have particular resonance for women, who (Hussmann, Tisne, and Mathisen 2009). are primarily responsible for providing “Classic” patronage politics can be a source education, health, clothing, and food for of social and political cohesion, in that it the household (MacPherson 2008). The promotes a certain consistency (Brinkerhoff state does not need to be involved in every and Goldsmith 2005) and trying to elimi- aspect of the provision of services. nate it can destabilize power dynamics However, being recognized as ultimately (Hameiri 2007). In certain cases, public responsible for providing services and for investments can enhance inclusive service organizing the contributions of other

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 159 actors bolsters its legitimacy and authority helping service delivery to adapt to local (Bellina et al. 2009). preferences and building trust between the Building state legitimacy requires, center and the periphery. Furthermore, in among other measures, the visible presence remote and sparcely populated areas where of state institutions, also referred to as “pen- state presence is scarce, security, justice, etration” (Nixon, Mallett, and McCullough basic, and livelihood services can be deliv- 2017, 4). Often, however, the state chooses ered with a smaller government presence to allocate limited resources in a rational “so long as mechanisms are nested within manner, only extending authority when the customary practices, ad hoc community benefi ts outweigh the costs. The state may structures, and communities themselves are decide not to integrate areas where its pres- invested in the success of delivery modali- ence is already low or weak if integration ties” (Wee et al. 2014). promises few benefi ts and meager returns on the investment (Keister 2014). For exam- Inclusion and Consultation in ple, limited infrastructure and fi scal con- Service Delivery straints in the north of Mali, along with high per capita cost of services in propor- Providing a platform for inclusion, partici- tion to low population density, make the pation, and voice to citizens and involving delivery of services very expensive and chal- them directly in the provision of services lenging (Wee et al. 2014). However, a grow- can signifi cantly improve citizens’ percep- ing sense of marginalization among the tions of the state. Citizens’ perceptions of local population (despite data showing that and regard for the state, particularly at the service provision in some sectors is compat- local level, are improved when they are con- ible with or higher than in the south) neces- sulted, when they feel heard, and, most sitates fi nding innovative ways to deliver important, when they are brought directly services (Wee et al. 2014). into the process itself (Sturge et al. 2017). Government strategies to compete with The presence of grievance mechanisms and alternative governance and service provid- possibilities of civil participation strongly ers by making the state a more attractive infl uence perceptions of government, option have had some success. A policy of which suggests that public services can act “peaceful penetration” in Pakistan between as a channel through which citizens and 1951 and 1955 and between 1972 and 1977 public authorities interact (Van de Walle saw the government provide Pashtun areas and Scott 2011). with a variety of development projects to In Nepal, Pakistan, and Uganda, includ- demonstrate the value of closer relations ing citizens in the process of service deliv- with the government; this helped to lessen ery through grievance mechanisms the appeal of an independent Pashtunistan improved the perceptions among citizens and to improve citizens’ perceptions of the of national actors and reinforced feelings government (Keister 2014). Using existing that both local and national government structures that emerge locally and organi- actors care about the opinion of citizens cally to form the “building blocks” of (Sturge et al. 2017). In Nepal, Sri Lanka, administration in areas such as the remote and Uganda, community meetings have regions of Somalia can also be effective had the same effect (Sturge et al. 2017). (Bryden 1999; Keister 2014). Although problematic service delivery can The extension of authority and legiti- also negatively affect attitudes to and rela- macy through local intermediaries in this tionships with both local-level service pro- way forms “mediated states” or “hybrid viders and the government, embedding regimes” (Boege et al. 2008; Keister 2014, 9; grievance mechanisms into the service can Menkhaus 2006, 7). Hybrid arrangements have the opposite effect (Nixon, Mallett, can involve public and private as well as for- and McCullough 2017). mal and informal arrangements. These The strongest results show up where arrangements can be effective in remote people are involved directly in running a communities with a high level of diversity, service, particularly at the local level.

160 Pathways for Peace Indeed, direct involvement matters more elements in the prevention of violent con- than the mere presence of services, when it fl ict throughout the confl ict cycle. comes to the way in which people think This chapter discusses security and jus- about the government. Experiences of tice individually, although they are deeply corruption in service delivery and poor interconnected both conceptually and as treatment by staff, especially when repeated, practical policy domains. Measures to pro- undermine trust in the capacity of govern- vide better security will not be sustainable if ment to provide decent care. In Sierra they are not combined with improvements Leone, decentralization of service delivery in access to justice—and vice versa. was intended to give local communities a Together, security and justice form the basis greater say and stake in outcomes (Sacks for the enjoyment of access to all the other and Larizza 2012). However, this was insuf- arenas—security as the system responsible fi cient in and of itself for building trust in for protecting the basic right to life and per- local authorities. What benefi ciaries cared sonal integrity and justice as the system about in reality was how fair and free of responsible for resolving confl ict. Each is corruption they perceived the process to be, treated separately here to give greater atten- combined with the quality of services (Sacks tion to their respective contributions to the and Larizza 2012). The state can gain legiti- overall risk of confl ict. macy by fencing in disagreements, opening up space for voice and arbitration, provid- The Role of the Security Sector ing services in a fair and inclusive manner, in Sustaining Peace and offering institutionalized arrangements for service provision. The monopoly of the use of force is a main characteristic of the state’s authority, and The Arena of Security the state almost always has a strong role in governance and the provision of security, and Justice even if this role is uneven across a country’s The security and justice arena is central to territory. The state cannot delegate security understanding and preventing violent con- functions to nonstate actors without even- fl ict. Security and justice institutions, tually sacrifi cing sovereignty. Nevertheless, whether formal or informal, impose sanc- hybrid models, with mixed arrangements tions on violence and limit the harm that of informal, nonstate, and formal state violence can cause. Severe defi cits in the security providers, are the norm in many governance of this arena, including lack of low-capacity contexts, for example, rural accountability, transparency, and respon- Liberia, where community watch teams siveness, can result in a breakdown in the constitute a large component of security rule of law and, consequently, impunity. If provision. While extending the reach of rules and norms regarding violence are dis- security provision, despite being “rooted in criminatory or poorly enforced, groups local custom and practice, [informal insti- may cease to rely on institutionalized secu- tutions] can sometimes be just as exclusive rity and justice sectors and may seek secu- and oppressive as formal security provi- rity and justice elsewhere (World Bank sion” (Bagayoko, Hutchful, and Luckham 2011). These issues are specifi cally addressed 2016, 20). in the 2030 Agenda. SDG 16 emphasizes The security arena offers opportunities effective, accountable, transparent, and for confl ict prevention. Security is a neces- inclusive institutions and specifi cally aims sary precondition for other public goods to reduce all forms of violence (target 16.1), and freedoms, such as freedom of move- particularly against children (target 16.2), ment and expression. When security is pro- and to promote the rule of law and ensure vided inclusively, access to the other arenas equal access to justice for all (target 16.3). is enhanced. Security enables economic This study argues throughout that design- development and overall development by ing incentives for peace and limiting the providing the conditions necessary for peo- harm that violent actors can cause are key ple to invest in new businesses, obtain and

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 161 maintain employment, and send children they returned home, are a case in point to school. Risks increase when security pro- (Stearns 2012). vision is weak, exclusionary, or predatory. In other contexts, the proliferation of Where security actors do not behave in a nonstate armed groups and formal provid- manner consistent with the rule of law, ers of security can fragment the provision they can pose a threat to the very popula- of security. For example, in South Sudan, tions they are charged with protecting the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the (World Bank 2011). Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in- Noting the trends in violent confl ict Opposition constitute “a conglomerate of elaborated in chapter 1, this section focuses various ethnic factions with different goals largely on internal security forces, for and trajectories; groups that at times have example, police, gendarmes, and wildlife fought each other, and that have come forces. However, even if designed to man- together to fi ght a joint enemy only to split age external security, military forces can up again and again, forming various alle- nonetheless have signifi cant direct and giances throughout South Sudan’s long indirect impacts on the prevention of con- journey towards self-determination” fl ict. While very few military regimes (Breitung, Paes, and van de Vondervoort remain in place in the world, the military 2016). In many countries, political elites still plays a very strong role in politics and essentially arm private militias to garner the economy in many countries. In some power and infl uence around key moments, cases, this situation can be a source of sta- such as elections. bility, especially when the army manages to Even when managed by formal institu- stay out of political infi ghting. However, tions, security actors—be they police military penetration of society and the units, individual patrols, or intelligence economy can make reform of the security offi cers—are motivated by a range of sector itself challenging. Where the military political, social, cultural, and economic owns corporations or controls economic incentives. Exclusionary and biased secu- sectors or, more precisely, where military rity forces pose an especially high risk if and security personnel derive benefi ts from access to and control of the tools to main- their rank that are not directly related to tain security are instead used to maintain their role as security providers, reform of loyalty or dispense favors. Although the the security sector often requires much state should provide security, as a service, broader reform of the state too. to its citizens, it may use security forces As noted, where the state’s presence is less to further the public good than to weak or the authority of the state is con- defend its own power and protect allied tested, nonstate security providers and private interests. As such, decision making, informal mechanisms can proliferate and the allocation of resources, and the use of become the preferred alternative for local force may refl ect private, group, or parti- populations.10 Such nonstate providers can san interests. Risks increase, for example, take many shapes and often change form when police operations are conducted in over time, including as rogue local-level accordance with private agendas and polit- units of formal security institutions, crimi- ical and economic interests, rather than nal gangs, violence entrepreneurs, rebel being operationally independent from groups, self-defense militias, or vigilante political decision making and conducted groups. In some fragile contexts, there is no in response to the population’s concerns clear distinction between state and nonstate and demands for public safety. security providers, with the relationship of In more extreme cases, security forces armed groups to state security forces chang- are predatory toward the populations they ing and evolving over time. The shifting are meant to protect. Examples of police alliances in the Democratic Republic of and military forces participating in or facil- Congo, where rebels were integrated into itating mass atrocities abound, as do abuses the armed forces, only to revert to their during so-called “crackdowns” and other established practices and structures once muscular approaches to security threats or

162 Pathways for Peace even common crime. As discussed in immediate security and stability, allowing chapter 4, abuse of identity groups by recovery and development to begin. In turn, security forces will deepen grievances and SSR processes can help to contain the risk may be a strong factor motivating people to of future violence by building institutions identify with and join violent groups. that support the welfare of former members The overall risk of weak, fragmented, of national armed services, creating new exclusionary, or predatory security provi- employment opportunities in reformed sion is popular disenchantment and loss of security institutions, reducing incentives for confi dence in a society’s willingness and future violence, and reestablishing trust ability to deliver security. Reform of the between the security and defense forces and security sector, understood as the struc- the population (McFate 2010). tures, institutions, and personnel responsi- In an increasing number of contexts, ble for managing, providing, and overseeing international and regional actors are play- security, including informal or traditional ing important roles in accompanying and security providers, can build the credibil- monitoring security forces, supplying ity, legitimacy, and effectiveness of a equipment, and providing technical society. 11 When security services have no training.13 This support has been instru- legitimacy, they will struggle to be effective, mental in monitoring and addressing short- and that effort will further undermine their term threats to stability, as evidenced by credibility and delegitimize them in the international counterterrorism support to eyes of the population. the Sahel (DeYoung 2017). However, Reform of security institutions can sig- addressing the deeper constraints to inclu- nal a change in approach, even when results sive and effective security requires sustained from such reforms require sustained invest- and fl exible support for a fuller reform ment. From its beginnings in the mid- process, with strong national ownership. 1990s, lessons on security sector reform Chapter 7 discusses the role of international (SSR) highlight three key entry points for actors in helping to calibrate incentives for reform: (a) the development of an institu- peace, to reform institutions, and to change tional framework of organizations and pol- structural factors in the fi eld of security. icies; (b) governance and civilian oversight; The UN Security Council recently recog- and (c) the establishment of capable, pro- nized that a professional, accountable, and fessional, and accountable security forces. effective security sector is critical to consol- In addition to security sector reforms, idating peace and stability and to prevent- demilitarization of society is also import- ing countries from lapsing or relapsing into ant. In recognition of the critical nexus confl ict (UN Security Council 2014, 2016). between security and development, SSR A representative security force, which is the processes have sometimes been undertaken face of the state, is a basic ingredient for in conjunction with disarmament, demobi- effective security provision in a society. lization, and reintegration (DDR) pro- Groups need to see themselves represented grams, especially in postconfl ict countries. in the makeup of the police force, The DDR-SSR nexus is manifested in the for example. Incorporating greater num- integration of former combatants into bers of marginalized ethnic or religious national security and defense forces, at both groups into the military and police forces the strategic and operational levels. Some and fostering a cultural shift toward non- countries tie development goals specifi cally discriminatory policing can help to allevi- to security goals or develop joint programs ate grievances around security. Increasing for security and development, for example, the number of female police offi cers and through integrated rule of law and DDR setting up women’s police stations have, in programs.12 If done effectively, DDR and some cases, contributed to higher report- SSR provide vital support to peace agreeing of crimes against women, especially ments and other transitional agreements by assault and domestic violence (DCAF building confi dence in postconfl ict institu- 2017). Community policing programs also tions and processes. DDR contributes to have increased the representativeness of

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 163 police forces, with important gains in citi- establishing civilian oversight and monitor- zen perceptions of security and state legiti- ing (Harborne, Dorotinsky, and Bisca 2017; macy. Chapter 6 discusses specifi c examples box 5.5). To date, these oversight mecha- drawn from country experiences with pre- nisms have received much less external venting violent confl ict. funding than the security forces themselves SSR also needs to bring about a cultural have (Bryden and Olonisakin 2010; shift in how authorities display and use Donnelly 1997). their power. It is essential to establish mech- SSRs are also more sustainable when anisms to signal and implement the shift in they include all of the security agencies institutional culture to make it real and vis- and forces. There is often a reluctance to ible to citizens. To reduce risk in the secu- include certain bodies in reform efforts— rity arena, SSR should establish civilian elite forces or intelligence units, for exam- oversight of security forces as well as of the ple. Where these agencies are perpetuating responsible ministries, parliament, and civil some of the worst human rights viola- society.14 This requires that the chain of tions, holding them accountable is essen- command for policy decisions is ultimately tial for the overall credibility of the in the hands of a civilian, that this offi cial is security architecture. However, because responsible for decisions to systematic over- they operate more clandestinely and with sight process, and that a legal regime exists impunity, they have proven to be the most to empower civil society to highlight con- elusive. In addition, including all agencies cerns and abuses. Public expenditure poses practical challenges to sequencing, reviews (PERs) provide a useful tool for prioritizing, and financing. Even in South

BOX 5.5 Public Expenditure Analysis of the Security Forces

A framework for analyzing the tried and tested tool that has been used expenditure for military, police, and over the last few decades in helping criminal justice institutions should governments to examine key questions resemble that for other elements of the of economic policy and public fi nancial public sector. It involves testing the management regarding their budgets. underlying rationale for state A PER examines government resource engagement, policy alignment of allocations within and among sectors, resource allocations, and effectiveness assessing the equity, effi ciency, and and effi ciency in spending. Recent work effectiveness of those allocations in the has also emphasized the need to mobilize context of a country’s macroeconomic domestic resources and strengthen framework and sectoral priorities. public expenditures in fragile states. Building on their complementary However, most central fi nance agencies mandates in economic management and development institutions are ill- and security sector reform (SSR), equipped to undertake this analysis. recent work by the World Bank and Similarly, most decision makers in United Nations provides national and national security have little or no international stakeholders with (a) the informed dialogue with their counterparts information needed to engage in in fi nance. This is largely due to a poor dialogue on security expenditure policy; understanding of the specifi c (b) a framework for analyzing fi nancial requirements of the security sector as management, fi nancial transparency well as a poor articulation between and oversight, and expenditure policy decision-making processes in public issues; and (c) advice on entry points fi nance and in security and justice. for integrating expenditure analysis into Security sector public expenditure SSR and broader governance reform reviews (PERs) fi ll this gap. The PER is a processes.

Sources: Development Committee 2015; Harborne, Dorotinsky, and Bisca 2017; OECD 2015; World Bank 2011.

164 Pathways for Peace Africa, where public consultations sub- Second, the institutional side of justice stantially contributed to the 1996 Defense refers to “the institutions that are central White Paper to great acclaim, there was to resolving confl icts arising over alleged no willingness to subject the Intelligence violations or different interpretations of White Paper to the same scrutiny (Nathan the rules that societies create to govern 2007).15 A notable exception was the State members’ behavior and that, as a conse- Information and Protection Agency in quence, are central to strengthening the Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was cre- normative framework (laws and rules) ated from scratch and therefore not sad- that shapes public and private actions” dled with the crimes of a predecessor (World Bank 2011). Justice systems include organization (Vetschera and Damian the framework of institutions that deter- 2006). mine how power is acquired and distrib- Finally, reform processes tend to be more uted, and they defi ne the sanctions against sustainable when based on citizen involve- abuses. They also adjudicate grievances in ment, through consultations, joint over- society and are the primary mechanism for sight with communities, or similar redressing disputes and wrongs done. mechanisms. In Kosovo, local public safety As such, justice systems go beyond the rule committees and municipal community of law, which refers to the general compli- safety councils, consisting of a wide range ance with laws in a society. The distinction of representatives ranging from local is important, in that it is possible for a authorities to nongovernmental organiza- regime to act in accordance with the rule tions and the community, were established of law for its particular context and still to enhance cooperation between the police violate, and be accountable to, the interna- and communities (OSCE 2008). Public tional system of justice. safety concerns of minority groups and Lack of legal identity is a major cause of women were emphasized in order to address exclusion from justice, and target 16.9 of specifi c violations against and needs of the 2030 Agenda focuses specifi cally on women and girls.16 Strengthening these dia- providing legal identity for all, including logues has been a key role for international birth registration, by 2030. Approximately action (Mahmoud 2017). In the same vein, 12 million people globally are stateless and SSR programs have at times promoted without effective citizenship rights.18 In national dialogue, but national dialogues addition, some 27 states around the world are labor- and time-intensive undertakings do not allow women to transfer nationality and depend on a tolerable security to their children, and statelessness can situation.17 occur where fathers are stateless, missing, or deceased. For example, the Rohingya are Justice and Fairness Muslims living in Rakhine (historically in Prevention known as Arakan) State, a geographically isolated area in western Myanmar, border- This study incorporates the defi nition of ing Bangladesh. There are different, irrec- two aspects of justice from the World oncilable narratives of who the Rohingya Development Report 2011 (World Bank are and the length of time they have resided 2011). First, the term justice refers to “the in Rakhine State. Since independence in broadly held notion of fairness,” which, 1948, the community has been gradually despite differences in context, is a univer- marginalized. The 1982 Citizenship Law sally relevant, albeit subjective, concept designated three categories of citizens: relating to just processes and outcomes (1) full citizens, (2) associate citizens, and regarding the distribution of power, (3) naturalized citizens. None of the cate- resources, opportunities, and sanctions. gories applies to the Rohingya, who are not A perception of unfairness is a key aspect of recognized as one of the 135 “national the relationship between grievances and races” by the Myanmar government mobilization to violence, as discussed in (Human Rights Watch 2017). While many chapter 4. remain stateless in Rakhine State today,

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 165 many more are stateless refugees residing By extension, access to the justice arena in other countries. They have been forced partly determines fair access to the other to fl ee as a result of widespread discrimi- arenas. Perceptions of injustice can be situ- nation and persecution rooted in the ated or can originate in the other arenas, deprivation of citizenship. but are ultimately resolved within the jus- The justice system, especially the formal tice and confl ict resolution systems. For justice system, is the space where rules and example, unfair outcomes in access to natu- power are ultimately defi ned. These rules ral resources and their benefi ts are addressed protect the basic rights that allow individuals within the justice system. Put another way, to enjoy the benefi ts from the other arenas. the credibility and legitimacy of the justice The justice system is the ultimate guarantor system has an impact on the functioning of of the right to physical integrity, which other arenas and on the population’s per- underlies all other rights through the sanc- ceptions of fairness and legitimacy overall. tions it imposes on violators. Most govern- Durable institutions that are perceived as ments have strong written policies that just are crucial to broad-based, inclusive guarantee the right to physical integrity, development (World Bank 2011). The 2030 which includes the right of protection from Agenda includes targets on equal access extrajudicial killing, torture, political or both to natural resources (targets 1.4, 2.3, wrongful imprisonment, or enforced disap- 5a) and to justice (target 16.3). pearance (box 5.6). If the state violates these A robust justice system creates incentives rights or tolerates impunity for their viola- for peaceful behavior. It can settle disputes tion, it can exacerbate grievances, particularly in a peaceful manner, ensure accountability when these manifestations of injustice over- of power, promote respect for human rights, lap with perceptions of exclusion, unfairness, combat corruption through the enforceabil- or inequality (Cingranelli et al. 2017). ity of contracts and property rights, and

BOX 5.6 Human Rights as a Basis for Normative Change

Many countries have used the universal, independent from government, for interrelated, and interdependent rights monitoring respect for human rights set out in the Universal Declaration of nationally. Civil society organizations Human Rights and the universal treaties have made vital contributions to that derive from it as well as a range of human rights instruments and their regional human rights instruments as a implementation. shared foundation for normative and International tools like fact-fi nding legal change. missions, routine reporting, investigative All 193 UN member states have commissions, and special rapporteurs ratifi ed at least two of the nine core have often focused on maintaining human rights treaties, and more than dialogue with governments on violations 80 percent of states have ratifi ed seven. of rights, discrimination, and abuse as The primary responsibility for respecting, part of efforts to reduce the risks of protecting, and fulfi lling human rights confl ict. The Universal Periodic Review rests with states, who translate the undertaken by the Human Rights international norms into laws, policies, Council is the main institutional review and programs. In many states, human mechanism for all 193 UN member rights have also underpinned institutional states. Its potential to contribute to reforms—for example, constitutional prevention and peacebuilding efforts reforms, creation of national human was acknowledged in the recent rights institutions, or transitional justice sustaining peace resolutions (UN mechanisms. National human rights General Assembly 2015a, para. 11; UN institutions serve as mechanisms, Security Council 2016).

Sources: OHCHR 2010; Payne et al. 2017.

166 Pathways for Peace ensure checks and balances (World Bank Reforms that fail to recognize this context 2017c). Conversely, a breakdown of justice may waste time and resources in building a systems and the rule of law generally can formal system that the population later infl ame the grievances that may be mobi- rejects and may also deepen resentment lized for confl ict and create incentives for of the overall project of state building violent behavior.19 The relationship between (Isser 2011). weak rule of law and violence is under- An important fi rst step is to understand scored by the poor perceptions of justice how people are solving the problems they systems often found in regions suffering face and the role that customary institu- from or at risk of violent confl ict, as people tions play in those processes. This under- lose confi dence in institutions that cannot, standing helps to identify the gap between or will not, protect them from injustices the way laws and policies are written, on the (Logan 2017). Grievances can accumulate one hand, and the way confl icts are resolved with prolonged confl ict, as the capacity of and needs are met in reality, on the other justice systems is strained by the need to hand. Starting with understanding as a respond to ongoing violence; the often- point of departure challenges the notion elevated levels of criminality and abuses that legal authority needs to originate in the during violent confl ict can further weaken state. It also opens up the possibility for the capacity of formal justice stystems. more inclusive and credible processes and Prevention of violent confl ict requires offers the potential to anticipate trade-offs identifying why justice system processes and and unintended consequences. In many outcomes may discriminate against certain contexts, including in contexts where vio- groups. In many cases, the formal justice sys- lent confl ict has already begun, local-level tem may be inaccessible. In others, it may be mechanisms for resolving confl icts have irrelevant to the justice-related needs of the helped to ensure stability and to reduce vio- population. Many people rely, voluntarily or lence. In the 1990s, the Islamic Courts in out of necessity, on informal or customary Somalia started to develop a level of popu- justice systems that are rooted in traditional lar legitimacy, and by 2006, various armed authority. Indeed, this is the case for groups were using the principle of credible roughly 80 percent of the population in law and order to form an Islamic Courts transition or postconfl ict settings (UN 2017). Union, which increased the stability in the A cross-country study of Afghanistan, territories under their control (Barnes and Guatemala, Iraq, Liberia, Mozambique, South Hassan 2007; box 5.7). Chapter 6 discusses Sudan, and Timor-Leste fi nds that customary practical experiences with local peace systems are often more trusted and used by committees. people because they are more sensitive to Reform of justice systems requires two the political and social realities and therefore parallel courses of action. On the one hand, faster and more effective in solving the every- it is important to ensure that current challenges day problems that people face (Isser 2011). receive equitable attention in order to Also, where formal rules diverge greatly from build trust and reestablish a sense of nor- local norms and customs, these customary malcy. At the same time, particularly in systems of justice are much more likely to be postconfl ict environments, perpetrators respected (Isser 2011). must be equally held to account for past Any reform of the formal system can abuses in order to send a strong signal of undermine public confi dence in the justice change. Balancing these needs is one of the system—and in the state more generally—if most formidable challenges of confl ict- it does not engage meaningfully with infor- affected environments. Weighing the equal- mal and customary justice systems. Time and ity of accountability processes against the again, experience has shown the critical imperative to bring perpetrators to book is importance, especially in countries transi- critical to the challenge of advancing stabi- tioning out of violent confl ict, of under- lization and justice in confl ict-affected standing the role that customary systems play environments under SDG 16 (UN General in responding to the problems people face. Assembly 2015b). Accountability processes

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 167 BOX 5.7 Traditional versus Formal Justice in Somalia

The formal court system in Somalia is In Benadir region, payments required perceived to be expensive, inaccessible, to process a case are higher than the and prone to manipulation. Somalis rely legally mandated court fees, and court primarily on traditional or clan-based users report that judicial decisions are forums to resolve disputes (xeer). often subject to political and economic Traditional elders are usually central to pressures. A real or perceived lack of any kind of conﬂ ict resolution or justice judicial independence, including a clan- service, relying primarily on the authority based appointment process, limits the of their clan or militia to enforce their ability of those who do not fall under judgments. This appears to be true even the protection of a dominant clan and in urban areas, where people can choose who are from vulnerable or marginalized to use the formal court system. groups (such as women or internally The lack of courts in rural areas displaced persons) to access an impartial means that there is little choice of forum. tribunal within the formal court structure.

Source: Zacchia, Harborne, and Sims 2017, 47.

may exacerbate grievances related to spe- and domestic violence. In some contexts, cifi c social groups if they are perceived to efforts to address this violence draw on cus- discriminate between groups (Mahony tomary norms to challenge the rules and 2015a). How and why the real or perceived practices of formal institutions. For example, unequal treatment of social groups actu- women’s advocacy groups in India’s ally occurs varies from one process to Gujarat and Utter Pradesh states set up another. Frameworks to identify how informal women’s courts (nari adalat) as an accountability processes treat groups dif- alternative to formal systems for resolving ferently can help to identify ways in which domestic violence cases (Kethineni, to preempt spoilers and mitigate risks of Srinivasan, and Kakar 2016). By drawingon confl ict (Mahony 2016). community norms, international human Responding to current needs implies rights laws, and state laws, they were able to expanding access to justice, especially for expand access to justice and help to prevent those who have been excluded. Strengthening further violence by contesting unequal gen- the capacity of local-level mechanisms to der power structures (Merry 2012; World resolve disputes that originate in the other Bank 2017c). arenas, as discussed in previous sections of Promoting accountability is pursued this chapter, can go a long way toward build- through transitional justice measures.20 ing confi dence. For example, promoting These include a wide range of mechanisms, more effective resolution of local-level con- such as vetting of government agencies fl icts over land or water access helps to and especially security forces, truth and address the everyday problems people reconciliation commissions, public apolo- face. It also builds useful bridges between gies,21 memorialization or local healing customary or informal and formal processes. processes, prosecution of human rights Strengthening the capacity of formal institu- abuses, and material or symbolic reparations to process judicial caseloads and tions.22 In some cases, transitional justice increasing the effi ciency of investigations measures enable high-level prosecutions to and prosecutions also need to be prioritized take place. These measures aim to establish (World Bank 2011). a clear public record of the past and to Addressing everyday justice needs also reassert respect for the rule of law, and entails dealing with manifestations of vio- they usually rely on heavy support from lence that tend to increase in situations of civil society and international actors violent confl ict, especially common crime (Payne et al. 2017).

168 Pathways for Peace There is widespread debate over the peace and justice has been debated, the value of transitional justice measures in focus of debate has generally been the will- reducing the risks of confl ict recurrence, in ingness of spoilers to reengage in violence part due to the range of actions included in response to the threat of prosecution in this category (Mallinder and O’Rourke (Vinjamuri 2010). 2016; Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2010). Some Effective reckoning with the past via have argued that prosecutions for past transitional justice measures requires a gen- crimes are essential to preventing confl ict dered approach. This implies accounting recurrence because they create deterrents for the multiple roles and experiences of for spoilers (Sikkink 2011); others argue women during confl ict as combatants, vic- that mechanisms to appease spoilers, such tims of violence, widows, or mothers whose as amnesty, are more effective (Snyder and children die (Tabak 2011). It is also import- Vinjamuri 2003). ant to consider the challenges that women, The Transitional Justice Research after a confl ict, face in accessing livelihoods, Collaborative examines the relationships recovering from physical and emotional between fi ve variables—trials, truth com- trauma, and obtaining justice. In many missions, amnesties, reparations, and cases, focusing on sexual violence as the sole vetting—that have been implemented form of violence women face during con- following 119 transitions from authoritar- fl ict ignores nonconfl ict-related violence ian rule or civil war in 86 countries since and its impacts. 1970 (Payne et al. 2017). It fi nds that Similar debates exist over the effective- implementing domestic criminal prosecu- ness of truth-telling processes as part of tions23 for past human rights violations has transitional justice (Mendeloff 2009). a signifi cant relationship with nonrecur- A recent quantitative study fi nds that cer- rence of intrastate confl ict. It also fi nds tain truth-telling and reconciliation pro- that the rate of recurrence decreases by cesses are associated with a decline in approximately 70 percent when trials are mental health, but higher levels of social pursued of middle- and low-level actors integration (Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi (Payne et al. 2017), holding all other fac- 2016). Some qualitative studies, moreover, tors constant. Paradoxically, the prosecu- suggest that deeply contested narratives tion of high-ranking individuals is associated with truth telling may revive associated with a 65 percent increase in the societal cleavages (Kelsall 2005). The inter- rate of confl ict recurrence, suggesting that vention of traditional elders in Sierra “coming together after a war to initiate a Leone’s Truth Commission has been cred- major legal process (much like writing a ited with enabling reconciliation and defus- new constitution) has important effects” ing tensions relating to contested truths (Payne et al. 2017, 19). there (Kelsall 2005). However, such pro- The number of cases of international cesses often require participants to subordi- criminal justice engagement with country nate to the very power structures situations is insuffi cient to make statisti- (traditional elites) that may have been at the cally signifi cant fi ndings about their impact root of the confl ict, so they may not suffi - on confl ict recurrence or nonrecurrence ciently address underlying causes over the (Payne et al. 2017). The International longer term (Mahony and Sooka 2015). Criminal Court defers jurisdiction to states Transitional justice measures can have a that are able and willing to prosecute broader impact on social relationships. Some international crimes domestically. There measures have been used to engage with pre- is debate over whether this relationship to viously marginalized communities or seces- domestic processes prompts improved sionist movements in order to address domestic trials or if it enables governments political polarization and prevent an out- to engage in selective prosecution targeting break. For example, the Tunisian Truth and specifi c social groups while avoiding others Dignity Commission established a record on (Hyeran and Simmons 2014; Mahony Ben Ali–era abuses, including systematic 2015b). Although the relationship between corruption, and laid the groundwork for

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 169 possible national criminal prosecutions sex, age, region of domicile, ethnicity, reli- (Toska 2017). These processes have arguably gion, or other group identity. National played a signifi cant role in preventing the plans to implement the 2030 Agenda can be violent confl ict that accompanied some useful in that regard. This aspect of the role other Arab Spring transitions. Some transi- of the state is at the heart of the social con- tional justice processes were less effective in tract that ties citizens to the state. Where the preventing violence overall but have pro- state does not play this role effectively, it will vided a model for future mechanisms to alle- become a source of contestation in itself viate social and political polarization. For and can become the object of violent con- example, exploration of historical injustice fl ict between groups within society. over more than 200 years, including state Confl ict in the security and justice arena expropriation of land of the Bangsamoro poses particular challenges for prevention. community in Mindanao, the Philippines, These challenges are discussed in greater was part of the comprehensive peace agree- detail in chapter 6, which reviews the expe- ment in 2014. riences of countries that have managed confl ict. They relate to actors’ political and physical survival; as such, security and jus- Conclusion tice reforms have proven sensitive and Most violent confl icts today play out in four politically charged. Domestic actors in arenas of contestation where groups in soci- countries that have successfully made ety negotiate access to power, resources, ser- changes have had to make risky trade-offs. vices, and security. As the spaces where Short-term capability has been sacrifi ced access to the means of livelihood and for the potential of longer-term effective- well-being are defi ned and defended, these ness. Reforms focused on inclusivity, trans- arenas are critical sites of both risk and parency, accountability, and management opportunity. of security institutions have boosted the Governance of these arenas in large part resilience and legitimacy of the state. shapes a society’s pathway. As demonstrated Reform of any institution is a long-term in chapters 3 and 4, risk is heightened where exercise. In the case of security and justice shocks interact with underlying grievances. institutions, it usually takes roughly Chapter 5 has described how this interac- 5–10 years for signifi cant and noticeable tion often plays out in the arenas of contes- improvements in effectiveness and account- tation. Because negotiations in the arenas ability to become evident (DCAF 2017). refl ect broader power dynamics in society, Reconciling the pressure from external reform is often contested. Actors who are supporters of SSR, who want to see change, already at the table must agree to change the with on-the-ground realities in specifi c rules, institutions, or structural factors that contexts has been an ongoing challenge for defi ne the power balance in the arenas, and many countries. In the Central African they may see little benefi t in challenging the Republic, the uneven approach from both status quo. the government and donors contributed to Preventing violent confl ict requires tar- an escalation of confl ict (DCAF 2017). To geted, fl exible, and sustained attention to all navigate such competing demands, Sierra of the arenas. When the risks of violent con- Leone signed a memorandum of under- fl ict build up across arenas of contestation, standing with the United Kingdom, which an effective state has a responsibility to provided assurance of long-term commit- ensure that confl icts and contestations ment and space for incremental and fl exible remain nonviolent and that the outcome is approaches (DCAF 2017) and helped to conducive to the well-being of all citizens. enable important incremental progress on Even if improving institutions can take accountable and effective institutions. decades, states can play an important role This chapter has given an overview of the by signaling that they are focusing on equal particular risks that can accumulate in each access to political process, natural resources, of the arenas, some technical aspects of services, security, and justice irrespective of reform of the arenas, and potential trade-offs

170 Pathways for Peace that are often present when addressing risks. fi scal and legal arrangements, how much is The next chapter draws experiences from produced, how much is paid, where are specifi c countries to illustrate how incentives those revenues allocated, and what is the for peace have been built and maintained contribution to the economy, including by paying careful attention to the arenas of employment. See http://www.eiti.org/about contestation as well as other measures. /who-we-are. 8. According to the terms of the KPCS, each Notes participating government must issue a certifi cate to accompany all rough diamonds 1. These arenas were selected following consul- being exported from within its borders, to tations within the UN and the World Bank ensure that they are “confl ict free.” Each and are based on an analysis of all Uppsala country must therefore be able to track the Confl ict Data Program (UCDP) identifi ed diamonds being exported to their place of violent confl icts since 2000. The choice also origin or to the point of import, and it must builds on literature that has examined these meet a set of standards for these internal issues, including Aall and Crocker (2017); controls. All participating countries must Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka (2015); Parks, also agree not to import any rough dia- Colletta, and Oppenheim (2013). monds without an approved KPCS certifi - 2. Power sharing is often associated with cate (Maconachie 2008, 7). See www Lijphart’s (1977) concept of “consociational” .kimberleyprocess.com/en/about for more democracy, but is a broader concept encom- information. passing other mechanisms of guaranteed 9. Service delivery is not the only infl uence on access to state authority. legitimacy: state or government can gain 3. McEvoy and O’Leary (2013) defi ne power political legitimacy through several sources, sharing “broadly as any set of arrangements including elections, charismatic leadership, that prevents one political agency or collec- good economic performance, improved tive from monopolizing power, whether security, and political inclusion, among oth- temporarily or permanently.” ers. See Baker (2017). 4. Other key factors were the ongoing war and 10. Chapter 3 discusses in greater detail the pre- general scarcity of arable land for the vention issues arising in areas where the population. state does not fully govern and where non- 5. Many papers cite research supporting the state actors actively create insecure areas. assertion that the appropriation and misman- 11. No single model of a security sector exists, agement of high-value natural resources have and it is the primary responsibility of the been key factors in triggering, escalating, or country concerned to determine the national prolonging confl icts, especially in Sub-Saharan approach to and priorities of the security Africa. See, for example, those referenced in sector. SSR should be a nationally owned Bannon and Collier (2003); Collier and process and could include defense, law Hoeffl er (2000); Elbadawi and Sambanis enforcement, corrections, intelligence ser- (2002); Fearon (2004); Maconachie, Srinivasan, vices, and institutions responsible for border and Menzies (2015, 5); Ross (2003). management, customs, and civil emergen- 6. Vasquez (2016) defi nes “local content” as cies. In some cases, elements of the judicial “the advantage given to local businesses and sector responsible for cases of alleged crimi- local employment in procurement processes nal conduct and misuse of force are for the oil or gas industries; the preference included. See UN Security Council (2014). given to local hiring where possible; and the 12. A case in point is the Global Focal Point for development of mechanisms for improving Police, Justice, and Corrections Areas in the local skills as needed.” Rule of Law in Post-Confl ict and other Crisis 7. The EITI standard requires information Situations, established in 2012, which is along the extractive industry value chain. designed to do just that: marry the opera- This includes how licenses and contracts are tional and developmental dimensions in allocated and registered, who are the benefi - joint programming and implementation in cial owners of those operations, what are the support of both security and development

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 171 (see Bryden and Olonisakin 2010; UNDP 22. Examples are Argentina and Colombia, Geneva n.d.). among others (De Greiff 2008). 13. As Security Council Resolution 2151 notes, 23. The small number of international and for- with the bulk of Security Council–mandated eign prosecutions could not render signifi - UN assistance in the area of security sector cant statistical results. reform taking place in, and directed to, countries in Africa, some African countries References are becoming important providers of such assistance (UN Security Council 2014). Aall, P., and C. A. Crocker, eds. 2017. The Fabric 14. Democratic control over security forces also of Peace in Africa: Looking Beyond the presupposes that the government and par- State. Waterloo: Centre for International liament are legitimate and have the capacity Governance Innovation. and knowledge to make informed decisions Abrahamsen, R. 2005. “Blair’s Africa: The Politics on security matters. Where this is not the of Securitization and Fear.” Alternatives case, SSR needs to address legitimacy and 30 (1): 55–80. capacity defi cits, or it is likely to be only of Adepoju, A., A. Boulton, and M. Levin. 2007. marginal benefi t. The mutual distrust Promoting Integration through Mobility: between the government and the armed Free Movement under ECOWAS. Geneva: forces that hampered progress on military United Nations High Commissioner for and intelligence reform in Guatemala in the Refugees. late 1990s is a case in point (Nathan 2007). Ainley, K., R. Friedman, and C. Mahony, eds. 2015. 15. Nathan (2007) argues that this was a decid- Evaluating Transitional Justice: Accountability ing factor in the Intelligence White Paper’s and Peacebuilding in Post-Confl ict Sierra Leone. lack of impact. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Ali, D., K. Deininger, and M. Goldstein. 2014. 16. SIPRI (2017) highlights the fact that regional “Environmental and Gender Impacts and gender-related differences are also of Land Tenure Regularization in Africa: important factors in the way that many per- Pilot Evidence from Rwanda.” Journal of ceive their security. Development Economics 110 (C): 262–75. 17. While national dialogue processes depend Arriola, L. R., and C. Johnson. 2012. “Electoral on host government, external funding, and Violence in Democratizing States.” Working expertise on planning and implementation, Paper, University of California, Berkeley, CA. dialogue processes have proven useful in Bagayoko, N., E. Hutchful, and R. Luckham. 2016. several cases, including in Liberia and Sierra “Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Leone (Permanent Secretariat and the Rethinking the Foundations of Security, Justice, Advisory Panel 2014). and Legitimate Public Authority.” Confl ict, 18. More than 10 million people are stateless in Security, and Development 16 (1): 1–32. dozens of low-, middle-, and high-income Bahout, J. 2016. The Unravelling of Lebanon’s countries around the world, although Taif Agreement: Limits of Sect-Based the exact numbers are not known (UNHCR Power Sharing. Washington, DC: Carnegie 2017). Endowment for International Peace. 19. For example, national postconfl ict, Baker, P. 2017. Reframing Fragility and Resilience: truth-seeking processes have identifi ed the The Way Forward. Washington, DC: Creative breakdown of the rule of law at local and Associates. national levels as the driver of confl icts. Ballentine, K., and H. Nitzschke. 2004. “Business 20. The UN defi nes transitional justice as “the and Armed Confl ict: An Assessment of Issues full range of processes and mechanisms and Options.” Die Friedens-Ware 79 (1-2): associated with a society’s attempt to come 35–56. to terms with a legacy of large-scale past Bannon, I., and P. Collier. 2003. Natural Resources abuses, in order to ensure accountability, and Violent Confl ict: Options and Actions. serve justice, and achieve reconciliation (UN Washington, DC: World Bank. 2010). Barnes, C., and H. Hassan. 2007. “The Rise and 21. See, for example, the case of Sierra Leone Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts.” Journal (Ainley, Friedman, and Mahony 2015). of Eastern African Studies 1 (2): 151–60.

172 Pathways for Peace Bates, R. 2008. When Things Fell Apart: State Sudan.” Working Paper 6/2016, Bonn Failure in Late-Century Africa. New York: Inter national Center for Conversion, Bonn. Cambridge University Press. Brinkerhoff, D., and Goldsmith, A. 2005. Bell, C. 2015. “Governance and Law: The “Institutional Dualism and International Distinctive Context of Transition from Confl ict Development: A Revisionist Interpretation of and Its Consequences for Development Good Governance.” Administration and Interventions.” PSRP Briefi ng Paper 4, Global Society 37 (2): 199–224. Justice Academy, Edinburg. Brinkerhoff, D., A. Wetterberg, and S. Dunn. ———. 2017. Navigating Inclusion in Peace 2012. “Service Delivery and Legitimacy in Settlements, Human Rights, and the Creation Fragile and Confl ict-Affected States.” Public of the Common Good. London: British Management Review 14 (2): 273–93. Academy. Brown, O., and M. Keating. 2015. “Addressing Bell, C., and J. Pospisil. 2017. “Negotiating Natural Resource Confl icts: Working towards Inclusion in Transitions from Confl ict: More Effective Resolution of National and The Formalised Political Unsettlement.” Sub-National Resource Disputes.” Chatham Research Paper 2017/04, Edinburgh School House, June 19. of Law, Edinburgh. Bruce, J. 2017. “Preventing Land-Related Confl ict Bell, C., and K. Zulueta-Fülscher. 2016. and Violence.” Background paper for the Sequencing Peace Agreements and United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Constitutions in the Political Settlement Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Process. Stockholm: International IDEA. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Bellina, S., D. Darbon, S. Sundstøl Eriksen, and Washington, DC. O. J. Sending. 2009. The Legitimacy of the Bryden, A., and F. Olonisakin, eds. 2010. Security State in Fragile Situations. Norad Report/ Sector Transformation in Africa. Geneva: Discussion Paper. Oslo: Norwegian Agency Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of for Development Cooperation. Armed Forces. Berry, M., Y. Bouka, and M. M. Kamuru. 2017. Bryden, M. 1999. “New Hope for Somalia? The “Kenyan Women Just Fought One of the Building Block Approach.” Review of African Most Violent Campaigns in History.” Foreign Political Economy 26 (79): 134–40. Policy, August 7. Burger, J. 2009. “The Reasons behind Service Besley, T., and T. Persson. 2011. “The Logic of Delivery Protests in South Africa.” ISS Political Violence.” Quarterly Journal of Today, July 29. Economics 126 (3): 1411–45. Call, C. T. 2012. “UN Mediation and the Politics Binford, L. 1993. “The Continuing Confl ict over of Transition after Constitutional Crises.” Land in Postwar El Salvador.” Culture and Policy Paper, International Peace Institute, Agriculture 13 (47): 13–16. New York. Boege, V., A. Brown, K. Clements, and A. Nolan. Cambodian Center for Human Rights. 2013. 2008. On Hybrid Political Orders and Cambodia: Land in Confl ict: An Overview of Emerging States: State Formation in the the Land Situation. Phnom Penh: CCHR. Context of Fragility. Berlin: Berghof Research Carter, D. 2011. “Sources of State Legitimacy in Centre for Constructive Confl ict Contemporary South Africa: A Theory of Management. Political Goods.” Working Paper 134, Brack, D., and G. Hayman. 2006. “Managing Afrobarometer. Trade in Confl ict Resources.” In Trade, Aid, Chabal, P., and J.-P. Daloz. 1999. Africa and Security, edited by O. Brown, M. Halle, S. Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument. Pena-Moreno, and S. Winkler. London: Bloo mington, IN: Indiana University Press. Earthscan. Charney, J. G. 1975. “Dynamics of Deserts and Brancati, D., and J. Snyder. 2012. “Time to Kill: Drought in the Sahel.” Quarterly Journal of The Impact of Election Timing on the Royal Meteorological Society 101 (428): Postconfl ict Stability.” Journal of Confl ict 193–202. Resolution 57 (5): 822–53. Cilliers, J., O. Dube, and B. Siddiqi. 2016. Breitung, C., W.-C. Paes, and L. van de “Reconciling after Civil Confl ict Increases Vondervoort. 2016. “In Need of a Critical Social Capital but Decreases Individual Well- Re-Think: Security Sector Reform in South Being.” Science 352 (6287): 787–94.

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 173 Cingranelli, D., M. Gibney, P. Haschke, R. Wood, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization D. Arnon, and B. Mark. 2017. “Human Rights 60 (3): 321–45. Violations and Violent Confl ict.” Background Development Committee. 2015. “From Billions paper for the United Nations–World Bank to Trillions: Transforming Development Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Finance; Post-2015 Financing for Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Development.” DC2915-0002, World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC. Group, Washington, DC. Cleaver, F., and D. Elson. 1995. “Women and Diamond, L. 2006. “Promoting Democracy in Water Resources: Continued Marginalization Post-Confl ict and Failed States.” Taiwan and New Policies.” International Institute for Journal of Democracy 2 (2): 93–116. Environment and Development, Edinburgh. Dix, S., K. Hussmann, and G. Walton. 2012. Coburn, N. 2011. The Politics of Dispute “Risks of Corruption to State Legitimacy and Resolution and Continued Instability in Stability in Fragile Situations.” U4 Anti- Afghanistan. Washington, DC: United States Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute of Peace. Institute, Bergen. Colletta, N., and B. Oppenheim. 2017. “Subnational Donnelly, C. 1997. “Defence Transformation in the Confl ict: Dimensions, Trends, and Options for New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling Prevention.” Background paper for the United the Problem.” NATO Review 1 (January): 15–19. Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways Dorner, P., and W. Thiesenhusen. 2005. “Selected for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Land Reforms in East and Southeast Asia: Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Their Origins and Impacts.” Asian-Pacifi c Collier, P., and A. Hoeffl er. 2000. “Greed and Economic Literature 4 (1): 65–95. Grievance in Civil War.” Policy Research Drew, E. 2017. “Assessing the Links between Working Paper WPS 2355, World Bank, Extractive Industries and the Prevention of Washington, DC. Violent Confl ict: A Literature Review.” ———. 2004. “Aid, Policy, and Growth in Post- Background paper for the United Nations– Confl ict Societies.” European Economic World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Review 48 (5): 1125–45. Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Collier, P., A. Hoeffl er, and D. Rohner. 2009. Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility Edwards, S. 2008. “Social Breakdown in Darfur.” and Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers Forced Migration Review 31 (October): 23–24. 61 (1): 1–27. Elbadawi, I., and N. Sambanis. 2002. “How Much Cordella, T., and H. Onder. 2016. “Sharing War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence Oil Rents and Political Violence.” Policy of Civil War.” Journal of Confl ict Resolution Research Working Paper 7869, World 46 (3): 307–34. Bank, Washington, DC. Elgin-Cossart, M., B. Jones, and J. Esberg, eds. Corruption Watch. 2014. “Corruption Fuels 2012. Pathways to Change: Baseline Study to Poor Service Delivery.” Corruption Watch, Identify Theories of Change on Political Johannesburg, February 3. Settlements and Confi dence Building. New DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic York: New York University, Center on Control of Armed Forces). 2017. “The International Cooperation. Contribution and Role of SSR in the Elkins, Z., T. Ginsburg, and J. Melton. 2014. Prevention of Violent Confl ict.” Background “Characteristics of National Constitutions, paper for the United Nations–World Bank Version 2.0.” Comparative Constitutions Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Project. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, EU (European Union). 2008. Climate Change World Bank, Washington, DC. and International Security. Brussels: European De Greiff, P. 2008. The Handbook of Reparations. Commission. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fearon, J. 2004. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last DeYoung, K. 2017. “US Pledges $60 Million to So Much Longer Than Others?” Journal of Build New African Counterterrorism Force.” Peace Research 41 (3): 275–301. Washington Post, October 30. Felter, C., and D. Renwick. 2017. Colombia’s Civil Deininger, K., and R. Castagnini. 2006. “Incidence Confl ict. New York: Council on Foreign and Impact of Land Confl ict in Uganda.” Relations.

174 Pathways for Peace Fergusson, J. 2015. “The World Will Soon Be at Global Water Forum. 2012. Water Outlook to War over Water.” Newsweek, April 24. 2050: The OECD Calls for Early and Strategic Fiedler, C. 2017. “The Effects of Specifi c Elements Action. of Democracy on Peace.” German Hameiri, S. 2007. “Failed State or a Failed Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Paradigm? State Capacity and the Limits of Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). Background Institutionalism.” Journal of International paper for the United Nations–World Bank Relations and Development 10 (2): 122–49. Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Harborne, B., W. Dorotinsky, and P. M. Bisca, Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, eds. 2017. Securing Development: Public World Bank, Washington, DC. Finance and the Security Sector. Washington, Field, E. 2007. “Entitled to Work: Urban DC: World Bank. Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru.” Hartzell, C. A., and M. Hoddie. 2006. “From Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (4): Anarchy to Security: Comparing Theoretical 1561–602. Approaches to the Process of Disarmament Fisk, K., and A. Cherney. 2016. “Pathways to following Civil War.” Contemporary Security Institutional Legitimacy in Postconfl ict Policy 27 (1): 155–167. Societies: Perceptions of Process and ———. 2007. Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Performance in Nepal.” Governance 30 (2): Institutions and the Negotiated Resolution of 2663–81. Civil Wars. University Park, PA: Penn State Fjelde, H., and K. Höglund. 2016. “Electoral University Press. Institutions and Electoral Violence in Sub- Ho, S. 2017. “Introduction to ‘Transboundary Saharan Africa.” British Journal of Political River Cooperation: Actors, Strategies, and Science 46 (2): 297–320. Impact.’” Water International 42 (2): 97–104. Gagnon, V. P. 1994. “Ethnic Nationalism and Hoddie, M., and C. Hartzell. 2005. “Power International Confl ict: The Case of Serbia.” Sharing and Peace Settlements: Initiating the International Security 19 (3): 130–66. Transition from Civil War.” In Sustainable Gates, S., B. A. T. Graham, Y. Lupu, H. Strand, Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil War, and K. W. Strøm. 2016. “Powersharing, edited by P. Roeder and D. Rothchild, 83–106. Protection, and Peace.” Journal of Politics Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 78 (2): 512–26. Homer-Dixon, T. 1999. Environment, Scarcity, Giannini, A., M. Biasutti, and M. Verstraete. and Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 2008. “A Climate Model-Based Review of University Press. Drought in the Sahel: Desertifi cation, the Human Rights Watch. 2017. Discrimination in Re-greening, and Climate Change.” Global Arakan. New York: Human Rights Watch. and Planetary Change 64 (—4): 119–28. Hussmann, K., M. Tisne, and H. Mathisen. 2009. Gilley, B. 2009. The Right to Rule: How States Win Integrity in Statebuilding: Anti-corruption and Lose Legitimacy. New York: Columbia with a Statebuilding Lens. Report prepared for University Press. the DAC Network on Governance—Anti - Gillingham, P., and F. Buckle. 2014. “Rwanda Corruption Task Team, OECD, Paris, August. Land Tenure Regularisation Case Study.” Hyeran, J., and B. A. Simmons. 2014. “Can the Evidence on Demand, UK, March. International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” Gleditsch, K. S., and A. Ruggeri. 2010. “Political International Organization 70 (3): 443–75. Opportunity Structures, Democracy, and IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee). 2015. Civil War.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (3): Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based 299–310. Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Gleick, P. 1993. “Water and Confl ict: Freshwater Action: Reducing Risk, Promoting Resilience, Resources and International Security.” and Aiding Recovery. Geneva: IASC. International Security 18 (1): 79–112. ICRC (International Committee of the Red ———. 2014. “Water, Drought, Climate Change, Cross). 2016a. “Armed Violence and the New and Confl ict in Syria.” Weather, Climate, and Urban Agenda: The ICRC’s Recommendations Society 6 (3): 331–40. for Habitat III.” ICRC, Geneva. Global Voices. 2015. “Violent Clashes in Ethiopia ———. 2016b. “Protracted Confl ict and over ‘Master Plan’ to Expand Addis.” Humanitarian Action: Some Recent ICRC Guardian, December 11. Experiences.” Report, ICRC, Geneva.

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 175 IDS (Institute of Development Studies). Linder, W., and A. Bächtiger. 2005. “What Drives 2017. “Using Digital and Social Media to Democratization in Asia and Africa?” Monitor and Reduce Violence in Kenya’s European Journal of Political Research 44 (6): Elections.” Policy Briefi ng Issue 144, 861–80. IDS, Brighton, U.K. Logan, C. 2017. “Ambitious SDG Goals Confront Isser, D. 2011. Customary Justice and the Rule of Challenging Realities.” Policy Paper 39, Law in War-Torn Societies. Washington, DC: Afrobarometer. United States Institute of Peace Press. Lujala, P. 2009. “Deadly Combat Over Natural Jarstad, A. K., and D. Nilsson. 2008. “From Words Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the to Deeds: The Implementation of Power- Severity of Armed Civil Confl ict.” Journal of Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords.” Confl ict Confl ict Resolution 53 (1): 50–71. Management and Peace Science 25 (3): ———. 2010. “The Spoils of Nature: Armed 206–23. Civil Confl ict and Rebel Access to Natural Keenan, J. 2008. “Demystifying Africa’s Security.” Resources.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (1): Review of African Political Economy 35 (118): 15–28. 634–44. Maconachie, R. 2008. Diamond Mining, Keister, J. 2014. “The Illusion of Chaos: Why Governance Initiatives, and Post-Confl ict Ungoverned Spaces Aren’t Ungoverned, and Development in Sierra Leone. Manchester, Why That Matters.” Policy Analysis 766, Cato U.K.: University of Manchester. Institute, Washington, DC. Maconachie, R. A., R. Srinivasan, and N. Menzies. Kelsall, T. 2005. “Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary 2015. Responding to the Challenge of Refl ections on the Truth and Reconciliation Fragility and Security in West Africa: Natural Commission in Sierra Leone.” Human Rights Resources, Extractive Industry Investment, and Quarterly 27 (2): 361–91. Social Confl ict. Washington, DC: World Kethineni, S., M. Srinivasan, and S. Kakar. 2016. Bank Group. “Combating Violence against Women in MacPherson, E. 2008. “Invisible Agents: Women India: Nari Adalats and Gender-Based in Service Delivery Reforms.” IDS Bulletin Justice.” Women and Criminal Justice 26 (4): 38 (6): 38–46. 281–300. Magalhaes, F., ed. 2016. Slum Upgrading and Lake, D. A., and D. Rothchild. 2005. “Territorial Housing in Latin America. Washington, DC: Decentralization and Civil War Settlements.” Inter-American Development Bank. In Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy Mahmoud, Y. 2017. “Peace Operations and after Civil Wars, edited by P. G. Roeder and Prevention for Sustaining Peace: The D. Rothchild, 109–32. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Restoration and Extension of State Authority.” University Press. Issue Brief, International Peace Institute, Le Billon, P. 2014. Wars of Plunder: Confl icts, New York. Profi ts, and the Politics of Resources. Oxford: Mahony, C. 2015a. “A Case Selection Oxford University Press. Independence Framework for Tracing Lijphart, A. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: Historical Interests’ Manifestation in A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: International Criminal Justice.” In Historical Yale University Press. Origins of International Criminal Law. Vol. 4, ———. 2008. Thinking about Democracy: Power edited by M. Bergsmo, C. W. Ling, S. Tianying, Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and and Y. Ping, 865–903. Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Practice. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge. Academic EPublisher. Lindemann, S. 2008. “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains ———. 2015b. “If You’re Not at the Table, You’re Matter? A Research Framework for on the Menu: Complementarity and Self- Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Interest in Domestic Processes for Core Sub-Saharan Africa.” Discussion Paper 15, International Crimes.” In Military Self- Crisis States Research Centre, London School Interest in Accountability for Core of Economics and Political Science. International Crimes, edited by M. Bergsmo Lindenmayer, E., and J. L. Kaye. 2009. A Choice and S. Tianying, 229–60. Brussels: Torkel for Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Opsahl Academic EPublisher. Mediation in Kenya. New York: International ———. 2016. “International Criminal Justice Case Peace Institute. Selection Independence: An ICJ Barometer.”

176 Pathways for Peace FICHL Policy Brief Series 58 (2016), Torkel Problem.” Research Paper 36, Developmental Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels. Leadership Program, Birmingham, U.K. Mahony, C., and Y. Sooka. 2015. “The Truth ———. 2015b. “When Does Service Delivery about the Truth: Insider Refl ections on the Improve the Legitimacy of a Fragile or Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Confl ict-Affected State?” Governance 28 (3): Commission.” In Evaluating Transitional 341–56. Justice: Accountability and Peacebuilding in Mendeloff, D. 2009. “Trauma and Vengeance: Post-Confl ict Sierra Leone, edited by K. Ainley, Assessing the Psychological and Emotional R. Friedman, and C. Mahony, 35–54. London: Effects of Post-Confl ict Justice.” Human Palgrave Macmillan. Rights Quarterly 31 (3): 592–623. Malik, A. 2017. “Electoral Violence and the Menkhaus, K. 2006. “Governance without Prevention of Violent Confl ict.” Background Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State- paper for the United Nations–World Bank Building, and the Politics of Coping.” Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive International Security 31 (3): 74–106. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Menzies, N., and G. Harley. 2012. “‘We Want World Bank, Washington, DC. What the Ok Tedi Women Have!’ Guidance Mallinder, L., and C. O’Rourke. 2016. “Databases from Papua New Guinea on Women’s of Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Engagement in Mining Deals.” Justice for the Contexts: Comparing Research Purposes and Poor Briefi ng Note 7 (2), World Bank, Design.” International Journal of Transitional Washington, DC. Justice 10 (3): 492–515. Merry, S. E. 2012. “Legal Pluralism and Legal Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject. Culture: Mapping the Terrain.” In Legal Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Marc, A., N. Verjee, and S. Mogaka. 2015. The Practitioners in Dialogue, edited by B. Z. Challenge of Stability and Security in West Tamanaha, C. Sage, and M. Woolcock, 66–82. Africa. Africa Development Forum series. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Washington, DC: World Bank; Paris: Agence Milliken, J., and K. Krause. 2002. “State Failure, Française de Développement. State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Matthew, R. A., O. Brown, and D. Jensen. 2009. Concepts, Lessons, and Strategies.” “From Confl ict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Development and Change 33 (5): 753–74. Natural Resources and the Environment.” Mukherjee, B. 2006. “Does Third-Party Briefi ng Paper, UN Environment Programme, Enforcement of Domestic Institutions Nairobi. Promote Enduring Peace after Civil Wars? Maze, K. 2014. “Land Confl ict, Migration, and Policy Lessons from an Empirical Test.” Citizenship in West Africa: Complex Diversity Foreign Policy Analysis 2 (2006): 405–30. and Recurring Challenges: A Desk Study.” Nathan, L. 2007. “South African Case Study: Fragility, Confl ict, and Violence Group, Inclusive SSR Design and the White Paper on World Bank, Washington, DC. Defence.” London School of Economics, Mazzuca, S., and J. Robinson. 2009. London. “Political Confl ict and Power Sharing in the Ndaruhutse, S., J. Dolan, N. Pearson, C. Talbot, Origins of Modern Colombia.” Hispanic M. Ali, R. Bohara, G. Kayijuka, S. Mtisi, American Historical Review 89 (2): 285–321. S. Musoke, and R. Scott. 2012. McEvoy, J., and B. O’Leary. 2013. Power Sharing Synthesis Research Report: State-Building, in Deeply Divided Places. Philadelphia, PA: Peacebuilding, and Service Delivery in Fragile University of Pennsylvania Press, Project and Confl ict-Affected States. Rugby, U.K.: MUSE. Practical Action Consulting. McFate, S. 2010. The Link between DDR and Neudorfer, N. S., U. G. Theuerkauf, and S. Wolff. SSR in Confl ict-Affected Countries. Special 2016. “Territorial Self-Governance: An Report. Washington, DC: United States Effective Approach to Territory-Centred Institute of Peace. Confl ict Management?” Paper prepared for McGovern, M. 2011. Making War in Côte d’Ivoire. the International Studies Association, 57th Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Annual Convention, Atlanta, March 16–19. Mcloughlin, C. 2015a. “Researching State Nixon, H., R. Mallett, and A. McCullough. Legitimacy: A Political Approach to a Political 2017. “Are Public Services the Building

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 177 Blocks of State Legitimacy? Input to the Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank’s 2017 World Development World Bank, Washington, DC. Report.” Working Paper 55, World Bank, Pedraza, L. E., and M. Heinrich. 2016. “Water Washington, DC. Scarcity: Cooperation of Confl ict in the NRGI (Natural Resource Governance Institute). Middle East and North Africa.” Foreign 2016. Natural Resource Revenue Sharing. Policy Journal, September 2. New York: NRGI. Permanent Secretariat and the Advisory Panel. Null, S., and L. H. Risi. 2016. Navigating 2014. The Burundi Defence Review: Lessons Complexity: Climate, Migration, and Identifi ed. London: Confl ict, Security, and Confl ict in a Changing World. Offi ce of Development Research Group (CSDRG), Confl ict Management and Mitigation Department of War Studies, King’s College Discussion Paper. Washington, DC: U.S. London and Institute of Economic Agency for International Development and Development in Burundi, June. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Postel, S., and A. Wolf. 2001. “Dehydrating Scholars. Confl ict.” Foreign Policy (September/ Nygård, H. M., K. Baghat, G. Barrett, K. Dupuy, October): 60–67. S. Gates, S. Hillesund, S. A. Rustad, H. Putzel, J., and J. Di John. 2012. Meeting the Strand, H. Urdal, and G. Ostby. 2017. Challenges of Crisis States. Crisis States “Inequality and Armed Confl ict: Evidence Research Centre Report. London: London and Data.” Background paper for the School of Economics and Political Science. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Reno, W. 2002. “The Politics of Insurgency in Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Collapsing States.” Development and Change Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, 33 (5): 837–58. World Bank, Washington, DC. Rosiny, S. 2016. “A Quarter Century of ‘Transitory OECD (Organisation for Economic Power-Sharing:’ Lebanon’s Unfulfi lled Ta’if Co-operation and Development). 2005. Agreement of 1989 Revisited.” Civil Wars “Water and Violent Confl ict.” OECD Issues 17 (4): 485–502. Brief, Offi ce of Economic Co-operation and Ross, M. 2003. “The Natural Resource Curse: Development, Paris. How Wealth Can Make You Poor.” In Natural ———. 2015. Fragile States 2014: Domestic Resources and Violent Confl ict: Options and Resource Mobilisation in Fragile States. Paris: Actions, edited by I. Bannon and P. Collier, OECD. 17–42. Washington, DC: World Bank. OHCHR (Offi ce of the United Nations High ———. 2006. “A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, Commissioner for Human Rights). 2010. and Civil War.” Annual Review of Political National Human Rights Institutions: History, Science 9 (1): 265–300. Principles, Roles, and Responsibilities. New ———. 2012. The Oil Curse: How Petroleum York: OHCHR. Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations. Omoeva, C., and E. Buckner. 2015. Does Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Horizontal Education Inequality Lead to ———. 2015. “What Have We Learned about Violent Confl ict? New York: United Nations the Resource Curse?” Annual Review of Children’s Fund. Political Science 18 (May): 239–59. OSCE (Organization for Security and Rotberg, R., ed. 2004. When States Fail: Causes Co-operation in Europe). 2008. Assessing the and Consequences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Impact: Kosovo’s Community Safety Action University Press. Teams. Kosovo: OSCE. Sacks, A., and M. Larizza. 2012. “Why Quality Parks, T., N. Colletta, and B. Oppenheim. 2013. Matters: Rebuilding Trustworthy Local The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Government in Post-Confl ict Sierra Leone.” Confl ict and International Development Policy Research Working Paper 6021, World Assistance. San Francisco, CA: Asia Foundation. Bank, Washington, DC. Payne, L., A. Reiter, C. Mahony, and L. Bernal- Samuels, K. 2005. “Post-Confl ict Peace-Building Bermudez. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention and and Constitution-Making.” Chicago Journal Guarantees of Non-Recurrence.” Background of International Law 6 (2): 663–82. paper for the United Nations–World Bank Sargsyan, I. L. 2017. “Corruption, Lack of the Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Rule of Law, and Confl ict.” Background

178 Pathways for Peace paper for the United Nations–World Bank Sturge, G., R. Mallett, J. Hagen-Zanker, and Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive R. Slater. 2017. Tracking Livelihoods, Services, Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, and Governance: Panel Survey Findings from World Bank, Washington, DC. the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium. Sekiguchi, M., and N. Hatsukano. 2013. “Land London: Secure Livelihoods Research Confl icts and Land Registration in Consortium. Cambodia.” In Land and Post-Confl ict Tabak, S. 2011. “False Dichotomies of Transitional Peacebuilding, edited by J. Unruh and R. C. Justice: Gender, Confl ict, and Combatants in Williams, 437–50. London: Earthscan. Colombia.” International Law and Politics Seligson, M. A. 1995. “Thirty Years of 44: 103–63. Transformation in the Agrarian Structure of Taydas, Z., D. Peksen, and P. James. 2010. “Why El Salvador.” Latin American Research Review Do Civil Wars Occur? Understanding the 30 (3): 43–74. Importance of Institutional Quality.” Civil Sikkink, K. 2011. The Justice Cascade: How Wars 12 (3): 195–217. Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing Thiesenhusen, W. C. 1995. Broken Promises: World Politics. New York: Norton. Agrarian Reform and the Latin American SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Campesino. Boulder, CO: Westview. Institute). 2017. “SIPRI and CONASCIPAL Thoms, O. N. T., J. Ron, and R. Paris. 2010. Launch Preliminary Results of Security “State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice: Perception Survey at National Forum in What Do We Know?” International Journal of Bamako.” SIPRI, Stockholm, March 11. Transitional Justice 4 (3): 329–54. Snyder, J. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Toska, S. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making Democratization and Nationalist Confl ict. Development Work for the Prevention of New York: Norton. Violent Confl icts Cases: Egypt, Tunisia, Snyder, J., and L. Vinjamuri. 2003. “Trials and Morocco, and Jordan.” Case study for the Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Strategies of International Justice.” Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to International Security 28 (3): 5–44. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Sorens, J. 2011. “Mineral Production, Territory, Washington, DC. and Ethnic Rebellion: The Role of Rebel Tyler, T. 2006. “Psychological Perspectives on Constituencies.” Journal of Peace Research Legitimacy and Legitimation.” Annual Review 48 (5): 571–85. of Psychology 57: 375–400. Stearns, J. 2012. Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: UN (United Nations). 2010. “United Nations The Collapse of Congo and the Great War of Approach to Transitional Justice.” Guidance Africa. New York: PublicAffairs. note of the UN Secretary-General, New York. Stel, N., and F. M. Abate. 2014. “Between Control ———. 2017. “Informal Justice.” United Nations and Cooperation: Multi-Stakeholder Service and the Rule of Law. Provision and the Legitimacy of State UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). Institutions in Ethiopia’s Amhara National 2003. Confl ict-Related Development Analysis Regional State.” European Journal of (CDA). New York: Bureau for Crisis Prevention Development Research 26 (5): 743–60. and Recovery. Stel, N., and R. Ndayiragiie. 2014. “The Eye of ———. 2013. Human Development Report 2013: the Beholder: Service Provision and State The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Legitimacy in Burundi.” Africa Spectrum Diverse World. New York: UNDP. 49 (3): 3–28. UNDP Geneva. n.d. Inter-Agency Working Strategic Foresight Group. 2013. Water Cooperation Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and for a Secure World: Focus on the Middle East. Reintegration (DDR). Geneva: UNDP Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group. Geneva. Straus, S., and C. Taylor. 2012. “Democratization UN General Assembly. 2015a. Strengthening the and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, Role of the United Nations in Enhancing the 1990–2008.” In Voting in Fear: Electoral Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, edited by and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of D. A. O. Bekoe, 15–38. Washington, DC: Democratization. Report A/70/306 of the UN United States Institute of Peace. Secretary-General.

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 179 ———. 2015b. “Transforming Our World: The Walter, B. F. 2003. “Explaining the Intractability 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” of Territorial Confl ict.” International Studies Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted September Review 5 (4): 137–53. 25, New York. Wee, A., J. Lendorfer, J. Bleck, and C. Yaiche. UN Human Settlements Programme. 2016. 2014. “State Legitimacy, Stability, and Social “Scoping and Status Study on Land and Cohesion in Low Population Density Areas: Confl ict: Towards a UN-Wide Engagement at The Case of Northern Mali.” Paper prepared Scale.” Working Paper, United Nations for the “Annual Bank Conference on Africa,” Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi. World Bank, Berkeley, CA, June 8–9. UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner Wilson, E., and J. Van Alstine. 2014. Localising for Refugees). 2017. Global Trends: Forced Transparency: Exploring EITI’s Contribution Displacement in 2016. Geneva: UNHCR. to Sustainable Development. London: UN Security Council. 2014. “The Maintenance International Institute for Environment of International Peace and Security: and Development. Security Sector Reform: Challenges and Wolf, A., A. Kramer, A. Carius, and G. Dabelko. Opportunities.” Resolution S/RES/2014/2151, 2006. “Water Can Be a Pathway to Peace, Not adopted April 28, New York. War.” Navigating Peace Paper 4, Woodrow ———. 2016. “Post-Confl ict Peacebuilding.” Wilson International Center for Scholars, Resolution S/RES/2282, adopted April 27, Washington, DC. New York. Wolff, S., S. Ross, and A. Wee. 2017. “Subnational UN Water. 2006. “Gender, Water, and Sanitation.” Governance and Confl ict.” Background paper Policy Brief, Inter-Agency Task Force on for the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Gender and Water, New York. Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches UN Women. 2015. “The Effect of Gender to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Equality Programming on Humanitarian Washington, DC. Outcomes.” Academic Paper, UN Women, World Bank. 2008. Liberia: Insecurity of Land New York. Tenure, Land Law, and Land Registration in USAID (United States Agency for International Liberia. Report 46134-LR. Washington, DC: Development). 2009. Democratic Decentral- World Bank. ization Handbook. Washington, DC: USAID. ———. 2010. Violence in the City: Understanding Van de Walle, S., and Z. Scott. 2011. “The Political and Supporting Community Responses to Role of Service Delivery in State-Building: Urban Violence, Washington, DC: World Bank. Exploring the Relevance of European History ———. 2011. World Development Report 2011: for Developing Countries.” Development Confl ict, Security, and Development. Policy Review 29 (1): 5–21. Washington, DC: World Bank. Vasquez, P. I. 2016. “Four Policy Actions to ———. 2013. World Development Report 2013: Improve Local Governance of the Oil and Jobs. Washington, DC: World Bank. Gas Sector.” International Development Policy ———. 2016. High and Dry: Climate Change, 7 (1). Water, and the Economy. Washington, DC: Vetschera, H., and M. Damian. 2006. “Security World Bank. Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: ———. 2017a. Social Service Delivery in Violent The Role of the International Community.” Context: Achieving Results against the Odds. International Peacekeeping 13 (1): 28–42. Washington, DC: World Bank. Vinjamuri, L. 2010. “Deterrence, Democracy, and ———. 2017b. Turbulent Waters: Pursuing the Pursuit of International Justice.” Ethics Water Security in Fragile Contexts. and International Affairs 24 (2): 191–211. Washington, DC: World Bank. Vogt, M. 2012. “Escaping the Resource Curse: ———. 2017c. World Development Report 2017: Ethnic Inclusion in Resource-Rich States in Governance and the Law. Washington, DC: West Africa.” Working Paper, Swisspeace, World Bank. Bern. Zacchia, P., B. Harborne, and J. Sims. 2017. Vreeland, J. 2008. “The Effect of Political Regime “Somalia—Security and Justice Sector Public on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy.” Journal Expenditure Review.” World Bank, of Confl ict Resolution 52 (3): 401–25. Washington, DC.

180 Pathways for Peace Additional Reading Diffusion, and Escalation, edited by D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild, 3–32. Princeton, NJ: Asunka, J., S. Brierley, M. Golden, E. Kramon, Princeton University Press. and G. Ofusu. 2017. “Electoral Fraud or Lohde, L. 2015. The Art and Science of Benefi t Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Sharing in the Natural Resource Sector. Manipulation Strategies.” British Journal of Discussion Paper. Washington, DC: Political Science (February): 1–23. Inter national Finance Corporation. Beaulieu, E., and S. D. Hyde. 2009. “In the Lynch, M. 2016. The New Arab Wars: Uprisings Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic and Anarchy in the Middle East. New York: Manipulation, International Observers, and PublicAffairs. Election Boycotts.” Comparative Political Mogaka, S. 2017. “Competition for Power in Africa: Studies 42 (3): 392–415. Inclusive Politics and Its Relation to Violent Bøås, M., S. S. Eriksen, T. Gade, J. H. Sande Lie, Confl ict.” Background paper for the United and O. J. Sending. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways and Ownership: Limits and Opportunities for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing for External Actors.” Background paper for Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Muggah, R. 2017. “Revisiting Community Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches Violence Reduction.” Background paper for to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Washington, DC. Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches Cassese, A. 1998. “Refl ections on International to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Criminal Justice.” Modern Law Review 61 (1): Washington, DC. 1–10. Norris, P. 2008. Driving Democracy: Do Power- Daxecker, U. E. 2012. “The Cost of Sharing Institutions Work? Cambridge, U.K.: Exposing Cheating: International Election Cambridge University Press. Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-Election Violence in Africa.” Journal of Peace Research North, D. C., J. J. Wallis, and B. R. Weingast. 2009. 49 (4): 503–16. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Hartzell, C. A., and M. Hoddie. 2003. Framework for Interpreting Recorded “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Human History. New York: Cambridge Post-Civil War Confl ict Management.” American University Press. Journal of Political Science 47 (2): 318–32. Paez, D., and J. H. Liu. 2011. “Collective Memory Hyde, S. D. 2007. “The Observer Effect in of Confl icts.” In Intergroup Confl icts and International Politics: Evidence from a Their Resolution: A Social Psychological Natural Experiment.” World Politics 60 (1): Perspective, edited by D. Bar-Tal, 105–24. 37–63. New York: Psychology Press. International Security Sector Advisory Team. Serrano, R., F. Carbonari, M. Cavalcanti, and 2017. “Colombia SSR Background Note.” A. Willman. 2012. Bringing the State Back Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Washington, of Armed Forces. DC: World Bank. Interpeace. 2017. Constitution Making for Peace: Simpser, A., and D. Donno. 2012. “Can Guiding Principles for the Process. Geneva: International Election Monitoring Harm Interpeace. Governance?” Journal of Politics 74 (2): Jarstad, A., and T. Sisk. 2008. From War to 501–13. Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. Sriram, C. L., and S. Pillay, eds. 2009. Peace Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Press. Justice in Africa. Scottsville, South Africa: Lake, D. A., and D. Rothchild. 1996. “Containing University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Fear: The Origins and Management of Thurston, A. 2011. “Can a Military Coup Restore Ethnic Confl ict.” International Security Democracy?” Christian Science Monitor, 21 (2): 41–75. July 1. ———. 1998. “Spreading Fear: The Genesis of UN General Assembly. 2016. “Review of United Transnational Ethnic Confl ict.” In The Nations Peacebuilding Architecture.” Resolution International Spread of Ethnic Confl ict: Fear, A/RES/70/262, adopted April 27, New York.

What People Fight Over: Arenas of Contestation 181 von Borzyskowski, I. 2013. “Sore Losers? ———. 2015b. Forced Displacement and Mixed International Condemnation and Domestic Migration in the Horn of Africa. Washington, Incentives for Post-Election Violence.” Working DC: World Bank. Paper, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. ———. 2016. “World Bank Supports Colombia’s World Bank. 2015a. “Colombia Protects Land and Land Organization and Regional Finance Patrimony of Internally Displaced Persons.” Efforts.” Press release, World Bank, Washington, World Bank, Washington, DC, August 13. DC, December 9.

182 Pathways for Peace CHAPTER 6 Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conﬂ ict

The pathway to peace or confl ict for each part of longer trajectories. The chapter society is unique. The previous chapters focuses on domestic actors, including the introduce a framework explaining how state, the private sector, and civil society, and societies create and maintain pathways via it emphasizes the comparative advantages of the unique interplay of structural factors, these different actors. Chapter 7 focuses on institutions, and actors. This chapter the role and contribution of the interna- reviews the experience of countries that tional community. have avoided violent confl ict, prevented its As part of efforts to sustain peace, pre- escalation, or rebuilt peace afterward. vention requires three areas of action: (1) Drawing on the 19 country case studies infl uencing actors’ incentives in favor of prepared for this study, this chapter draws prevention, (2) reforming institutions, and out several commonalities from the experi- (3) investing to address structural chal- ences of countries that have successfully lenges. These areas must be addressed prevented violence, interrupted its escala- simultaneously, rather than sequentially. In tion, or avoided its recurrence.1 This chap- most cases, this has involved constantly ter draws on country examples in several monitoring and mitigating short-term risks ways, including through a fi ne slicing of the in order to anticipate shocks and prevent country cases to apply to a particular aspect them from triggering violence and taking of prevention and illustrate a specifi c point advantage of transition moments while also and through a more integrated examination addressing structural risks. of selected cases—presented in text boxes— This chapter describes country experi- that bring together the multiple factors that ences in building on transition moments have coalesced in order to steer a country’s and engaging across the three areas of pathways for peace. action: infl uencing incentives, transforming The discussion is not comprehensive and institutions, and targeting structural fac- is not intended as an exhaustive examina- tors. This does not imply that all actions fall tion of all possible actions that were taken to neatly or exclusively into these categories. prevent confl ict. This chapter highlights In reality, many actions have multiple the experiences of countries in addressing effects. For example, efforts to promote the risks of exclusion and mobilization of inclusion in the security forces address both grievances, especially within the arenas of an institutional factor (reform of the contestation, as discussed in chapters 4 security sector) as well as a structural and 5. While the discussion highlights policy one (historical exclusion that underlies choices or transition moments in country disproportionate access to security), while pathways, it is understood that these were all also shifting incentives (creating stronger

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict 183 sanctions against violence). This study does deadlock put economic stability and not assume that all actions referred to were political progress at risk, and a power- undertaken for the sole purpose of prevent- sharing agreement then opened a path to ing violent confl ict, as many were guided further reform. by other objectives. However, all have demonstrated transformational2 potential Managing Outbreaks of to curve a society’s pathway toward sustain- Violence able peace. In many cases examined for this study, the way in which national actors managed out- Navigating Transition breaks of violence became a transition Moments moment. Violence can bring society to a Transition moments enable new efforts to crossroads, with a choice between continu- prevent or recover from violence (World ing to escalate the violence or interrupting Bank 2011, xvii). They may occur at any the violence to create an opening for a shift point along a country’s trajectory and pro- in direction. The introduction of a peace- vide a window of opportunity whereby keeping mission or a cease-fi re, as happened actors can change the direction of a path- in Liberia and Timor-Leste in 2006, can way. As discussed in chapter 3, a peaceful alter the incentives toward negotiations. pathway often results from actions taken Mediation and diplomacy can also reroute during multiple transition moments rather an incendiary situation. For example, in than a single event. These moments open or Kenya, in 2008, the intervention of a coali- facilitate opportunities for actors to address tion led by Kofi Annan interrupted tit- underlying grievances through institutional for-tat violence that was escalating and reform or investments, develop a national gaining momentum. It opened a window of implementation plan, rally support for opportunity for resolution via dialogue the plan among all segments of the popula- (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009). tion, and signal the importance of equitable The ability to recognize a transition and inclusive development. By their very moment and act in a swift, decisive manner nature, transition moments are diffi cult is key. The 2012 oil shutdown in South to predict and anticipate and, indeed, Sudan and border war with Sudan demon- may present themselves when actors least strated the rapidity with which the situation expect them and are often ill-prepared to could deteriorate in the nascent country act on them. (Verjee 2017). It also presented an opportu- Transition moments come in many nity for the international community, led forms and can be triggered by a confl uence by the African Union and widely sup- of internal or external factors. In some ported by key donors and allies, to seal the cases, they occur suddenly: natural disasters September 2012 Cooperation Agreement or economic shocks, political changes such between Sudan and South Sudan. While as elections or new constitutions, or this was a crucial step forward, the agree- actor-related changes such as the death of a ment itself did not account for struc- leader can shift incentives quickly. Other tural weakness and ongoing violence within transition moments emerge more gradually. South Sudan, and few of the commit- While the Revolution of 2011 in Tunisia, for ments to the agreement have since been met example, represented a turning point for (Verjee 2017). the country, it resulted from a buildup of grievances related to unmet expectations. Maintaining Macroeconomic This transition moment led to civil protests, Stability which paved the way for a transition from authoritarianism toward a more open and The lead-up to violent confl ict often puts inclusive political system (Toska 2017). tremendous pressure on macroeconomic A second transition moment occurred equilibrium, particularly with respect to with the shared realization that political infl ation and state budgets (Carey and

184 Pathways for Peace Harake 2017). A fi scal shock in these less-than-perfect governance because essen- environments—for example, linked to a tial goods are subsidized. The mismatch can terms of trade adjustment, a collapse in com- also cause a backlash against subsidy modity prices, or a fall in tax revenues—can reform, which can undermine social cohe- force the government to make unexpected sion and escalate confl ict. For these reasons, fi scal adjustments, cut consumption subsi- leaders have a strong incentive and impera- dies, or reduce the civil service wage bill. tive to maintain macroeconomic stability as In many of the country cases examined a part of prevention, especially in situations for this study, maintaining macrofi scal sta- at risk of violent confl ict. bility has created a hard imperative for transition in critical areas, for example, Capitalizing on External reform of subsidies. Such reforms offer a Shocks distinct development opportunity in that they free up public resources and allow Exogenous shocks such as natural disasters countries to reap sizable benefi ts in terms of or major shifts in the global economy can overall social welfare, economic effi ciency, paradoxically reset dynamics for prevention and fi scal stability.3 However, subsidy by altering incentives and shaking up reform is complex in itself (Carey and entrenched positions. The Boxing Day tsu- Harake 2017; Vagliasindi 2012) and can act nami in 2004 is often noted as having as a trigger of violence (Clements et al. helped to push through agreement in Aceh, 2013; OECD 2011, 2012).4 Cases of reform Indonesia. The tsunami damaged many reversal in Jordan (2011), Indonesia (2012), existing institutions, including much of the and Thailand (2013) all point to the politi- military’s control infrastructure, and pre- cal diffi culties of staying the course. cipitated a humanitarian crisis that incen- Moreover, they underscore the fi scal risks tivized the rebels to come to the negotiating associated with reversals in the reform pro- table. The infl ux of some US$7 billion in cess (Inchauste and Victor 2017).5 The tim- aid resources for rebuilding, combined with ing of cuts also needs to be chosen a collective focus on common goals of carefully—for example, when prices are recovery and reconstruction, provided a already low—and the country should platform from which the community could receive adequate support from the interna- renegotiate norms and expectations. It tional community and multilateral institu- compelled the government and rebels to tions to be able to make these adjustments demonstrate willingness to make progress with suffi cient fl exibility. toward peace, especially given the scrutiny In socially and politically polarized con- and support of international actors (Renner texts, taking advantage of macroeconomic and Chafe 2006). transitions requires careful management to The earthquake that hit Nepal in April avoid the perception that some groups may 2015, killing more than 8,000 people and benefi t disproportionately or be harmed. leaving much of the center of the country in Combining subsidy reform with robust ruins, is another example of how a natural safety nets helps to mitigate the risk of disaster can open a window of opportunity destabilization. An effective communica- for prevention (von Einsiedel and Salih tions strategy can help to secure buy-in 2017). The Constituent Assembly had spent from a broad set of domestic and interna- several years debating a new constitution, tional stakeholders.6 Yet, social safety nets unable to agree on the federalist restructur- and direct compensation programs are ing of the state. The inadequate response to rarely effective in identifying and properly the earthquake and the ensuing humanitar- targeting those who lose out from subsidy ian disaster contributed to a hasty deal on a cuts.7 This ineffectiveness can fuel griev- new constitution, which was eventually ances and fray the social contract that helps adopted in September 2015 (von Einsiedel to maintain a measure of stability in many and Salih 2017). As in South Sudan, how- low- and middle-income countries, on the ever, the acute need translated into limited assumption that the public tolerates consultation and insuffi cient consideration

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 185 of structures and institutional realities and increased participation became more visi- thus undermined the ability to target ble (Walsh 2017). Similarly, in both underlying risks (Verjee 2017; von Einsiedel Indonesia and the Kyrgyz Republic, eco- and Salih 2017). nomic crises helped to tighten purse strings, Global shocks, even when not proximate hasten the process of bringing warring to violent confl ict, can also create transition parties in alignment on a peace deal moments for action. Northern Ireland’s (Timor-Leste in Indonesia), and resolve an peace process was advanced by the ongoing standoff (the Kyrgyz Republic) September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the (Jaffrey 2017; Logvinenko 2017). United States, which delegitimized the use of terror tactics (Walsh 2017; box 6.1) and Exploiting Hurting Stalemates increased pressure on all sides to seek solutions through peace talks. With time, a full- When parties recognize that they cannot be scale return to violence became unthinkable, victorious over one another, either militar- as the benefi ts of institutional change and ily (when the losses from fi ghting outweigh

BOX 6.1 Political Inclusion in Northern Ireland

Improving political inclusion. Northern international community was not going Ireland’s path away from decades of to take sides to resolve it. Inclusion in confl ict and armed violence was made realistic settlement talks was a powerful possible by gradual political inclusion. incentive to consider ceasing violence, The Anglo-Irish Agreement was struck since exclusion from power or self- in 1985, giving Ireland input into the determination was a cause of confl ict. administration of Northern Ireland, Once the need for alternative approaches pending the development of devolved was recognized at government and institutions accepted by both nongovernment levels, enough communities. In the Good Friday momentum for change was created to Agreement of 1998, Ireland deleted its consider compromise. territorial claim to Northern Ireland from Important opportunities for changing its constitution, and the British the dynamics were created when the government acknowledged that it would United Kingdom and Ireland joined the “stay out of the way” if both parties European Economic Community in 1973. were for Irish unity. An elected Membership gradually strengthened assembly was established in Northern Ireland’s own sense of legitimacy and Ireland with a power-sharing executive sovereignty, through interaction with and chosen based on the proportional recognition of an important international allocation of seats. In addition, a north- institution on its own terms. This south ministerial council was critical third-party relationship opened established to promote cross-border opportunities for informal discussions on cooperation. social and economic changes. It helped Incentives for more inclusive politics. to strengthen avenues for infl uence Arriving at an eventual power-sharing other than violence and to change the arrangement was motivated largely perception of violence as a worthwhile by mutual experience of trying other option. The fruit of this relationship was avenues for infl uence and control, for the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. This example, using ongoing violent tactics 20-year relationship laid the groundwork and internationalizing the struggle. for the approval of substantial resources Over time, resources on both sides from the European Union (EU), which were drained, the military confl ict were essential to putting the peace had reached a deadlock, and the process into action.

(Box continued next page)

186 Pathways for Peace BOX 6.1 Political Inclusion in Northern Ireland (continued)

At the community level, one critical further test of the political and economic example of important trust-building dynamics. On the one hand, the decision opportunities came through the newly could support the unionist cause. formed police service of Northern Reestablishing a hard border between Ireland. A policy of equal recruitment Ireland and Northern Ireland could and a completely new identity, including undermine a key pillar of the Good Friday name and uniforms, helped to balance Agreement and bring into question the power institutionally and symbolically and funding that Northern Ireland receives to open doors for overcoming divisions. from the U.K. government. Means for prevention were Trade-offs. Improving political strengthened substantially by inclusion necessitated trade-offs for international resources. The EU’s both sides. Once incentives were commitment over recent decades of strong enough, a key compromise was some 2 billion provided a common the British agreeing, on principle, to concern for both sides. Through the include “terrorists” in negotiations. relationship came an investment of The Irish Republican Army (IRA) had both money and time. The fi rst EU to relinquish the use of violence and, program, PEACE I, was an investment therefore, their main source of power. over 5 years (1994–99). PEACE II was Early demands for decommissioning for 7 years (2000–07), and PEACE III weapons, however, proved a step was for 13 years (2007–20), refl ecting too far, resulting in a brief resurgence the gradual strengthening over two and of IRA violence. Progress became half decades—the minimum timeframe possible again once decommissioning in which transition toward sustainable was renegotiated as a gradual process, peace can be expected. At the same rather than as a prerequisite to talks. time, the United States worked to reduce This agreement aligned better with the means for violence by advocating the time necessary to build trust and that Irish Americans support the deal establish alternative institutions for rather than provide tacit or fi nancial confl ict resolution. support for a cause using violent tactics. Global events were powerful in Short-term change with long-term both propelling the confl ict early on and vision. Both the Anglo-Irish Agreement helping to improve political inclusion and the EU support combined near-term to prevent further violence later. The changes with a vision for longer-term original protests against unionist rule change, leading from greater political drew inspiration from the U.S. civil rights and social inclusion toward devolving movement. Global events such as the power and resources. Education and political and social changes that followed community development projects the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 caused created visible, relevant, and tangible a rethinking of dogmatism. Peace changes that strengthened incentives negotiations in other major confl icts such to support cease-fi res. Interim bodies as the Middle East and South Africa in were established to manage certain the 1990s and the terrorist attacks in the governance functions and enable the United States in 2001 also delegitimized transfer of responsibilities over time. revolutionary violence. This, in turn, lent Transitioning away from EU funding will legitimacy to nationalists moving away still present challenges in the future. from violence and toward peace talks, Dependency on aid funds instead of but retaining the support of their base for the government for certain areas of the cause and avoiding major splits in the social spending is heavy. Deep divisions movement. The Good Friday Agreement also remain, especially with regard called on democracy to decide Irish unity, to housing and education. The U.K. requiring only a vote by the majority to vote in June 2016 to leave the EU is a change the situation.

(Box continued next page)

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conﬂ ict 187 BOX 6.1 Political Inclusion in Northern Ireland (continued)

Improving political inclusion in and relationships from the EU and Northern Ireland clearly shows the various U.S. administrations were intersection of domestic with regional critical in changing political calculations and international actors, institutions, and to prioritize prevention. Ongoing structural factors. Incentives and means prevention continues to rely on exercising for resolution and prevention efforts, political inclusion, now institutionalized, while ultimately locally dependent, drew to navigate difﬁ cult actor-related, heavily on regional and international institutional, and structural factors, such relationships and institutions. Resources as the effects of separation from the EU.

Sources: Walsh 2017; World Bank 2011.

the sense of gains or when combatants, see- Maluku and Sulawesi after the parties had ing the mounting costs of war, lose the mutually exhausted one another’s organiza- desire to fi ght) or politically (when the risks tional capacity for violence (Jaffrey 2017). In of further confl ict outweigh the potential the Central African Republic, the wide- gains of a peaceful settlement), space is cre- spread desire among much of the popula- ated for a transition from violence to peace- tion to see the back of violence has been ful resolution of confl ict. Those attuned to cited as one of the glimmers of possibility this dynamic can recognize and capitalize for resolution in the war-torn country; there on such moments. is hope in the mere existence of a strong Hurting stalemates—situations where desire among Central Africans to fi nd a way neither side can win, but neither wants to out of vicious cycles of confl ict (Lombard retreat—can play a decisive role in the deci- 2017). sion to lay down arms (Brahm 2003; Day and Pichler Fong 2017; Zartman 2001). This Changing Actors’ Incentives was seen in the decision by combatants in The incentives and interests of actors go to Sierra Leone to end the confl ict and sue for the heart of whether prevention efforts are peace. In Liberia, too, growing fatigue successful. Particularly when the threat of among combatants and the public at-large violence is imminent, incentives are often contributed to termination of the civil war stacked against prioritizing prevention. (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). It galva- Actions in favor of crisis prevention or mit- nized civil society and women’s groups to igation are often heavy with risk, not least lend their infl uence and weight to a peace physical, and may have uncertain outcomes agreement. In Nepal, after almost a decade for the actors who control the means of vio- of civil war, a mutually hurting stalemate lence. Decisions in favor of violence, in con- brought about a realization by both sides trast, often have specifi c and tangible that violence was no longer a tenable path to results. As such, mobilizing actors’ incen- power (von Einsiedel and Salih 2017). The tives in favor of peaceful action involves warring parties fi nally entered serious peace managing diffi cult choices and trade-offs. negotiations, which paved the way for restructuring the centralized, unitary state Strengthening Leadership toward inclusive, progressive democracy and full political participation of the Maoists From Burkina Faso and Tunisia to Indonesia (von Einsiedel and Salih 2017). In Indonesia, and Niger, the leadership of key actors has too, a sense of fatigue contributed to the played an outsize role in preventive action. Malino II Accord that halted hostilities Leadership is more than occupying a posi- between Christian and Muslim militias in tion of institutional power. It includes

188 Pathways for Peace the ability to mobilize others and to guide democratic environment (Marc, Verjee, and a process of political and social change. Mogaka 2015). Clear, decisive leadership exerts a powerful Decisive leadership also involves gambles infl uence on the calculus of other actors. that can sometimes come at steep personal For example, Mahatma Gandhi in India cost. In Indonesia, President Bacharuddin and Nelson Mandela in South Africa built Jusuf Habibie’s surprise decision to hold the and guided broad coalitions with a vision 1999 referendum on Timor-Leste, which had for social and political change. been forcefully annexed in 1975 with the Leaders can promote institutional death of almost 19,000 people, offered a change and build or activate coalitions that solution to the long-held resentment on the rally support, spread risk, and create oppor- part of the Timorese people. The move tunities. Leaders are often in a unique posi- found favor with various elements in gov- tion to identify and act on transition ernment, including the military leadership. moments or opportunities for prevention; However, the eventual secession was unpop- through the careful use of narrative, they ular among some Indonesians and may have can invoke or shape norms and values that cost President Habibie, who had previously can underwrite prevention—both in indicated that he was not in favor of full moments of crisis and over time. secession, his position two months later In many of the case studies examined for (Jaffrey 2017). this chapter, decisive leadership has pro- Changes in leadership can pave the way to vided the incentives for peaceful contesta- an alternate course of action and enable a tion of power. For example, in Burundi, deescalation of tensions. The departure of President Pierre Buyoya demonstrated leaders who have contributed to the escala- political willingness to build an inclusive tion of violence and confl ict through intran- government that helped to bring about the sigence and self-interested behavior has Arusha Accords in 2000 (Nygård et al. created opportunities for transition toward 2017). His efforts succeeded where previous prevention and peace. In Malawi, the death attempts at power sharing had failed and of President Bingu wa Mutharika in 2012 ushered in a transitional government that opened the door for new leadership in the handed power to a democratically elected form of his Vice President Joyce Banda. Her government in 2005. It was backed by a appointment—and strong connection to framework that addressed fundamental civil society—helped to defuse tensions and ethnic inequalities in politics, brought move the country away from the confronta- warring parties to the table, and strength- tion and violence that had been stoked by a ened the representative nature and over- combination of a crackdown on civil liber- sight capacities of Parliament (Nygård et al. ties, economic mismanagement, and efforts 2017). to centralize executive power (Stackpool- Strong and visionary leadership follow- Moore and Bacalja Perianes 2017). ing the fl ush of a peace agreement and ces- Critical moments that helped to open a sation of hostilities remains a critical path for more peaceful resolution of con- element in sustaining a country along a fl icts in The Gambia also hinged on the peaceful pathway and in building on early eventual decision of the president of gains. The role of leadership was central to the country to step down from offi ce. In The ensuring the continuation of peace in Gambia, popular opposition backed by Liberia and Sierra Leone following the end efforts of regional leaders and the United of the bloody confl icts in the Mano River Nations (UN) special representative for West basin. In the wake of peace agreements in Africa and the Sahel, coupled with the immi- Liberia and Sierra Leone and the resolution nent threat of military intervention by the of postelection tensions in Côte d’Ivoire, Economic Community of West African each country’s president was credited with States (ECOWAS), was suffi cient to persuade steering a pathway toward improved rela- President Yahya Jammeh to negotiate his tions with donors, improved economic gov- departure from offi ce after losing the election ernance, and a more open and inclusive (Steven and Sucuoglu 2017). His decision to

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 189 stand down led to a peaceful transition of the possibility—albeit short-lived—of power to the legitimate president, Adama resolution (Toska 2012). Barrow. Therefore, just as Jammeh’s decision to dig in precipitated a crisis, his decision to Success in prevention efforts relies on leave offi ce—accompanied by suitable the presence and participation of leaders inducements—enabled its deescalation across all levels and segments of society, not (Steven and Sucuoglu 2017). just within the military or government. Diplomacy and mediation have at times Leaders are needed in the private sector and succeeded in shifting the incentives of lead- among civil society. As social tensions ers, especially during a crisis and in concert deepen, it becomes critical to identify and with pressure exerted by local and national support leadership that can mobilize actors: needed social change at different levels and across sectors in a nonviolent manner, par- • The mediation that followed Kenya’s ticularly to counter extreme narratives and 2007–08 election violence is one exam- ideologies. It is often “middle-range leader- ple of this (Lindenmayer and Kaye ship”—ethnic or religious leaders, mayors, 2009). When talks stalled, the lead academic or intellectual leaders, or heads of mediator, Kofi Annan, made a public prominent nongovernmental organiza- statement, emphasizing the agency and tions—who wield power as interlocutors responsibility held by President Mwai with excluded groups and the higher ranks Kibaki and the leader of the opposi- of national leadership (Lederach 1997, 45). tion, Raila Odinga. By underscoring that Investing in and supporting middle-range “peace lay on the shoulders of the two leaders is an important component of more powerful leaders in the country,” prevention. he placed the onus on them to act in the Faith-based leaders can be particularly best interests of the country and its peo- well placed to challenge violent narratives ple in the medium term (Lindenmayer and, in particular, to prevent violent extrem- and Kaye 2009). ism within a culturally appropriate frame- • In Burkina Faso, the international com- work, as seen in Indonesia (Mirahmadi, munity, regional partners, and domestic Farooq, and Ziad 2012; box 6.2). In recogni- actors all worked via diplomatic means to tion of the critical role that such leaders infl uence the calculus of President Blaise play, some domestic actors have shifted Compaore, who had escalated tensions by attention to empowering moderate voices. pursuing efforts for constitutional change. Such leaders are less visible and therefore His sudden decision to resign took the often have more room for maneuver and country by surprise and left the military infl uence than those at the top of the power to fi ll the void. International partners and structure. In some contexts, these burgeon- local actors then successfully prevailed on ing or middle-range leaders are sidelined or the military, including through the threat imprisoned, as they may be perceived as of sanctions, to permit a civilian-led tran- representing a future threat to the estab- sition (Pichler Fong 2017). lished order. • In the Republic of Yemen, in 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh was Building Coalitions encouraged to step down from his post by the Gulf Cooperation Council in Peaceful pathways have always required return for immunity from prosecution coalitions. Just as violent conflict mobi- after multiple previous efforts to bro- lizes civil, government, military, religious, ker a deal had failed (Kasinof 2012). He business, and social concerns to sustain also requested safe passage out of the violence, so too does preventive action. country. This engineered compromise The comparative advantages, perspec- helped to transfer power to President tives, relationships, and resources of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, temporarily each, across society and externally, averted a slide into civil war, and opened have been instrumental for many

190 Pathways for Peace BOX 6.2 Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism

National approaches to preventing violent extremism has been seen in violent extremism have enjoyed some Indonesia, where the government success where they have been rooted in worked with religious leaders and the community and capitalized on the community organizations that had persuasive power and legitimacy of credibility with their constituents to middle-range leaders. Trusted and counter efforts by extremist groups infl uential voices within communities— to spread violent messages. These such as women, religious scholars, social organizations were critical to youth leaders, and traditional chiefs— coordinating activities on various levels. can help to educate the population and Based on the concept of pancasila, or develop community-specifi c strategies culture, the strategy helped to establish for preventing violent extremism at the a counternarrative to promote the local level. Familiarity with the prevailing separation of church and state and foster context, as well as the authority of and religious tolerance. One organization, trust in these local formal and informal LibForAll, enlisted celebrity singers actors, has aided their efforts to provide to write songs to counter extremist peer-to-peer support and mentorship narratives. The resulting album sold and to act as positive role models. 7 million copies and reached the top Indeed, a recent investigation into of the music charts in Asia, giving the extremism in Africa fi nds that recruits antiextremism messages weeks of high- largely hold community and religious level publicity (Ranstorp 2009). leaders in relatively high regard, as the The example of Morocco also custodians of informal, community-level highlights growing recognition of the institutions, while 78 percent of those power and sway of moderate voices interviewed reported having poor or zero in infl uencing incentives. The state trust in the police, military, and political has worked to prevent the spread of elites (UNDP 2017). extremist ideologies and violence by Recruitment strategies vary by bringing religious leaders closer to context, and violent extremist groups state institutions. The program has often spread by tapping into identity- been credited with limiting the reach based confl icts, mobilizing group-based and damage of extremist narratives by grievances, and exploiting preexisting providing strong incentives for local elites fractures in society. Weak states with to join the state’s project (Wainscott limited presence over their territory and 2017). As a means of regulating religious in their border regions can be particularly narratives, the central government also vulnerable to violent extremism. Amid took control of educational institutions growing recognition and acceptance that can confer the title of religious that a solely security-based approach is scholar (alim). The program included insuffi cient and, in fact, may worsen the training women as “spiritual guides” problem, governments also understand (females cannot be imams) to lead that the broader community context is prayers in community mosques and to important. Communities can play a role combat extremist messages, placing as incubators for potential extremists and special emphasis on the sacred role of as a source of recruits, just as they can women in families and communities act as a source of resilience. In particular, (Bano and Kalmbach 2011). community-based approaches that focus Efforts to counter extremism in the on youth can be an effective part of a Kyrgyz Republic have focused on the broader development plan or embedded role of women in preventing violent in a program on slum upgrading in extremism, with Women Leadership addition to more specifi c projects on rural Schools in 16 target communities or livestock development. educating more than 80 women to act as The infl uence of faith-based leaders religious leaders. The initiative, developed in challenging narratives that can fuel by the government in conjunction with (Box continued next page)

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conﬂ ict 191 BOX 6.2 Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism (continued)

a nongovernmental organization— In Bangladesh, the government has Foundation Tolerance International—aims funded efforts, run by civil society, to strengthen participants’ community- to sensitize religious leaders in areas level prevention and peacebuilding vulnerable to violent extremism, while capacity, including identifying other also offering educational and ﬁ nancial women who could potentially be prone support for the families of convicted to radicalization and violent extremism. extremists. The regions targeted have The initiative also includes outreach to seen a reduction in extremist incidents, wider community groups to collaborate recruitment into extremist groups, and on preventing violent extremism. levels of local violence.

reasons: for example, sustaining pro- in support of the domestic push helped to longed action, gaining access to warring shift the calculus of the military in favor parties, acting as a vehicle for legitimate of a civilian-led political transition and negotiations, monitoring commitments, opened space for inclusive Burkinabe-led or providing a network to identify, share, negotiations on the transition roadmap or mitigate risk. (Pichler Fong 2017). Coalitions—both formal and informal — At times, coalitions have drawn on the can involve any number and combination experience of countries with geographic of actors, including civil society, private proximity or common historical, cultural, sector, and international actors. They can or other linkages to infl uence incentives be effective in the immediate and short for initiating or perpetuating confl ict. In term in shifting and aligning incentives, the Middle East, specifi cally Tunisia, the while fostering a sense of collective owner- Islamist party Ennahda learned from the ship among disparate actors. Coalitions mistakes made by the Muslim Brotherhood provide forums for resolving differences in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and and a vehicle for actors to pull in the same notwithstanding the fact that it was rela- direction. They can demonstrate unity of tively weaker and more inclined to com- purpose and ensure that peace talks and promise than the Muslim Brotherhood, it leaders stay the course. adopted a more participatory and accom- Coalitions are strengthened by wide- modating approach (Toska 2017). In ranging participation from all corners of Jordan and Morocco, King Abdullah II society. The uprising and political transi- and King Mohamed VI both moved rap- tion in Burkina Faso in 2014, dubbed the idly and astutely to head off the popular Burkina Spring, owes its peaceful charac- protests of the Arab Spring by promis- ter to the “determination and concilia- ing far-reaching reforms and signaling tion” of the Burkinabe people and an their receptiveness to demands for change, active and invested civil society backed by while at the same time playing to the the international community (Pichler fear of instability among the popula- Fong 2017). President Blaise Compaore’s tion (Toska 2017). The experiences of plans to change the constitution mobi- neighboring countries also loomed over lized a vocal civil society opposition, and the peace talks in Kenya in 2008, with socially networked young people in the observers to the mediation noting that cities, religious groups, and even tradi- the descent into genocide in Rwanda and tional chiefs who had historically been on the specter of decades-long confl ict in the side of the ruling party came together. Somalia were factors in giving impetus to The combined weight of the the African talks when they fl agged (Lindenmayer and Union, ECOWAS, and the United Nations Kaye 2009).

192 Pathways for Peace International and Regional Support and oftentimes more successful than for Coalitions movements that employ violence: The Gambia is a case study of how African national, regional, and continental leaders, • A cross-country study of the 25 largest with the support of the United Nations, social mobilization campaigns between worked in concert to mobilize domestic 1900 and 2006 shows that nonviolent and regional pressure for a peaceful trans- movements achieve their objectives at fer of power (Steven and Sucuoglu 2017). least half of the time compared with Hailed as a success of the regional preven- 26 percent of the time for movements tive architecture, the effort was facilitated that turn to violence (Stephan and by coordination between internal and Chenoweth 2011). regional actors, led by ECOWAS, which • The greater the support that nonvio- balanced internal negotiations with diplo- lent moments can muster, the higher matic pressure. This engagement, backed the chances that governments will seek by credible threats of military action, accommodation, as seen in Serbia9 in delivered clear preventive benefi ts in the 2000 (Sombatpoonsiri 2015) and Ukraine immediate term and enabled longer- in 2004 (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006; lasting, structural change, a task that Zunes, Hardy, and Stephan 2010), and would fall largely to domestic actors that security actors will choose to side (Steven and Sucuoglu 2017). with the nonviolent campaign (Dahl, In South Sudan, the Intergovernmental Gates, and Nygård 2017). Authority on Development sought to pro- • A global study of transitions from vide an umbrella intervention ensuring authoritarianism between 1972 and 2005 that regional rivalries did not sabotage fi nds that nonviolent civic resistance peace efforts (Verjee 2017). Although criti- was a key factor driving 50 of 67 transi- cized for lack of results, the coalition it tions; it fi nds that transitions driven by built constrained the pursuit of individual civic resistance led to more and greater national interests by Sudan and Uganda, increases in political rights and civil eliminated forum shopping by the parties, liberties than did transitions that were and produced a rare demonstration (albeit elite-driven or transitions in which the short-lived) of unity between all the political opposition engaged in violence regional actors, the African Union, and (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005; Zunes, other international partners that led to the Hardy, and Stephan 2010). signing of a peace agreement in August 2015 (Verjee 2017). Civil society groups often play important roles in peace processes by increasing Civil Society Actors in Coalitions accountability among confl icting parties Civil society plays a strong role in fostering and potentially endowing the process with social cohesion and collective action for greater public credibility (Chataway 1998; peaceful pathways (Aslam 2017) by build- Lanz 2011; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). ing relationships across groups in every- Given the role that perceptions of exclusion day interactions. For example, analysis of play in increasing the risk of violence, sev- interethnic and intraethnic ties in India eral studies have shown that bringing civil fi nds that interethnic organizations are society groups into peace negotiations or more effective at preventing the escalation decision making can increase the chances of communal violence than intraethnic of addressing the underlying causes of the organizations, because they strengthen confl ict rather than focusing solely on social and civic ties (Varshney 2002).8 This managing the risk of immediate violence social trust forms the basis for collective or the postwar distribution of power action. Several large-sample studies have (Barnes 2005; Nilsson 2012; Paffenholz demonstrated that civil society mobiliza- et al. 2017; Saunders 1999). Analysis of the tion tends to be overwhelmingly peaceful impact of including civil society in peace

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 193 negotiations shows that such inclusion is principles of the rule of law, and human associated with greater durability of peace rights (Toska 2017). It was formed in agreements: 2011 to advance peaceful democratic development, just as the democratiza- • In Liberia, civil society groups were tion process risked collapse. The Quartet involved from the early stages of the brokered a national dialogue between civil war in trying to end hostilities, the governing administration and the with faith-based groups among the fi rst opposition, which resulted in a roadmap to intervene (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka to new elections. Tunisia’s strong civil 2015). Women’s groups campaigned society tradition and this broad spec- actively against wartime rape and advo- trum of interests gave the Quartet moral cated on behalf of women’s issues, while authority in exercising its mediation local and international civil society role (World Bank 2015b). The Quartet groups worked to defuse tensions at var- was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in ious junctures. Civil society was initially 2015 “for its decisive contribution to confi ned to the sidelines of the Liberian the building of a pluralistic democracy peace process, which contributed, in part, in Tunisia in the wake of the Jasmine to fl awed agreements that only refl ected Revolution of 2011” (Norwegian Nobel the interests of combatants (Marc, Verjee, Committee 2015). and Mogaka 2015). Their eventual inclu- • Before the confl ict degenerated, youth sion in the Accra peace talks in 2003 was organizations in the Republic of due to widespread recognition of their Yemen—some fi nanced by the private contribution in making peace deals stick sector—connected young people to one and the desire to represent the interests another for social support and help in of a wide range of groups in society. searching for jobs, dealing with fi nan- Civil society was also ultimately included cial problems, and organizing commu- in the power-sharing agreement that nity activities. These practices can instill emerged from those talks (Marc, Verjee, a sense of cooperation, solidarity, and and Mogaka 2015). public spirit among participants and can • In Sierra Leone, too, the Inter-Religious help individuals to develop organizing, Council of Sierra Leone played an active mobilizing, and problem-solving skills role in building confi dence and trust (Marc et al. 2012, 106). between the government and rebels, during and after the 1991–2002 civil war Private Sector Presence in Coalitions there, and is credited with preventing the Peacebuilding organizations have increas- emergence of religious schisms in such a ingly identifi ed the potential of private fraught environment (Marc, Verjee, and sector actors to work for peace and are Mogaka 2015). seeking innovative ways by which to mobilize them to this end as part of coalitions. Inclusive coalitions consisting of civil International Alert, for instance, works society actors can also incentivize peaceful with private sector companies with the dialogue that can foster trust, hold different aim of helping a country to “turn its back actors to account, and mobilize collective on confl ict and move towards lasting action. Civil society can provide a vehicle to peace” (Wennmann 2017, 8). It has also mobilize groups around common values, issued guidance to help extractive compa- purposes, and interests and to foster con- nies to understand and manage better the vergence across social cleavages and reli- risks of working in contexts of confl ict and gious boundaries: violence (International Alert 2005). Participation by the business community • The Tunisian Nobel Peace Prize–winning as peace mediators and in confl ict preven- Quartet coalition represented a wide tion has reaped results in contexts includ- range of sectors and values in Tunisian ing Nepal, the Philippines, Rwanda, civil society: working life and welfare, South Caucasus, Sri Lanka, and Uganda

194 Pathways for Peace (Wennmann 2017). In South Africa, a move- media and publicity campaigns to highlight ment led by business leaders facilitated the the benefi ts of a peace dividend and pushed country’s transition from the apartheid era for a resolution to the confl ict (Peschka 2011). to a multiracial state. The Consultative As private sector activity cuts across all Business Movement was born in August socioeconomic strata, it can also help to 1988, forged from an understanding that the foster inclusion and social cohesion and to traditional methods of interaction adopted address grievances related to socioeconomic by the business community with mainly exclusion: black unions and political leaders were “inadequate” (Ganson 2017, 5). During 1988 and • In Sri Lanka, a group of members from 1989, the movement initiated broad-based regional chambers of commerce across bilateral consultations with political parties, the country promoted joint initiatives civil society, the media, and private sector between Muslim, Sinhalese, and Tamil actors. Together with the South African businesses as well as policy advocacy Council of Churches, it convened a process (Peschka 2011). that led to the 1991 National Peace Accord, • In the Philippines, La Frutera and Paglas which set the stage for constitutional negoti- Corporation set up a banana plantation ations and put into motion South Africa’s in a marginalized area and employed transition to democracy (Ganson 2017). In Christian and Muslim workers, some this case, the private sector was able to act as of whom were former combatants, and a “stabilizing agent” in the transition because thus helped to promote religious toler- it occupied the space between the apartheid ance and reconciliation (International regime and the African National Congress Alert 2006). and thus could credibly promote dialogue, • In Colombia, the Footprints of Peace trust building, and consensus building. project, run by the Federación Nacional The private sector can exert its infl uence de Cafeteros coffee guild, worked to within society to sue for peace in various build local peace between 2011 and 2015 ways and help to infl uence actors’ incentives in some of the country’s most violent toward a peaceful pathway. In Kenya, pri- areas (Miklian 2016). It succeeded in vate sector actors skillfully deployed their mitigating some risks of confl ict through leverage and infl uence during the 2007–08 “community development, economic postelection crisis for peaceful ends (Austin engagement, and reconciliation-based and Wennmann 2017). The long-standing peacebuilding” (Miklian 2016, 3). patronage system that has fostered strong bonds between actors in the private and Transparency and accountability are public sectors gave business leaders an edge critical to ensure responsible business con- lacking in other actors (Bigsten and Moene duct and confl ict prevention. The absence 1996; Hope 2014). On this basis, private of information on the origin of output from sector actors such as the Kenya Private fi rms doing business in fragile countries or Sector Alliance intervened to help to end on the use of revenue from their sales gen- the crisis and have since continued to erates scope for illicit activities that contrib- engage in peacebuilding activities by ute to the continuation of confl icts. Larger funding peace forums, preventing incite- local and multinational fi rms can be sub- ment, disseminating conciliatory narra- jected to such screenings—because of their tives, negotiating privately with political operations—outside of the fragile states leaders, organizing presidential debates, themselves. Information and certifi cation and maintaining neutrality (Goldstein and can eliminate revenue from fi rms that cut Rotich 2008; Materu 2015; Owuor and corners with regard to social standards or Wisor 2014; Wachira, Arendshorst, that channel resources toward illicit activi- and Charles 2010). Similarly, in Northern ties. The Kimberley Process is one of the Ireland, the Confederation of Business fi rst such certifi cation schemes to develop Industry and other business associations greater transparency in fi nancial fl ows, with formed the Group of Seven, which used mixed results so far. Regulatory provisions

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 195 within the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices activities within their supply chains. At the Act and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act in the level of governments, 52 countries have also United States, the 2010 Bribery Act in the implemented the Extractive Industries United Kingdom, or similar regulation Transparency Initiative (EITI) standard adopted recently by the EU on “confl ict requiring them to disclose annually infor- minerals” require importers to carry out mation on how the revenue from natural due diligence and monitor their supply resources makes its way through the gov- chains to prevent the fi nancing of armed ernment and how it contributes to social groups and human rights abuses. Similar spending. Dependence on foreign demand initiatives focusing on human traffi cking where issues are sensitive can also be a pow- and slavery have also been introduced erful tool for responsible business conduct recently in California and the United and confl ict prevention, as long as there is a Kingdom, requiring fi rms to disclose their fl ow of information on fi rms operating in efforts to monitor and prevent these sensitive markets (box 6.3).

BOX 6.3 Private Sector Contributions to Peacebuilding

The private sector has contributed to pressure by adopting a more socially peacebuilding in various ways. In addition conscious outlook. Over the years, some to their role as mediators and promoters leading fi rms have gradually shifted their of economic stability, private sector strategies from running “safe operations” actors often adopt confl ict-sensitive (protecting their own employees and business practices. These practices assets) to building “safe communities” require fi rms to desist from contributing (taking action to address confl ict risks to confl ict dynamics, human rights in local communities). One example violations, corruption, or any type of of such an approach is the Niger Delta criminal activity. Impetus to observe such Partnership Initiative, established in practices comes from growing 2010, to which Chevron committed recognition that being perceived to fuel millions of dollars of investment and or contribute to confl ict can have leveraged additional funds from donor commercial, reputational, and fi nancial agencies (Chevron Corporation 2014). An repercussions. Private businesses can independent assessment after six years operate in a confl ict-sensitive manner by found that its programs had helped to adapting to the local context and achieve widespread change by bringing incorporating an understanding of confl ict international attention and private risks and a philosophy of “do no harm” investment to the Niger delta. This oil- into their operations. The private sector rich region has suffered the effects of contributes to prevention when it aligns extensive environmental damage from its activities with the Sustainable extractive industries, which has affected Development Goals (SDGs), for example, the livelihoods of the local populations. by adhering to the UN Guiding Principles The partnership’s greatest impact has for Business and Human Rights or joining been in development and peacebuilding, the UN Global Compact, which helps creating a positive environment for companies align their strategies and economic growth and peace to take operations with universal principles of hold. While some companies have gone human rights, labor, the environment, beyond the minimum standard, the and anticorruption. incentives for this type of behavior do Some multinational fi rms have not always exist in companies that are responded to reputational risk from public operating in emerging economies or that relations scandals or environmental are smaller in size and not at the mercy disasters by developing stringent rules, of the same sort of reputational risks as while others have responded to global large multinational companies.

Sources: Chevron Corporation 2014; Ganson and Wennmann 2012; Gifford et al. 2016.

196 Pathways for Peace Infl uencing Narratives and • The Media Foundation for West Africa’s Norms monitoring of hate speech and indecent campaign language is testament to Whether enshrined in law or followed as a the negative power of narrative and the social practice, norms are among the most need to reinforce efforts to counter it powerful forces by which to infl uence (Tietaah 2014). incentives. Norms provide a shared frame- • An examination of the blogosphere in work through which actors and leaders can Pakistan fi nds that, while peacebuild- manage contestation in an equitable man- ing efforts on the Internet might not ner, including through the UN 2030 Agenda match the level of blogging activity seen for Sustainable Development, and thus by extremists, peaceful social coalitions reduce the risk of confl ict becoming violent. of citizens can and do emerge in the Norms are often undergirded by narratives Internet space (Naseem, Arshad-Ayaz, that appeal to core values and notions and Doyle 2017). related to constructs of identity, making them a potent force both for prevention Narratives have signifi cant power to and for mobilization toward violence. work for negative ends, too, and can be Given the well-recognized power of nar- manipulated to engineer a context that rative to amplify values and norms in sup- encourages violence. This was exemplifi ed port of either peace or violence, leaders and in the insidious effects of hate speech or those lobbying them have often looked to “coded language” that was used to deadly craft or sway narrative as a way to shift effect in Kenya during the preelection vio- incentives (Sargsyan 2017). Narratives can lence of 2007–08 and in Rwanda during the draw on values of identity, belonging, genocide in 1994 to deepen fi ssures in rights, territory, or culture. They can be society, delegitimize certain groups within called on to respond to signs of confl ict or society, and justify the use of violence to carve out an alternative pathway against them (Somerville 2011). Often, this (Zartman 2015). speech is perpetuated by leaders and infl u- Many state and civil society actors have ential actors and disseminated through used narratives to strengthen norms of social and broadcast media (Deb, Donohue, social cohesion and tolerance. Some coun- and Glaisyer 2017). tries have made notable efforts and invest- The Internet is playing an increasingly ments to counter the destructive effects of infl uential role in transmitting and spread- narratives that can act as an echo chamber ing hate speech, and this has led to a and reinforce exclusionary and violent much-debated push in some countries, narratives: including Kenya and South Africa, toward greater regulation (Nyathi and Rajuili • With international support, Ghana’s 2017). The more recent phenomenon of National Commission on Civic “fake news” experienced in many coun- Education has engaged political party tries, including Germany and the United representatives in all 275 constituencies States, is another example of how informa- on peace, civic, and voter responsibilities, tion can be manipulated or instrumental- aiming to change the image and dialogue ized to reinforce a certain narrative and regarding electoral violence (Hounkpe further an agenda or attain a specifi c objec- and Bucyana 2014). Following the trou- tive (Gu, Kropotov, and Yarochkin 2017). bled 2012 elections in Ghana, a body- New norms and values have arisen builder group called Macho Men for during confl ict and changed the pathway of Peace and Justice promoted a narrative a society: to change the image of “macho men” from the stereotype of thugs for hire at • South Africa has worked hard to foster an the bidding of corrupt politicians to con- inclusive historical narrative as a direct structive protectors of peace and democ- way of restoring and nurturing social racy (Bob-Milliar 2017). cohesion (Sisk 2017). As one example of

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conﬂ ict 197 many steps taken as a result of national The government of Nepal signed an leadership that articulated agendas of agreement with the high commis- reconciliation, equality, and justice, the sioner for human rights to establish an country has celebrated December 16 as office with a far-reaching mandate on a Day of Reconciliation and a public hol- human rights. The mission aimed to iday since 1995, instead of using the day reduce impunity on both sides of the to commemorate war and symbols of conflict and to strengthen the national division (Sargsyan 2017). capacity to protect human rights. Its • Niger, too, has reinforced a national presence is credited with helping to narrative of social cohesion, peace, lessen abuses, torture, and disappear- and tolerance by building on some of ances and with encouraging both sides the unique characteristics of Nigerien to do more to limit civilian deaths. society. In times of crisis, the country’s It also engaged with nonstate actors leadership leverages this sense of solidar- and opened opportunities to pro- ity as a way of managing and mitigating mote inclusion, equality, and dialogue tensions between groups (Pérouse de among parties to the conflict (von Montclos 2017). Einsiedel and Salih 2017).

Narratives and norms can be institu- Gender norms can also be called on to tionalized and have a more sustainable mitigate tensions and promote peace. One impact on pathways to peace by promoting of the best-known examples is that of civic values and a culture of peace through Liberian women evoking norms of mascu- peace education,10 civic education, public linity to pressure men to continue peace memorialization, and arts and culture negotiations and empowering women in (UNHRC 2016). Refl exively promoting their traditional confl ict resolution roles civic values and strengthening a sense of (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). Women citizenship can help to maintain and safe- came together to institutionalize a more guard institutions. When citizens regard permanent way of mediating local disputes the state and social institutions as effective and preventing violence, while nurturing an in protecting their rights and delivering ethic of peace and fostering social cohesion services, they will see themselves as a part (Alaga 2010; box 6.4). of public life and promote a sense of com- Development and peacebuilding institu- mon well-being (Brennan 2017; UNDP tions have, in recent decades, placed a greater 2016). priority on mobilizing women’s efforts for Domestic actors have strategically used peace, drawing on the roles they often play global norms, particularly human rights in society as connecters and trust builders. norms, but the 2030 Agenda also provides National action plans for the implementa- entry points for rallying support behind a tion of UN Security Council Resolution push for change or warding off pressure 1325, designed to increase women’s partici- from contesting forces: pation in dialogue and peacebuilding, draw • For the Kyrgyz Republic, government’s on this role, while efforts to prevent violent public declaration of its intention and extremism often focus on women as critical efforts to strengthen human rights pro- actors for moderating extremist messages tections helped to reinforce domestic and preventing radicalization (Sisk 2017; and international support in the face of UN Security Council 2000). As discussed in regional political pressures (Logvinenko chapter 4, preexisting gender and power 2017). norms heavily infl uence the space and • A desire to be seen as abiding by human weight accorded to women’s participation in rights norms also formed the basis for peacemaking (Nygård et al. 2017), which a robust mission of the Office of the makes consideration of such norms, partic- United Nations High Commissioner ularly in a domestic context, critical to for Human Rights to Nepal in 2005. successful prevention.

198 Pathways for Peace BOX 6.4 Cost Savings of Investing in Women’s Grassroots Prevention: Female-Led Peace Huts in Liberia

Women peace activists in Liberia started • Peace huts reduce the workload peace huts shortly after the end of the of the police and justice systems civil war in 2003. An adaptation of the by handling disputes and traditional palava hut, women in peace interpersonal conﬂ icts before huts mediate local disputes, monitor the they require intervention by the police and justice services, refer victims security sector.

of violence to counseling and other • Peace huts link traditional redress services, and raise awareness within mechanisms and the formal justice communities regarding peacebuilding system by facilitating reporting of priorities, such as elections, serious cases and improving access decentralization, and natural resource to justice when required. concessions. According to the local • Women working with peace huts police, peace huts have been key to have established connections with reducing and even preventing violence in political leaders and opened avenues the community because they defuse for improving women’s participation in tensions and alert police to potential decision making. outbreaks of confl ict. A study was commissioned to look at the • Peace huts are more sustainable and effectiveness of peace huts and to resilient than similar initiatives, compare the modest investment in including throughout the Ebola crisis, establishing and maintaining them to the due in part to their indigenous and costs of addressing violence once it grassroots nature. breaks out. The total fi nancial cost of • The proximity of peace huts to the peace huts is small, amounting to an community means that their efforts estimated US$1.5 million per year, or directly respond to pressing security approximately US$62,000 per hut per issues at the local level. year, including the expense of establishing the hut, building capacity, Fall (2017) suggests that a low-cost, and conducting training and monitoring. local, and women-led intervention In comparison to the US$10 billion cost fulfi lls important roles in the community, of overall peacekeeping and foreign aid or including confl ict mediation, community the US$95 million in domestic fi nancial policing, awareness raising, and resources incurred by the justice sector sensitization. These roles fi ll a gap where per year, peace huts constitute a minor communities lack immediate access to investment with signifi cant potential cost state justice mechanisms such as the savings. This study found the following: police and judicial system.

Sources: Douglas 2014; Fall 2017.

Several countries have drawn on global spread the values of human rights, dignity, norms regarding human rights, tolerance, inclusion, and participation of all and the and inclusion through sports program- peaceful resolution of disputes. Recent ming to build trust and cohesion. research from Northern Ireland shows Particularly in postconﬂ ict settings, sports that appropriately designed sports inter- are seen as both a method of programming ventions can help to overcome problems for reconciliation and development work of symbolic competition and territorial (such as youth livelihood development) segregation with the representation of and a symbolic metaphor for peaceful coex- new, less distinct, and divided identi- istence and indeed “normality” in social ties (Mitchell, Summerville, and Hargie relations. Practically, sports are used to 2016).

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 199 Addressing Institutional to information, and the means to pursue Weaknesses collective interests nonviolently, can have a powerful effect on actors’ incentives for Efforts to address institutions’ shortcom- prevention: ings for peace constitute the second broad area for action on sustained prevention. As • In Northern Ireland, the experience of the “immune system” of a society (World gaining infl uence through participat- Bank 2011, 72), effective institutions ing in political discourse and seeing strengthen resilience to shocks and enhance the utility of compromise strengthened the capacity for peaceful mitigation of con- Sinn Fein’s motivation to invest in more fl ict. Institutions provide the regulatory peaceful confl ict resolution processes framework, both formal and informal, gov- (Walsh 2017). erning actors’ behavior and limiting the • In Ghana, greater political inclusion and harm individuals and groups can infl ict. openness created an enabling environ- The quality and legitimacy of institutions ment not only for a robust political oppo- refl ect social relationships in broader soci- sition to form and unrepresented groups ety, and institutions evolve together with to participate, but also for a vibrant civil those relationships. In contexts with deep society to emerge and security sector tensions across groups, institutions may reform to take place (Bob-Milliar 2017; be more exclusionary, more biased, and Steven and Sucuoglu 2017). less trusted by underrepresented groups. • Colombia’s more local-level, informal Reform of institutions, therefore, presents bargaining process between nonstate an important opportunity for prevention. actors helped to implement demobiliza- Across the country cases prepared for tion. Thus, nontraditional and informal this study, efforts to increase the represen- mechanisms of inclusion and outsourc- tativeness and reach of institutions have ing can also help to maintain regime tended to see a reduction in the risk of stability and create an alternative kind violent confl ict. However, as the country of order that enables the conditions for cases show, reform efforts can run into averting immediate threats of violence obstacles and experience setbacks and (Ahram 2011). reversals, as groups contest processes of change. This underscores the lesson that In all countries, however, taking the fur- how institutions are reformed matters at ther step of institutionalizing changes least as much as what technical reforms through reform of state institutions is are implemented. what laid the foundation for lasting peace. Negotiated roadmaps, peace agreements, Implementing Power-Sharing and postconfl ict settlements have often Arrangements and Temporary provided platforms for a renegotiation of Mechanisms institutional arrangements and provided public signals of intentions for reform, Broadening and improving political inclu- creating space for longer-term change. sion11 at the national level is a key plank in Enshrining them in institutions helps to virtually every successful case of effective ensure that they last over time: long-term prevention and also is refl ected in the 2030 Agenda, including SDGs 10 and • Ghana’s new constitution ensured 16. As described in chapters 4 and 5, increas- the empowerment of minority and ing access to the power and governance marginalized ethnic groups within arena creates strong disincentives for substantive local decision-making violence, especially when power-sharing structures (Steven and Sucuoglu 2017). arrangements are enshrined in formal • Northern Ireland established an elected agreements, such as new constitutions. Over assembly, structured to ensure power time, the benefi ts of political inclusion, sharing across divided groups (Walsh such as increased infl uence, greater access 2017).

200 Pathways for Peace • Meanwhile, in South Africa, gradual include moderate elements of the former increases in political inclusion helped ruling party meant that the Charter of the the country to navigate long-held struc- Transition was more inclusive and that tural and racial divides (Daly and Sarkin the reconciliation process had broader buy-in 2007). (Pichler Fong 2017). • In Tunisia, the national dialogue forum One of the factors that has helped Niger that helped Islamists and the secular to maintain relative stability in a region government to overcome an increasingly beset by security crises has been the move to violent stalemate and agree on a roadmap institutionalize greater political inclusion at going forward also served as a platform the national level. The transition from a for compromise, including a new consti- military regime to an inclusive civilian-led tution guaranteeing fundamental rights regime in 2011 saw a change in Niger’s for- for the entire population irrespective of tunes and helped to maintain stability in gender, political conviction, or religious the face of various internal and external beliefs (Norwegian Nobel Committee threats (Pérouse de Montclos 2017). The 2015; Steven and Sucuoglu 2017). Islamist new president, Mahamadou Issoufou, ush- leaders reached out to the secular camp ered in a parliamentary regime that to strike compromises on diffi cult issues extended political inclusion to a range of such as the role of Shari’ah in the consti- groups and parties, including naming vari- tution and gender equality. ous opposition leaders to government posts and appointing a Tuareg, Brigi Rafi ni, to the Both Burkina Faso and Tunisia also post of prime minister in 2011 (Pérouse de demonstrated inclusion by explicitly includ- Montclos 2017). The inclusion offered by ing past politicians, even from rival groups, in the new government helped it to maintain politics rather than excluding or prosecuting an elite pact and also helped Niger to them (Pichler Fong 2017; Toska 2017). For address specifi c grievances among the pop- Tunisia, this broadened accountability for ulation and to develop greater accountabil- a peaceful political transition, while giving ity (box 6.5). the transition team access to institutional To be meaningful, inclusion needs to go memory and a wealth of prior experience deeper than mere participation. It should (Toska 2017). In Burkina Faso, although not lead to an increased focus on the core issues popular with civil society leaders, the move to that are central to managing risks and that

BOX 6.5 Niger: An Example of Resilience in a Troubled Neighborhood

Niger faces the threat of extremist the southeast and with armed groups groups on its border with Mali, is from Mali in the southwest have stoked exposed to the lawless Sahara interior intercommunal tensions and deepened through its border with Libya and tensions over access to resources. northern Mali, and has seen repeated Despite these risks, Niger has managed incursions by Boko Haram into its to remain stable over the last decade. territory from Nigeria in the south. The following factors help to explain how Internally too, it has experienced two the country has managed to avoid sliding military coups in recent years, tensions into open, violent conﬂ ict. with its Toubou and Tuareg populations Fostering a sense of national unity. have exacerbated internal divides in the Niger has a robust national narrative past, and its battle with Boko Haram in regarding social cohesion. A grassroots

(Box continued next page)

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conﬂ ict 201 BOX 6.5 Niger: An Example of Resilience in a Troubled Neighborhood (continued)

rural development program fostered by to transhumance activities. Finally, a President Mahamadou Issoufou has recovery plan for the Diffa region, which strengthened the state’s relationship has suffered the effects of Boko Haram with communities and increased its attacks, is currently being drafted and legitimacy. The separation of the church contains elements related to security, and state during colonial times helped humanitarian assistance, and longer-term to give rise to a secular state and a development. context that has partially contained the Boosting political inclusion. Measures emergence of radical Islamist ideology. to boost political inclusion include the The state supports secularism but also absorption of Tuaregs into the public engages in an active dialogue with sector and into administrative positions. religious authorities, with Islam playing The appointment of Brigi Rafi ni, a Tuareg a central role in Niger. The religious leader, as prime minister in Niamey and community has supported confl ict the placement of a Tuareg as head of mitigation activities in the southwest the HACP have helped to foster a sense since 2011; today, most religious actors of inclusion that cuts across divides, as in the southeast reject the Islamist have the election and appointment of narrative of Boko Haram. However, some Tuareg leaders to local governance this rejection has not entirely mitigated positions. The inclusion of dominant local the risk of radicalization toward violent elites and minority representatives at extremism among the youth. Overall, the all levels has helped to achieve stability. combination of historical, economic, and This stability is a product of both the religious factors in Niger has helped to elite pact that lasted between 2011 and contain a further polarization of groups 2015, which ensured a fair distribution along the north-south divide and diluted of power and rents between elites, as the appeal of extremist ideologies. The well as a tradition of nationalist sentiment leadership has used these factors to build that has helped to keep elites integrated a narrative of peace and tolerance. At the and united. At the national level, Niger local level, the wide dispersal of Niger’s introduced multiparty politics in 1991 Tuareg population across the country, and returned to a parliamentary system living and intermarrying with different in 2011, following the end of a military communities, has also contributed to hiatus that lasted from 2010 to 2011. cohesive social dynamics. Promoting early warning and Forging a development, security, mediation. Niger has developed an and diplomacy nexus. Niger has original mechanism for early warning and engaged in a major push to forge a mediation that it implements through strong nexus between development, the HACP, which was created in October security, and diplomacy. The army in 2011 and replaces a previous similar Niger is well trained and, on the whole, structure. The HACP reports directly to has a positive relationship with the the presidency and administers a range population. It has made efforts to work of programs, including intercommunal with civilian authorities, especially with dialogue, demobilization and reintegration structures such as the Haute Au torité à of former combatants, and development la Consolidation de la Paix (HACP). The projects aimed at promoting peace and comprehensive economic and social cohesion. The early warning mechanism development plan includes components supports early mediation through a on security and confl ict resolution. A network of local and community actors— US$2.5 billion strategy for the security some of whom are hired by the HACP and development of the Sahara-Sahel as chargés de mission—who report region proposes an integrated approach back to the president of the HACP when to security and development and includes there are signs of heightened tension issues like pastoralism development and in a particular region or community. It is management of local confl icts related highly dynamic and coordinates activities (Box continued next page)

202 Pathways for Peace BOX 6.5 Niger: An Example of Resilience in a Troubled Neighborhood (continued)

closely with the army as well as with those affected by crises, and a warning the various sectoral ministries, local system has been established to prevent administration, and traditional authorities. and manage food crises and natural Despite the informal character of the disasters. In 2006, the government early warning and early response passed a law to redistribute 15 percent mechanism, its ability and capacity of revenues from extractive industries for rapid intervention and its holistic back to the communes where the mining approach have been key to preventing takes place. However, this mechanism violence in Niger. is contested and has not yet been Addressing socioeconomic implemented, mostly because of the grievances. The Renaissance lack of capacity to manage resources socioeconomic plan—a high-level at the central level and the dwindling platform of reforms—that was put of mining resources. The decision by forward by President Issoufou when he the government not to obstruct the was ﬁ rst elected in 2011 aims to address functioning of the informal economy socioeconomic grievances. Within that provides a vital source of livelihoods this, the 3N Initiative (the Nigeriens for many has helped to build resilience Nourish the Nigeriens) serves as a and social cohesion across the country, framework to enhance the resilience of particularly in the border regions.

Sources: Antil and Mokheﬁ 2014; Guichaoua and Pellerin 2017; ICG 2013, 2017; Pérouse de Montclos 2017; World Bank 2016b.

build confi dence for further progress. The to divide the Republic of Yemen into pressure for a regime to survive or persist a federation of six geographic entities can incentivize temporary mechanisms perceived to enjoy unequal access to for inclusion over institutional reform. resources ultimately contributed to an Inclusion through the redistribution of escalation of violence and a full-fl edged favors, privileges, or some control of the use military confl ict (Steven and Sucuoglu of force can reduce tensions and increase 2017). incentives to refrain from violence. • In the Democratic Republic of Congo, However, this redistribution can come at successive political regimes since the the expense of a comprehensive reform of 1970s have relied on alternative strategies institutions or improved state capacity and, for political survival, such as patronage, ultimately, lasting prevention: corruption, aid, and mineral extraction, among others (Bøås et al. 2017). • For example, the Republic of Yemen’s 2013 National Dialogue Conference Ultimately, though, without corre- ultimately failed to bring about much- sponding improvements in state capability, needed structural changes, despite being effi ciency, and accountability or efforts to hailed as an inclusive and representa- lay the groundwork for a more durable set- tive process that brought in the political tlement, prevention is unlikely to be sus- elite, traditional leaders, the Houthis, the tained. Such arrangements have tended to southern militant group Al Hirak, civil work only so long as the pool of elites to society, and women’s and youth groups co-opt is of a manageable size, incentives (Steven and Sucuoglu 2017). Although remain aligned, or the arrangements have the process agreed on a draft document the backing of a strong or canny leader. In and wide-ranging recommendations, the Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the founding decision by a small presidential panel president, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, ran an

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 203 inclusive government and promoted national These structures allow concessions to cohesion for decades through patronage greater political reform, without undermin- mechanisms and temporary elite pacts ing or threatening elites, and promote sta- (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015). However, bility, at least while the arrangements the stability conferred by this arrangement endure (Toska 2017). came to an end following his death, contributing to the country’s eventual descent Decentralizing Power, Services, into civil war. and Resources Gender inclusion has proven a powerful element in helping to ensure that processes As discussed in chapter 5, the decentraliza- move beyond dialogue to meaningful tion12 of power and resources to local and change. UN Security Council Resolution federal levels has been a signifi cant force for 1325 articulates this approach and has preventing and mitigating confl ict (Nygård enabled global norms on gender equality et al. 2017). It represents a practical demon- to infl uence many peace negotiations as stration of reforms that boost political and well as broader development plans in a social inclusion. Decentralization usually manner that goes beyond the simple inclu- requires fundamental and, often, extensive sion of women at the table (OSAGI 2000; institutional changes that have the power to UN Security Council 2000). It provides address underlying confl ict risks, shift international backing for greater women’s actors’ incentives, and navigate structural leadership in decision making at the constraints to peace. It is therefore not national, regional, and international levels. without risks. In Ghana and Kenya, decen- This backing has contributed to the credi- tralization transferred greater resources and bility and durability of many peace agree- control to historically marginalized regions ments (O’Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, and (Bob-Milliar 2017; Mogaka 2017): Paffenholz 2015). Attempting supportive institutional • In Ghana, a gradual increase in trans- reforms to sustain prevention can also come fers of funds from the central to local up against serious challenges. In the case of government, in particular, to poorer dis- many such states, efforts to reform institu- tricts in the northern region, took place tions have disrupted the precarious balance over a decade (Bob-Milliar 2017). The of power established by the patrimonial process was set in motion by President state. Development partners and the inter- Jerry Rawlings and ratifi ed four years national community face the conundrum later in the 1992 constitution. The pres- of either supporting such states for the tem- ident retained some powers, but the porary stability they can provide or Regional Coordinating Councils, district attempting to encourage reforms that may assemblies, and even subnational bodies incur instability via the process of change. all have meaningful powers of decision The lessons in many cases, however, high- making and resource distribution. light that whether reforms are managed or • Kenya’s extensive program of devolution, imposed, reform is a fundamental part of adopted under its 2010 constitution, was sustaining peace. aimed, in part, at addressing concerns The monarchies in Jordan and Morocco related to perceptions of fairness and withstood the revolutions that swept the political inclusion in the multiethnic state Middle East through the Arab Spring in (Mogaka 2017). It established 47 county part due to the plausible promise of politi- governments and redistributed resources cal and economic reforms and the prospect across the country, in a move that gave of those reforms translating into real inclu- the historically marginalized north and sion (Toska 2017). Both countries also rely northeast of the country control over its on access to rents in the form of foreign aid political and economic destiny for the as one means of maintaining stability, and fi rst time. In 2013, new county governors their kings are protected, in part, by the dual and assemblies were elected, creating a elected and royal structure of their states. new tier of government. Spatial diffusion

204 Pathways for Peace of power and resources to the counties ethnic identity as a way to mobilize offers the country’s marginalized regions their bases (Jaffrey 2017). After 2004, the opportunity for rapid development however, the country moved into a sta- directed by local priorities. bilization phase, which was attributed to public satisfaction with decentral- In both cases, the focus was on fostering ization, greater space for the expression a sense of political inclusion at local levels. of local identities, greater levels of state In Kenya, the National Cohesion and penetration, effective design of local Integration Commission was established to elections, and strong leadership and ease concerns that the tendency to central- institutional frameworks at the local ize national structures would be mirrored at level (Steven and Sucuoglu 2017). the county level; it also helped to facilitate • In Kenya, too, devolution brought chal- discussions on political cohesion in local lenges (Mogaka 2017). The absence of communities (Mogaka 2017). A sense of existing “rules of the game,” combined political inclusion was reinforced through with the scale of resource fl ows, created the so-called “negotiated democracy” and exacerbated local-level contesta- model, whereby some counties brokered tions. It heightened the stakes of politi- deals to ensure adequate community repre- cal offi ce at the local level and raised the sentation in positions of leadership, specter of violence around elections at enabling individuals to vote across ethnic the county level. Balancing the way in lines with the expectation that their com- which power in the counties is shared munity would be adequately represented by elites from different communities regardless (Mogaka 2017). remains a signifi cant challenge (World Where decentralization has worked well, Bank 2017a). control of power and resources has been traded, fi rst, to manage frustrations stem- Where decentralization has failed to take ming from horizontal inequalities and effect, the failure is largely because it has long-standing tensions relating to exclusion been implemented incompletely or because from political power (Nygård et al. 2017) political actors and leaders have had little or and, second, to manage resources more effi - no incentive to see such wide-ranging ciently. While decentralization has been changes take effect. Decentralization in instrumental in averting potential violence Mali, although viewed as the main vehicle or diffusing ongoing violence, it has also for confl ict prevention, did not achieve its created short-run risks for violent confl ict. aims due to incomplete implementation This is particularly the case where elite amid “considerable resistance to change competition is transferred to the local level from offi cials at central and regional levels or local governments lack legitimacy who stand to lose power when the capacity (Nygård et al. 2017): of local authorities is increased” (Bøås et al. 2017). The resulting unmet expectations • An extensive decentralization pro- and grievances undermined state legiti- gram in Indonesia in 2001 led to macy. The Central African Republic’s small major transfers of administrative, polit- Bangui-based elite is an example of how ical, and fi nancial authority to district entrenched interests can block attempts at and municipal levels (box 6.6). In the reform: the lack of state presence outside short term, the devolution of power the capital should be addressed ahead of and funds increased opportunities any decentralization attempt (Lombard for contestation at the local level, as 2017). In Afghanistan, where competition groups jockeyed to position themselves for devolved resources or power is high, the favorably during the process (Bertrand perseverance of warlords and local strong- 2004). Once implemented, decentral- men, as well as weak or no state presence, ization heightened the stakes for access increased local-level corruption, which to resources from the central govern- fed into local grievances and reinforced ment, and political elites exploited confl ict.13

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conﬂ ict 205 BOX 6.6 Decentralization and Security Reform as Prevention in Practice: Indonesia

Indonesia has undergone cycles of practical risks of decentralizing, the violence and repression, with four government also recognized the potential secessionist confl icts waged between of more fi scally effi cient approaches to 1999 and 2004, as the country governance and resource management transitioned from decades of across the country’s highly complex authoritarian rule toward democracy and social makeup and geographic territory. economic and political stability. The The potential means to manage such confl icts were due to an array of long- extensive decentralization existed in standing historical issues. Each was Indonesia, due to its relatively high, intensifi ed by Indonesia’s deep economic although very uneven, human and crisis in the late 1990s and widespread institutional capacity. political uncertainty following President Central Sulawesi and Maluku were Hajji Suharto’s sudden resignation. given recovery aid (an estimated Among Indonesia’s subnational US$300 million from the central confl icts, Timor-Leste’s struggle for government) that was placed outside independence became known, in part, the government’s regular disbursement for the violent referendum of 1999, mechanism, allowing local-district heads whereby a strong-arm military response to allocate resources at their discretion. left up to 1,000 people dead and a Simultaneously, Aceh enacted political quarter of the population dispersed. A and fi scal autonomy provisions as part temporary UN administration took over, of the peace agreements, including laws and recognition of the outcome of the for balanced formulas for previously referendum by the Indonesian Parliament marginalized areas, direct election of led to eventual independence in 2002. regional heads, and high degrees of The negotiated peace processes of the local discretion in managing regional other three confl icts—Aceh, Central budgets. The decentralization measures Sulawesi, and Maluku—are considered to were conducted in districts instead of in have been relatively successful, although ethnically bounded provinces to mitigate those, too, where not without violence. the chance of separatist sentiment and While Indonesia continues to struggle ethnic politics. These changes were with episodes of subnational violence, underpinned over the longer term by including in Papua’s “postconfl ict” areas, gradually improving political inclusion. two effective prevention strategies In the case of Timor-Leste, resolution have had well-demonstrated success: eventually came in the form of full decentralizing power and resources and secession, despite intense political paying attention to the security forces. resistance from Indonesia and the Political and fi scal decentralization. Indonesian military’s use of violence Long-standing local intergroup to dissuade citizens from voting for tensions and horizontal inequalities that secession. While international pressure underscored the major confl icts were played a pivotal role in the government’s exacerbated by political marginalization eventual decision, the economic crisis also by the state and a desire for greater played a role. The government recognized self-determination. To address the that granting Timor-Leste its independence grievances that were intensifying entailed lower fi scal and political costs secessionist sentiment, the government than maintaining it as territory. recognized that ceding some central Reform of security forces. Indonesia’s control of both power and resources military had long played an active was necessary to improve social stability role in the country’s politics. As such, and fi nd resolution. Further motivation security sector reform was particularly to decentralize came from the economic important in the move away from military crisis the country faced in the 1990s. dictatorship and toward democratization In return for taking the political and and durable peace—an important (Box continued next page)

206 Pathways for Peace BOX 6.6 Decentralization and Security Reform as Prevention in Practice: Indonesia (continued)

FIGURE B6.6.1 Foreign Direct Investment Net Flows as a Proportion of Gross Domestic Product in Indonesia, 1980–2015

3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 –0.5 –1.0 –1.5 –2.0 Foreign direct investment net ﬂows (% of GDP) –2.5 –3.0 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Year

Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

political and practical complement product (GDP) and balance of payments to decentralization. Indonesia took (fi gure B6.6.1). The eventual institutional the crucial step of ensuring political clarity was critical to ensuring that the impartiality of its armed forces by government had the means subsequently separating the police and military and to form and enforce peace deals in other establishing parliamentary oversight. areas over the longer term. The resulting In exchange for conceding domestic more even power balance between the security tasks to a newly formed police military and the government further force, the military received signifi cant disincentivized the use of force as an budgetary concessions and was allowed option for resolving confl ict. Decisive to retain its territorial command structure. action by the Indonesian police in the Impact of peacebuilding on the early 2000s to improve surveillance economy. While at fi rst, this substantial and antiterror operations in response political and security risk was further to terrorist attacks helped to improve destabilizing, follow-through on the citizen confi dence in the security forces. changes paid off, with increasing Indonesia’s relatively strong institutional infl ows of foreign direct investment capacity was critical to facilitating and as a percentage of gross domestic following through on changes.

Sources: Jaffrey 2017; Nygård et al. 2017.

Like most approaches to prevention, the by combining decentralization with com- effectiveness of decentralization requires munity-driven development (CDD). If parallel attention to other social and eco- managed well, CDD can ensure that the nomic factors (Nygård et al. 2017), as well as beneﬁ ts of decentralization, such as greater to the capacity, legitimacy, and interests of local decision making and direct control of recipients to govern and manage resources. resources, trickle down to the local level and In many cases, this purpose has been served potentially lead to more efﬁ cient delivery of

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 207 services and, eventually, to measurable resolution mechanisms. A two-province reductions in poverty. CDD projects study in Aceh of the Kecamatan can aim to reconfi gure intergroup and Development Project—a framework state-community relations in order to infl u- through which more than US$20 mil- ence local power relations and, as such, con- lion in assistance was made available to fl ict dynamics. By addressing the risks of more than 1,700 confl ict-affected indi- confl ict related to an infl ux of resources, the vidual villages in block grants—fi nds goal is to make resources a force for pro- that, while there is little evidence that gressive change. CDD in itself does not the project itself has reduced levels of avoid violence; however, it can consolidate violent confl ict, it has had “notable and peace by promoting positive social change positive” indirect impacts on the local and infl uencing pathways through confl ict institutional environment in the areas in (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2006, which it operates (Barron, Diprose, and 2007). It can also improve intergroup rela- Woolcock 2006, 2007). CDD projects tions, help to share power at the village such as this can also complement local level, and even help to resolve disputes and confl ict mediation mechanisms, but they confl icts. are unlikely to replace preexisting mech- Where CDD approaches have had lim- anisms. Where CDD projects comple- ited success, this can be attributed largely to ment ongoing governance reforms and the low intensity of interventions, a mis- local confl ict mediation capacities, they match in timeframes, or a lack of coherent can reinforce positive outcomes (Barron, and explicit theory of change (Bennett and Diprose, and Woolcock 2006, 2007). D’Onofrio 2015; King and Samii 2014). Strengthening the Rule of Law • In Afghanistan, the National Solidarity Program (NSP) created community Security and justice issues have often been councils and gave them small grants to at the center of both challenges and solu- start projects (Yemak, Gan, and Cheng tions for violent confl ict, as discussed in 2013). The program—the largest devel- chapter 5. The country cases examined for opment program in Afghanistan—has this study underscore that there is no been credited with success for the fact quick fi x in addressing the risks of violent that it is rooted in a local focus and scaled confl ict that emerge from the security and to existing capacity (Mashal 2015). It has justice arena or in realizing its full poten- brought CDD to all of Afghanistan’s 34 tial for prevention. Societies in high-risk provinces and, in doing so, has over- or postconfl ict contexts must manage come security challenges, prevailing multiple, often competing, demands to gender norms, and suspicion of the cen- address abuses of the past and demon- tral government (Beath, Christia, and strate a clear departure from past prac- Enikolopov 2015). By dividing resources tices, while simultaneously responding to into small packages, the NSP has avoided the current security and justice needs of pitfalls such as large-scale corruption, the population. while ensuring local ownership over As discussed in chapter 3, violence is projects. Although NSP has had some highly path-dependent; once it takes hold, benefi cial effects, including increased incentives and systems begin to reorient acceptance of democratic processes themselves in ways that sustain violence. and improved perceptions of economic Violence often justifi es beefi ng up military well-being, the positive effects regarding budgets and consolidating decision making attitudes toward central and subnational within defense ministries. Altering the bal- government fell off soon after the com- ance of power in favor of security forces has pletion of NSP-funded projects (Beath, often worsened abuses during confl ict and Christia, and Enikolopov 2015). requires strong resistance to rebalancing • Indonesia implemented a large power with other sectors once violence has CDD program that included confl ict ceased. To address this, many countries

208 Pathways for Peace move to increase the accountability and Alongside such reforms, where ethnic or transparency of the security forces to signal identity divides run deep, integrating mar- a change of direction. ginalized ethnic or religious groups into the In most cases, increasing accountability military has helped to defuse the salience of and transparency has involved paying closer schisms (Brzoska 2006). Nepal’s eventual attention to the separation between military integration of some 1,500 Maoist combat- and policing functions. Indonesia worked ants into the army in 2012 was a major to increase citizen trust in security forces by breakthrough in lowering the risk of return dividing the police from the military and to fi ghting (von Einsiedel and Salih 2017).14 setting up an oversight body within The dissolution of the Maoist army was Parliament (Jaffrey 2017; box 6.6). The made signifi cantly easier and less of a risk to reform of the security sector in Tunisia, the Maoists themselves by dint of the fact where the abuses and impunity of the inter- that it held political power at that stage (von nal security institutions served as a catalyst Einsiedel and Salih 2017). In Burundi, a for the protests that ended the rule of focus on maintaining parity in numbers President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, involved between Hutus and Tutsis in military a move from “a police order to a police ser- recruitment helped to promote inclusion vice” (Hanlon 2012, 8). The reform reorga- and reconciliation (Samii 2013). In Kosovo, nized the security services into three too, ethnic diversity in the police force was bodies—the National Guard, the National pursued as a deliberate policy by which to Police, and Civil Protection (Hanlon 2012). build community trust and create a less Northern Ireland also underwent an exten- prejudiced institution (Heinemann-Grüder sive reform and transformation of police and Grebenschikov 2006; box 6.7). and policing mechanisms that involved cre- Although the process of building trust ating an independent police ombudsman to takes time, decisive and clear measures encourage local accountability (Groenewald to address failings can go a long way to and von Tangen 2002). restoring confi dence and signaling intent.

BOX 6.7 Inclusion for Security Reform: Burundi, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste

Inclusion has proven indispensable to is noteworthy for the level of broad achieving lasting security sector reform, acceptance they achieved. This appears including with regard to establishing due to the inclusive and integrated trust, as a critical ingredient for approach to reform. Burundian military prevention. Inclusive approaches focus reforms, with international support, set on transparency, view such reform as a out to be inclusive in two main ways: public policy issue, and involve the full ﬁ rst, in addition to operational capability, spectrum of social actors. reforms explicitly considered governance Burundi. Reforms began with across multiple areas of government, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation prioritized political dialogue, and gradually Agreement in 2000, which set the included civil society and the experiences course for the country’s emergence from of neighboring countries; second, the 12 years of devastating civil war. After Arusha Agreement stipulated that no a long legacy of military domination of more than 50 percent of the armed politics, the military itself was interested forces could be drawn from any one in professionalizing and rebuilding its ethnic group and that membership was reputation. Although still facing serious open to all Burundian citizens, including political and practical challenges, the rebel factions. Along with a gradual relative success of the military reforms approach to building trust, educating

(Box continued next page)

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conﬂ ict 209 BOX 6.7 Inclusion for Security Reform: Burundi, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste (continued)

citizens, and increasing local ownership Kosovo-Albanians who had not shown of the process, the reforms have been any confi dence in police previously. Polls a signifi cant part of implementing the in 2009 and 2010 showed the police to Arusha Agreement, which so far, has be the most trusted institution, with low avoided a return to full-scale civil war. levels of corruption and good community Kosovo. The explicit efforts to ensure relationships. multiethnic representation in the newly Timor-Leste. Greater local leadership formed Kosovo police service were and local inclusion were key to critical factors of successful community- implementing security sector reforms level policing in postconfl ict Kosovo. In in Timor-Leste. Over the fi rst decade order to gain the confi dence and trust after independence, the technical and of all ethnic communities and prevent administrative capability of security further confl ict in a deeply divided forces improved with largely imported society, the new police service was processes. The second-generation to have minimum quotas for Kosovo- changes to security reforms put more Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs, as well emphasis on a holistic, locally led as 20 percent female offi cers. Without approach. Once the donors’ footprint this kind of inclusion, it would likely have in the reform process had started to been impossible to extend effective decline, many instrumental reforms policing to all areas of the country. were brought about, increasing public Through training, different ethnic groups trust in the state security and justice were obliged to interact, motivated at institutions. National actors became least by the need to keep their new job. more assertive in leading the reform While achieving a relative ethnic balance process, leveraging civil society, and was diffi cult and took time, by 2005 the engaging both formal and informal share of women in the police force (16 security providers. These inclusive percent) exceeded that of most European steps “fostered slower, but deeper, forces (around 10 percent). Over time, more multifaceted, and therefore more levels of comfort and even comradery sustainable societal, political, and grew in a way that outpaced those in cultural transformations concerning the wider communities, despite ongoing the role of security sector institutions political divisions. International support in Timorese society.” Instituting for development of the police service community policing, devolving confl ict from the UN Interim Administration resolution to communities where Mission in Kosovo and the Organization appropriate, and creating interlinkages for Security and Cooperation in Europe, between formal and informal institutions in particular, was crucial. It provided not all sought to improve inclusion. Public only funding but also impartial expertise, confi dence and trust in the security and which enabled depoliticization of the justice institutions improved, along with police service. By 2008, the police the perception of legitimacy of security service was almost entirely locally institutions, which was previously a key led. Community confi dence in the challenge and a key driver of confl ict in police grew signifi cantly, especially for Timor-Leste.

Sources: Ball 2014; DCAF 2017; Dewhurst and Greising 2017; Greene, Friedman, and Bennett 2012; Heinemann-Grüder and Grebenschikov 2006; Stodiek 2006.

Allegations of political partisanship and part of the 2010 constitution (Mogaka human rights violations, including rape and 2017). The reforms aimed to make the secu- excessive use of force, following Kenya’s rity institutions politically impartial and postelection violence in 2007–08 provided establish oversight over various security the impetus for security sector reform as institutions, with the goal of restoring

210 Pathways for Peace popular trust in these institutions. limited in their reach if not embedded in a Increasing the visibility and transparency of regional or national framework. Similarly, the police through joint action and dialogue national policies and strategies that do not with communities can help to build trust connect to local initiatives will struggle to and signal a change in direction while gain traction on the ground (Giessmann, reforms are implemented, as in Jamaica by Galvanek, and Seifert 2017). way of innovative community-policing The process of establishing these inter- approaches (DCAF 2017). The bottom-up linkages is often referred to as building approaches adopted in the Kyrgyz Republic, “infrastructures for peace,” defi ned as the Timor-Leste, and Uganda are more likely to organizational elements and linkages that produce direct and visible results in regard form domestic “mechanisms of coopera- to creating inclusiveness, legitimacy, and tion among all relevant stakeholders in responsiveness in security and justice provi- peacebuilding by promoting cooperative sion (DCAF 2017). problem solving to confl icts and institu- Gender inclusion—through increasing tionalizing the response mechanisms to the number of women in the security confl icts in order to transform them” (van forces—has boosted community trust and Tongeren 2001, 400; Giessmann 2016). reduced both the misconduct of police Strengthening these infrastructures has and the use of excessive force to deal meant aligning successful local initiatives with emerging threats (DCAF 2017). with national strategies, ensuring that Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, where resources fl ow effectively, and enhancing women have traditionally played a core role coordination (box 6.8). in confl ict resolution, has been especially Ghana’s comprehensive infrastructure effective in integrating women into its polic- for peace has succeeded in managing ten- ing structure (DCAF 2017). Nicaragua, too, sions and mitigating confl ict risks, espe- has used a multifaceted approach, includ- cially around elections, and has inspired ing strong political commitment, revised neighboring countries to follow suit (Hopp- recruitment procedures, training, and dedi- Nishanka 2012; box 6.9). The infrastructure cated women’s police stations, to attain a includes a mediation, consensus-building, 26 percent female police staffi ng rate (DCAF and advocacy role for the National Peace 2017). This represents one of the highest Council, with activities organized at proportions of female offi cers in the world national, regional, and district levels; a role and has contributed directly to Nicaragua for the judiciary; a role for the National having one of the lowest homicide rates in Security Council; a traditional authority the region (DCAF 2017). and alternative justice role for the National House of Chiefs; a watchdog and advocacy Establishing Forums for role for civil society; oversight by the legis- Peaceful Confl ict Resolution lature and independent national human rights body; and a role for the Electoral In the more successful cases, reforming Commission. The national government also institutions to foster incentives for peace has hosts a Peacebuilding Support Unit within transcended a focus on national institutions the Ministry of the Interior to coordinate and peace processes to focus on strengthen- preventive efforts by all actors across the ing coordination across and building links country. Electoral confl ict and violence also between the myriad bodies that bear some provided Kenya with the impetus to trans- responsibility for peacebuilding. A key les- form its national confl ict prevention and son has been that, while national reforms management architecture (Mogaka 2017). play an important role, they are insuffi cient It has used district peace committees as the in themselves to support sustained peace. basis for a uniform national peace structure Local-level mechanisms offer a unique van- and has worked to build a multistakeholder tage point and cultural relevance for approach (Mogaka 2017). addressing confl ict early on, while being Niger provides another example of contextually appropriate. However, they are building effective infrastructures for peace

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conﬂ ict 211 BOX 6.8 Infrastructures for Peace: Developing and Sustaining National Capacity

The concept of infrastructures for peace focus on reducing violence, promoting (I4P) encompasses the long-term, dialogue, guiding problem-solving multilevel mechanisms and institutional activities, encouraging community structures for collaboration between building, and working toward stakeholders, including the state, civil reconciliation. They typically capitalize society, and the private sector, to prevent on the skills of agents of change as and resolve violent confl ict. There is no mediators to bridge social, political, and single ready-made model for I4P, and economic divides. Peace committees each country has to tailor it to its historical, are found at the national, regional, institutional, and structural conditions. The and local levels. They often include concept was originally formulated in the representatives of government, civil 1980s by Lederach (1997), based on his society, and political or traditional experiences with local and national peace leaders and can be fully or partially processes and the use of commissions in integrated into the structures of the peace negotiations. state. I4Ps can only be put in place through Peace secretariats assist parties nationally owned and driven processes, in negotiations by advancing and but they are enhanced through global implementing the peace process. experience in building peace architectures They fulfi ll their roles during peace to fi t local needs. At different stages, negotiations by assisting in the creation they can also serve as an exit strategy for of more permanent I4P entities. In peacekeeping and political missions as particular, they coordinate with other well as development actors. They offer institutions, create linkages between an assurance to national actors of the “tracks,” and streamline peacebuilding persistence of national institutions and approaches. constituencies that work for sustainable National peacebuilding forums peace. National I4P can include various are multistakeholder platforms for elements, including peace committees, consultation and collaboration. They peace secretariats, and national are based on inclusive and interactive peacebuilding forums. relationships and networks that establish Peace committees bring together spaces for collective action and systemic national and local institutions and engagement.

Sources: EU and UNDP 2014; Giessmann 2016; Lederach 1997.

BOX 6.9 Peace Committees and Early Warning Mechanisms: Kenya, Indonesia, and Ghana

Kenya has a history of bottom-up included establishing Al-Fatah leaders peacebuilding by local community and creating the Al-Fatah Declaration, structures. In the early 1990s the which became the basis for resolving Women for Peace Committee was future community conﬂ icts. Local formed in response to an upsurge in government recognized the value added communal conﬂ ict in what was then the by local actors and encouraged the Wajir District. Women worked across formation of district peace committees, clans to mobilize youth and elders to which integrated local peacebuilders into work toward peace. Their efforts district development and security

(Box continued next page)

212 Pathways for Peace BOX 6.9 Peace Committees and Early Warning Mechanisms: Kenya, Indonesia, and Ghana (continued) committees. This marked a milestone for resources, develop regional development introducing multistakeholder approaches plans, and enhance early mediation to confl ict prevention in Kenya. In the efforts in local confl ict. Indonesia’s early 2000s, the government-established police, concerned about increasing National Steering Committee on terrorist activity on Indonesian soil, Peacebuilding and Confl ict Management worked to improve surveillance capacity and a confl ict early warning and response (for example, in Central Sulawesi after mechanism also became important the peace agreement, where several platforms for confl ict prevention. The terror networks participated in anti- latter, however, initially focused narrowly Christian violence). on cross-border confl ict in the Karamoja Ghana’s comprehensive institutional and Somali clusters. This focus later setup has been instrumental in expanded to national coverage of more preventing violence. The architecture than just cross-border pastoralist confl ict. combines regional-, national-, and The National Council of Churches in local-level institutions with multiple Kenya has offered critical support to dimensions of government, civil society, interethnic and interfaith dialogue at local and dialogue mechanisms. The Northern and national levels, including Regional Peace Advisory Council mechanisms such as study tours to learn was set up in 2004, followed by the from the experience of ethnic violence in National Peace Council, 10 regional Rwanda. Civil society organizations and peace councils, and district advisory nongovernmental organizations played a councils. These mechanisms have prominent role prior to the 2013 election featured prominently in preventing and by promoting peace through various addressing violence, including around the activities. Initiatives include their 2012 elections. Traditional and religious participation in the Uwiano platform—a organizations play an important role as multistakeholder platform that brought nonstate mechanisms in prevention together government institutions, civil of violent confl ict. Chiefs or Queen society, and development actors—ahead mothers, the Earth priest, clan heads, of the 2010 constitution to prevent family heads, and religious leaders political violence similar to what occurred are key stakeholders in the prevention during the 2005 referendum. process. Religious leaders are especially Indonesia also established programs important in the northern savannah to monitor, prepare for, and respond to zone, where interethnic confl icts appear violence that integrated civilian, state, endemic. Early warning systems exist, and international mechanisms. The with support from international actors. Aceh Monitoring Mission, composed The National and Regional Peace Council of civilians, reported on violations of set up the National and Regional Election the memorandum of understanding Early Warning System in all regional between the Free Aceh Movement and capitals, along with response strategies the government. Aceh confl ict monitoring to contain potential threats. The Media updates, provided by the World Bank, Foundation for West Africa also monitors tracked violent incidents across the campaign language on the radio during province through local media reports. The election time to keep track of hate National Violence Monitoring System, speech and indecent campaign language. developed from the work of the World Military deployment appears to be Bank and the National Planning Agency, used widely and effectively for confl ict collected data on postconfl ict violence prevention. Security personnel have been in affected regions. These data were sent to volatile areas to mitigate tensions, used to inform the future allocation of such as in the Yendi confl ict.

Sources: Bob-Milliar 2017; Jaffrey 2017; Mogaka 2017.

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 213 (Pérouse de Montclos 2017). The Haute Comparative analysis suggests that local Autorité à La Consolidation de la Paix, led peace committees helped to lower the risk of by a Tuareg since it was launched in 2011, violence overall and, in particular, to reduce has been successful in managing relations the risk that localized insecurity could with the various communities in the north escalate.15 Local-level structures often have of the country (box 6.5). The HACP is one the most immediate and pressing incen- of the reasons the country has been more tives to maintain peace and work toward effective in managing confl icts with the prevention. Local peace committees can Tuareg populations in the north than with build on local incentives, capacity, and rela- Boko Haram in the south (Pérouse de tionships. They provide “an alternative insti- Montclos 2017). tutional framework for mediating local Civil society, religious bodies, and pri- disputes, responding to crises, harnessing vate sector actors can maximize their con- a range of local capacities through peace- tributions by plugging into broader building networks” (Sisk 2017), mapping networks. The Christian Council of Lesotho resources and issues, and linking local and has played the role of mediator and international contexts. For such committees, civil locutor between confl icting parties in the society and the private sector have proven country for the last few decades (Giessmann, indispensable as interlocuters and mediators, Galvanek, and Seifert 2017). Due to its particularly in the presence of a high degree success in mediating all election-related of political corruption, organized crime, and processes since the end of military rule in dysfunctional state institutions. 1993, assisting with the nonviolent transi- Challenges arise in several areas. Where tion of power in 2012, and helping to build peace committees are well resourced, they mediation and confl ict resolution capacity have become targets of capture by groups across the country, the Christian Council of seeking rents or attempting to advance spe- Lesotho was recognized as de facto media- cifi c interests, which may not be in the tor-in-chief by both Lesotho’s state authori- interests of broader peace (Sisk 2017). In ties and the Electoral Commission in other cases, peace committees have suffered 2009. Other infl uential actors have also from weak capacity, unclear mandates, and recognized its role, including the politicization. Finally, peace committees Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental can be seriously challenged if they result in Organizations as well as international a parallel structure to the formal confl ict partners and regional organizations resolution mechanisms. For example, fol- (Giessmann, Galvanek, and Seifert 2017). lowing the cessation of confl ict in Nepal, The Peace Messengers program in the the minister of peace and reconstruction— Kyrgyz Republic between 2010 and 2015 with support from the Nepal Peace Trust created teams of peace mediators drawn Fund—established local peace committees from local communities (Giessmann, in almost all of the country’s 75 districts to Galvanek, and Seifert 2017). The teams help to maintain peace at the local level. were made up of local decision makers, Although a few of these have had some community elders, religious leaders, infor- success at inclusive peacebuilding, von mal neighborhood leaders, women’s com- Einsiedel and Salih (2017) argue that it mittees, head teachers, and others. Their would have been more effective to promote prevention activities helped to keep local mediation activities within the established disputes from escalating and protected district- and local-level development com- local mediation processes from external mittees rather than attempting to build a pressures. However, the program failed to parallel structure. create self-sustaining capacity for confl ict prevention, in part because the external Investing in Structural funding on which it was reliant dried up before it was fi rmly anchored into local Factors structures (Giessmann, Galvanek, and Tackling the structural challenges to achiev- Seifert 2017). ing sustained peace is the fi nal critical area

214 Pathways for Peace for domestic action to be examined in this peace agreements in a bid to address social chapter. Structural factors comprise the and economic issues: foundational elements of society and shape the overall environment in which actors • Kenya recognized the destabilizing make decisions. These factors usually potential of regional imbalances and change slowly and require time, patience, in Vision 2030, its national long-term and a long-term vision. However, it is possi- development blueprint, committed to ble to tackle these factors and to address the invest in marginalized areas to unlock risks they present through targeted action. their development potential, while Economic reforms, redistributive policies, contributing to spatial and national and infrastructure investments, for exam- inclusion (Mogaka 2017). The 2010 ple, all can foster structural changes that constitution also made provisions for an reduce the risk of violence. equalization fund to improve the deliv- Chapters 3 and 4 discuss some of the ery of basic services to marginalized structural factors that feature prominently areas in a bid to bring service provision in many confl icts, in particular, patterns of up to the levels experienced across the socioeconomic exclusion and inequality rest of the country. across groups, while chapter 5 examines the • Indonesia’s 2015–19 National Mid-Term arenas of contestation in which these griev- Development Plan looks to address ances accumulate. This section highlights political, economic, security, and envi- the efforts of countries to manage struc- ronmental dimensions through national, tural factors by addressing social and eco- regional, and sectoral responses (Jaffrey nomic grievances via reforms related to 2017). Among other objectives, the access to and redistribution of land, by plan aims to reduce inequality, develop increasing equity in the distribution of peripheral areas, act against corrup- resource revenues, and by engaging in tion, improve security, implement good efforts to heal social divisions. governance, address law and justice, and advance social reform (Steven and Addressing Economic and Sucuoglu 2017). • Social Grievances Niger’s Renaissance project under President Issoufou attempts to reduce Perceptions of exclusion present a major poverty across the nation as part of a risk for violent confl ict, as discussed in strategy to address social and economic chapters 4 and 5. By focusing on the grievances that could translate into con- arenas of contestation—power and gover- fl ict risks (Pérouse de Montclos 2017). nance, access to land and natural resources, delivery of services, and justice and Redistribution is always a contentious security—countries have taken various process because it necessarily creates win- measures to address grievances by foster- ners and losers. In the country cases exam- ing greater access and redistributing ined for this study, the process by which benefi ts. In some cases, these measures resources and access were redefi ned made a have come about because of a peace agree- critical difference in determining the credi- ment or a new constitution and have been bility, fairness, and sustainability of the incorporated into national development reforms. These complex mechanisms pose plans. The 2030 Agenda offers an import- major challenges for countries with limited ant framework for addressing many griev- fi scal space and limited capacities. They also ances and building consensus around require political will from the top level the ways to ameliorate them. In other down to the local level. Some countries, cases, they have involved stand-alone, tar- such as Indonesia, found ways to mobilize geted efforts to address the source of a political will while the reforms were imple- grievance. mented and eventually even garnered sup- Many countries have negotiated broad- port for reforms from former opponents based development plans that transcend (Jaffrey 2017).

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 215 Specifi cally, three overarching lessons 2014 (World Bank 2006). The program have emerged from successful cases: fi rst, under the District Assembly Common establishing a formula for redistribution Fund16 weig hs various factors, includ- that is viewed as fair by different groups; ing “need,” and accounts for differences second, creating mechanisms to ensure that in the quality of public services across funds are distributed as the state claims they districts. Between 2001 and 2007, more will be; and third, ensuring that the funds funds from the central government or services are delivered in an inclusive made their way to less prosperous dis- manner and viewed by the local population tricts than to those that were econom- as appropriate. The 2030 Agenda offers ically more robust. In all regions, an entry points to apply all three lessons. increase in external revenue from the Leaders are often under intense pressure government boosted the delivery of to deliver tangible results in the immediate basic services. term as they seek to infl uence incentives for peace. In some countries, redistribution policies have taken the form of integrating • Following the confl ict in Aceh, the neglected parts of urban centers into the Indonesian central government was broader city, as highlighted also in SDG aware of the importance of signaling target 11.1. In these cases, increasing the its commitment to the peace process in presence and responsiveness of the state Aceh (Jaffrey 2017). It prioritized highly via the rollout of basic services is critical. visible projects that would serve the During the 1990s in Medellín, Colombia, dual goal of neutralizing spoilers, while a growing drug trade overtook many improving the image of the central slum areas that were economically and government. It provided reintegration socially disconnected from the rest of the assistance to former combatants in an city (Steven and Sucuoglu 2017). A decade effort to stop them from sabotaging the later, “social urbanism” had transformed agreement and assistance to civilians in Medellín from one of the most violent cit- order to boost popular support for the ies in the world to one of the most pro- peace process. To avoid the impression gressive (Turok 2014). City institutions that the Acehnese were being compen- joined forces with other spheres of govern- sated for past abuses, much of the civil- ment to push a development approach ian aid was disbursed in the form of based on a commitment to social inclusion disaster recovery efforts (Jaffrey 2017). and equity. The city government invested A particular challenge in this case was heavily in participatory processes to that postdisaster aid did not fully refl ect increase citizen voice in urban planning the postconfl ict realities, as the funds and in building infrastructure to connect provided were inadequate to address slum areas with the broader city, including damage and losses caused by the confl ict a cable car system, public parks, and librar- (MSR 2009). ies designed by world-renowned archi- • Similarly, Ghana focused funds for the tects. Expansion of basic services, including north on the critical areas of improving a community policing initiative, and services, health, education, and some greater investment in schools and health economic infrastructure to create gov- services were credited with helping to ernment visibility and legitimacy at bring down levels of violence and improv- the local level (Steven and Sucuoglu ing public perceptions of the state (Steven 2017). The comprehensive program of and Sucuoglu 2017). Economic develop- subnational investment, which helped ment was also propelled by catalytic proj- the country to bridge a north-south ects to rehabilitate former industrial sites divide and bolstered political inclusion and rundown buildings, generating jobs in at the local level, also saw the transfer the city (Turok 2014). of resources from the central to the Broadening access and improving local government between 1995 and quality of education have been another

216 Pathways for Peace important element addressing grievances Resolving Land- and Resource- around exclusion. The positive impacts Related Grievances seem to stem less from efforts to address a specifi c grievance (lack of education) than Grievances relating to perceptions of from indirect effects (the role of educa- unfairness and exclusion in access to and tion in improving lives generally). Support ownership of land can heighten the risks of for education signals government violent confl ict. Left unaddressed, they rep- intent, providing confl ict resolution resent a major source of risk, particularly tools, addressing the social acceptability where grievances have deep historical of violence, and strengthening a sense of antecedents, as seen in chapter 5. The cen- confi dence in the future. The evidence is trality of addressing structural issues related particularly strong for the link between to land distribution and sustained preven- government expenditure on education tion is underscored in the example of and availability of secondary education Colombia, where the protection, formaliza- (particularly for young men) and peace tion, and restitution of land to displaced (Nygård et al. 2017). Ghana and Northern people have been a core plank of Colombia’s Ireland both focused on education as a ongoing peace process (World Bank 2016d; means of furthering social inclusion box 6.10). Country efforts to address the (Bob-Milliar 2017; Walsh 2017). sources of these grievances have focused

BOX 6.10 Land Protection for the Forcibly Displaced in Colombia

Colombia’s long-running civil war displaced rural dwellers peaked in 2002 between government forces, including at 447,429. In all, the confl ict displaced paramilitary forces, and insurgent between 3 million and 5 million people. guerrilla groups caused large-scale In 1997, the government passed displacement of the population. Land, the fi rst comprehensive law (Law territory, and the lack of institutional 387) with measures to prevent forced security for land tenure in rural areas displacement and to address challenges were at the heart of the confl ict. Disputes faced by its internally displaced citizens, over land between tenants and large- including loss of productive assets. scale farmers began as early as the The Victims and Land Restitution Law 1920s and were core to the long-running of 2011 created the formal framework civil war. Cycles of violence continued, for the restitution of land to internally fueled, in part, by unresolved land displaced persons. Between 2002 and questions and calls for land reform, and 2014, donors supported and funded were accompanied by massive land a three-part program to promote the seizures and the forced displacement of protection, formalization, and restitution roughly 2 million small-scale farmers in order to support internally displaced from rural land to urban areas (World persons and the peacebuilding process. Bank 2016d). Tensions brought about by Through systematic data collection structural inequality, political exclusion, and research to address specifi c land and forced dispossession of the land by tenure issues, the project built the large landowners erupted into war in the knowledge base and policy support for 1960s, spurred by the leftist ideology the Restitution Law. This law, and the espoused by the Revolutionary Armed land restitution process it promotes, Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the despite having been associated with National Liberation Army. The confl ict some violence against potential escalated in the 1980s, as armed groups returnees, was a key plank of the 2016 found new sources of fi nancing in the peace deal between the government illegal drug trade. The number of and FARC.

Source: Amnesty International 2014; Observatorio de Tierras 2017; World Bank 2015a, 2016d.

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 217 largely on land reform to promote redistri- that had been commonplace previously bution of and expand access to land. For (Mogaka 2017). instance, in Uganda, the Commission for Some countries have addressed the risk the Return of Properties to Departed Asians of extractives-related violent confl ict by legally affi rmed specifi c property rights, enhancing transparency in revenue sharing thus administering justice and serving the and dealing with perceptions of equity, as national interest of reestablishing interna- well as by devolving greater control of reve- tional recognition and legitimacy of gov- nues to producing regions. Several SDGs ernment (Colletta and Oppenheim 2017). offer entry points in this regard. Nigeria, for Some countries have had success in example, has instituted a formula for dis- addressing the risks of violent confl ict tributing the proceeds from extractives, in a through schemes to redistribute underuti- bid to manage tensions related to percep- lized land, as in Malawi, where the inheri- tions of unfairness in the allocation of tance of colonial estates by a small number resource revenues. Although 95 percent of of large landowners created a situation of export earnings and 65 percent of govern- frequent land encroachments by a large ment revenues in Nigeria came from the oil number of land-poor citizens (Chinigò and gas sector in 2010, only 9 out of 36 2016; Machira 2009). In 2004, amid mount- states produced oil (Aguilar, Caspary, and ing social tensions, the government Seiler 2011). The northern states have sup- launched a community-based rural land ported the principle of land mass and pop- development project, aimed to redistribute ulation as criteria for resource distribution, underutilized portions of large estates while the oil-producing states have argued among the landless poor, around Blantyre, in favor of a derivative principle by which in southern Malawi. The project aimed to they receive larger allocations. Since 1993, transfer land to about 15,000 poor, rural 13 percent of oil proceeds have been dis- families through subsidized transactions, tributed among the 25 percent of states that while also addressing titling and registra- produce oil (Eze 2013). tion of the new holdings. In total, the gov- As discussed in more detail in chapter 5, ernment successfully reallocated 27,988 the decentralization of natural resource rev- hectares to 12,656 families and helped to enues and decision making has been seen as ease tensions among the landless poor in a way to counter grievances related to that region, despite coming up against some resources at the local level. This approach resistance from large landowners (Chinigò has had mixed success, however, as in 2016; Machira 2009). Ghana, where the Mineral Development In Kenya, where contestations over land Fund facilitated local-level revenue sharing use and management have also formed the but introduced new forms of inequality and basis of much confl ict, land is likened to reinforced elite capture (Standing and the “fulcrum around which everything Hilson 2013). revolves” (Kanyinga 2005). To address this, the 2010 constitution provided for detailed Confronting the Past and policies and the creation of institutions Building Social Cohesion designed to improve the management of land (Mogaka 2017). The National Land Social relationships form the cornerstone of Commission was subsequently established a society’s ability to manage confl ict con- to manage public land on behalf of the two structively. Resilient relationships in which levels of government, while the reforms also people and groups have an incentive to sought to address the grievances of com- cooperate, or at least coexist, without vio- munities and reduce the power of the exec- lence, form the basis for effective institu- utive over land management. Although the tions and pathways toward sustainable process has faced numerous challenges, and peace (Marc et al. 2012). Violent confl ict implementation remains incomplete, prog- deepens social divisions and erodes trust ress in land reforms has helped alleviate between social groups and the state. While some of the risks related to land allocation physical infrastructure can be rebuilt over a

218 Pathways for Peace period of months or years, repairing the postconfl ict contexts in order to provide damage to the social fabric can take genera- recourse for victims of crimes and pro- tions. Rebuilding trust and cohesion is mote reconciliation. While evidence on the therefore a critical element in preventing value of transitional justice in preventing further cycles of violence. recurrence of violence is quite limited In the case studies prepared for this overall (Payne et al. 2017), the country study, most countries have found it neces- experiences examined for this study sug- sary to take some measures toward reckon- gest that such measures can help to increase ing with the events of the past to build the confi dence in a new government and rule- trust to move forward. These efforts have of-law institutions and to rebuild civic taken a variety of forms. Formal truth com- trust (World Bank 2011). missions in Sierra Leone and Tunisia There are, however, cases where the brought people together to help close and absence of justice provisions for confl ict-era heal the divides between groups, lessening crimes has helped to bring warring parties the threat of a relapse into violence (Ainley, together in more informal forums. In Friedman, and Mahony 2016). In the Indonesia, the absence of justice provisions Central African Republic, a hybrid nation- in peace agreements helped to bring com- al-international special criminal court is batants to the negotiating table in the short being set up to address grievances regarding term (Jaffrey 2017). In the long term, how- impunity (Lombard 2017). However, it ever, the absence of acknowledgement and faces multiple challenges, not least being punishment for past abuses has remained decisions regarding whom to prosecute, an obstacle to the full reconciliation of reli- how to rebuild trust, and how to avoid the gious communities in Maluku and Sulawesi. perception that its choices are politically Lack of trust and the memory of ills done motivated. have led to a stratifi cation of residential In some cases, addressing past abuse has areas and hampered interaction of the two been dealt with through less judicial pro- communities (Jaffrey 2017). cesses, including offi cial apologies and truth-telling processes, as in Sierra Leone (Ainley, Friedman, and Mahony 2016; ICTJ Conclusion 2016) or recognition of suffering and mate- This chapter draws out some common ele- rial reparations for victims, as in Argentina ments of effective prevention based on an (De Greiff 2008). Tunisia’s Truth and analysis of the country cases commissioned Dignity Commission established a record for this study. Drawing on the framework on Ben Ali–era abuses, including on sys- for the study, it describes the experience tematic corruption, with parallel intent for of national actors in three key areas: shap- national criminal prosecutions (ICTJ 2016). ing the incentives of actors for peace, These processes have helped to prevent vio- reforming institutions to foster inclusion, lent outbreaks similar to other Arab Spring and addressing structural factors that feed political changes. In the Philippines, the into grievances. The chapter also high- recognition of historical injustice over more lights the possible role of the 2030 Agenda. than 200 years, including state expropria- From these experiences, common pat- tion of land of the Bangsamoro community terns emerge, even if specifi c prescriptions in Mindanao, was part of the comprehen- do not. sive peace agreement in 2014 and helped to A central dilemma for all countries alleviate social and political polarization examined is that the incentives for violence (TJRC 2016). The work of the Truth, Justice, are often certain and specifi c to an individ- and Reconciliation Commission was car- ual or group, while the incentives for peace ried out subsequent to signing of the peace are often uncertain and diffuse (World agreement, in spite of the fact that imple- Bank 2017b). To shape incentives and mentation of the agreement had stalled. reduce or share risk across a broader range As discussed in chapter 5, transitional of actors, the more successful cases mobi- justice mechanisms are often adopted in lized a range of domestic actors, bringing in

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 219 the comparative advantages of civil society, diplomatic action put in place long before a the faith community, and the private sector political process was initiated or formalized. to manage tensions and infl uence incentives In some cases, political settlements were toward peace. Governments introduced applied only to address specifi c aspects of both long-term reforms or investments tar- confl ict, while underlying causes were targeting structural factors, at the same time geted more comprehensively through gov- implementing immediate initiatives that ernment action. In others, political buttressed confi dence in commitments to settlements were not used as part of the pre- more inclusive processes. vention process at all. Nevertheless, before or after violence, In many cases, states sought interna- most of the countries examined that have tional support in these endeavors. The next found pathways to sustaining peace have chapter turns to the role of international eventually tackled the messy and contested actors in supporting domestic processes. process of institutional reform to address the risk of violence. Expanding access to the arenas of contestation has been a key part of Notes this effort, in order to increase representa- 1. These commonalities are derived from the tion and alleviate grievances related to country case studies and research commis- exclusion. Often, the transition moment sioned for this study as well as broader rel- that led to sustainable peace was based on a evant literature. The case studies cover shift away from security-led responses and Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African toward broader approaches that mobilized Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Arab Republic a range of sectors. of Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, In many cases, governments planned Jordan, Kenya, the Kyrgyz Republic, socioeconomic development, undertook Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Northern reforms, launched security operations, and Ireland, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and managed political life, even while violence Tunisia. was ongoing. In these experiences, the 2. Here, “transformational” refl ects the defi ni- greatest challenge lay not so much in access- tion from World Bank (2016c), which ing knowledge, but in the contentious pro- defi nes transformational engagements as cess of identifying and prioritizing risks. “interventions or series of interventions that Confl ict did not bring a windfall of support deep, systemic, and sustainable resources: a diversion of development change with the potential for large-scale investments into peaceful areas and a move impact in an area of a major development to equip and support police, military, or challenge.” security operations strained national bud- 3. Since 2009 (Pittsburgh Communiqué), for gets. Rather than creating the space for the instance, the G-20 has called on concerned more forward-looking decision making countries to rationalize and phase out ineffi - that is needed to establish the institutional cient fossil-fuel subsidies, while compensat- or structural conditions for sustainable ing the poor and vulnerable and ensuring peace, violence narrowed the options. For their access to energy. This commitment was this reason, preventive action was at times reaffi rmed in the 2010 summit in Busan, the contrary to popular demands for visible 2012 meeting in Los Cabos, and the 2013 and tangible security measures over lon- summit in Saint Petersburg. ger-term, more complex responses that 4. According to OECD (2012), “An import- could address the causes of violence. ant condition for subsidy reform is the In these processes, formal political credibility of the government’s commit- settlements—or at least durable settlements— ment to compensate vulnerable groups … were important, but also rare events on the and to use the freed public funds in a ben- pathway for peace. Approaches to prevent- eficial way.” ing violence or resolving violent confl ict, 5. Once a social protection policy is intro- once started, often resulted from govern- duced, it is hard to reverse, regardless of any ment policies of investment, security, and changes in the underlying subsidy policy,

220 Pathways for Peace because such reversals entail political risks: 14. Serious challenges to the integration the recipients now feel entitled to benefi ts. efforts remain, however, with continuing 6. Recent analysis refl ecting best practices in perceptions of unfairness spurring the for- subsidy reform calls for the use of social mation of some splinter groups. safety nets as a necessary element. 15. For a comparative analysis of peace commit- 7. Clements et al. (2013) point to Indonesia as tees, see Odendaal (2010, 2013); van an example of successful and thoughtful Tongeren (2013). planning of the use of social safety nets to 16. External revenue comprises (1) the District overcome political economy and social Assembly Common Fund, (2) transfers from concerns. the central government to support the sala- 8. At the community level, civic organizations ries of local government offi cials, (3) donor that cut across ethnic lines had a fundamen- funds, (4) the Heavily Indebted Poor tal role in keeping a community stable and Countries fund, (5) school feeding, and (6) peaceful versus those communities that did the District Development Facility. The not have such structures. District Assembly Common Fund is the 9. In 2000, Serbia was known as Serbia and main vehicle for intergovernmental Montenegro. transfers. 10. According to UNESCO (2008), “Education for non-violence and peace includes train- References ing, skills, and information directed Aguilar, J., G. Caspary, and V. Seiler. 2011. towards cultivating a culture of peace “Implementing EITI at the Subnational based on human rights principles … The Level.” Extractive Industries for Development learning objectives of peace education may Series 23, World Bank, Washington, DC. include an understanding of the manifes- Ahram, A. I. 2011. “Learning to Live with tations of violence, the development of Militias: Toward a Critical Policy on State capacities to respond constructively to that Frailty.” Journal of Intervention and violence, and specifi c knowledge of alter- Statebuilding 5 (2): 175–88. natives to violence. Two fundamental con- Ainley, K., R. Friedman, and C. Mahony, eds. cepts of peace education are respect and 2016. Evaluating Transitional Justice: skills. Respect refers to the development of Accountability and Peacebuilding in Post- respect for self and for others; skills refer Confl ict Sierra Leone. Berlin: Springer. to specifi c communication, cooperation, Alaga, E. 2010. “Challenges for Women in and behavioral skills used in confl ict Peacebuilding in West Africa.” Policy Brief situations.” 18, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria. 11. Political inclusion here is used broadly to Amnesty International. 2014. “A Land Title Is describe meaningful inclusion of groups or Not Enough: Ensuring Sustainable Land individuals in politically salient dialogue or Restitution in Colombia.” Amnesty processes, whether part of formal gover- International, New York, November. nance institutions or informal processes (see Antil, A., and M. Mokhefi . 2014. “Managing the Call 2012). Sahara Periphery.” Sahara Knowledge 12. Here decentralization refers to territorially Exchange Series, World Bank, Washington, based autonomous political authority and DC. decentralized political systems. Federalism Aslam, G. 2017. “Civic Associations and or decentralization entails regional political Confl ict Prevention: Potential, Challenges autonomy from the capital; it is a combina- and Opportunities—A Review of the tion of self-rule and shared rule that can Literature.” Background paper for the preserve peace by “retain[ing] the territorial United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, integrity of the state while providing some Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to form of self-governance for disaffected Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, groups” (Bakke and Wibbels 2006, 5). Washington, DC. 13. See, for example, http://www.u4.no Austin, J. L., and A. Wennmann. 2017. “Business /publications /corruption-and-decentralisation and the Prevention of Violence in Kenya, -in-afghanistan/. 2007–2013.” Background paper for the

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 221 United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, and Post-Communist Studies 39 (3): Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to 411–29. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Bøås, M., S. S. Eriksen, T. Gade, J. H. S. Lie, and Washington, DC. O. J. Sending. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention and Bakke, K., and E. Wibbels. 2006. “Diversity, Ownership: Limits and Opportunities for Disparity, and Civil Confl ict in Federal External Actors.” Background paper for the States.” World Politics 59 (1): 1–50. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Ball, N. 2014. “Lessons from Burundi’s Security Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Sector Reform Process.” Africa Security Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Brief, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC. Washington, DC. Bob-Milliar, G. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making Bano, M., and H. Kalmbach, eds. 2011. Women, Development Work for the Prevention of Leadership, and Mosques: Changes in Violent Confl icts: Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire Contemporary Islamic Society. Leiden, the Compared.” Case study for the United Netherlands: BRILL. Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Barnes, C. 2005. “Weaving the Web: Civil-Society Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Roles in Working with Confl ict and Building Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Peace.” In People Building Peace II: Successful Washington, DC. Stories of Civil Society, edited by P. van Brahm, E. 2003. “Hurting Stalemate Stage.” In Tongeren, M. Brenk, M. Hellema, and Beyond Intractability, edited by G. Burgess and J. Verhoeven, 7–24. Boulder, CO: Lynne H. Burgess. Boulder, CO: Confl ict Information Rienner. Consortium, University of Colorado. Barron, P., R. Diprose, and M. Woolcock. Brennan, J. 2017. “ESSA: Mapping Opportunities 2006. “Local Confl ict and Community for Civic Education. Education Trends.” Development in Indonesia: Assessing the Education Commission of the States, Impact of the Kecamatan Development Denver, CO. Project.” Indonesian Social Development Brzoska, M. 2006. “Introduction: Criteria for Paper 10, World Bank, Jakarta. Evaluating Post-Confl ict Reconstruction and ———. 2007. “Local Confl ict and Development Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Project in Indonesia: A Part of the Problem Operations.” International Peacekeeping 13 or a Part of the Solution.” Policy Research (1): 1–13. Working Paper 4212, World Bank, Call, C. 2012. Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Washington, DC. Prevention of Civil War Recurrence.Washington, Beath A., F. Christia, and R. Enikolopov. 2015. DC: Georgetown University Press. “The National Solidarity Programme: Carey, K., and W. Harake. 2017. “Macroeconomic Assessing the Effects of Community-Driven Environment and Policies.” Background Development in Afghanistan.” International paper for the United Nations–World Bank Peacekeeping 22 (4): 302–20. Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Bennett, S., and A. D’Onofrio. 2015. Community- Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Driven? Concepts, Clarity, and Choices for World Bank, Washington, DC. CDD in Confl ict-Affected Contexts. Chataway, C. 1998. “Track II Diplomacy: From a International Rescue Committee Report. Track I Perspective.” Negotiation Journal 14 New York: International Rescue Committee. (3): 269–87. Bertrand, J. 2004. Nationalism and Ethnic Chevron Corporation. 2014. “Chevron Increases Confl ict in Indonesia. Cambridge, U.K.: Support for Niger Delta Partnership Initiative.” Cambridge University Press. Press Release, June. Bigsten, A., and K. O. Moene. 1996. “Growth and Chinigò, D. 2016. “Rural Radicalism and Rent Dissipation: The Case of Kenya.” Journal the Historical Land Confl ict in the of African Economies 5 (2): 177–19. Malawian Tea Economy.” Journal of Southern Binnendijk, A. L., and I. Marovic. 2006. “Power African Studies 42 (2): 283–97. and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Clements, B., D. Coady, S. Fabrizio, S. Gupta, Influence State Security Forces in Serbia T. Alleyne, and C. Sdralevich. 2013. Energy (2000) and Ukraine (2004).” Communist Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications.

222 Pathways for Peace Washington, DC: International Monetary Eze, C. 2013. “Nigeria: New Revenue Formula— Fund, September. Niger Delta Demands 50 Percent Derivation.” Colletta, N., and B. Oppenheim. 2017. Daily Trust, October 11. “Subnational Confl ict: Dimensions, Trends, Fall, A. 2017. “Cost-Saving of Women-Led and Options for Prevention.” Background Confl ict Prevention Mechanisms in paper for the United Nations–World Bank Liberia.” Background paper for the United Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to World Bank, Washington, DC. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Dahl, M., S. Gates, and H. M. Nygård. 2017. Washington, DC. “Securing the Peace.” Background paper for Ganson, B. 2017. “Business in the Transition to the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Democracy in South Africa: Historical and Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Contemporary Perspectives.” Peace Research Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Institute Oslo, CDA Collaborative, and Africa World Bank, Washington, DC. Centre for Dispute Settlement. Daly, E., and J. Sarkin. 2007. Reconciliation in Ganson, B., and A. Wennmann. 2012. Divided Societies: Finding Common Ground. “Confronting Risk, Mobilizing Action: A Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Framework for Confl ict Prevention in the Press. Context of Large-Scale Business Investments.” Day, A., and A. Pichler Fong. 2017. “Diplomacy Friedrich-Stiftung, Bonn. and Good Offi ces in the Prevention of Giessmann, H. J. 2016. Embedded Peace. Confl ict.” Background paper for the United Infrastructures for Peace: Approaches and Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Lessons Learned. New York: UNDP, SADC, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to and Berghof Foundation. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Giessmann, H.-J., J. Galvanek, and C. Seifert. Washington, DC. 2017. “Curbing Violence. Development, DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Application, and the Sustaining National Control of Armed Forces). 2017. “The Capacities for Prevention.” Background Contribution and Role of SSR in the paper for the United Nations–World Bank Prevention of Violent Confl ict.” Background Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive paper for the United Nations–World Bank Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive World Bank, Washington, DC. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Gifford, A., A. DeVries, A. Knott, and H. Mant. World Bank, Washington, DC. 2016. Pioneering New Operating Models and Deb, A., S. Donohue, and T. Glaisyer. 2017. “Is Measurement Techniques for Private Sector- Social Media a Threat to Democracy?” Led Development: Assessing Impact in Nigeria’s Omidyar Group. Niger Delta. Washington, DC: Initiative for De Greiff, P., ed. 2008. The Handbook of Global Development. Reparations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goldstein, J., and J. Rotich. 2008. Digitally Dewhurst, S., and L. Greising. 2017. The Gradual Networked Technology in Kenya’s 2007–2008 Emergence of Second Generation Security Post-Election Crisis. Cambridge, MA: Berkman Sector Reform in Timor-Leste. CSG Paper 16, Klein Center for Internet and Society. Centre for Security Governance, Kitchener, Greene, M., J. Friedman, and R. Bennett. 2012. Canada. “Rebuilding the Police in Kosovo: Case Douglas, S. 2014. “This Hut Is Working for Me: Studies.” Foreign Policy, July 18. Liberian Women and Girls Make Peace in Groenewald, H., and M. von Tangen. 2002. Their Communities.” International Feminist “Towards a Better Practice Framework in Journal of Politics 16 (1): 148–55. Security Sector Reform: Broadening the EU (European Union) and UNDP (United Debate.” Occasional SSR Paper 1, Clingendael, Nations Development Programme). 2014. International Alert, and Saferworld, The Hague. “Supporting Insider Mediation: Strengthening Gu, L., V. Kropotov, and F. Yarochkin. 2017. “The Resilience to Confl ict and Turbulence.” Fake News Machine: How Propagandists UNDP, New York. Abuse the Internet and Manipulate the

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 223 Public.” TrendLabs Research Paper, Trend Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Micro, Tokyo. Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Guichaoua, Y., and M. Pellerin. 2017. “Faire la Kanyinga, K. 2005. “Speaking to the Past and the paix et construire l’etat: Les relations entre Present: The Land Question in the Draft pouvoir central et périphéries sahéliennes Constitution of Kenya.” In The Anatomy of au Niger et au Mali.” Study 51, Institute de Bomas: Selected Analysis of the 2004 Draft Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire Constitution of Kenya, edited by K. Kindiki (IRSEM), Paris. http://www.defense.gouv.fr and O. Ambani. Nairobi: Claripress Ltd. /content/download/509288/8603319/file Karatnycky, A., and P. Ackerman. 2005. How / Etude_IRSEM_n51_2017.pdf. Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Hanlon, Q. 2012. Security Sector Reform in Durable Democracy. A research study by Tunisia. Special Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House. United States Institute for Peace. Kasinof, L. 2012. “Yemen Legislators Approve Heinemann-Grüder, A., and I. Grebenschikov. Immunity for the President. Middle East.” 2006. “Security Governance by Internationals: New York Times, January 22. The Case of Kosovo.” International King, E., and C. Samii. 2014. “Fast Track Peacekeeping 13 (1): 43–59. Institution Building in Confl ict Affected Hope, K. R. 2014. “Kenya’s Corruption Problem: Countries? Insights from Recent Field Causes and Consequences.” Commonwealth Experiments.” World Development 64 and Comparative Politics 52 (4): 493–512. (December): 740–54. Hopp-Nishanka, U. 2012. Giving Peace an Lanz, D. 2011. “Who Gets a Seat at the Table? Address? Refl ections on the Potential and A Framework for Understanding the Challenges of Creating Peace Infrastructures. Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Berlin: Berghof Foundation. Peace Negotiations.” International Negotiation Hounkpe, M., and O. Bucyana. 2014. “Electoral 16 (2): 275–95. Management.” Administration and Cost of Lederach, J. P. 1997. Building Peace. Washington, Elections Project, IDEA, IFES, and UNDESA, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press. New York. Lindenmayer, E., and J. Kaye. 2009. A Choice for ICG (International Crisis Group). 2013. “Niger: Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Another Weak Link in the Sahel?” Africa Mediation in Kenya. New York: International Report 208, ICG, Brussels. Peace Institute. ———. 2017. “Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Logvinenko, I. 2017. “Confl ict and Violence Counter-Insurgency.” Africa Report 245, ICG, in Kyrgyzstan.” Case study for the United Brussels, February 27. Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, ICTJ (International Center for Transitional Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Justice). 2016. “Revolutionary Truth: Tunisian Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Victims Make History on First Night of Washington, DC. Public Hearings for TDC.” ICTJ, New York. Lombard, L. 2017. “Case Study: The Central Inchauste, G., and D. G. Victor. 2017. African Republic.” Case study for the United The Political Economy of Energy Subsidy Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Reform. Directions in Development— Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Public Sector Governance. Washington, Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, DC: World Bank. Washington, DC. International Alert. 2005. Confl ict-Sensitive Machira, S. 2009. “Pilot Testing a Land Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Redistribution Program in Malawi.” In Industries. London: International Alert. Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward ———. 2006. “Local Business, Local Peace: The Greater Consensus, edited by H. P. Binswanger- Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Mkhize, C. Bourguignon, and R. van den Private Sector.” International Alert, London. Brink, 367–95. Washington, DC: World Bank. Jaffrey, S. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making Marc, A., N. Verjee, and S. Mogaka. 2015. The Development Work for the Prevention of Challenge of Stability and Security in West Violent Confl icts. Case Study: Indonesia.” Africa. Africa Development Forum series. Case study for the United Nations–World Washington, DC: World Bank; Paris: Agence Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Française de Développement.

224 Pathways for Peace Marc, A., A. Willman, G. Aslam, M. Rebosio, and “Inequality and Armed Confl ict: Evidence K. Balasuriya. 2012. Societal Dynamics and and Data.” Background paper for the United Fragility: Engaging Societies in Responding to Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Fragile Situations. New Frontiers of Social Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Mashal, N. 2015. “Afghan Jobs Program Aims to Washington, DC. Stem Exodus of Young.” New York Times, Observatorio de Tierras. 2017. “Killings of Peasant November 18. Leaders Involved in Land Restitution Efforts.” Materu, S. F. 2015. The Post-Election Violence in Observatorio de Tierras, June. Kenya: Domestic and International Legal Odendaal, A. 2010. An Architecture for Building Responses. London: Springer. Peace at the Local Level: A Comparative Study Miklian, J. 2016. “How Businesses Can Be of the Use of Local Peace Forums. New York: Effective Local Peacebuilders: Evidence from UNDP. Colombia.” PRIO Policy Brief, Peace Research ———. 2013. “The Political Legitimacy of Institute Oslo. National Peace Committees.” Journal of Mirahmadi, H., M. Farooq, and W. Ziad. 2012. Peacebuilding and Development 7 (3): 40–53. Pakistan’s Civil Society: Alternative Channels OECD (Organisation for Economic to Countering Violent Extremism. WORDE Co-operation and Development). 2011. Report. Washington, DC: World Organization “Fossil-Fuel Support.” OECD Secretariat for Resource Development and Education. background report for G-20 meeting of Mitchell, D., I. Summerville, and O. Hargie. fi nance ministers, Paris. 2016. “Sport for Peace in Northern Ireland? ———. 2012. “An OECD-Wide Inventory of Civil Society, Change, and Constraint after Support to Fossil-Fuel Production or Use.” the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.” British OECD, Paris. Journal of Politics and International Relations O’Reilly, M., A. Ó Súilleabháin, and T. Paffenholz. 18 (4): 981–96. 2015. Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Mogaka, S. 2017. “Kenya Case Study.” Case study Roles in Peace Processes. New York: for the United Nations–World Bank Flagship International Peace Institute. Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive OSAGI (Offi ce of the Special Adviser to the Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Secretary-General on Gender Issues and World Bank, Washington, DC. Advancement of Women). 2000. “Landmark MSR (Multi-Stakeholder Review of Post-Confl ict Resolution on Women, Peace, and Security. Programming in Aceh). 2009. Identifying the Offi ce of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues Foundations for Sustainable Peace and and Advancement of Women.” OSAGI, UN, Development in Aceh. Washington, DC: World New York. Bank, December. Owuor, V., and S. Wisor. 2014. The Role of Kenya’s Naseem, M. A., A. Arshad-Ayaz, and S. Doyle. Private Sector in Peacebuilding: The Case of 2017. “Social Media as Space for Peace the 2013 Election Cycle. Broomfi eld, CO: One Education: Conceptual Contours and Earth Future Foundation. Evidence from the Muslim World.” Research Paffenholz, T., A. Hirblinger, D. Landau, F. Fritsch, in Comparative and International Education and C. Dijkstra. 2017. “Preventing Violence 12 (1): 95–109. through Inclusion: From Building Political Nilsson, D. 2012. “Anchoring the Peace: Civil Momentum to Sustaining Peace.” Background Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable paper for the United Nations–World Bank Peace.” International Interactions 38 (2): 258. Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Norwegiean Nobel Committee. 2015. “The Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Nobel Peace Prize for 2015.” Press Release. World Bank, Washington, DC. Nyathi, N., and K. Rajuili. 2017. “South Africa and Payne, L., A. Reiter, C. Mahony, and L. Bernal- Kenya’s Legislative Measures to Prevent Hate Bermudez. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention and Speech.” Confl ict Trends 2017/2, ACCORD, Guarantees of Non-Recurrence.” Background Mt. Edgecomb, South Africa, July 12. paper for the United Nations–World Bank Nygård, H. M., K. Baghat, G. Barrett, K. Dupuy, Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive S. Gates, S. Hillesund, S. A. Rustad, Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, H. Strand, H. K. Urdal, and G. Østby. 2017. World Bank, Washington, DC.

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 225 Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. 2017. “The Republic Somerville, K. 2011. “Violence, Hate Speech, and of Niger: A Test-Case, with Reference to the Infl ammatory Broadcasting in Kenya: The Republic of Mali.” Case study for the United Problems of Defi nition and Identifi cation.” Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to 32 (1): 82–101. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Stackpool-Moore, L., and M. Bacalja Perianes. Washington, DC. 2017. “Malawi Case Study: Demonstrations Peschka, M. 2011. “The Role of the Private Sector July 2011.” Case study for the United in Fragile and Confl ict-Affected States.” Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Background paper for World Development Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Report 2011: Confl ict, Security, and Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Development, World Bank, Washington, DC. Washington, DC. Pichler Fong, A. 2017. “Burkina Faso: Popular Standing, A., and G. Hilson. 2013. Distributing Uprising and Political Transition (2014–2015).” Mining Wealth to Communities in Ghana: Case study for the United Nations–World Bank Addressing Problems of Elite Capture and Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Political Corruption. Bergen, Norway: Anti- Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Corruption Resource Centre. World Bank, Washington, DC. Stephan, M., and E. Chenoweth. 2011. Why Civil Ranstorp, M. 2009. “Preventing Violent Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Radicalization and Terrorism: The Case of Nonviolent Confl ict. New York: Columbia Indonesia.” Center for Asymmetric Risk University Press. Studies, Swedish National Defense College, Steven, D., and G. Sucuoglu. 2017. “What Works Stockholm. in Confl ict Prevention? Development- Renner, M., and Z. Chafe. 2006. “Turning Disasters Security-Diplomacy Collaboration towards into Peacemaking Opportunities.” In State of Better Results.” Background paper for the the World 2006, edited by Worldwatch United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Institute. New York: W. W. Norton. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Samii, C. 2013. “Perils or Promise of Ethnic Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Integration? Evidence from a Hard Case Washington, DC. in Burundi.” American Political Science Stodiek, T. 2006. “The OSCE and the Creation Review 107 (3): 558–73. doi: 10.1017 of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces in the /S0003055413000282. Balkans.” Core Working Paper 14, Centre Sargsyan, I. L. 2017. “Narrative, Perception and for OSCE Research, Institute for Peace Emotion: A Review of Recent Political Research and Security Policy, University of Science Studies.” Background paper for the Hamburg. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Tietaah, G. 2014. Watching the Watchdog: Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Spotlighting Indecent Election Campaign Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Language on Radio. Accra: Media Foundation Washington, DC. for West Africa. Saunders, H. H. 1999. A Public Peace Process: TJRC (Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Committee). 2016. Report of the Transitional Ethnic Confl icts. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Justice and Reconciliation Committee. Makati Sisk, T. D. 2017. “Preventing Deadly Confl ict City, Kenya: TJRC. in Ethnically Fractured Societies: An Toska, S. 2012. “Building a Yemeni State While Overview and Analysis of International Losing a Nation: The Middle East Channel.” Development Assistance for ‘Bridging’ Social Foreign Policy, October 29. Cohesion.” Background paper for the United ———. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Development Work for the Prevention of Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Violent Confl icts Cases: Egypt, Tunisia, Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Morocco, and Jordan.” Case study for the Washington, DC. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Sombatpoonsiri, J. 2015. Humor and Nonviolent Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Struggle in Serbia. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, University Press. Washington, DC.

226 Pathways for Peace Turok, I. 2014. “Medellin’s ‘Social Urbanism’ a the Post-Election Crisis in Kenya—2008.” Model for City Transformation.” Mail and Nairobi Peace Group, Nairobi. Guardian, May 16. Wainscott, A. M. 2017. Bureaucratizing Islam: UNDP (United Nations Development Morocco and the War on Terror. Cambridge, Programme). 2016. Citizen Engagement in MA: Cambridge University Press. Public Service Delivery: The Critical Role of Walsh, M. 2017. “Prevention of Confl ict, Public Offi cials. New York: UNDP. Northern Ireland.” Case study for the United ———. 2017. Journey to Extremism in Africa. Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, New York: UNDP. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to UNESCO (United Nations Educational and Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Scientifi c Organization). 2008. “UNESCO’s Washington, DC. Work on Education for Peace and Non- Wanis-St. John, A., and D. Kew. 2008. “Civil Violence: Building Peace through Education.” Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting UNESCO, Paris. Exclusion.” International Negotiation 13 UNHRC (United Nations Human Rights (2008): 11–36. Council). 2016. “Report of the Special Wennmann, A. 2017. “Assessing the Role of the Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Private Sector in Preventing Violent Justice, Reparation, and Guarantees of Confl ict.” Background paper for the United Nonrecurrence, Pablo de Greiff.” Report A/ Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, HRC/30/42, UNHRC, Geneva, September 7. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to UN Security Council. 2000. “Women, Peace, and Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Security.” Resolution S/RES/1325, adopted Washington, DC. October 31, New York. World Bank. 2006. World Development Report Vagliasindi, M. 2012. Implementing Energy 2006: Equity and Development. Washington, Subsidy Reform: Evidence from Developing DC: World Bank. Countries. Directions in Development— ———. 2011. World Development Report 2011: Energy and Mining. Washington, DC: Confl ict, Security, and Development. World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank. van Tongeren, P. 2001. “Infrastructures for ———. 2015a. “Colombia Protects Land Peace.” In Peacemaking: From Practice to and Patrimony of Internally Displaced Theory, edited by S. A. Nan, Z. C. Mampilly Persons.” World Bank, Washington, DC, and A. Bartoli. New York: Praeger. August 13. ———. 2013. “Potential Cornerstone of ———. 2015b. “Tunisia Risk and Resilience Infrastructures for Peace? How Local Peace Assessment. Fragility, Confl ict, and Violence Committees Can Make a Difference.” Journal Cross-Cutting Solutions Area.” World Bank, of Peacebuilding 1 (1): 39–60. Washington, DC. Varshney, A. 2002. Ethnic Confl ict and Civic Life: ———. 2016a. “An Integrated Framework for Hindus and Muslims in India. New Haven, Jobs in Fragile and Confl ict Situations.” CT: Yale University Press. World Bank, Washington, DC. Verjee, A. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making ———. 2016b. “Niger Risk and Resilience Development Work for the Prevention of Assessment: Fragility, Confl ict, and Violence Violent Confl icts South Sudan Case Study.” Cross-Cutting Solutions Area.” World Bank, Case study for the United Nations–World Washington, DC. Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: ———. 2016c. Supporting Transformational Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Change for Poverty Reduction and Shared Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Prosperity Lessons from World Bank Group von Einsiedel, S., and C. Salih. 2017. “Confl ict Experience. Washington, DC: Independent Prevention in Nepal.” Case study for the Evaluation Group, World Bank. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, ———. 2016d. “World Bank Supports Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Colombia’s Land Organisation and Regional Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Finance Efforts.” World Bank, Washington, Washington, DC. DC, December 12. Wachira, G., T. Arendshorst, and S. M. Charles. ———. 2017a. Mapping Confl ict and Violence in 2010. “Citizens in Action: Making Peace in Kenya. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict 227 ———. 2017b. World Development Report 2017: Boix, C., and D. Posner. 1996. “Making Social Governance and the Law. Washington, DC: Capital Work: A Review of Robert Putnam’s World Bank. ‘Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions Yemak, R., F. Gan, and D. Cheng. 2013. Celebrating in Modern Italy.’” Harvard University, Ten Years of the National Solidarity Program Cambridge, MA. (NSP): A Glimpse of the Rural Development Collier, P., V. L. Elliott, H. Hegre, A. Hoeffl er, Story in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: World M. Reynal-Querol, and N. Sambanis. 2003. Bank. Breaking the Confl ict Trap: Civil War Zartman, W. 2001. “The Timing of Peace and Development Policy. Policy Research Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Report. Washington, DC: World Bank; Moments.” Global Review of Ethnopolitics Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1 (1): 8–18. Crespo-Sancho, C. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention ———. 2015. Preventing Deadly Confl ict Polity. and Gender.” Background paper for the Hoboken, NJ. John Wiley and Sons. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Zunes, S., M. Hardy, and M. J. Stephan. 2010. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to “Nonviolent Struggle.” In International Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Studies Encyclopedia, edited by R. A. Washington, DC. Denmark. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Djordje, D. 2017. “Arendt on Prevention and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence.” In Additional Reading Philosophical Foundations of International Criminal Law. Torkel Opsahl Academic Anderlini, S. N. 2007. Women Building Peace: EPublisher. What They Do; Why It Matters. Boulder, CO: Dolan, C., and F. Cleaver. 2003. “Collapsing Lynne Rienner. Masculinities and Weak States—A Case Baliqi, B. 2012. “Security Sector Reform in Study of Northern Uganda.” In Masculinities Kosovo: From Institutional Transitions to Matter! Men, Gender, and Development, the Democratic Consolidation.” Iliria edited by F. Cleaver, 57–83. London: Zed International Review 2: 24–31. Books. Ballentine, K., and V. Haufl er. 2009. Enabling Erk, J., and L. Anderson. 2009. “The Paradox of Economies of Peace. New York: United Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Nations. Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?” Regional and Banfi eld, J., A. Barbolet, R. Goldwyn, and Federal Studies 19 (2): 191–202. N. Killick. 2005. “Confl ict-Sensitive Business Fiedler, C. 2017. “The Effects of Specifi c Elements Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries.” of Democracy on Peace.” Background study, International Alert, London. University of Essex and German Development Barnes, C. 2009. “Civil Society and Institute. Peacebuilding: Mapping Functions in Fiedler, C., and K. Mross. 2017. “Post-Confl ict Working for Peace.” International Spectator: Societies: Chances for Peace and Types of Italian Journal of International Affairs 44 (1): International Support.” Briefi ng Paper 131–47. 4/2017, German Development Institute/ Batley, R., and C. McCoughlin. 2015. “The Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik Politics of Public Services: A Service (DIE), Bonn. Characteristics Approach.” World Gettleman, J. 2008. “Death Toll in Kenya Exceeds Development 74 (October): 275–85. 1,000, but Talks Reach Crucial Phase.” New Binswanger-Mkhize, H. P., J. P. de Regt, and S. York Times, February 6. Spector. 2010. Local and Community Driven Glover, T. D., K. J. Shinew, and D. C. Parry. Development: Moving to Scale in Theory and 2005. “Association, Sociability, and Civic Practice. New Frontiers of Social Policy. Culture: The Democratic Effect of Community Washington, DC: World Bank. Gardening.” Leisure Sciences 27 (1): 75–92. Blattman, C., and L. Ralston. 2015. “Generating Hearn, S. 2017a. “CICIG in Guatemala.” Case Employment in Poor and Fragile States: study for the the United Nations–World Bank Evidence from Labor Market and Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Entrepreneurship Programs.” World Bank, Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Washington, DC. World Bank, Washington, DC.

228 Pathways for Peace ———. 2017b. “Inclusive Development for Parks, T., N. Colletta, and B. Oppenheim. 2013. Confl ict Prevention: The Case of Burundi.” The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Case study for the United Nations–World Confl ict and International Development Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Assistance. San Francisco: Asia Foundation. Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Rakotomalala, O. 2017. “Local Level Mechanisms Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. for Violent Confl ict Prevention Literature ———. 2017c. “Preventing the Recurrence of Review.” Background paper for the United Confl ict in Sierra Leone: How Did the UN Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways Mission Succeed?” Case study for the United for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Sany, J. 2010. Education and Confl ict in Côte Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, d’Ivoire. Special Report 235. Washington, DC: Washington, DC. United States Institute of Peace. Hegre, H., and H. M. Nygård. 2015. “Governance Stone, L. 2015. “Study of 156 Peace Agreements, and Confl ict Relapse.” Journal of Confl ict Controlling for Other Variables, Quantitative Resolution 59 (6): 984–1016. Analysis of Women’s Participation in Peace ISDC (International Security and Development Processes.” In Reimagining Peacemaking: Committee). 2016. Jobs Aid Peace. Berlin: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes, by M. O’Reilly, ISDC. A. Ó Súilleabháin, and T. Paffenholz, annex I. Kenya Red Cross Society. 2008. Annual Report. New York: International Peace Institute. Nairobi: Kenya Red Cross Society. UNDP (United Nations Development Langer, A., A. R. Mustapha, and F. Stewart. 2007. Programme). 2015. Joint UNDP-PDA “Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria, Ghana Programme on Building National Capacities and Côte d’Ivoire: Issues and Policies.” CRISE for Confl ict Prevention. New York: UNDP. Working Paper 45, Centre for Research on Wallensteen, P., and I. Svensson. 2014. “Talking Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Peace: International Mediation in Armed Oxford University, Oxford. Confl icts.” Journal of Peace Research 51 (2): Mcloughlin, C. 2015. “When Does Service 315–27. Delivery Improve the Legitimacy of a Fragile Wilson, W. 1918. “President Wilson’s Message to or Confl ict-Affected State?” Governance: An Congress, January 8, 1918.” Records of the International Journal of Policy, Administration, United States Senate, Record Group 46, and Institutions 28 (3): 341–56. National Archives, Washington, DC. Paffenholz, T. 2014. “Civil Society and Peace Yamagishi, T., and Yamagishi, M. 1994. “Trust and Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion– Commitment in the United States and Japan.” Exclusion Dichotomy.” Negotiation Journal Motivation and Emotion 18 (2): 129–66. 30 (1): 69–91. Zahra, S. A., E. Gedajlovic, D. O. Neubaum, and Parks, T., and W. Cole. 2010. Political J. M. Shulman. “A Typology of Social Settlements: Implications for International Entrepreneurs: Motives, Search Processes, Development Policy and Practice. Occasional and Ethical Challenges.” Journal of Business Paper 2. San Francisco: Asia Foundation. Venturing 24 (5): 519–32.

Country Approaches to Preventing Violent Conﬂ ict 229

CHAPTER 7 The International Architecture for Prevention

Primary responsibility for mitigating shocks political settlements, investment in peace- and reducing risks rests with states and keeping operations to implement agree- national authorities. However, international ments reached, and a focus on prevention and regional engagement has proven piv- of abuses (Gowan and Stedman 2018). otal in supporting national pathways for Despite criticism, this treatment has peace. Most of this support has been bilat- “achieved stability and security at relatively eral, but where national interests align, the low cost” in many countries (Eikenberry international community has come together and Krasner 2017, 9). around an international architecture to pre- Today the international architecture vent violence and sustain peace. deploys multilateral tools ranging from Following World War II, the foundations regional political offi ces to complex, multi- for this architecture were put in place, dimensional peace operations working rooted in the United Nations (UN) Charter across development, diplomatic, and secu- and customary international law. The pri- rity pillars. In an interconnected world, mary purpose of this architecture is to these efforts are increasingly based on coop- “maintain international peace and security, eration between international and regional and to that end: to take effective collective organizations and engage states in efforts to measures for the prevention and removal of address international, regional, and subna- threats to the peace.” 1 Over the last 70 years, tional levels of confl ict. However, despite this architecture has, arguably, succeeded at these evolutions, changes in the nature of its primary aim by providing a framework violent confl icts mentioned in chapter 1 for continuous consultation that has signifi - and international affairs in chapter 2, this cantly reduced the risk of confl ict between architecture is struggling to identify collec- the great powers. This success has been tive remedies to increasingly complex situa- achieved in large part by having provided a tions on the ground. forum in which the major military powers This chapter analyzes the international of our era “debate international problems and regional architecture for prevention, as and seek constructive solutions” (von well as the tools developed to prevent vio- Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2015, 828). lent confl ict, in light of current challenges. Primarily focused on reducing the risks In particular, with confl icts becoming of interstate confl ict, over the past 30 years, increasingly protracted and transnational, this system, with the support of member as seen in chapters 1 and 2, and with strong states, developed what scholars have correlations between intergroup grievances recently identifi ed as a “standard treatment” and violence, as seen in chapters 4 and 5, for intrastate confl ict: the mediation of this chapter reexamines the relevance of the

The International Architecture for Prevention 231 existing architecture and tools and provides authority and capacity to establish or examples of how they might further adapt reform institutions, allocate the resources to confront current challenges. In particular, necessary to tackle structural causes of the chapter highlights the potential benefi ts violence, and address the processes by of engaging earlier, more comprehensively, which the risks of violence manifest. and in a more sustained manner to address Internationally, governments infl uence risks of violence. country pathways through direct bilateral As chapter 3 notes, the state is the cen- relations and aid, including security assis- tral actor infl uencing a society’s pathway tance (box 7.1), and through interna- and the point of reference for preventive tional legal frameworks and multilateral action.2 National governments have the institutions.

BOX 7.1 International Engagement through Military and Police Assistance

The most widespread form of development cooperation can make them international engagement in peace and more credible. Because of sensitivities security assistance across states regarding the core state function of occurs through the bilateral fi nancing, security and circumscribed authority, equipping, and training of national external actors have only slowly become military, police, and intelligence comfortable with expanding development services by allies. The nature of such assistance to the security sector. assistance can have a profound Development assistance is subject to infl uence on the risks faced by a society greater scrutiny and different standards and, more important, how national than military assistance. actors seek to manage such risks. While often essential for international Donor countries have used bilateral security, military assistance has military cooperation to help produced mixed results in addressing institutionalize security systems that internal security challenges. As noted protect recipient countries, in chapter 5, a focus on creating professionalize the security sector, accountable and professional security and forge stronger alliances based sector institutions with civilian on mutual military dependence oversight can facilitate effective confl ict (Anderson and McKnight 2014; Fisher prevention. Most bilateral fi nancing for and Anderson 2015; Poe 1991; Wendt military and police, however, has gone and Barnett 1993). to enhancing operational capacities The level of foreign military rather than to transformative reforms assistance is not included in the offi cial conducive to preventing confl ict and development assistance (ODA) fi gures.a building peace (Bryden and Olonisakin This division refl ects a fi rewall between 2010, 9; Donnelly 1997). In addition, military and development resources bilateral military and police assistance and institutions, which contributes to at the country level is not always the fact that these two streams often effectively coordinated, resulting in are not coordinated. Indeed, they often confl icting or competing interests; a are at odds in the material effects and mismatch of standards and approaches signals about international priorities with respect to training, equipment, that they send to the population and and reform processes; and defi cits in to the elites of recipient countries. national ownership. Harmonizing decisions about military and

a. After 13 consecutive years of increases (from 1998 to 2011), world military spending has plateaued, at an estimated US$1,686 billion in 2016, equivalent to 2.2 percent of global gross domestic product or US$227 per person (Tian et al. 2017). No military equipment or services are reportable as ODA. Antiterrorism activities are also excluded. However, the cost of using the donors’ armed forces to deliver humanitarian aid is included. Similarly, most peacekeeping expenditures are excluded in line with the exclusion of military costs. However, some closely deﬁ ned developmentally relevant activities within peacekeeping operations are included (Development Assistance Committee 2017).

232 Pathways for Peace Systemic Prevention Understood this way, prevention lies at the heart of the rules-based international Beyond the more visible deployments and order. The international system, including actions by multilateral institutions, state the United Nations, the Bretton Woods engagement in preventive action has institutions, regional security arrange- included a focus on systemic prevention, ments, and even development as a practice, defi ned by United Nations Secretary- was built, in part, around the notion that General Kofi Annan as “measures to address the world needed consensual norms and global risks of confl ict that transcend par- rules to minimize the risk that confl ict ticular states” (UN General Assembly could escalate into violence (Schlesinger 2006a, 1). Systemic prevention addresses 2004). The United Nations system—in par- transnational risks that can contribute to ticular, the UN Security Council—and spe- violent confl ict and be dealt with effectively cialized agencies like the International only by global partnerships. It includes, for Atomic Energy Agency have played a signif- example, measures to deal with illicit econ- icant role in facilitating intergovernmental omies, including traffi cking and the use and treaties, enabling multilateral action, and trade of arms, all of which are also addressed fostering transnational advocacy networks. in the Sustainable Development Goals Together, this global infrastructure trans- (SDGs), and weapons of mass destruction; mits and promotes norms against violence address war crimes and crimes against (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Risse, Ropp, humanity; respond to health epidemics and Sikkink 1999). This system, designed such as human immunodefi ciency virus/ primarily to regulate interstate confl ict acquired immunodefi ciency syndrome (box 7.2), has evolved signifi cantly to (HIV/AIDS) and Ebola; and create broad address broader risks associated with vio- coalitions to address climate change. lent confl ict (box 7.3).

BOX 7.2 Public International Law and Armed Conflict

International law establishes the International human rights law derives obligations of signatory states and principally from the Universal Declaration provides the most powerful framework of Human Rights (UN General Assembly for the conduct of states and organized 1948) and nine core UN human rights armed groups in armed confl ict. treaties as well as regional human Public international law. The following rights instruments such as the African branches of public international law are Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. directly relevant to situations of armed International human rights law recognizes confl ict. fundamental rights for individuals and International humanitarian law groups, which states must respect, derives from customary international protect, and fulfi ll. It applies during law, the four Geneva Conventions, peacetime and during armed confl ict. three additional protocols, and other International criminal law prohibits international treaties (ICRC n.d.). It certain acts considered to be the most regulates the conduct of states and serious crimes (such as war crimes, organized nonstate armed groups that are crimes against humanity, the crime of party to an armed confl ict. International aggression, and genocide) and regulates humanitarian law applies during armed the investigation, prosecution, and confl ict to protect persons who are not or punishment of individual perpetrators. no longer participating in hostilities and The Rome Statute (UN Secretary-General restricts the means and methods of war 1998) establishes the jurisdiction of between fi ghting parties. the International Criminal Court for the

(Box continued next page)

The International Architecture for Prevention 233 BOX 7.2 Public International Law and Armed Conflict (continued)

investigation and prosecution of crimes another state to maintain or restore under international criminal law. international peace and security (UN Rules on interstate use of force. Charter, Ch. VII). The UN Charter prohibits the threat or Peremptory norms. International law use of force against another state. One contains certain rules that are accepted exception to this rule is the right of a and recognized by states as allowing state to use force in self-defense in for no derogation. The prohibitions case of an armed attack (UN Charter, of aggression, torture, slavery, racial Art. 51). Short of this exception, only discrimination, genocide, and crimes the UN Security Council is entitled against humanity are examples of to authorize the use of force against peremptory norms.

Source: McInerney-Lankford 2017.

As the primary multilateral body respon- outside of self-defense, the UN Security sible for maintaining international peace and Council possesses a range of tools for pre- security and the sole international body, in venting, managing, and responding to vio- principle, able to authorize the use of force lent conﬂ ict. Chapter VI of the UN Charter

BOX 7.3 The Evolution of International Approaches to Conflict Prevention

Although the international system was, It states that the primary responsibility and remains, largely premised on the for prevention lies with national concept of state sovereignty, countries governments supported by civil society are increasingly interdependent, and and distinguishes between operational risks are not confi ned to national prevention focused on an impending borders. New and complex challenges crisis and structural prevention focused have arisen since the end of the Cold on keeping crises from arising in the fi rst War that range from terrorism and place (UN Secretary-General 2001). The violent extremism to cybersecurity, from 2006 progress report on armed confl ict climate change to massive forced prevention expands on these concepts, displacement, and from global illicit introducing systemic prevention or activities to outbreaks of disease. measures that address global risks These trends have motivated a new of confl ict that “transcend particular and explicit emphasis within the UN states” (UN General Assembly 2006a). on addressing not only new forms of In 2014, the Security Council passed confl ict, but also all phases of confl ict. its fi rst resolution explicitly on confl ict Secretary-General Boutros Boutros- prevention (S/RES/2150) (UN Security Ghali highlighted this focus on confl ict Council 2014). This recalled that the prevention in the 1992 Agenda for “prevention of confl ict remains a primary Peace, which identifi es as guiding responsibility of States” and further concepts preventive diplomacy,a recalled their “primary responsibility peacemaking, peacekeeping, and to protect civilians and to respect and postconfl ict peacebuilding (UN ensure the human rights of all individuals Secretary-General 2001). Secretary- within their territory and subject to their General Kofi Annan’s 2001 report on jurisdiction.” This resolution conceived the prevention of armed confl ict also of the UN’s tools as including special emphasizes the mutually reinforcing political missions (such as regional nature of confl ict prevention and offi ces), peacekeeping operations, sustainable and equitable development. and the Peacebuilding Commission,

(Box continued next page)

234 Pathways for Peace BOX 7.3 The Evolution of International Approaches to Conflict Prevention (continued)

as well as regional and subregional system. Advancing beyond linear organizations and arrangements and understandings of confl ict prevention, acknowledged that serious abuses and the resolutions concluded that violations of international human rights sustaining peace should be “broadly or humanitarian law, including sexual understood as a goal and a process and gender-based violence, can be an to build a common vision of a society, early indication of descent into confl ict or ensuring that the needs of all segments escalation of confl ict. of the population are taken into account, Despite these multiple commitments, which encompasses activities aimed three major strategic reviews of the at preventing the outbreak, escalation, UN’s peace and security functions in continuation, and recurrence of confl ict” 2015 found that prevention remains (UN General Assembly 2016a; UN “the poor relative of better resourced Security Council 2016). The sustaining peace operations deployed during and peace resolutions underlined the after armed confl ict.”b Building on these importance of additional, urgent support 2015 reports, the General Assembly in contexts where the risk of crisis and Security Council sustaining peace is heightened, and the need for tools resolutions articulated a conceptual to address root causes, especially in vision and operational guidance for societies having diffi culties working member states and the United Nations toward the SDGs.

Source: Call 2017. a. Defi ned as an “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing dispute/s from escalating into confl icts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” b. The report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) underscored the importance of preventing confl ict, concluding that the prevention of armed confl ict was “the greatest responsibility of the international community” and yet remained underprioritized and underresourced (UN 2015). At the same time, an Advisory Group of Experts that conducted a review of peacebuilding architecture, under a mandate from the General Assembly and the Security Council, concluded, “A broader, comprehensive approach of sustaining peace is called for, all along the arc leading from confl ict prevention … through peacemaking and peacekeeping, and on to postconfl ict recovery and reconstruction” (UN General Assembly 2016a). The 2015 report of the Secretary-General regarding the global study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 underlined the importance of bringing women’s participation and leadership to the core of peace and security efforts, including responses to new and emerging threats (UN Secretary-General 2015; UN Security Council 2000).

provides a framework for the Security “maintain or restore international peace and Council’s engagement in the peaceful settle- security” (UN Department of Political Affairs ment of disputes brought to its attention, 2015b).3 including through investigative and fact- Through these frameworks, the Security fi nding activities. Chapter VI also provides Council can take decisions at all stages of the framework for the Security Council’s the confl ict cycle and within a wide array of own direct engagements in recommending responses, ranging from simply calling for actions to the parties of a confl ict or in sup- parties to resolve a dispute peacefully, to port of the efforts of the secretary-general directing the terms or principles by which a (see, for example, UN Department of confl ict will be resolved, to authorizing Political Affairs 2015b). Chapter VII of the enforcement measures to ensure the imple- UN Charter provides the framework within mentation of its decisions (von Einsiedel, which the Security Council may take enforce- Malone, and Ugarte 2015). Ultimately the ment action. It allows the Security Council to effectiveness of these tools, as with all other “determine the existence of any threat to the facets of the Security Council’s work, peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres- depends on the collective willingness of sion” and to make recommendations or to states to respond to threats to international resort to nonmilitary and military action to peace and security (Wood 2013).

The International Architecture for Prevention 235 In practice, absent a major crisis to mobi- Beyond the traditional chambers of the lize collective action, the Security Council United Nations system, the multilateral sys- has tended to “stand back” (von Einsiedel, tem has expanded and evolved within a Malone, and Ugarte 2015). Actions have broader trend of proliferation of actors on tended toward crisis management and the global scene. This brings greater diver- response, and, as noted by the UN Security sity of both instruments and forums Council (2017, 2), “Despite strong rhetorical engaging in systemic prevention, but also support for prevention, … concrete, mean- contributes to a fragmentation of global ingful preventive action is too often lacking.” governance (Biermann et al. 2009; Tasked increasingly with dealing with con- Koskenniemi and Leino 2002). There are fl icts within rather than between states, four times as many state actors today as in Security Council mechanisms can encoun- 1945 and a growing number and diversity ter resistance to actions that could challenge of nonstate actors (Thakur 2011). In 1951, or weaken sovereign rights and responsibili- there were only 123 intergovernmental ties, both of council members and of states organizations. 5 By 2013, there were 7,710 on the council agenda (von Einsiedel, (ICM 2017). The emergence of bodies such Malone, and Ugarte 2015). At the same time, as the G-20 speaks to a desire for wider the number and complexity of ongoing con- global steering groups, while the growth fl icts in which the Security Council is of regional instruments—for example, engaged distracts from less immediate but the European Partnership process—has potentially preventable confl icts (UN expanded the range of institutional frame- Security Council 2017). works engaged in promoting prevention. Beyond crisis management, UN member The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable states are also working through the Security Development encapsulates the increased Council to establish global norms related to interlinkages between efforts at systemic confl ict situations through thematic debates prevention. The SDGs call for integrated and resolutions. This work covers a range solutions extending across development, of topics, including protection of civilians; peace, environment, and humanitarian children and armed confl ict; justice, rule of realms and recognize the critical impor- law, and impunity; women, peace, and secu- tance of sustainability to development prog- rity; and sexual violence in confl ict (Keating ress as well as the importance of investing in 2015). Increasingly, the Security Council is global (and regional) public goods (Framtid addressing nontraditional security threats, 2015; Jenks and Kharas 2016). The SDGs such as piracy, illicit traffi cking, and orga- also include specifi c targets on human traf- nized crime and climate change (von fi cking, illicit fi nancial and arms fl ows, and Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2015).4 organized crime. The SDGs confi rm that Globally, the General Assembly has building resilience through investment in broad authority to consider confl ict preven- inclusive and sustainable development— tion within the framework of the UN including addressing inequalities, strength- Charter. It has held special or emergency ening institutions, and ensuring that sessions on a wide range of prevention- development strategies are risk-informed— related thematic and geographic issues. It is the best means of prevention. has adopted declarations on peace, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and international cooperation, notably the landmark Regional Action resolution on sustaining peace in 2016 (UN Amid a changing global order and the muta- General Assembly 2016a). As the leading tion of confl ict away from conventionally intergovernmental body specialized in pol- fought interstate wars, regional organiza- icy and coordination on economic, social, tions have become increasingly important and environmental issues, the Economic actors in preventive action. Conceived as a and Social Council is the central UN plat- fi rst resort for challenges to security that form for refl ection, debate, and innovative transcend national territories (Verjee 2017), thinking on sustainable development. regional capacities are also seen as critical to

236 Pathways for Peace reducing the risks of regional contagion and mandates or capacities for autonomous instability caused by the rise of nonstate action. These include the League of actors and intrastate confl ict, with a focus Arab States and the Southern African on Africa. With the emergence of armed Development Community, among others, groups with transnational goals, the concen- which serve primarily as platforms for tration of confl icts in regions where neigh- coordinated political, diplomatic, and boring countries have endogenous risk sometimes military engagement in crises factors, and the increase in international and confl icts. interference (Walter 2017), regional While regional organizations vary in responses, whether positive or negative, are their normative frameworks and capacity, likely to remain important. some have had success in forging a consen- Long recognized as key partners of global sus on common priorities among states, institutions,6 regional and subregional sometimes serving as a pacesetter in trans- organizations have evolved considerably formative agendas. These include, for exam- since the end of the Cold War. Differences ple, the African Union’s legal provision of in size, membership structure, and strategic the right to intervene in grave human rights objectives notwithstanding, many such violations as contained in Article 4(h) of its organizations have experienced an expan- Constitutive Act;8 the development of an sion of their mandates, legal frameworks, ambitious Agenda 2063 on regional inte- and organizational capacities to address a gration (African Union Commission 2015); broad range of regional political, security, and the immediate priority of “Silencing and economic issues. the Guns by 2020.”9 In particular, and with the support of Regional and subregional economic the Security Council, some regional and communities, in particular, have gone subregional organizations have acquired beyond fostering economic cooperation considerable authority to engage in confl ict and integration to providing important management (Nathan 2010). These include platforms for addressing regional threats to the European Union (EU), which promotes peace and security. Approximately 33 peace through cooperation and integration regional economic organizations have been in economic, political, and, increasingly, secu- founded since 1989, and 29 regionally based rity matters; the African Union, which has intergovernmental organizations have an developed specialized institutions and capac- established agenda related to peace and ities to support political mediation, crisis security. Part of the importance of regional management, postconfl ict reconstruction, economic communities has been their role and peacekeeping, the most notable example in implementing regional integration agen- of which is the African Union Mission in das bridging peace, security, and economic Somalia (Anderson and McKnight 2014); cooperation. Based on this cooperation, and the Economic Community of West regional economic communities are playing African States (ECOWAS), which is empow- increasingly operational roles targeting sub- ered to act in the case of threats to stability regional threats—for example, through through political, economic, and military regional coalitions such as the Multinational means (Fisher and Anderson 2015; box 7.4). Joint Taskforce against Boko Haram, the The growing signifi cance of regional and sub- G-5 Sahel, or the Regional Coalition regional organizations in confl ict prevention Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army. is refl ected in increasingly complex and mul- The increasing role of regional organiza- tidimensional cooperation among them as tions in addressing threats to stability and well as with the United Nations. 7 security in their regions is most evident in Other regional organizations serve regional peacekeeping operations and more as forums for coordination between regionally coordinated and negotiated secu- regional states, with their engagement and rity responses (box 7.3). The African Union role in confl ict management structured and ECOWAS (box 7.4) peace operations on an intergovernmental basis and with have increased, especially in the initial limited operational and institutional stages of international deployments, and

The International Architecture for Prevention 237 BOX 7.4 Subregional Organizations and Prevention: ECOWAS

Among subregional organizations, Governance, ECOWAS became engaged ECOWAS stands out for its successes in in preventing and managing confl ict in confl ict mitigation and peacekeeping in West Africa. In 2002, the Observation West Africa. In the post–Cold War era, and Monitoring Centre of ECOWAS ECOWAS has expanded its institutional partnered with the West African structures to respond to security threats Network for Peacebuilding, a civil emanating from intrastate confl icts in society organization established in 1998 the region. This has entailed diplomatic in Ghana, to implement a regional early investment in developing normative and warning and early response system. the legal tools to address confl ict risks long Early Warning and Reponse Network before any specifi c crisis, and (ECOWARN). Since 2006, ECOWAS has developing dedicated capacities for maintained a standby force, a regional early warning and response. 6,500-strong rapid-response brigade Under the 1999 Protocol Relating to known as ECOBRIG. In 2008, the the Mechanism for Confl ict Prevention, organization also established the Management, Resolution, ECOWAS Confl ict Prevention Peacekeeping, and Security and the Framework aimed at addressing the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good structural causes of violent confl ict.

Source: Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka 2015.

have at times proven quicker to deploy than 2008 (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009) and other multilateral missions, as well as gen- the instrumental role of the Inter- erally more willing to use military force, if Governmental Authority on Development necessary. However, these operations are at (IGAD) in negotiations on ending the war times poorly funded and equipped relative in Sudan in 2005 (Healy 2009). However, to the enormity of the task at hand, and a when consensus among member states heavy strategic focus on military action has cannot be established, perceptions of par- sometimes come at the expense of a holistic tiality exist, or critical capacities are in civilian-led approach (De Coning and short supply, regional and subregional Prakash 2016). organizations are faced with diffi cult chal- Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006), Salehyan lenges that may curtail their effectiveness (2009), and more recently Goldstone et al. in preventing and managing confl ict. (2010) have shown that one relatively good predictor of whether a country will experi- International Tools ence a civil war is whether neighboring countries are experiencing civil war. Given for Prevention their knowledge of the regional context Over the past decades, the international and vested interest in preventing regional community has developed tools for pre- instability, regional and subregional orga- venting the outbreak, escalation, continu- nizations possess inherent attributes that ation, and relapse of confl ict. While often afford them greater effi cacy and historically linked to international multi- legitimacy to assume the role of mediators lateral institutions, such tools are increas- (Ibrahim 2016). Their proximity and ingly, if unevenly, shared with regional access to regional and national stakehold- and subregional organizations. ers allow them to engage and intervene These tools, ranging from remote more quickly when crises occur. These monitoring of risks to deployments advantages are refl ected, for instance, in through in-country peace operations, the success of the African Union in mediat- have evolved considerably to deal with ing an end to electoral violence in Kenya in the growing complexity of conflicts.

238 Pathways for Peace Engagements are increasingly aimed at • Government systems were designed, the entire cycle of conflict from outbreak for example, in France (Système to relapse, regional and subregional oper- d’Alerte Précoce, located at the General ations are more frequent, and multilateral Secretariat for National Defense) and deployments are increasingly recogniz- Germany (BMZ Crisis Early Warning ing the importance of multidimensional System). approaches integrating political, security, • At the intergovernmental level, the African and development efforts. Union has developed a Continental Early Nevertheless, the current amount of Warning System to advise the Peace and attention to and spending on prevention Security Council on “potential confl ict amounts to a fraction of the quantity spent and threats to peace and security” and responding to crisis or on rebuilding after- “recommend best courses of action.” ward,10 and the existing tools remain chal- IGAD has designed the Confl ict Early lenged by the changing nature of violent Warning and Response Mechanism confl ict. The following sections provide an (CEWARN) as an institutional founda- overview of several operational instru- tion for addres sing confl icts in the region. ments through which states provide sup- It is a collaborative effort of the member port through multilateral frameworks for states of IGAD (Djibouti, Eritrea, prevention, highlighting the evolution of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, policy, practice, and the extent and poten- Sudan, and Uganda). ECOWAS has also tial for greater convergence between developed ECOWARN to collect and ana- international political, security, and devel- lyze data and draft up-to-date reports on opment actors. possible emerging crises, ongoing crises, and postcrisis transitions. • Early Warning Systems Nongovernmental organizations have set up their own EWSs. The nonprofi t orga- Early warning systems (EWSs) play a sig- nization International Crisis Group uses nifi cant role in the international fi eld of qualitative methods and fi eld research to confl ict prevention. The Organisation for produce a monthly early warning bul- Economic Co-operation and Development letin, Crisis Watch, designed to provide defi nes early warning as “a process that (a) global warnings of impending violence; alerts decision makers to the potential out- the Forum on Early Warning and Early break, escalation, and resurgence of violent Response–Africa focuses on the Ituri confl ict and (b) promotes an understand- region in the Democratic Republic of ing among decision makers of the nature Congo; and the Early Warning and Early and impacts of violent confl ict” (OECD Response Project focuses on Timor-Leste 2009, 22). EWSs are practical tools relying (Defontaine 2017).12 on qualitative or quantitative data on medium- and short-term risks, with the Good practices of EWSs include (a) the intention of directly informing or support- use of fi eld networks of monitors; (b) appli- ing preventive actions. EWSs help in for- cation of both qualitative and quantitative mulating best- and worst-case scenarios analytical methodologies; (c) use of tech- and response options and then communi- nology; (d) regular monitoring and report- cate the fi ndings to decision makers ing, as confl ict dynamics evolve rapidly; and (Mwaûra and Schmeidl 2002). (e) assurance of a strong interconnection Initial models of early warning emerged between early warning and response, in the 1970s. After the end of the Cold War, as emphasized in third-generation EWSs these systems developed rapidly, using both (Nyheim 2015). 13 qualitative and quantitative data to improve While converging qualitative and quan- the accuracy of predictions and extend titative evidence suggests that EWSs can their time horizons. Today diverse types of provide accurate information of imped- EWS exist: governmental, intergovernmen- ing violent confl ict in the short term tal, and nongovernmental.11 (Chadefaux 2014; Ward et al. 2013), most

The International Architecture for Prevention 239 models cannot make long-term projec- devise actions. The UN Charter establishes tions (longer than two to three years) or a link between protection of human rights predict the location, intensity, and trajec- and maintenance of international peace tory of impending violence. At the same and security,14 and the Universal Periodic time, even when predictions are accurate, Review undertaken by the Human Rights fi nding entry points for action, particu- Council is the main institutional review larly in the context of current confl ict mechanism for all 193 UN member dynamics, can be challenging. However, states.15 The power of these systems lies even the best EWS will have minimal effect not only in their triggering of action, but if not used to inform preventive action. also their acceptance as a basis for standard The short time horizons of warnings can setting across countries. 16 Recognizing limit the scope of relevant preventive that where preventive action fails, interna- action and make it diffi cult to sustain tional action must protect the lives and engagement beyond contingency planning. dignity of civilians caught up in confl ict, Likewise, EWSs rarely address how much international action has advocated for uncertainty is associated with concrete enhanced respect for both international predictions, with the result that action humanitarian law and international rarely immediately follows warning human rights law, prioritizing protection (box 7.5; Brandt, Freeman, and Schrodt of civilians in UN peace operations and 2011a, 2011b; King and Zeng 2001). preventing forced displacement of refugees For this reason, some countries have devel- and internally displaced persons (UN oped dialogue processes among a variety of Secretary-General 2017b). stakeholders to analyze data from different More recently, systems have evolved to sources and channel this information into focus specifi cally on the prevention of more coordinated action. In particular, vio- large-scale and deliberate attacks on lence observatories have become common civilians. Even when confl ict prevention tools to support the design and implementa- has failed or no means of stopping armed tion of violence prevention actions, especially confl ict are available, prevention of mass in urban areas. Observatories grew out of the atrocities remains a priority. In 2001, fol- experience of city governments in Latin lowing the tragedies of the Balkans America and have been central to govern- (A/54/549) and Rwanda (S/199/1257), the ment efforts to reduce gang and interpersonal UN Security Council invited the secre- violence in cities like Bogotá, Medellín, and tary-general “to refer to the Council infor- Rio de Janeiro. Observatories usually involve mation and analyses within the United regular meetings by stakeholders from differ- Nations system on cases of serious viola- ent sectors—law enforcement, health, and tions of international law” and on “poten- urban development, for example— to tial confl ict situations” arising from analyze trends in violence and take coordi- “ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes” nated actions to address it (Duque, Caicedo, and other related issues (UN General and Sierra 2008; Sur 2014). They have Assembly 1999a, 1999b; UN Security been adapted to some situations of armed Council 2001). In 2004, following this confl ict, such as Indonesia (Barron and instruction, the UN secretary-general Sharpe 2005). appointed the fi rst special adviser on the prevention of genocide, followed in 2008 Protection of Civilians and by appointment of the fi rst special adviser Prevention of Mass Atrocities on the responsibility to protect. In 2014, the Offi ce of Genocide Prevention and the Human rights violations, discrimination, Responsibility to Protect released the fi rst and abuse are among the major warning United Nations Framework of Analysis for signs of instability and confl ict, and moni- Atrocity Crimes (UN 2014). toring and reporting of such abuses pro- This framework highlights that, like vide the evidence base from which to many other forms of violence, in most cases,

240 Pathways for Peace BOX 7.5 Challenges in Predicting Violent Conflict

Given the dynamics of violent confl ict confl ict (Bosley 2016; Yi 2017c). today, there has been a resurgence of Forecasting efforts have also been interest in expanding beyond early undertaken to identify risks of warning systems to more accurate violence subnationally. forecasting of medium- to long-term • In Liberia, for example, Blair, confl ict risks. Blattman, and Hartman (2015) use 56 Unlike early warning, forecasting potential risk factors to predict relies on predictive capabilities of data locations of confl ict, fi nding that monitoring tools and systems and is ethnic diversity and polarization designed not to alert observers to consistently predicted the location of impending violence, but to improve violence over time. Another remote monitoring of underlying risks forecasting model using cross- through data collection, multimethod sectional survey data in Liberia and multidisciplinary research, adaption predicted up to 88 percent of actual and revision of existing prediction local violence in 2012 and had an models, and generation of policy-oriented overall accuracy of 33–50 percent analyses. (Blair, Blattman, and Hartman 2011, Prediction models vary, not only in 2015; Blattman 2012, 2014). a their accuracy in predicting the onset of violent confl ict, but also in their precision The ability of qualitative sources in determining location, intensity, and to yield robust and policy-relevant time. While conventional approaches predictions (Gibler 2016) is underscored rely on statistical analyses of a country’s in research that analyzed specialized structural conditions, open-source newspaper content to predict political information—that is, data from electronic violence. News sources are not only news articles and web resources— available in real time, but also have is increasingly used for confl ict risk strong country-specifi c elements. assessment and near-time forecasting (Yi Therefore, by using topic models and 2017c). focusing on within-country variation (or the timing of the occurrence of • The Political Instability Task Force, a violence), researchers could predict macrostructural country-level accurately the onset of political violence forecasting model, has, for example, one to two years before it occurred used a parsimonious selection of (Mueller and Rauh 2016). variables, focused on types of Nevertheless, several different political regime and the existence of metricsb developed to evaluate state-led exclusion to predict and predictive accuracy have shown that explain large-scale violent confl ict, confl ict forecasting still suffers from destabilizing regime change, and many limitations. Forecasting is most genocide or politicide (Goldstone often based on complex models and is et al. 2010). limited by technical and data issues—in • Peace Research Institute Oslo has particular, too many different variables developed the Confl ict Prediction are playing out in moving from risks to Project to generate long-term violence for simple modeling to provide a simulation-based forecasts of armed reliable basis for prediction. a. Using cross-sectional surveys of respondents in 242 small rural towns and villages in Liberia in 2008, 2010, and 2012, researchers focused on communal, extrajudicial, and criminal violence. The team used the 2008 data to predict local violence in 2010 and then generated predictions for 2012, while collecting new data to compare the predictions with the reality. b. Point forecast evaluations such as mean absolute error, root mean squared error, and receiver operator characteristic curves are among the most widely used metrics to assess the performance of forecasting models. These metrics are often complemented by interval and density forecast evaluations such as prediction interval, probability integral transform, and continuous ranked probability score (Yi 2017b).

The International Architecture for Prevention 241 atrocity crimes are not unforeseen and mediation attempts during the 1990s (64 “tend to occur in similar settings and share percent) than during the entire 1945–89 several elements or features” (UN 2014, 6). period, and this trend seems to have con- The framework highlights eight common tinued (Themmer and Wallensteen risk factors for atrocities, including previ- 2011). 17 ous serious violations of international Within the United Nations, the establish- human rights law, the capacity to commit ment of regional political offi ces—the UN atrocity crimes, and concrete preparatory Offi ce for West Africa and the Sahel action. In addition to these common factors, (UNOWAS),18 the UN Offi ce for Central the framework identifi es six risk factors Africa (UNOCA), and the UN Regional relevant specifi cally to the international Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central crimes of genocide, crimes against human- Asia (UNRCCA)—has responded to the ity, and war crimes. For example, crimes increasing regionalization of confl ict. Given against humanity are often preceded by their standing presence, ability to deploy, systematic attacks against specifi c civilian and relationships with most key stake- populations, and war crimes are often holders across the region, these regional preceded by serious threats to humanitarian offi ces offer alternatives to peacekeeping or peacekeeping operations. The framework operations. In the Kyrgyz Republic, the also provides detailed indicators for assess- EU, the Organization for Security and ing these risks. Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and UNRCCA responded to the 2010 crisis by Preventive Diplomacy focusing mainly on capacity building; tack- and Mediation ling the rule of law; facilitating regional dialogues, especially around terrorism, water, Preventive diplomacy refers to early diplo- and energy issues; and providing aid to matic action taken “to prevent disputes displaced Uzbeks. This concerted effort from arising between parties, to prevent enabled the government to end violence and existing disputes from escalating into con- commence a process of political reforms fl icts, and to limit the spread of the latter that led to parliamentary elections (Call when they occur” (UN Secretary-General 2012). Another example is the response of 1992, 3). The UN secretary-general, for the UN Offi ce for West Africa (UNOWA) to example, plays an essential and personal the crisis in Guinea in 2008 following the role in preventive diplomacy through the death of President Lansana Conté and the provision of “good offi ces” to all parties. takeover of the country by a military junta. Mediation is a process whereby a third party With the mediation of the head of UNOWA, assists two or more parties, with their con- Special Representative of the Secretary- sent, to prevent, manage, or resolve a con- General Said Djinnit, and ECOWAS, the sit- fl ict by helping them to develop mutually uation was diffused. UNOWA subsequently acceptable agreements. provided expertise on confl ict prevention, Using confi dence building and lever- mediation, and security sector reform, age, preventive diplomacy and mediation which helped the country to hold successful can play a role in altering the incentives of national elections at the end of 2010. actors that propel societies toward Mediation is increasingly conducted by violence. Given that diplomatic action can a range of organizations, including cadres be mobilized quickly, when consent is of experienced envoys or mediators from present, it is often a tool of fi rst resort in the UN, regional and subregional organi- response to high risks of confl ict and zations, individual states, and nongovern- sometimes the only approach, short of mental actors (box 7.6; Svensson and military intervention, that can be deployed Lundgren 2015). 19 In a study undertaken to avert violence (Day and Pichler using Uppsala Confl ict Data Program Fong 2017). Mediation has also been used (UCDP) data between 1989 and 2013, increasingly frequently. Greig and Diehl states were found to be the principal (2012) conclude that there were more mediators in 59 percent of cases, while

242 Pathways for Peace BOX 7.6 Multiple-Actor Mediation

Bilateral, subregional, and regional • In Guinea in 2009–10, the African organizations and the United Nations Union, the International Contact often seek to work in tandem, rather than Group, and the United Nations in parallel, to bring the legitimacy and supported the ECOWAS-led weight of their respective bodies to bear mediation that persuaded a military in coordinated efforts. These efforts junta to support a transition to civilian include other international and regional rule and constitutional order (Mancini organizations as well as nongovernmental 2011).

actors (in so-called track 2 approaches) • In Colombia, the Cuban and and national actors (individual local Norwegian governments facilitated mediators as well as civil society groups, the peace agreement between the for example, youth and women’s groups). government of Colombia and the This collaboration has led to efforts to Revolutionary Armed Forces of increase coordination at the international Colombia (FARC) rebels, with and national levels. At the country level, it technical assistance on thematic has led to broader and more inclusive agreements and confi dence building mediation approaches, including provided by various UN entities and organization of national dialogue other actors (Aguirre 2015). a initiatives. The broadening of the mediation • In Kenya in 2008, Kofi Annan, former environment (in terms of both UN secretary-general, mediated the mediators and parties) has improved end of postelection ethnic violence the responsiveness and mobilization on behalf of the Panel of Eminent of international actors and facilitated African Personalities of the African broader ownership of peace processes. Union, with technical support In The Gambia, for example, the national provided by experts from the United government, African Union, ECOWAS, Nations and the nongovernmental the EU, Nigeria, and the United Nations Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue played a decisive role in preventing (Crocker and Aall 1999; Lanz and violence and enabling a peaceful Gasser 2013; Lindenmayer and Kaye transition of power to the elected 2009). president, Adama Barrow. However, the • In the Kyrgyz Republic in 2010, after growing number of stakeholders has President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s ouster, also made the management of mediation a triple mediation initiative of the EU, more complex, increasing the need for the OSCE, and the United Nations coordination, leadership, and unifi ed provided considerable leverage and approaches to prevent confusion and legitimacy to the effort to ensure efforts from working at cross-purposes stability during the transition (Call to each other. 2012).

a. See also http://www.un.org/undpa/en/diplomacy-mediation.

intergovernmental organizations were In many processes, multiple mediators principal mediators in 30 percent of cases. may be engaged, at times in a coordinated Private individuals and nongovernmental fashion in support of a lead mediator, at organizations such as the Geneva-based other times working at cross-purposes Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the (Whitﬁ eld 2010). Helsinki-based Crisis Management The growing body of practice in preven- Initiative, or the Community of tive diplomacy has translated into stronger Sant’Egidio in Rome were the principal institutional frameworks supporting such mediators in 11 percent of cases reported actions. At the international level, group- in the press (Svensson and Onken 2015). ings of member states and international

The International Architecture for Prevention 243 organizations supporting the prevention (Hoeffl er 2014; Walter 2017). In sum, diplo- or resolution of confl icts and leveraging matic action can provide the framework for fi nancial and other resources, known vari- proposing measures that, if implemented, ously as “groups of friends,” “contact can consolidate peace. 23 When preventive groups,” and “core groups,” grew from 4 to diplomacy and mediation lead to settle- more than 30 between 1990 and 2009 ments, they can provide much-needed (Whitfi eld 2010). At the same time, in space for other forms of action that address some prominent cases—the Syrian Arab the underlying causes of violence. How dip- Republic most obviously, but also Libya lomatic and other forms of engagements and the Republic of Yemen—the breadth could work together is explored in more and complexity of the confl ict and the detail later in this chapter. multiplicity of actors involved have defi ed Despite these fi ndings, preventive dip lo- long-standing efforts to secure lasting macy and mediation face important chal- political settlements. lenges, including both the identifi cation of Assessing the effectiveness of diplomacy entry points and the characteristics of the and mediation faces inherent challenges, confl icts to be mediated. States can be sensi- since it is hard to isolate the effects of such tive to the engagement of outsiders in what efforts from the conduct of the confl ict, are perceived as internal responsibilities. the parties, and other external actors. Data Preventive diplomacy also suffers from a bias suggest that, while diplomatic engagement toward the national level and underuse of dia- is the most common form of international logue processes at the subnational level that recourse in violent confl ict, evidence of its involve local actors, including trusted media- ability to halt the outbreak of confl ict is tors (Harland 2016). In addition, interna- mixed.20 What is clearer is that mediation tional third-party contributions tend to come alone is insuffi cient to resolve underlying once a pathway to violence has been set and causes of violence. While mediators have deviation from the path is more diffi cult. the potential to help to generate settlement deals that can bring short-term stability, Preventing Violent Extremism these deals are fragile and more likely to break down than military victories There is a strong consensus on behalf of (Hoeffl er 2014; Svensson and Lundgren many national governments and multilat- 2015). Qualitative case studies show that eral organizations, including the UN diplomacy, which at its core relies on the General Assembly, the UN Security “wisdom and appeal of its arguments” Council, and the World Bank, that violent (Hinnebusch et al. 2016, 4), has helped to extremism has reached a level of threat and avert or end violence in specifi c cases, but sophistication that requires a comprehen- that, even when successful, mediation and sive approach encompassing not only mili- elite settlements often provide breathing tary or security measures, but also space rather than long-term solutions preventive measures that directly address (Day and Pichler Fong 2017). development, good governance, human These fi ndings, however, require careful rights, and humanitarian concerns analysis of the defi nition of success.21 A (Rosand 2016; UNDP 2017). Accordingly, study using the International Crisis the United Nations has developed an over- Behavior data set of interstate war fi nds arching Plan of Action to Prevent Violent that, in cases of confl ict relapse after medi- Extremism (A/70/674), reinforcing the ated settlement between 1945 and 2005, fi rst pillar of the United Nations Global violence was often reduced in the fi rst Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288), years after relapse.22 Furthermore, when which focuses on addressing the condi- negotiated settlements are combined with tions conducive to the spread of terror- third-party security guarantees, such settle- ism (UN General Assembly 2006b; UN ments extended the duration of peace Secretary-General 2016a).

244 Pathways for Peace The Plan of Action recognizes that the While rarely deployed to avert the outbreak risk of violent extremism often increases of violence, mandates today range from under the same conditions that lead to building institutions and facilitating peace- heightened risk of confl ict and provides ful dialogue to protecting civilians and entry points for national and international upholding human rights (DPKO 2008). actors to address key drivers of extremist Since 1945, most such deployments have violence. Where violent confl ict exists, been peacekeeping operations or special efforts must be redoubled to promote and political missions led by the United Nations, sustain dialogue between warring parties, although regional and subregional missions since persistent, unresolved confl ict has fi elded by the African Union and ECOWAS proved to be a major driver of violent and multinational forces with Security extremism (ICG 2016). Therefore, the fi rst Council authorization have become of the seven strategic priority areas consists increasingly common. Peacekeeping roles of dialogue and confl ict prevention. have ranged from the “classic” model of The UN General Assembly, in Resolution interpositioning forces and monitoring 70/291 adopted on July 1, 2016, recom- cease-fi res all the way to conducting robust, mends that member states implement rec- peace enforcement operations with rules of ommendations from the Plan of Action, as engagement entailing the use of force. As of relevant to each national context (UN mid-2017, 16 peacekeeping operations are General Assembly 2016b; UN Secretary- deployed (fi gure 7.1), comprising approxi- General 2016a). It also invites member mat ely 94,000 uniformed personnel and states, together with regional and subre- 15,000 civilian personnel and lasting on gional organizations, to develop national average three times longer than operations and regional plans of action to prevent vio- prior to 2000 (UN 2015, 4). The United lent extremism. As discussed in chapter 6, a Nation’s special political missions, mean- growing number of member states and while—considered as “operations whose regional and subregional organizations are principal mandate is ‘political’” (Johnstone now developing national and regional plans 2010)—have steadily increased in the past to address the drivers of violent extremism, two decades. While only 3 political missions drawing on the UN Plan of Action to were active in 1993, 21 were active in 2017, Prevent Violent Extremism, and are request- with more than 3,000 personnel.24 Both ing UN support in their efforts. A High- peacekeeping and political missions have Level Prevent Violent Extremism Action evolved considerably over time to support Group, chaired by the secretary-general and confl ict prevention, mediation, and man- consisting of the heads of 21 UN agencies, agement across all phases of confl ict (that funds, and programs, is taking the lead in is, from situations of active confl ict to implementing the Plan of Action in support immediate postconfl ict and longer-term of member states, at their request. peacebuilding phases). Most quantitative studies, drawing on Peace Operations different statistical models and defi nitions of peacekeeping, conclude that peace oper- Although not explicitly envisioned in the ations have a large and statistically signifi - UN Charter, peace operations remain one cant impact on fostering the negotiated of the most widely known international resolution of civil wars, preventing the esca- tools for prevention and have evolved sig- lation of violence against civilians, and pre- nifi cantly since 1990, from a narrow focus venting the recurrence of violence (Doyle on monitoring cease-fi res and peace agree- and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2004; ments to complex multidimensional Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Hartzell, missions with mandates to consolidate Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Walter 1997, peace, prevent relapse into confl ict, and 2017). Evidence also suggests that peace support the restoration of state authority. operations can prevent the spread of

The International Architecture for Prevention 245 FIGURE 7.1 Overview of Deployment of UN Peacekeeping Forces, 1945–2015

120 Latin America and the Caribbean 100

Europe Sub-Saharan 60 Africa Asia 40 Thousands of troops

20 Middle East and North Africa 0

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Sources: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations; International Peace Institute; and Stimson Center. Note: Data do not include civilian personnel or volunteers. The Middle East and North Africa region includes missions to Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, and Western Sahara. All other missions are categorized according to UN regional divisions. Data for 1945–1990 show midyear values; data from 1991–2005 are monthly.

confl ict within a country once violence has managing differences and disputes. 27 Both broken out. 25 These studies have been rein- peacekeeping and political missions are, forced by analyzing different types of peace as a result, increasingly providing com- operations. For example, Collier and prehensive support across areas as diverse Rohner (2008), analyzing the correlation as human rights, the rule of law, sexual between peacekeeping expenditure and violence in confl ict, violent extremism, risks of recurrence of violent confl ict, and organized crime and drug traffi cking, Doyle and Sambanis (2000), considering security sector reform, disarmament, different types of operations and the proba- demobilization and reintegration, and bility of peace breaking down within two mine action.28 years, have shown that robust mandates and As highlighted in the 2015 report of the larger missions in terms of budget and High-Level Independent Panel on United troop strength appear to perform better in Nations Peace Operations, peace operations preventing relapse into civil war (Beardsley are increasingly deployed in protracted and 2011; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; complex confl icts, with peacekeepers and Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013). political offi cers operating in remote, unsta- Qualitatively, the successes of peace- ble, and often dangerous environments (UN keeping are numerous, including Bosnia 2015). In these contexts, peace operations and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Kosovo,26 must actively engage in confl ict prevention Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, and, and management where there is no clear more recently, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra “peace to keep” or in unstable postconfl ict Leone, and Timor-Leste. contexts characterized by fragile peace settle- The preventive value of these actions ments, weak institutions, and high risk of lies precisely in the creation of disincen- future confl ict. Peace operations in these envi- tives for the use of violence (box 7.7). As ronments play a role in (a) preventing the the complexity of confl icts has grown, continuation of violence following a cease- however, multidimensional missions have fi re or peace agreement and (b) preventing increasingly been tasked with establishing or managing new forms of confl icts and institutional mechanisms for peacefully crises (outbreak, escalation, reoccurrence).

246 Pathways for Peace BOX 7.7 Preventive Peacekeeping Deployment: The Case of the UN Preventive Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The only explicit case of a preventive exclusion. In 1995, the UN mission deployment of peacekeeping forces, the helped this nascent country to avert UN Preventive Deployment Force in the invasion by its neighbors as well as newly independent FYR Macedonia is the outbreak of an internal armed widely credited with helping to secure conﬂ ict comparable to the ones that border areas and, in conjunction with affected other Yugoslav successor diplomatic and development initiatives, states (Ackerman 1999; Babbitt 2012; preventing the outbreak of violence in Björkdahl 2006; Eldridge 2002; Lund the country (Babbitt 2012; Eldridge 2000; Sokalski 2003; Stamnes 2004; 2002; Lund 2000; Sokalski 2003; Tardy 2015). A total 1,050 troops, Stamnes 2004). combined with a dialogue with different FYR Macedonia presented many risk ethnic groups in the country and factors associated with the outbreak of the engagement of several regional civil war: a new government, adjacent governments in a high-level process of violent conﬂ ict, and a deep and politicized preventive diplomacy, played a critical divide between different groups, some role in preventing the escalation of of which suffered discrimination and violence and securing peace.

From the military side, this involvement has phases of risk from outbreak to risk of led to major changes in the rules of engage- continuation and relapse. Furthermore, ment and use of force, which have expanded the evidence shows that the various inter- to include the protection of civilians and national tools and core functions have the maintenance of access for providing worked in specific circumstances. EWSs humanitarian assistance, more robust have provided short-term warning of engagement and use of force against armed impending violence, increased diplo- actors, and capacity building of security matic efforts have secured settlements to forces. conflict and reduced the risk of out- These new circumstances have extended breaks, and peace operations have the duration of peacekeeping operations reduced spillover, escalation, and contin- and increased the scale of operations uation of violence. Evidence also suggests required both to mitigate the impact of that these tools have achieved greatest immediate violence and to reduce the risk of impact when deployed in a coordinated reoccurrence (box 7.8). While peace opera- manner after the outbreak of violence tions have prevented regional spillovers and (Hoeffler 2014), for example, when using supported postconfl ict transitions in many mediation to encourage a cease-fire or countries, they have been mandated to technical support to reinforce policy undertake tasks beyond their military and reforms. fi nancial capabilities and often run the risk However, current trends are testing the of overstretch. Some countries have experi- limits of the existing tools, and the interna- enced escalation of subnational confl ict in tional system is struggling to adapt. For spite of the deployment of large peacekeep- example, recent UN reviews highlighting ing operations, such as the Central African the “primacy of politics” in guiding UN Republic, the Democratic Republic of operations point to a more concerted need Congo, and South Sudan. to address the underlying causes of confl ict Taken together, the international across multiple levels. Chapter 8 discusses system has developed tools designed to recommendations for their adaptation and engage in preventive action across different application in more detail.

The International Architecture for Prevention 247 BOX 7.8 Evolution of “Multiphase” Conflict Prevention in Peace Operations

Contemporary crises and armed confl icts peace agreements and the transition to have brought renewed focus on the new political frameworks (transitional importance of ensuring support for governance). This work has included political solutions across all phases of peacekeeping operations and political confl ict and have established broad operations performing traditional mandates for supporting mediation, monitoring and verifi cation functions as peacemaking, and peacebuilding. These well as facilitating the implementation efforts include the following: of broader governance, economic, and Mitigating tensions and preventing security-related provisions of peace the outbreak of violence. International agreements. The United Nations Support peace operations have occasionally Mission in Libya in 2015 was involved been deployed in precrisis situations in negotiations prior to the signing of to address latent sources of tension or the Libyan Political Agreement and long-standing “frozen confl icts.” These contributed to its implementation (UN include several regional offi ces (for Department of Political Affairs 2015a). In example, UNOWAS and UNRCCA) as Burkina Faso, the United Nations helped well as other political missions (Offi ce of to strengthen national capacity for local the United Nations Special Coordinator mediation and preventive diplomacy for Lebanon and Offi ce of the United efforts and helped to draft the Charter Nations Special Coordinator for the of the Transition that was adopted in Middle East Peace Process). These November 2014. offi ces develop early warning systems Preventing reoccurrence of confl ict and provide analysis, working with through long-term peacebuilding. UN other partners to address the underlying peace operations have been mandated political, social, economic, and other to support peace consolidation efforts, causes of confl ict. with a focus on addressing core Preventing escalation of active drivers of confl ict. The UN Integrated confl icts. Peace operations have also Peacebuilding Offi ce in Sierra Leone proven their effectiveness in providing (UNIPSIL, 2008–13) was involved good offi ces and mediation support in successful peace consolidation to address “escalatory situations” and multidimensional and long-term characterized by the breakdown of recovery efforts. Following successive political dialogue and mounting violence peacekeeping operations from 1999 to (Gowan 2011). Several operations 2008, UNIPSIL was mandated to provide have been deployed during active political advice on good governance, confl icts and have been instrumental to support and train national police and in supporting cease-fi re and peace security forces, and to strengthen the negotiations (CIC 2012). capacity of democratic institutions; it Preventing continuation of confl ict has since been replaced by development in immediate postconfl ict periods. In assistance to the government in immediate postconfl ict or postcrisis implementing Sierra Leone’s Agenda contexts, peace operations have worked for Prosperity, a social and economic on preventing the continuation of confl ict development strategy for 2013–18 by supporting the implementation of (UNIPSIL 2017).

International Development peaceful and prosperous world. UN Assistance Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan’s report on conﬂ ict prevention in 2001 highlighted that International development assistance has “one of the principal aims of preventive long been a cornerstone of the interna- action should be to address the deep-rooted tional community’s endeavors to create a socioeconomic, cultural, environmental,

248 Pathways for Peace institutional, and other structural causes The Relationship between Aid that often underlie the immediate political and Confl ict symptoms of confl icts” (UN Secretary- General 2001, 2). The question of whether development Development assistance has increased assistance helps to prevent or fuel violent steadily over the past 60 years and is increas- confl ict has been a matter of debate for ingly targeted at confl ict-affected and frag- decades. Three main theories, discussed in ile contexts. Where it is aligned with an chapter 3, have guided research in this area. understanding of confl ict dynamics, aid is a Some (Calì and Mulabdic 2017; Dube and very important mechanism to support Vargas 2013) argue for a “rapacity effect,” national and local capacities to build path- whereby aid essentially creates an incentive ways toward peace. This is especially the for violence because there are more case when aid can be designed to address resources to fi ght over. For example, Nunn early risks of violent confl icts. Recent inter- and Qian (2014) fi nd a positive effect of national commitments on aid, such as the U.S. food aid on the incidence and duration 29 Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Action of confl ict. Collier and Hoeffl er (2004) Agenda (2008), and the New Deal for and Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2011) counter that Engagement in Fragile States (2011), have increasing the available resources (through recognized the role of development aid in aid or other measures) creates a disincentive peacebuilding. for violence by raising the opportunity cost, Over the past decade, the development especially if resources are allocated in a way focus among important bilateral and mul- that raises wages or redistributes them to tilateral agencies has started to shift would-be combatants. toward supporting national institutions A growing body of research suggests that and actors in confl ict prevention. However, the degree to which an increase in aid could despite calls for greater investment in pre- fuel confl ict depends on the extent to which vention (OECD 2015; World Bank 2011), the aid is fungible and the way the state uses most aid is still delivered after violence has it (Collier and Hoeffl er 2006; Langlotz and occurred, and aid fl ows to fragile and Potrafke 2016). In particular, country-level postconfl ict settings tend to be unpredict- aid, especially budget support, is sometimes able and inconsistent. Development aid is seen as being much more political and still not commonly viewed as a relevant therefore confl ict-inducing than proj- tool for early prevention, and policies that ect-level aid, precisely because it allows a stimulate growth and poverty reduction great deal of autonomy over use of the aid often are assumed to be suffi cient in and (Gehring, Kaplan, and Wong 2017). of themselves to reduce the risk of However, for governments that have a violence. sound prevention strategy, budgetary sup- In addition, international development port can be essential to providing the fi scal actors and multilateral development space and capability to implement their banks, in particular, are still highly con- prevention strategy in a comprehensive strained from engaging on sensitive issues way. A project-by-project approach can be with governments by their mandates, unmanageable and lead to fragmentation. institutional makeup, and internal culture. The use of aid is critical, as is the rele- At early signs of risk and in precrisis con- vance of the strategy that frames its delivery. texts, these constraints often limit the If part of the budget support is channeled scope for development programming to toward military spending, it could contrib- address causes of tension and sensitive ute to a decrease in violence if it effectively areas such as security and justice. Aid for deters opposing groups from using violence. prevention also tends to be fragmented, However, if the increased military funding short term, and seen as a complement to is channeled toward more repressive mea- rather than an integral part of develop- sures seen as illegitimate by the population, ment efforts. it can have the opposite effect.

The International Architecture for Prevention 249 Aid at the project level is viewed as could be political diffi culties in realigning less political, although certainly not development aid in precrisis contexts or the confl ict-neutral. Aid projects that provide often-dramatic reprioritization of aid that basic goods (food, water) or improve ser- occurs when crisis breaks out (with empha- vice delivery can have different effects sis placed on security or humanitarian depending on how the aid is used and what expenditures). Even more worrisome are kind of aid it is. Aid that goes to individual the disruptions of standard procedures in projects can contribute to increased vio- development coordination that occur when lence if rebel groups are able to appropriate a crisis breaks. and use it as an incentive for recruitment, or Because of these potential negative it can reduce violence if it helps to boost impacts, linking the delivery of aid to incomes and relieve economic stresses in do-no-harm measures is essential to help confl ict-affected regions (Anderson 1999; donors be sensitive to the specifi c con- Fearon and Laitin 2003). texts in which they operate. This process Because aid is part and parcel of the local includes identifying issues, elements, or fac- context, differential benefi ts from aid can tors that divide societies as well as local reinforce intergroup tensions and fuel divi- capacity for peace that brings societies sive narratives of “us” versus “them” together. It also requires donors to consider (Anderson 1999; Jenny 2017). Moreover, what aid will do for whom, who are the aid can reinforce grievances along identity responsible actors and stakeholders, and lines when it lacks impartiality or when it is who has access to aid (Wallace 2015). A perceived as biased in favor of specifi c study conducted at the end of the fi ve-year groups irrespective of their need for assis- pilot phase of the New Deal took stock of tance (Carbonnier 2015). An OECD (2010) how bilateral and multilateral donors have report on monitoring the principles for conceptualized and implemented their good international engagement in fragile commitment to promote “inclusive and states and situations highlights the uneven legitimate politics” (INCAF 2017). On the distribution of aid resources as problematic basis of empirical evidence acquired in fi ve of the six countries reviewed through case studies in four G-7+ pilot (Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, countries (Afghanistan, Somalia, South the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Sudan, and Timor-Leste), the study fi nds and Timor-Leste). In Timor-Leste, for that, at best, donors work with an incom- example, the “Dili-centric” development plete and inadequate understanding of the efforts were thought to worsen the typically fragmented and contested politics urban-rural divide and contribute to pock- of fragile societies beyond the formal repre- ets of exclusion (OECD 2010). sentatives of their governments and admin- Aid can also create a substitution effect istrations (INCAF 2017). The study also when an action takes over local capacity fi nds that, in response to perceived or real and reduces or replaces local efforts. This defi cits in governance with regard to legiti- can have negative impacts by reducing the macy or inclusivity, donors tend to offer legitimacy of existing structures or standardized packages of political support authorities. For example, a dual or parallel that focus on the technical and procedural public sector can detract from important aspects of an idealized democracy (for state- and peacebuilding processes that are example, pressuring national stakeholders necessary for the country to earn legitimacy to hold national elections as soon as possi- in the eyes of its constituents. Aid also can ble after a political settlement) rather than affect the local market, reinforce market on realities on the ground. distortions by feeding the war economy, Overall, aid brings positive results when and undermine peacetime production it is delivered with meaningful engagement (Kang 2017). with government and civil society. As Finally, aligning priorities for develop- described in chapter 6, civil society plays a ment aid can be diffi cult, depending on critical role in confl ict prevention. Donors when crisis breaks out. For example, there have supported local peace committees

250 Pathways for Peace and various confl ict resolution platforms, dialogues (box 7.10) as well as consultative including in postconflict situations. processes to develop confl ict and fragility For such programs, civil society has assessments. Two relevant examples are the proven to be an indispensable interlocutor, UN’s confl ict and development analysis and facilitator, and mediator, particularly in the World Bank’s risk and resilience assess- cases in which political corruption, orga- ments, which inform programming. nized crime, and dysfunctional state insti- Multistakeholder analytical and coordi- tutions are major issues. Donor-funded nation platforms are increasingly being community-based confl ict resolution has used to improve alignment of aid fl ows proved critical in various contexts. includ- among multiple partners with identifi ed ing Ghana, the Kyrgyz Republic, and confl ict and peacebuilding priorities. Lesotho (Giessmann, Galvanek, and Seifert Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments 2017). This involvement entails risks: when (RPBAs), for instance, are assessments sup- development aid is channeled primarily ported by the EU, the United Nations, and through nongovernmental organizations, the World Bank to support countries in the it can undermine the state’s capacity to development of holistic strategies for play a central role in prevention. addressing the political, security, and devel- A critical element of enhancing the opment priorities related to stabilization impact of aid on peace is connecting aid and peacebuilding (box 7.11). from both development and security actors to national processes of prioritization. The Supporting Peaceful Pathways New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States with Development Assistance (box 7.9) provides a guiding framework for this connection. It emerged from the As discussed in chapter 3, the path depen- 2007 Principles for Good International dence of violence and of peace means that, Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, as risks accumulate and intensify, the which sought to translate established prin- options for preventing violence become ciples of aid effectiveness—as per the Paris scarcer and more diffi cult to take. Because Declaration of 2005—to contexts of fragil- aid is channeled through national govern- ity and confl ict. These initiatives and others ments, international actors also experience are supported by bodies such as the this dynamic in supporting national pro- International Network on Confl ict and cesses; in higher-risk contexts, a smaller Fragility, established in 2009 by the range of tools are applicable and feasible. Development Assistance Committee to To increase effectiveness, aid needs to be enable its members to develop similar targeted suffi ciently on supporting preven- frameworks. tion policies and programs when early signs International actors are supporting of risk appear and fl exible enough to adapt national prioritization and planning pro- as risks change. This targeting has proven cesses in a growing number of countries. diffi cult in the past, not least because it This can include support for national requires having a frank and engaged

BOX 7.9 The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile agreement formed with guidance from the States emerged from the recognition that International Dialogue on Peacebuilding ensuring effective development and Statebuilding, which comprises assistance requires a common conﬂ ict-affected and fragile countries, civil international framework for all countries society, and international partners. It has tackling the challenge of conﬂ ict and been endorsed by more than 40 countries fragility. The New Deal is a global policy and organizations since 2011.

The International Architecture for Prevention 251 BOX 7.10 United Nations–World Bank Partnership in the Republic of Yemen

During the Republic of Yemen’s post- support to confl ict-affected vulnerable 2011 Arab Spring period, the World Yemenis. The current International Bank provided technical assistance to Development Association (IDA) the government in support of the portfolio of more than US$1 billion is country’s transition, including advice on being implemented in full partnership implementation of the Yemeni National with selected United Nations partners Dialogue process. In 2014 the Bank that have presence on the ground seconded a staff member to the Offi ce and can work closely with Yemeni of the Special Advisor to the UN institutions to provide critical support Secretary-General on the Republic of in sectors such as health, nutrition, Yemen to optimize the support of both water, social protection, and urban institutions for implementation of the services. The World Bank is also National Dialogue outcomes. When the preparing for postconfl ict recovery Republic of Yemen’s military confl ict and reconstruction, paying due fully erupted in 2015, the United attention to state and institution Nations and the World Bank agreed to building and laying the foundation for align the political mediation process a more inclusive and resilient Republic with economic recovery through the of Yemen. development of initiatives that The partnership between the United interwove political and economic Nations and the World Bank has been elements. institutionalized through a Yemen Despite suspension of its preconfl ict Humanitarian-Development-Peace portfolio, the World Bank maintained Program that brings together joint and its engagement with the Republic of shared data across the humanitarian- Yemen during the confl ict, preserving development-peace spectrum and critical local service delivery institutions contributes to a common understanding and providing inclusive emergency of risks, needs, gaps, and opportunities.

discussion with governments on issues of ultimately undermining the state or increas- risk of violence that both sides too often ing the vulnerability of those actors to state perceive as being outside the realm of devel- retaliation. opment efforts. 30 Finding ways to support national actors in A more formidable challenge arises changing course toward prevention, when when the state is the source of violence or a incentives are strongly aligned against it, major obstacle to peace. In these situations, requires a level of coordination and sensitivity international actors are left with few to local dynamics that is rarely seen. Calls for options. They can halt aid entirely or con- better coordination are consistently made, fi ne it to priority regions or essential ser- agreed on, and later ignored. In many cases, vices, with the risk that doing so could rather than enhancing coordination and effi - reinforce divisions or give groups no alter- ciency, large-scale external aid has produced native but to seek the support of the state. fragmentation, confronting government part- Conditioning aid on a change in course by ners with thousands of projects, many of the state is another option, but doing so can them short term, and parallel governance and generate risks similar to the impacts of fi duciary systems (Institute for State sanctions and has not proven effective in Effectiveness 2018). At the heart of this failure the recent past. Working through nonstate is a misalignment of incentives within both actors is another option, but this too risks multilateral and national institutions.

252 Pathways for Peace BOX 7.11 Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment in the Central African Republic

The Central African Republic RPBA The survey collected information on aimed to help the new government to household socioeconomic well-being, promote peace and prevent a relapse of perceptions of security and economic confl ict following presidential elections conditions, and opinions on policy in early 2016. The assessment was priorities. The assessment reached fi rmly grounded in a shared more than 14,000 people across the understanding of the confl ict, building country, resulting in a national plan that on a World Bank risk and resilience was adopted by the government and assessment, which informed the Parliament as basis for its recovery RPBA’s confl ict analysis and the UN’s efforts. strategic assessment mission. It The assessment recognized the supported the planning for the limited outreach of government United Nations Multidimensional services and the signifi cant role that Integrated Stabilization Mission in the international community, including the Central African Republic civil society organizations, played in (MINUSCA) operations. The joint EU, security and service delivery. The UN, World Bank scoping mission to RPBA established a basis for a renewed Bangui in May 2016 met with the partnership between government and government, the international international partners, formalized in a community, civil society, and the framework for mutual accountability private sector. The fi ndings of the signed during a Brussels donor confl ict analysis were shared with the roundtable (November 17, 2016). government and were used to defi ne This partnership focused on a limited shared strategic objectives across number of critical priorities essential development, peace, and security for the Central African Republic’s pillars. transition toward peace, stability, and The RPBA was innovative in economic recovery. The fi nancing its integration of the views of the and implementation arrangements population, gathered in a survey recognized the country’s need to conducted in all 179 communes transition away from international and through interviews with local fi nancing and to increase its revenue authorities on local infrastructure mobilization. and security and policy priorities.

Source: “Central African Republic: National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017–21.”

Allocation of Offi cial Development Assistance multilateral institutions—has been growing steadily, quadrupling since 1960 in real Offi cial development assistance (ODA), terms (OECD 2017).32 Since 2000, the rate as an external fi nancial fl ow—along with of increase has accelerated, with ODA foreign direct investment, remittances, and measured in real terms (in constant 2015 lending—is vital to countries with limited prices and exchange rates) more than capacity to raise domestic resources, doubling between 2000 and 2016 from including countries affected by confl ict.31 US$70.85 billion to US$143.3 billion, with In response to the increasingly complex a nearly 50 percent increase from 2007 to challenges faced by many low- and 2016 alone (OECD 2017). 33 The share of middle-income countries, ODA— comprising ODA going to multilateral institutions has concessional fi nancing from donor increased, while bilateral aid has decreased governments to both governments and slightly (falling by 5 percent from 2015).

The International Architecture for Prevention 253 As a result, multilateral aid is now The largest share of ODA is directed roughly equal to bilateral aid (Development toward countries considered fragile or Assistance Committee 2017). confl ict-affected, where other sources of The rise in ODA has been boosted by an fi nancing, especially foreign direct invest- increase in humanitarian aid, particularly ment, tend to be more limited.35 During in response to the refugee crisis (box 7.12). 2011–14, 14 of the top 20 ODA recipients Humanitarian aid increased by 8 percent were considered fragile, according to the between 2015 and 2016 in real terms, reach- OECD framework (OECD 2016), and ing US$14.4 billion. Still, humanitarian aid overall net ODA fl ows to fragile states remains a small portion of overall ODA, increased by around 140 percent in real only about 10 percent in 2016 (Development terms from 2000 to 2015 (Dugarova and Assistance Committee 2017). In addition, Gulasan 2017). ODA spent by donor countries to cover the Across fragile contexts, ODA tends to costs of hosting refugees surged by 27.5 per- concentrate in a handful of countries. For cent to US$15.4 billion between 2015 and instance, between 2003 and 2012, 2016, representing roughly 10.8 percent of Afghanistan and Iraq received 22 percent of ODA (Development Assistance Committee all ODA allocated to fragile contexts (OECD 2017). 34 2015). In per capita terms, 34 of 56 fragile

BOX 7.12 Humanitarian Assistance

The primary purpose of humanitarian refugees are important responsibilities assistance is to save lives, reduce of countries, and in the absence of suffering, and maintain human dignity. successful prevention of confl icts and Since 2013, approximately 97 percent of disaster risk reduction, it is essential humanitarian crises have been “complex to mitigate the impact of confl ict on emergencies,” meaning that they are the most vulnerable. Since the World multifaceted humanitarian crises Humanitarian Summit in 2016, important requiring multisectoral response efforts have been under way to (UNOCHA 2016). With humanitarian integrate the provision of humanitarian appeals lasting an average of seven and development assistance more years, humanitarian actors have been tightly, recognizing the need to respond present in many crises for more than two simultaneously to life-saving needs, decades, for example, in the Democratic strengthen economic and social Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Sudan resilience, and, where possible, promote (UNOCHA 2015). peacebuilding in confl ict contexts. The As highlighted by the World World Humanitarian Summit resulted in Humanitarian Summit, this funding is important commitments in this regard, unsustainable. Financing requirements with member states and international for the UN-coordinated humanitarian organizations committing to improve appeals and refugee response plans joint planning and aid predictability increased signifi cantly from US$5.2 and to ensure seamless transitions billion in 2006 to US$22.1 billion in 2016 between humanitarian and development (UN 2017). Whereas humanitarian aid assistance. The summit secured, above also increased from US$3.4 billion to everything else, key commitments to US$12.6 billion during the same period, it prevent and end confl icts and leave no increasingly falls short of needs, and only one behind. Building on the summit, 56 percent of the UN appeals were met the World Bank and the United Nations in 2016 (UN 2017). have committed to “engaging earlier Providing humanitarian aid and to prevent violent confl ict and reduce meeting international commitments to humanitarian need” (World Bank 2017).

254 Pathways for Peace contexts attracted less than the average period 2007–14 aid volatility in fragile and ODA per capita that the group as a whole confl ict-affected settings was 7 percentage received between 2011 and 2014—among points higher and donors performed 10 them, 17 fragile contexts received less percentage points fewer of their activities than half the average level (OECD 2016). jointly with other donors than in other The extent of aid dependency also varies contexts (Chandy, Seidal, and Zhang 2016). signifi cantly within the group. During the It has been argued that in high-risk same period, the average aid dependency contexts, volatile aid risks amplifying coun- among fragile contexts was 10.5 percent of tries’ internal instability (Chandy, Seidel, gross national income (GNI), compared and Zhang 2016) and constrains the capac- with 2.5 percent of GNI for stable contexts; ity for postconfl ict recovery. In many in Afghanistan, Liberia, and the Solomon protracted confl icts, this volatility in the Islands, it was around or above 30 percent volume of aid can be exacerbated by sud- (OECD 2016). den diversion of aid from developmental or Despite strong arguments for increas- institutional development to humanitarian ing aid fl ows before violence takes hold service delivery, and back, as countries (OECD 2015; World Bank 2011), most aid undergo repeated cycles of violence (Carver focuses on postcrisis situations. While 2017). As the example of the Central humanitarian aid tends to spike during African Republic (box 7.13) illustrates, and immediately after confl ict, develop- unpredictable aid fl ows are creating major ment assistance, which represents the bulk constraints on efforts to prevent the relapse of ODA, is most often disbursed only after of violent confl icts. Collier and Rohner violence has occurred and declines very (2008), noting the negative effects that vio- rapidly (see, example, fi gure 7.2). lent confl ict infl icts on a country’s institu- Aid volatility poses another set of chal- tions and capacity, argue that aid fl ows lenges, especially for countries recovering would be much more productive if sus- from violent confl ict. According to a report tained over time, as countries rebuild by the Brookings Institution, during the institutions.

FIGURE 7.2 Aid Inflows (2002–15) and Conflict-Related Fatalities (2000–16) in the Democratic Republic of Congo

8,000 8,000 7,000 7,000 6,000 6,000 5,000 5,000 4,000 4,000 3,000 3,000

2,000 2,000 Number of deaths 1,000 1,000 Gross disbursement (US$, millions) 0 0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Reported fatalities (right axis) DAC donors (left axis) All donors (left axis) Multilateral donors (left axis)

Sources: OECD Statistics; Armed Conﬂ ict Location and Event Data (ACLED) database; Yi 2017. Note: DAC = OECD Development Assistance Committee.

The International Architecture for Prevention 255 BOX 7.13 Aid Volatility in the Central African Republic

The Central African Republic has been on during the period 2002–14, amounting the “fragile states” list of the OECD to US$65 per capita. The average, every year since the fi rst year it was however, is biased upward by two large published in 2007. In 2013 the OECD aid allocations: US$760 million in debt identifi ed the country as being potentially relief in 2009 and US$270 million in underaided—an “aid orphan”—according emergency relief in 2014. to two needs-based models using Over the same period, ODA income per capita and population size as allocations to the fi rst three parameters. Peacebuilding and State-bu ilding Goals In reality, however, the Central African of the New Deal on political, security, Republic has been the recipient of often and justice institutions amounted to large, but extremely volatile, support. In only US$3 per capita and an even more 1998 a UN peacekeeping operation was paltry US$1.4 per capita for 2002–05, deployed in the context of army mutinies immediately after withdrawal of the and in the midst of controversial electoral peacekeeping operation. Total ODA preparations with a mission budget of allocated to goals 1–3 amounted to only approximately US$200 million in 2018 US$180 million over the 12-year period dollars. This mission was replaced on between 2002 and 2014. January 1, 2000, by a “peacebuilding Following the escalation of violence offi ce” with a budget 100 times in 2013–14, a peacekeeping mission smaller—approximately US$2 million. with more than 12,500 uniformed At the same time, total fl ows of ODA personnel and an annual operating to the country have been small. On budget of US$920 million was deployed, average, the Central African Republic with US$2.2 billion of ODA pledged to received US$286 million per year support peacebuilding and recovery.

Sources: IMF 2009; OECD 2016.

Areas of Convergence the development of institutional platforms between Diplomatic, for interagency coordination and resource Security, and Development pooling. The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Fund have played a stra- Instruments tegic role in fostering greater coordination With violent confl ict increasingly operating between peacekeeping and development outside of state-based frameworks and the actors and ensuring fi nancial resources for need for prevention to move beyond single integrated programs (box 7.14). This has actions and toward sustained engagement, been notably the case in Burundi, the no single policy realm is adequate to Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra manage the risks of confl ict (Griffi n, Leone, where support of the Peacebuilding forthcoming). Instead, successful confl ict Commission and Peacebuilding Fund has prevention strategies increasingly need to enabled peace consolidation and postcon- align security, development, and diplomatic fl ict transition processes. Collaboration has action over the long term. also gone beyond UN development agencies Recognizing the potential impact of to include partnerships with other multilat- more coordinated responses, diplomatic, eral development organizations, including security, and development actors increas- the World Bank. ingly seek to bridge divides and fi nd areas of The evolution of both practice and convergence between international tools in policy points to some critical areas of order to harness more coordinated action convergence among security, develop- for prevention. This has been facilitated by ment, and diplomatic action. This section

256 Pathways for Peace BOX 7.14 The Peacebuilding Commission

The Peacebuilding Commission was • Bring sustained international attention established on December 20, 2005, by to sustaining peace and to providing Resolution 60/180 of the UN General political accompaniment and advocacy Assembly (2005) and Resolution 1645 of to countries affected by conﬂ ict, with the UN Security Council (2005), with the their consent

following mandate: • Promote an integrated, strategic, and

• Bring together all relevant actors to coherent approach to peacebuilding, marshal resources and to advise on noting that security, development, and and propose integrated strategies for human rights are closely interlinked postconﬂ ict peacebuilding and and mutually reinforcing recovery • Serve as a bridge between the

• Focus attention on the reconstruction principal organs and relevant entities and institution-building efforts of the United Nations by sharing necessary for recovery from conﬂ ict advice on peacebuilding needs and and support the development of priorities, in line with the respective integrated strategies in order to lay competencies and responsibilities of the foundation for sustainable these bodies development • Serve as a platform to convene all

• Provide recommendations and relevant actors within and outside information to improve the the United Nations, including from coordination of all relevant actors member states; national authorities; within and outside the United UN missions and country teams; Nations, develop best practices, international, regional, and help to ensure predictable subregional organizations; fi nancing for early recovery international fi nancial institutions; activities, and extend the period of civil society; women’s groups; youth attention given by the organizations; and, where relevant, international community to the private sector and national postconfl ict recovery. human rights institutions, in order to provide recommendations and Resolutions A/RES/70/262 (UN General information to improve their Assembly 2016a) and S/RES/2282 coordination, to develop and share (UN Security Council 2016) stress the good practices in peacebuilding, importance of the Peacebuilding including on institution building, and Commission to fulfi ll the following to ensure predictable fi nancing for functions in this regard: peacebuilding.

Sources: UN General Assembly 2005, 2016a; UN Security Council 2005, 2016.

discusses how this convergence has con- planning and assessments have been used to tributed to the prevention of violent con- inform possible mediation planning, and flict over the long term. development operations have directly undertaken or supported early mediation Preconfl ict Mediation efforts. These efforts are particularly useful for addressing subnational disputes or Development actors have a standing pres- latent tensions. A good example of this ence in almost all countries at risk of work is the Joint United Nations confl ict and maintain well-established rela- Development Programme (UNDP)– tionships and contacts with a wide range of Department of Political Affairs Program on national actors. In some cases, development Building National Capacities for Confl ict

The International Architecture for Prevention 257 Prevention (box 7.15), which has supported reform, disarmament, demobilization, and confl ict analysis and early mediation efforts reintegration (DDR), and economic recov- in countries including Chad and Kenya and ery, among others (box 7.16). Peace opera- has engaged national governments to build tions and development agencies have the capacity to address confl ict risks (UNDP developed joint strategic frameworks to and Department of Political Affairs 2016). support multidimensional stabilization efforts, which have combined military, Support for Postconfl ict police, and civilian capacities and resources Peacebuilding with development programming and fi nancing to support improved security Peace operations—particularly in contexts conditions and institutional capacities. with tenuous or no peace agreements— Experience shows the importance of increasingly have mandates to support “ bottom- up,” community- driven confl ict the creation of a political, security, institu- mitigation strategies with inclusive tional, and economic environment condu- approaches to defi ning, reestablishing, and cive to peacemaking and longer-term reforming institutions of governance and peacebuilding.36 In some countries, this has economic recovery strategies predicated on required technical advisory and develop- addressing inequality and exclusion.37 This ment assistance across a range of the- evolving approach to stabilization, which matic areas, including restoration of state has been articulated operationally in the authority, security and justice sector Central African Republic, the Democratic

BOX 7.15 Strengthening National Capacities for Conflict Prevention

Within the United Nations, the Program with national stakeholders related on Building National Capacities for to social cohesion, dialogue, confl ict Confl ict Prevention is an example of prevention, peacebuilding, or other confl ict prevention programming that relevant fi elds; (c) establishing brings together political and strategic partnerships with key developmental comparative advantage, national stakeholders, regional and capitalizing on the diversity within the international actors, and development United Nations system (UNDP and partners; and (d) strengthening the Department of Political Affairs 2016). capacity of UNDP and the UN country Drawing on a cadre of peace and team to undertake confl ict analysis and development advisers (PDAs), the joint mainstream confl ict sensitivity in regular program helps in-country UN personnel programming. to strengthen national capacities and In 2016, for example, the joint infrastructures for peace. Growing program engagements ranged from exponentially, 42 PDAs were deployed strengthening dialogue, mediation, and globally in 2016. national peace architectures in Kenya, The role of PDAs is to adapt and Niger, the Philippines, and Ukraine to respond to complex political situations enabling strategic responses of the and to develop and implement strategic United Nations system through confl ict prevention initiatives and programs. analysis in Burundi and Tunisia and from Broadly speaking, they engage in four conducting recovery and peacebuilding core areas: (a) providing strategic advice assessments with the World Bank and confl ict analysis support to UN and the EU in Cameroon and Nigeria personnel in their relations with host to supporting the design of confl ict government offi cials; (b) identifying prevention programs in Bangladesh, areas of programmatic engagement Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan.

Sources: Batmanglich 2017; UNDP and Department of Political Affairs 2016.

258 Pathways for Peace BOX 7.16 Iraq’s Facility for Stabilization

At the request of the Iraqi prime minister, economy, generate local jobs, and reduce UNDP established the Funding Facility overall costs. for Stabilization (FFS) in June 2015 to Nearly 1,550 projects are currently help the government stabilize cities under way in 28 liberated towns in and districts liberated from the Islamic Anbar, Diyala, Nineveh, and Salah al Din State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The governorates. More than half involve FFS is designed to help safeguard rehabilitation of electricity, water, and against the resurgence of violence and sewage grids. Rather than starting at extremism, facilitate returns, and lay the the top of the grid and forcing families groundwork for reconstruction and to wait for services, sometimes for recovery. years, households are being connected FFS is an on-demand instrument to the nearest functioning component of overseen by a steering committee the grid. chaired by the secretary-general of the Bridges, schools, health centers, Iraqi Council of Ministers. Stabilization pharmacies, hospitals, universities, priorities are set by the Iraqi authorities and administrative buildings are being who are directly responsible for repaired, and thousands of people are stabilizing areas. As soon as a newly employed on work crews, removing liberated area is declared safe and local rubble and transporting debris. Destitute authorities have identifi ed priorities, families, including women-headed UNDP uses fast-track procedures to bring households, are benefi ting from cash local contractors on the ground, usually grants, and thousands of houses are being within weeks. rebuilt in destroyed neighborhoods. More than 95 percent of all The impact has been signifi cant; stabilization projects are done through half of the nearly 6 million Iraqis who the local private sector employing local were displaced during the fi ghting have labor. This approach is highly effective, returned to their homes and started to helping to inject liquidity into the local rebuild their lives.

Sources: Pillay and van der Hoeven 2017.

Republic of Congo, and Mali, attempts to current decade has seen heightened politi- provide a long-term commitment to reduc- cal and security challenges in settings where ing violence by identifying and managing peace operations deploy (for example, no the drivers of confl ict alongside political peace agreement or inclusive political pro- negotiations. cess, transnational criminal networks, a rising number of armed nonstate actors, Disarmament, Demobilization, violent extremism, or regional armed group and Reintegration and dynamics), making DDR more challenging Community-Based Confl ict to achieve (Colletta and Muggah 2009; Management Muggah 2010). Nonetheless, the Security Council continues to mandate DDR in situ- A core element of postconfl ict peacebuild- ations of protracted confl icts, violent ing is the DDR of combatants. The United extremism, and generalized criminal Nations, the World Bank, and other inter- violence. national organizations have been effective One of the emerging challenges facing at monitoring and supporting demobiliza- development, security, and diplomatic tion and disarmament processes. When it operations alike is the presence of organized comes to reintegration, however, their armed groups and criminal gangs, often record is mixed (Berdal and Ucko 2009; rooted in unsuccessfully reintegrated Weinstein and Humphreys 2005). The combatants. While these groups are usually

The International Architecture for Prevention 259 small, they can create local confl icts that can capacity to restore and maintain law and rapidly escalate to the national level. order, providing training and technical International partners, particularly assistance for legal reform and institu- peace operations, are increasingly working tional strengthening (UN Secretary- with national governments in formulating General 2016b). With respect to justice bottom-up, nonmilitary preventive “com- and corrections, technical advisory sup- munity engagement strategies.” These ini- port from a wide range of sources has been tiatives may complement formal peace deployed to support legal and institutional agreements and include approaches such as reforms and to boost professionalism and community violence reduction programs or capacity through direct technical support community stabilization projects. These and advice (DPKO 2016). This support strategies are focused on “localizing” ser- changes signifi cantly in contexts marked vices in arenas of contestation, through by the absence of a clear political settle- protection of civilians, mitigation of inter- ment or peace agreement, as in Mali and communal confl icts, and community vio- South Sudan. In these cases, support for lence reduction actions, while at the same security and justice sector reform can be time restoring state authority in sensitive provided during peace negotiations or areas. These initiatives have used fi eld national dialogue processes through deployments of peace operations as plat- upstream provision of technical advice. forms for engagement and have proven popular for their targeted and fl exible Building National Capacity for nature. There is a clear point of convergence Mediation between these efforts and the actions of development partners focusing on local The shift in mediation practice from a peacebuilding and reconciliation as well as “state-centric” model toward inclusive pro- broader community- or area-based eco- cesses involving governmental and nongov- nomic recovery and social protection ernmental actors has been complemented programming. However, questions remain with stronger support for national and local as to their accountability and sustainability. mediation capacities. Provision of capacity Similar to other types of decentralized development assistance—through training, efforts to strengthen security at the local development of guidance, and institutional level, community violence reduction, in strengthening—has been supported by particular, has been criticized for inadver- civil society, development, and multilateral tently empowering gangs, stigmatizing cer- organizations alike, often forming part of tain communities, and lacking adequate governance or peacebuilding programming. oversight (Muggah 2017). Since 2012, for instance, the United Nations has partnered with the EU to support Security and Justice Reform “national and local mediation” capacities in 14 countries with a focus on dialogue and Another area of convergence between dif- negotiation. Together, the United Nations ferent operations has been in the area of and the EU have supported national plat- security and justice reform as part of forms for mediation and dialogue in Bolivia efforts to improve effectiveness, civilian and Ghana; youth and women organiza- oversight, and accountability of the state tions in Chad, the Maldives, and Togo; and (UN Secretary-General 2013). While his- national dialogue processes in Guyana, torically mandated in the context of peace Mauritania, Nepal, and the Republic of operations, reform of security and justice Yemen. Best-practice guidelines have been institutions has increasingly been sup- summarized in a joint publication by the ported through development assistance. In United Nations and EU, joining similar policing, for instance, collaborative opera- guidelines for mediating confl icts over nat- tions between peacekeeping and develop- ural resources and guidance on gender and ment actors have provided direct inclusive mediation strategies (UN operational support to enhance national Secretary-General 2012).

260 Pathways for Peace Development Support for 2015 presidential and legislative elections. Negotiations This group was composed of the African Union, ECOWAS, and the United Nations, Development assistance can be a useful international and regional actors, and resource for mediators seeking to facilitate development partners, including the World comprehensive agreements on the social, Bank (Pichler Fong 2017). economic, and governance provisions of a peace settlement or successor agreement. Conclusion This support is particularly important, where multitier agreements are under nego- Since the end of the Cold War, the multilat- tiation (that is, where they focus not just on eral architecture for confl ict prevention and high-level political issues but also on postconfl ict peacebuilding has struggled to broader social, economic, and institutional adapt to a fast-changing situation in the issues). Development institutions such as fi eld and globally. Despite many challenges, the World Bank have provided technical there have been some clear achievements. advice and guidance on the development At a systemic level, comprehensive interna- of economic provisions of political tional normative and legal frameworks are settlements. In complex multilevel media- in place to regulate the tools and conduct of tion efforts that span various stages of polit- war; protect human rights; address global ical negotiation toward a comprehensive threats including climate change, terrorism, settlement, development actors help to and transnational criminal networks; and identify and frame technical issues, assess promote inclusive approaches to develop- the developmental and fi scal impacts of ment (the SDGs). Several of these aspects negotiated settlements, and provide advi- are refl ected in the 2030 Agenda. sory assistance on options. Operationally, the United Nations and In the context of the 2011 Gulf regional organizations such as the African Cooperation Council peace agreement in Union and the EU have provided global and the Republic of Yemen, for instance, which regional forums to coordinate international included the organization of a national dia- responses to threats to peace and stability. logue to achieve consensus on key national The results have been important tools priorities, development partners actively stretching across the confl ict cycle— including supported the UN special envoy in identify- preventive diplomacy, protection of civil- ing, framing, and organizing negotiations ians, and peace operations—which have around key social and economic issues. proven instrumental in preventing con- Development assistance can also support fl icts, mediating cease-fi res and peace agree- the translation of political “blueprints” for ments, and supporting postconfl ict recovery governance arrangements into reality and transition processes. through investments in institutional Growing collaboration between efforts development. Technical support and devel- to prevent violent confl ict and development opment of capacity of the parties in peace actors has been a key part of these negotiations between the government of developments. As confl icts have increas- the Philippines and Mindanao Islamic ingly originated from and disrupted the Liberation Front was provided by the UN core institutions of states, international and and the World Bank through the Facility for regional initiatives have accompanied these Advisory Support for Transition Capacities, changes with greater coordination and or FASTRAC. In Burkina Faso, for example, resource pooling between development, the International Follow-up and Support diplomatic, and security efforts. In preven- Group for the Transition in Burkina Faso, tive diplomacy, this coordination has been established in December 2014, aimed to demonstrated by the involvement of diverse implement the transition roadmap and stakeholders, the codifi cation of mediation, provided diplomatic, technical, and fi nan- and its broadening both thematically and in cial support to the transitional government terms of its application at all levels and in restoring peace and preparing for the phases of confl ict. Peacekeeping has evolved

The International Architecture for Prevention 261 from a narrow focus on monitoring cease- multilateral tools and the mandate to fi res and peace agreements to complex mul- instruct engagements on developmental, tidimensional missions with mandates to peace, and security dimensions of confl ict consolidate peace, stabilize the country, and are often fragmented between institutions support the restoration of state authority. and actors. Development assistance is shifting toward Bringing the full power of international earlier engagement, more attention to tools to bear on today’s risks requires a socioeconomic and institutional drivers of much greater level of coordination and con- fragility and confl ict, and improved align- vergence than has been present historically. ment with diplomatic, peace, and security Achieving this demands a realignment of efforts. incentives to encourage greater collabora- While this evolution is welcome, with tion among states and within the multilat- confl icts becoming more fragmented, more eral system. Chapter 8 turns to this complex, and more transnational, these challenge. tools are profoundly challenged—entry points for diplomatic engagement are Notes harder to fi nd (Gowan and Stedman 2018; Walter 2017), and peace operations are 1. United Nations Charter, Art. 1. increasingly deployed to insecure 2. See UN General Assembly (2016a) and environments. Meanwhile, multilateral Articles 2 and 3 of the UN Charter. The sus- engagement, per se, is tested by the emer- taining peace resolutions reaffi rmed this gence of nonstate actors uninterested in principle, recognizing “the primary respon- state-based power, ideologies at odds with sibility of national Governments and international humanitarian law, and the authorities in identifying, driving, and increased sponsorship of proxy warfare by directing priorities, strategies, and activities global and regional powers, as discussed in for sustaining peace … emphasizing that chapter 1. Each of these elements decreases sustaining peace is a shared task and respon- the incentives of violent actors to accept sibility that needs to be fulfi lled by the mediation and increases the resistance of Government and all other national stake- the international community to accept the holders” (UN General Assembly 2016a; UN terms of negotiated settlements. Security Council 2016). These conclusions increase the need to 3. Of the 63 resolutions adopted by the focus on country pathways—the endoge- Security Council in 2014, 32 were adopted nous risk factors that engender violence and “acting under Chapter VII of the Charter” support for countries to address their own (approximately 51 percent), while in 2015, crises. Despite notable successes, current 35 of the 64 resolutions were adopted “act- tools for international support are chal- ing under Chapter VII of the Charter” lenged with engaging effectively before the (approximately 55 percent). As in previous risks of violence become manifest. To some periods, most of those resolutions con- degree, this challenge refl ects the diffi culty cerned the mandates of UN and regional of gaining accurate information, as even the peacekeeping missions or multinational most sophisticated EWSs offer only short forces and the imposition, extension, modi- time frames for averting crisis. However, in fi cation, or termination of sanctions mea- larger part, the lack of incentives of actors sures (see, for example, UN Department of to identify and address broader risks pres- Political Affairs 2015b, 4). ents the wider challenge. 4. The topics covered under these thematic At its core, preventive action now is debates are an arena of evolving multilateral instigated in large part by actions to miti- agreement. During 2014 and 2015, for gate violence and its impact on individual example, under the broad category of main- rights and by the international and regional tenance of international peace and security, system, rather than by countries’ own devel- the Security Council held 17 meetings, more opment progress. When dealing with a than a fi vefold increase with respect to the new generation of confl icts, governance of previous two years. Subagenda items

262 Pathways for Peace discussed in this period also multiplied and confl ict and US$400 million during recovery included the following: (a) war, its lessons, years. Similarly, peacekeeping support aver- and the search for a permanent peace; ages US$30 million a year for countries at (b) security sector reform; (c) confl ict pre- high risk, compared with US$100 million vention; (d) inclusive development for the for countries in open confl ict and US$300 maintenance of international peace and during recovery (Mueller 2017). security; (e) the role of youth in countering 11. Many government-owned or govern- violent extremism; (f) peace and security ment-sponsored confl ict prediction systems challenges facing small islands developing are classifi ed. Since the early 2000s, the states; (g) regional organizations and con- United Nations has undertaken signifi cant temporary challenges of global security; and steps to anticipate and prevent violent con- (h) traffi cking of persons in situations of fl ict, and the World Bank is currently devel- confl ict (see, for example, UN Department oping the Global Risk Scan, a tool designed of Political Affairs 2015b, 2). to identify multifaceted fragility, confl ict, 5. According to the Union of International and violence risks in countries across the Associations, intergovernmental organiza- globe. tions are defi ned as bodies that are based 12. Some governmental and intergovernmental on a formal instrument of agreement early warning systems have civil society between national governments, include at reporting components, for example, the least three nation states, and possess a per- African Union, CEWARN, and ECOWARN manent secretariat performing ongoing all have links to civil society networks, while tasks. See http://www.uia.org/archive/types early warning systems in the Southern - organization /cc. African Development Community and the 6. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognizes International Conference of the Great Lakes the importance of regional arrangements in Region rely on state intelligence (ATF 2016). support of the maintenance of international 13. Third-generation EWSs are located in con- peace and security and stresses that “no fl ict areas with strong local networks. The enforcement action shall be taken under objective is to detect confl ict and link EWS regional arrangements or by regional agen- to response mechanisms, where monitors cies without the authorization of the act as “fi rst responders.” Security Council” (UN Charter, Ch. VIII, 14. Article 55 of the UN Charter states that to Art. 53). support the “creation of conditions of sta- 7. In 2017, for instance, the African Union and bility and well-being which are necessary the UN signed a framework agreement to for peaceful and friendly relations among strengthen their responses to emerging chal- nations based on respect for the principle lenges in key areas such as peace and secu- of equal rights and self-determination of rity, human rights, and development. See peoples, the United Nations shall promote http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? … universal respect for, and observance of, NewsID=56587#.WgsBnFtSzcs. human rights and fundamental freedoms 8. “The right of the Union to intervene in a for all without distinction as to race, sex, Member State pursuant to a decision of the language, or religion” (UN Charter, Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, Preamble). See UN General Assembly namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes (2003), also the “Vienna Declaration and against humanity” (African Union 2000). Programme of Action” (World Conference 9. “We pledge not to bequeath the burden of on Human Rights 1993): “The efforts of the confl icts to the next generation of Africans United Nations system towards the univer- and undertake to end all wars in Africa by sal respect for, and observance of, human 2020” (African Union 2013, art. E). rights and fundamental freedoms for all, 10. For example, offi cial development assistance contribute to the stability and well-being to countries with high risk of confl ict aver- necessary for peaceful and friendly rela- ages US$250 million per year, only slightly tions among nations, and to improved con- higher than that to countries at peace, but ditions for peace and security as well increases to US$700 million during open as social and economic development,

The International Architecture for Prevention 263 in conformity with the Charter of the concludes that military interventions United Nations.” increase the likelihood of civil war, eco- 15. The potential of the Universal Periodic nomic interventions have no effect on the Review to contribute to confl ict prevention likelihood of war, and diplomatic interven- and peacebuilding efforts was acknowledged tions decrease the likelihood of war (for in the sustaining peace resolutions (UN example, Hoeffl er 2013). General Assembly 2016b, para. 11; UN 21. The meaning of success is much disputed Security Council 2016). among scholars of international mediation, 16. This has occurred gradually, with member and indicators vary substantially. Success states having ratifi ed universal human rights rates of mediation have been measured on instruments adopted under the aegis of the the basis of whether mediation has been United Nations, and organizations like the accepted, whether violence has ended, African Union, the Council of Europe, and whether confl icting parties have reached a the Organization of American States having formal agreement, and how long it holds. adopted regional instruments, the imple- When measuring success against whether mentation of which is supported by civil the parties reach any type of agreement society organizations and national human (from cease-fi re to comprehensive settle- rights institutions. ment), Wallensteen and Svensson (2014) 17. Growing confi dence in mediation has conclude that 55 percent of mediated pro- resulted in expanded capabilities to support cesses fail, in part, because they often do not such processes. Despite data gaps, there has result in such formalized outcomes. There been a signifi cant increase in the number of are also signs that mediation successes are deployed envoys, special advisers, and politi- evolving. Building on the UCDP confl ict cal missions over the past 10–15 years. These termination data, Kreutz (2010) has calcu- entities have taken up an increasingly broad lated that, in the 1990s, 46.1 percent of con- range of functions, including early warning fl icts that ended by negotiated settlement and analysis, coordination of regional medi- restarted, but the number of confl icts ation initiatives, and direct support for returning to violence decreased to 21.0 per- mediation before, during, and after crises cent in the 2000s, suggesting that learning and confl icts. Special political missions alone led to more lasting successes later. have increased in number by 70 percent, and 22. Bercovitch and Wells (1993) fi nd that in spending has increased by a factor of 13, interstate confl icts, 29 percent of mediation since 2000 (UN Secretary-General 2017a). attempts resulted in a cease-fi re or more 18. In 2016, the Security Council requested the enduring peace. However, Svensson and United Nations Offi ce for West Africa Lundgren (2015) show that more than 60 (UNOWA) and the Offi ce of the Special percent of cases of mediation led to an Envoy for the Sahel to merge into a single abatement of crisis between 1945 and 2005. entity, the United Nations Offi ce for West For other studies on the effectiveness of Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS). mediation, see, for example, Beardsley et al. 19. Since 2008 the UN’s Mediation Support 2006; Bercovitch and Wells 1993; Eisenkopf Unit, with a standby team of senior media- and Bachtiger 2013; Shrodt and Gerner tion experts has provided tailored advice to 2004; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003. national negotiators and international 23. Data confi rm that multifaceted approaches mediators (see www.peacemaker.un.org). used in tandem with other tools render 20. While qualitative cases indicate the potential mediation more effective. For instance, there importance of diplomatic engagement in is “strong empirical evidence” that media- both coordinating international and tion in combination with a peacekeeping regional action and bridging confl ict parties, operation highly correlates with nonrecur- few studies have assessed these cases against rence (DeRouen and Chowdhury 2016). data. Regan (2010, 2012), building on Mediated agreements that encompass Goldstone et al. (2010), assesses the success political, military, territorial, and justice of interventions in countries and periods provisions also decrease the risk of recur- with a high risk of civil war. Regan (2012) rence, although the likelihood of recurrence

264 Pathways for Peace rises over time in mediated cases (Beardsley .worldbank.org/financing/ida-special 2011; DeRouen and Chowdhury 2016; -allocation-index-isai-0. Fortna 2003; Joshi and Quinn 2016a, 2016b). 31. ODA is composed of many elements includ- 24. See http://www.un.org/undpa/en/diplomacy ing, for example, humanitarian aid, debt -mediation. relief, and country programmable aid. When 25. Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) explore removing special-purpose fl ows such as whether the deployment of external peace- humanitarian aid and debt relief, country keepers can prevent violent confl ict from programmable aid can provide a good esti- spreading within a country once a civil war mate of funding used for development pro- has broken out. Using geo-referenced con- gramming in recipient countries and thus is fl ict polygons between 1990 and 2010, the often used as a proxy for development aid at authors fi nd that peacekeeping missions that the country level. are large, especially when there are many 32. While ODA fl ows fell in the mid-1990s troops, have a strong containment effect. because of fi scal consolidations in donor 26. All references to Kosovo should be under- countries, overall fl ows rose again after 1998. stood in the context of UN Security Council 33. According to offi cial data collected by the Resolution 1244 (UN Security Council OECD Development Assistance Committee. 1999). Total ODA fl ows corresponded to 0.32 per- 27. The practice of peace operations in these cent of GNI of member countries in 2016. areas has been codifi ed in various policy and Despite the sizable increases, this still falls guidance documents, with support and short of the long-standing 0.7 percent of resources provided through the Offi ce of GNI commitment. Rule of Law and Security Institutions at 34. A 1988 rule allows donor countries to headquarters level (which also supports include the costs of hosting refugees in special political missions led by the ODA for the fi rst year after arrival. Department of Political Affairs). Development Assistance Committee (2017) 28. According to the UN Peacekeeping notes that efforts are ongoing to revise ODA Operations: Principles and Guidelines reporting rules to minimize the risk that (Capstone Doctrine; UN 2008), the role of spending on refugees diverts from spending multidimensional peacekeeping operations on development. is to “create a secure and stable environment 35. The group of 56 fragile contexts defi ned by while strengthening the State’s ability to pro- the OECD hosts approximately 22 percent vide security, with full respect for the rule of of the world’s population, but only attracts 5 law and human rights; facilitate the political percent of the global total of foreign direct process by promoting dialogue and reconcil- investment (OECD 2016). iation and supporting the establishment of 36. Relevant missions include MONUSCO in legitimate and effective institutions of gov- the Democratic Republic of Congo, ernance; and provide a framework for MINUSMA in Mali, MINUSTAH in Haiti, ensuring that all United Nations and other UNMISS in South Sudan, and MINUSCA international actors pursue their activities at in the Central African Republic (Gorur the country-level in a coherent and coordi- 2016). nated manner” (POTI 2010). 37. The shift to “bottom-up” approaches is a 29. More recent studies dispute this link, citing reaction to important failures of more methodological questions (Christian and state-centric approaches to stabilization that Barrett 2017) and arguing that the mac- were tried in the Democratic Republic of ro-level analysis hides important spatial Congo between 2008 and 2011, in which distribution effects (Gehring, Kaplan, and “top-down” approaches to state authority Wong 2017). had the result of extending institutions that 30. In order to enable countries to access fi nanc- were perceived as illegitimate, reproduced ing at early sign of risks of violent confl ict, certain “predatory” characteristics, and the World Bank has created a risk mitigation failed to provide frameworks for adequate facility under IDA 18 to support countries in governance of complex local confl ict, social, their prevention efforts. See http://ida and other dynamics (De Vries 2016).

The International Architecture for Prevention 265 References Beardsley, K. C., D. M. Quinn, B. Biswas, and J. Wilkenfeld. 2006. “Mediation Style and Ackerman, A. 1999. Making Peace Prevail: Crisis Outcomes.” Journal of Confl ict Preventing Violent Confl ict in Macedonia. Resolution 50 (1): 58–86. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Bercovitch, J., and R. Wells. 1993. “Evaluating African Union. 2000. Constitutive Act of the Mediation Strategies.” Journal of Peace African Union. Adopted in 2000 at the Lome Research 18 (1): 3–25. Summit (Togo), entered into force in 2001. Berdal, M., and D. Ucko. 2009. Reintegrating Addis Ababa: African Union. Armed Groups after Confl ict: Politics, Violence, ———. 2013. “50th Anniversary Solemn and Transition. New York: Routledge. Declaration.” Assembly of the Heads of State Biermann, F., P. Pattberg, H. van Asselt, and and Government of the African Union, Addis F. Zelli. 2009. “The Fragmentation of Global Ababa. Governance Architectures: A Framework for African Union Commission. 2015. Agenda 2063: Analysis.” Global Environmental Politics 9 (4): The Africa We Want. Addis Ababa: Africa 14–40. Union Commission. Björkdahl, A. 2006. “Promoting Norms through Aguirre, A. 2015. “Fiscal Policy and Civil Confl ict Peacekeeping: UNPREDEP and Confl ict in Africa.” Paper prepared as part of the World Prevention.” International Peacekeeping 13 Bank Regional Study, Africa’s Macroeconomic (2): 214–28. Vulnerabilities, World Bank, Washington DC. Blair, R. A., C. Blattman, and A. Hartman. 2011. http://alvaroaguirre.weebly.com/uploads Patterns of Confl ict and Cooperation in /1/3/2/9/13298570/pf_confl ict.pdf. Liberia. Part 2: Prospects for Confl ict Anderson, D. M., and J. McKnight. 2014. “Kenya Forecasting and Early Warning. New Haven, at War: Al-Shabaab and Its Enemies in Eastern CT: Innovations for Poverty Action. Africa.” African Affairs 114 (454): 1–27. ———. 2015. “Predicting Local Violence.” Brown Anderson, M. B. 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid University; University of Chicago; University Can Support Peace—or War? Boulder, CO: College of London. https://papers.ssrn.com Lynne Rienner. / sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2497153. ATF (African Task Force on the Prevention of Blattman, C. 2012. “Can We Predict Eruptions of Mass Atrocities). 2016. African Regional Violence? Statistics and the Future of Confl ict Communities and the Prevention of Mass Early Warning.” Harris School of Public Atrocities. Budapest: Budapest Centre for Policy, University of Chicago. https:// Mass Atrocities Prevention. chrisblattman.com/2012/02/13/can-we Babbitt, E. F. 2012. “Preventive Diplomacy by -predict -local -confl ict/. Intergovernmental Organizations: Learning ———. 2014. “Can We Use Data and Machine from Practice” International Negotiation 17 Learning to Predict Local Violence in Fragile (3): 349–88. doi: 10.1163/15718069-12341236. States? As It Turns Out, Yes.” Harris School of Barron, P., and J. Sharpe. 2005. “Counting Public Policy, University of Chicago. https:// Confl icts—Using Newspaper Reports to chrisblattman.com/2014/10/02/can-use Understand Violence in Indonesia.” Social -data-machine-learning-predict -local Development Paper, Confl ict Prevention, and -violence-fragile-states-turns-yes/. Reconstruction Series CPR 25, World Bank, Bosley, C. C. 2016. “The ‘New’ Normal: Instability Washington, DC. Risk Assessment in an Uncertainty-Based Batmanglich, S. 2017. “Independent Review of Strategic Environment.” International Studies Peace and Development Advisors and the Review 19: viw038. 10.1093/isr/viw038. Joint UNDP/DPA Programme on Building Brandt, P. T., J. R. Freeman, and P. A. Schrodt. National Capacities for Confl ict Prevention.” 2011a. “Racing Horses: Constructing and U.K. Department for International Evaluating Forecasts in Political Science.” Paper Development, London. presented at the 28th Summer Meeting of the Beardsley, K. 2011. “Peacekeeping and the Society for Political Methodology, Princeton Contagion of Armed Confl ict.” Journal of University, Princeton, NJ, July. http://www Politics 73 (4): 1051–64. .princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository Beardsley, K., and K. S. Gleditsch. 2015. /public/RHMethods20110721.pdf. “Peacekeeping as Confl ict Containment.” ———. 2011b. “Real Time, Time Series International Studies Review 17 (1): 67–89. Forecasting of Inter- and Intra-State

266 Pathways for Peace Political Confl ict.” Confl ict Management and Collier, P., and D. Rohner. 2008. “Democracy, Peace Science 28 (1): 41–64. Development, and Confl ict.” Journal of the Bryden, A., and F. Olonisakin, eds. 2010. Security European Economic Association 6 (2-3): 531–40. Sector Transformation in Africa. Geneva: Crocker, C., and P. Aall, eds. 1999. Herding Cats. DCAF. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Calì, M., and A. Mulabdic. 2017. “Trade and Civil Peace Press. Confl ict: Revisiting the Cross-Country Dal Bo, E., and P. Dal Bo. 2011. “Workers, Evidence.” Policy Research Working Paper Warriors, and Criminals: Social Confl ict in 7125, World Bank, Washington, DC. General Equilibrium.” Journal of the European Call, C. T. 2012. “UN Mediation and the Politics Economic Association 9 (4): 646–77. of Transition after Constitutional Crises.” Day, A., and A. Pichler Fong. 2017. “Diplomacy Policy Paper, International Peace Institute, and Good Offi ces in the Prevention of New York. Confl ict.” Background paper for the United ———. 2017. “The Evolution of Confl ict Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Prevention in the United Nations.” Background Pathways to Peace: Inclusive Approaches to paper for the United Nations–World Bank Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Washington, DC. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, De Coning, C., and C. Prakash. 2016. Peace World Bank, Washington, DC. Capacities Network Synthesis Report. Oslo: Carbonnier, G. 2015. Humanitarian Economics: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. War, Disaster, and the Global Aid Market. Defontaine, C. 2017. “Short Literature Review on London: Hurst and Company. Monitoring Risks of Violent Confl ict.” Carver, F. 2017. “A ‘Call to Peacebuilding’: Background paper for the United Nations– Rethinking Humanitarian and Development World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Activity in South Sudan.” Humanitarian Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Exchange 68 (January): 7–10. https://odihpn Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. .org/magazine/a-call-to -peacebuilding DeRouen, K., and I. Chowdhury. 2016. -rethinking- humanitarian -and - development/. “Mediation, Peacekeeping, and Civil War Chadefaux, T. 2014. “Early Warning Signals for Peace Agreements.” Defence and Peace War in the News.” Journal of Peace Research Economics (May 9): 1–17. 51 (1): 5–18. Development Assistance Committee. 2017. Chandy, L., B. Seidel, and C. Zhang. 2016. “Offi cial Development Assistance: Defi nition “Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States, How and Coverage.” OECD, Paris. http://www Bad Is It and How Can It Improve?” . oecd.org/dac/stats/offi cialdevelopmentassi Brooke Shearer Series, Brookings Institution, stancedefi nitionandcoverage.htm#Coverage. Washington, DC. De Vries, H. 2016. The Ebb and Flow of Christian, P., and C. B. Barrett. 2017. “Revisiting Stabilization in the Congo. Nairobi: Rift Valley the Effect of Food Aid on Confl ict: A Institute. Methodological Caution.” Policy Research Donnelly, C. 1997. “Defence Transformation in Working Paper 8171, World Bank, the New Democracies: A Framework for Washington, DC. Tackling the Problem.” NATO Review 1 (45): CIC (Center for International Cooperation). 15–19. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1997 2012. Review of Political Missions 2012. New /9701-4 .htm. York: Center for International Cooperation. Doyle, M. W., and N. Sambanis. 2000. Colletta, N., and R. Muggah. 2009. “Context “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical Matters: Interim Stabilisation and Second- and Quantitative Analysis.” American Political Generation Approaches to Security Science Review 94 (4): 779–801. Promotion.” Confl ict, Security, and ———. 2006. Making War and Building Peace: Development 9 (4): 425–53. United Nations Peace Operations. Princeton, Collier, P., and A. Hoeffl er. 2004. “Greed and NJ: Princeton University Press. http://www Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic .jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rtn4. Papers 56 (4): 563–95. DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping ———. 2006. “Military Expenditure in Post- Operations). 2008. United Nations Confl ict Societies.” Economics of Governance Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 7 (1): 89–107. Guidelines. New York: UN DPKO.

The International Architecture for Prevention 267 ———. 2016. “Support for Strengthening Justice Gibler, D. M. 2016. “Combining Behavioral and and Corrections Systems.” Non-Paper, UN Structural Predictors of Violent Civil DPKO, New York, January. Confl ict: Getting Scholars and Policymakers Dube, O., and J. F. Vargas. 2013. “Commodity to Talk to Each Other.” International Studies Price Shocks and Civil Confl ict: Evidence Quarterly 61 (1): 28–37. from Colombia.” Review of Economic Studies Giessmann, H. J., J. B. Galvanek, and C. Seifert. 80 (4): 1384–421. 2017. “Curbing Violence: Development, Dugarova, E., and N. Gulasan. 2017. Global Trends: Application, and the Sustaining of National Challenges and Opportunities in the Capacities for Confl ict Prevention.” Implementation of the Sustainable Development Background paper for the United Nations– Goals. Geneva: United Nations Development World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways to Peace: Programme and United Nations Research Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Institute for Social Development. Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Duque, L. F., B. Caicedo, and C. Sierra. 2008. Gilligan, M., and E. Sergenti. 2008. “Do UN “Sistema de vigilancia epidemiológica de la Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching violencia para los municipios colombianos.” to Improve Causal Inference.” Quarterly La Revista Facultad Nacional de Salud Pública Journal of Political Science 3 (2): 89–122. 26 (2): 196–208. Goldstone, J. A., R. H. Bates, D. L. Epstein, T. R. Eikenberry, K., and S. Krasner. 2017. “Civil Wars Gurr, M. B. Lustik, M. G. Marshall, J. Ulfelder, and Global Disorder: Threats and and M. Woodward. 2010. “A Global Model Opportunities.” Daedalus 146 (4): 6–17. for Forecasting Political Instability.” American Eisenkopf, G., and A. Bachtiger. 2013. “Mediation Journal of Political Science 54 (1): 190–208. and Confl ict Prevention.” Journal of Confl ict Gorur, A. 2016. Defi ning the Boundaries of UN Resolution 57 (4): 570–97. Stabilization Missions. Washington, DC: Eldridge, J. L. C. 2002. “Playing at Peace: Western Stimson Center. Politics, Diplomacy, and the Stabilization of Gowan, R. 2011. “Multilateral Political Missions Macedonia.” European Security 11 (3): 46–90. and Preventive Diplomacy.” United States doi: 10.1080/09662830208407538. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC. Fearon, J., and D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Gowan, R., and S. J. Stedman. 2018. “The Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political International Regime for Treating Civil War, Science Review 97 (1): 75–90. 1988–2017.” Daedalus (Winter): 171–84. Fisher, J., and D. M. Anderson. 2015. Greig, J. M., and P. Diehl. 2012. International “Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Mediation. Cambridge, MA: Polity. Development in Africa.” International Affairs Griffi n, M. Forthcoming. “The UN’s Role in a 91 (1): 131–51. Changing Global Landscape.” In The Oxford Fortna, V. P. 2003. “Scraps of Paper? Agreements Handbook on the United Nations, 2d ed., and the Durability of Peace.” International edited by T. G. Weiss and S. Daws, ch. 45. Organization 57 (2): 337–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2004. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? Harland, D. 2016. “War Is Back: The International International Intervention and the Duration Response to Armed Confl ict.” Horizons 7 of Peace after Civil War.” International Studies (Spring): 231. Quarterly 48 (2004): 269–92. Hartzell, C. A., M. Hoddie, and D. Rothchild. Framtid, U. 2015. From Billions to Trillions: MDB 2001. “Stabilizing the Peace after Civil Contributions to Financing for Development. War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables.” Washington, DC: World Bank Group. International Organizations 55 (1): 183–208. Gehring, K., L. Kaplan, and M. H. L. Wong. 2017. Healy, S. 2009. “Peacemaking in the Midst of “Aid and Confl ict at the Local Level— War: An Assessment of IGAD’s Contribution Mechanisms and Causality.” Draft paper pre- to Regional Security.” Working Paper 59, sented at Northeast Universities Development Royal Institute of International Affairs, Consortium Conference, Harvard Kennedy Chatham House, London, November. School, Cambridge, MA. August 18. https:// Hinnebusch, R., and I. W. Zartman, with E. sites.tufts.edu/neudc2017/files/2017/10 Parker-Magyar and O. Imady. 2016. “UN /paper_472.pdf. Mediation in the Syrian Crisis: From Kofi

268 Pathways for Peace Annan to Lakhdar Brahimi.” International peaceoperationsreview.org/commentary Peace Institute, New York, March. /all-peacebuilding-is-local/. Hoeffl er, A. 2013. “Can International Johnstone, I. 2010. “Emerging Doctrine for Interventions Secure the Peace?” ERSA Political Missions.” Thematic essay for Working Paper 31, Economic Research Review of Political Missions 2010, a project Southern Africa, Cape Town. http://citeseerx. of the Center on International Cooperation, ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1 New York. .357.3971&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Joshi, M., and M. Quinn. 2016a. “Is the Sum ———. 2014. “Can International Interventions Greater than the Parts? The Terms of Civil Secure the Peace?” International Area Studies War Peace Agreements and the Commitment Review 17 (1): 75–94. Problem Revisited.” Negotiations Journal 31 Hultman, L., J. Kathman, and M. Shannon. 2013. (1): 7–30. “United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian ———. 2016b. “Watch and Learn: Spillover Protection in Civil War.” American Journal of Effects of Peace Accord Implementation on Political Science 57 (4): 875–91. Non-signatory Armed Groups.” Research and Ibrahim, R. 2016. Regional Organizations and Politics 3 (January-March): 1–7. https://doi. Internal Confl ict: The Arab League and the Arab org/10.1177/2053168016640558. Spring. Rio de Janeiro: BRICS Policy Center. Kang, S. Y. 2017. “Aid Flow to Fragile and Confl ict ICG (International Crisis Group). 2016. Affected Situations: How Does Aid Create Exploiting Disorder: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Incentives or Disincentives for Confl ict?” State. Geneva: ICG. Background paper for the United Nations– ICM (Independent Commission on World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Multilateralism). 2017. “The New Primacy of Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Partnerships: The UN, Regional Organizations, Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Civil Society, and the Private Sector.” Policy Keating, C. 2015. “Power Dynamics between Paper, International Peace Institute, New York. Permanent and Elected Members.” In The ICRC (International Committee of the Red UN Security Council in the 21st Century, Cross). n.d. “The Geneva Conventions of 12 edited by S. von Ensiedel, D. M. Malone, and August 1949.” ICRC, Geneva. B. S. Ugarte. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2009. “IMF Keck, M. E., and K. Sikkink. 1999. “Transnational and World Bank Support the Central African Advocacy Networks in International and Republic’s Completion Point under the Regional Politics.” International Social Science Enhanced HIPC Initiative and Approve Debt Journal 51 (159): 89–101. Relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief King, G., and L. Zeng. 2001. “Improving Initiative.” Press Release 09/245, IMF, Forecasts of State Failure.” World Politics 53 Washington, DC, June 30. (4): 623–58. INCAF (International Network on Confl ict and Koskenniemi, M., and P. Leino. 2002. Fragility). 2017. “Communiqué: INCAF “Fragmentation of International Law? Director-Level Meeting: 7 November 2017.” Postmodern Anxieties.” Leiden Journal of OECD, Paris. http://www.oecd.org/dac International Law 15 (3): 553–79. / conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/INCAF Kreutz, J. 2010. “How and When Armed Confl icts _COMMUNIQUE.pdf. End: Introducing the UCDP Confl ict Institute for State Effectiveness. 2018. Termination Dataset.” Journal of Peace “Sovereignty Strategies: Enhancing Core Research 47 (2): 243–50. Government Functions as a Post-Confl ict Langlotz, S., and N. Potrafke. 2016. “Does and Confl ict Prevention Measure.” ISE, Development Aid Increase Military Washington, DC. Expenditure?” CESifo Working Paper 6066, Jenks, B., and H. Kharas. 2016. “Towards a CESifo Group, Munich. New Multilateralism.” Uppdrag Framtid Lanz, D., and R. Gasser. 2013. “A Crowded Field: background report, Brookings Institution, Competition and Coordination in Washington, DC. International Peace Mediation.” Centre for Jenny, J. 2017. “All Peacebuilding Is Local.” Global Mediation in Africa, University of Pretoria, Peace Operations Review, February 7. http:// Hatfi eld, South Africa.

The International Architecture for Prevention 269 Lindenmayer, E., and J. Kaye. 2009. A Choice for 81, Crisis States Research Center, Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Development Studies Institute (DESTIN), Mediation in Kenya. New York: International London School of Economics. Peace Institute. https://peacemaker.un.org Nunn, N., and N. Qian. 2014. “US Food Aid and /sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Kenya Civil Confl ict.” American Economics Review Mediation_IPI2009.pdf. 104 (6): 1630–66. Lund, M. 2000. “Preventive Diplomacy for Nyheim, D. 2015. Early Warning and Response to Macedonia, 1992–1999: From Containment Violent Confl ict. Time for a Rethink? London: to Nation Building.” In Opportunities Saferworld. Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive OECD (Organisation for Economic Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, Co-operation and Development). 2009. edited by B. Jentelson. New York: Rowman Preventing Violence, War, and State Collapse. & Littlefi eld. The Future of Confl ict Early Warning and Mancini, F. 2011. “Managing Partnership Response. Paris: OECD. (Partnerships – A New Horizon for ———. 2010. Monitoring the Principles for Good Peacekeeping?) (Conclusion).” International International Engagement in Fragile States and Peacekeeping 18 (5): 627–33. https://ssrn. Situations, Fragile States Principles Monitoring com/abstract=2902467. Survey: Global Report. Paris: OECD. Marc, A., N. Verjee, and S. Mogaka. 2015. The ———. 2015. States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Challenge of Stability and Security in West Post-2015 Ambitions. Paris: OECD. Africa. Africa Development Forum series. ———. 2016. States of Fragility 2016. Paris: Washington, DC: World Bank; Paris: Agence OECD. Française de Développement. ———. 2017. Offi cial Development Assistance, McInerney-Lankford, S. 2017. Background note 2016. Paris: OECD. http://www2. compare for Pathways to Peace: Inclusive Approaches to yourcountry .org/oda?cr=20001&cr1 =oecd Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, &lg=en&page=1. Washington, DC. Pichler Fong, A. 2017. “Burkina Faso: Popular Mueller, H. 2017. “How Much Is Prevention Uprising and Political Transition (2014– Worth?” Background paper for the United 2015).” Case study for the United Nations– Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways to Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, Washington, DC. DC. Mueller, H., and C. Rauh. 2016. “Reading Pillay, R., and J.-J. van der Hoeven. 2017. between the Lines: Prediction of Political Stabilisation: An Independent Stocktaking and Violence Using Newspaper Text.” INET Possible Elements for a Corporate Approach for Institute Paper, IAE (CSIC), Barcelona; UNDP. New York: UNDP. University of Cambridge, Cambridge, MA. Poe, SC. 1991. “Human Rights and the Allocation Muggah, R. 2010. “Innovations in Disarmament, of U.S. Military Assistance.” Journal of Peace Demobilization, and Reintegration Policy Research 28 (2): 205–16. and Research: Refl ections on the Last POTI (Peace Operations Training Institute). Decade.” Working Paper 774, Norwegian 2010. Principles and Guidelines for UN Institute of International Affairs, Oslo. Peacekeeping Operations. Williamsburg, VA: ———. 2017. “Revisiting Community Violence POTI. http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/course Reduction.” Background paper for the United _promos/principles_and_guidelines /principles Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, _and_guidelines_english.pdf. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Regan, P. M. 2010. “Interventions into Civil Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Wars: A Retrospective Survey with Washington, DC. Prospective Ideas.” Civil Wars 12 (4): 456–76. Mwaûra, C., and S. Schmeidl, eds. 2002. Early ———. 2012. “Interventions before Civil Wars.” Warning and Confl ict Management in the Department of Political Science, University Horn of Africa. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. of Binghamton, Binghamton, U.K. Nathan, L. 2010. “The Peacemaking Effectiveness Risse, T., S. Ropp, and K. Sikkink. 1999. The of Regional Organizations.” Working Paper Power of Human Rights: International Norms

270 Pathways for Peace and Domestic Change. Cambridge, U.K.: Debate on Global Governance,” UN General Cambridge University Press. Assembly, New York. Rosand, E. 2016. “Communities First: A Blueprint Themmer, L., and P. Wallensteen. 2011. “Armed for Organizing and Sustaining a Global Confl ict, 1946–2010.” Journal of Peace Movement against Violent Extremism.” The Research 48 (4): 525–36. Prevention Project, Washington, DC. Tian, N., A. Fleurant, P. D. Wezeman, and S. T. Salehyan, I. 2009. Rebels without Borders. Ithaca, Wezeman. 2017. “Trends in World Military NY: Cornell University Press. Expenditure, 2016.” SIPRI Factsheet, Salehyan, I., and K. S. Gleditsch. 2006. “Refugees Stockholm International Peace Research and the Spread of Civil War.” International Institute. Organisation 60 (2): 335–66. UN (United Nations). 2008. United Nations Schlesinger, S. 2004. Act of Creation: The Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Founding of the United Nations. New York: Guidelines. New York: United Nations Basic Books. Secretariat. Shrodt, P., and D. Gerner. 2004. “An Event Data ———. 2014. The UN Framework of Analysis for Analysis of Third-Party Mediation in the Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention. New Middle East and Balkans.” Journal of Confl ict York: United Nations, October 30. Resolution 48 (3): 310–30. ———. 2015. Uniting Our Strengths for Peace— Sokalski, H. J. 2003. An Ounce of Prevention: Politics, Partnership, and People. Report of the Macedonia and the UN Experience in High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Washington, DC: Operations (HIPPO). New York: United United States Institute of Peace Press. Nations. Stamnes, E. 2004. “Critical Security Studies and ———. 2017. Financing for Development: the United Nations Preventive Deployment Progress and Prospects. Report of the Inter- in Macedonia.” International Peacekeeping Agency Task Force on Financing for 11 (1): 161–81. Development. New York: United Nations. Sur, J., ed. 2014. “Que observan los que observan UN Department of Political Affairs. 2015a. el delito.” Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Annual Report—Multi-year Appeal 2015. IDB-DP-364, Inter-American Development New York: UN DPA. Bank, Washington, DC. http://www.worldbank ———. 2015b. “Repertoire of the Practice of the .org/en/news/video/2015/08/17/indonesias Security Council 19th Supplement 2014– -national-violence-monitoring-system. 2015.” Security Council Affairs Division, Svensson, S., and M. S. Lundgren. 2015. “Patterns Security Council Practices and Charter of Peacemaking.” Research report on Confl ict Research Branch, New York. Trends, Peace Research Institute of Oslo, UNDP (United Nations Development Norway, April. Programme). 2017. Journey to Extremism in Svensson, I., and M. Onken. 2015. “Global Trends Africa: Drivers, Incentives, and the Tipping Point of Peace Negotiations and Confl ict Mediation.” for Recruitment. New York: UNDP. In Global Trends 2015. Prospects for World UNDP and Department of Political Affairs. 2016. Society, edited by M. Roth, C. Ulbert, and Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building T. Debiel. Bonn: Development and Peace National Capacities for Confl ict Prevention: Foundation and Institute for Development and Annual Report. New York: UNDP. http://www. Peace; Duisburg: Centre for Global Cooperation undp.org/content/undp/en /home/librarypage/ Research. www . globale-trends.de/home.html. democratic-governance / conflict-prevention/ Tardy, T. 2015. “United Nations Preventive joint-undp-dpa - programme-on-building-nati Deployment Force (UNPREDEP-Macedonia).” onal-capacities -for -con.html. In The Oxford Handbook of United Nations UN General Assembly. 1948. “Universal Peacekeeping Operations, edited by J. A. Koops, Declaration of Human Rights.” Resolution N. MacQueen, T. Tardy, and P. D. Williams. RES 217, adopted December 10, Paris. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1999a. “Report of the Independent Thakur, R. 2011. “The United Nations in Global Inquiry into the Actions of the United Governance: Rebalancing Organized Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Multilateralism for Current and Future Rwanda.” Report S/1999/1257, UN General Challenges.” Paper prepared for “Thematic Assembly, New York, December 15.

The International Architecture for Prevention 271 ———. 1999b. “Report of the Secretary-General of Disputes: Confl ict Prevention and Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution Resolution.” Report of the Secretary-General 53/35: The Fall of Srebenica.” Report A/54/549, A/66/811, United Nations, New York. UN General Assembly, New York, November 15. ———. 2013. “Securing States and Societies: ———. 2003. “Prevention of Confl ict.” Strengthening the United Nations Resolution A/RES/57/337, adopted July 3, Comprehensive Support to Security Sector New York. Reform.” Report of the Secretary-General ———. 2005. “Resolution on the Peace A/67/970, United Nations, New York, Commission.” Resolution 60/180, adopted August 13. . December 20, New York. ———. 2015. “Report on Women and Peace and ———. 2006a. “Progress Report on the Security.” Report of the Secretary-General Prevention of Armed Confl ict: Report of the S/2015/716, United Nations, New York, Secretary-General.” Report A/60/891, UN September 16. General Assembly, New York, July 18. ———. 2016a. “Plan of Action to Prevent ———. 2006b. “The United Nations Global Violent Extremism.” Report of the Secretary- Counter-Terrorism Strategy.” Resolution General A/70/674, United Nations, New York, A/RES/60/288, adopted September 8, New January 15. York. ———. 2016b. “Report on United Nations ———. 2007. “Strengthening of the Economic Policing.” Report of the Secretary-General and Social Council.” Resolution A/RES/61/16, S/2016/952, United Nations, New York, adopted January 9, New York. November 10. ———. 2016a. “Review of United Nations ———. 2017a. “Report on Arrangements for Peacebuilding Architecture.” Resolution Funding and Backstopping of Special A/RES/70/262, adopted April 27, New York. Political Missions.” Report of the Secretary- ———. 2016b. “The United Nations Global General A/66/340, United Nations, New Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review.” York. Resolution A/RES/70/291, adopted July 1, ———. 2017b. “Report on the Protection of New York. Civilians in Armed Confl ict.” Report UNIPSIL (UN Integrated Peacebuilding Offi ce S/2017/414.2017, United Nations, New in Sierra Leone). 2017. “Background: The York. Confl ict in Sierra Leone and the Engagement UN Security Council. 1999. “Resolution on the of the United Nations.” UNIPSIL, New York. Situation in Kosovo.” Resolution S/RES/1244, https://unipsil.unmissions.org/background. adopted June 19, New York. UNOCHA (United Nations Offi ce for the ———. 2000. “Resolution on Women, Peace, Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). and Security.” S/RES/1325, adopted October 2015. World Humanitarian Data and Trends 31, New York. 2015. New York: UNOCHA. ———. 2001. “The Role of the Security Council ———. 2016. World Humanitarian Data and in the Prevention of Armed Confl icts.” Trends 2016. New York: UNOCHA. Resolution S/RES/1366, adopted August 30, UN Secretary-General. 1992. “An Agenda for New York. Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, ———. 2005. “On Establishment of the and Peacekeeping.” Report A/47/277–S/24111 Peacebuilding Commission.” Resolution S/ of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, RES/1645, adopted December 20, New York. United Nations, New York, June 17. ———. 2014. “Threats to International Peace ———. 1998. “The Rome Statute of the and Security.” Resolution S/RES/2150, International Criminal Court.” Adopted at a adopted April 16, New York. diplomatic conference, United Nations, ———. 2016. “Post-Confl ict Peacebuilding.” Rome, July 17. Resolution S/RES/2282, adopted April 27, ———. 2001. “Report on the Prevention of New York. Armed Confl ict.” Report A/55/985-S/2001 ———. 2017. Can the Security Council Prevent /574 of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Confl ict? Research Report 1. New York: UN United Nations, New York. Security Council, February 9. ———. 2012. “Report on Strengthening the Verjee, N. 2017. “Regional Economic Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement Communities in Confl ict Prevention and

272 Pathways for Peace Management.” Background paper for the ———. 2017. World Development Report 2017: United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Governance and the Law. Washington, DC: Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to World Bank. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, World Conference on Human Rights. 1993. Washington, DC. “Vienna Declaration and Programme of von Einsiedel, S., D. M. Malone, and B. S. Ugarte. Action,” adopted June 25, Vienna. 2015. “Introduction.” In The UN Security Yi, J. 2017a. “Aid Flows to Confl ict-Affected Council in the 21st Century, edited by S. Situations: Exploring Cross-Country Empirical Ensiedel, D. Malone, and B. S. Ugarte. Studies and Updated Data.” Background paper Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. for the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Wallace, M. 2015. From Principle to Practice, A Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches User’s Guide to Do No Harm. Cambridge, to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Washington, DC. Wallensteen, P., and I. Svensson. 2014. “Talking Peace: ———. 2017b. “Evaluating Confl ict Forecasts: International Mediation in Armed Confl icts.” Criteria, Approaches, and Tools.” Background Journal of Peace Research 51 (2): 315–27. paper for the United Nations–World Bank Walter, B. 1997. “The Critical Barrier to Civil Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive War Settlement.” International Organization Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, 53 (1): 335–64. World Bank, Washington, DC. ———. 2017. “The Role and Impact of Third ———. 2017c. “A Review of Confl ict Forecasting Party Interventions in the Prevention of Models.” Background paper for the United Violent Confl ict.” Background paper for the Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Additional Reading Ward, M. D. N. W. Metternich, C. L. Dorff, M. Gallop, F. M. Hollenbach, A. Schultz, and S. Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative. 2017. Weschle. 2013. “Learning from the Past and arlpi.org. Stepping into the Future: Toward a New Biersteker, T., S. E. Eckert, and M. Tourinho. Generation of Confl ict Prediction.” International 2016. Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Studies Review 15 (4): 474–90. Effectiveness of United Nations Action. Weinstein, J., and M. Humphreys. 2005. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. “Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Brandt, P. T., J. R. Freeman, and P. A. Schrodt. Demobilization and Reintegration.” Working 2014. “Evaluating Forecasts of Political Paper 69, Center for Global Development, Confl ict Dynamics.” International Journal of Washington, DC. Forecasting 30 (4): 944–62. Wendt, A., and M. Barnett. 1993. “Dependent Brown, S., and J. Grävingholt, eds. 2016. The State Formation and Third World Securitization of Foreign Aid. New York: Militarization.” Review of International Palgrave Macmillan. Studies 19 (4): 321–47. Brubaker, R., and T. Dorfl er. 2017. “UN Sanctions Whitfi eld, T. 2010. Working with Groups of and the Prevention of Confl ict.” Thematic Friends. Washington, DC: United States paper for the United Nations–World Bank Institute of Peace. Study on Confl ict Prevention, United Nations Wilkenfeld, J., K. Young, V. Asal, and D. Quinn. University, Tokyo. 2003. “Mediating International Crises: Cross- Call, C. 2012. Why Peace Fails: The Causes and National and Experimental Perspectives.” Prevention of Civil War Recurrence. Washington, Journal of Confl ict Resolution 47 (3): 279–301. DC: Georgetown University Press. Wood, M. 2013. “International Law and the Use of Cederman, L. E., and N. B. Weidmann. 2017. Force: What Happens in Practice?” Indian “Predicting Armed Confl ict: Time to Adjust Journal of International Law 53: 345–67. Our Expectations?” Science 355 (6324): 474–76. World Bank. 2011. World Development Report Charron, A. Forthcoming. “The Evolution of 2011: Confl ict, Security, and Development. Intrastate Confl ict Sanctions Regimes: From Washington, DC: World Bank. Stopping Violence to Peacebuilding and

The International Architecture for Prevention 273 Beyond.” In The Sanctions Enterprise: York. https://www.globalpolicy.org/security Assessing a Quarter-Century of UN Action for -council / peacekeeping/peacekeeping-data. Peace, Security, and Human Rights, edited by html. S. Lopez and G. von Einsiedel. Tokyo: United Hufbauer, C. G., J. J. Schott, K. S. Elliott, and B. Nations University. Oegg. 2007. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, Charron, A., and C. Portela. 2015. “The UN, 3d ed. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for Regional Sanctions and Africa.” International International Economics. Affairs 91 (6): 1369–85. IISS (International Institute for Strategic Comolli, V. 2017. “Transnational Organized Crime Studies). 2016. Armed Confl ict Survey. and Confl ict.” Background paper for the United London: IISS. Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways Koskenniemi, M. 2006. “Fragmentation of for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing International Law: Diffi culties Arising from Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. the Diversifi cation and Expansion of DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping International Law.” Report of the Study Operations). 2017a. DPKO Operations List Group of the International Law Commission, and Deployment Statistics. New York: United fi fty-eighth session, International Law Nations. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeep- Commission, Geneva, May 1–June 9 and July ing/documents/operationslist.pdf. 3–August 11. ———. 2017b. “Overview of Peacekeeping Lombard, L. 2017. “Case Study: The Central Operations.” UNDPKO, New York. https:// African Republic.” Case study for the United www.unmissions.org/#block-views-missions Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, -peacekeeping-missions. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Eriksson, M. 2016. “The Unintended Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Consequences of United Nations Targeted Washington, DC. Sanctions.” In Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts Mueller, J., and K. Mueller. 1999. “Sanctions of and Effectiveness of United Nations Action, Mass Destruction.” Foreign Affairs 78 (3): edited by T. Biersteker, S. Eckert, and M. 43–53. Tourinho, 190–219. Cambridge, U.K.: Salehyan, I., and K. S. Gleditsch. 2014. “The Cambridge University Press. Syrian Refugee Crisis and Confl ict Spillover.” FEWER (Forum on Early Warning and Early Political Violence at a Glance, February 11. Response). 1999. FEWER Confl ict and Peace http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2014 Analysis and Response Manual. London: /02/11/the-syrian-refugee-crisis-and -confl ict FEWER. -spillover/. Gartner, S. S., and M. M. Melin. 2009. “Assessing Sambanis, N. 2008. “Short- and Long-Term Outcomes: Confl ict Management and the Effects of United Nations Peace Operations.” Durability of Peace.” In The Sage Handbook of World Bank Economic Review 1 (1): 9–32. Confl ict Resolution, edited by J. Bercovitch, V. Shmueli, G. 2010. “To Explain or to Predict?” Kremenyuk, and I. W. Zartman, 564–79. Statistical Science 25 (3): 289–310. London: Sage. Sponeck, H.-C. 2000. “Ending the Iraq Impasse.” Gleason-Roberts, M., R. Gowan, and A. Kugel. Global Dialogue 2 (3): n.p. 2012. “Strategic Summary.” In Political Wallensteen, P., and C. Staibano. 2005. Missions 2012, edited by M. Gleason-Roberts, International Sanctions: Between Wars and R. Gowan, and A. Kugel, 1–9. New York: Words in the Global System. New York: Centre on International Cooperation. Routledge. Gordon, J. 2010. Invisible War: The United States Zartman, I. W. 2000. “Ripeness: The Hurting and Iraq Sanctions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Stalemate and Beyond.” In International University Press. Confl ict Resolution after the Cold War, edited GPF (Global Policy Forum). 2017. by P. C. Stern and D. Druckman. Washington, “Peacekeeping Tables and Charts.” GPF, New DC: National Academies Press.

274 Pathways for Peace CHAPTER 8 Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention

A surge in violent confl icts in recent years such as climate change, population has left a trail of human suffering—displac- movements, and transnational orga- ing millions, fracturing societies, and sus- nized crime. pending development progress in affected • Chapter 3 presents the pathways frame- countries. The costs of destruction and lost work, highlighting that confl ict risks economic growth are enormous. So, too, are exist at various levels and that preven- the costs of response and recovery. tive action, as part of efforts to sustain Preventing these confl icts would have pro- development and peace, needs to iden- tected the lives and dignity of millions in tify solutions to imminent or ongoing addition to protecting substantial develop- violence and address underlying risks of ment gains that have, instead, been lost. confl ict through incentives, institutional This study presents the evidence to sup- reforms, and investment in structural port a renewed focus on prevention: factors. • Chapter 4 shows that grievances related • Chapter 1 presents the evidence that vio- to real and perceived exclusion and lent confl ict is increasing after decades inequalities among groups are fueling of relative decline. Direct deaths in war, many modern confl icts. Groups and numbers of displaced populations, mil- elites are mobilizing around complex itary spending, and terrorist incidents, issues of identity and narrative to esca- among others, have all surged since the late and sustain confl ict. The UN’s 2030 beginning of this century. Confl icts are Agenda for Sustainable Development more internationalized, are more pro- is an important vehicle for addressing tracted, cross borders more often, and these risks. are fought by more nonstate actors than • Chapter 5 shows that, to prevent cycles of in recent decades. violence, action must focus on the inter- • Chapter 2 shows how this rise in violence action among different dimensions of risk is taking place in a rapidly evolving global across arenas of power, opportunity, ser- context. Growing interdependence has vices, justice, and security. States hold the created opportunities for development primary responsibility for resolving con- progress, but also amplifi ed the impact fl icts peacefully in these arenas, sometimes of risks that transcend national borders, with the support of coalitions of actors.

Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention 275 • Chapter 6 provides evidence that preven- exclusion and institutional weaknesses that tive strategies are most effective and can increase the risk of violent confl ict. only be sustained when they come from The second section presents an agenda within societies. Many governments at for action for national actors. Prevention differing levels of capacity are working in strategies are successful when they increase concert with national, and often interna- capacity for constructive contestation, allow tional, partners to implement a variety of disputes to be managed peacefully, and pro- strategies that reduce the risks of violent tect people from the threat of violence. This confl ict by addressing structural factors, section offers options available for support- institutions, and incentives of actors. ing peaceful pathways by targeting the • Chapter 7 demonstrates that interna- interaction between grievances and contes- tional efforts have helped countries tation across key arenas of power, opportu- to emerge from violence in many set- nity, services, and security and justice. tings, but are challenged by the growing The third section explores how interna- complexity of confl icts today. Effective tional actors can effectively organize for preventive action must be grounded prevention to overcome incentives that in national processes, be implemented undermine their support for national part- when early risks are perceptible, and ners. It includes a critical look at the organi- support initiatives, at various levels, to zational incentives that frustrate effective prevent the escalation of violence. collective action and prevent engagement before a crisis reaches its acute phase. At the center of this study is the appreci- ation that, to be effective, prevention needs to be recognized as the collective responsi- Principles for Prevention bility of all actors of society and an integral The evidence amassed by this study indi- part of our efforts to achieve the Sustainable cates, overwhelmingly, that, to address the Development Goals (SDGs). Prevention complex and integrated nature of con- must be based on inclusive partnerships in temporary confl ict-related risks, preven- all sectors and at all levels. States need to tion must be sustained, inclusive, and improve collaboration in the development targeted. of multilateral solutions when unilateral Prevention must be sustained. It is easy, solutions will not suffi ce. Collaborating to but wrong, to see prevention as a trade-off revitalize systemic prevention—addressing between the short and long term. Preventive those risks that no country can address action must address immediate crises while alone and that are in nature international— investing to reinforce a society’s pathway as well as committing to cooperation and toward peace. Achieving prevention goals collaboration in the development of tools requires fl exibility, and development invest- supporting preventive action in countries ments should be integrated into overarch- and regions at risk of violence are vital. This ing strategies, with politically viable study posits that prevention enhances sov- short-term and medium-term actions. The ereignty by relying on national capacity and need for sustainability requires balancing ensuring that international support is based effort and resources so that action does not on engagement with states and national reward only crisis management. Those actors. working on prevention face irrelevance if The fi rst section of this chapter sets out their time horizons stretch beyond political three principles for prevention. Above all, and investment cycles (table 8.1). prevention must be sustained over the time Prevention must be inclusive. Too often, needed to build more peaceful, just, and preventive action is focused on elites. inclusive societies. Prevention must be In complex, fragmented, and protracted con- inclusive and build broader partnerships fl icts, an inclusive approach to prevention across groups to identify and address the puts an understanding of grievances grievances that fuel violence. Prevention and agency at the center of national and must actively and directly target patterns of international engagement. It recognizes the

276 Pathways for Peace TABLE 8.1 A New Paradigm for Prevention

Today’s challenges A new paradigm Short term Short and long term Aspires to be long term, but the short term Shorter-term results increase the attractiveness of dominates sustained and strategic approaches to prevention Sustained Slow and infl exible Adaptive Lacks fl exibility and agility to act in or create More agile approaches adapt in the face of windows of opportunity changing risks and opportunities Top down People-centered Risks identifi ed by elites and direction set by a Partnerships at all levels identify risks and develop small group of specialists solutions Fragmented Inclusive Integrated Highly technical, isolated in silos Solutions increase resilience to multiple forms of risk, with effective prevention tools often in the hands of actors for whom confl ict is not a primary focus Delayed Proactive Dominated by crisis response, with prevention Early and urgent action is taken to tackle and focused only on the most immediate risks manage directly the full range of risks that could lead to violent confl ict Weakens leadership Targeted Prevention seen as undermining national Strengthens leadership sovereignty Prevention enhances national sovereignty and expands the scope of action for governments

importance of understanding people and mitigating the risks of future outbreak and their communities: their trust in institutions, escalation. Prevention of violent confl ict confi dence in the future, perceptions of risk, should be a collective outcome, bringing and experience of exclusion and injustice. It together security, development, and political uses this understanding to disaggregate risks efforts around shared priorities, with devel- and build inclusive responses to risk that opment policy as a central instrument for enhance state legitimacy, reduce polariza- addressing the risk of violent confl ict. tion, and avert violence. The lessons of successful prevention that Prevention must be targeted. Preventive come across in the study show how national action must actively and directly target actors, to be effective, need to target several grievances and exclusion across key arenas important policy and program areas: of contestation before, during, and after violence. Once group grievances become 1. Monitoring risks entrenched, it is harder for leaders and 2. Addressing multidimensional risks other national actors to fi nd common 3. Aligning peace, security, and develop- ground and build consensus for actions that ment efforts can reduce the risk of violence. 4. Implementing a people-centered approach to prevention An Agenda for Action: 5. Sustaining prevention across levels of risks Prevention in Practice The principles—sustained, inclusive, and Monitoring Risks of targeted—help to shift thinking about pre- Violent Confl ict vention; to effect real change, they must be put into practice. This section presents an Engaging in preventive action early, before agenda for action that can guide national the outbreak of violence, requires a shift actors as they partner for prevention. from early warning of violence to awareness Preventive action requires comprehensive of risk. Development planning should inte- approaches that respond simultaneously to grate the identifi cation of risk and enable the causes and impacts of violence, while multisectoral responses. Risk management

Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention 277 systems should not be limited to informa- escalating rapidly and becoming pro- tion sharing; instead, they should support tracted, particularly in border or remote decision making geared toward rapid areas, early warning systems that monitor response, policy change, and redirecting of short- and medium-term risks need to be investment. reinforced and linked to appropriate action Monitor exclusion. Preventive strategies (Defontaine 2017). need to be based on an understanding of Harness technology to improve monitoring. the dynamics of exclusion and, more gener- Considerable progress has been made in ally, the grievances of social groups. This applying information and communication understanding should be based on regular technologies to collect perception data; monitoring of horizontal inequalities such technologlies can be particularly effi - among groups or geographic areas and cient in remote and confl ict-affected areas, other forms of exclusion, as well as assess- where exclusion can be felt acutely and ment of societal cleavages such as gender where access is often most diffi cult. Real- inequality and youth exclusion. As much as time data collection methods such as possible, exclusion should be monitored crowdsourcing3 and crowdseeding,4 social around access to power, resources, services, media monitoring, geospatial technology, and security. These efforts should be based and mobile data collection tools provide on SDG indicators, targeting horizontal opportunities—many of them low cost—to inequalities across economic, political, and improve timeliness, detail, and nuance in social dimensions. Several SDGs, including monitoring. most notably, but not exclusively, SDG 5, Ensure that survey and data collection is SDG 10, and SDG 16, address exclusion.1 sensitive to confl ict and capacity.5 The way This monitoring requires assessing the data are accessed and shared requires strat- intersection of exclusion with broader risks egies that balance risks and opportunity. such as climate change. The dissemination of data on group per- Monitor perceptions and grievances of ceptions of security, services, resources, and social groups. Perceptions matter, are not power can, if not carefully used, reinforce always related to objective data, and are polarization (Haider 2014; Putzel 2010). often missed by traditional surveys and reg- At the same time, limiting data to the use of ular assessment tools. Innovative tech- a narrow group of technocrats can reduce niques, such as high-frequency surveys, the benefi t of data collection, as the many polling, and focus groups can facilitate actors that can play a key role in prevention monitoring of public perceptions over would not benefi t from this information. time.2 While monitoring perceptions has Finally, adding complex risk-monitoring become a valuable tool of public policy for- systems where data collection capacity is mulation, assessments of individual or already challenged can be counterproduc- group perceptions need to be mainstreamed tive. Where possible, it is advisable to inte- in preventive action. Perception monitoring grate risk monitoring into ongoing data needs to be undertaken with full awareness collection efforts—for example, household of the need for safeguards related to the surveys and price data collection—or to security and privacy of individuals, so that combine their setup with careful attention the data cannot be used for repression or to long-term capacity building and fi nan- exclusion based on identity; it also needs to cial sustainability. be undertaken with sensitivity to the context in which these surveys have been car- Addressing the ried out (Sartorius and Carver 2008). Multidimensionality of Risk Strengthen early warning systems. Early warning systems (EWSs) are designed to National actors are dealing with multiple initiate rapid actions to support prevention risks simultaneously and are constrained by from the community level to the regional limited budgets, political capital, and time. level. Noting that the risks of confl icts are Chapter 3 emphasizes that risks, whether

278 Pathways for Peace exogenous to a country, such as climate community involvement in development change and cross-border movements, or efforts. Border regions, specifi cally, can endogenous, such as contested elections, often benefi t from improved regional con- can intersect and accumulate to increase nectivity, if investments are made alongside vulnerability to violence. transport infrastructure so that growth is Develop integrated peace and development inclusive and benefi ts are widely shared. plans. Responding to complex interrelated Given the positive infl uence that trade can risks almost inevitably requires that institu- have on mitigating confl ict, measures tions act in concert in support of common should be taken to reduce trade barriers objectives using different instruments. This and facilitate logistics. requires a level of integrated planning that is Mitigate the impact of shocks when often challenging. Actors working on pov- tensions are high. Shocks, whether eco- erty reduction, disaster risk reduction, social nomic, political, or security related, can act service delivery, and environmental man- as triggers for violence. One crucial factor agement need to come together, at different in preventing a shock from triggering a levels of government, to identify and priori- violent response is the ability of govern- tize confl ict risks and responses under a sin- ments to address the impact of shocks in a gle framework aligned with the SDGs. Such way that is timely and distributes impact plans should identify collective outcomes fairly. People increasingly expect govern- across the humanitarian, development, and ments to play a signifi cant role in mitigat- peace nexus, while respecting their man- ing the effects of shocks. For governments dates, bringing together mandates around with limited fi scal space and capability to shared objectives and, where possible, rein- respond fl exibly and quickly, the support forcing and strengthening capacities at of the international community is key. In national and local levels. At the same time, all of these cases, it is important to ensure addressing risks of confl ict that evolve and clear communication and outreach to the change relatively rapidly requires adaptabil- population to explain the nature of the ity and fl exibility. The New Way of Working shocks and the government response. How launched at the World Humanitarian to do this will depend on the nature of Summit in 2016 provides a possible frame- the shock and the specifi c context. Price work for such actions based on the Agenda shocks are particularly sensitive, and mac- for Humanity.6 The New Way of Working roeconomic management is an important advocates for pooled and combined data, tool for prevention. The ability of govern- analysis, and information; better coordina- ments to introduce compensation rap- tion of planning and programming pro- idly to the groups most affected and to cesses; effective leadership for collective adjust the regulatory framework to address outcomes; and fi nancing modalities to sup- speculative behaviors can play a central port closer collaboration across humanitar- role in preventing violence from starting ian, development, and peacebuilding or escalating. operations. Target action and resources to arenas of Target border and periphery areas. contestation: power, resources, security, and Border areas and zones of low popula- services. As the spaces where access to live- tion density tend to be particularly vulner- lihoods and well-being are determined and able to risks of violence, as state presence where power imbalances manifest most is often weak, delivering services is often clearly, these arenas present both risks and expensive, and identifying economic invest- opportunities. These are areas of focus ments with positive rates of return is also where governments can effectively use a challenge. However, the benefi ts of redistributive policies to address underly- addressing perceptions of exclusion and ing risks of confl ict. Resolving complex grievances can be well worth the invest- disputes in these arenas requires inclusive ment. Such efforts often require innovative policy and institutional reforms as well as ways of delivering services and strong solid management of confl ict. Table 8.2

Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention 279 lays out guidance on speciﬁ c actions in Aligning Peace, Development, each arena where governments can help and Security to ensure that contestation is productive (nonviolent) instead of destructive (vio- In addressing the risk of violent conﬂ ict, lent). These actions are far from exhaus- much stronger synergies need to be estab- tive, but indicate some possible entry lished between peacebuilding efforts, secu- points. rity provision, and economic and social

TABLE 8.2 Ensuring Productive Contestation in Key Arenas

Arena 1: Power and governance Arena 2: Land and natural resources • Placing a premium on responsible political leadership, • Tensions around resources tend to be strongest at the encouraging the broad participation of all political local level. Community and local dispute resolution actors, and mitigating “winner takes all” processes mechanisms can help to manage disputes in the short are key. to medium term, while longer-term reforms are agreed • Inclusive, representative, and embedded power- upon, designed, and trialed. sharing arrangements create greater chances for • Land and housing reforms and policies to improve peaceful pathways. access to water have different impacts on women and • Institutionalizing power-sharing arrangements via disadvantaged groups; these groups need to be integral constitutions and other legal frameworks, rather than to decision making. ad hoc arrangements, improves their sustainability. • Securing land rights can reduce tensions, recognizing • Decentralizing, devolving, or allowing autonomy that a continuum of a wide range of different types of of subnational regions or groups can help to land tenure rights exist and should be protected. accommodate diversity and lower the risk of violence • Robust mechanisms to ensure multiple uses of land and at the national level. water can manage contestations between groups such • Space for civil society engagement, itself diverse as pastoralists and farmers. and contested, has to be preserved (or opened up • Cooperation and negotiations between riparian countries where lacking) as a vital link to local constituencies. and subregions on water sharing can provide the • An independent and involved private sector can foundation for peaceful relations. moderate the behavior of actors and facilitate • Climate change, population growth, urbanization, and connections where tensions manifest. the expansion of large-scale agriculture can exacerbate • Credible and robust electoral authorities, preelection tensions around water access and use. mediation, and protection of the right to vote, • Equitable oversight mechanisms regarding the use and especially for women and marginalized groups, help management of extractives, including with regions on to create incentives for peaceful elections. the division of benefi ts, can offset tensions; involvement • Dialogue and consensus to agree on the “rules of the from the private sector is essential. game” help to ensure nonviolent power sharing. Arena 3: Service delivery Arena 4: Security and justice • Equitable service delivery can exert an indirect • Enhanced parliamentary, civilian, and internal oversight infl uence on reducing the risk of violence by of security institutions can boost reform. reinforcing the legitimacy of the state. • Broad-based consultations improve the sustainability • How services are delivered and how fair they are and effectiveness of security reform. perceived to be matter at least as much for state • Greater transparency in public expenditure of the security legitimacy as who delivers them or their quality. sector can support greater accountability of security • Participatory processes and redress mechanisms can forces and increase public confi dence. help to lessen grievances around service delivery. • Antidiscrimination legislation, access to free legal aid, • Issues related to local corruption can often be and inclusion in the judiciary of marginalized groups reduced through community control mechanisms can help to manage risks around exclusionary justice and empowerment of citizens. systems. • The local community can play a role in the delivery • In the context of heightened social tensions, addressing of services, but the state must retain an overall grievances related to systematic abuses in the past can presence to be seen as legitimate. help to alleviate the risks of renewed violence. • Concerted effort should be made to reach an • Bottom-up approaches to justice reform should be rooted increasing number of remote or underserved in an understanding of the way people resolve confl icts communities to ameliorate grievances and ensure in their everyday lives. human capacity. • Greater diversity, consideration of gender, and community • Exclusion in education represents a particularly representativeness can strengthen the legitimacy and strong risk for fueling grievances and is central to quality of security forces. preventing violent confl ict. • Education for peace and citizenship can play a key role for prevention.

280 Pathways for Peace development. Local or national planning fi nancing to be able to pay civil servants, should be integrated within single guiding especially those working in security and documents to ensure synergies among var- justice and other core services, to imple- ious actors and actions. Specifi c national- ment core state functions across the coun- level coordination platforms should help try, and to have the discretion necessary to to ensure complementarity between these disburse fi nancing rapidly to geographic different components of prevention in the areas with higher risk. Budgetary support fi eld. should be considered for well-designed Ensure that security and development policies for prevention, when they are suf- objectives are compatible. In high-risk fi ciently transparent and when they inte- contexts, development planners should grate accountability mechanisms. recognize that groups with grievances Integrate security sector reform with other might not be the poorest and might not be institutional reforms. While the status quo in areas of high potential for economic is that security sector reforms are often growth, yet failing to make investments addressed separately from other institu- that could channel their grievances into tional reforms, a shift toward preventive productive contestation can lead to vio- action will require that issues of account- lent confl ict, which can wipe out larger ability, procurement, payment, and others development gains. Stability poles should follow the same rules for security services become an important focus of develop- as for the rest of the civil service. This is ment actions in areas where risks of vio- particularly important to ensure transpar- lence are high and security is an issue. ency and facilitate civilian oversight. In Security, implemented as a service to the parallel, it is important that support to the local population, not only serves to iden- security sector be conducted in line with tify and address security threats but also principles of national ownership and in is key to protecting rights, property, and coordination with other sectors. In some economic livelihoods. When security cases, a recently concluded peace process interventions are warranted, social ser- can offer an opportunity to promote a cul- vices and economic support should be ture of transparency and openness and to provided in tandem, so that armed forces move toward a “people-centered” approach are not the only interface between the to security and justice sector reform. In state and the population. To avoid the per- such contexts, national actors can place ceptions that development actions are priority on increasing the visibility and only done to facilitate the acceptance of a transparency of police services through securitized approach, armed forces should community dialogue and joint action, not directly support or execute develop- integrating women and minorities into ment programs that civilians could imple- policing structures, and developing local ment effectively. security accountability forums. These mea- Address the fi scal dimensions of preven- sures can help to avoid the recurrence of tion. In many countries dealing with high violent confl ict by increasing the account- risk of violence or where violence is already ability of the security sector. high, domestic revenue is low or depen- Establish credible forums for dialogue and dent on volatile commodity prices, and exchange. Prevention efforts should focus national fi nances are often in fi scally pre- on strengthening the capacity of society for carious situations. In order to implement prevention—not just the state. Supporting preventive policies effectively, states need local actors’ efforts in prevention is a critical minimal fi scal space. Relying exclusively part of better understanding and addressing on donor fi nancing for preventive pro- local grievances. Establishing forums at dif- grams and projects often results in a prolif- ferent levels of society for dialogue and eration of programming that is outside exchange of ideas and building capacity state control and not sustainable. The state through development assistance—training, needs to have access to a certain level of development of guidance, and institutional

Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention 281 strengthening—for national and local these elements can help to ensure that all actors can build a society’s capacity to efforts are focused on locally defi ned prob- mediate between social groups as well as lems and that proposed solutions are between various elite interests. Many such accepted as legitimate by all relevant stake- efforts can be integrated into development holders, thereby ensuring ownership and programming (Rakotomalala 2017). Such stronger trust in service providers, particu- capacity development assistance is already larly central and local governments. pursued in some instances by the United Integrating local authorities—both informal Nations and some development organiza- and formal—in community development tions and can help to build mediation programs is important, so that the efforts capacity across lines of division or improve the social contract at both local and long-standing confl ict. However, for this national levels. decentralized approach to mediation and Link grievance-handling mechanisms to peacebuilding to work, it is important to development actions. Programs need to allo- create synergies among various efforts at cate resources to ensure that grievances are local, national, and regional levels and with mediated quickly and transparently. diplomatic efforts. Development actors should integrate support for national and local mediation prac- Implementing a People- tices as part of existing governance and Centered Approach economic planning and programming. This to Prevention effort should include addressing national issues—for example, establishing national National actors should seek to reorient ser- development priorities targeting long- vice delivery systems to make people part- standing cleavages around resources, power, ners in the design and delivery of public or equal access to services—as well as local services. Emerging evidence appears to con- grievances related to the functioning or dis- fi rm the relative importance of how people tribution of services, land, and security. To are engaged as compared to what resources this end, development and political actors or services they receive, especially in areas of should build on existing efforts with stand- weak state presence or contested state legiti- ing support for strengthening the mediation macy (Marshak et al. 2017; Mcloughlin and negotiation capabilities of institutions 2015). National actors can contribute to as well as political leaders and supporting addressing grievances through strengthening middle-range leadership with infl uence and more inclusive and accountable approaches authority—traditional or modern—to con- to development. vene the relevant actors and build consensus Mainstream people’s engagement in com- around contested issues. munity development programs and local con- Engage nonstate actors in specifi c plat- fl ict resolution. It is important to empower forms for peacebuilding. In many countries, underrepresented voices such as women, prevention requires new coalitions that youth, and marginalized groups and to more accurately refl ect the importance increase the quality of people’s engagement. of young people, women, and representa- An inclusive process for selecting representatives from the private sector, civil society, tives from diverse groups is critical for and community-based organizations. The building trust and creating meaningful par- growing power and preponderance of ticipation. Furthermore, service delivery nonstate actors mean that many actors in should be reoriented to make people part- confl ict today are not accessible by tradi- ners in the design and delivery of public ser- tional diplomatic platforms or via state vices and to strengthen trust in local and actors. Individuals and communities at central government. Making people partners the local level have the highest stakes is done most effectively through main- in preventing violence, and effective, last- streaming participatory and consultative ele- ing solutions must begin with them. ments for all planning and programming in The inclusion of such partners is key to areas at risk of violent confl ict. Mainstreaming defusing tensions, restoring confi dence,

282 Pathways for Peace infl uencing a more peaceful narrative, To break out of this cycle and prevent recur- providing access to local-level justice sys- rence of violence, governments should focus tems, and improving transparency and on building more legitimate institutions and accountability through, among others, investing in people’s security (World Bank mechanisms such as participatory budget- 2011). Yet, building such institutions is a ing and third-party monitoring. long-term process. Meanwhile, national reformers need to rebuild trust between the Sustaining Preventive Action state and the population by focusing on across Levels of Risk confi dence-building measures, support for livelihood activities, efforts to address the Different actions are needed in situations past, and development of sound security of emerging risk, high risk, and open vio- and justice institutions. lence and in postviolence contexts. As such, Civil society and informal institutions play actors across development, security, polit- a key role in reducing risks. International ical, and humanitarian sectors need to experience has shown that measures to work more closely together across all levels strengthen inclusiveness of civil society insti- of risk according to their comparative tutions are effective in rapidly decreasing the advantages. Figure 8.1 illustrates how this risk of confl ict recurrence (Paffenholz et al. shift could look. In the current paradigm, 2017). For example, the inclusion of civil development actors tend to decrease society in the negotiation, contents, and engagement, or halt altogether, when risks implementation of the agreement is a key fac- escalate, while political actors enter the tor for the success of peace agreements and scene only once violence is present. This can help induce governments to show com- study argues, instead, for a focus on early mitment to addressing the grievances that action by all actors, stronger partnerships, have been at the origin of violent confl ict and shared fi nancing platforms that spread (Lanz 2011; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). prevention throughout policies and pro- In many cases, informal institutions such as grams. This study posits that all actors have community leadership, religious institutions, a role to play at all times, while acknowl- and traditional governance systems can also edging that different actors can be more or play an important role in resolving confl icts less prominent at different times. and avoiding the breakout of violence. This is not simply a call for better integration: exploiting comparative advantages Organizing for Prevention across sectors has been acknowledged for decades and most recently, at the interna- The High-Level Independent Panel on tional level, in the 2015 review of United United Nations Peace Operations calls for Nations peace operations (UN Security building a collective commitment to preven- Council and UN General Assembly 2015). tion (UN Security Council 2015; UN This requires differentiated approaches Security Council and UN General Assembly across levels of risks (described in table 8.3), 2015). To do so, the international commu- where existing tools can converge to sustain nity should (1) align incentives; (2) share prevention given the constraints and win- risks assessments openly and candidly; dows of opportunity that these categories of (3) build partnerships at local, national, risk can create (fi gure 8.2). regional, and international levels; and (4) provide fi nancial and human resources Preventing Recurrence support that is designed more appropriately for preventing crises than for responding to The fi ndings of the World Development them. Report 2011 underscore the high risks of confl ict recurrence in postconfl ict environ- Align Incentives ments, particularly if underlying grievances are not addressed in the settlement that Development organizations should adjust ended the confl ict (World Bank 2011). incentives toward prevention. Chapter 7 shows

Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention 283 FIGURE 8.1 Siloed Approach to Prevention

Political settlement LEVEL OF VIOLENCE

Violence

High Emerging risks risks Escalation Recurrence PHASES TIME Development Development Political ACTORS Security Relief/humanitarian

that the current incentives of multilateral sys- development banks are still constrained from tems to engage in dialogue with national gov- engaging on sensitive issues with governments ernments to facilitate a greater and earlier by their mandates, intergovernmental agree- focus on risks remain weak, especially among ments, and institutional culture. In precrisis development actors. Since the 1990s, the contexts, these constraints limit the scope for development focus among important bilat- development programming and diplomatic eral and multilateral agencies started to shift efforts to address causes of tension, even when toward supporting national institutions and lessons from other countries are readily avail- actors in conﬂ ict prevention. However, inter- able. Pressure to disburse funds, resistance to national development actors and multilateral addressing conﬂ ict risks that have not yet

FIGURE 8.2 Sustained Approach to Prevention

Stronger partnerships at all levels

Early and sustained Prevention integrated into LEVEL OF focus on risks programs and policies VIOLENCE

Violence

High Emerging risks Escalation Recurrence PHASES risks TIME

Development Security ACTORS Political Relief/humanitarian

284 Pathways for Peace TABLE 8.3 Differentiated Approaches across Levels of Risk

Area Emerging risks High risks Escalation Monitoring Most violent confl icts today are rooted Addressing actors’ incentives for violence Addressing and reducing humanitarian in grievances that stem from inequality is key to averting outbreak, including needs are the priority during confl ict. Where among groups and political, economic, perceptions of security. Scaling up possible, development approaches should and social exclusion. Addressing risk mediation is central at various levels be undertaken simultaneously to reduce early on means identifying and addressing during this period. As tensions escalate, risks and vulnerabilities, build resilience, inequality, exclusion, and feelings of it is important to monitor and manage and maintain the capacities of institutions injustice that arise when groups believe effectively potential confl ict triggers, that are still able to function. they are not getting their fair share. reinforce early warning systems, and ensure that they are connected to early action. Shocks As with a fi nancial crisis, the reluctance Prioritize macrofi scal stability, It is important to deescalate confl ict; to to adjust in the face of external shocks commodity price decline, and indicators avoid distributing resources that are likely may accelerate the onset of the fi scal of expectations such as capital fl ight, to be perceived as exacerbating intergroup and fi nancial dimensions of the crisis. A banking system stress, and exchange tensions; and to focus on fi scal, wage, and preventive approach calls for the design rate depreciation. Surveillance and social protection programs that are aimed at of “slow and steady” policy adjustments enforcement to prevent fi nancial fl ows reducing inequity among social groups within to achieve sustainability, which get a linked to confl ict fi nancing are also countries. Reductions in intergroup inequality head start on potential crises through important. are likely to protect against shocks. earlier actions than is normally the case. Arenas It is important to reform state institutions or Build confi dence by signaling a change Where possible, it is important to preserve legal structures and address narratives that in direction and taking visible actions to the fi scal, physical, and political integrity could be contributing to violence mobilization show that grievances will be addressed. of the state as a platform for political at the central and local levels. Group-based Hold transparent dialogue on areas of negotiation and service delivery. Establish exclusion from power and resources, land tension and demonstrate a commitment parallel delivery mechanisms able to issues, abuses by security forces, limited to peaceful change, inclusion, and complement humanitarian assistance or low quality of basic services, and lack collaboration, including holding actors, and reach insecure areas. This support of redress mechanisms often combine to particularly security actors, accountable may also consist of continuing to invest in increase the risks of violence. to the population. development in areas not affected by confl ict. Partnerships It is important to develop normative and Build coalitions with nonstate actors to It is important to engage international and legal mechanisms to respond to crisis and reach areas and groups with limited state regional partners. to bring various actors around common presence. Invest in innovative delivery platforms to have a frank discussion on mechanisms that can address grievances risks and how to address them. even in the midst of a confl ict. Civil society and community networks can provide the basis for partnerships and help to bridge diffi cult divides.

resulted in violence, and the need to satisfy While these efforts are critical to putting domestic constituencies in donor countries societies on pathways for peace, they should can undermine incentives to undertake pre- also assist the design of long-term develop- ventive action. Assisting national government strategies to build capacity and create ments in developing institutions that are just, sustainable institutions and committed citi- inclusive, and capable of sustaining peace zenship. For effective and sustained preven- should be a mainstay of development to leave tion, greater attention should be paid to no one behind. The call for such a commit- increasing economic and social resilience. ment should be made at the highest levels of Collaboration between peace and security management to signal a change in culture and and development actors on long-term strate- approach. gies for sustaining peace should respond to Peace and security actors should work with demands on the ground, supported by development actors to incorporate longer-term enhanced analysis and planning capacity. perspectives. By nature of their mandates, international actors engaged in peacemaking Share Assessments of Risks and peace operations tend to have a stronger focus on immediate needs, whether that This study highlights the importance of means ﬁ nding entry points for political monitoring risks of grievances and exclu- engagement or addressing security concerns. sion for preventing violent conﬂ ict by

Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention 285 deploying more innovative approaches for Joint risk assessments should articulate data collection. Yet, if this information is to agreed priorities. Such assessments should be become the basis for more integrated action based on agreed indicators that allow trends between different international actors and to be monitored over time. The use of their national counterparts, the assessments mutual accountability frameworks, or of these risks must be shared and collec- compacts, in countries such as Afghanistan tively agreed on. and Somalia, have proven effective at International partners should commit to galvanizing coordination and maintaining collective efforts to identify and understand a sense of urgency of implementation risks at regional, country, and local levels. At once the media spotlight has moved on. present, action on prevention is defi ned by The joint United Nations–European Union– the absence of a common vision, objectives, World Bank Recovery and Peacebuilding systems, and capacities across development, Assessment (RPBA) offers such an approach. crisis response, political, and peacekeeping It provides an inclusive process to support work. The absence of collective efforts to dialogue and participation of a broad range assess and establish shared priorities trans- of stakeholders in order to agree on the nar- lates into ad hoc and fragmented action. rative related to the challenges and risks of Nationally, these actions could include, confl ict and uses this process to identify, for example, multistakeholder forums prioritize, and sequence recovery and and processes bringing together govern- peacebuilding activities. The goal is not a ments; representatives from development, technical output, but a joint narrative and humanitarian, security, and diplomatic shared prioritization framework between organizations; civil society; and private sec- government and partners for how to miti- tor, academia, and regional organizations. gate and address confl ict risks over time. In committing to joint risk assessments, Currently used mostly during and immedi- it is important that international actors ately following confl ict, this approach share key fi ndings with the government and could be used further upstream and devel- national actors. Engaging with the govern- oped into joint platforms for prioritizing ment and other stakeholders, including at risks. For example, in Cameroon, the RPBA the subnational level, through policy dia- methodology was used successfully to help logue can help to generate a joint under- the government to respond to subnational standing of the challenges that need to be pressures and prevent an escalation and addressed. spillover of the security and displacement Risk monitoring systems should be crisis created by Boko Haram. linked to resources and capacities to act. As described in chapter 7, EWSs have been Create Stronger Regional and set up in several regions at risk of violent Global Partnerships confl ict, often with the support of regional organizations. Such systems provide evi- Strengthen regional analyses and strategies dence for confl ict prevention decision for prevention. With an increasing number making, allowing stakeholders to antici- of confl icts taking on regional dimensions, pate trends and better understand the rap- approaches to prevention need to be coor- idly changing dynamics of situations. dinated across countries to develop regional However, one of the main challenges of strategies to address critical risks early on. such systems is whether they can effectively To the extent possible, international devel- infl uence response by actors at various lev- opment, security, and political actors els. With the growing complexity of con- should work together to share risk analyses fl icts, the format of these systems needs to at the regional level. Such analyses should shift from information-sharing facilities lead to the provision of strategic, political, toward effective monitoring of longer-term and operational guidance and to integrated risks and vulnerabilities that is linked to operational support for prevention and sus- decision making and cross-sectoral capaci- tainable development. This guidance and ties to respond. support requires commitment to improved

286 Pathways for Peace regional analysis, strategies, and responses circumstances, such strategies have created and enhanced cooperation with regional opportunities to align development planning and subregional organizations. with political processes. Linkages between Facilitate stronger cooperation with mediation efforts and development assis- regional and subregional organizations. The tance should be reinforced at national and United Nations should enable and facilitate subnational levels. For example, actors others to play their role. UN facilitation involved in mediation could complement should be achieved through deepened ties their efforts by providing fi nancing for devel- with regional and subregional organiza- opment programming in priority areas to tions, including the African Union and sub- support confi dence building and incentives regional African organizations, as well as for actors to engage in mediation. Enhanced other partners such as the European Union, attention to subnational grievances and con- the Association of South East Asian Nations, fl icts, including through appropriate devel- the League of Arab States, the Organisation opment or peacebuilding assistance, can of Islamic Cooperation, the Organization of forestall their escalation. Peace operations, American States, and the Pacifi c Islands through coherent approaches with develop- Forum. Enhanced cooperation should ment actors, can further the implementation include encouraging the sharing of lessons, of their political strategies and mandates and good practices, and methodologies as they provide political leverage for shared preven- relate to analyses and operations related to tion and sustaining of peace goals. prevention. Enhance diverse partnerships for preven- Improve Investment tion. International and regional action for Prevention needs to leverage the comparative advantage of different groups and platforms, Financing for prevention remains risk- including civil society, the media, and the averse and focused on crises. Current mod- private sector, and to be more inclusive of els are too slow to seize windows of groups that have not traditionally been part opportunity and too volatile to sustain pre- of development or diplomacy. Valuing vention. Complex and multilevel preven- women’s leadership and including the con- tion efforts are often constrained by the lack tributions of youth are both essential to of readily available resources, resulting in ad consolidating peace, as is mobilizing local hoc attempts to mobilize resources and too mediation and confl ict resolution forums. often in delayed and suboptimal responses. Invest in anticipatory relationships with a Strengthen support for national fi nancing range of stakeholders. In order to have access capacity for prevention. Low-income coun- and infl uence when a crisis breaks out, tries face challenges related to limited fi scal international actors need to invest in rela- space that also make investments in preven- tionships with a range of political and non- tion diffi cult. As described in chapter 7, they state groups as well as with regional are highly dependent on donor aid, which is stakeholders. While building these relation- unreliable and often comes in feast-or-famine ships takes time, such relationships can cycles. Too frequently, budgetary support is yield valuable information, strengthen sen- provided quite narrowly for economic and sitivity to context, and enhance the credibil- institutional reforms without consideration ity of an envoy or mediator among the of the efforts and reforms needed for pre- stakeholders whose buy-in is essential for vention. International actors can offer sup- confl ict to be averted or assuaged. UN port to national governments in retaining regional political offi ces are a good example existing investments despite the risk for of efforts to build such relationships. potential investors. Organizations like the Create stronger bridges between diplomatic Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and development actions. Peacemaking has can work with national governments and advanced beyond “state-centric” models and private investors to consider the type and increasingly is engaging through multi- reliability of insurance available for private track (or “horizontal”) strategies. In some investors in the country, what kind of

Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention 287 arbitration system is available, and whether countries that are most vulnerable and least foreign investors can obtain insurance for equipped to deal with the impacts of crises. political risk. Such innovative approaches will be needed Combine different forms of fi nancing. to attract greater private investment and, Financing for preventive action requires when coupled with confl ict-sensitive different forms of fi nancing to work with approaches, can maximize the private sec- each other to support short-term and tor’s contribution to peace. In addition to long-term outcomes. Even when fi scal innovative fi nancial solutions, the private resources are available, national budgets sector also needs a strong enabling environ- are often slow to change and need to be ment and complementary public invest- supported by other resources. Another ments to support the development of basic major challenge to the provision of the infrastructure and services. necessary resources for prevention relates Strengthen international fi nancing mecha- to middle-income countries. As chapter 1 nisms for prevention. Regardless of national shows, confl icts are often seen in such set- fi nancing strategies, dedicated funds for pre- tings, yet middle-income countries typi- vention and risk mitigation should be consid- cally are not eligible for “softer” lending ered at the international level. Noting the lack facilities, which can help to incentivize of incentives for sustained and focused sup- investments in confl ict prevention—that port for prevention, existing mechanisms like is, concessional fi nancing and grants— the International Development Association’s and are increasingly facing constrained IDA18 Risk Mitigation Regime and or the access to fi nancing. Appropriate forms of UN Peacebuilding Fund should be scaled up. fi nancing across different phases of risk These funds could provide a vehicle for are important to bridge the gap. For exam- incentivizing investments in prevention. ple, making concessional fi nancing avail- Targeted fi nancial support can strengthen able to middle-income countries to government policies that recognize and prioritize action in key areas or risks is an address emerging risks more proactively as innovative means to build national capac- well as build institutional resilience to sustain ities.7 This was done with the Concessional prevention efforts over time. Financing Facility providing support for Strengthen fi nancing for regional pre- dealing with forced displacement in vention efforts. Financing strategies should Jordan and Lebanon. be designed to account for the risk of Support fi nancing and help to foster an cross-border spillovers posed by regional enabling environment for the private sector. confl ict. There may be opportunities to The private sector, including small- and learn from recent innovations for provid- medium-size enterprises and international ing insurance for regional pandemics, investors, can play an important role in such as the World Bank’s Pandemic preventing violent confl ict. There is grow- Emergency Financing Facility, which ing recognition that offi cial development funds coverage through fi nancial markets assistance (ODA) alone will not be suffi - and a complementary cash window. A cient to meet the SDGs and that much fi nancing facility that provides insurance greater engagement from the private sector coverage within a region destabilized by will be necessary to meet fi nancing needs. It confl ict could offer predictable, coordi- will be critical to prioritize private sector nated, and scaled-up disbursements of solutions where they can help to achieve funds for countries with escalating risk in development goals and to use scarce public the key arenas described in this study, to fi nance where it is most needed. However, be defi ned further for specifi c activation many countries that are most vulnerable to criteria. To receive the coverage, countries confl ict face severe challenges in attract- could be required to have a risk manage- ing private investment and fi nancing. ment plan in place that integrates devel- Sustainable and responsible private sector opment, diplomacy, and security sectors investments should help to grow more as well as a risk-monitoring platform with robust economies and build resilience in regional actors.

288 Pathways for Peace A Call for Action immense human suffering and avoid the exorbitant costs of confl ict. The time to act This study shows that the 2030 Agenda for is now. Sustainable Development is the paradigm shift on prevention. If the 1992 Agenda for Notes Peace and the 2005 World Summit were the precursors, the time is ripe to deal collec- 1. A host of SDG targets and indicators could tively with the challenges and to capitalize have relevance for assessing the risks of hor- on the opportunities of an increasingly izontal inequalities. Specifi cally, the follow- interdependent world.8 ing set of core targets for SDG 5, SDG 10, This study highlights and elaborates and SDG 16, respectively, are key: 5.1: end how synergies between peace and develop- all forms of discrimination against all ment can be effectively pursued. Where women and girls everywhere; 10.2: by 2030, the SDGs call for inclusivity and for the empower and promote the social, eco- imperative of leaving no one behind, this nomic, and political inclusion of all, irre- study provides evidence that forms of spective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, exclusion create risks of violent confl ict. origin, religion, or economic or other sta- As the SDGs underscore the importance of tus; 10.3: ensure equal opportunity and protecting our environment, renewing our reduce inequalities of outcome, including infrastructure, and combating climate by eliminating discriminatory laws, poli- change, this study highlights how struc- cies, and practices and promoting appro- tural factors intersect with exclusion and priate legislation, policies, and action in this can increase the risks of violence. Where regard; 16.3: promote the rule of law at the the 2030 Agenda envisages broad-based national and international levels and ensure partnerships as a prerequisite for its imple- equal access to justice for all; and 16.7: mentation, the study puts agency at the ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, focus of attention and calls for a recogni- and representative decision making at all tion and inclusion of the growing diversity levels. In addition, many indicators col- of actors in building coalitions for action lected through household surveys, includ- from the local to the global level. ing mortality rates, could be used to While there is no single formula for effec- monitor horizontal inequalities, including tively preventing violent confl ict, based on among geographic areas. expert analyses of country cases, the study 2. Many governments use perception surveys, demonstrates that prevention works, saves mini surveys, focus groups, key informant lives, and is cost-effective. It estimates that interviews, community maps, and other “savings” generated from prevention range techniques in policy making and testing. from US$5 billion to US$69 billion a year. These methodologies can also be helpful in The study establishes that efforts must be assessing risks in challenging contexts (Van sustained, inclusive, and targeted. Preventing de Walle and Van Ryzin 2011). violent confl ict is a continuous process 3. The most well-known example is Ushahidi, requiring long-term domestic efforts to pro- an open-source software program to collect mote inclusive societies and institutions. information and do interactive mapping. It Targeted engagement, through different was fi rst used after the 2007 presidential entry points, is critical. election in Kenya. Implementing these principles requires a 4. This term was fi rst used in the Voix des shift in policies and practices on the part of Kivus project in the Democratic Republic of national and international actors. The case Congo (2009–11). See http://cu-csds.org for prevention has been made. National and /projects/event-mapping-in-congo/. international actors have before them an 5. Implementing monitoring of perceptions agenda for action to ensure that attention, and issues such as horizontal inequality efforts, and resources are focused on pre- requires several important safeguards to be vention. It is time to address distorted in place. Governments or other actors can incentives and to do the utmost to prevent use questions on perceptions, identity, and

Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention 289 aspirations to identify certain groups, target security can serve to build a culture of them for security purposes, deny people peace. Only recently has a concerted effort rights, or support implementation of exclu- been made to embed this mind-set and sionary policies. It is essential that very operational approach into the work of the strong attention be given to protecting the United Nations. individual and collective rights of both the population interviewed and the people col- References lecting the information. There are increasingly sophisticated methodologies to do Defontaine, C. 2017. “Short Literature Review on this, such as asking the region of origin Monitoring Risks of Violent Confl ict.” more than identity or asking diffi cult ques- Background paper for the United Nations– tions in a way that people can respond to World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for directly or indirectly. Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing 6. The Agenda for Humanity is a fi ve-point Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. plan that outlines the changes needed to Haider, H. 2014. Confl ict Sensitivity. Topic Guide. alleviate suffering, reduce risk, and lessen Birmingham, U.K.: GSDRC, University of vulnerability on a global scale. In the 2030 Birmingham. Agenda, humanity—people’s safety, dignity, Lanz, D. 2011. “Who Gets a Seat at the Table? A and right to thrive—is placed at the heart of Framework for Understanding the Dynamics global decision making around fi ve core of Inclusion and Exclusion in Peace responsibilities, including the prevention Negotiations.” International Negotiation 16 and ending of confl icts. (2): 275–95. 7. The World Bank’s Global Concessional Marshak, A., D. Mazurana, J. H. Opio, R. Gordon, Financing Facility (GCFF), launched in April and T. Atim. 2017. “Tracking Change in 2016, provides concessional or “International Livelihoods, Service Delivery, and Governance: Development Association–like” fi nancing to Evidence from a 2013–2015 Panel Survey help middle-income countries to address the in Uganda.” Working Paper 59, Secure infl ux of refugees, with Jordan and Lebanon Livelihoods Research Consortium, London. being among the fi rst to receive assistance to Mcloughlin, C. 2015. “Researching State manage spillovers from the refugee crisis in Legitimacy: A Political Approach to a Political the Syrian Arab Republic. Although conces- Problem.” Research Paper 36, Developmental sional lending hinges primarily on income Leadership Program, University of level, with the lowest rates reserved for the Birmingham, U.K., November. world’s poorest nations, the GCFF alters this Paffenholz, T., A. Hirblinger, D. Landau, F. Fritsch, equation by offering concessional fi nancing to and C. Dijkstra. 2017. “Preventing Violence countries like Jordan and Lebanon that pro- through Inclusion: From Building Political mote a global public good by opening their Momentum to Sustaining Peace.” Background borders to refugees. Facilities such as the GCFF paper for the United Nations–World Bank will be important sources of funding going Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive forward, especially for incentivizing invest- Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, ments in preventative measures. See http:// World Bank, Washington, DC. globalcff.org/about-us/objectives-and-scope. Putzel, J. 2010. Confl ict and Fragility. Do No Harm: 8. Since the mid-1990s, the UN “culture of International Support for Statebuilding. Paris: peace” resolutions have recognized the fun- OECD. damental link between peace, development, Rakotomalala, O. 2017. “Local Level Mechanisms and human rights. In particular, the for Violent Confl ict Prevention.” Background Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, paper for the United Nations–World Bank adopted in 1999, details how actions taken Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive through education; economic and social Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, development; human rights; gender equal- World Bank, Washington, DC. ity; democratic participation; understand- Sartorius, R., and C. Carver. 2008. Monitoring, ing and tolerance; the free fl ow of Evaluation, and Learning for Fragile and information; and international peace and Peacebuilding Programs: Practical Tools for

290 Pathways for Peace Improving Program Performance and Results. States? As it Turns Out, Yes.” Harris School Arlington, VA: Social Impact Inc. http://pdf of Public Policy, University of Chicago. .usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady656.pdf. https://chrisblattman.com/2014/10/02/can UN (United Nations) Security Council. 2015. The -use-data-machine-learning-predict-local Future of United Nations Peace Operations: -violence-fragile-states-turns-yes/. Implementation of the Recommendations of Bush, K., and C. Duggan. 2013. “Evaluation in the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Confl ict Zones: Methodological and Ethical Operations. New York: United Nations. Challenges.” Journal of Peacebuilding and UN Security Council and UN General Assembly. Development 8 (2): 5–25. 2015. Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Calì, M., and A. Mulabdic. 2017. “Trade and Civil Partnership, and People; Report of the High-Level Confl ict: Revisiting the Cross-Country Independent Panel on Peace Operations. New Evidence.” Review of International Economics York: United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/ga 25 (1): 195–232. / search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/446. DFID (Department for International Develop Van de Walle, S., and G. Van Ryzin. 2011. “The ment). 2010a. “Interim Guidance Note: Order of Questions in a Survey on Citizen Measuring and Managing for Results in Satisfaction with Public Services: Lessons Fragile and Confl ict-Affected States and from a Split-Ballot Experiment.” Public Situations.” DFID, London. Administration 89 (4): 1436–50. ———. 2010b. “Working Effectively in Confl ict- Wanis-St. John, A., and D. Kew. 2008. “Civil Society Affected and Fragile Situations.” Briefi ng and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion.” Paper I: Monitoring and Evaluation, DFID, International Negotiation 13 (2008): 11–36. London. https://www.gov.uk/government http://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/upload / uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data /Wanis-Kew-Civil-Society-and-Peace-Negotiat /fi le/67695/building-peaceful-states-I.pdf. ions.pdf. FEWER (Forum on Early Warning and Early World Bank. 2011. World Development Report Response). 1999. FEWER Confl ict and Peace 2011: Confl ict, Security, and Development. Analysis and Response Manual. London: Washington, DC: World Bank. FEWER. Goldwyn, R., and D. Chigas. 2013. Monitoring and Additional Reading Evaluating Confl ict Sensitivity: Methodological Babbitt, E. F., I. Johnstone, and D. Mazurana. 2016. Challenges and Practical Solutions (CCVRI “Building Legitimacy in Confl ict Affected and Practice Product). Cambridge, MA: CDA. Fragile States.” Policy Brief 1, Institute for Hagen-Zanker, J., R. Mallett, and R. Slater. 2015. Human Security, Fletcher School of Law and “The First Round of the SLRC Panel Survey: Diplomacy, Tufts University , Medford, MA. The Process Paper.” Secure Livelihoods Blair, R. A., C. Blattman, and A. Hartman. 2011. Research Consortium, Overseas Development Patterns of Confl ict and Cooperation in Institute, London. https://assets.publishing Liberia. Part 2: Prospects for Confl ict .service.gov.uk/media/57a0898f40f0b652dd0 Forecasting and Early Warning. New Haven, 002ae/SLRC-Panel-Survey-Process-Paper.pdf. CT: Innovations for Poverty Action. Herbert, S. 2013. Perception Surveys in Fragile ———. 2015. “Predicting Local Violence.” Brown and Confl ict-Affected States. Birmingham, University; University of Chicago; University U.K.: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. College of London. https://papers.ssrn.com Institute for State Effectiveness. 2018. “Sovereignty /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2497153. Strategies: Enhancing Core Government Blattman, C. 2012. “Can We Predict Eruptions of Functions as a Post-Confl ict and Confl ict Violence? Statistics and the Future of Confl ict Prevention Measure.” Institute for State Early Warning.” Harris School of Public Effectiveness, Washington, DC. Policy, University of Chicago. https:// Kakachia, K., and L. O’Shea. 2012. “Why Does chrisblattman.com/2012/02/13/can-we Police Reform Appear to Have Been More -predict-local-confl ict/. Successful in Georgia Than in Kyrgyzstan or ———. 2014. “Can We Use Data and Machine Russia?” Journal of Power Institutions in Post- Learning to Predict Local Violence in Fragile Soviet Societies 13: n.p.

Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention 291 Lainé, A. 2002. “Biological Identities, Social OECD, Paris. http://www.oecd.org/governance Identities, and Ethnic Confl icts in Sub-Saharan /regulatory-policy/49217483.pdf. Africa.” Journal des Anthropologues 1 (88-89): ———. 2012b. Evaluating Peacebuilding 29–39. Activities in Settings of Confl ict and Fragility: Lavoix, H. 2007. Etude sur l’alerte pré coce. Paris: Improving Learning for Results. Paris: OECD. Ministère d es Affaires Etrangères. Parks, T., N. Colletta, and B. Oppenheim. 2011. Letouzé, E. 2012a. “Can Big Data from The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Cellphones Help Prevent Confl ict?” IPI Confl ict and International Development Global Observatory, November 8. https:// Assistance. San Francisco: Asia Foundation. theglobalobservatory . org/2012/11/can-big Pattison, C., and N. W. Myint. Forthcoming. -data-from -cellphones-help-prevent “Community-Driven Development in -confl ict/. Situations Affected by Fragility, Confl ict, ———. 2012b. Big Data for Development: and Violence: Magic or Mirage?” Social Challenges and Opportunities. New York: UN Development Working Paper, World Bank, Global Pulse. Washington, DC. Letouzé, E., P. Meier, and P. Vinck. 2013. “Big Puig Larrauri, H. 2013. “New Technologies and Data for Confl ict Prevention: New Oil and Confl ict Prevention in Sudan and South Old Fires.” In New Technology and the Sudan.” In New Technology and the Prevention Prevention of Violene and Confl ict, edited by of Violence and Confl ict, edited by F. Mancini, F. Mancini, 4–27. Washington, DC: United 71–86. Washington, DC: United States States International Peace Institute, United International Peace Institute, United Nations Nations Development Programme, and U.S. Development Programme, and U.S. Agency Agency for International Development for International Development. Meier, P. 2013. Artifi cial Intelligence for Monitoring Richards, S., A. Morrice, and T. Carr. 2016. Elections (AIME). https://irevolutions.org Confl ict Sensitivity Monitoring in Myanmar. /2013/04/17/ai-for-election-monitoring/. Findings for OECD-DAC INCAF. Prangins, ———. 2015. Digital Humanitarians: How Big Switzerland: PeaceNexus Foundation. Data Is Changing the Face of Humanitarian Scharbatke-Church, C., and A. Patel. 2016. Response. London: Routledge. “Technology for Evaluation in Fragile and Morel, A. 2016. Violent Incidents Monitoring Confl ict Affected States: An Introduction for Systems: A Methods Toolkit. San Francisco: the Digital Immigrant Evaluator.” Working Asian Foundation. Paper, Fletcher School of Law and Moser, C., and C. Mcilwaine. 2006. “Latin American Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA. Urban Violence as a Development Concern: Schmeidl, S., and J. C. Jenkins. 1998. “The Early Towards a Framework for Violence Reduction.” Warning of Humanitarian Disasters: World Development 34 (1): 89–112. Problems in Building an Early Warning Mwaûra, C., and S. Schmeidl, eds. 2002. Early System.” International Migration Review 32 Warning and Confl ict Management in the (2): 471–86. Horn of Africa. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. Schmeidl, S., and E. Piza-Lopez. 2002. Gender Nyheim, D. 2015. Early Warning and Response to and Confl ict Early Warning: A Framework for Violent Confl ict: Time for a Rethink? London: Action. Kampala, Uganda: International Saferworld. Alert. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation Smith, R. 2003. “The Impact of Hate Media in and Development). 2008. Guidance on Rwanda.” BBC, December 3. http://news Evaluating Confl ict Prevention and Peace .bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3257748.stm. Building Activities: Working Draft for U.K. Stabilisation Unit. 2016. Confl ict Sensitivity Application Period. Paris: OECD, Tools and Guidance. London: U.K. Stabili- Development Assistance Committee. sation Unit. ———. 2009. Preve nting Violence, War, and UN (United Nations). 2013. The Report of the State Collapse. The Future of Confl ict Early High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Warning and Response. Paris: OECD. Post-2015 Development Agenda. New York: ———. 2012a. “Checklist to Commission, United Nations. http://www.post2015hlp.org Design, and Run a Perception Survey.” / wp-content/uploads/2013/05/UN-Report.pdf.

292 Pathways for Peace ———. 2017. Restructuring of the United Nations Monitoring and Evaluation. GoP-UN ACT for Peace and Security Pillar. Report of the Peace Programme. Secretary-General A/72/525. New York: Weber, M. 1919. “Politics as a Vocation.” Duncker United Nations. and Humblodt, Munich. United States Institute of Peace. 2015. Lessons and World Bank. 2001. Low-Income Countries under Opportunities from the Tokyo Mutual Stress. Washington, DC: World Bank. Accountability Framework. Washington, DC: ———. 2010. Crime and Violence in United States Institute of Peace. https://www Central America. Vol. II. Washington, DC: .usip.org/sites/default/ﬁ les/SR378-Lessons-and World Bank. -Opportunities-from-the-Tokyo-Mutual-Acco ———. 2018. Pilot Toolkit: Measuring and un ztability-Framework.pdf. Monitoring in FCV Environments. Washington, Villanueva, S. D. 2009. Managing Performance in DC: World Bank. http://fcvindicators Peacebuilding: Framework for Conﬂ ict Sensitive .worldbank . org/.

Pursuing Pathways for Peace: Recommendations for Building Inclusive Approaches for Prevention 293

APPENDIX A Thematic Papers and Case Studies

Thematic Papers for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Aslam, G. 2017. “Civic Associations and Confl ict Washington, DC. Prevention: Potential Challenges and Bøås, M., S. S. Eriksen, T. Gade, J. H. S. Lie, and Opportunities: A Review of the Literature.” O. J. Sending. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention and Background paper for the United Nations– Ownership: Limits and Opportunities for World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: External Actors.” Norwegian Institute of Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent International Affairs (NUPI). Background Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. paper for the United Nations–World Bank Austin, J. L., and A. Wennmann. 2017. “Business Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive and the Prevention of Violence in Kenya, Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, 2007–2013.” Background paper for the World Bank, Washington, DC. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Boggero, M. 2017. “Technologies for Confl ict Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Prevention.” Background paper for the Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Washington, DC. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Banim, G., and I. Magnusson. 2017. “Low Road Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, to Peace: The Potential of Peace Mediation in Washington, DC. Revitalizing Prevention.” European Institute Brubaker, R., and T. Dorfl er. 2017. “How and of Peace. Background paper for the United Why Have Sanctions Been Effective in Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Helping Prevent the Escalation, Continuation, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to and Recurrence of Confl ict?” United Nations Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, University (UNU). Background paper for the Washington, DC. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Betz, M. 2017. “Media Noise and the Complexity Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to of Confl icts: Making Sense of Media in Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Confl ict Prevention.” Background paper for Washington, DC. the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Bruce, J. 2017. “Preventing Land-Related Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Confl ict and Violence.” Background paper Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, for the United Nations–World Bank Flagship World Bank, Washington, DC. Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Black, C., and K. Powell. 2017. “Macroeconomic Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Policies in Confl ict-Affected Contexts: World Bank, Washington, DC. A Review of the Evidence.” Deetken Group. Call, C. 2017. “The Evolution of Confl ict Background paper for the United Nations– Prevention in the United Nations.” Background World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways paper for the United Nations–World Bank

Thematic Papers and Case Studies 295 Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Washington, DC. World Bank, Washington, DC. DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Carey, K., and W. Harake. 2017. “Macroeconomic Control of Armed Forces). 2017. “The Environment and Policies.” Background Contribution and Role of SSR in the paper for the United Nations–World Bank Prevention of Violent Confl ict.” Background Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive paper for the United Nations–World Bank Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive World Bank, Washington, DC. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Cingranelli, D., M. Gibney, P. Haschke, R. Wood, World Bank, Washington, DC. D. Arnon, and B. Mark. 2017. “Human Rights Defontaine, C. 2017. “Short Literature Review on Violations and Violent Confl ict.” Background Monitoring Risks of Violent Confl ict.” paper for the United Nations–World Bank Background paper for the United Nations– Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing World Bank, Washington, DC. Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Cockayne, J., L. Bosetti, and N. Hussain. Demetriou, S. 2017. “Towards Convergence 2017. “Preventing Violent Urban Confl ict.” between Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Background paper for the United Nations– Operations and Development in Confl ict World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Prevention.” Background paper for the Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Colletta, N., and B. Oppenheim. 2017. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, “Subnational Confl ict: Dimensions, Trends, Washington, DC. and Options for Prevention.” Background Drew, E. 2017. “Assessing the Links between paper for the United Nations–World Bank Extractive Industries and the Prevention of Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Violent Confl ict: A Literature Review.” Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Background paper for the United Nations– World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Comolli, V. 2017. “Transnational Organized Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Crime and Confl ict.” Background paper for Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Fall, A. 2017. “Cost-Saving of Women-Led Confl ict Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Prevention Mechanisms in Liberia.” Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Background paper for the United Nations– World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Crespo-Sancho, C. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent and Gender.” Background paper for the Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Fatima, Q. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention/ Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Management Literature Review.” Background Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, paper for the United Nations–World Bank Washington, DC. Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Dahl, M., S. Gates, and H. M. Nygård. 2017. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, “Securing the Peace.” Peace Research World Bank, Washington, DC. Institute Oslo (PRIO). Background paper for Fiedler, C. 2017. “The Effects of Specifi c the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Elements of Democracy on Peace.” German Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Development Institute/Deutsches Institut Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). Background World Bank, Washington, DC. paper for the United Nations–World Bank Day, A., and A. Pichler Fong. 2017. “Diplomacy Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive and Good Offi ces in the Prevention of Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Confl ict.” Background paper for the United World Bank, Washington, DC. Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Fiedler, C., J. Gravinghold, and K. Mross. 2017. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to “Identifying Pathways to Peace: How Post-

296 Pathways for Peace Confl ict Support Can Help Prevent Relapse Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing of War.” German Development Institute/ Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik DC. (DIE). Background paper for the United Khosrokhavar, F. 2017. “Humiliation and Its Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways Multiple Dimensions.” Background paper for for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Giessmann, H.-J., J. Galvanek, and C. Seifert. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, 2017. “Curbing Violence: Development, World Bank, Washington, DC. Application, and Sustaining National Malik, A. 2017. “Electoral Violence and the Capacities for Prevention.” Berghof Prevention of Violent Confl ict.” California Foundation. Background paper for the State University San Marcos (CSUSM). United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Background paper for the United Nations– Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Washington, DC. Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, Hammond, D., and D. Hyslop. 2017. DC. “Understanding Multi-Dimensional Risks Min, E., M. Singh, J. N. Shapiro, and B. Crisman. and Violent Confl ict Lessons for Prevention.” 2017. “Understanding Risk and Resilience to Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). Violent Confl icts.” Empirical Studies of Background paper for the United Nations– Confl ict Project (ESOC), Princeton World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for University. Background paper for the United Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to DC. Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Justino, P. 2017. “Linking Inequality and Political Washington, DC. Confl ict: The Role of Social Mobilization and Mogaka, S. 2017. “Competition for Power in Collective Action.” Institute of Development Africa: Inclusive Politics and Its Relation to Studies (IDS), University of Sussex. Violent Confl ict.” Background paper for the Background paper for the United Nations– United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, Washington, DC. DC. Mueller, H. 2017. “How Much Is Prevention Kang, S. Y. 2017a. “Aid Flow to Fragile and Worth?” Barcelona Graduate School of Confl ict Affected Situations: How Does Economics. Background paper for the United Aid Create Incentives or Disincentives for Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways Confl ict?” Background paper for the United for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Müller, L. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention and the Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Legitimacy of Governance Actors.” Freie Washington, DC. Universitat Berlin. Background paper for the ———. 2017b. “Cultural and Religious Identity, United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, and Its Implications for Understanding Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Confl icts Today.” Background paper for the Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Washington, DC. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Muggah, R. 2017. “Revis iting Community Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Violence Reduction.” Background paper for Washington, DC. the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Kelly, J. 2017. “Intimate Partner Violence and Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Confl ict: Understanding the Links between Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Political Violence and Personal Violence.” World Bank, Washington, DC. Background paper for the United Nations– Nezam, T. 2017. “Alternatively Governed Spaces.” World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Background paper for the United Nations–

Thematic Papers and Case Studies 297 World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. DC. Steven, D., and G. Sucuoglu. 2017. “What Works Nygård, H. M., K. Baghat, G. Barrett, K. Dupuy, in Confl ict Prevention? Development- S. Gates, S. Hillesund, S. A. Rustad, H. Strand, Security-Diplomacy Collaboration towards H. Urdal, and G. Østby. 2017. “Inequality and Better Results.” Center on International Armed Confl ict: Evidence and Data.” Peace Cooperation (CIC), New York University. Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Background Background paper for the United Nations– paper for the United Nations–World Bank World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank, Washington, DC. Verjee, N. 2017. “Regional Economic Paffenholz, T., A. Hirblinger, D. Landau, Communities in Confl ict Prevention and F. Fritsch, and C. Dijkstra. 2017. “Preventing Management.” Background paper for the Violence through Inclusion: From Building United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Political Momentum to Sustaining Peace.” Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative (IPTI), Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Geneva Graduate Institute of International Washington, DC. and Development Studies. Background Walter, B. 2017. “The Role and Impact of Third- paper for the United Nations–World Bank Party Interventions in the Prevention of Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Violent Confl ict.” Background paper for the Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, World Bank, Washington, DC. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Payne, L., A. Reiter, C. Mahony, and L. Bernal- Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Bermudez. 2017. “Confl ict Prevention and Washington, DC. Guarantees of Non-Recurrence.” Background Wennmann, A. 2017. “Assessing the Role of the paper for the United Nations–World Bank Private Sector in Preventing Violent Confl ict.” Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Background paper for the United Nations– Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for World Bank, Washington, DC. Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Rakotomalala, O. 2017. “Local-Level Mechanisms Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. for Violent Confl ict Prevention.” Background Wolff, S., S. Ross, and A. Wee. 2017. “Subnational paper for the United Nations–World Bank Governance and Confl ict.” Background paper Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive for the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive World Bank, Washington, DC. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Sargsyan, I. L. 2017a. “Corruption, Lack of the World Bank, Washington, DC. Rule of Law, and Confl ict.” Background Yi, J. 2017a. “Aid Flows to Confl ict-Affected paper for the United Nations–World Bank Situations: Exploring Cross-Country Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Empirical Studies and Updated Data.” Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Empirical Studies of Confl ict Project (ESOC), World Bank, Washington, DC. Princeton University. Background paper for ———. 2017b. “Narrative, Perception, and the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Emotion: A Review of Recent Political Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Science Studies.” Background paper for the Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, World Bank, Washington, DC. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to ———. 2017b. “Evaluating Confl ict Forecasts: Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Criteria, Approaches, and Tools.” Empirical Washington, DC. Studies of Confl ict Project (ESOC), Princeton Sisk, T. D. 2017. “Preventing Deadly Confl ict in University. Background paper for the United Ethnically Fractured Societies: An Overview Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, and Analysis of International Development Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Assistance for ‘Bridging’ Social Cohesion.” Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Background paper for the United Nations– Washington, DC.

298 Pathways for Peace ———. 2017c. “A Review of Confl ict Forecasting Mogaka, S. 2017. “Kenya Case Study.” Case study Models.” Empirical Studies of Confl ict Project for the United Nations–World Bank Flagship (ESOC), Princeton University. Background Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive paper for the United Nations–World Bank Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive World Bank, Washington, DC. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. 2017. “The Republic World Bank, Washington, DC. of Niger: A Test-Case, with Reference to the Republic of Mali.” Case study for the United Country Case Studies Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Bob-Milliar, G. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Development Work for the Prevention Washington, DC. of Violent Confl icts: Ghana and Côte Pichler Fong, A. 2017. “Burkina Faso: Popular d’Ivoire Compared.” Case study for the Uprising and Political Transition (2014– United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, 2015).” Case study for the United Nations– Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Washington, DC. Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, Hearn, S. 2017a. “CICIG in Guatemala.” Case DC. study for the United Nations–World Bank Stackpool-Moore, L., and M. Bacalja Perianes. Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive 2017. Watipa Community Interest Company. Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, “Malawi Case Study: Demonstrations July World Bank, Washington, DC. 2011.” Case study for the United Nations– ———. 2017b. “Inclusive Development for World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways Confl ict Prevention: The Case of Burundi.” for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Case study for the United Nations–World Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Washington, DC. Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Toska, S. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Development Work for the Prevention of ———. 2017c. “Preventing the Recurrence of Violent Confl icts Cases: Egypt, Tunisia, Confl ict in Sierra Leone: How Did the UN Morocco, and Jordan.” Case study for the Mission Succeed?” Case study for the United United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Washington, DC. Verjee, A. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making Jaffrey, S. 2017. “Sustaining Peace: Making Development Work for the Prevention of Development Work for the Prevention of Violent Confl icts; South Sudan Case Study.” Violent Confl icts. Case Study: Indonesia.” Case study for the United Nations–World Case study for the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. von Einsiedel, S., and C. Salih. 2017. “Confl ict Logvinenko, I. 2017. “Confl ict and Violence in Prevention in Nepal.” United Nations Kyrgyzstan.” Case study for the United University. Case study for the United Nations– Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Lombard, L. 2017. “Case Study: The Central Walsh, M. 2017. “Prevention of Confl ict, African Republic.” Case study for the United Northern Ireland.” Case study for the United Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Nations–World Bank Flagship Study, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Preventing Violent Confl ict, World Bank, Washington, DC. Washington, DC.

Thematic Papers and Case Studies 299 ECO-AUDIT Environmental Benefits Statement

The World Bank Group is committed to reducing its environmental footprint. In support of this commitment, we leverage electronic publishing options and print-on-demand technology, which is located in regional hubs worldwide. Together, these initiatives enable print runs to be lowered and shipping distances decreased, resulting in reduced paper consumption, chemical use, greenhouse gas emissions, and waste. We follow the recommended standards for paper use set by the Green Press Initiative. The majority of our books are printed on Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)–certiﬁ ed paper, with nearly all containing 50–100 percent recycled content. The recycled ﬁ ber in our book paper is either unbleached or bleached using totally chlorine-free (TCF), processed chlorine–free (PCF), or enhanced ele- mental chlorine–free (EECF) processes. More information about the Bank’s environmental philosophy can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/corporateresponsibility.