DOCSLIB.ORG

Tilburg University Firms and Their Distressed Banks Ongena, S.; Smith, D.C.; Michalsen, D

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Tilburg University Firms and Their Distressed Banks Ongena, S.; Smith, D.C.; Michalsen, D Tilburg University Firms and their distressed banks Ongena, S.; Smith, D.C.; Michalsen, D. Published in: Proceedings of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on Bank Structure and Competition Publication date: 2001 Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Ongena, S., Smith, D. C., & Michalsen, D. (2001). Firms and their distressed banks. In D. Evanoff (Ed.), Proceedings of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (pp. 262- 276). Unknown Publisher. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 25. sep. 2021 n Competitio d an e Structur k Ban 2 26 N NORWEGIA E TH M FRO S LESSON S BANK D DISTRESSE R THEI D AN S FIRM BANKING CRISIS 1988-1991) Steven Ongena* 'ilburg university David C. Smith 'ederal Reserve Board Dag Michalsen Norwegian School of Management Introduction Many economists maintain that large-scale interruptions in l rea e th o t s shock e negativ e propagat n ca s activitie g lendin k ban sector. For example, Bernanke (1983) argues that the systematic failure of banks exacerbated the decline in the U.S. economy •The authors are affiliated with Tilburg University, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Norwegian School of Management, respectively. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Board, or ita staff. In the interests of brevity and simplicity, this working paper reports only some of the details of the research findings. A more comprehensive paper containing more details of the data, methodology, variables, and results, as well as additional references is available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ ifdp/2000/686/default.htm. The authors thank Oyvind Bahren, Doug Breeden, Hans Degryse, Half Elsas, Karl Hermann Fisher, Mike Gibson, Jan Pieter Krahnen, Theo Hijman, Richard Priestley, Jay Ritter, Paola Sapienza, Greg Udell, Jan Pierre Zigrand, and participants at the 1999 CEPR Conference on Financial Markets (Gerzensee), 2000 European Economic Association Meetings (Bolzano), 1999 Estes Park Summer Finance Conference, 1999 New Hampshire Spring Finance Conference, 1999 Symposium on Finance, Banking, and Insurance (Karlsruhe), Norges Bank, and the Universities of Amsterdam, Antwerpen, Florida, Freibourg, Frankfurt, Leuven, North Carolina, Tilburg, and Wisconsin for comments. The authors are grateful to Bernt Arne Odegaard and 0yvind Norli for supplying Norwegian data, and Andy Naranjo for providing data from Datastream. Ongena thanks the Center for Financial Studies in Frankfurt for their hospitality and the Fund for Economic Research at Norges Bank. V. Banking Relationships 263 during the Great Depression and Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) show that firms borrowing from Continental Bank suffered large atock price declines upon its collapse in 1984. More d an , (2000) a Nakamur d an k Morc , (2000) p Kashya d an i Hoah , recently Bayoumi (19991 lay at least partial blame for Japan's current t tha g lendin k ban n i s disruption e system-wid n o e malais c economi began in the early 1990s. All of these researchers maintain that e valuabl g obtainin m fro s firm d prevente s imperfection t marke . distressed e becam s bank r thei e onc g financin A second set of economists view banks as performing l capita y b d enhance r o e substitutabl r eithe e ar t tha s function , (1975) k Blac y b d exemplifie , researchers e thes f o e Som . markets Fama (1980), and King and Plosser (1984), see nothing special y causalit e th t tha n reaso d an s bank y b d provide s service e th t abou d an m syste g bankin e th f o h healt e th n betwee n correlatio y an f o economic activity runs from the real sector to banks. Still others link the importance of banks to the structure of the ) (1999 n Greenspa , instance r Fo . general n i m syste l financia e ar s shock g bankin o t e susceptibl t mos s countrie t tha s suggest those that lack developed capital markets. He reasons that countries with well-developed capital markets insulate borrowers , Similarly . lending p sto s bank n whe s substitute d goo g providin y b m fro n competitio t sufficien t tha e argu ) (1998 s Zingale d an n a j Ra o t s fund g misallocatin m fro s bank s prevent s market l capita a f o t impac e th s mitigate d an s project t investmen e unprofitabl . sector l rea e th n o s crisi l financia e th e investigat e w , debate s thi n o t ligh w ne e som d she o T - 1988 f o s crisi g bankin n Norwegia e th g usin s distres k ban f o s coat r pape s thi r fo d compile a dat e Th . study f o y laborator r ou s a 1 199 l commercia r thei o t s bank n Norwegia k lin y directl o t s u t permi customers. Using these links, we measure the impact of bank distress announcements upon the stock price of firms related to the troubled banks. Our sample covers 90% of all commercial bank assets, and nearly all exchange-listed firms in Norway. This - near e th f o e influenc e th k trac o t y opportunit a th s u s afford collapse of a banking system on a large segment of the economy. The data also enable us to conduct a controlled test of the e th d an s bank f o h healt e th n betwee g runnin y causalit f o n directio s asset k ban n i n deterioratio e Th . customers r thei f o e performanc during the crisis resulted primarily from failures of small n i s companie d exchange-liste e th o t d unrelate e ar t tha s businesse our study, which were relatively healthy at the outset of the crisis. There are a number of reasons why the Norwegian banking crisis presents an ideal setting for studying the impact of bank distress on firm performance. First, the crisis was systemic and s bank , years s crisi e th g Durin . significant y economicall representing 95% of all commercial bank assets in Norway became insolvent, forcing the closure of one bank and the bailout of e thre s Norway' g includin , institutions l financia r othe s numerou largest commercial banks. Bank managers were fired, employees n Competitio d an e Structur k Ban 4 26 ——————————————————————————————————!•• i'n.>-**H" <f*-U*il'..ifg»».JM)'«gFJ..... 'ii- 1).i. .IL>|Hfc y equit r thei f o % 00 r ove t los s bank d liste d an , off d lai e wer value. Second, banks are a primary source of funds to companies in Norway. Most of the commercial debt in Norway is raised • h wit p relationshi a n maintai s firm througy loansk man hd ban an , only one bank. This assures that we isolate the impact of bank ... - t deb f o e sourc , only t no f i , primary a firm' h eac n o t impairmen ; , aide t credi e th n o d bank-dominate h althoug , Third . financing r othe h wit y starkl s e systemcontrast governanc e corporat s Norway' bank-centered economies such as Japan and Korea that have recently experienced financial crises. In particular, regulatory and legal restrictions in Norway keep significant control rights out of the . y minorit f o n protectio e th r favo o t d ten d an , banks f o s hand equity shareholders. s distres k ban f o s announcement t tha s suggest e evidenc r Ou during the Norwegian banking crisis had little impact on the welfare of firms maintaining relationships with the troubled . ' e averag n a d experience s bank , basis t event-by-even n a n O . banks s day e thre e th n i % -10.6 f o ) (CAR n retur l abnorma e cumulativ surrounding their distress announcement and -11.7% over a longer, . h wit s maintainins firm , grelationship Meanwhile . window y seven-da these distressed banks experienced an average 3-day CAR of -1.4% and 7-day CAR of +1.7% around the same event dates. He show that , benchmark f o e choic e th o t e insensitiv e ar s result e thes . tests s robustnes l empirica r othe s variou d an , method g averagin The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details . Norwegiae crisis th g g nbankin surroundin s event r majo e th y stud t even e th s introduce d an a dat e th s discusse 3 n Sectio methodology used in our paper and Section 4 contains the event >; :-.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Nordea Annual Report 2000
    Annual Report 2000 Nordea is the leading financial services group in the Nordic and Baltic Sea region and operates through six business areas: Retail Banking, Corporate and Institutional Banking, Asset Management, Investment Banking, Life Insurance and Pensions and General Insurance. The Nordea Group has nearly 10 million customers, 1,260 bank branches and 125 insurance service centres in 22 countries. The Nordea Group is a world leader in Internet banking, with more than 2.2 million e-customers. The Nordea share is listed in Stockholm, Helsinki and Copenhagen. Contents Nordea 2000 in brief ...................................... 1 Legal structure................................................ 81 The Nordea statement................................... 3 Corporate governance ................................... 82 Summary of important events ...................... 4 Board of Directors .......................................... 84 Key financial figures ...................................... 5 Group Management ...................................... 86 Letters to the shareholders ........................... 6 Financial structure.......................................... 88 The Nordea share........................................... 12 Real estate....................................................... 90 Risk management .......................................... 92 Economic development in the Economic capital ............................................ 104 Nordic region ................................................. 16 Business environment...................................
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report 2001
    Annual Report 2001 Contents Corporate statement 4 Highlights of 2001 6 Letter to shareholders 10 The Nordea share 14 Business overview and market position 20 Strategy for leadership and growth 22 Financial targets 24 Second wave of integration 26 Information technology 28 Organisational and management principles 29 The Nordea brand 30 Economic development and business environment 32 Results by business area 34 Retail Banking 36 Corporate and Institutional Banking 46 Asset Management & Life 54 General Insurance 62 Group Treasury 66 Ratings 69 Planning and performance 70 Risk management and asset quality 74 Care for the environment and good citizenship 88 Human resources 92 Financial structure 94 Operational income statement 96 Comments to operational income statement 98 Financial statements 100 3-year overview 132 Quarterly overview 133 Board of Directors 134 Group Executive Management 137 Business organisation 138 Legal structure 140 Notice of the Annual General Meeting 143 In this Annual Report ”Nordea” means Nordea AB (publ), the Nordea Group or the business operations of the Nordea Group. The significance in individual cases is shown by the context. Nordea Bank Norge ASA and Nordea Bank Danmark A/S are also referred to as "Nordea Bank Norway" and "Nordea Bank Denmark" respectively. The Nordea Group is also referred to as ”the Group”. The legal structure of the Nordea Group is presented on page 140. Nordea in short Nordea is the leading financial services group in the Nordic and Baltic Sea region and operates through four business areas: Retail Banking, Corporate and Institutional Banking, Asset Management & Life and General Insurance. The Nordea Group has nearly 11 million customers, 1,245 bank branches and 125 insurance service centres in 22 countries.
    [Show full text]
  • Three Episodes of Financial Fragility in Norway Since the 1890S by Karsten R Gerdrup*
    BIS Working Papers No 142 Three episodes of financial fragility in Norway since the 1890s by Karsten R Gerdrup* Monetary and Economic Department October 2003 * Central Bank of Norway (Norges Bank) BIS Working Papers are written by members of the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank for International Settlements, and from time to time by other economists, and are published by the Bank. The views expressed in them are those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS. Copies of publications are available from: Bank for International Settlements Press & Communications CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland E-mail: [email protected] Fax: +41 61 280 9100 and +41 61 280 8100 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). © Bank for International Settlements 2002. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is cited. ISSN 1020-0959 (print) ISSN 1682-7678 (online) Abstract This paper provides for the first time a comparative study of three major banking crises in Norway (1899-1905, 1920-28 and 1988-92), and presents financial and macroeconomic data spanning more than 130 years. Financial sector development appears to be closely linked to booms and busts in economic activity during these years. The boom periods that preceded each of the three crises all have some common features: they were characterised by significant bank expansion, considerable asset price inflation and increased indebtedness. The non-financial sector increased its debt only slightly more than its income during the first two boom periods, but subsequent deflation increased its debt burden.
    [Show full text]
  • Storebrand Main Aspects 1St Quarter 1998
    ............................................................................................................................................................ Storebrand Main aspects 1st quarter 1998 • Operating result NOK 1,031 mill.; compared with NOK 1,126 mill. last year. • Group result NOK 279 mill.; compared with NOK 141 mill. last year. • Value-adjusted operating result NOK 3,013 mill.; compared with NOK 1,778 mill. last year. Unrealised gains increased by 1,982 mill. to 8,531 mill. • Favourable development in financial income - high realised gains. • Satisfactory result in Life due to good sale of Life-insurance. • Non-life still characterised by suppressed prices and increased claims. • Following the approval from the Ministry of Finance preference share capital will be repaid approx. May 20th. Results 1Q98 1 ............................................................................................................................................................ Storebrand Group Operating result 1st quarter 1998 01.01. - 31.03. 01.01.- 31.12. NOK mill. 1998 1997 1997 Net premium income 5,087 4,721 14,642 Income financial items insurance 4,935 2,975 15,490 Other income 260 175 786 Operating income 10,283 7,871 30,918 Insurance benefits, allocations -5,496 -5,044 -15,928 Costs financial items insurance -2,717 -870 -6,307 Insurance related operating costs -697 -606 -2,601 Other costs -342 -225 -1,273 Operating result 1,031 1,126 4,809 Results 1Q98 2 ...........................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • SUMMARY the Christiania Bank Group's Net Profit for the First Nine Months of 2001 Amounted to NOK 2117 Million
    CHRISTIANIA BANK 3rd QUARTER 2001 SUMMARY The Christiania Bank Group’s net profit for the first nine months of 2001 amounted to NOK 2,117 million (NOK 1,700 million), equivalent to NOK 3.84 per share (NOK 3.08 per share). Net profit for the third quarter of 2001 amounted to NOK 274 million (NOK 653 million), equivalent to NOK 0.50 per share (NOK 1.18 per share). Operating profit before loan losses and profit on long-term securities for the first nine months totalled NOK 2,293 million (NOK 2,201 million), and the equivalent figure for the third quarter alone was NOK 625 million (NOK 756 million). Total income is somewhat lower than expected due to losses on stock trading and reduced income from commissions and fees from securities trading, while total operating costs were largely in line with expectations. Loan losses and provisions for the first nine months amounted to NOK 384 million (write-back of NOK 103 million), of which the third quarter accounted for NOK 222 million (write-back of NOK 146 million). The profit reported for the first nine months corresponds to a return on the Group’s equity of 16.1 per cent (14.3 per cent) on an annualised basis. Net loans to customers increased by NOK 2.5 billion in the third quarter, equivalent to 1.7 percent. Growth for the year to date stands at NOK 4.4 billion or 2.5%. After adjusting for the sale of Christiania Bank's London branch, net loans to customers increased by approximately NOK 10.3 billion in the first nine months.
    [Show full text]
  • Competitiveness and Regulation of Norwegian Banks. by Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe, Bent Vale, Morten H. Grindaker and Erling Skanc
    Nr. 18 | 2013 Staff Memo Financial Stability Competitiveness and regulation of Norwegian banks Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe, Bent Vale, Morten H. Grindaker and Erling Skancke Staff Memos present reports and documentation written by staff members and affiliates of Norges Bank, the central bank of Norway. Views and conclusions expressed in Staff Memos should not be taken to represent the views of Norges Bank. © 2013 Norges Bank The text may be quoted or referred to, provided that due acknowledgement is given to source. Staff Memo inneholder utredninger og dokumentasjon skrevet av Norges Banks ansatte og andre forfattere tilknyttet Norges Bank. Synspunkter og konklusjoner i arbeidene er ikke nødvendigvis representative for Norges Banks. © 2013 Norges Bank Det kan siteres fra eller henvises til dette arbeid, gitt at forfatter og Norges Bank oppgis som kilde. ISSN 1504-2596 (online only) ISBN 978-82-7553-781-0 (online only) Competitiveness and regulation of Norwegian banks* Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moea Bent Valeb Morten H. Grindakerc d Erling Skancke 27 November 2013 * We thank Ingvild Svendsen for valuable comments. a University of Oslo b Norges Bank c Morten H. Grindaker was engaged as research assistant in Norges Bank in 2012-2013. d Erling Skancke was engaged as research assistant in Norges Bank in 2012-2013. 1 Contents 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 4 2. The Norwegian banking sector in an international perspective ............................................
    [Show full text]
  • What Is Your Pension Figure?
    What is your pension figure? Annual report Storebrand ASA STOREBRAND ASA | 1 ANNUAL REPORT 2012 1954: The acquisition department (sales department) in Kirkegata 24. 2012: Everyone sits in an open floor plan at Storebrand's offices at Lysaker. The 35,000 m2 building is interconnected by lifts, stairs and walkways. 1767–1919: ROOTS ”Christiania Almindelige Forsikrings-Aksje- 1990–1999: CRISIS AND CHANGE 2007 2012: Recommended BY our customers History of selskap” (renamed in 1915) to ”Christiania Storebrand acquires SPP, the Swedish life 1767 Almindelige Forsikrings-Aksjeselskap 1990 insurance and pensions provider, from Storebrand launches its new vision in Storebrand ”Den almindelige Brand-Forsikrings- Storebrand”. This name is kept until 1971. Storebrand and UNI Forsikring agree to Handelsbanken and forms the leading life January: "Recommended by our cus- Anstalt” is established in Copenhagen. merge, and the merger receives official insurance and pensions provider in the tomers". Six customer promises, a new 1936 permission in January 1991. Nordic region. position and adjusted core values are also 1814 Storebrand acquires Europeiske, the lead- introduced. Following the split from Denmark, man- ing travel insurance company in Norway. 1992 2008 agement of the fire insurance scheme is UNI Storebrand’s negotiations with Skan- The financial crisis in the USA spreads to Storebrand's CEO for 12 years, Idar transferred to Christiania, as the capital of 1962 dia concerning establishing a major Nordic the global financial markets and during Kreutzer, resigns to become the new Norway was called at that time. In 1913 Storebrand initiates a new wave of acquisi- company fail to reach agreement. 2008 the New York Stock Exchange (Dow Managing Director of Finance Norway the scheme is converted into a public tions and mergers by acquiring Norrøna, Jones DJIA) falls by 34 per cent and the (FNO).
    [Show full text]
  • Norway – GBIF/SBIF (Nordic Crisis 1991)
    PRELIMINARY YPFS DISCUSSION DRAFT| MARCH 2020 Norway – GBIF/SBIF (Nordic Crisis 1991) Priya Sankar1 March 6, 2020 Abstract Prior to the Nordic financial crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Norwegian government DiD not have a preexistent financial safety net. The private Savings Bank Guarantee FunD (SBGF) anD Commercial Bank Guarantee FunD (CBGF) proviDeD guarantees and capital injections to struggling banks in their sector, but by 1991, these actions DepeteD their resources. The Norwegian Parliament (Storting) createD the GBIF (Government Bank Insurance Fund) in March 1991 to loan money to these two funDs, but by November of 1991, they haD incurreD an unsustainable amount of Debt anD the Storting gave the GBIF the power to make Direct capital injections through suborDinateD Debt, common anD preferreD equity, anD primary capital certificates. At the same time, it establisheD the SBIF (Government Bank Investment FunD) to proviDe liquiDity to struggling but solvent banks. From 1991-1993, the GBIF anD SBIF recapitalizeD many banks, incluDing the three major banks: Fokus Bank, Den Norske Bank, and Christiania Bank. The GBIF had sold all its shares in all banks except Den Norske by 2002, when its shares were transferred to the SBIF, and the GBIF was retireD. By 2004, the SBIF owneD 34% of DnB NOR, the entity that resulteD from a merger of Den Norske bank and the Union Bank of Norway, and these shares were transferred to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance and Industry and the SBIF was retireD. Keywords: GBIF, SBIF, CBGF, SBGF, Norway,
    [Show full text]
  • General Note
    Index General note The main references to cities which have changed their names in the course of history will be their modern names, but there will be cross references from older names if both old and new names have been used in the main text, whish is usually the case (e.g. Oslo is found under Oslo with cross references under Christiania and Kristiania). In connection with names of institutions, old spellings are generally used (e.g. Kjøbenhavns Handelsbank instead of Københavns Handelsbank). Names of Finnish institutions are generally found under the names used in English, unless their original Finnish or Swedish names are normally used outside Finland (e.g. Föreningsbanken i Finland, or Suomen Yhdyspankki (SYP) is found under Union Bank of Finland, while references to Kansalis Osake Pankki are found under KOP, and Suomen Pankki is found under Bank of Finland). ABC Sparebank 242 Banco della Piazza di Rialto 5, 6 Åbo, City of see Turku Bank, definition of 10, 11, 114, 167 Åbo Diskont 38 ff, 94 ff, 100 Bank of England 32, 44, 50, 71, 75, Åbo Sparbank 105 ff 126, 227 Adler, D.B. 79 Bank of Finland 95 ff, 100 ff, 105, Affärsbankernas Säkerhetsfond 109, 126, 194, 195, 198, 202, 205 ff, (Finland) 208 212, 215, 216, 235 Agarhd, C.A. 144 (fn, 154 Bank of Helsinki 111, 200, 212 Ålandsbanken 196 Bank van leening 6 Alberti, C. 81 (fn) Bankhæftelse 70 Alexander I, Czar 95, 98 Banking acts and regulations Alfred Berg 159 (fn) Denmark 83, 164, 167ff, 174ff, 182, Allmänna hypotekskassan för Sveriges 183 städer (“Stadshypotekskassan”) Finland 108, 110, 114, 164, 198, 155, 156 207 ff “Alte Fünf” see also Landschaften 7, Norway 124, 164, 221, 222, 227, 157 233 ff, 241 Amsterdam, City of 6, 7, 20, 22, 25, Sweden 108, 114, 140, 141, 144 ff, 30, 48, 149 147, 162, 164, 250 ff, 255 ff, Amsterdam Wisselbank 6, 7, 21 ff, 262, 270 25 ff, 44, 49, 50, 53, 73, 96 Banking crises, failures, and Andelsbanken 181 rescues 279 Andresen, N.A.
    [Show full text]
  • Resolving the Financial Crisis: Are We Heeding the Lessons from the Nordics?
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Borio, Claudio; Vale, Bent; von Peter, Goetz Working Paper Resolving the Financial Crisis: Are We Heeding the Lessons from the Nordics? Working Paper, No. 2010/17 Provided in Cooperation with: Norges Bank, Oslo Suggested Citation: Borio, Claudio; Vale, Bent; von Peter, Goetz (2010) : Resolving the Financial Crisis: Are We Heeding the Lessons from the Nordics?, Working Paper, No. 2010/17, ISBN 978-82-7553-567-0, Norges Bank, Oslo, http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2497446 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/209962 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der
    [Show full text]
  • Occasionalpaper 38.Pdf (1.843Mb)
    i “˙op38main” — 2007/12/5 — 11:06 — page i — #1 i i i NORGES BANK OCCASIONAL PAPERS No. 38 Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway – Part II Øyvind Eitrheim, Jan T. Klovland and Jan F. Qvigstad (eds.) Oslo 2007 i i i i i “˙op38main” — 2007/12/5 — 11:06 — page ii — #2 i i i ii NORGES BANK OCCASIONAL PAPERS NO. 38 i i i i i “˙op38main” — 2007/12/5 — 11:06 — page iii — #3 i i i Preface In the fall of 2004 Norges Bank published the first volume in its series on Historical Monetary Sta- tistics for Norway reporting the construction of consistent historical time series for a set of key macroeconomic variables for Norway. The aim of the project has been to stimulate research in the area of monetary history, and to foster empirical analysis of long runs of time series data. The first volume covered historical consumer prices, monetary aggregates, bond yields, exchange rates, stock and housing prices, as well as real GDP and main demand components. The time span covered by this book was mainly between 1819–2003. In addition to the voluminous documentation of data, the book also discussed some of the methodological issues involved in constructing historical time series spanning long periods of time, as well as some of the institutional aspects of financial markets in Norway during that period. With the publication of this volume, Norges Bank completes its project of collecting and system- atizing historical data of relevance for price stability and financial stability. The data series presented in this volume are complementary to the historical time series published in the first volume, a fact which is reflected in the name of the second volume.
    [Show full text]
  • Standing Committee of the Efta States
    31 . 12 . 94 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 394/1 I (Information) EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE EFTA STATES List of credit institutions authorized in Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden provided for in Article 3 ( 7 ) of Directive 77/780/EEC ( 94/C 394/01 ) General Articles 3 ( 7 ) and 10 ( 2 ) (*) of First Council Directive 77/780/EEC of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of laws , regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions ( 2 ) require the Commission to draw up and publish a list of all credit institutions authorized to do business in Member States . Paragraph 6 ( b ) of Protocol 1 to the EEA Agreement requires that facts , procedures, reports and alike regarding the EFTA States shall be published in a separate section of the Official Journal of the European Communities when corresponding information is to be published regarding the EC Member States . This is the first occasion on which the Standing Committee of the EFTA States complies with the abovementioned requirement, in accordance with paragraph 6 ( b ) of Protocol 1 to the EEA Agreement and Article 1 ( 1 ) ( b ) of Protocol 1 to the Agreement on a Standing Committee of the EFTA States . The list published in the Annex to this communication reflects the situation as at 31 August 1994 . As regards the content of the list, updating of the list and classification of credit institutions in the list by groups , reference is made to the corresponding list published by the Commission ( OJ No C 156, 7.
    [Show full text]