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Indo-Pacific Newsletter Indo-Pacific Newsletter FROM EDITOR’S DESK Vol 1, No 2, 30 July 2021 CONTENTS This fortnight witnessed some major moves in geopolitics of the world powers, which will largely play out in this 1. From Editor‘s Desk spectrum of cooperation and contest in the Indo-Pacific 2. Opinion/ Review/ Expert View region. On the Military front, while US moved its B-52 Bombers, F-22 raptor and about 17000 troops in the 3. Recent Developments region, Royal Navy has also deployed its naval might. On 4. Military Strategy/ Diplomacy the diplomatic front, New Zealand PM has declared firm alignment with US towards Indo-Pacific commitment with 5. Social Media Corner EU and Germany towing the line. With the US-China PEEP-IN tussle for dominance of Indo-Pacific, the region is likely to become an area of multiple flash points; Taiwan could Blinken reaffirms ASEAN's essential be the first. It would be interesting to watch the strategic role in Indo-Pacific move by QUAD in the backdrop of the open threat by https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3 CCP to Japan. bdLUXLeyc In this era of active Social Media domain, from this issue QUOTE onwards, we have introduced a SM corner for the readers, that includes you tube links of Interviews, “New Zealand is not alone in adopting this Indo-Pacific outlook ... Australia, debates and recent developments along with links for India, Japan, and the United States, the Podcast. We would continue to strive to keep you abreast European Union, the United Kingdom, of latest developments in the region. and Germany have also referred to an Jai Hind Indo-Pacific region in reaction to more challenging geopolitics” Jacinda Ardern, PM, New Zealand Indo-Pacific Newsletter communications and trade with those regions. So on Opinion/Review the one hand, India looked eastward, and on the What’s in a Name? India’s Role in the Indo- other, toward the Indian Ocean. The foundations of Pacific India‘s current Indo-Pacific policy were laid at the turn of the twenty-first century. In the aftermath of The notion of the Indo-Pacific has recently become the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, the United States widely used, particularly in the United States, India, began a policy of rapprochement with India, which Japan, and Australia, and has almost replaced the led to closer Indo-U.S. ties. earlier term ―Asia-Pacific.‖ In Russia, this change of geopolitical terminology is usually seen through The next stage in Indo-U.S. interaction occurred in the prism of the U.S.-China confrontation and the wake of the devastating tsunami of December Washington‘s determination to strengthen 26, 2004, which killed some 225,000 people in America‘s position in that part of the world by Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India. At the engaging India on its side. Yet India is developing initiative of then U.S. president George W. Bush, its own conceptual constructs, which may carry the the United States, Australia, India, and Japan same name, but are based on New Delhi‘s view of formed a coalition to provide immediate assistance the world and national interests. to those affected. Although the To balance China’s growing coalition lasted merely a week, The term ―Asia-Pacific,‖ which it formed the basis of the notion might and its expanding was first coined in the United of a quadrilateral grouping: the States, excluded South Asia. influence, Washington and Tokyo Quad. A proposal to formalize The Asia-Pacific Economic began to work to bring New Delhi the group was put forward by Cooperation (APEC), which Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo staged high-profile annual into the strategic equation. Abe in 2006, but came to summits from the 1990s through nothing. the 2010s, does not include India as a full member. As for India itself, following the end of the Cold Since then, the steep rise of China and its increasing War, it began to come up with new geopolitical assertiveness—evidenced by developments in the concepts that reflected the dramatically changed East and South China seas, as well as the growing international environment. importance of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole— have triggered a number of policy moves by various The diplomatic and economic facet of New Delhi‘s countries. To balance China‘s growing might and its strategy began with the ―Look East‖ policy of the P. expanding influence, Washington and Tokyo began V. Narasimha Rao government in 1991: an effort to to work to bring New Delhi into the strategic cultivate economic and strategic relations with equation. To achieve that, they modified their Southeast Asia, in a marked shift in India‘s global strategic concepts around the notion of the ―Indo- outlook following the Cold War. It was also seen as Pacific.‖ an important component of India‘s decision to open up its economy and take advantage of the dynamic True, India is not a significant economic or military East Asia region. player east of the Malacca Straits. But to the west of the straits, its geography makes it a major anchor India‘s strategic thinking was shaped by the fact for any strategy that links the Pacific with the that it has serious disputes with Pakistan to its west Indian Ocean. India shares maritime and land and China to the north, which limits its overland borders with four out of the ten ASEAN states. Vol 1 No 2 30 July 2021 /Page 2 Indo-Pacific Newsletter Jutting out 2,000 kilometers into the Indian Ocean, to play a significant military role outside its India also sits astride key sea lanes and dominates neighborhood. Confronting China somewhere in the the western end of the Malacca Straits. Western Pacific, 5,000 kilometers away, is not credible when the Chinese are sitting along a large ASEAN countries themselves remained ambivalent: chunk of India‘s land borders. In any case, India they welcomed the U.S. presence in the region, but lags behind China in almost all elements of since they also enjoy close economic ties to China, comprehensive national power, including its they refused to participate in any confrontation with military. East of Malacca, India can at best play a Beijing. The ASEAN reluctance to directly involve symbolic role as an ally of the United States and itself in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy pushed Japan, and seek a payoff in pushing its own Washington to take another course. In 2017, as economic growth agenda amid the U.S.-Chinese U.S.-Chinese rivalry escalated into confrontation, estrangement. It could play a strong security role President Donald Trump‘s administration dusted off west of the Malacca straits in the Indian Ocean, the old Quad format to serve as an instrument of its where it has considerable natural advantages. Indo-Pacific strategy to check China. Trump‘s successor Joe Biden regards China as the main India recognizes the centrality of ASEAN to its challenger to U.S. global Indo-Pacific strategy, but in the primacy, and is busy building a region, its key political and ―coalition of democracies‖ India will not hesitate to take economic ties remain anchored aimed at outcompeting China on advantage of the grouping to in the city-state of Singapore. It a wide range of issues, mainly has failed to build significant enhance its own political and economic. ties with other ASEAN states, economic profile in the region even Vietnam, with which it had The Quad grouping, however, long had an important remains an instrument of any relationship. In that sense, it is U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. The goal of that strategy, unable to play a larger role of counterbalancing as articulated in a declassified U.S. government Chinese power in the region. As of now, India‘s document at the beginning of 2021, is ―maintaining role in the Western Pacific region remains U.S. strategic primacy‖ in the region. For that, symbolic, and in the Indo-Pacific context, confined Washington needs a credible democratic partner on to the ―Indo,‖ or the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). the Asian continent and in the Indian Ocean area. Even here it is feeling the pressure from China, With that in mind, the United States is willing ―to which has made significant inroads into South Asia accelerate India‘s rise and capacity.‖ and the IOR. India‘s neighbors, such as Nepal, New Delhi may, of course, have a different point of Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar view, and is not committed to these goals. Unlike have developed strong ties with Beijing, which has the other Quad nations, it does not have any formal already developed substantial trading links with the military ties to the United States. But India will not IOR as a whole. hesitate to take advantage of the grouping to India‘s future ambitions depend on the trajectory of enhance its own political and economic profile in its economy. By opting out of the Regional the region. Comprehensive Economic Partnership free trade Even though there is a great deal of activity around agreement, New Delhi has forfeited an opportunity the Quad, it is clear that New Delhi is in no position to participate in a vital new economic grouping that Vol 1 No 2 30 July 2021 /Page 3 Indo-Pacific Newsletter could have added zest to its Indo-Pacific strategy. minister of Japan, hinted that China‘s possible This has already begun limiting its naval ambitions invasion of Taiwan may be perceived as a threat to and the ability to play the role into which many Japan‘s survival, leading Japan to deploy its Self- expect the Quad is hoping to evolve: that of an Defense Forces.
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