Somaliland, 1991 - 2001

Richard Bennet, Michael Woldemariam Innovations for Successful Societies

NAVIGATING A BROKEN TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE: SOMALILAND, 1991 - 2001

SYNOPSIS After nearly a decade of civil war, Somaliland declared independence in 1991 amid high expectations. Though the war had left the East African country desperately poor and deeply divided, the rebel organization that had won liberation, the Somali National Movement (SNM), had taken steps to ensure that peace and public order would be preserved in the run-up to a transition to civilian government in May 1993. Yet scarcely a year into its administration, the SNM imploded, unleashing a spiral of violence that threatened the country’s future. As the prospect of all-out warfare loomed throughout 1992, the government of SNM Chairman Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali Tuur struggled to navigate the stormy transition from fragmented rebel rule to a legitimate civilian administration. This case study describes these efforts and focuses on the political consensus building that brought Tuur’s successor, President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, to power. Egal’s early efforts to build coalitions, manage political opponents and disarm clan militias were more successful than Tuur’s, although problems of insecurity and violence persisted. The case offers broader insights into ensuring peace in post-conflict societies and demonstrates how many of the actions needed to build short-term political consensus can come at the expense of long-term efforts to bolster good governance.

Richard Bennet and Michael Woldemariam drafted this policy note on the basis of interviews conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland, in October 2010. The companion case study, “Nurturing Democracy in the Horn of Africa: Somaliland’s First Elections, 2002-2005,” examines how Somaliland successfully avoided violence and instituted efficient electoral processes.

INTRODUCTION order. A former Somali diplomat turned rebel On 5 May 1993, in the Somaliland town of leader, Tuur had relied on decades of political Borama, a conference of clan elders deliberated experience in holding his new country together. over who the next president of Somaliland But he was barely succeeding. According to would be. Much hinged on the decision of this Mohammed Fadal, a former minister of conference, as the transitional administration of planning who attended the Borama conference, President Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali Tuur had Tuur claimed that he “just kept the place largely failed to prevent a breakdown of public together.” Yet a formidable array of opponents

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were now violently contesting his authority, and (SNM), the rebel organization that liberated with it, the peace and stability of Somaliland. Somaliland from Barre’s rule in 1991, had “He suffered, he was humiliated. At certain mandated a two-year transitional period through points they slandered him,” Fadal said of Tuur, which the SNM would cede administration to a who died in 2003. With Somaliland’s sitting civilian government, such a peaceful transition of president marginalized, and the politics of the power looked increasingly unlikely. The country broken, the fate of the nation rested on transitional government of SNM Chairman the Borama delegates. Tuur teetered, as conflicts over government Somaliland arose as an experiment in peace revenue erupted between SNM elites and the ill- building toward the end of the Somali Civil War disciplined clan militias that supported them. (1981-1991). Named by its colonial creators, As political unity gave way to discord, the region in the extreme northwest of Somalia Somalilanders openly wondered whether their had been the target of heavy bombing by the society would soon mirror the chaos and Mogadishu-based government of Mohammed disorder of their cousins to the south. Siad Barre. The region’s major city, Hargeisa, Largely spurned by international donors had been reduced to rubble. Adan Yusuf who worried that Somaliland’s independence Abakor, a prominent civil-society member would spawn a generation of aspiring would-be whose imprisonment in 1982 ignited Somalia’s states, Somaliland embarked on an effort to save civil war, was in Hargeisa with German aid the peace and create a sustainable political workers after the bombing campaign. He settlement. Frustrated and marginalized, Tuur recalled the devastation: “The day we entered soon faded from the scene, retreating into self- Hargeisa in 1991, together with the German imposed exile in southern Somalia. team, a German doctor starting crying. I In 1993, SNM leaders and clan elders couldn’t stop her from crying. She said, ‘This elected a new president, Mohammed Ibrahim place looks unimaginable.’” Hargeisa reminded Egal. Recognizing the limitations of his the doctor of her hometown of Dresden, a major predecessor’s political strategies, Egal sought to German industrial city that was largely co-opt potential opponents by first including destroyed by bombing and a resulting firestorm them in his administration and then effectively during World War II. marginalizing them. Furthermore, he launched Prompted by this legacy of war, and against a campaign to demobilize clan militias in an the backdrop of decades of perceived economic effort to reduce their capacity to pursue their and political domination by southern-based narrow goals by force of arms. Egal encountered elites, the northerners decided to stake out a new numerous setbacks, and his behavior produced course. At a conference of political and clan several troubling trends, including an unfocused leaders in Burao in May 1991, Somaliland development program, the illicit use of private declared independence, severing the union with money for political purposes, and a Somalia that had existed since 1960. In the centralization of power in the office of the initial aftermath of the Burao conference, president. Still, his efforts demonstrate how Somaliland’s prospects looked promising, as the savvy political leaders can build powerful euphoria of independence masked the tensions coalitions for peace in the most inauspicious inherent in a desperately poor, deeply divided, post-conflict environments. war-ravaged society. By February 1992, the veneer began to THE CHALLENGE crack. While the Somali National Movement In late 1981, a group of northern Somali

Richard Bennet, Michael Woldemariam Innovations for Successful Societies

exiles established the SNM at a meeting in resources be mobilized for what planners hoped London. Shortly after that, the group launched to be the decisive stage of the war? military operations against the Barre regime These questions proved to be intractable, from bases in neighboring Ethiopia. While the splitting the SNM politburo down the middle vast majority of the SNM’s founders hailed from and prompting several members to leave a testy the Isaaq, Somaliland’s largest clan family, it was leadership meeting in anger. Over this a motley crowd. Bobe Yusuf, a former SNM opposition, and with some reluctance, the political secretary, remembered the SNM as a leadership decided that the only way to proceed “front where everybody comes in. … You have was to restructure the SNM along clan lines by everybody who hates Siad Barre and wants to creating a Guurti, or body of clan elders who take up a gun and fight against him. You have would raise resources and make key the clerics, you have the military officers, you recommendations to the SNM leadership. have the intellectuals, you have the socialist- Although the empowerment of traditional oriented people, you have the capitalist-oriented clan structures within the SNM was thought to people, you have every Dick and Harry united be the most efficient way for the organization to against Siad Barre. You had to accommodate stay afloat in hard times, the decision effectively them.” Because the SNM comprised Islamists tribalized the SNM. After the withdrawal of and secularists, politicians and experienced Ethiopian support, the clan structure came to military commanders, and various Isaaq sub- define the composition of the militias, according clans, the organization’s internal cohesion was to Hassan Issa Jama, then vice chairman of the never certain. SNM and later the country’s first vice president. In 1988, with its hand forced by a “From then on, we relied completely on our withdrawal of Ethiopian support, the result of grassroots, our clans,” he said. “Every clan an Ethiopian peace agreement with Barre, the preferred to supply their own kin. That is when SNM abandoned its cross-border sanctuaries in our units became clan-based.” According to a bid to win the war, seizing Somaliland’s major Jama, this move “was not a welcome urban centers, Hargeisa and Berbera. Barre’s development,” and it was to have far-reaching response to the SNM victories was harsh. consequences in the immediate post-conflict Bombing Somaliland’s cities to the ground, period. Barre prompted a costly SNM retreat and In January 1991, Barre fled Mogadishu, created massive human flight into refugee camps ousted by a coalition of rebel groups that in Ethiopia. included the SNM. In Somaliland, the SNM Ethiopia’s withdrawal of direct support and took the major towns and the lion’s share of the the SNM’s failed gamble had complex and rural areas, becoming the most powerful force in paradoxical effects. While in the short term the the territory. Although the SNM had never SNM suffered significant military losses, the seriously entertained the idea of independence, movement of the Isaaq population into the refusal of the movement’s southern allies to Ethiopian refugee camps greatly increased the work together on the composition of the new organization’s ability to recruit members. Yet as government, combined with popular pressure, the SNM was poised to grow significantly in forced the issue. On the Guurti’s size, fundamental questions emerged about how recommendation, SNM Chairman Tuur yielded the organization should be structured. With to nationalist pressures, declaring an Ethiopian support gone, how could such a large independent republic that the SNM central force be sustained in the field? How could committee would lead for a two-year transitional

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period, after which power would pass to a to rebuild.” An important yet unintended civilian government. Adan Yusuf Abakor, who consequence of this calculated magnanimity in later became the country representative for the victory was that hundreds of talented former British non-governmental organization government officials returned to Somaliland, Progressio, described how the situation providing crucial human capital to a poorly unfolded: “The SNM was not prepared to rule. resourced government trying to get on its feet. … Suddenly they found themselves The SNM’s successes with external [transitioning] from a liberation movement into relations were soon undone by internal fighting, a government, into an administration which was as violence erupted between SNM units in supposed to rule a country and people. … The February and March 1992. With the common chairman [of the SNM] became the president enemy gone, rivalries emerged within the SNM and the central committee became a parliament. and, more importantly, within the Isaaq clan. In Then suddenly there was a lot of mess going on. a land where most were impoverished, these It was more of a people’s movement rather than conflicts were largely driven by economic an organization.” Organizing and corralling scarcity and a demand for the spoils of war, as internal factions became a primary challenge for young, well-armed but poorly disciplined men SNM leaders who sought to unify the country. were easily mobilized along clan lines by SNM Between Barre’s fall in January 1991 and a leaders who competed for power. Fadal, who landmark Burao conference in May, the SNM had returned from Canada in 1992 after being took several crucial steps that averted a abroad during the war, described the situation continuation of civil war in Somaliland. that he confronted when he arrived in Hargeisa: Recognizing that their organization was “1992 was a very difficult time for Somaliland. (correctly) perceived as Isaaq-dominated, SNM In fact the whole place was teeming with militia, leaders sought to reassure non-Isaaq clans that guns. In the night you would be hearing people had been allied with the former government that firing…mortars and big guns, and fire all over they would not be persecuted in the new the place,” he said. While the SNM had political order. Toward this end, the SNM succeeded in capturing the major towns in the initiated a series of local clan peace conferences, latter stages of the war against Barre, the using SNM members from non-Isaaq clans as organization quickly devolved into feuding clan key representatives during negotiations. militias. The port of Berbera was a significant Significantly, the SNM made the pragmatic flashpoint, as the government sought to reassert decision that all individuals and clans would be control of the city and its port revenues in the absolved of crimes committed during the civil face of opposition from clan commanders who war, while demonstrating restraint in deploying sought to prevent a government monopoly. By SNM troops to regions populated by non-Isaaq September, the government’s efforts to assert clans. “Magnanimity in victory. … We said, control of Berbera had failed, key ministers had ‘Look, the war is finished. You are going to resigned, and renegade commanders were enjoy equal rights with us. Let’s rebuild the threatening to march on the seat of government country,’ ” Jama said. “We gave our forces in Hargeisa. orders, ‘You are not going to take revenge, you While the SNM’s clan-based structure are not going to fire on civilians.’… That was a helped create these ruptures, other factors were surprise to the people who were fighting us. We involved. Chief among these was the issue of wanted something more than revenge, and that presidential succession, as the mandate of was to give our country and our people a chance President Tuur, a member of the Habar Yunis

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sub-clan, was due to expire in May 1993. Other FRAMING A RESPONSE Isaaq sub-clans within the SNM, particularly the In keeping with the process of consensus Habar Awal and Habar-Ja’lo, felt that with the building that had emerged in the previous two expiration of Tuur’s original mandate, a member years, SNM leaders and clan elders convened a of their clan should lead the new civilian clan conference in Borama from January to May government. However, Tuur had other ideas, 1993. While the conference was supposed to and as he sought to expand the writ of the new manage the transition to a new administration, government across the country, other major its initial agenda was ill-defined and would likely Isaaq sub-clans became deeply concerned. involve more than the simple selection of a new Tuur’s firing of several Habar-Ja’lo government leader. In a surprising turn of events, a ministers exacerbated the tensions. beleaguered Tuur ceded nearly all decision- Furthermore, while Tuur had been making authority for the transition to traditional chairman of the SNM for a relatively brief clan authorities. Unable to obtain the quorum period, he took credit for winning the war necessary to hold an SNM congress and resolve against Barre; in less than three years, he had the organization’s internal leadership struggles, guided the SNM from near-defeat to a victory Tuur hoped that clan elders would endorse his that few anticipated. Jama, Tuur’s second in candidacy for president at the conference. command, said political opponents, many of Tuur’s unilateral move set the stage for a whom were former SNM leaders, attacked seismic shift in Somaliland’s political terrain. Tuur’s reputation in an effort to derail his efforts The decision sparked the ire of several SNM as president. “They refused to give us a chance,” stalwarts who recognized that the action Jama said, “because they thought if they gave us effectively gutted the SNM of its authority and a chance they wouldn’t be able to compete with reduced any leverage it would have at the clan us for public support because of our record of conference. Tuur’s vice president, Jama, said he liberation. So they had to disrupt everything. was stunned by the “complete and total lack of Unsportsmanship, honestly; there’s no other way consultation.” Many had believed that the new to put it—complete and total unsportsmanship. administration would be a reaffirmation of SNM Instead of congratulating us, they decided to rule in one form or another, because the SNM spoil everything.” Personal animosities among was the only effective national force in the leadership and questions of individual honor, Somaliland and had been responsible for status and reputation reinforced age-old clan liberation of the country from Barre’s rule. dynamics. With 150 voting delegates who roughly Mediation by the clan elders resolved represented the clan composition of Somaliland, disputes over the Berbera port and an earlier the Borama conference made several significant dispute in Burao, but these solutions constituted decisions. Beginning with the issue of security, short-term fixes rather than a long-term the conference decided that while clans would be settlement that all SNM clan factions could buy responsible for the provision of a basic level of into. The May 1993 power transition loomed as order within their geographical areas, they a tipping point. What would Somaliland’s post- would be required to demobilize large militias transition government look like? More and integrate them into the national army. On importantly, how would Somaliland’s leaders the issue of the structure of government, the ensure that the transition did not break down? conference decided to set up a bicameral, non- Although all hoped for the best, many expected elected legislature in which a national Guurti the worst. served as the upper house. More importantly,

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the delegates decided to empower a strong Although the group had been popular executive with a council of ministers. While immediately after liberation, bitter internecine deliberations around these issues were fraught conflict had eroded confidence in the SNM’s with tension, the use of local resources in ability to govern the country. Second, as a financing the conference provided a significant historical matter, Somalilanders perceived the amount of community pressure on delegates to SNM as a vehicle of Isaaq hegemony, and thus move quickly to a settlement. Indeed, the clan key minority clans like the Warsengeli, that hosted the Borama conference, the Dhulbahante, Gadabursi, and Dir were Gadabursi, played a substantial role in breaking unwilling to endorse SNM candidates at the several impasses over the nature of executive conference. power in the new administration. Egal had a storied career in politics dating The highest drama was reserved for the back to his tenure as Somaliland’s first president selection of the new president. In addition to prior to the union with Somalia, and he Tuur, several candidates emerged, but it was the personally knew many of the major clan leaders. most unlikely and the least willing of these that Edna Adan, a former foreign minister of proved to be his most serious opponent. Somaliland and Egal’s ex-wife, referred to him Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, the last elected as a “political heavyweight” with few peers in prime minister of a united Somalia before being Somaliland’s political arena. With the country ousted by Barre in a military coup in 1969, had still struggling to gain international recognition, been in exile in the Middle East for several years many believed that Egal had the stature and and was not expected to attend Borama, much savvy to make the new government work. What less run for the presidency. Egal was a member was more, Egal had built significant credibility of the Habar Awal sub-clan of the Isaaq, and with Somalilanders for having endured a decade many at the conference assumed his clan would in Barre’s jails after the 1969 coup. nominate another candidate from within the Underpinning Egal’s election was a SNM leadership. Egal’s arrival changed the sentiment, widely held among the clans (with direction of the Borama conference, as he the exception of Tuur’s Habar Yunis), that it strongly defended Tuur’s actions as president was time for the presidency to revert to the and attacked Tuur’s opposition, many of whom Habar Awal sub-clan of the Isaaq. To give were Egal’s own supporters. “He really played balance to the new administration, that tune, which pacified Tuur’s clan and Abdirahaman Aw Ali Farah of the minority supporters. … That is his skill,” Fadal said of Gadabursi clan was elected as vice president. Egal, who received 99 of 150 delegates in the Though personally well equipped to be final presidential tally. president, Egal faced daunting challenges. For many long-time SNM cadres, Egal’s Divisions within the SNM were far from healed, election was anathema. The SNM had shed as the losers of the elections, only temporarily blood in liberating Somaliland, and now a non- placated, would threaten war. While trying to member, who had never been on the battlefield, manage these potential spoilers and ensure that would govern the country. How could this have they did not fight one another or attack his happened? Beyond Tuur’s decision to resolve government, Egal had to find a way to disarm internal SNM conflicts by ceding unprecedented and demobilize them. This was no easy task, authority over the political transition to clan but three interrelated themes framed his elders, several factors were important. First, by approach to keeping the peace. First, Egal was 1993 the SNM was a discredited organization. willing to use his own substantial financial

Richard Bennet, Michael Woldemariam Innovations for Successful Societies

resources and those of his clan to build a broad- safely in government hands, Egal turned the based political coalition that turned potential tables. Vested by the Borama conference with enemies into friends. Egal’s father had been a full legal power to replace ministers, Egal fired wealthy real estate developer, and many of Egal’s those who collectively had opposed Tuur. But clansmen were wealthy traders is Djibouti. Such instead of ousting them all at once, a mistake financial resources were especially important Tuur had made in 1992, Egal removed his because Somaliland’s government lacked the ministers one by one at intervals of several capacity to generate substantial revenue. months. The goal was to isolate each minister, Second, in employing his personal resources, create the impression that the reasons for his Egal was able to concentrate on building an removal were unique, and obtain the political immediate political consensus based on an support of other ministers who would be extensive network of patronage, even though reassured of their status but who later would that meant shelving long-term development meet the same fate. What Egal lost in time he objectives. Third, the lack of a written gained in effectiveness, as lines of constitution or functioning body of law provided communication and coordination in the bellicose institutional ambiguity in the early years of his anti-Tuur faction broke down. By the end of administration, allowing Egal use of money for Egal’s second year as president, these political political purposes in ways that would be high rollers were on the outside looking in, considered dubious in other contexts but that much as they had been during the Tuur years Egal believed were crucial to maintaining the but no longer possessing the means to create peace. significant problems for the government.

GETTING DOWN TO WORK Demobilizing militias Beyond ensuring that his administration The marginalization of this faction of SNM broadly represented all of Somaliland’s major political leaders furthered another goal, the clans, Egal recognized that he would have to broader and more systematic effort at placate the SNM clan factions that had undone demobilization. After a decade of civil war, the Tuur administration—a group collectively Somaliland was awash with arms. In addition to known as the “Red Flags.” The question was: light weapons, the tool of choice for clan militias How? Although the political leaders of these were “technicals”—Toyota pick-up trucks restive and well-armed groups were glad Tuur equipped with machine guns—that were was gone, they were equally suspicious of Egal devastatingly effective in the country’s open and and his motives. In a bold move, Egal relatively flat terrain. Some clans even had incorporated several of these SNM commanders acquired tanks and armored personnel carriers into his administration, while offering cash and from Barre’s retreating forces. The situation was jobs to these individuals and the constituencies unsustainable. they represented. Egal was well aware of the Egal recognized that Somaliland’s clans potential danger that these recalcitrant SNM faced a classic security dilemma: the willingness commanders posed to his government. Having of individual clans to demobilize depended in brought them into his coalition, he pressed them large part on what their neighbors did. Giving to demobilize their clan militias as a signal of up their guns today could mean they could suffer their new allegiance. Feeling secure as members tomorrow in a dispute with a rival clan. Egal of the new government, the SNM commanders needed an early victory to alter perceptions of obliged, and with their militia’s heavy weapons clan threats and to create momentum for

Richard Bennet, Michael Woldemariam Innovations for Successful Societies

demobilization. efforts created a competitive dynamic that Egal decided to do what he did best: He accelerated the demobilization of the clans. traded on his personal connections. He asked Sultan Umar of the Arab sub-clan of the Isaaq, a OVERCOMING OBSTACLES revered SNM commander whom he had known While Egal’s strategy yielded immediate well for decades, to be the first major clan leader political dividends, the gains came at a high to demobilize his militia. Egal was shrewd in price. Egal’s government was polarizing from his choice of Umar. Not only did the two men the beginning. One of his core problems was have a personal relationship but, equally that the vote for his selection at the Borama important, Umar’s group had few longstanding conference was split rather than unanimous, tensions with other major clans. Egal was unlike most decisions taken by conferences of pragmatic in other ways, saying Umar’s followers clan elders. The split reflected the frustrations could keep their handguns and rifles as a kind of that the Habar Yunis group felt over Tuur’s insurance policy, a practice he maintained in ouster from the new political dispensation, as dealing with other clans. well the sentiment that Tuur received a raw deal Sultan Umar agreed, and his high-profile during his presidency. Compounding this issue demobilization reverberated around the country. was that Egal himself was a member of the Egal was eager to capitalize. In keeping with Habar Awal, the Berbera-based clan of the the Borama agreement, Egal committed himself recalcitrant SNM commanders who had created to enticing clan militias into the national army. such significant problems for Tuur. Though Based on the amount of weapons and equipment Egal attempted to placate Tuur after winning it surrendered, each clan would receive a share of the presidency at Borama, the move was resources in the national army and financial effective only in the immediate short term. incentives, in the form of cash and jobs for Thus Habar Yunis leaders left Borama with instance, from the Egal administration. chips on their shoulders. With their candidate Importantly, every clan militia member was spurned and marginalized, they were in no welcome in the new armed services, a feature of mood to cooperate with the new government. the program made possible by Egal’s significant Tuur and his colleagues openly denounced the financial capacity. Former clan militia members Borama conference and threatened war. In this were integrated into the national army through context, Egal’s decision to incorporate en masse military training and education at a base in members of the SNM faction that had Mandera that was supported by the French undermined Tuur was particularly problematic, government. and served to reinforce the perception that the Egal paid careful attention to the imagery new administration would be a bulwark for and theater of the demobilization process, Habar Awal dominance in Somaliland. “Egal is turning the demobilization of clan militias and a clever man,” said Fadal. “He adopted [the the surrendering of arms into public spectacles. commanders] because he wanted to have them Demobilization events took place at the national inside his cabinet. But that angered Tuur’s side. stadium, and were widely attended and also They saw it as a betrayal, saw it as a slap in their screened on national television. As these events face.” When Egal sought to reassert became increasingly popular, clan militias government control over revenues from recognized that they could gain prestige and Hargeisa’s airport, which was in an area credibility by surrendering greater quantities and populated by the Habar Yunis, Tuur’s clan types of weapons. Almost inadvertently, Egal’s openly opposed the government’s efforts, much

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as the Habar Awal had done in Berbera when consolidation of power, the balance of forces had Tuur was president. By early 1994, the situation shifted against those who opposed Egal. had escalated into all-out war, with Tuur Egal’s successful demobilization and rejecting the idea of an independent Somaliland. integration of several clan militias into the While initially pressing on with the national army had greatly increased the military fighting, Egal left open the possibility of capabilities of the government, allowing him to peaceful negotiations. In particular, Egal exert substantial pressure on the Tuur faction. encouraged an effort by Hussein Bulhan, a Furthermore, Tuur’s rejection of an independent professor at Boston University and later Somaliland was an unpopular move that in the president of Hargeisa University, to organize a long term weakened his support in his own clan. group of diaspora Somalilanders to mediate the In any case, by this time Tuur had relocated to dispute. Bulhan’s first step was to ask the two Mogadishu in the south, and was unable to sides to come up with lists of acceptable effectively mobilize his constituents from mediators. “I felt that if I were to rally a group hundreds of kilometers away. of Somaliland intellectuals abroad, who were not involved in the conflict but were members of the ASSESSING RESULTS different clans, who feel the pain [of conflict], as After the tumult of the Tuur years and the I did, and do not have allegiance to petty clan shaky transition of power to civilian government issues, I felt as though something could come of in 1993, Egal’s political acumen was sorely it,” Bulhan said of his initial motivations. He needed. A gifted and well-heeled politician, he scheduled the gathering in Addis Ababa. wisely built a coalition that neutralized potential While the initial mediation efforts went opponents while crafting a demobilization well, the discussions were so sensitive that process that greatly reduced the potential for a disputes arose from innocuous issues. For resumption of fighting. In attempting to build a example, the Tuur faction, which viewed Egal as stable peace and consolidate his government, illegitimate, went into frenzy when one of Egal leaned heavily on his personal resources in Bulhan’s colleagues referred to the Egal faction order to build an extensive network of patronage as the “government” in an interview with the that brought his enemies to his side. Despite BBC. Egal eventually soured on the the rancor of the early years of Egal’s negotiations as well. But while Bulhan’s efforts administration, diaspora and clan mediation, in broke down, they paved the way for another addition to the military prowess of the comprehensive clan conference in October 1996 government, allowed him to weather the storm. (the Hargeisa Peace and Reconciliation By 1997, Egal’s government was entrenched and Conference) at which all parties negotiated the by 2000 had written and ratified a new parameters of a final agreement. constitution. Egal died in 2002, and because of Re-confirmed as president, Egal was the the process he set in motion, Somaliland’s first big winner of the 1996 Hargeisa conference. democratic elections were held later that year, The election of a new vice president, Dahir setting the country on a path to stability. Riyale Kahin from the minority Dhubahante Although some violence and clan tensions clan, reflected the hard bargaining and persisted, levels were low compared with those concessions that this political reconciliation at the time that Egal came into office. required. While Bulhan’s mediation and the The shortcomings of Egal’s reform efforts traditional consensus-building efforts during the were clear. His use of personal resources for clan conference were important to Egal’s final political patronage, though not illicit in the

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context of the limited legal framework in no silver bullet,” the entire process “was people- Somaliland at the time, left underlying clan powered, people-centered and people-funded.” tensions untouched while perpetuating The Somaliland story stands out for the limited corruption and undermining public confidence role that the international community played in in government institutions. Moreover, Egal’s brokering peace. focus on developing a political consensus Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, of the Social through patronage to political elites largely Research and Development Institute in ignored basic issues of public services like Hargeisa, credited the successful transition to education, health and infrastructure. Viewed the SNM government’s innate weakness. “A broadly, the Egal years were bereft of any weak SNM government was a blessing in significant national development campaign or disguise,” Yusuf said. “If it was very strong, we strategy. As a result, the peace he established do not know what would have happened. … paid limited socio-economic dividends. They were weak, they did not have resources, Finally, Egal’s significant personal they were not well organized, and that deficiency resources, and his willingness to abuse those and weakness and lack of resources helped them resources, so firmly entrenched his authority that not become warlords.” Without the capacity to many worried that an imperial presidency would become dictatorial, the SNM was forced to emerge. In fact, the 2000 constitution reflected relinquish power to civilians. Egal’s desire (and Parliament’s acquiescence) to The SNM’s weaknesses, a product of have a strong executive with wide-ranging internal clan wrangling over scarce resources, at powers. Egal came to office as a weak president the same time worked against the transition but died a powerful one. Although many felt in process. Somaliland’s largest political entity, the 1993 that Somaliland needed a strong SNM, was the only one that could provide the government and president, the pendulum may public order required for a lawful change of have swung too far in the other direction by government. Yet SNM leader Abdulrahman 2000. Egal did not die a wealthy man, having Ahmed Ali Tuur seemed unable to control the exhausted his personal wealth in the name of situation while he was president. political bargaining and peacemaking, but the Although the 1993 Borama conference peace that he established formed a solid, if formally marked the end of a tumultuous somewhat problematic, foundation for future transition process and paved the way for the administrations. Indeed, Egal’s strategy emergence of a civilian government under the highlighted a trade-off that leaders often face reins of President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, between the need to build immediate post- the challenges in many ways were just conflict consensus and the more long-term beginning. Somaliland teemed with well-armed imperative of establishing good, ethical clan militias, many of which threatened to governance. upend the new political dispensation. Egal had to placate and disarm potential troublemakers. REFLECTIONS With a mix of persuasion, patronage and Many factors contributed to the successful political maneuvering, Egal did so. By the time transition of Somaliland government from total he died in 2002, large-scale conflict was a thing control by the Somali National Movement to a of the past, as the political agreements he had civilian-led democracy. For one thing, it was forged paved the way for Somaliland’s first homegrown. Former Foreign Minister Edna democratic elections. Adan said that while there was “no magic wand, Given the significant moral trade-offs

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inherent in Egal’s program of action, Somaliland’s experience during the decade beginning in 1991 likely represents an interesting point of departure for discussions of post-conflict peace-building rather than a script that can be employed in other post-conflict settings.

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