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10Th Phd Conference Proceedings 10. Doktorandská Konference New UNIVERSITY OF DEFENCE / CZECH REPUBLIC UNIVERZITA OBRANY / ČESKÁ REPUBLIKA 10th PhD Conference Proceedings 10. doktorandská konference New Trends in National Security Nové přístupy k zajištění bezpečnosti státu Published by University of Defence in Brno Brno 2015 Conference Steering Committee / Programový výbor plk. Dr. habil. Ing. Pavel Foltin, Ph.D. prof. Ing. Ladislav Potužák, CSc. prof. PhDr. Miroslav Krč, CSc. prof. Ing. Petr Hajna, CSc. prof. Ing. Zdeněk Zemánek, CSc. Organization Committee / Organizační výbor por. Ing. Adéla Adámková Ing. Monika Cabicarová Ing. Magdaléna Náplavová Editor sborníku: Ing. Magdaléna Náplavová Ing. Kateřina Pochobradská Ing. Monika Cabicarová Ing. Michaela Vašková © Univerzita obrany © Autoři příspěvků Copyright © 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of University of Defence in Brno University Press. ISBN 978-80-7231-994-7 2 ÚVODNÍ SLOVO VOJENSKÉ TECHNOLOGIE, MEZINÁRODNÍ POLITIKA A VÁLKA MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND WAR prof. PhDr. Miroslav KRČ, CSc. Abstrakt Článek objasňuje vztah vojenských technologií a mezinárodní politiky, základní paradigmata formování zbrojního průmyslu a deskriptivně prověřuje tezi o růstu významu vojenských technologii po skončení studené války, což je reflektováno v trvale rostoucí globální úrovni vojenské síly. Pozornost je soustředěna na deskripci efektu vojenských technologií při ovlivňování mezinárodní situace. Řešení tohoto cíle staví právě na prolnutí logiky a integraci bezpečnostních studií a mezinárodní politické ekonomie. V obecné rovině se pak hledá odpověď na otázku, zda může být zbrojní průmysl vhodným geopolitickým indikátorem geopolitického uspořádání světa. Hledá se logika hodnocení války z různých hledisek. Klíčová slova: vojenské technologie a mezinárodní politika, formování zbrojního průmyslu, integrace bezpečnostních studií a mezinárodní politické ekonomie průmyslu, zbrojní průmysl Abstract The article explains the relationship of military technology and international politics, the basic paradigms of shaping the arms industry and descriptive examines the thesis of growing importance of military technology after the Cold War, which is reflected in the steadily growing global level of military force. Attention is focused on the description of the effect of military technology in influencing the international situation. The solution of this goal builds precisely on combination of logic and integration of security studies and international political economy. In general it seeks to answer the question whether arms industry could be appropriate geopolitical indicator of geopolitical world order. It is looking for the logic of evaluation of the war from different perspectives. Keywords: military technology and international politics, forming the arms industry, the integration of security studies and international political economy industry, arms industry ÚVOD Vojenské výdaje jsou aktuálním, avšak polemickým tématem. Státy světa čelí různým hrozbám: některé se účastní závodů ve zbrojení, některé mají dlouhou historii regionálních konfliktů a některé se naopak pokouší omezit závody ve zbrojení prostřednictvím mírových smluv. V současnosti (2015) jsme svědky rostoucích vojenských výdajů v důsledku změny vojenskopolitické situace. Rovněž přístup k zajištění obrany je u jednotlivých států odlišný. Některé státy preferují být součástí vojenských aliancí; jiné preferují nezávislost a neutralitu; některé získaly jaderné zbraně; jiné se spoléhají na dobrovolné ozbrojené síly a některé podporují domácí průmyslovou základnu obrany [1]. V posledních letech se pozornost ekonomů stále více obrací na otázku efektivnosti využití zbrojních systémů a jejich náročnosti. Na druhou stranu vojenský rozpočet nelze stanovit pouze na základě ekonomických kritérií [2], ale přistupují zde i otázky globalizačních tendencí. Mezinárodně politická situace v podobě konfliktu malého i většího rozsahu, včetně hybridní války determinuje vývoj vojenských výdajů a ty jsou dynamizovány novými vojenskými technologiemi. Klasické dělení na útočníka a obránce už přestává platit, ale místo toho se stále víc objevuje vztah predátor-kořist. Poskytovat bezpečnost by v zájmu spotřebitelů této nehmotné komodity mělo zůstat předmětem 3 svobodné konkurence. Avšak významný ekonom M. Charles Dunoyer, ekonom, který se významně zasloužil o rozšíření principu svobody, se domnívá, že „funkce státu nebudou nikdy moci spadat do sféry soukromé iniciativy“ [3]. 1 EFEKT VOJENSKÝCH TECHNOLOGIÍ A OVLIVŇOVÁNÍ MEZINÁRODNÍ SITUACE 1.1 INTEGRACE BEZPEČNOSTNÍCH STUDIÍ A MEZINÁRODNÍ POLITICKÁ EKONOMIE Od roku 1998 sledujeme pozvolný růst vojenských výdajů v celém světě. Ten je doprovázen růstem objemu zbrojních obchodů [4]. Graf 1 Regionální světové VV 1988 - 2012 Zdroj: [4] V poslední dekádě sledujeme, že dochází k integraci bezpečnostních studií a mezinárodní politické ekonomie. Moderní zbrojařská poptávka v rámci globální produkce má významný vliv na mezinárodní politiku. Vlastnosti kombinované poptávky se silou mezinárodního trhu spolu s jejími komparativními výhodami ústí v distribuci produkce, která zvyšuje mezinárodní napětí. Efekt vojenské úrovně technologie na mezinárodní konflikt dosáhl největšího rozmachu prostřednictvím americké revoluce v oblasti vojenství ve válce v Perském zálivu, konfliktu na Balkáně, v boji proti islámu a nyní v soupeření mezi Ruskem a NATO. Zřejmým důkazem revoluce ve vojenství byl vytvořen především poptávkou po nákladných, ale sofistikovaných zbraních, které mohlo produkovat pouze několik společností na světě. Zatímco revoluce ve vojenství rozšiřovala schopnost Spojených států, Ruska a dalších států, prosazovat sílu po celém světě, kapacita vyzkoušení těchto schopností byla omezena globalizačním tendencemi [6]. Po roce 2001 se změnily geopolitické stavy a došlo k možnosti odzkoušení vojenských technologií ve větším měřítku. Také boj proti islámu urychlil vyzkoušení nových sofistikovaných zbraní. Globalizace zbrojní produkce jako historická novinka, nevede k nezávislosti a k míru. Liberálové se již od působení Kanta pokoušeli o propojení mezinárodního obchodu a mezinárodní stability. Doposud se ovšem nepodařilo tyto tvrzení posoudit, alespoň z hlediska historického [7]. Rozšiřující 4 se mezinárodní obchod a kapitálová mobilita nezabránily první světové válce, studené válce a nezabraňují eskalaci ve vztahu k Ukrajině. Tato současná i předchozí selhání jsou fenomén globální produkce, vyvolaná technologickou nutností, která se neobejde bez celosvětové inspirace. V tomto případě trend nemůže vyvolat dlouze očekávaný uklidňující efekt. Producenti bezpečnostních prvků tvrdí, že jediným moderním charakteristickým znakem obranného průmyslu, je současný růst v důležitosti technologického vývoje a stupňování nákladů, složitosti a rozmanitosti škály technologií. Zatímco každý stát může preferovat svůj vlastní obranný průmysl, všechny státy musí nakupovat zbraně dle nejnižších cen a zůstat tak v technologickém popředí. Ukázalo se, že spolehnutí na národní firmy je častějším důvodem k válečnému konfliktu, nebo v lepším případě k eskalaci napětí. Stát snažící se o soběstačnost nemůže vyvinout špičkovou zbraň potřebnou k dobytí území, ale stát vlastnící tyto zbraně pro agresivitu zvyšuje napětí v mezinárodní ekonomice a politice. Je to projev neomerkantilismu 21. století. Docházíme k tomu při testování této vazby mezi stabilitou a globalizací. Všechny státy se snaží být samostatnými a nejlépe vybavený, resp. vyzbrojený stát jde svou vlastní cestou bez ohledu na probíhající globalizačními tendence. Mezi soběstačností a bezpečností existují kompromisy, ovšem ne jako v pozdní části studené války, kdy produkce nadnárodních zbraní byla zanedbatelná. 1.2 VOJENSKÉ TECHNOLOGIE A STÁT Státy hrají stěžejní roli v téměř každé mezinárodní transakci v oblasti obrany v rozsahu od nařízení o převodu technologií až ke snížení práv manipulace obchodních společností prostřednictvím offsetů. Státy čelí nezbytně nutné globalizaci za účelem zůstat na hraně technologie zbraní, ale tohle zároveň vyvolává otázku, zda je ke globalizaci na prvním místě zapotřebí zbraní. Ani závody ve zbrojení, ani technologický vývoj se nevyskytují ve vzduchoprázdnu – politický podnět pro produkci zbraní musí existovat. Vojenské technologie s mezinárodními politickými efekty jsou pravděpodobně politického původu. Složité, sofistikované vojenské technologie nyní podporují globalizaci zbrojní produkce. V tomto případě je možno navrhnout alternativní teorii globalizace obrany jako hegemonickou strategii, která ukazuje, jak tyto charakteristiky vedou ke koncentraci obchodu. Za předpokladu, že se státy zajímají spíše o relativní, než o absolutní vzájemnou závislost, teorie lépe vysvětluje masivní nerovnováhu v obranném transnacionalismu. Vzájemná závislost států, více než vzrůstající technologický přístup a nižší náklady, je přínos obranného globalizačního principu. Stát může preferovat soběstačnost závislou na vzájemném vylepšování, ale bude příznivě preferovat asymetrickou vzájemnou závislost před soběstačností díky vylepšení jejich relativní síly a jejich šanci na přežití. Liberálové a podobně také realisté dlouho uznávali předpoklad, že nerovnoměrná distribuce ekonomické nezávislosti může být zdrojem síly. Např. oslabením protivníka, aniž by muselo jít o obchodní válku [7, s. 602]. Zatímco se teorie liberální vzájemné nezávislosti 90. let zaměřovala na narušování síly státní autority, následně došlo k pokusům o narušení liberalizačních tendencí v některých
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