Managing International ‘Relations’: ASEAN’s Dilemma of Attraction-Autonomy Deficits and Ideational Changes after the Cold War by Ki-Hyun Bae A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Ki-Hyun Bae 2014 Managing International ‘Relations’: ASEAN’s Dilemma of Attraction-Autonomy Deficits and Ideational Changes after the Cold War Ki-Hyun Bae Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto 2014 Abstract Under what conditions do ASEAN states adopt foreign ideas? Why do they find the new ideas more attractive at certain times than others? This article offers a new instrumental explanation that idea receiver-promoter relations provide a powerful constraint on the idea diffusion process within ASEAN. Specifically, I develop a concept of ‘the dilemma of attraction-autonomy deficits.’ One commonality among the cases concerned in this study is that the new ideas were exported by foreign policy elites of major advanced power countries in the West (including Japan from the East). As leaders of weak dissimilar states vis-à-vis the idea-promoters, ASEAN elites share concerns over ‘attraction-deficits’ since the major powers’ disengagement from the region would disrupt their political survival. Ideational engagement can be one of the measures that ASEAN elites can take to cope with the concerns because it is expected to draw the idea- promoters’ attention to the region. However, a straightforward pledge of ideational convergence may allow the promoters’ increasing pressure on ASEAN leaders for giving up their ‘otherness’ to an undesirable extent. This could eventually lead concerns over autonomy-deficit to rise. But any divergent moves to buffer autonomy could make the relations with the West distant again, which might lead them to disengage from the region. This can raise their concerns over ii attraction-deficits again. This article argues that the pattern and timing of the ideational changes at the ASEAN level was a reflection of ASEAN elites’ decisions to manage the dilemma of inversely-related deficits. ASEAN’s responses to common security, human rights and Asia- Pacific regionalism will be discussed to support this argument. iii Acknowledgments I would like to thank all my teachers, colleagues and friends for their support throughout this long journey. I express my greatest appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Steven Bernstein. He was always open-minded and supportive of the idea of my research project from the beginning. I am very much indebted to him for his constructive feedback and kind encouragement. Emails and Skype were the only tools for communication with him for the last two years because I had to stay in Asia for field trips, work and family occasions. Despite the inconvenience, he was always willing to make time for me and provide me with clear guidance. He is one of my best teachers. When I become a teacher, I would like to be like him. I also like to thank Professor Matthew Hoffmann and Professor Joe Wong for their insights and fine comments on my writing. Their inputs and constructive suggestions made me think harder and write clearer. I am thankful for having had the chances to work with them. In addition, I thank my internal and external examiners, Professor John Kirton and Professor Alice Ba, for their insightful comments. My sincere gratitude also goes to my great teachers at Sogang University. First, I want to thank my great mentor, Professor Shin Yoon Hwan. Any words cannot describe fully what I am indebted to him. Without his support since my undergraduate years, I could not even imagine starting an academic career. I thank him for giving me so many opportunities to grow as a scholar and encouraging me not to give up. Also, Professor Gerald Geunwook Lee and Professor Lew Seok Jin have my thanks for their warm guidance and mentorship. They taught me to keep challenging old ideas and not to hesitate developing my own ideas as an IR student. Many other people helped me so much along the journey. They include my best friends, Jung Jaehwan, Jung Cho-won and Kim Hee-ryang. Also, I express many thanks to Janice Chen, Pei- Ying Lin, Jessica Soedirgo, Kim Min-jung, Kim Tae-Eun Cha Jung-Min, Professor Ed Schatz, Professor Nhung Tuyet Tran, Professor Todd Hall, Professor Jeon Je Seong. I am also grateful to all the interviewees I spoke to during the field trip in Southeast Asia for their generous time and valuable opinions. Many thanks also go to Ambassador Baek Seong-taek, Ms. Lee Saemini, Ms. Yang Seon-Yeong and all my other colleagues at the Korean Mission to ASEAN for their warm support. iv Moreover, I appreciate generous financial support provided throughout my research by University of Toronto, the Korean Association of Southeast Asian Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies at Sogang University and the Centre for International Studies at University of Toronto. I also thank my teachers and colleagues I met during bahasa Indonesia classes at the Indonesian Embassy to Canada as well as Southeast Asian Studies Institute at University of Wisconsin-Madison. Lastly, I want to express my deepest appreciation to my mother and the loveliest lady in my life, Sohn Min-Sook, my father, Bae Soon-heum, my brother Bae Chul-woo, my sister-in-law Shin Soo-yeon and their lovely kids Ji-hoon and Jung-woo. Thanks to them, I could endure and grow all along. v Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iv List of Tables and Figures viii List of Acronyms ix Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Why Ideational Changes? Why Institutions? Why ASEAN? 4 Studies of International Ideational Changes 6 Arguments 13 Contributions 18 Methods and Data Collection 21 Contents of the Study 23 Chapter 2: Dilemma of Attraction-Autonomy Deficits and Ideational Changes 25 Power Relations and Identity Relations between Idea-Promoters and Takers 25 Leaders of ‘Distant’ States: Relational Positions of ASEAN Members as Idea-takers 28 Attraction-Autonomy Deficits of ‘Distant’ States 33 The Distribution of Attraction-Autonomy Deficits within ASEAN 35 Neither Sidelined nor Pushed-over: Dilemma of Dual-deficits and Ideational Changes 38 Chapter 3: ASEAN Member States and their Dual-deficits 44 Introduction 44 Indonesia 48 Malaysia 52 vi Singapore 55 The Philippines 57 Thailand 60 Brunei 62 Vietnam 63 Lao PDR 65 Cambodia 68 Myanmar 69 Conclusion 75 Chapter 4: Institutionalizing Common Security in Post-Cold War ASEAN 76 Introduction 76 The End of the Cold War and Rising Periphery Fear 80 Conclusion 94 Chapter 5: Institutionalizing Human Rights in ASEAN 97 Introduction 97 Critical Reservation of Human Rights: The Story of 1993 100 Institutionalized Acceptance of Human Rights: The Story of 2003 onwards 109 Conclusion 123 Chapter 6: Rise and Fall of APEC: Dilemma of Dual-Deficits and Commitment to Asia- Pacific Regionalism 128 Introduction 128 ASEAN and Rise of Asia-Pacific Regionalism 131 ASEAN’s Waning Interest in Asia-Pacific Regionalism 147 Conclusion 163 Chapter 7: Conclusion 167 References 174 vii List of Tables and Figures Figure 1-1: Dilemma of dual-deficits in relations with major powers 15 Figure 1-2: Dual-deficit dilemma and ideational change 17 Table 2-1: GDP and military expenditures of ASEAN states and major idea sponsors 29 Figure 2-1: Power-identity distributions of ASEAN countries in relation to major Western powers 33 Figure 2-2: The distribution of dual-deficits within ASEAN 38 Figure 3-1: Summary of the distribution of dual-deficits among ASEAN countries in relations to the major Western countries 47 Table 3-1: Trade dependence after ASEAN membership 71 Table 3-2: Relative trade dependence after ASEAN membership 71 Table 3-3: Aid dependence 73 Table 3-4: Ratio of bilateral aid flows to net ODA and official aid 73 Figure 4-1: Summary of ASEAN’s adoption of common security 93 Figure 5-1: Temporal comparison of ASEAN’s responses to human rights 100 Figure 5-2: Summary of ASEAN’s reservation toward human rights in the early 1990s 108 Figure 5-3: Summary of ASEAN’s adoption of human rights 122 Figure 6-1: Temporal comparison of ASEAN’s responses to APEC 130 Table 6-1: History of the idea of inclusive Asia-Pacific economic regionalism 133 Figure 6-2: Summary of ASEAN’s adoption of Asia-Pacific economic regionalism 145 Figure 6-3: Summary of ASEAN leaders’ waning interests in APEC 163 viii List of Acronyms ABAC APEC Business Advisory Council ABMI Asian Bond Markets Initiative AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Agreement AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations AMF Asian Monetary Fund APT ASEAN Plus Three CEPEA Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia EAFTA East Asian Free Trade Agreement EAS East Asian Summit EASG East Asia Study Group EAVG East Asia Vision Group EPG Eminent Persons Group EVSL Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization FTAAP Free Trade Agreement of the Asia Pacific NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NAM Non-Aligned Movement NIEO New International Economic Order NMI New Miyazawa Initiative ODA Official Development Assistance ix PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership x 1 Chapter 1 Introduction Realist wisdom tells us that weak states likely adopt norms and ideas that dominant states impose or teach. However, why did the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopt a ‘common security’ norm in spite of the cool response to the idea from the United States and China? Some scholars in the constructivist or historical institutionalist school tell us that new ideas will be more easily taken when they “fit” locally. But what do they teach us about the adoption of locally-unfit ideas that sometimes take hold? For example, what made ASEAN leaders adopt human rights as a principle of their regional cooperation arrangements after years of resistance? Others in the constructivist school focus on the process, noting that persuasion and regular interactions through institutional ties have gradually socialized local actors into global culture.