Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation in Pakistan

SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION IN PAKISTAN

A thesis submitted to the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

by Naeem Haider

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

MAY 2014

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for any other degree.

Naeem Haider May 2014

APPROVAL

The Ph.D. thesis Safety and Security of Chemical Industry: Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation in Pakistan by Naeem Haider has been written to my satisfaction, which meets the required standards of research for the award of Ph.D. degree. Therefore, the thesis is approved for external evaluation.

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal Associate Professor Director (SPIR)/ Supervisor May 2014

CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS x

ABBREVIATIONS xi

LIST OF TABLES xiii

INTRODUCTION 1 Objective of the Study 9 Definition of the Problem 9 Review of Literature 10 Research Framework 29 Research Methodology 29 Limitations of the Study 31 Organization of the Study 32

CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LEARNING FROM REGIME THEORY 37

PART- I: REGIME THEORY 39 1.1 Conceptualizing Regime Theory 39 1.2 Evolution of International Regimes 42 1.3 Determinants for the Efficacy of Regime 44 1.4 Efficacy of Regime: An Appraisal 49 1.5 Regime Theory: Various Schools’ Perspectives 51 1.6 Transformation: From Regime to Institutions 55 1.7 Institutionalism: Various Schools’ Perspectives 63

PART- II: REGIME THEORY & CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 68 1.8 Evolution of the Regime of Chemical Weapons 68 1.9 Four Pillars of CWC 70 1.10 CWC Not Self-Implementing Regime 70 1.11 Regimes and Their Supporting Organizations 71 1.12 CWC: Variables of the Regime 72 1.13 CWC: Various Aspects of the Regime 77 1.14 Conclusion 85

CHAPTER 2 CHEMICAL INDUSTRY: SIGNIFICANCE AND CHALLENGES 89 2.1 Significance of Chemical Industry 89 2.2 Evolution of Chemical Industry 90 2.3 Chemical Industry and CWC 94 2.4 Modern Trends in Chemical Industry 95 2.5 Challenges to Chemical Industry 97 2.6 Impact of Scientific and Technological Developments 104 2.7 Lack of Awareness Regarding CWC in Chemical Industry 106 2.8 Conclusion 108

CHAPTER 3 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION : A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 110 3.1 National Implementation Measures under CWC 111 3.2 Need for Transformation of OPCW 113 3.3 Need to Intensify Routine Industrial Verification under CWC 119 3.4 Consultations, Cooperation and Fact Finding 126 3.5 Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons 129 3.6 National Protective Programmes under CWC 134 3.7 Export Control Regime under CWC 136 3.8 Scientific and Technological Developments and Implications for CWC 143 3.9 Conclusion 146

CHAPTER 4 COUNTERING CHEMICAL PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 150 4.1 General: Chemical Proliferation and Terrorism 150 4.2 Prospects of WMD Terrorism 153 4.3 CWC Role: Countering Chemical Proliferation and Terrorism 160 4.4 OPCW Role: Countering Chemical Proliferation and Terrorism 167 4.5 Industry Role: Countering Chemical Proliferation &Terrorism 178 4.6 Conclusion 182

CHAPTER 5 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 186 5.1 Major Chemical Disasters 188 5.2 International Initiatives for Management of Chemicals 195 5.3 Prevention of Chemical Accident 198 5.4 Preparedness for Chemical Accident 205 5.5 Response to Chemical Accident 210

5.6 Trans-boundary Cooperation 216 5.7 Site Security of Chemical Industry 217 5.8 Security of Hazardous Chemicals Transportation 220 5.9 Cyber Security in Chemical Industry 224 5.10 Conclusion 227 CHAPTER 6 PAKISTAN: MANAGEMENT OF CHEMICALS 231 6.1 Overview of Pakistan Chemical Industry 223 6.2 Legal and Regulatory Mechanism for Managing Chemicals 239 6.3 Non-regulatory Mechanism for Managing Chemicals 251 6.4 Multilateral Instruments 253 6.5 Ministries and Agencies Managing Chemicals 255 6.6 Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Mechanism for Chemicals 258 6.7 Role of Community and Public Interest Groups 259 6.8 National Chemical Disaster Management 261 6.9 Realistic Account 265

CHAPTER 7 PAKISTAN: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION 271 7.1 Pakistan National Authority on CWC 273 7.2 Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance 2000 279 7.3 Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules 2010 284 7.4 Pakistan Export Controls Act/ Regime 2004 290 7.5 Pakistan Export Controls under CWC 293 7.6 Pakistan Export & Import Policy Order 2013 296 7.7 Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997 298 7.8 Conclusion 302

CHAPTER 8 PAKISTAN’S CHEMICAL INDUSTRY: CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SAFETY AND SECURITY APPARATUS 305 8.1 Collection of Empirical Data 306 8.2 Declared Chemical Industry: Safety and Security 310 8.3 Other Chemical Industry (OCIs): Safety and Security Puzzles 323 8.4 Safety and Security of Chemical Industry: National Concerns & Requirements 329 8.5 Conclusion 338

CONCLUSION 341

BIBLIOGRAPHY 356

GLOSSORY 403

APPENDICES

Appendix I CWC Article- I, General Obligations 413 Appendix II List of Schedules of Chemicals 414 Appendix III CWC Regime for Declarations and Verification of OCPFs 417 Appendix IV CWC Article- VII, National Implementation Measures 423 Appendix V Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules, 2010 425 ABSTRACT

In the prevailing national and global security environment, the illegal proliferation of chemicals, the safety and security of chemical industry and above all chemical terrorism present grave challenges. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), however, spells out an appropriate mechanism for addressing said threats. Although, this germinates optimism, yet it is very much dependent on the national efforts of the CWC States Parties. Moreover, the said challenges also necessitate the reevaluation of the mandate, priorities and functioning of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Pakistan being a State Party to the CWC attaches great importance to the effective national implementation of the Convention and has established National Authority on CWC, and enacted necessary and comprehensive legislative and administrative measures. Nonetheless, the National Authority needs to be revitalized and its monitoring and outreach roles and capacity need to be enhanced in the light of the General Purpose Criteria of the CWC (catch-all clause). The declared chemical industry of Pakistan and other larger enterprises maintain good standards of ‘safety and security’. However, the small and medium industries (termed ‘Other Chemical Industry’) require definite improvement. Moreover, various ministries and organizations managing chemicals and related facilities need better coordination, and to develop monitoring and implementation capacities for the safe and secure management of chemicals, related facilities and addressing national concerns, such as, the misuse of chemicals by terrorists, smuggling, improper chemical waste disposal, environmental harm, workers and

community health and safety issues, and lack of safe and secure chemical transportation system.

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my wife

Farzana Naeem

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am thankful to Allah the almighty for giving me the desire and everything needed for this study. I offer profound gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Director School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR), Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU), Islamabad, who supervised, supported and guided me throughout this thesis with his patience, keen interest, magnanimous approach, thoughtful discussions and authoritative direction.

I am extremely grateful for the support of my teachers from the Department of Defence and Startegic Studies (DSS), QAU, especially Professor Rasheed Khalid Chairman DSS Department, Professor Jamil Raza, Professor Nasrulla Mirza, Dr. Shabana Fayyaz, Professor Salma Malik and Dr. Mansoor Ahmed. I am also indebted to Dr. Tahir Amin, Director National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Mr. Zafar Ali, Director General Strategic Export Control Division, Dr. Shahid Bukhari, Assistant Professor Bahawalpur University, Ms. Maryam Baba and Ms. Haleema International Research Analysts at Strategic Plans Division for their guidance and support.

I am humbled to my friends and associates who cheerfully helped me, when ever I needed them, especially, Mr. Khalid Ashraf, Mr. Arif Ashraf, Mr. Pervaiz Irfan, Mr. Nasir Mahmood Bhatti, Mr. Muhammad Saad, Mr. Muhammad Yasir, Mr. Abdul Aleem, Mr. Tahir, Mr. Aziz-ur-Rehman, Mr. Noman Shahzad, Mr. Kamran Ahmad, Mr. Gulfaraz Shah and Mr Muhammad Rizwan.

I am thankful to my late parents Professor Haider Khan, Mrs. Gul Shama and Mrs. Alam- ara- Farhan, who taught me the value of learning in life. Finally, I have no words to thank my wife Farzana Naeem for her kind support, care, encouragement and above all her prayers.

Naeem Haider 16 May 2014 ABBREVIATIONS

AG Australia Group AN Ammonium Nitrate AFLCIO American Federation of Labour & Congress of Industrial Organization BW Biological Weapons BWC Biological Weapons Convention CAN Calcium Ammonium Nitrate CASR Central Abstract Service Registry Number CBO Community Based Organizations CBRN Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Cefic European Chemical Industry Council CFATS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards CHE Chemical Hazards Evaluations Chem- bio Chemical and Biological CSP Conference of the States Parties CTITF UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force CW Chemical Weapon CWC Chemical Weapons Convention CWDF Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities CWPF Chemical Weapons Production Facilities DDMA District Disaster Management Authority DESTO Defence Export Science and Technology Organization

DHS Department of Homeland Security DOC Discrete Organic Chemicals DOC /PSF DOCs with elements of Phosphorus, Sulphur & fluorine ESHA Environmental Safety Health Affairs EU European Union EC Executive Council of the OPCW GPC General Purpose Criterion of CWC G8 GP G8 Global Partnership HAZMAT Hazardous Material HS Harmonized Commodity Description Encoding System IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IC Incident Commander ICCA International Council of Chemical Associations ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions IED Improvised Explosive Devices INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization IPEN International POP Elimination Network) IUPAC International Union for Pure and Applied Chemistry ISO International Organization for Standards LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committees MIC Methyl Isocyanate MFA Ministry for Foreign Affairs NAM Non-Aligned Movement NEQS National Environmental Quality Standards NDMA National Disaster Management Authority NGO Non- Governmental Organization NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty OCI Other Chemical Industry OCPF Other Chemical Production Facilities OHSAS Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Service OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration PEPA Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 PHA Process Hazard Analysis

PDMA Provincial Disaster Management Authority QA Quality Assurance RCA Riot Control Agents RBPS Risk-Based Performance Standards RMP Risk Management Plans SAB Scientific Advisory Board of OPCW SAICM Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 1986. SECDIV Strategic Export Control Division SMART Self Monitoring and Reporting Tool SP State Party SVA Security Vulnerability Assessments TS Technical Secretariat of OPCW UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNODA United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs UNODA United Nations Organization for Disarmament Affairs UNSCR 1540 United Nations Security Council Resolution-1540 VCE Vapor Cloud Explosion VERTIC Verification Research, Training and Information Centre WCO World Customs Organization WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Responsibilities of Ministries for Managing Chemicals 255

2. Declaration Thresholds for Schedule Chemicals and DOCs 286

3. List of Schedule Chemicals 414

INTRODUCTION

The disastrous effects of a chemical plant accident such as Bhopal India 1984, Sandoz Switzerland 1986, etc, reveals that the chemical plants can cause immense destruction. President Barack Obama (then Senator) pleaded that the 9/11 Commission specifically focused on the dangers of chemical plants. The alarming fact is that extremely hazardous industrial chemicals such as chlorine, phosgene, ammonia, hydrochloric acid, etc are stored in huge quantities near cities. For instance, currently there are 111 chemical facilities in the U.S. from which a chemical release could threaten more than one million people. These plants could be one of the most attractive targets for terrorists. Basically these chemical plants are “Stationary Weapons of Mass Destruction” spread throughout the country.12 Moreover, the report of 9/11 Commission highlighted the failure of imagination in foreseeing catastrophic terrorism.3 Thus, it is imperative to visualize and take effective national and multilateral measures for preventing chemical accidents as well as deliberate misuse, such as chemical terrorism. In this regard, the effective national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) would substantially contribute to the safety and security of chemical industry, and also in effectively countering the challenges of proliferation and chemical terrorism.

The U.S. Army has estimated that up to 2.4 million people will be killed or injured in the event of a worst-case successful terrorist attack on a chemical industry.4 This fact highlights the significance of safety and security of chemical plants. It means that beside loss to life and property, chemical accidents have severe environmental consequences, such as the Exxon Valdez spill. Though such spill may not cause loss of life, yet it would have severe consequences for wildlife, tourism and fishing.

1 Senator Barack Obama, Speech “Improving Chemical Plant Security,” Homeland Security, 29 March 2 , p.1. 3 Mark Smith, Caitríona McLeish, “Countering CBW Proliferation,” Report on Wilton Park Conference 871, Wilton Park, 28- 30 September 2007. 4 U.S Army, Draft Medical NBC Hazard Analysis of Chemical-Biological-Radiological- Nuclear-High Explosive Threat, Possible Scenarios & Planning Requirements, Office of the Surgeon General, 2001; and Eric Pianin, “Study Assesses Risk of Attack on Chemical Plant,” Washington Post, 12 March 2002, p. A8.

In the aftermath of 9/11 many countries such as the U.S., the U.K., Canada etc have taken concerted legislative and administrative measures for addressing their vulnerabilities,5 and ensuring the safety and security of their chemical industry. Pakistan’s chemical industry’s impressive growth coupled with the Non- State Actors’ threat alarms that if immediate safety and security related initiatives are not taken, the state could face chemical disaster in the future. Thus, Pakistan’s chemical industry requires serious attention from the policy makers. In this context, it seems imperative that its safety and security apparatus ought to be revamped to avoid accidents, inadvertent and deliberate sabotage of the chemical facility in the country. Such an approach and realization is required in the entire community of nations due to growing threat from Non- State Actors. Moreover, states that are facing the threat of terrorism and political instability need to securitize6 the safety and security of chemical industry and chemicals on an emergency basis. This grave threat has been confirmed by the CIA that Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups are seeking and developing chemical warfare agents, such as Mustard agent, Sarin, and Nerve agents7. Therefore, states have to take pragmatic measures such as creating domestic mechanisms or institutions to prevent the misuse of chemical agents and infrastructure for the benefit of national security and the community of nations.

The Chemical Weapons Convention demands that its States Parties’ must take into account appropriate measures for the safety and security of the chemical industry. Though, Pakistan is determined for the effective implementation of the Convention, yet, for safeguarding public health, environment and property in the prevalent security environment it

5 Vulnerability is the manifestation of the inherent states of the system (e.g., physical, technical, organizational, social, cultural) that can be exploited by an adversary to adversely affect (cause harm or damage to) that system. As defined by Y.Y. Haimes, Risk Modelling, Assessment, and Management, 2nd ed, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2004, p. 699. 6 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever defined the term ‘securitization’ and ‘de-securitization’ as “securitization is the discursive process through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat. And de-securitization is a process by which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat. The process can be indirect, where a shift of orientation towards other issues reduces relative attention to the previously securitized issue.” Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.489-491. 7 CIA Report, “Terrorism CBRN: Materials and Effects,” May 2003.

needs to chalk out an actionable plan and invest more resources to prevent chemical disaster. It is imperative that the relevant governmental authorities, the industry and the public ought to coordinate among themselves in preventing both chemical accidents and acts of chemical terrorism. More precisely, the magnitude of the chemical industry related threats necessitates that the safety and security of chemical industry and chemicals ought to be ‘securitized’.

The main difference between safety and security is malicious intent. The preventive safety identify weaknesses in the design of the infrastructure and the control mechanism of various plants, e.g. if a single component fails it may lead to cascading consequences. On the other hand, security is protection against danger, loss, damage and crime. For major hazardous chemical industry, the security measures are designed for ensuring physical protection, and safeguarding from malevolence and unauthorized access.8 Safety is also regarding the risks of physical injury, harm to human health, property and the environment. The plant 9 managers are basically responsible to control chemical process hazards for achieving desired standard of protection. For achieving the safety standards, the public authorities, civil society and other stakeholders have important obligations for contributing to the overall safety. Security is basically to prevent unauthorized access to any component of the facility such as operating system, control system, confidential information, etc. Thus, safety deals with unintentional events, and security deals with intentional malicious actions. Both safety and security failures can cause disastrous industrial accidents/ incidents. Therefore, as a fundamental measure, states must have adequate and comprehensive legislations and their effective implementation for ensuring the safety and security of chemical industry and chemicals according to national and international standards.10

8 Frank Huess Hedlund, “Do Provisions to Advance Chemical Facility Safety also Advance Chemical Facility Security? - An Analysis of Possible Synergies”, International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012. 9 Plant is defined as a relatively self contained area, structure, or building containing one or more units with auxiliary and associated infrastructure such as an administrative section, storage/ handling area for feedstock and products, waste disposal area, analytical laboratory, medical facility and records associated with the movement into and from the site. Refer: CWC, Part-I of the Verification Annex, Paragraph 6 (b). 10 Author’s Meeting with Michel Crowley, Director Verification Research Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), London, U.K., 23 April 2007.

In addition to safety and security of chemical industry, the Chemical Weapons are also an important concern for the international community. What is a Chemical Weapon? As per the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Chemical Weapons (CW) can be munitions, containers, special equipment designed for the delivery of toxic chemicals. However, this is a narrowly understood definition of Chemical Weapons. In fact, not to talk of Schedule chemicals 11 any chemical becomes Chemical Weapon if its toxic properties are used to cause harm to humans or environment.12 Therefore, the National Authorities have the responsibility to monitor the production, sale, use and transportation of any dual-use chemical that had been misused or could be misused for terrorism and proliferation purpose.

The safety and security of chemical industry and related facilities require multilateral efforts due to changed non-proliferation 13 rules and the rise of Non-State Actors threatening both national and international peace and security.14 The multilateral efforts include instruments and measures such as the effective national implementation of the CWC by the OPCW and the National Authorities;15 the UNSCR-1540, which obligates all states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enforce effective national measures

11 The CWC establishes three lists of Schedule chemicals, which categorizes chemicals according to their toxicity. Schedule 1 chemicals are super toxic chemicals that have little or no commercial use. Schedule 2 includes chemicals and precursors that are high risk and have limited commercial applications. Schedule 3 chemicals are used in large quantities commercially, but are also precursors for Chemical Weapons. 12 This is a concept built into the definition of Chemical Weapons (CW) as the required measure for national implementation of the CWC. Rather than relying on a list of prohibited chemicals, the CWC considers any toxic chemical or precursor a Chemical Weapon unless it was intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, and only as long as their types and quantities are consistent with the stated purposes. The Schedules should not be confused with a list of prohibited chemicals or a definition of CW. Their sole purpose is to guide routine verification activities. 13 The ‘non-proliferation’ is based on four key pillars: treaty-based, arms control and disarmament treaties; export control arrangements; 'hands-on counter-proliferation', such as UNSC Resolution- 1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), etc; and defence and consequence management as stated by Mark Smith, Caitríona McLeish, “Countering CBW Proliferation,” Report on Wilton Park Conference 871, Wilton Park, 28- 30 September 2007, p.2. 14 Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, The US Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs, Presentation at the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012, p.2 15 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW, “Opening Statement” at the Table-Top Exercise on the Preparedness of States Parties to Prevent Terrorist Attacks Involving Chemicals, Warsaw, Poland, 22 November 2010, p.1.

against the proliferation of WMD, related material and their delivery means;16 The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which encourages States Parties to cooperate; and encourages the OPCW and the IAEA for assisting states in developing capacities in countering proliferation of CBRN material.17 The UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), which includes the OPCW, the United Nations Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy (2006),18 the G- 8 Global Partnership (GP), which is working for addressing the threats posed by WMD and related material.19 Similarly at national level various ministries and organizations, chemical industry, civic society, public interest groups, public authorities, academia, etc have to work as a team for the safety and security of chemical industry.20

Chemicals are the weapons of choice for terrorists. They are readily available and have the potential to inflict significant casualties. Moreover, chemicals are attractive for deployment against an open society: easily concealed, undetectable at a distance, and visually indistinguishable from daily use materials. 21 The technology required for Chemical Weapons is more widespread and available in public domain than any other WMD. Technology is facilitating developing new agents and their dissemination. All these aspects increase national vulnerability to the threat of chemical terrorism.

16 On 28 April 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution- 1540 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This Resolution mandates that all states establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials, and adopt legislative measures in that respect. In that context, the Council also established a committee comprising all Council members (the 1540 Committee) that would report on the implementation of the Resolution. 17 Zeeshan Amin, “United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force” International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8 November 2012, p.2. 18 It includes Interpol, WHO, IAEA, IMO, ICAO, UNICRI, OPCW, UNODA, and the 1540 Committee. 19 Ambassador Dr. Jan Borkowski, “Development of the OPCW Engagement in Chemical Safety and Security: Perspective from Poland” International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, 8- 9 November 2012, Tarnów, Poland, p.2. 20 Author’s Meeting with Mark Alborn, OPCW Head Implementation Support Branch, Singapore National Authority, Singapore, 4 June 2010. 21 National Research Council, “Toxic Chemicals and Explosive Material”, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, The US Committee on Science and Technology on Countering Terrorism, 2002.

There is a growing concern that terrorists may attack commercial chemical industry/ facility or when dual-use chemicals are transported, which could cause release of toxic chemicals. This concern was affirmed by the Second Review Conference of the CWC.22 In fact, the chemical industry is both attractive and vulnerable to terrorist target. The design of chemical plants cannot prevent properly executed attack, nor is there enough protection from the insider threat. Most of the operations in chemical industry are controlled by automatic systems, which stress interoperability more than security. Furthermore, the huge and regular transportation of commercial chemicals also presents several risks when they are moved through or near population centres. 23 Moreover, importantly, the sophisticated chemical industry is rapidly growing in developing countries. The question of security in the area of legitimate production, transportation and use of chemicals is important. Chemical industry could be targeted by terrorist, and therefore it requires advice, assistance and strategic approaches to tackle these dangers. 24 Moreover, chemical safety essentially requires chemical security.

Terrorists are quite innovative and they may resort to novel terrorist tactics such as using nontraditional chemical agents and delivery systems.25 It was noted that “terrorist attacks on industrial chemical facilities may be an element of the expansion of chemical warfare from the state based Chemical Weapons programmes of the Cold War.”26 It is noteworthy that improvised chemical terrorism does not require sophisticated knowledge and technology. Anyone with access to chemical technology and a college level science education can produce Chemical agents that can devastate a city. The raw materials are easily available from chemical industries, university laboratories, pharmacies, fertilizer stores, etc. Moreover, the scientific and technological developments has expanded the agents of concern

22 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, “Opening Statement at the Table-Top Exercise,” op.cit, p.1. 23 National Research Council, “Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism,” op.cit, p.128. 24 Wojciech Lubiewa Wielezynski, President of Board Polish Chamber of Chemical Industry, “MultiStakeholders Cooperation in Promoting Chemical Safety and Security in all Areas of Chemical”, the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012, p.1. 25 Al Baker and William Rashbaum, “U.S. Feared Cyanide Attack on New York Subway” New York Times, 18 June 2006. 26 U.S. GAO, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, NSIAD- 98- 74, September 1999.

from approximately fifty chemical warfare (CW) agents to thousands of toxic industrial chemicals.27 Such developments have immense implications for the verification regime of the CWC and the chemical industry; and it profoundly complicates addressing the issue of proliferation and terrorism. It is generally believed that terrorist may prefer Chemical Weapons over nuclear, biological and radiological weapons. Because dual-use Chemicals and the requisite technology for production of Chemical Weapons are more widespread and easily available in public domain than any other WMD.28

Pakistan is bordered by India, China, Iran and Afghanistan and covers about 796,095 sq km with a population of some 193,238, 868 in July 2013. The overall literacy rate (age 15 years and above) is 54.9 percent. The government of Pakistan spends on education and health 2.4 percent (2010 data) and 2.5 percent (2011 data) of the GDP respectively. The hospital bed density is 0.6 beds per 1000 population (2010 data). Pakistan has extreme variations of temperature as well as great topographical variety. Pakistan has four provinces, Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K) area and Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Economy of Pakistan has two main fields namely agriculture sector based in rural areas and industrial sector located in urban population centres. 29

At the time of independence in 1947, chemical industry in Pakistan was practically non-existent. Over the years, some traditional sectors have developed. In early 1950s, a large chemical estates comprising Pak- American Fertilizers, Maple Leaf Cement, Antibiotics (Penicillin) and Pak Dyes & Chemicals, was established at DaudKhel, district Mianwali. This industrial estate served the role of a nucleus for chemical industry in Pakistan.30 Presently, Pakistan’s industrial sector comprises small, medium and large units

27 Margaret E. Kosal, “Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce the Chemical Terror Threat”, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, September 2008, p.5. 28 National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, 2002. 29 Pakistan Demographic Profile- 2013. 30 Sohail A. Paracha, “Comparative Analysis of Pakistan and India Chemical Industry: Sectoral Analysis of Pakistan- India Trade Normalization,” Working Paper by Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development, August 2012, pp.6-7.

with mix of new and old technology. Most of the chemical industries are situated in urban population centers. The major cities where industries are located are Karachi, Lahore Faisalabad, Multan, Hyderabad, Peshawar, Gujranwala, Sialkot, and Gujrat. In addition, the industrial states are at Hattar, Kala Shah Kakoo, Multan, Lahore, Gadoon Amazai, Mianwali and Haripur. At present there are nearly 30 chemical companies. The larger enterprises include, Fauji Fertilizers, ICI Pakistan, Engro Chemicals, Dawood Hercules, Clariant Pakistan, Sitara Chemicals, Fatima Group, Pak-Arab Fertilizers, Colgate Palmolive, Berger Paints, Sindh Alkalis and Dyno Pakistan.

The official record manifests that Pakistan has been seriously endeavouring to implement the CWC provisions for the safety and security of its chemical industry. For instance, it has put in place comprehensive legislative and administrative measures for the effective implementation of the CWC. Pakistan has designated the Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), to serve as the National Authority for the purposes of CWC Implementation Ordinance.31 Since, it is not possible for the OPCW to monitor compliance of all national obligations. Therefore, State Parties are mainly responsible for ensuring compliance with the CWC including the General Purpose Criterion given in Article-I, which is the catch-all clause of the CWC (Appendix- I).32 This is an expansive task, which is evident from the definition of Chemical Weapons as per the CWC.

Objectives of the Study

Pakistan’s chemical industry’s safety and security has not been examined critically to date. That’s why; a comprehensive study on the subject is not available for both policy- makers and analysts. The purpose of this study is to fill this gap in the literature. Nevertheless, the primary focus of the study is to critically examine Pakistan’s implementation of the CWC; the safety and security of chemical industry and the

31 CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, Pakistan, Section 9, p.5. 32 CWC, Article VI, paragraph 2. It states “Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.”

management of chemicals in Pakistan with an aim to identify the weaknesses and chalk out policy measures for making improvements in the said fields. This study also aims to examine how the CWC, OPCW and the chemical industry can contribute to countering the challenges of chemical proliferation and terrorism. Indeed, this study would contribute constructively to both academic work and national policy formulation for addressing the challenges related to chemical industry, dual-use chemicals and effective national implementation of the CWC.

Definition of the Problem

This study is imperative in Pakistan due to the prevailing national and international security environment, immature chemical safety and security culture or sluggish attitude towards chemical safety and security and related infrastructure, the momentous global challenges of proliferation and terrorism, and the absence of academic contribution in the said fields. This study would be an important contribution in the realm of the ‘national implementation of the CWC’ and ‘the safety and security of Pakistan’s chemical industry’. Thus, this study will have both academic and policy relevance. During this research three questions would be critically examined: First, what is the level of the safety and security of the chemical industry, and management of chemicals in Pakistan? Second, how can the CWC, OPCW and the chemical industry contribute to countering chemical proliferation and terrorism? Third, how well is the CWC implemented in Pakistan?

Review of Literature

Regarding safety of chemical industry, Lane Kirkland and the 12 member investigation team prepared “The Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission33 to Study the Causes and Effects of the Methyl Isocyanate Gas Leak at the Union Carbide Pesticide Plant in Bhopal, India, on December 2-3-1984”. This report is the most realistic and detailed analysis of the Union Carbide’s Bhopal Plant accident, which caused disaster. It places the responsibility of the catastrophe on both the management of the plant and the Union

33 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)

Carbide Corp. This investigation established that some of the conditions that caused this disaster could have been avoided by following the rules of the occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency or effective implementation of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention on occupational safety and health. This report emphasized that many in the developed countries have viewed the Bhopal Tragedy as an isolated event and endemic to developing countries. Some have even suggested that accidents like Bhopal are to be expected in developing countries and are the price that must be paid for technological development. This investigation proved such views wrong. The investigation revealed that the factors that caused or contributed to the Bhopal accident are common to many chemical manufacturing industries throughout the world. These conditions were discrete but well-recognized problems that could have been controlled.34

Francine Schulberg in “An Indication of the Needs of Countries in Transition for Assistance Related to Industrial Accident Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Cleanup” highlighted three general areas as priorities for the countries in transition: institutional development including legislative and administrative frameworks; safety management and technology; and training. This study is based on a series of activities related to the development of the United Nations work programme to facilitate the implementation of the Convention on the Trans-boundary Effects of Industrial Accidents.

For successful assistance programmes this document suggested that the assistance programmes should: be practical and action-oriented; it should be part of a larger programmes to ensure proper follow-up measures; take into account the capacities and skills in target states; such programmes should develop internal capacities for training own people and developing requisite protective equipment and policies; involve community and civic society for the various phases of prevention, preparedness and response to accidents; identify constraints especially resource constraints in target countries; encourage and

34 Lane Kirkland, “The Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission to Study the Causes and Effects of the Methyl Isocyanate Gas Leak at the Union Carbide Pesticide Plant in Bhopal, India, on December 2-3-1984” 1985.

promote sharing of knowledge and experience; and ensure requisite coordination and cooperation among various assistance programmes.35

Penny Wark in an editorial entitled “The Toxic Legacy of the Explosion of a Pesticide Factory in Bhopal is Still Felt 20 Years On” stated that the devastation at Bhopal had terrifying impact on the public; and because of socioeconomic standard of the local people the exact figure of casualties will never be known. Wark also warns that this devastation may motivate terrorists to pursue such mass-destruction events.36

Raymond Carroll and Loren Jenkins cited in “Italy: Our Own Hiroshima” that how a reactor exploded that led to the release of 2–3 kg of 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzopara- dioxin (TCDD), which is a highly toxic, long-term carcinogen and birth-defecting compound. Under the Environmental Protection Agency regulations, the production and most uses of TCDD were prohibited. TCDD was an unwanted and unavoidable byproduct in the manufacture of the phenoxy herbicides used in “Agent Orange” as chemical warfare agent.37

Regarding security Richard K. Betts in his work The New Threat of Mass Destruction stated that WMDs presently presents more worries as compared to the Cold War era. Now, the fear of complete annihilation with Nuclear Weapons is not the main concern, as chemical and biological weapons have come to the fore and are considered weapons of choice for terrorism and the probability that terrorists may attack with WMD material. Betts states that the end of Cold War gave relief to people but WMDs still present more things to worry about than during the Cold War, such as the challenges of proliferation and super-terrorism. He contends that the probability that some smaller number of WMDs will be used is constantly growing. Moreover, new thinking is required

35 Francine Schulberg, “An Indication of the Needs of Countries in Transition for Assistance Related to Industrial Accident Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Clean-up” Background document to a Workshop to Promote Assistance for the Implementation of Chemical Accident Programme, Organized by Organization for Economic Cooperation and development (OECD) and United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), Paris, February 1995. 36 Penny Wark, “The Toxic Legacy of the Explosion of a Pesticide Factory in Bhopal is Still Felt 20 Years On,” The Times (London), 25 May 2004. 37 Raymond Carroll and Loren Jenkins, “Italy: ‘Our Own Hiroshima,’ ” Newsweek, 16 August 1976, p. 49.

to understand these issues and coping with them because the Cold War era strategies of deterrence and arms control may not prove effective against those groups, which cannot be deterred. The role WMDs play in international conflicts is also changing. Increasingly, these weapons will be used by the weak-states or groups that militarily conventionally are not first-class. Betts suggests according highest priority to serious civil defence programme, which effectively involve the community, public interest groups, public administration, and all stakeholders for blunting the effects of the WMDs. 38

Jessica Stern in “The Ultimate Terrorists” presented that after the Cold War the threat of all-out nuclear war is being replaced by the less costly threat of terrorist attacks with WMD. The probability of a major terrorist incident has increased due to several factors such as new terrorist organizations with immense resources, the ability to recruit scientists, wide-spread availability of knowledge regarding chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear improvised devises, proliferation risks from weak states especially the former Soviet facilities. It is especially frightening to the victim, due to no reasons for symptoms. And if the antidotes are not readily available, it will further raise public concerns, as the victim would perceive that no recourse is available. It suggests that continued investment in the public health system and law enforcement and intelligence agencies, increasing hospital capacity, adequate medical and mental health professionals, enhanced surveillance and screening and keeping sufficient protective equipment. Thus sufficient depth of response will be created, which will reduce a chemical, biological, or toxin attack’s effectiveness.39

“U.S. Army, Draft Medical NBC Hazard Analysis of Chemical- BiologicalRadiological- Nuclear-High Explosive Threat, Possible Scenarios & Planning Requirements” cited that in the wake of 9/11, voluntary initiatives are taken at the U.S for chemical security and to safeguard masses living close to chemical industry. Terrorist attack on chemical facilities would damage the public health and national economy. The

38 Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, No.1, Jan- Feb 1998. 39 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

chemical facilities are quite attractive and present immense diversity and risks. Experts agree that the theft or release of certain toxic chemicals from chemical facilities would significantly disrupt related critical infrastructure and local economy. This report estimates that in a worst-case scenario more than one million people could be exposed to toxic gases. Therefore, this report recommends to the DHS and EPA to develop Chemical Security Strategy. 40

Brian R. Dunbobbin, Thomas J. Medovich, Marc C. Murphy and Annie L. Ramsey in their work “Security Vulnerability Assessment in the Chemical Industry” presented that after the attacks of 9/11 the Air Products and Chemicals Inc developed a Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) methodology for comprehensive evaluation of chemical facilities. These facilities range from small industries to large plant sites. The SVA evaluates various attack scenarios, possible consequences and the attractiveness of facility for terrorism. SVA also includes recommendations regarding security improvements.41

CRS Report “Homeland Security and Counter terrorism Research and Development: Funding, Organization, and Oversight” by Genevieve J. Knezo and CRS Report “Research and Development in the Department of Homeland Security” by Daniel Morgan provided an overview of the Research and Development priorities and funding by the Department of Homeland Security. It covers the DHS focus on increasing community preparedness and preparedness of the first responders against the use of chem- bio weapons, and governmental funding for enhancing research for chem-bio defence.

Regarding security from chemical terrorism Ehud Sprintzak, in his work “The Great Superterrorism Scare” presented that the threat of super-terrorism has occupied the minds of security managers and policy makers. In fact, the events such as Sarin attack in the Tokyo subway system, the discovery of Saddam Hussain’s chemical and biological arsenal,

40 U.S. Army, Draft Medical NBC Hazard Analysis of Chemical-Biological-Radiological- Nuclear-High Explosive Threat, op.cit. 41 Brian R. Dunbobbin, et al., “Security Vulnerability Assessment in the Chemical Industry,” Process Safety Progress, Vol.23, No.3, September 2004.

etc significantly contributed to such concerns. As this fear spread through the security establishments, governments worldwide are devoting more attention to the threat. But the relatively low risks of such an event do not justify the high cost of response and prevention measures. Sprintzak asserts that most of the counter-measures against super-terrorism will prove ineffective, and the level of funding for such protective programmes will advance the terrorists’ goals of sapping the states’ resources and creating a climate of fear and panic. Moreover, several factors are constraining terrorists from WMD terrorism such as having political objectives and ideological affinities. These groups strive to gain political goals from terrorist attacks and to be seen effective without losing public support. Moreover, Sprintzak makes a case that terrorists do not require WMD for inflicting large number of casualties, which was amply proven during the attacks of 9/11.42

Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands stated in “An Unlikely Threat” that some experts believe that the threat of WMD terrorism such as terrorists using chemical or biological weapons or material is unlikely because in the last century not a single American died as a result of bio-terrorism and only one US citizen died due to a chemical agent. Stephen Sloan takes similar lines and explains in “If there is a ‘Fog of War,’ there is Probably a More Dense ‘Smog of Terrorism and also in Terrorism: How Vulnerable is the United States?” that developing a genuine mass casualty capability with chemical or biological weapon is not that easy affair.43

John Parachini in “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective” makes a point that Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and the Tamil Tigers operated in an environment where government authorities were not analyzing obvious signals and did not checked the activities of the above-mentioned terrorist groups. This is especially true for Japan, whereas, Afghanistan lacked the requisite capacity and national will for checking AlQaeda.

42 Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,” Foreign Policy, No. 112, Fall 1998. 43 Jonathan B.Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No.4, July– August 1999.

In case of Japan, the national laws allowed religious freedom, which were misused by Aum Shinrikyo and thus the terrorist group evaded investigations from the Japanese police. As a result, Aum Shinrikyo released sarin in the Tokyo subway system. Parachani suggests that small signs should be intelligently collected, analyzed and thoroughly and immediately investigated by specially trained experts for safeguarding against WMD terrorism.44

Mattew J. Morgan in “The Origins of the New Terrorism” stated that terrorism has tremendously changed recently. Terrorism has undergone significant changes in recent years. For example, terrorists are using non-hierarchical structures; the potential availability of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons’ related material and technology provides the perils of unprecedented human disasters. And as recognized by the U.S. National Security Strategy this era is the “crossroads of radicalism and technology,” these factors of wide-spread technology and radicalism presents the predominant security threat in the post-Cold War world. This had been amply demonstrated in the attacks of 9/ 11, which were facilitated and caused by a combination of cultural, technological and political factors and proved the emergence of the new terrorism. Morgan asserts that terrorist groups immense resources, reach, globalization, flexible organizational structure and the potential availability of CBRN material and technology provides the prospects that terrorists may resort to WMD terrorism and cause unprecedented disasters.45 .

Brian Michael Jenkins in “All Citizens Now First Responders” presented an approach for reducing the impact of chemical and biological (Chem-bio) weapons by educating the public regarding the likely dangers these weapons pose and the recommended response. He believes that the use of chemical and biological weapons by terrorists would have immense consequences, but since they are low probability events, therefore, educating the masses might reduce the public concerns. Jenkins make a case that an approach for addressing the impact of terrorism is effective outreach to public and conveying them likely

44 John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.26, No.4, Autumn 2003. 45 Mattew J. Morgan, “The Origins of the New Terrorism”. Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army, Vol.34, No.1, Spring 2004.

risks from nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism. The explanation of the risks and response measures would significantly reduce public concerns regarding these weapons. This outreach would be very effective if it is undertaken by the public health agencies of the state or federal level. By providing practical information regarding the response measures and the resources available for treatments in case of such an attack would reduce public concerns and will be useful for the crisis managers for controlling situation.46 The local community would be confident that in the event of an emergency, they would be able to make rational choices regarding the situation, which will reduce their anxiety. 47

Ehud Sprinzak in The Great Super-terrorism Scare stated that most terrorists possess political objectives. The terrorists groups make concerted efforts to gain public support and benefit from any terrorist act politically and psychologically, as Brian Jenkins has remarked “terrorists want lots of people watching, not lots of people dead.” 48 Sprinzak draws three broad conclusions. First, terrorists determined to kill thousands of people know that they have less chances for political survival and winning public support. Second, terrorists take time to become dangerous, particularly for using WMD. A long process of radicalization precedes during which they provide enough early warning signs, which should be utilized by law enforcement and intelligence agencies for interdicting such terrorists. Third, the number of potential super-terrorism suspects is significantly less than generally believed.49

Brian M. Jenkins argued in “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” that the rapid development of civilian nuclear industry, commerce in plutonium, enriched uranium radioactive waste material and the proliferation of nuclear technology internationally provides good opportunities to terrorist groups to engage in some type of nuclear action. Moreover, the guaranteed widespread publicity and the serious public concerns enhance the possibility that terrorist groups may attempt nuclear action. Jenkins explains that the terrorist nuclear

46 Brian Michael Jenkins, “All Citizens Now First Responders,” USA Today, 24 March 2003. 47 Ibid. 48 Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Super-terrorism Scare”, Foreign Policy, No.112, Fall 1998 Issue. 49 Ibid.

threat encompasses broad spectrum of malevolent and mischievous actions such as creation of alarming hoaxes, theft from nuclear facilities, armed attack on Nuclear Weapons storage sites, occupation or seizure of nuclear facility, dispersal of radio-active material for causing catastrophic calamities. Jenkins explains that terrorists are mostly described as irrational killers; but in fact they intelligently run a campaign of violence for inspiring fear, which causes people to exaggerate the strength and significance of their movement. Moreover, since terrorist groups have limited resources as compared to states, therefore, they strive to generate shocking and exaggerated fear in the minds of public. Terrorism choreograph violence in a manner that makes their operations a theatre.50 Robert Kupperman makes similar point of view that terrorists would resort to WMD terrorism due to the emergence of more organized and ideologically motivated terrorist organizations and the spread of WMD related knowledge and technology in “A Dangerous Future: The Destructive Potential of Criminal Arsenals” (1995).51

CRS Report “Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Terrorist Threat” by Steve Bowman provided an overview of the use of WMD by terrorists. It makes a point that the immense public unrest due to anthrax mailing and the growing concern regarding possible WMD terrorism have highlighted the potentials such weapons have for terrorism. It makes a point that until the Anthrax attacks, it was thought that extremist religious groups and small splinter terrorist cells would be most likely to attempt attacks with WMD. However, the Anthrax attacks suggest that domestic “lone wolf” may also perpetrate such devastating acts.52 This report explains that worldwide the likelihood of terrorists capability to produce or acquire WMD may be growing especially due to loose controls of stockpiles and technology in the former Soviet states; and the global spread of related information and

50 Brian M. Jenkins, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” The RAND Corporation Paper, November 1975. 51 Robert Kupperman, “A Dangerous Future: The Destructive Potential of Criminal Arsenals” Harward International Review, Vol.17, No.3, Summer 1995. 52 The devastation is evident from the fact that as a result of the Anthrax attacks there were five deaths; but the U.S. government spent $1.6 billion on emergency preparedness for biological attacks and more than $200 million for the cleanup of facilities. Kempter, J. “Update on Building Contamination,” presented to the National Academies’ Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology, 26 April 2005.

technology. However, WMD remains significantly harder to produce or obtain than what is commonly believed. Nonetheless, the CIA warns that Al- Qaeda has accorded very high priority to obtaining WMD capability.53

J. Stern in “The Ultimate Terrorists” gave an overview of public perceptions of chem-bio weapons. This book explains that the use of chemical or biological weapon would generate immense public response due to public perceptions, concerns and lack of knowledge regarding characteristics of such weapons and appropriate response. It suggests, inter alia, enhancing hospital capacities, suitably equipping the law enforcement personnel and first responders, increased surveillance and export controls for effectively managing and responding to the threat of chem-bio terrorist attack.54

Roger D. Congleton in “Terrorism, Interest-Group Politics, and Public Policy: Curtailing Criminal Modes of Political Speech” explained that terrorist attacks are violence for the purpose of sending a political message with the aim to influence policy. Thus ‘terrorism’ is a form of political dialogue. This paper further explains that political messaging and even civil disobedience in liberal democracies has often generated improvements in national policies. Thus, there is a need to examine the U.S. foreign policy mistakes that resulted into the attacks of 9/ 11. The author makes a point that terrorism is simply another form of interest group politics. Both terrorist networks and interest groups attempt to influence controversial policies in a disproportionate manner. This work analyses that the U.S. has grossly over-reacted to the acts of terrorism by focusing too much on the worst case scenarios. However, this paper subsequently explains that terrorism is an illegal form of political communication and analyses appropriate response to control costly national measures. Congleton suggests that the national anti-terrorism policies of present time are excessive given the risk being faced by the U.S.55

53 Steve Brown, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Terrorist Threat,” CRS Report for Congress, RL 31332, 7 March 2002. 54 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 55 Roger D. Congleton, “Terrorism, Interest- Group Politics, and Public Policy: Curtailing Criminal Modes of Political Speech,” Centre for Studying Public Choice, George Mason University, 11 January 2001.

Regarding chemical industry Ernst Homburg, Anthony S. Travis, Harm G. Schröter in “The Chemical Industry in Europe, 1850-1914: Industrial Growth, Pollution and Professionalization” analysed the growth of the chemical industry during the Industrial Revolution in most states of Europe. This book highlights the importance of environmental issues, which are caused by chemical industry, and how the environment can be protected by the collective efforts of the industry, community and public authorities.56

Johann Peter Murmann explained in “Chemical Industries after 1850” that significant national efforts spread over hundred years had gone into improving working

th conditions in the chemical industry. An investigation of death rates at the end of the 19 century revealed the fact that the chemical industry had the highest death rate of all industries with 98 per 1,000 compared to 57 per 1,000 for all occupied males. Hence the governmental authorities and the management of industry worked as a team and made significant improvement. In the U.S., which can be taken as representative for all major chemical producing countries, the occupational injury and illness rates (per 100 full-time employees) are less than half of the manufacturing sector as a whole (4.4 versus 9.2). The management of industry eliminated hazardous jobs, effectively implemented safety policies and above all at the turn of the Twenty first century the industry and public authorities reduced the level of fatigue for the employees. In the mid 19th century the common 12 hours shift was reduced to eight hours. In Germany, the workweek of an employee in chemical industry decreased continually e.g. 72 hours per week in 1872, 62 hours per week in 1900, 57 hours per week 1913, and then 37.5 hours at the turn of the Twenty first century. The author emphasises that good working environment and

56 Ernst Homburg, Anthony S. Travis, Harm G. Schröter, eds., The Chemical Industry in Europe, 18501914: Industrial Growth, Pollution, and Professionalization. Chemists and Chemistry. (Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998).

involvement of top management in implementing safety policies would make substantial contribution to the safety of employees in the chemical industry.57

Regarding the at-risk community Robin Hart in “Trans-border Consequence Management: Responding to Major Acts of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive or Nuclear Terrorism”, Report on Wilton Park Conference 855, highlighted the media’s keen hunt for information, which makes it a “beast to feed” for officials and first responders. Moreover, a small number of people with few images can create immense confusion and divergent perceptions that can devastate the government’s credibility to respond. With a spread of portable media technology now anyone can provide first hand video immediately to media outlets and downloading such videos on internet spread news well before they are analyzed by the policy makers. For example, just few minutes and hours the London bombing on 7 July 2005 the BBC had received 20 video clips and 1000 images; while the official position was that a power surge had taken place.58 This ‘realtime’ media can have de-stabilising affect, because the perceptions of the public are affected and challenge the official position. This development creates a new level of transparency for governmental and nongovernmental officials and responders. A CBRN attack could increase the nervousness and fear of the public and the media skills of officials and others therefore becomes imperative in order to deliver timely and accurate information and advice to calm the public and squash rumours. This report highlights that in a CBRN incident, the media skills of officials and others becomes imperative for delivering timely and accurate information and advice to public for calming public and addressing rumours.59

Nick Pidgeon, Roger E. Kasperson, Paul Slovic in “The Social Amplification of Risk” highlighted social factors that amplify risks and bring out useful lessons for policy formulation, management of risk, educating the at-risk community regarding hazards in the

57 Johann Peter Murmann, Chemical Industries after 1850, Article for the Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University: 17 May 2002. 58 Robin Hart, “Trans-border Consequence Management: Responding to Major Acts of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive or Nuclear Terrorism”, Report on Wilton Park Conference 855, 18- 20 June 2007. 59 Ibid.

area and how to safeguard and respond to such hazards in the event of an accident/ incident. The authors highlight the importance of educating masses and cognitively involving them as stakeholders would facilitate appropriate governmental and local response. This research highlights that the attacks of 9/11 placed renewed emphasis on the importance of risk communication efforts related to chemical industry. Industry must provide required information to society otherwise it would harm their relationship with the community. This communication can help in better understanding and managing risk perceptions related to terrorism; community would believe that industry is undertaking the requisite safety and security measures; and the community would become more receptive to know and comply with the emergency response procedures and measures.60

Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute in “What Should We Know? Whom Do We Tell?” contended that open discussions regarding chem-bio terrorism would reduce the utility of these weapons for terrorism. It is because, public would learn the peculiar characteristics of chem-bio weapons, likely targets, and effective preventive and response measures. 61 William Booth asserts similar views in an editorial, “Many Americans Worrying About Attack on Home-front” (2003). This article contends that adequate preparation and awareness of masses would substantially reduce casualties and public anxieties. However, some scholars argue that such informational programmes may reduce casualties but would surely increase day-to-day anxiety. These critics are of the view that if information is not presented in the proper context then it may prove counterproductive. 62

The U.S. Department of Community Affairs, “Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) Title III, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know” was approved in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy of Bhopal, India (1984). This Act emphasized that chemical accident could happen anywhere. The purpose

60 Nick Pidgeon, Roger E. Kasperson, Paul Slovic, “The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework,” Risk Analysis, Vol.8, No.2, January 1998. 61 Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, What Should We Know? Whom Do We Tell?, December 2002. 62 William Booth, “Many Americans Worrying About Attack on Home-front,” Washington Post, 21 March 2003.

of this legislation is to gather information about hazardous substances in the community through close interaction with industry, and to make this information available to public for planning and responding to emergencies. This statute is designed for improving the access of community to information regarding chemical hazards and to help in developing emergency response plans by states and local level governments. SARA Title-III obligates governmental authorities at state and local levels for formulating and coordinating emergency response activities and for designating Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs).63

Regarding the OPCW verification mechanism with focus on inspections for commercial chemical industry at the 7th Conference of States Parties, the European Union stated its preference for ‘an approach to Article VI inspections based upon the capabilities of facilities’. The European Union expressed dissatisfaction with the present OPCW verification mechanism, since it does not effectively contribute to the object of the CWC. The EU representative argued that the modern, flexible Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs)64 pose more risk of proliferation, since they can produce variety of chemicals including scheduled chemicals at short notice.65

Jonathan B. Tucker states in “The Conduct of Challenge Inspections Under the Chemical Weapons Convention: Proceedings of an Expert Workshop” held in Washington, DC, in 2002, stated that so far no Challenge Inspection has been conducted. Tucker believes that not utilizing this important component of the OPCW verification regime is tantamount to undermining the CWC verification mechanism. He asserts that the ‘the framers of the CWC anticipated that the routine and challenge inspection mechanisms would interact synergistically, creating a verification system that was stronger than the sum of its parts”. Therefore, the longer Challenge Inspections remain unused; the political costs of requesting and conducting Challenge Inspection would

63 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act- 1986, SARA- Title-III, Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know, New Jersey Division of Fire Safety, updated on 1 February 2011. 64 Commonly known as commercial chemical industry. 65 The U.K. Paper, “The Changing Face of the Chemical Industry: Implications for the Chemical Weapons Convention”, OPCW Conference of the States Parties, The Hague, The Netherlands, 24 April 2003.

increase.66

The US Central Intelligence Agency “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to WMD and Advanced Conventional Munitions”, highlighted that the U.S. had publicly accused Iran for non-compliance with CWC but did not exercise its right to request for Challenge Inspection.67 John Bolton in his “Statement to the Conference on Disarmament”, reaffirmed the same point of never requested a challenge inspection in Iran for non-compliance concerns/ suspicions.68 To address such serious concerns related to WMD all possible measures should be taken. Not using the Challenge Inspection will have serious implications for the verification mechanism of the CWC, since different measures are designed to synergize and complement each other. Therefore, the States Parties need to utilize all the CWC provisions for consultations, cooperation and fact-finding, including challenge inspections.

Douglas MacEachin in “Routine and Challenge: Two Pillars of Verification” 69 highlighted that if Iran’s non-compliance concerns were so serious that they were revealed publicly, then international community must have utilized all measures specified in the Convention for upholding the credibility of the CWC. He stresses that not using the Challenge Inspection provisions of the CWC will have serious implications for the CWC and international security. Therefore, for the sake of transparency and confidence building States Parties should utilize the CWC provisions of fact-finding, consultations and cooperation including Challenge Inspection.

66 Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., The Conduct of Challenge Inspections Under the Chemical Weapons Convention: Proceedings of an Expert Workshop, Held on May 29– 31, 2002, in Washington, DC, Monterey Institute of International Studies, August 2002. 67 The United States Central Intelligence Agency , ‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2001’, 30 January 2002; Carl Ford [US Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research], testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 March 2002. 68 John Bolton [US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security], Statement to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, CD/PV.890, 24 January 2002. 69 A Group of Governmental Experts appointed by the UN Secretary General in its 1995 report, defined verification as “a process in which data are collected, collated and analysed in order to make an informed judgement as to whether a party is complying with its obligations.”

David P. Fidler in “The Chemical Weapons Convention After ten Years: Successes and future Challenges” highlighted that along with the NPT and BWC, the CWC is the central pillar of disarmament and non-proliferation. Fidler also identifies the future challenges to CWC such as universality, Chemical Weapons proliferation concerns, CW destruction, national implementation, non-compliance concerns, changes in the chemical industry, non-lethal chemical agents, etc. Fidler asserts that the CWC has to suitably adjust for addressing future challenges and remaining relevant institution for the international peace and security.70

Regarding proliferation concerns Jean Pascal Zanders in his article “Assessing the Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists” analyzed the process of proliferation to Non- State Actors. Pascal concludes that while the acquisition of Chem- bio material by terrorists is possible, but developing chem-bio weapon capability is a complicated affair, which decreases the likelihood and attractiveness of their proliferation to terrorists. This article also suggests ways and means for preparing for a chem-bio terrorist attack.

Mark Smith, Caitríona McLeish in “Report on Wilton Park Conference 871”, Countering CBW Proliferation, stated that ‘proliferation’ increasingly will refer to the spread of dual-use technology that can be converted into weapon should possessors choose to do so, and that dual-use nature is the root cause for CBW non-proliferation efforts. This problem becomes a serious international security issue when people exploit the duality for weapons purposes. These entities include suppliers including industry or criminal organizations, and the demand-side actors that include states and Non-State Actors.71

Julian Perry Robinson in “Chemical Warfare Arms Control: A Framework for Considering Policy Alternatives” explained the whole concept of CWC verification

70 David P. Fidler, “The Chemical Weapons Convention After ten Years: Successes and Future Challenges”, The American Society of international Law, Vol.11, No.12, 27 April 2007. 71 Mark Smith, Caitríona McLeish, “Countering CBW Proliferation,” Report on Wilton Park Conference 871, Wilton Park, 28- 30 September 2007.

mechanism as a cooperative process for addressing international concerns/ suspicions regarding non-compliance with the Convention. Robinson also explains that the objective of on-site verification is to deny a potential violator the means for concealing prohibited programmes thus highlighting the deterrence role of CWC verification mechanism. The OPCW Routine Industrial inspections and Challenge Inspection are designed to serve as two pillars of the verification regime of the CWC. Therefore, not utilizing the provision of Challenge Inspection will have implications for the adaptation of the Convention to address future challenges.

G. Ackerman, J. Bale, K. Moran in “Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical "Chemical" Infrastructure” provided insight into the motivational factors that affect terrorist organizations’ propensity to attack chemical facilities. This viewpoint is supported by quoting the U.S. Department of Justice "Individuals have indeed attempted to use chemical releases from individual facilities as makeshift WMD both domestically and abroad."72

Regarding the international regime theory, Robert O. Keohane in “After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” advanced the neoliberal institutionalist perspective and focuses on a question that why cooperation sometimes persist among states even in the absence of a hegemon? The author’s main argument is that under certain conditions cooperation can develop based on common interests among states. Keohane uses microeconomic theory of cooperation for exploring economic cooperation but he strongly believes that his theory has relevance to other areas such as security. The author examine economic relations among advanced- market economies where he believes common interests are greatest and the benefits of international cooperation the easiest to realize. However, Keohane notes that in the real world both political and economic issues are simultaneously the most important.73

72 U.S. Department of Justice, " Assessment of the Increased Risk of Terrorist or Other Criminal Activity Associated with Posting Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information on the Internet," 18 April 2000, p 24. 73 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

Barry Buzan in his article “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century” had highlighted five sectors of security, namely political, military, economic, societal, and environmental. He had concluded that any changes in these five sectors of security in the centre would have effects on the periphery states, due to their wider implications. He emphasised that these sectors are extremely important for comprehensively understanding security. Moreover, they are closely interlinked, and each sector defines an important area of the security problematique.74

Stephen Krasner along with thirteen other scholars in “International Regimes” explored the concept of international regime, “the implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and procedures” that provide guidance for conducting inter-state relations. Moreover, the authors develop three approaches of international regimes and apply them on specific international agreements and issues. This volume conceptualized regimes as an intervening variable between causal factors and outcome/ behaviour. Oran Young, Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala view international regimes as pervasive characteristics of the international system. They believe that regimes and behaviour are closely inter-linked because any patterned behaviour does require a regime. In contrast, Susan Strange argues that the basic concept of regimes is misleading because it just obscures the basic economic and power relationships. The remaining authors such as Arthur Stein, Robert Keohane and Robert Jervis take a third position, which can be termed ‘modified structuralism’. They accept the basic assumption of ‘structural realist approach’ which posit an international system in which power maximizing states function in an anarchic world. But they maintain that international regimes impact situations and the behaviour of states even in an anarchic world. 75

Robert Jervis in “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” viewed international system as anarchic and seeks to discover variables for reducing the anarchy. He structure international dealings as games of Stag Hunt or repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with four

74 Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century”, International Affairs, Vol.67, No.3, July 1991. 75 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

possible outcomes such as Defect-Defect, Cooperate-Defect, Defect-Cooperate and Cooperate-Cooperate. In these scenarios the concerns regarding exploitation generate the security dilemma. Jervis discusses that changes in the outcome of each scenario is directly related to the level of cooperation. Jervis presents the ‘offence defence theory’ which helps indicate the intensity of security dilemma with the help of four different offence defence scenarios. Each scenario results into different intensity of security dilemma.76

Arthur A. Stein in “Neoliberal Institutionalism” contended that if institutions are rules of the game and if all recurrent behaviour is guided by some rule, then the entire study of international politics is the study of international institutions. Because, rules are “humanly devised constraints” and the social reality is in fact the outcome of constraints. Rules provide constraints to states interacting in an anarchic international system. Thus the domain of international institutions is very wide Moreover, Regime theory is rooted in the core elements of realist theory. Rather than proving that regimes were a different way of thinking about international politics, regime theorists accept the realist view of states as the central actors of international politics, and also accept the central realist premise that state behaviour is rooted in power and interest. 77

Hedley Bull in “Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics” provided a liberal view called the English School, which emphasized the existence of international society. This School recognizes an international system in which states interacts based on power politics. This book provides an expansive and delimiting definition of international society.78 The main argument of this work is that states interact in an anarchic international society guided by norms and rules of behaviour, rather than an anarchic international system. The inter-state relations reflect the socially constructed rules and norms of the game and they constitute the foundation of the international society. The English School

76 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol.30, No.2, January 1978. 77 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, ed., Oxford Handbook on International Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 78 “An international society exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.” Refer: Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

just like social constructivism characterize the study of international institutions so broadly as to make all international relations institutional. This book highlights that international institutions helps secure adherence to rules by formulating, communicating, administering, enforcing, interpreting, legitimating and adapting them. 79

Louis Henkin in “How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy” advanced the thesis “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all their obligations almost all of the time.” States make laws and conclude agreements for a particular purpose. Some international agreements have more significance due to their wider implications such as Westphalia, Versailles, Dayton, etc. Presently, a new dimension is added to foreign policy and international law i.e. large numbers of states agree to pursue a common purpose e.g. the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, World Bank, etc. This book concludes that international relations depend on legal order, and states operate in a legal framework, which controls and limits state behaviour.80

Mrs. Kehkeshan Azhar, Acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the OPCW in her statement during the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, stated that Pakistan attached high importance to the national implementation of the CWC, but promoting national implementation through cooperative means is more productive approach as illustrated in the context of UNSC Resolution-1540. Mrs. Kehkashan highlighted that the CWC keeps alive the hope regarding the implementation of genuinely moral, legal and ethical basis for advancing arms control and disarmament affairs as opposed to selective regimes that violates its own rules and thus carve out unprecedented and dangerous exceptions. Therefore, Pakistan reaffirms its support for the CWC and its effectiveness. This statement highlights the critical importance of the verification of disarmament and non-proliferation measures through multilateral, nondiscriminatory and effectively verifiable legal instruments. Furthermore, this statement welcomed the progress of destruction of declared Chemical Weapons and expressed hope

79 Ibid. 80 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

for early chemical disarmament in Pakistan’s neighbourhood, which will contribute to confidence-building in South Asia. 81

Research Framework The research framework of this study is based on the ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’ (CWC), and this research is undertaken from the perspective of multilateral arms control, non-proliferation and international security.

Research Methodology

The methodology of this research is qualitative utilizing both primary and secondary sources. The case study approach is adopted for the conduct of this research.

The research employ primary sources while investigating Pakistan’s chemical industry, such as through sequence of visits making conclusions and observations about the chemical industry’s safety and security arrangements, interviews, and interactions; moreover, critically reviewing national documents and national policy documents. Thus both sources of observation and literature search have been used. Deductive reasoning approach and the method of epistemology have been applied. The philosophy of this research is based on post-positivism. In the context of chemical industry and associated challenges especially accidents, terrorism and proliferation; a comparative analysis technique has been used to learn from the safety and security best practices and related national measures for chemical industry, countering chemical proliferation and terrorism of the developed states especially the U.S., and the U.K. To conceptualize this study, the theoretical framework and guiding conceptual tool of ‘neo-liberalism’ specifically the ‘international regime theory’ has been applied.

To gain first- hand knowledge from the primary sources, the author visited OPCW Headquarters at The Hague, concerned national ministries, organizations, almost all chemical industries of Pakistan declared to the OPCW, many non-declared chemical

81 Statement by Mrs. Kehkeshan Azhar, Acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan, Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, The Netherlands, 7–18 April 2008.

industries, facilities and industrial estates, chemical industry in Qatar and Singapore, etc. Relevant national institutions were visited such as Pakistan Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan National Authority on CWC, Pakistan Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV), academic institutions, research institutions in Pakistan and abroad, medical facilities located inside industry and outside close to industry, law enforcement agencies, at-risk communities, transport companies, etc. To better understand the national implementation of the CWC, the author attended OPCW sponsored ‘Basic Course’ and subsequently an ‘Advance Course’ on the national implementation of the CWC. The list of visits is given in Chapter-8. Collecting information at industry and offices was a difficult task because mostly the managers and officials were reluctant discussing safety and security issues.

Varieties of secondary sources were utilized for this study. For example widely recognised libraries such as Quaid-i-Azam University library, Army Central Library, Strategic Plans Division library and PASTIC library were used. Secondary sources were obtained from the digital libraries and portals that focus on the CWC and chemical industry. For example, the World Wide Web and specialized resources on chemical issues that have been used including, inter alia, the UNIDIR Disarmament Forum Geneva, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Nonproliferation Project, the Henry L. Stimson Center, the Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey, VERTIC, Arms Control Association, Foreign Affairs, CBW Conventions Bulletin, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Arms Control Today, SIPRI, International Review of the Red Cross, Foreign Affairs, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Non-proliferation Review, Process Safety Process, Christian Science Monitor, International Organization, Survival, Homeland Defence Journal, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Michigan Journal of International Law, The Monitor, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and the State Department, Journal of Hazardous Material, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, and The American Society of International Law. No Pakistani research institute, academic institution or scholar has

undertaken academic research on the ‘national implementation of Chemical Weapons Convention’ or ‘the safety and security of Pakistan chemical industry’.

Limitations of the Study

In the family of WMD, this study is focused on chemicals, Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs) commonly known as ‘commercial chemical industry’ and related facilities. Within the purview of the broader ‘Non-proliferation Regime’ and numerous related national legislative measures, this study focuses on the Chemical Weapons Convention. Thus, it does not cover NPT, BTWC, Conventional Arms Control Treaties, ILO Conventions, overall non-proliferation regime, multilateral arrangement for handling of chemicals such as Australia Group and national legislations dealing indirectly with chemicals. However, relevant national laws have been discussed in the context of management of chemicals, disaster management and related environmental implications.

This study does not cover Chemical Weapons Production Facilities (CWPF), and Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities (CWDF). This study focuses on nonproliferation of dual- use chemicals and technology; but it does not cover Chemical Weapons disarmament. This study covers OPCW Routine Industrial Inspections; however, the ‘OPCW Challenge Inspection’ is not part of this study. The timeframe selected for this research is commencing from 9/ 11 up till June 2013.

Organization of the Study

This study is divided into eight chapters. Chapter-1 spells out a theoretical framework for this study. This chapter is entitled Theoretical Framework: Learning from Regime Theory, and is divided into two parts. Part-I includes discussion on theoretical understanding of the regime theory such as various definitions of international regime, various variables and salient aspects of regime theory, the views of different schools of thoughts on regime theory, etc. Part-II of this chapter presents the linkages of the Chemical Weapons Convention with the theory of international regimes (or institutions) such as national implementation of CWC, the role of international supporting organization in implementing CWC, variables of the regime of CWC such as its strength, scope and

organizational form. This part also presents salient aspects of the CWC regime such as transparency and confidence building, adaptation of CWC to emerging challenges and multilevel governance.

Chapter -2 is entitled Chemical Industry: Significance and Challenges. This chapter covers the significance and evolution of chemical industry, the relationship of chemical industry with CWC, and the challenges chemical industry is facing such as environmental challenges, the challenges of proliferation and chemical terrorism, and lack of awareness regarding CWC non-proliferation provisions in the chemical industrial sector. This chapter also discusses the modern trends in chemical industry and how it is giving speed and flexibility in production that facilitates the Non-State Actors to misuse the widely available chemical technology and know-how. This chapter also discusses how chemical industry as partner to international regimes can contribute to national, regional and international non-proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts.

Chapter-3 is entitled Chemical Weapons Convention: A Critical Appraisal. This chapter contains explanations and examination of various aspects of the CWC such as national obligations and significance of national implementation measures, the need for transforming the mandate of the OPCW and improving routine industrial inspections. This chapter also discusses the export control regime under CWC, the CWC mechanism for consultations, cooperation and fact-finding, the CWC positive security assurance in the form of ‘assistance and protection’, national protective programmes against Chemical Weapons, and the scientific and technological developments and their implications for the Convention, especially the verification regime of the Convention.

Chapter-4 is entitled Countering Chemical Proliferation and Terrorism. The primary focus of this chapter is on the roles and significance of the CWC, national implementation of CWC, the OPCW and the chemical industry in countering proliferation and terrorism. In addition, a brief overview on the probability of chemical terrorism is also part of this chapter. The first section contains the discussion on prospects of chemical terrorism; significance of national export controls, monitoring of dual-use chemicals and equipment, and correct national declarations to the OPCW in countering the

challenges of proliferation. This chapter also highlights the limitations of the OPCW verification system, which highlights the significance of effective national implementation of the CWC, and especially the national verification and monitoring mechanism. This chapter contains the OPCW cooperating with various international organizations as part of global struggle against terrorism and proliferation. The final section of the chapter contains the discussion on the role of chemical industry for providing enabling environment to the OPCW and National Authorities for effective implementation of the legal and moral norms of the Convention. The conclusion part contains findings and recommendations.

Chapter-5 is entitled Safety and Security of Chemical Industry. This chapter covers the safety and security of chemical industry. For the sake of understanding the gravity of threat, the industrial chemical disasters/ accidents such as Bhopal India (1984), Toulouse France (2001), BP Texas City USA (2005), Buncefield Fire U.K (2005), Cheme-Pack The Netherlands (2011) are discussed. The primary objective of this discussion is to learn and understand the immediate and the underlying causes of chemical disasters. This part is followed by a discussion on safety of chemical industry including prevention, preparedness and response measures for understanding various significant safety measures and the responsibilities of various stakeholders such as public authorities, chemical industry, civil society, local community, academia, media, NGOs, etc. This chapter also analyses the security of chemical industrial sites, the security of transportation of hazardous chemicals and cyber security for chemical industry. The final section contains recommendations for various stakeholders for enhancing the safety and security of chemical industry.

Chapter-6 is entitled Pakistan Chemical Industry: Management of Chemicals. The primary focus of this chapter is Pakistan’s legal, regulatory and non-regulatory mechanism for the management of chemicals, yet the proper understanding of country’s chemical industry is imperative for critical examination of its safety and security arrangements as well as judging Islamabad’s compliance with the CWC. Therefore, an overview of Pakistan’s chemical industry is also part of this chapter. This chapter also contains discussion on Pakistan’s membership of international legal instruments, national implementation measures, and international best practices. The responsibilities of various

ministries, departments and inter-ministerial coordinating mechanism for the management of chemicals in Pakistan are also spelled out in this chapter. The contributions of local community, academia, public interest groups, trade unions and labour organizations for the safe and sound management of chemicals are also analyzed. In this context, Pakistan disaster management mechanism is discussed specifically for the chemical disasters. The conclusion part contains findings and recommendations.

Chapter-7 is entitled Pakistan: CWC Implementation. This chapter begins with the discussion on the functions and powers of Pakistan National Authority on CWC and also certain recommended measures for revitalizing Pakistan National Authority. This chapter also covers Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000 and Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules- 2010. This part presents the comprehensiveness of the said legal instruments and how they redress and remedy any violation by its citizens any where, including the aspects of extra-territorial application and provision of legal cooperation to the international community for safeguarding and upholding the credibility of the CWC. This chapter also includes Pakistan Export Control Regime for preventing the proliferation of WMD, related material, technology and their means of delivery; which is followed by Pakistan export control arrangements under CWC, such as, how transfers of Schedule chemicals is prohibited/ controlled to non-States Parties; and criminalizing offences such as variety of transfers that can be used for prohibited activities. Pakistan Export and Import Policy Order-2013 is also included in this chapter. Safeguarding the environment and human health is an important obligation under CWC, which is fulfilled in Pakistan by implementing Pakistan Environmental Protection Act- 1997 (PEPA), therefore, PEPA and related Rules are also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter-8 is entitled Pakistan’s Chemical Industry: Critical Examination of Safety and Security Apparatus. This chapter discusses the safety and security standards and measures by both the declared chemical industry82 including related major enterprises of

82 Declared chemical industries are those industries, which produced more than 200 tonnes of unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOCs) by synthesis during the previous calendar year; or which produced more than 30 tonnes of DOCs containing the elements of Phosphorous, Sulphur and Fluorine (PSF chemicals) by synthesis during the previous calendar year (refer CWC, Verification Annex, Part-I, paragraph 1).

Pakistan, and the Other Chemical Industry 83 (OCIs). Moreover, it analyses national concerns and requirements for addressing issues related to chemical industry such as the misuse of fertilizers in Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) by the terrorists, smuggling concerns, environmental implications, issues regarding waste disposal, specialized treatment, etc.

The ‘conclusion’ brings together the salient findings, conclusions and recommendations of this study. This synthesis answers the research questions of the study specifically the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Pakistan; the safety and security of chemical industry in Pakistan; the management of chemicals that includes chemical disaster management in Pakistan; and how the CWC, OPCW and the chemical industry can contribute to countering the challenges of chemical proliferation and terrorism.

83 For the purpose of this study, the chemical industry, which is below the above-mentioned production/ declaration thresholds specifications (refer footnote 80 above), but which produces, consumes or uses significant quantities of toxic industrial chemicals have been termed as ‘Other Chemical Industry’ (OCI). This industry does not make annual declarations to the OPCW through the National Authority, and hence the OPCW does not inspect such facilities.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LEARNING FROM REGIME THEORY

The safety and security of chemical industry is a complex phenomenon because many of its associated problems are truly international in scope. The current trends in the global politics and inescapable utility of chemical industry have multiplied the challenges to the chemical industry. The proliferation of dual-use chemical agents, rapid scientific and technological developments in the field of chemical industry and above all probability of chemical terrorism manifests that the challenges posed by chemical industry cannot be tackled by a single country or even a regional organization alone. Therefore, international cooperation and effective multilateral approaches are imperative, i.e. an approach that establishes synergy between national, regional and international apparatus for the safety and security of chemical industry. In this context, Regime Theory seems appropriate because it provides a multilateral 84 and institutionalized mechanism for a sustained cooperation among sovereign states in an anarchic international society.85 Do regimes have constructive influence on states’ behavior in the realm of safe and secure management of chemicals and related infrastructure and, if so, how? The Regime Theory explains the cooperative behavior of sovereign actors in an anarchic society for the sake of one’s self- interest or national interest. Therefore, it is appropriate to correctly understand and address the puzzles of chemical industry and dual-use chemicals and related technology in the prevalent international security situation.

84 Under the UN Charter, multilateralism implies establishing conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained. 85 Eric Neumayer, “How Regime Theory and the Economic Theory of International Environmental Cooperation Can Learn from Each Other,” Global Environmental Politics, Vol.1, No.1, February 2001, pp. 122-123

The rapid scientific and technological developments have created linkage between industrialization and the ability of states to produce Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Industrialization is essentially required for human and economic development and due to rapid scientific and technological developments chemical industry is spreading throughout the world. The knowledge and technology for producing Chemical Weapons were developed almost a century ago and now any state or even a small industrial unit can produce Chemical Weapons. Initially, Chemical Weapons were under state control, now there are serious concerns that Non-State Actors may acquire or develop and employ Chemical Weapons for their nefarious designs such as terrorism.

The Aum Shinrikyo cult released Sarin in the Tokyo subway system in 1995. Consequently ten people were killed and thousands were injured. 86 This dual-use phenomenon of the chemical industry is challenging for the law enforcement and regime implementation agencies of the states. More precisely, any company or industrial unit that can produce basic industrial chemicals such as fertilizers or pesticides, etc, is also capable to produce Chemical Weapons or explosive devices, which terrorist can use for terrorist activities.87 Thus the export- control of dual-use technology and material and effective multilateralism through effective national implementation of international regimes has gained immense significance due to proliferation concerns and the possible misuse of technology by both the states and Non- State Actors.

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part-I includes discussion on theoretical understanding of the regime theory such as various definitions of international regime, various variables and salient aspects of regimes, the views of different schools of thoughts on regimes, transition of regimes into institutions, various aspects of international institutions such as design, adaptation, growing intrusiveness, relations of international and national institutions, etc and views of various schools of thoughts on institutions. Part-II

86 Ramesh Thakur, “Chemical Weapons and the Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Ramesh Thakur and Era Haru, ed., The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Challenges and opportunities, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006), p.5. 87 Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century”, International Affairs, Vol.67, No.3, July 1991, p. 445.

of this chapter presents the linkages of the Chemical Weapons Convention with the theory of international regimes (or institutions) such as national implementation of CWC, the role of international supporting organization in implementing CWC, variables of the regime of CWC such as its strength, scope, organizational form, and allocation of international resources, salient aspects of the CWC regime such as transparency and confidence building, regime yielding better contractual results, consultations, cooperation and fact finding, application of selective safeguards and constraints, the Conventions’ prescribed and proscribed activities, unintended cooperation, CWC as knowledge based institution, adaptation of CWC to emerging challenges and multi-level governance.

PART- I: REGIME THEORY

1.1 Conceptualizing Regime Theory Since the end of the First World War and subsequent creation of the League of Nations, the international community has been constantly striving to codify various aspects of inter-state interactions and cooperation in universally recognized treaties, institutions, and norms. Nevertheless, the processes of cooperation in the anarchical international society received an impressive response from the sovereign states with the establishment of the United Nations in the aftermath of the Second World War. 88 Perhaps, the International regimes help in developing better understanding of world politics and the international cooperation that is based on choices made within rational paradigm.89 In the words of Robert O. Keohane:

“World politics lacks authoritative governmental institutions, and is characterized by pervasive uncertainty. Within this setting, a major function of international regimes is to facilitate the making of mutually beneficial agreements among governments, so that the structural condition of anarchy does not lead to a complete ‘war of all against all.”90

88 Robert O. Keohane, “The demand for International Regimes,” International Organization, Vol.36, No.2, Spring 1982, p.330. 89 Robert O. Keohane, ibid, p.4. 90 Robert O. Keohane, Ibid.

Since the second half of twentieth century the significance of international regimes has gradually multiplied. The prevalent trends in the global politics, i.e. the globalization, increasing interdependency among the states and the indivisible role of Non- State Actors, such as, multinational companies, regional/ global organizations, institutions, voluntary groups, 8 etc; in day-to-day affairs of both states and citizens oblige us to develop a better understanding of Regimes Theory, which explains both creationcum-evolution and smooth functioning, failure and demise of the regional and international institutions.

The Regime theory is rooted in the core elements of realist,9 who focuses on power relationships and neoliberals, who base their analyses on constellations of interests; in simple terms, “states, power, and interests.” In the words of Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons: “The regimes literature can be viewed as an experiment in reconciling the idealist and realist traditions.”10 Regimes are not a different way of thinking about international politics, but Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmon highlight that “the policy dilemmas created by the growth of interdependence since Second World War generated new forms of coordination and organization that fit uneasily in a realist framework.”11

The regime theorists defined regimes as contracts, agreements, or institutions formulated for the sake of self-interest. Robert O. Keohane argued that the “Regimes are more like contracts, when these involve actors with long-term objectives who seek to

8 International politics today is institutional and international institutions are present in every domain of life. For example, the United Nations (UN), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Australia Group, European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),etc 9 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983. 10 “The regimes literature can be viewed as an experiment in reconciling the idealist and realist traditions.” Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regime,” International Organization Vol.41, No.3, Summer 1987, p.492. 11

Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regime,” International Organization Vol.41, No.3, Summer 1987, p.491. structure their relationships in stable and mutually beneficial ways.” 91 He also added that "Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations." Similarly, Stephen Krasner argued that regimes are:

“Implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 92 Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”93

Although Krasner definition has received impressive acceptability among both the international relations scholars and practitioners; yet many expressed their reservations on the comprehensiveness of the preceding definitions of the Regime Theory. They claimed a degree of vagueness associated with various elements of this definition, which might inhibit the accumulation of knowledge in the long run. They raised two questions i.e. “what criteria do students of regimes have for reliably distinguishing principles, norms, rules, and procedures of a regime? Second, when can we say that a regime component exists in a given issue-area?” In addition, they had also highlighted three major flaws in Krasner's definition of the International Regime. They argued that:

“The definition is really only a list of elements that are hard to differentiate conceptually and that often overlap in real-world situations. Second; it exhibits a disconcerting elasticity when applied to the real world of international relations. Third, it is conceptually thin and fails to tie the concept into larger system of ideas that would help to solve the ambiguities

91 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes”, International Organizations, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1992, p.4. 92 Ibid. 93 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” op.cit; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, et al, Theories of International Regimes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.9-11.

in definition and that would offer guidance in formulating key questions and hypotheses regarding international regimes.”94

The debate among various schools of thought is important and it is difficult or seems inappropriate to negate completely anyone’s point of view. Therefore, it is appropriate to mention that for the sake of this study the regimes are treated as multilateral agreements among states and international institutions/ organizations implementing such multilateral agreements, which work closely with national authorities for the effective national implementation of a regime.

1.2 Evolution of International Regimes The unpredictable initiation and subsequent unprecedented devastations caused by the First World War resulted in vigorous debates among the scholars, which resulted in the formation of an independent international relations’ academic discipline. This development was accompanied by the consolidation of an academic tradition which was termed as an idealist school of thought that conceptualized and recommended the institutional approach for addressing international issues. The Idealist School of thought is an extension of enlightened movement of 18th century and gave more importance to moral and ethical considerations. In the conception of policy formulation, idealism gives importance to the role played by international law and international organizations. Modern idealist thinking is like ‘democratic peace theory’ which asserts that democratic states do not fight each other. In the words of Hedley Bull:

“…the distinctive character of idealism is the belief in progress: the belief, in particular, that the system of international relations that had given rise to the First World War was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world; that under the impact of the awakening of the democracy, the growth of the international mind, the development of the League of Nations, the good works of the men of peace or the enlightenment spread by their own thinking, it was in-fact being transformed; and that their responsibility as students of international relations was to assist the march of progress to

94 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, ibid, pp.11-12.

overcome the ignorance, the prejudices, the ill will, and the sinister interests that stood in its way.”95

Importantly, the creation of the League of Nations entailed the creation of the discipline of international law, which mainly focused on the role of international organizations. But the failure of the League of Nations for preventing aggressions significantly reduced the value of both the international organizations and international law. The international scholars such as E. H Carr denounced the promoters of international organizations and international cooperation for the sake of collective security and declared them idealists or Utopians.96 The main victim of the criticism of the realists was not the discipline of international organizations, but rather the study of international law.97 Realists challenged the legitimacy and the validity of international law. They asserted that the essence of a legal system lies in its enforcement and since international legal system has no police force to command sanctions and ensure compliance, therefore, international law is not a law. This idea dates back to the ancient debate that can be linked to the work of Samuel von Pufendorf and Thomas Hobbes.

International law is not just rules rather it is a normative system. All organized structures require a system of normative conduct, which is regarded by the group as obligatory, and the violation carries a price.98 However, in the aftermath of the Second World War; scholars took renewed interest in international organizations, which resulted in the creation of various financial organizations99 such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, etc. The creation of the European Economic Community was initiated, and the integration of Europe proved land mark achievement because the

95 Donald Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace, (Oxford University Press, 2006), p.3. 96 Edward Hallett Carr, Twenty Years Crisis, 1919- 1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, (Polgrave Publishers, 2001), p.42. 97 G John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.4. 98 Rosalyn Higgins, Problem and Process: International Law and How We Use It, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 99 G John Ikenberry, loc.cit.

European state system had witnessed centuries of great-power rivalry and wars. The European unification can be considered as a landmark contribution for addressing the anarchic state of nature. Subsequently, the study of international organizations and regional integration became an important subfields of international politics.

The field of international organizations has undergone major changes during the last seven decades. Notably, the study of international organizations and regional integration was named regime theory in the early 1980s. 100 Regime theory was subsequently called neoliberal institutionalism. These changes broadened the focus of the causal logic.101 Causality is the causal relations between causes and effects. The post1945 concept of international organization was something physically existing. International organization was defined as “a formal arrangement transcending national boundaries that provides for the establishment of institutional machinery to facilitate cooperation among members in the security, economic, social, or related fields”.102 This conceptualization was broadened and improved with the definition of regime given by Stephen Krasner that regimes are set of implicit and explicit rules, norms, practices and decision making procedures that shapes actors expectations in a given issue area and addresses the uncertainties that undermines cooperation amongst actors.103

1.3 Determinants for the Efficacy of Regime Regime may transform over time and have following four variables that determine its validity in the regional and global politics. Indeed, the understanding of the determinants of the efficacy of regimes seems imperative because the regimes deal with the sovereign political entities. The linkages of these variables with the CWC would be discussed in

100 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, ed., Oxford Handbook on International Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.3. 101 Ibid. 102 Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, ed., The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.203. 103 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

detail in the second part of this chapter. The following discussion, however, contains discussion on the variables of the regime, which is vital for its operability.

1.3.1 Strength There are regimes that gain strength and there are regimes that gradually decay and disappear. Regimes begin with a small number of members and then gradually grow. This has been proven by most international regimes. With the passage of time, institutions take on new tasks as per the changing conditions; and gets more formalized and organized e.g. the present structure and role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was not visualized in the initial arrangement. Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is functioning today in a manner, which was not imagined at the time of its creation. 104 Generally, the degree of compliance show the strength of the regime, especially when the interests of a state or group of states are in disagreement with the provisions of the regime. The test of a regime’s strength is the demonstration of states’ behaviour motivated by benefits provided by the regime, or by concerns regarding reputation. Adherence to an international regime will project a responsible image of a state; on the contrary withdrawal from an international regime or not adhering to any provision of the regime will make bad publicity for that state.

Regimes mostly reflect and protect the interests of the powerful states. However, Aggraval notes that regimes control even powerful states’ behaviour by reducing the chance of exercising power directly, but at times stronger states gives preference to their national interest and violate treaty norms and rules.105 For example, the U.S. preferred nuclear commerce over the norms of nuclear non-proliferation regime and it influenced the decision making of the member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that allowed Indo- U.S. Nuclear deal in September 2008. This deal is a violation of the Nuclear Non-

104 Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, “The Theory of Overlapping Clubs,” in Richard Rosecrance, ed., The New Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001), p.227. 105 Vinod K. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade, (California, University of Califormia Press, 1985), p.28.

Proliferation Treaty106 (NPT) and it allowed India to buy fuel for its nuclear reactors from the international market. 107 Regimes facilitate the achievement of common objectives, however, regimes are also arenas for conflict and at times they institutionalize inequalities. As per functionalists and game-theoretic approaches regimes are so strong that they alter the settings in which states strive for cooperation. Iterated Prisoner’s Dillema claims that regime increases the incentive for cooperation by suitably altering institutional environment, enhancing transparency, and changing the payoff structure.

1.3.2 Organizational Form In a regime, some matters can be addressed better by decentralized regulations through the states parties, e.g. national declarations and refraining from certain actions and activities that would contribute to prohibited activities. There are regimes that require positive intervention by its implementing body working closely with other member states, but as for as the implementation of the regime is concerned they are largely decentralized.

1.3.3 Scope The range of issues that the regime covers becomes the scope of the regime. The scope of any treaty helps in shaping the mandate of the treaty and the supporting infrastructure for the implementation of the treaty. The scope of the regime plays an important role in the success or failure of a regime. Sometimes, the scope has to be suitably adjusted to address current or future challenges and other externalities. For example, the scope and mission of NATO was suitably modified after the Cold War.

1.3.4 Allocation of Resources Allocation of resources deals with budget allocation or major equipment allocation for various activities, e.g. in the context of OPCW budget allocation for verification activities, international cooperation and capacity building, etc. Different regimes have

106 The basic bargain under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is that Non-Weapon States would gain access to nuclear technology in exchange for giving up the possibility of developing Nuclear Weapons. Article-II and IV of the NPT.. 107 M.V. Ramana, “The Impact of the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal on the NPT and the Global Climate Regime,” 10 December 2013. Available at in.boell.org/2013.

different mechanisms for the allocation of resources. A commercial regime prefers private allocations and contracting with very little national controls. On the other hand, security regimes favour direct national control of resources by the regime authorities and require extensive organizational mechanism for implementation and monitoring functions. 108

1.3.5 Application of Safeguards and Constraints Stephen Cohen and John Zysman highlight that at times states apply selective safeguards and constraints, which undermine the regime.109 Keohane is of the view that constraints are dictated both by powerful actors and the environmental factors.110 Thus, in a sense, a regime is imposed and states agree within constraints that are mostly mandated by powerful actors. An international regime is always negotiated and various actors consider the opportunity costs of alternatives. Therefore, in world politics, the mutual relationship between ‘power’ and ‘dependence’ will be significant determinants of the characteristics of international regime. The actors’ choices are constrained in such a way that the preferences of powerful states are accorded more importance. 111 Thus while applying “rational-choice theory”112 for forming and maintaining an international regime, we have to be cognizant of the structural context in which the regime is formulated. Voluntary choice can not be equated with equality of situation or net result. Regimes are agreements and the parties have long-term objectives. The states parties seek to structure their relationship in stable, negotiable, adaptable and mutually beneficial ways.113

1.3.6 Addressing Uncertainties and Suspicions International regimes are beneficial for states because they oblige states for the provision of specific information, and also regimes render it possible for states to conclude

108 Oran R. Young, Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Application, (John Hopkins University Press, 1979), p.55. 109 Stephen Cohen and John Zysman, “Double or Nothing: Open Trade and Competitive Industry,” Foreign Affairs 62, Summer 1983, pp.1113- 39. 110 Stephen Cohen and John Zysman, ibid. 111 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” op.cit, p.331. 112 Rational Choice Theory is based on the idea that all action is fundamentally rational and people calculate the costs and benefits before taking any action. 113 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” loc.cit.

multilateral and mutually beneficial agreements. 114 Keohane emphasizes the role of regimes and institutions in enhancing inter-state cooperation, and also facilitate cooperation by providing requisite information and reducing the costs of transactions. Realists also admit that such an approach sufficiently addresses the problem of inter-state cheating; but realists assert that institutionalists ignore the concerns regarding relative gains in inter-state relations.115 Mearsheimer asserts that liberal institutionalism largely avoids security issues and concentrate instead on economic and environmental issues, where cooperation is mutually beneficial; but their exist arenas where considerations of relative gains matter most. For example, when states are contending over the ownership of territory or the usage of rivers, there is clear conflict of interests, with room for either cooperation or conflict.116

Keohane and Martin disagree with Mearsheimer because they believe that regime theory focuses on the role of institutions in providing information to various actors, thus enhancing trust and confidence. Hence, regime theory is applicable on security issues, as well as economic and environmental issues. 117 Snidal is of the view that if the institutionalist perspective is correct, then regimes should promote cooperation, even in situations where states have quite divergent preferences, when relative gains concerns are paramount such as Prisoners’ Dilemma game.118

1.3.7 Transparency and Confidence Building The parties to an international regime are required to submit variety of national reports and declaration of activities. This national reporting and the rigour with which such reports are prepared demonstrate how effectively the regime has been implemented and

114 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). 115 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol.19, No.3, 1994- 95, p.5. 116 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel, “International Institutions and the Management of Contentious Issues,” Paper presented in the Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society, Arizona, 2002, pp.2- 3. 117 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, Vol.20, No.1, 1995, pp.39- 51. 118 Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains the Pattern of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review, Vol.85, No.3, 1991, pp. 701- 726.

forms the basis for subsequent monitoring and verification activities.119 It is expected from the parties to the International Regime that National reports should be rigorously prepared, accurate, transparent, up-to-date and comparable. Once submitted to the coordinating/ implementing international body, the national reports must be analyzed, interpreted and assessed in good time for correctly and timely responding to deficiencies and disagreements.120 Some states do not always or appropriately comply with their reporting obligations. Possible reasons for this noncompliance, inter-alia, include a lack of capacity for gathering and analyzing correct information, lack of requisite infrastructure and expertise, unclear reporting formats, and some states consider monitoring of national compliance as an intrusion on their sovereignty121 Correct reporting helps in effective international and national verifications, national implementation and mutual learning.

1.4 Efficacy of Regime: An Appraisal Two aspects can show the significance of a regime, one is the level of effectiveness and second is the degree of resilience.122 The effectiveness of a regime can be measured by two overlapping ideas. First, is the “regime strength” i.e. the extent to which the States Parties or organizations abide by the rules and norms of the regime. Second, how much the regime has achieved its objectives and purpose.123 The most important purpose of any regime is to make member states cooperate in the issue area. On the other hand, the regime resilience is the staying power of international institutions despite exogenous challenges. The institutions that change with every shift of power lack resilience. Change in institution mean fundamental declining change in the regime rules and norms.

119 Michael Bothe, “Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Systems of Inspections and External Monitoring”, Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia, (Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 2006), p.247. 120 Tuula Kolari, Promoting Compliance with International Environment Agreements- A Multidisciplinary Approach, (University of Joensuu Publishers, 2004), p.49. 121 Ibid, p.48. 122 Robert Powell quoted by Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger in, Theories of International Regimes, op.cit, p.2. 123 Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, (Cornell University Press, 1994), Chapter 6.

Another factor for measuring the efficacy of a regime can be how much a regime has reduced the likelihood of conflict. In this regard, a regime can contribute in several ways such as directly coercing and restraining those violating their national obligations or provoking aggression, serving as agent of mediation, conveying requisite information for addressing suspicions and thus reducing uncertainty and risk, encouraging states to expand their conception of the interest at stake and promoting longer-term thinking.124

No rule can be part of a regime that does not contribute to shaping the behavior of its addressees. Thus, the "effectiveness" of a rule can be defined technically as the extent of its compliance125 However, it is not must that compliance has to be perfect for a regime to be effective. Another point is that the rules that govern practices need not be formally stated, i.e. it is possible to have implicit rules and even regimes. Therefore, when a formal agreement has been concluded, it is often misleading to equate the contents of the regime with the terms of the agreement. Young and Zacher perceived no need for requiring that all behavior conform to the prescriptions and proscriptions of the regime all the time. 126 But occurrences of major or long-term noncompliance, particularly involving participation of or support by major actors in the system, bring into question the efficacy of regime injunctions.

1.5 Regime Theory: Various Schools’ Perspective

In the discipline of international relations there are various schools of thought. Among them, three seems relevant for the sake of this study’s theoretical framework. They are: the realism, neo-liberalism, and structuralism.

1.5.1 Realists Views on Regimes

124 Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organization, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), p.37. 125 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, op.cit, p.16. 126 Ibid.

Realists think that humankind is driven by competitive spirit and is self-centered. They emphasize the role of power in the anarchic international settings. Thomas Hobbes viewed the human nature as egocentric and conflictual.127 Realists strive for selfsufficiency and are motivated for enhancing power. The classical realist approach describes world politics as a struggle for power. 128 From such a perspective, states have a single, all encompassing goal: they think and act in terms of interest defined as power. The core assumptions of realism are: first, in international politics states are the key actors; second, states are homogenous units that acts on the basis of self-interest; third, states are rational actors; four, the international system is anarchic (absence of central executing authority). This implies that conflict between self-interested states entails the danger of war and coercion.

Through 1960s, realism was intellectually hegemonic, and even through the 1980s, new ideas were always tested against the perspective of realism. In this field, Hans Morganthau’s Politics Among Nations contributed impressively.129 However, the state- centric assumption was subsequently challenged by work on transnational relations, and the core assumption of anarchy by scholars of international institutions, regimes and society.130 Regime theorists posit that regimes contribute to inter-state cooperation while norms act as constraints in the policy making process. Realists reject the independent impact of rules, norms or institutions on states behavior, and argue that regimes are meant to safeguard the interest of powerful states.131 There are large numbers of institutions but they could not address the anarchic nature of international system. Regimes gain strength till the time they serve the interests of the powerful states.132

127 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, op.cit, p.6. 128 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Fourth Edition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p.5. 129 Ibid. 130 Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn 1998, p.18. 131 Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levincon, “Law of States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law,” The Harvard Law Review, Vol.122, No.7, May 2009, p.1793. 132 Ibid.

1.5.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism Views on Regimes In the mid-1970s, the neoliberals challenged realism. This challenge focused on the concept of international regime first used in the 1975 political science literature of John Ruggie and subsequently elaborated by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Their views differ from realism and neo-realism by viewing international politics as an arena in which states contend on variety of issues, and the focus on issue is imperative for correctly understanding cooperation and conflict among states. And for states the salience or value of issues varies.133 Keohane and Nye developed the concept of “complex interdependence” that the fortunes of states are inextricably tied together. The concept of complex interdependence has three characteristics. One, the use of multiple channels of action between states; two, strong linkages between issues and absence of hierarchy of issues; three, in international relations the use of force has decreased. Hence, the better interdependence could cause enhanced inter-state cooperation.134

The formation of international regime requires specifying the context within which a regime will deliver and the actors will be required to make choices. Two characteristics of international context are fundamental, namely, the international society lacks authoritative government and secondly, the international context has pervasive uncertainty. Thus, in this anarchic and uncertain world, the major function of a regime is to facilitate mutually beneficial relations and agreements among states and multilateral institutions, so that the structural anarchy does not lead to wars and conflicts. The actors function in a context what Waltz has termed a “self-help system,” in which they cannot seek the assistance of higher authority for resolving issues and provision of requisite protection. 135 Moreover, “negative externalities are common: states are forever impinging on one another’s interests. Therefore, in the absence of authoritative international institutions, the conflicts of interests produce risks and uncertainties.136

133 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (Boston: Little Brown, 1977). 134 Ibid. 135 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, MAS: Addison- Wesley), 1979. 136 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” op.cit, p.332.

1.5.3 Structuralists Views on Regime The Structuralist’s considers the structure of international system as a mainly stable variable that is formed by the action of various actors and intervenes between their actions and political outcomes. Structural constraints, especially the relative distribution of power, determine international politics, rather than the behavior of individual units. The general model is like that of a market that intervenes between producers and consumers and influences the behavior of various actors. Structuralism does not take into account internal political processes, diversities and national particularities. Actors, who are assumed rational and egoistic have consistently ordered preferences for pursuing their well being.137

The structure of international system is, in essence, made up of relatively small number of major actors. Structuralism is not concerned with the unit level. Like the structure of a market, the structure of the international system is determined by the relative strength of a number of important actors. The international system modeled by structuralism is anarchic, but anarchy is not chaos. It simply implies that order is determined by structural patterns. Even anarchy has virtues, because the threat of force always looms in the background. This limits states’ manipulations, moderate their demands, and seek the settlement of disputes prior to escalation and spiraling out of control.138

Most structural theories of regimes are state-centric. 139 The structural regime theories demonstrate that international conditions compel states to cooperate. In fact, the structures are so effective that they favourably adjust behavior for achieving desired international outcome. 140 In structuralism, the theory of hegemonic stability links the presence of a dominant power to the creation and maintenance of a regime. The earlier proponents of the theory of hegemonic stability such as Charles Kindleberger considered

137 Duncan Snidal, “The Theory of International Politics,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No.1, October 1985, p.38. 138 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading Mass: Addison- Wesley Publishers, 1979), pp.88- 89. 139 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1998), p.18. 140 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op.cit, p.74.

the unilateral leadership important and not any formal international regime or institution.141 Subsequently, Keohane and Nye worked on regime dynamics and proposed “issue- structure” model that “stronger states in the issue system will dominate the weaker ones and determine the rules of the game.”142 Moreover, hegemons provide maximum support to regimes and institutions because they benefit the most from an organized system that functions on the basis of rules mostly formulated by hegemonic states.

Thus regimes and institutions are controlling states behavior and policies. Structural theories mostly consider national variables.143 Whereas, there is strong linkage between international and domestic levels, because international regimes and dominant states influence the behavior of other states by undertaking intense lobbying and setting regime’s agenda and priorities. This view cast doubts on the cooperative character of regimes but despite that even the coerced states are amongst the beneficiaries of the regime. 144

The preceding discussion reveals an important difference in perceptions about the regime among the international relations’ scholars. They debated on the maximalist and minimalist functionality of “institutionalism” i.e. how much international institutions matter. Neoliberals or interest-based theories of regimes have been extraordinarily influential during the 1980s and represented the main stream approach in analyzing international regimes and international institutions. Neoliberals acknowledge the effects of power differentials, but they emphasize the role of international regimes in helping states in achieving common interests. They believe that states pursue absolute gains. Thus regimes put certain constraints on states and coordinate their behavior and measures in a manner that all parties benefit and gain based on certain rules and norms.

141 Charles Kindleberger, World in Depression, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1973). 142 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (University of California: Scott Foresman Publishers, 1989), pp.50- 51. 143 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization, Vol.41, No.3, Summer 1981, p.503. 144 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, quoted in Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” ibid, p.504. .

Since regimes bring stability in inter-state dealings the neoliberals maintain that member states develop and maintain a regime even if the cause for the creation of a regime does not exist, e.g. NATO’s transformation and development after the Cold War. 145 Regarding conflict resolution, institutionalists believe that once regional or international institution gets involved in the resolution of a dispute, this tremendously enhances the chances for conflict resolution, since states then view their reputations at stake. Moreover, institutions play a direct and effective role by providing requisite information fairly to each side and performing its obligation as a fair and neutral arbiters.146

1.6 Transformation: From Regime to Institutions

During 1990s the term regime was replaced with institution, because, it allowed international relations experts to connect intellectually with the study of institutions in economics, political science, and sociology. In all these fields, an “old institutionalism” which had focused on formal institutions was replaced by a “new institutionalism” with broad conceptualization.147 International institutions are explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors that prescribe, proscribe, and/ or authorize behavior. 148 An institution that is not highly formalized and develop through an evolutionary process contain rational design principles significantly. Institutions should be taken as rational responses to the international problems or issues, which international states face. This explanation can be linked with the game theory, where institutions perform the role of equilibria that includes the expectations of various parties and the rules of the game. This approach of equilibrium has significant implications. First, the rules of institutions must

145 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, ed., Oxford Handbook on International Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.6. 146 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel, “International Institutions and the Management of Contentious Issues,” Paper presented in the Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society, Arizona, 2002, p.5. 147 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, op.cit, p.204. 148 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization, Vol. 55, No.4, Autumn 2001.

be “incentive compatible”149 so that parties to the institution willingly adhere to the rules and provisions of the institution and overall regime because adherence advances their national interests.150

Across various fields scholars could accept the definition of “institutions,” as “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”.151 The expansion in focus makes it possible to identify and address related issues. For example, overwhelming majority of states signed the NPT and IAEA was established for monitoring compliance. Subsequently, the issue of delivery system surfaced, which was addressed by creating the MTCR. Both these instruments deal with related proliferation concerns, but constructed differently. 152 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international organization, but no international organization was created for the MTCR. Thus we can term both the NPT and the MTCR as international regimes or international institutions.153 Stein viewed this phenomenon that if institutions are simply rules of the game and if all recurrent behavior is guided by some rule, then the entire study of international politics is the study of international institutions. 154 Institutionalists and realists think alike that hegemonic powers create institutions because they serve state purposes. Thus hegemonic powers impose institutions. Moreover, hegemonic powers induce states for establishing institutions and provide variety of resources and leadership, which are essentially required for regime formation.155

1.6.1 Design of Institutions

149 Incentive compatibility does not mean that every state always benefit from the institution to which it is party. It means states are sure that by and large and in the long run the membership of institution will be beneficial for the national interest. 150 Barbara Koremenos, op.cit. 151 Paul Ingram, “Changing the Rules, Interests, Organizations and Institutional Change in the U.S. Hospitality Industry,” in Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee, ed., The New Institutionalism in Sociology (California: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.258. 152 Rasmussen and Stein cited by Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, ed., Oxford Handbook on International Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.204. 153 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, op.cit, p.204 154 Ibid, p.7. 155 Oran R. Young quoted by Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, ed., Oxford Handbook on International Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.212.

States undertake hectic lobbying for influencing shaping the design of a regime because eventually the regime design affects the results. Moreover, the design of institution cannot be subsequently easily and quickly changed as per the new international power configuration. For example, both Japan and Germany have insignificant role at the United Nations because they could not block the decision made in 1944- 45 when they were excluded from the United Nations Security Council. And the institution of the United Nations could not adapt to the tremendous national power of both Germany and Japan. For such reasons and since institutions do matter, states are extremely sensitive and careful about the design of institution. Therefore, states construct and shape the design of institutions for advancing their national interest.156

International institutions have variety of designs. Some institutions are international and some are regional in character. Some institutions have no implementing body such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and some have implementing body such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Some institutions give more importance to monitoring and verification such as the CWC and some institutions do not. International institutions are designed according to the nature of the problems that the institution has to address, e.g. institutions that perform the task of coordination are less formal and do not require extensive monitoring and enforcement mechanism. On the other hand, institutions working on security issues such as non-proliferation, disarmament, etc are more formal and require stringent monitoring and verification mechanism, because the chances of cheating are highly likely. 157 A special issue of International Organization 2001 specifies five dimensions of design, namely, membership, scope, tasks centralization, rules for functioning of the institution, and the flexibility for addressing unanticipated circumstances. 158 The design features can be many because

156 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” op.cit. 157 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, op.cit, p.213. 158 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” op.cit, pp.761- 799.

international institutions work like national governments, and they include legislative, executive, and judicial features.159

1.6.2 Development of Institutions The institutions begin with a small number of countries and gradually their membership increases. This has been proven by most international institutions. Even narrow security regimes such as NATO grew in both its membership and scope. For example, NATO originally had 12 member states in 1949; whereas, in year 2014 the membership of NATO has grown to 28 States.160 As institutions grow, they become more organized and formal. With the passage of time, institutions take on new tasks as per the changing conditions. For example, when the CWC came into force the OPCW was primarily focused on the destruction of declared Chemical Weapons stockpiles, but now with the passage of time there is growing realization that OPCW should focus on nonproliferation activities. With the passage of time institutions get formalized and organized e.g. the present structure and role of NATO was not visualized in the initial arrangement. Similarly, the IMF is functioning today in a manner, which was not imagined at the time of its creation.161

1.6.3 Impact of Institutions on States’ Behaviour States prefer to institutionalize their relations with one another, because international institutions have strong influence on states’ behavior and the nature of interstate politics. Institutions mitigate the effects of anarchy, by decreasing transaction costs, facilitating cooperation, increasing transparency and confidence and reducing uncertainty.162 International institutions promote compliance by providing opportunities for interaction, lengthening the shadow of the future and raising costs for reneging on

159 Sidney Tarrow and Donatella Della Porta, “Globalization, Complex Internationalism and Transnational Contention,” in Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, ed., Transnational Protest and Global Activism, (Maryland USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000). 160 Matt Rosenberg, “NATO Member Countries,” NATO, 20 May 2009; see also www.nato.int. 161 Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, “The Theory of Overlapping Clubs,” in Richard Rosecrance, ed., The New Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001), p.227. 162 Liliana Botcheva and Lisa L. Martic, “Institutional Effects on State Behaviour: Convergence and Divergence,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1, March 2001, p.1.

agreements, especially reputation costs for violation or noncompliance of a regime. 163 While realists contend that power rather than law or institutions determines compliance in international politics.164 The institutionalists and international lawyers accord a much more positive relationship between international institutions and compliance.

In the context of international regime (or institution) states are more likely to comply due to factors such as transparency, reciprocity, accountability, and above all the reputation being at stake for future bargaining situations within the same regime/ institution. 165 Both Gelp and Dffield are of the view that reputational costs for noncompliance may be more acute when important regional or international institutions are directly involved in a dispute resolution process.166 Had they not affected states’ behavior then an overwhelming majority of states would not have joined international institutions. States carefully consider joining any international regime, but after joining states make concerted efforts for ensuring compliance with the regime. At times, states do not rightly understand their obligations, and also ascertaining compliance is a complicated process because compliance is related to the design of the institution.167

1.6.4 Growing Intrusive Role of Institutions Multilateral bodies conduct verification activities for the purpose of inspection, monitoring or observation of related national measures. The international institutions undertake variety of on-site inspections and systematic monitoring for exercising control on the international implementation of the regime. Inspections and monitoring are conducted with an aim to deter and detect possible contravention of a regime, and to establish that violation of a regime has taken place. Inspections also help deter future

163 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel, “International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, Issue. 4, October 2007, p.33. 164 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Fourth Edition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967). 165 Ronaldo B. Mitchell, “Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance,” International Organization, Vol.48, No.3, 1994, p.429. 166 Christopher Gelpi, “Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining,” American Political Science Review 91, 1997, pp.339- 360; John S. Duffield, “International Regimes and Alliance behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels,” International Organization, 46, 1992, p.836. 167 Ronaldo B. Mitchell, “Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance,” International Organization, Vol.48, No.3, 1994, pp.387- 423.

violation by any state for the sake of its reputation in the community of nations and in a particular regime. The on-site inspections and monitoring are conducted by relevant national authorities, implementing body of a regime and independent experts.168

In view of the prevailing security situation, international institutions are becoming more intrusive and states are accepting it in both security and economic arrangements as means of confidence-building and transparency.169 International organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW are conducting systematic verifications that include on-site monitoring by foreign experts. The CWC Challenge Inspection is so intrusive that on receipt of credible information, the international inspectors can visit a State Party within 14 hours notice. During Cold War such arrangements were sure recipe to kill the deal.

Now, it is a fact that the decline of state’s sovereignty is increasing, e.g. in Europe states exist but major governance takes place above the level of the state. Thus, the states political authority is draining and they are constrained to act alike.91

1.6.5 Interlinked Domestic Politics and International Institutions In the 21st Century states interact with one another through international law, diplomacy, and international institutions. This regulated functioning and interaction constitutes an international system, which has two essential elements: networks among states and norms. This system seems skeleton of the contemporary world system. In the field of international relations, there is growing inter-dependence of nations.92 Consequently, international politics and domestic politics have become closely interrelated. For example, the national legislative body must support becoming party to an international regime and subsequently the state must take all measures for the effective implementation of the regime. Joining international regime/ institution has domestic implications. For example, a state has to exercise requisite restraints and controls while utilizing state’s

168 Balakrishna Pisupati, Charlotte Bournal, Elizabeth Maruma and Alphonse Kambu, “Issues of Compliance: Considerations for the International Regime on Access and Benefit Sharing,” Produced by United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi: UN Nairobi Publishers, 2004, p.13. 169 Arthur A. Stein, “Constrained Sovereignty: The Growth of International Intrusiveness,” in Richard Rosecrance, ed., The Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations, (Maryland: Rowman Littlefield Publishers, 2001).

political capital. At the same time state can also make difficult choices due to the legal cover provided by international institutions.

1.6.6 Multilevel Governance through Institutions There are number of institutions at international, regional and national levels that address same issues and are overlapping. Political scientists have studied how and why international regimes proliferate and overlap under the rubric of ‘complex interdependence’. The reasons could, inter alia, include that sometimes conversation about one topic leads to discussion about related issue, sometimes an agreement just prove a starting point for subsequent agreements; sometimes linkages amongst regimes

91 Miles Kahler and David A. Lake, Globalization and Governance: Definition, Variation, and Explanation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p.1; E.Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950- 1957, 2nd Edition, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968); Walter Mattli and Stone Sweet, “Regional Integration and the Evolution of the European Polity; On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Journal of Common Market Studies,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.50, No. S1, Blackwell Publishers, 2012, p.4. 92 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S Nye Jr., “Introduction,” in Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue, ed., Governance in a Globalizing World, (Virginia: R.R. Donnelley and Sons, 2000), p.19. are crafted for creating synergy; or to create redundancies for continuous pursuit of an objective should any single agreement fail.170 This approach is desirable also because in today’s world if loopholes in the national system exist, they can be exploited by international terrorist groups and can challenge international and regional security. Thus international regimes and states utilize this multi-level governance, but it demands meticulous coordination and harmony at various levels.

1.6.7 Institutions Adaptations Institutions constantly change and adapt to new circumstances.171 Some institutions fail to achieve the purpose for which they were created, whereas, some institutions becomes pillars of international system. The membership of growing institutions increases and they

170 Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, The Politics of international Regime, Working Paper No. 07-003, Buffett Centre for International and Comparative Studies, June 2007, pp.5- 6. 171 Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, “The Theory of Overlapping Clubs,” loc.cit.

confidently face new challenges.172 The initial literature regarding international regimes emphasized that institutions were created by great powers for safeguarding their interests. Therefore, institutions decay when the interests of great powers change. 173 However, another perspective is that institutions can grow so strong that they may change the nature of interests and subsequent national priorities and policies.174

Another dimension is that when states face new challenges, they either create new institutions or expand and reform the scope of the existing institutions.175 For example, when states faced the problem of proliferation of missile technology they created MTCR as a regime separate from the NPT for addressing the proliferation of missile technology.

On the contrary, states modified and expanded the scope of the NATO for addressing new challenges. Just like states and domestic policies, the international organizations have also failed in accomplishing their objectives. This happens when an organization cannot maintain an independent behavior or in developing the desired level of cooperation among its member states for adapting to emerging challenges. In such situation, powerful states may intervene for reviving the organization but the intervention may and may not work.176

1.7 Various Schools’ Views on Institutions

1.7.1 Realist Views on Institution The realist school of thought considers that institutions reflect state calculation of self-interest, which is primarily concerned about relative power. Therefore, institutional

172 Kalevi Holsti, Taming the Sovereign: Institutional Change in International Politics, (London: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 173 Wali Aslam, The United States and Great Power Responsibility in International Society, (New York: Routledge, 2013); Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order,” The European Journal of International Law, Vol.16, No.3, 2005; David Malone, Yuen Foong Khong, Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspective, (London: Lynee Rienner Publishers Inc, 2003). 174 Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” International Organization, 36, Spring 1982, pp.299- 324. 175 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, op.cit, p.16. 176 Ibid, p.11.

outcome invariably reflects the balance of power. Realists believe that institutions cannot push states away from war, and cannot change state behavior. However, great powers use institutions and alliances to enhance their power, e.g. the U.S. established NATO, but NATO does not compel its members to behave contrary to the logic of balance-ofpower.177 The realist views are summarized as following:178

1.7.1.1 Institutions are Epiphenomenal Realists argue that institutions are epiphenomenal. They only reflect the power and interest of the powerful and have no causal role. This is obvious from the fact that despite having large number of institutions, they could not mitigate the anarchy of the international system. Nonetheless, the post- Cold War period puts to test the resilience of institutions. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the US predominance. In this context, the realists argued that an institution such as NATO was doomed, since its main purpose was to contain the former Soviet Union. 179 Yet NATO expanded both its membership and scope. For realists, it is difficult to explain this phenomenon of institutional resilience.

1.7.1.2 Institutions are Marginal Factor The international politics is riddled with international institutions. Nonetheless, realists view states as the primary actors and emphasize the role of power in the anarchic international settings. Realists view international institutions as a relatively small component of international relations.180 Realists have downplayed the role of institutions in international politics arguing that institutions exist typically in “low politics” of transportation, communication, health, etc and not in the “high politics” such as national defense, etc. In the field of ‘high politics’ institutions are just a “false promise”.181 But the world is witnessing in the field of international security an extremely beneficial role of the

177 John J. Measheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security, Vol.20, No. 1, Summer 1995, p.82. 178 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, op.cit, p. 6. 179 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic, August 1990, pp. 35- 50. 180 Arthur A. Stein, “Realism/ Neorealism,” in Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences, Vol. 19, (New York: Pergamon Press, 2001). 181 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” op.cit, p.5

NPT, CWC, BWC, MTCR, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), IAEA, OPCW, etc.

1.7.1.3 Issue of Relative Gains Realists argue that, states are always concerned about relative gains, even if the cooperation is beneficial for them. Therefore, achieving and sustaining international cooperation is an up-hill task, when states would perceive that others would gain more due to cooperation.182 States are always concerned about relative standing and relative gains from cooperation. However, the relative gains concerns do not do away with the possibility of cooperation and especially when the number of parties in a system increases. During the last half century, the international hierarchy of power and wealth has changed partly in the context of international institutions.

1.7.1.4 Coercive Cooperation Powerful states use power including diplomatic power for creating institutions and in this process structuring and limiting the choices for others. Based on this fact, the realists argue that such arrangements confirm their view of the world. Stephen Krasner argues that great powers use their bargaining power to obtain preferred outcomes. This is in fact “coordination for the powerful” especially when faced with multiple equilibria. 183 Powerful states offer other states the difficult choice of joining an institution with difficult conditions or staying out. Thus, the states creating the club exercise immense power.184 In any regime states are given clear obligations and rights based on which the membership is granted.185 In case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the possessor states are obligated to destroy their Chemical Weapons stockpiles within specific timeframe and non-possessor states are obliged not to develop and acquire Chemical Weapons. The membership then

182 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42, 1988, pp. 485-508. 183 Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Cooperation: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” op.cit, p.311.

184 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 185 Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, “The Theory of Overlapping Clubs,” in Richard Rosecrance, ed., The New Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001), pp.225-26.

entitles States Parties for trade in all categories of chemicals including Schedule-1 chemicals, and international cooperation for the development of chemistry. That’s how a club good is created by the States Parties to the CWC.

1.7.2 Liberals View of Institutions Post Second World War the liberals focused on the cooperation that was underlying in the international arrangements; whereas, realists remained focused on conflict and competition. The regime scholars accepted the classical liberal notion i.e. the possibility of change and improvement, in contrast to the realist belief of unchanging anarchic international system and the omnipresent prospects of war. Some scholars believe that regimes were basically intended to fill the gap between realists and institutionalists. Realists believed in microeconomic competition, whereas, the liberals viewed “international institutions constituted mutually beneficial arrangements both for individuals and firms”.186 The new institutional literature emphasized cooperation and usefulness of institutions; but despite focusing on micro-economics, self- interest, and using game theory as realists do, the institutional literature was labeled neoliberal institutionalism because of its emphasis on cooperation and institutions.187

The neoliberal institutionalists believe that self-interested behavior can create grave problems, therefore, international institutions are essentially required. To coordinate national measures of large number of states and international organizations, some sort of coordinating mechanism is required. In some cases, creation of institutions is quite difficult due to divergent interests, yet states prefer institutional solutions.188 For example, the game of Prisoner’s Dilemma, institutions can help states identify mutually beneficial course of action. Thus, states have created international institutions for optimum outcome. 189 This institutional solution is similar to the social contract for the creation of states, which is an

186 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, op.cit. 187 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, ed., Oxford Handbook on International Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.5. 188 Duncan Snidal, “Cooperation vs. Prisoners’ Dilemma,” American Political Science Review, January 1985. 189 Ibid, p.8.

institutional solution to the problem of autonomous choice in the state of nature. Individuals agree due to their self-interest and cede some of their freedom for better collective outcomes.

States also require international institutions to reduce the costs associated with do it alone actions. The costs of organizing coalitions of the willing for addressing any problem are extremely high as compared to an institutional response.190 For example, in case of the ongoing Syrian crisis, the OPCW received immense financial and technological assistance from the U.S., the EU and other member states for eliminating the chemical weapons arsenal and infrastructure of Syria. The UN- OPCW Joint effort negotiated immense difficulties and is confident to meet the destruction deadline for Syrian Chemical Weapons by 30 June 2014. Moreover, the international opinion has forced Syrian government to join the CWC and assume all national obligations under the Convention.

1.7.3 English School Views on Institutions Another view is known as the English School, which emphasizes the existence of international society. This School recognizes an international system in which states interacts based on power politics. English School argues that an international society constitutes international reality. This School provides a delimiting definition of international society “an international society exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions”.191 Thus states interact in an anarchic international society guided by norms and rules of behavior, rather than an anarchic international system. The inter-state relations reflect the socially constructed rules and norms of the game and they constitute the foundation of the international society. The

190 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism”, op.cit, p.9. 191 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p.13.

English School characterizes the study of international institutions so broadly as to make all international relations institutional.

The English School emphasizes the centrality of international society to the disciple of international politics. The goals of this School of thought are more like historians, therefore, English School does not seek to create testable hypothesis regarding the behavior of states. They gave due importance to the subject of international law and argue that international law was one of five central institutions mediating the impact of international anarchy. This School believes that historical understanding is crucial for the study of international politics, e.g. knowing the concept of ‘balance of power’ in the international system is not enough. Rather, we ought to know what preceded that system? How states reached this level? And what might motivate or threaten states in future?

PART-II: REGIME THEORY AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

1.8 Evolution of the Regime of Chemical Weapons

The first international regime limiting the use of chemical weapons dates back to 1675, when France and Germany concluded Strasbourg Agreement, thus prohibiting the use of poisoned bullets.192 Exactly 200 years later, in 1874, another treaty of this sort was concluded: the Brussels Convention on the Law and Customs of War. This Convention prohibited the employment of poison or poisoned weapons, and the use of arms, projectiles or material to cause unnecessary suffering. The third agreement called The Hague Peace Conference was concluded in 1899 that prohibited the use of projectiles filled with poison gas.193

192 Ramesh Thakur, “Chemical Weapons and the Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Ramesh Thakur and Era Haru, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Challenges and Opportunities, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006), pp.5-7. 193 Ibid.

In the First World War 124,000 tones of deadly chemical agents were used. This caused 90,000 deaths and over one million casualties, who remained disabled for the rest of their lives. This shook the conscious of the World and terribly scared them because during the First World War, the means of delivery of Chemical Weapons were crude such as wind. Subsequently, the rapid scientific and technological developments during the twentieth century such as development of artillery shells, mortar projectiles, aerial bombs, development of more lethal chemical agents, variety of mines, etc, tremendously increased these weapons’ already frightening capacity to kill and maim. Chemical Weapons were deployed on a large scale in almost all theatres in the First and Second World Wars, thus leaving behind a complex legacy of old and abandoned Chemical Weapons. 194

In the aftermath of World War- I, international efforts to ban the use of Chemical Weapons and prevent such suffering from being inflicted again, on soldiers and civilians, intensified. The result of this renewed global commitment was the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The Geneva Protocol does not, however, prohibit the development, production or possession of Chemical Weapons. It only bans the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in war. Furthermore, many countries signed the Protocol with reservations permitting them to use Chemical Weapons against countries that had not joined the Protocol or to respond in kind if attacked with CW.195

During the Cold War, both the United States and the former Soviet Union maintained stockpiles of Chemical Weapons (CW), amounting to tens of thousands of tonnes, which was more than enough to destroy much of the human and animal life on Earth. Iraq used CW in Iran during the 1980s, and Iraq also used Mustard gas and Nerve agents, Sarin, Tabun, and possibly Cyanide against Kurds at Halabja, Northern Iraq, in

194 Ibid. 195 Ibid.

1988.196 The horrific pictures of Halabja victims shocked the conscious of the world at the time of the negotiations in Geneva on the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction” commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

1.9 Four Pillars of CWC

The CWC is a key multilateral treaty for preventing and prohibiting the proliferation of Chemical Weapons, reducing the risk of chemical terrorism through the universality and effective implementation of its provisions. This Convention eliminates an entire category of WMD under strict international verification. The CWC stands as a monument to the world’s determination to eliminate one of the most inhumane weapons ever conceived.” 197 The CWC rests upon four pillars:198 First, the destruction of Chemical Weapons stockpiles and Chemical Weapons Production facilities (CWPF). Second, the non-proliferation of Chemical Weapons, which plays a critical role in ensuring that the Convention remains a durable barrier against the re-emergence of Chemical Weapons and the misuse of toxic industrial chemicals. Non-proliferation of Chemical Weapons necessitates effective national implementation of the Convention; and stringent national and international verification and monitoring mechanism. Third, the provision of ‘assistance and protection’ by a cooperative international effort duly coordinated by the OPCW in the case of use or serious threat of use of Chemical Weapons. Fourth, the non- proliferation policy regarding chemicals has to be compatible with the international economic and technological cooperation for the global spread of chemistry and chemicals.

196 “Thousands Die in Halabja Gas Attack,” BBC News, 16 March 1988. 197 United Nations Website, “Ban Ki-moon Urges States to Eliminate Chemical and Unexploded Weaponry,” 5 November 2007. Available at www.un.org. 198 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu Director General OPCW “Address to the Seminar on the CWC and Chemical Safety and Security Management for Member States of the Region of Southeast and South Asia,” Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 8-11 May 2012.

1.10 CWC is not Self-Implementing Regime The international regimes are rarely enforced automatically, regimes are not selfimplementing.199 Indeed, the provisions of an international regime are implemented by States Parties of the regime through enacting national implementing legislations, regulations and administrative measures. Regime rules and provisions convert the regime norms into specific prescriptions and proscriptions. For example, the norms and rules regarding chemical export controls and verification regime under CWC have resulted into detailed regulations, which facilitate the OPCW and the National Authorities on CWC in identifying non-compliance with the Convention. One distinguishing feature of the CWC is that it specifies the destruction obligations and timelines for the possessor states of Chemical Weapons. The NPT is however vague due to the failure of regime members for reaching agreement on corresponding rules regarding time-frames for disarmament. Moreover, various procedures are integral to the CWC, e.g. procedures for the collective review of the CWC, selection of members of the Executive Council, conduct of OPCW Challenge and Routine Industrial Inspections for addressing proliferation concerns, ensuring confidentiality of information, etc.

1.11 Regimes and Supporting Implementing Organizations The international regimes are international institutions, but the terms ‘international regime’ and ‘international organization’ are not synonymous.200 An international regime may have an implementing organization such as the OPCW in the case of the CWC; and an international organization may not have implementing organization such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). But in most cases regimes have supporting organizations. 201 In the non-proliferation field, e.g. the IAEA and the OPCW have important supporting roles. Perhaps, the fundamental difference between regimes and organizations is that regimes are sets of principles, norms, rules, and procedures accepted by states that can not act, whereas organizations can develop appropriate response to

199 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” op.cit, p.330. 200 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.10. 201 Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, (Cornell University Press, 1989), p.25.

emerging needs and challenges.202 The domain of an international organization remains restricted to a particular issue of international relations, whereas regimes are issue-specific institutions by definition.203 In fact, some of the functions of the regimes, e.g. collecting, analyzing and verifying variety of national declarations under the CWC can not be performed without the support of the OPCW that is embedded in the CWC. Similarly, the CWC requires the OPCW for the on-site industrial verification activities, and analyzing and reconciling the national declarations regarding import and export of Schedule (listed) chemicals.

1.12 CWC: Variables of the Regime

1.12.1 Strength

There are regimes that gain strength and there are regimes that gradually decay and disappear. Generally the degree of compliance shows the strength of the regime. If we look at the CWC, it is clear symbol of successful multilateralism. The CWC is the fastest growing international regime with 190 States Parties that is representing 98 percent of the global landmass and 98 percent of global population.204 Thus the CWC is quite close to achieving universality with only six states as non- Member States. 205 The CWC has attained the status of customary international law; thus the benefits to international peace and security are obvious. In the words of Gerry Simpson “customary international law is both the source of power and an effect of power.206 The Nobel Committee bestowed on the OPCW the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize for placing global ban on the Chemical Weapons

202 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (University of California: Scott, Foresman Publisher, 1989), p.384. 203 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, op.cit, p.11. 204 OPCW Technical Secretariat Note, “State of Participation in the CWC as at 14 October 2013,” S/1131/ 2013, 14 October 2013. 205 The Non- Member States are Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea and South Sudan. 206 Gerry Simpson, “The Situation on the International Legal Theory Front: The Power of Rules and the Rules of Power,” European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2000, p. 444.

and realizing this objective through effective verification. 207 This is indeed a unique achievement in the history of disarmament.

The OPCW is providing technical support and capacity building programmes to member states for the peaceful uses of chemistry and providing assistance and protection against Chemical Weapons.208 The OPCW has established an effective verification regime and has destroyed 82 percent of the 72,531 metric tonnes of chemical agents declared under international verification. Moreover, the OPCW has conducted 5,365 inspections at 265 Chemical Weapons related and 1,940 industrial sites by first quarter of 2014.209 Basically, the driving force behind the success of the CWC is the strength of international consensus regarding the indivisibility of chemical security. This strength of consensus was amply demonstrated by the international community in its strong reaction to the confirmed use of Chemical Weapons in Syria in August 2013.210 The abovementioned few facts prove that the regime of CWC is gaining strength day-by-day and is appropriately equipping, adapting and positioning itself for addressing the future challenges to humanity and international security.

Notwithstanding the above, the international community and the OPCW have to remain cognizant of the fact that institutions have miserably failed when they do not remain relevant to future challenges and when they feel complacent on their achievements. Institutions gain strength when they remain unbiased and collectively move in an environment of cooperation towards their goals. 211 Therefore, the CWC has to appropriately adjust for addressing the challenges of proliferation, terrorism and so on. In

207 His Excellency Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW, “Working Together for a World Free of Chemical Weapons, and Beyond,” 2013 Nobel Peace Prize Lecture to the Members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, 10 December 2013. 208 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW, “Address to the Sixty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” New York, 18 November 2012. 209 Interview with H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW, 4 February 2014. Available at www.opcw.org/interview. Statistics available on OPCW website www.opcw.org on 25 February 2014. 210 Interview with H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW, 4 February 2014. 211 Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” International Organizations, Vol. 53, No.4, Autumn 1999.

case, the CWC does not appropriately adjust to the emerging security challenges, it will decay and will not remain a relevant multilateral instrument for international security.

1.12.2 Organizational Form In a regime, some matters can be addressed better by decentralized regulations through the States Parties, and some require meaningful intervention by the regime implementing body. The CWC regime has an effective implementation and verification mechanism, e.g. in recent Syrian case of possessing and using Chemical Weapons, the OPCW working closely with the United Nations and States Parties such as the U.S. and the members states of the EU exerted full diplomatic and even military pressure on Syria. Resultantly, Syria relinquished its Chemical Weapons programme and Chemical Weapons arsenal. But for implementation of the Convention, the OPCW works closely with the National Authorities on CWC, which are in fact responsible for effective national implementation of the CWC.

Most regimes have established dedicated bodies for the settlement of disputes, collection and analysis of national declarations, monitoring and in some cases verification. Complex regimes require an institutionalized, elaborated and autonomous structure.212 For example, the CWC has established the OPCW, which ensures international monitoring and verifications, dispute settlements and clarifications of suspicions regarding contravention of the CWC. The CWC establishes the OPCW and its three integral organs, the Conference of the States Parties (CSP), the Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS). The CSP is the policy making body for the regime, the EC is the executive authority for the CWC, and the Technical Secretariat is responsible for conducting the international verification.213

1.12.3 Scope

212 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (University of California: Scott, Foresman Publisher, 1989), p.55. 213 Article VIII, Chemical Weapons Convention, paragraph 1- 4.

The scope of the regime plays an important role in the success or failure of a regime. Sometimes, the scope has to be suitably adjusted to address current or future challenges and other externalities. The scope of the CWC was initially focused on getting rid of the declared Chemical Weapons stockpiles of the possessor states. But now the destruction of Chemical Weapons is nearing completion and proliferation of WMD technology and material and related terrorism issues are the current and futuristic challenge to international security. Therefore, the OPCW will need to appropriately focus its resources and efforts on proliferation and terrorism challenges from dual use industrial chemicals and technology in the chemical industry. Though, the CWC is not an anti-terrorism organization, yet, keeping in view the expertise and resources available to the OPCW and its States Parties, and elaborate mechanism of utilizing them, the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006 has specifically recognized the role of the OPCW.214

The general obligations specified in Article-I of the CWC are the basic national obligations for the States Parties and sets the scope of the CWC. It requires States Parties to destroy their Chemical Weapons (CW), Chemical Weapons Production Facilities (CWPF), and Chemical Weapons abandoned by them; and in future not to acquire Chemical Weapons, and not to assist anyone in the acquisition of Chemical Weapons, not to make preparation for using Chemical Weapons, and not to use Chemical Weapons. Moreover, not to use Riot Control Agents (RCA) for the purpose of warfare. Article I provides the scope for the Convention and the most fundamental prohibitions of the CWC, i.e. "never under any circumstances to engage in certain activities related to Chemical Weapons".215 It implies that even the "retaliatory use" of Chemical Weapons is not allowed.

The prohibition on the use of Chemical Weapons covers any type of situation, including internal conflicts, situation of civil war, terrorism sponsored by state. Thus, this article addresses the inadequacies of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which was limited in

214 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW Opening Address, “OPCW in a Changing Environment- Promoting Security and Cooperation,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-Proliferation, OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, 11- 12 April 2011. 215 CWC, Article 1, Paragraph 1.

scope to the use of Chemical Weapons in inter-state war. These prohibiting national obligations are also called the ‘catch-all clause’ of the CWC.216 The GPC does not specify every national obligation but states have to develop norms, principles, best practices, rules and regulations for the effective national implementation of the GPC and the CWC. 217 Moreover, variety of norms guides the behavior of States Parties to a regime in a manner that produces results as per the object and purpose of the Convention, such as completely prohibiting misuse of chemicals, monitoring trade and consumption of chemicals, ensuring safety and security of chemical facilities and transportation, preventing dual-use chemicals and technology, including intangible technology going into wrong hands.

1.12.4 Allocation of Resources Different regimes have different mechanisms for the allocation of resources. A commercial regime prefers private allocations, whereas, a security regime favours direct national control of resources by the regime authorities and requires extensive organization for necessary coordination, implementation and monitoring.218 For example, in case of the CWC, the OPCW exercises control on the resources pledged by States Parties for assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of Chemical Weapons, such as provision of analytical equipment, technical experts, protective units and equipment, international training, financial assistance and related aspects. Some assistance is kept readily available at the OPCW Headquarters and most of the pledged assistance remains in the States Parties. In the event of an emergency, the OPCW mobilizes its resources and decides how and which assistance will be delivered to the crisis situation.

1.13 CWC: Various Aspects of the Regime

216 Urs Cipolat, The New Chemical Weapons Convention and Export Controls: Towards Greater Multilateralism? Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 3, Spring 2000, pp. 393–444 217 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article I, II and VI. 218 Oran R. Young, Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Application, (John Hopkins University Press, 1979), p.55.

1.13.1 Denials and Exclusions Most regimes ensure compliance through denial and exclusions, e.g. economic and technological cooperation in return for adherence to nonproliferation agreements. In case of the CWC, the Convention specifies a number of restrictions on trade regarding chemicals listed in the CWC three Schedules. With the entry- into- force of the Convention in April 1997, transfers to Non-States Parties of chemicals and precursors listed on Schedule- 1 were banned immediately, and trade with Non- States Parties in chemicals listed on Schedule- 2 have been prohibited since April 2000.219 In 2003 the OPCW Conference of the States-Parties considered a possible ban on exports to NonStates-Parties of Schedule- 3 chemicals but could not agree by consensus. At present, the CWC allows exports of Schedule- 3 chemicals to Non-States Parties only if the recipient provides an end-use certificate and pledging not to retransfer the Schedule chemicals in question.220

1.13.2 Transparency and Confidence Building The parties to an international regime are required to submit variety of national reports and declaration of past and anticipated activities, which helps in effective international and national verifications and implementation activities. The CWC obligates States Parties for number of national reports and declarations, e.g. Article III requires each State Party to submit declarations to the OPCW within 30 days after the Convention enters into force for that particular State Party such as declarations of Chemical Weapons, including old and abandoned Chemical Weapons, Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, Riot Control Agents and facilities that have been designed, or used for development of Chemical Weapons since 1 January 1946.221

219 OPCW, “International Transfer of Schedule Chemicals under the CWC.” Available at www.opcw.org. 220 Article VI, CWC; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Strengthening the CWC Regime for Transfers of Dual-Use Chemicals,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, Vol. 75, March 2007, pp. 1- 7. 221 “Chemical Weapons Convention”, Article III, pp. 6-8.

Article- III also requires each State Party to declare whether it has transferred or received any Chemical Weapon since 1 January 1946.222 A State Party has to declare any relevant laboratories, and their capacities.223 Chemical Weapons buried on land after 1977, or were dumped at sea after 1 January 1985, are also declarable.224 Similarly, States Parties make number of annual declarations regarding relevant chemicals and chemical facilities; national legislative and administrative measures for the effective implementation of the Convention, national protective programmes, etc. Moreover, the national declarations on transfers of Schedule chemicals is a fundamental part of international monitoring regime, enabling the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibitions of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for monitoring the global movement of Schedule chemicals and to identify suspicious transfers or trends.225

1.13.3 Regimes Yield Superior Contractual Results Agreement concluded in the context of an international regime proves superior as compared to those inter-state agreements concluded in other contexts such as bilateral context.226 International regimes deliver credible agreements since regimes establish the patterns of legal liability and the political and economic costs. Governments believe that ad-hoc attempts for concluding an agreement will yield inferior outcome as compared to an agreement negotiated within the framework of an international regime. This suggests that compliance with settlement brokered by an international institution will prove more effective. 227 For example, India simultaneously developed Chemical Weapons arsenal and

222 This implies that all transfers or receipts of Chemical Weapons during or prior to Second World War are not covered. 223 New developments in the life sciences may make this aspect more prominent in the future as stated by Mark Smith, Caitríona McLeish, “Report on Wilton Park Conference 871”, Countering CBW Proliferation, Wilton Park, 28- 30 September 2007, p.1. 224 OPCW, “Overview of the Chemical Weapons Convention”, p.1 Available at www.opcw.org 225 Daniel Feakes, “Challenges in the Implementation of Export Controls under the Chemical Weapons Convention,” in Rodrigo Yepes-Enríquez and Lisa Tabassi, eds., Treaty Enforcement and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters, (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2002), p. 338. 226 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.88. 227 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel, “International Institutions and the Management of Contentious Issues,” op.cit, p.8.

also concluded a bilateral Pakistan-India 1992 Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Through the abovementioned Pakistan-India Declaration both sides declared never to develop, produce, or acquire Chemical Weapons; secondly, never to use Chemical Weapons; third, never to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, any one to engage in development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of Chemical Weapons. At that time, India showed that it did not posses Chemical Weapons, however, in 1993 the CWC was opened for signature and the international mood was overwhelmingly supporting joining CWC. 228 Therefore, when India ratified the CWC in 1996, it realized the force of an international regime and hence, declared a huge arsenal of Chemical Weapons and huge infrastructure of the Chemical Weapons production and development. Thus international regimes compel states to modify their policies for the collective international good and the fear that contravention of the Convention would have immense political and diplomatic implications.

1.13.4 Consultations, Cooperation and Fact Finding Transparency in the regime regarding its operations and national measures enhances the effectiveness and strength of a regime and also serves as a confidence building measure. For example, the CWC provides provisions for the clarification of possible non- compliance concerns. It specifies the procedures for requesting a Challenge Inspection in any State Party.229 The CWC creates a general obligation for States Parties to consult and cooperate directly on any matter related to the implementation of the Convention. States Parties can seek clarification through the OPCW or other appropriate international

228 Pakistan- India- 1992 Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; Shireen M. Mazari, “India: A Legacy of Violating International” 2005. Available at www.pakpac.net/News. 229 OPCW, “Overview of the Chemical Weapons Convention”, p.1.

procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter regarding implementation of the Convention.230 1.13.5 International Cooperation International regimes facilitate cooperation in a number of ways. Regimes establish the patterns of national legal liabilities or obligations, organize inter-state relations in a mutually beneficial way and establish patterns of transaction costs, e.g. the costs of reneging on national commitments are increased and the costs of functioning as per the provisions of regimes are reduced and facilitated.231 Moreover, regimes increase the flow of information among member states. Some regimes are supported by implementing organizations. The secretariat of such international organizations acts both as mediators and as provider of unbiased information through a process of upgrading available information. Thus international regimes reduce uncertainty and associated risks, and facilitate inter-state cooperation.232 Under the CWC, States Parties have pledged to provide assistance and protection to fellow member states when they are threatened with the use of Chemical Weapons or have suffered a chemical attack.

If a State Party requests assistance, the Technical Secretariat of OPCW is responsible for the effective coordination of assistance and protection measures provided by member states. 233 The OPCW also cooperate with other international organizations regarding dispatching and delivering assistance, managing on-site activities, and training. Moreover, the recent use of Chemical Weapons in Syria presented an opportunity to the international regime against Chemical Weapons (CWC) to demonstrate that effective multilateralism and international cooperation can be brought to bear on even the most

230 Douglas MacEachin, “Routine and Challenge: Two Pillars of Verification”, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 39, March 1998, pp. 1–3. 231 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, op.cit, p.89. 232 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel, “International Institutions and the Management of Contentious Issues,” op.cit, p.7; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, op.cit, p.94. 233 CWC, Article X.

difficult of situations.

1.13.6 Application of Selective Safeguards and Constraints At times states apply selective safeguards and constraints, which undermine the regime.234 Keohane is of the view that constraints are dictated both by powerful actors and the environmental factors. Therefore, in world politics, the mutual relationship between ‘power’ and ‘dependence’ will be significant determinants of the characteristics of international regime.235 In case of the CWC, at times States Parties do not provide export license to their firms for exporting analytical and protective chemical equipment to another State Party on the pretext of proliferation concerns. Whereas, the CWC balances the need for free trade in chemicals, equipment and technology with the objective of preventing the proliferation of Chemical Weapons. Such equipments are essentially required by States for developing their national protective programmes. Moreover, the CWC encourages States Parties to facilitate inter-state transfer of scientific and technological information and technology.236 The CWC also makes clear that the Convention shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic and technological development of States Parties.

1.13.7 Regimes Prescribes and Proscribe Activities Regimes specify permissible and prohibited activities, and contain rules for its amendments and transformation. The CWC has specified prohibited activities as “the use of toxic chemicals or precursors in the development or production of Chemical Weapons, as prohibited under Article- I of the CWC; the term also applies to the transfer or use of Chemical Weapons, preparations to use Chemical Weapons militarily, or assisting in the performance of these prohibited activities.” Moreover, the CWC has specified permitted

234 Stephen Cohen and John Zysman, “Double or Nothing: Open Trade and Competitive Industry,” Foreign Affairs 62 (Summer 1983), pp.1113-39. 235 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” op.cit, p.331. 236 CWC, Article X.

purposes such as industrial, agricultural, medical, research, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; protective purposes against toxic chemicals and Chemical Weapons; military purposes not connected with the use of Chemical purposes and law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.237

1.13.8 Unintended Cooperation Regime for addressing an issue may produce an unintended cooperation in another issue- area. Thus the regime constantly grows in strength and develops because the cooperation generates positive externalities. Keohane believes that regimes and institutions are extremely important in facilitating cooperation among rational egoist states. 238 The regime’s benefits are that it provides incentives for cooperative action, e.g. offering financial support for costly measures, providing a forum of consultations and cooperation, and formulating policies. 239 Notably, the CWC was negotiated to get rid of Chemical Weapons. But in the prevailing security environment, the CWC is used as counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation instrument. In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, the OPCW has confirmed that it can utilize its “assistance and protection provisions” for responding and cooperating with international efforts against an incident of WMD terrorism. Resultantly, there is enhanced interest of international community in the assistance and protection provisions of the CWC.

1.13.9 Regimes are Economical Organizations address opportunism, uncertainty, high costs and difficulties of implementing regimes. Keohane in After Hegemony has stated “regime reduces cost effect and facilitates decentralized rule making.” He adds “the marginal cost of dealing with an additional issue will be lower with the regime, which also somewhat explains why regimes scopes often expand.”240 In this regard, Aggarwal pointed out “construction of multilateral

237 CWC, Article II, Paragraph 9. 238 Rober O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, op.cit, p.81. 239 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel, “International Institutions and the Management of Contentious Issues,” op.cit, p.6. 240 Rober O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, op.cit, pp.103- 106.

mechanism is organizationally less expensive than is the development of many bilateral contracts”.241 In case of CWC, the developed states such as the U.S. and Japan are making major financial contributions to the functioning of the OPCW. The U.S. is financially and technologically assisting Russia, Syria and Libya in destroying their chemical arsenals. Moreover, the OPCW is conducting variety of training programmes for enhancing the capacities of National Authorities, customs authorities, analytical chemists, first responders, medical and health professionals, emergency managers, etc, and providing a forum for multi-stakeholder consultations and cooperation. This cooperation and education would have been extremely difficult and expensive at bilateral or even regional level.

1.13.10 Significance of Knowledge In regime cooperation cannot be fully explained without reference to the values of actors, the beliefs regarding inter-dependence of issues, and the knowledge available to them in realizing the specific goals. Cooperation also depends upon developing perceptions and misperceptions, the capacity to analyze information and then learning from it.242 Actors’ learning is crucial for necessary cooperation and effective implementation of a regime. In the prevailing security environment, the CWC will remain relevant to changing scenario only if the OPCW can evolve into a knowledgebased organization working closely with other stakeholders and relevant international organizations.

The OPCW has already established strategic relationships with the International Science Union, the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, held Open Forums alongside Review Conferences, the Industry and Protection Forum, the Academic Forum, the Conference on International Cooperation and Chemical Safety and Security,

241 Vinod K. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade, (California, University of Califormia Press, 1985), p.28. 242 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

etc.243 The OPCW is also cooperating with the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the IAEA.244 The OPCW is engaging in chemical safety and security, which would enhance security at chemical plants, and support national efforts for prevention, preparedness and response against misuse of toxic chemicals.245 But to manage this process and provide strategic guidance, the OPCW and States Parties will need to work as a team for shaping the future implementation of the CWC. Moreover, as per the Convention, each State Party has the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information.246 However, it is troublesome that awareness of CWC is low among relevant communities such as practicing chemists, those trading, transporting and otherwise handling chemicals, those responsible for regulating chemicals, and chemistry teachers and students.

1.13.11 Multilevel Governance through Institutions There are number of institutions at international, regional and national levels that address same issues and are overlapping. They create requisite redundancies for continuous pursuit of an objective should any single agreement fail.247 For example, with regard to chemical safety and security (including non-proliferation), the CWC, UNSCR1540, UN Counter Terrorism Task Force, Australia Group, G8- GP, UNICRI, VERTIC, Cefic, etc are collectively working for creating requisite synergy. This approach is desirable also because in today’s world if loopholes in the national system exist, they can be exploited by international terrorist groups and can challenge international and regional security. Thus international regimes and states utilize this multi-level governance.

243 Krysztof Paturej, “OPCW’s Role in Global Efforts Against Terrorism,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-proliferation,” The Hague, 11- 12 April 2011, pp.4-5. 244 Ambassador Dr. Jan Borkowski, “Development of the OPCW Engagement in Chemical Safety and Security – Perspective from Poland” International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, 8- 9 November 2012, Tarnów, Poland, p.1 245 Nico Frandi, “Enhancing Chemical Safety and Security: The European Union Support to the Work of the OPCW”, The International Meeting On Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8 – 9 November 2012, p.2 246 CWC, Article X, Paragraph 3. 247 Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, The Politics of international Regime, Working Paper No. 07-003, Buffett Centre for International and Comparative Studies, June 2007, pp. 5- 6.

1.13.12 Institutions Adaptations Institutions constantly change and adapt to new circumstances.248 Some institutions fail to achieve the purpose for which they were created, whereas, some institutions becomes pillars of international system. Adaptable institutions confidently face new challenges.249 For instance, the rapid scientific and technological developments have created linkage between industrialization and the ability of states to produce Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Due to obvious economic reasons, industrialization is spreading throughout the world including regions, which are infested with terrorism. The knowledge and technology for producing Chemical Weapons were developed almost a century ago and now any state or even an industrial unit can produce Chemical Weapons. Initially Chemical Weapons were under state control, now there are serious concerns that terrorists may develop and employ Chemical Weapons.

1.14 Conclusion

International regimes/ institutions are emerging as a major focus of empirical research and theoretical debate in International Relations. The contrast between competitive inter-state relations and cooperative relations among advanced states is not properly explained by the realists. Moreover, since the Second World War new forms of interdependence, coordination and organizations grew; this does not properly fit in the overall realist framework. After the Second World War, the realists questioned the significance of international law in constraining states’ behavior. Resultantly, its study by political scientists was significantly reduced by the 1970s. However, the subfield of international organizations generated significant theoretical debates during the 1960s.250

248 Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, “The Theory of Overlapping Clubs,” op.cit, p.227. 249 Kalevi Holsti, Taming the Sovereign: Institutional Change in International Politics, (London: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 250 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, “International Integration and Interdependence”, in Fred Grenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol.8 (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

Yet the study remained restricted to the study of international organizations missing a range of regulated and organized state behavior, which are basically institutionalized”. 251 Therefore, scholars tried to fill this gap by focusing on an area that was neither as broad as international system nor as narrow as formal organizations. Regime analysts assumed that norms influence state behavour, which are completely in line with pursuing national interests. Hence the regime analysis reconciles the realists and idealists positions. The initial regime analysis focused on interdependence, but the widening of the states’ goals included the significant role of NSAs and the influence of regimes in states’ behaviour.252

The study of international regimes has tremendous scope. The definitional issues has not hindered the study of regimes, rather the ambiguity keeps the field open for different views and perspectives. We need to know more how regimes gain strength and how they decay? Breaking down regimes into different types depending on their role and purpose may help in better understanding various developmental paths. It is also important to explore how regimes interact with one another, particularly if they have overlapping jurisdictions. The relationship of regimes and national-level processes for the implementation of regimes requires further study. How regimes influence national institutions and how national implementation measures under various regimes provide resilience to international regimes? It is an acknowledged fact that the international governance through regimes is constantly growing. The influence of NGOs, civil society groups and transnational corporations are tremendously influencing international affairs.

In the past century, the growth in the number and influence of institutions is amazing. According to the Union of International Associations, “in 1909 there existed 37 intergovernmental organizations of all types… in contrast, today exist over 6400

251 John Gerard Ruggie, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,” International Organization Vol. 29, No.3, Summer 1975, p.559. 252 Susan Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragons: A Critique of Regimes Analysis,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 337- 354.

intergovernmental organizations that includes 2028 multilateral treaties and interstate agreements.”253 Such a trend amply supports the viewpoint of neoliberal institutionalist scholars regarding the usefulness of international regimes in an anarchic international environment. Moreover, international institutions promote compliance by providing a forum for consultations and cooperation, thus providing opportunities for interaction, raising political costs for violation of the provisions of institution and lengthening the shadow of the future.177 Therefore, any disagreement about definition cannot overshadow the growing importance of international regimes. How effectively international institutions are taming inherent anarchy in the system is open to question and discussions, but the world is witnessing willing and constructive growth of supranational governance in the form of international regimes and institutions.

Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins argued that “a regime exists in every substantive issue-area in international relations… Whenever there is regulatory in behaviour, some kinds of principles, norms or rules must exist to account for it.”178 But an organized behavior should not mislead regarding the existence of a regime.179 At times the term “regime” is used in a purely descriptive way to group a range of state behaviours in a particular issue-area, which is not desirable and appropriate.180 Moreover, an international treaty alone may not constitute regime. One major benefit of the concept of regime is that it takes scholars beyond analysis and enable them to envisage a "functional whole" which are mostly composed of variety of both formal and informal agreements, practices, and institutions181 For instance, the CWC forms the backbone of the regime, it alone does not constitute regime. Various other measures and documents both formal and informal that draws mandate from the CWC together constitute the CWC regime, e.g. the OPCW, various OPCW procedures for the conduct

177 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel, “International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, October 2007, p. 33.

253 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel, “International Institutions and the Management of Contentious Issues,” op.cit, p.6.

178 Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins, “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp.61-91; Stephen Haggard, and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organizations, Vol.41, No.39, 1987, p. 493. 179 Friedrick Hayek, “Law, Legislation and Liberty,” Rules and Order, Vol.1, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 78-79. 180 Ernst B. Hass, “On Systems and International Regimes,” World Politics, Vol.27, January 1975, pp.147- 174. 181 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, “Theories of International Regimes”, op.cit, p.20.

of OPCW verification activities, establishment of National Authorities by the States Parties, the legislative and regulatory measures by the States Parties for the effective national implementation of the CWC, national data declarations and verification measures, export control, national capacity building programmes, states taking all those implicit and explicit measures for implementing the General Purpose Criteria (GPC) of the Convention, which is the catch all clause, and so on. This comprehensive synergetic multilateral effort promotes the spirit and purpose of the international regime on the prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

CHAPTER 2

CHEMICAL INDUSTRY: SIGNIFICANCE AND CHALLENGES

The chemical substance is a form of matter that has constant characteristics and properties and cannot be broken into parts by physical method. It requires separating the chemical bonds. It is found in all forms such as gas, liquid, plasma and solid. However, it is different from mixtures. Examples of pure chemical substance can be diamond (carbon), gold, table salt, etc.254 The earliest chemical industry was found in the Middle Eastern artisans in 7,000 B.C, who would process limestone and alkali for glass production. Today, the chemical industry comprises those industries and companies where commercial industrial chemicals are produced. Chemical industry has attained a central role in the global economy and its support is crucial for each and every industry. This chapter underscores three important areas, i.e. significance of chemical industry; prevailing trends in the chemical industry and challenges of chemical industry.

2.1 Significance of Chemical Industry

The products of chemical sector are essential for national economy and everyday life.255 The chemical industry, today, is generating trillions of dollars business. A few leading areas of the industry are fertilizers, pesticides, water purification substances, polymers for making household and industrial products, etc. Thus, its role is crucial in every modern and transitioning economy. For example, in the U.S. on the basis of significance the chemical industry ranks ninth out of seventy-seven distinct industrial

254 IUPAC, “Compendium of Chemical Terminologies, (the Gold Book), Second edition, (Cambridge UK: Blackwell Science Publisher, 1997). 255 In leading economies, chemical production share of GDP is similar such as, 4.1% in the U.S., 4.4% in Japan, 5.4% in Germany, 3.6% in the U.K. and 5.5 % in France, demonstrating the significance of chemical industry. See Johann Peter Murmann, “Chemical Industries after 1850,” Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, 17 May 2002, p.1.

sectors, and chemical industry is also one of the top exporters.256 Annually, the chemical industry provides products worth $97 billion to the health care alone.257

The products of chemical industry, such as, specialty and raw chemicals are part of any country’s critical infrastructure.258 Therefore, if the chemical industry’s products are compromised, it will have significant implications for both national economy and defence.259 A few successful targeted attacks on chemical industry complexes could have economic implications much greater than the destruction and deaths.260 In today’s world the significance of chemical industry is undeniable. Moreover, the dependence amongst chemical industry and other industries is mutually reinforcing. The products of chemical industry are dependent on gas, water, electricity, raw material, transportation system, research facilities, security services, manufacturing plants, etc.261

2.2 Evolution of Chemical Industry

Chemistry describes the interaction between different substances through chemical reactions and explains their properties, structure and composition. Modern chemistry dates back till the 18th century, but the principles of using experiments and observations is two millenniums old. Alchemy preceded chemistry. Just like chemistry the alchemy involved the concept of understanding various matters through observations and experiments. It was based on the Greek concept that all matters consist of Earth, Air, Fire and Water. This conceptual foundation was used for understanding nature. By 17th and 18th century this

256 Johann Peter Murmann, “Chemical Industries after 1850”, Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, 17 May 2002, p.2. 257 The U.S. DHS, “National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,” February 2003, p.77. 258 DHS, “The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,” op.cit, pp. xii, 6, 65-66, identified chemical industry as critical infrastructure along with 12 other sectors, such as banking and finance, public health, energy, and agriculture. 259 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 define critical infrastructure as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” 260 Thomas Homer Dixon, “The Rise of Complex Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, No. 128, Jan- Feb 2002, pp. 52-62. 261 DHS, “The U.S. National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,” op.cit, p.77.

theory was challenged. Notably, Robert Boyle (1627- 91) challenged this theory in his book The Skeptical Chemist and proved that the nature does not consist only of the said four elements. Boyle is often called the founder of modern chemistry.262

The Industrial Revolution brought unprecedented economic growth for the world. In 1736, the pharmacist Joshua Ward produced Sulphuric acid in bulk through industrial process. Subsequently, in 1749, John Roebuck and Samuel Garbett established a huge chemical factory in Prestonpans. For the production of Sulphuric acid this factory used condensing chambers.263 Later, in 1776 Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations. This landmark work introduced an economic system that further built on the industrial revolution. Adam Smith presents his thinking that labour is the main source from which a nation derives, therefore, improving the division of labour is the measure of productivity, and in it lie human prosperity.264

The earlier inventions of the Industrial Revolution were empirical in nature and not scientific, but the modern industry of twentieth century essentially required scientific base and support. In 1856, William Henry Perkin discovered synthetic mauve. 265 This invention enabled chemical industry to attain the status of first science based industry. John Wiley and Sons had covered in detail this landmark development in their book Chemicals and Long-Term Economic Growth. During 1830s and 1840s, the British chemical industry was globally dominant. The British industry produced inorganic chemicals, which were extracted such as minerals, and then processed into the form of alkalis, lime, caustic soda, etc, which were then used in fertilizers, pesticides, textiles, glass making, etc.

262 Thomas Allan Rayher, Aiga Mackevica and Torben Brouner, “The Birth of Modern Chemistry,” Third Semester Project, Fall 2008, p.5. 263 Thomas Kingston Derry and Trevor I. Williams, A Short History of Technology: From the Earliest Times to A.D. 1900, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). 264 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, (London: Printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776). 265 G. Nagendrappa, “Sir William Henry Perkin: The Man and his ‘Mauve’,” Resonance, September 2010.

The early inorganic chemical industry was just like mining. Subsequently, Perkin's discovery in 1856 introduced modern organic chemical industry.266 Organic compounds have more variety and are pervasive as compared to the inorganic compounds.267 Britain continued dominating the dyestuff industry until the 1870s. By the end of 1880s the Germans attained the global dominance.268 The U.S. industry was a large producer of inorganic basic chemicals, and it was mainly dependent on German dyestuff, except for the domestic production of explosives. During the last 150 years the raw materials and final products of chemical industry has changed significantly. In the earlier stage, the main products were alkalis and acids. But now chemical industry has attained immense diversity and innovation, e.g., it produces over 70,000 different chemical substances and this number continues to grow rapidly.269

2.2.1 Impact of World War- I The First World War shattered the German chemical industry and for some time changed the ranking and priorities of the leading nations in this strategic sector. The United States was deprived of German dyestuffs and therefore, the U.S. developed its domestic organic chemical industry. In the post-war period, both Germany and the Great Britain resumed competition and started creating chemical companies that were national standard bearers. Germany merged all dye firms into a single stock corporation commonly known as I.G. Farben Company on 2 December 1925. In response, in 1926, Britain merged smaller entities such as Nobel Industries Limited; Brunner, Mond and Company Limited; United Alkali Company; and British Dyestuffs Corporation and created Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI).270 Similarly, the U.S. consolidated many private companies and formed standard bearers such as Allied Chemical, DuPont and Union Carbide. Germany entered the field

266 Joel Mokyr, “The Second Industrial Revolution, 1870- 1914,” August 1998, p.4. 267 Organic chemistry utilizes inputs containing hydrocarbons, such as coal, natural gas and oil. They constituted the base for the eventual organic product. In stage one, raw material were processed for producing benzene and ethylene. In stage two, oxygen and chlorine were added for giving the chemical compound the desired properties. 268 Joel Mokyr, “The Second Industrial Revolution, 1870- 1914,”op.cit, p.4. 269 Garrett Upstill, Alan J. Jones, et al, “Innovation Strategies for the Australian Chemical Industry,” Journal of Business Chemistry, September 2006, p.1. 270 Ralph Landau and Ashish Arora, “The Chemical Industry: From the 1850s until Today,” The Journal of the National Association of Business Economists, Vol.34, No. 4, 1999, pp.2-4.

with fierce determination and formed IG Farben and other associations and thus once again established its global dominance in the chemical industry. Meanwhile, the U.S. was making consistent efforts and developing huge petroleum refining base, and also developing the skills for designing huge chemical manufacturing plants with capability for continuous processing.271

2.2.2 Impact of World War- II The Second World War destroyed the German chemical industry and amply demonstrated the strategic significance of chemical industry. American industry grew and eventually established its dominance, which lasted until the 1970s. Meanwhile, Germany was constantly struggling to regain its former dominance in the chemical industry. The inter-state trade gave impetus to Japan’s chemical industry and it attained second largest global industry status. Keeping in view, the strategic significance of chemical industry, the U.S. Britain and France focused on developing domestic chemical industry and shun reliance on outside sources.272 Petrochemicals are the basic raw materials for polymer products. The United States has huge resources of natural gas and oil; therefore, it was the first country that developed petrochemicals industry. Later on, the Second World War gave further impetus to the petrochemical industry and the U.S. government focused on research and development of aviation fuel.

The famous "oil shocks" of 1970s enhanced the cost of basic raw materials and also compelled the U.S. government for pursuing diversification programmes during the 1970s. Subsequently, private Specialized Engineering Firms developed chemical process technology and commenced transferring the technology to other parts of the world. This development accelerated international competition in the chemical sector. The chemical industry in Germany, Britain and the United States shifted its organic chemical production from coal to petrochemicals. 273 This caused rapid growth of chemical industry.

271 Ralph Landau and Ashish Arora, “The Chemical Industry: From the 1850s until Today,” op.cit, pp.2-4; Wollheim Memorial, The Founding of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. Available at wolleim-memorial.de. 272 . A. Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade: World Trends in Production, Consumption and Trade in Manufactures , (Cambridge University Press, 1963).

273 Ralph Landau and Ashish Arora, “The Chemical Industry: From the 1850s until Today,” op.cit, p. 4.

Importantly, two factors proved the drivers for the chemical industry's growth in the post World War-II period. First, he polymer science for developing synthetic fibers, plastics, adhesives, paints, resins, and coatings that is used in almost every product. Second, the development in the field of chemical engineering that produced these materials at low costs and large quantities.

2.3 Chemical Industry and CWC

According to Fred Webber, 274 “the chemical industry participated in the CWC negotiations because of our contempt for Chemical Weapons, and of our outrage at the misuse of the legitimate products of chemistry as Chemical Weapons.” 275 He also considered the CWC as “an unprecedented model of industry-government cooperation towards advancing peace and security.”276 The chemical industry has played crucial role in the negotiation of the CWC, it has a key role today, and it will be centrally involved in addressing the future challenges of chemical safety and security.277 The CWC has an industrial verification regime, i.e. if any industry produces or uses certain chemicals that could be misused is subjected to data declaration and systematic verification by the OPCW.278 The chemical industry has a pivotal role in the effective implementation and

274 President of the former American Chemistry Council. 275 Military planners generally organize chemical agents such as Chemical Weapons and toxic industrial chemicals into four groups. They are Nerve Agents, such as VX and Sarin, which interfere with the human nervous system; Chocking Agents such as Chlorine and Phosgene, which inhibits breathing; Blood Agents such as Hydrogen Cyanide; and Blister Agents such as Mustard Gas. Refer Dana A. Shea, “Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects,” Congressional Research Service, Code R42862, 13 September 2013, p.2. 276 Frederick L. Webber, “A U.S. Industry Perspective on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention”, OPCW Synthesis, November 2000; Richard H. Burgess, “Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the United States of America- A Viewpoint from Industry”, The Monitor,Nos. 5-6, 1999/ 2000, p.8. 277 Prof. William W. Keller, “Toward a ‘Chemical Safety and Security Leadership Forum’ The Advent of CBRN Security Culture”, International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012, p.4. 278 Compared to the CWC, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has no verification mechanisms. This means it is an instrument of principle rather than procedure. After some difficult times, it settled on the new course set out in the Inter-Sessional Work Programme (ISWP) after the 2001 Review Conference. The ISWP model has been successful, and was consolidated at the 2006 Review Conference through the establishment of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) as stated by Mark Smith, Caitríona McLeish, “Countering CBW Proliferation,” Report on Wilton Park Conference 871, Wilton Park, 28- 30 September 2007. Moreover, States need to adopt appropriate international best practices and develop national capacities for detecting non-compliance with the BWC.

success of the CWC. Moreover, beside the verification regime of the CWC, the chemical industry is also realizing the value of voluntary measures regarding safety and security. For example, the U.S chemical industry has developed security codes for reducing vulnerabilities and protecting chemical and hazardous materials infrastructure against terrorist attack.279

2.4 Modern Trends in Chemical Industry

The preceding discussion reveals that the chemical industry has gradually evolved significantly.280 This evolution has serious implications for the Convention, which merits detailed examination by the CWC’s Scientific Advisory Board. 281 In the 1980s the chemical industry would comprise large multinational companies and plant sites. These large chemical industries would produce variety of products on a large scale. But, subsequently, the large companies were broken into smaller units. Thus, the smaller units had independent owners and operations but they would share centralized administrative resources such as waste disposal, medical, fire fighters, etc.282 Such changes can enable states to limit access entitled to the OPCW inspection team, based on the definition of the plant site given in the Convention. 283

Larger companies now concentrate on ‘core’ activities such as specialized synthesis or final formulation of products; and purchase specific chemicals from external suppliers. There is a rapid rise in the number of facilities and plants specializing in the production of chemicals on a contract basis. Industry is driven towards flexibility in production, which means that they are able to respond quickly to meet new customer requirements and orders.

279 DHS, “The U.S. National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,” op.cit, p.78. 280 David P. Fidler, “The Chemical Weapons Convention After Ten Years: Successes and Future Challenges”, The American Society of international Law, Vol.11, No.12, 27 April 2007. 281 The U.S. Ambassador Eric M. Javits Statement, “Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” 7 April 2008. 282 The U.K. Paper, “The Changing Face of the Chemical Industry: Implications for the Chemical Weapons Convention,” OPCW Conference of the States Parties, 24 April 2003, p.4. 283 Ibid.

Cumulatively, the abovementioned changes have significantly altered the design of chemical production facilities.

Chemical plants with flexible manufacturing equipment that can be reconfigured can switch from one product to another for meeting commercial demands. Such flexible and multipurpose industries are rapidly spreading throughout the developing and developed world. This increases the risk that they could be diverted to the production of Chemical Weapons. The chemical industries in Japan, Germany, India and South Korea are taking immense interest in purchasing micro-reactors continuous flow reaction vessels instead of large size reactors for the production of pharmaceuticals, etc. A company can produce tons of chemicals per hour, if it operates hundreds or thousands of such micro-reactors, mixers and heat exchangers in parallel. On one hand, this technology offers environmental safety and health benefits by consuming less energy and generating less hazardous waste. But on the other hand, they are ideal for synthesis of highly toxic compounds and reduce the size of the chemical plant to the size of a bedroom thus eliminating the traditional signature associated with illicit production of Chemical Weapons.284

If this is viewed from the proliferation perspective, the scientific and technological developments enable states to acquire virtual capacity for the production of Chemical Weapons without building large size dedicated facilities. A state may establish small-scale testing of the Chemical Weapons production line secretly and then maintain that capacity in distributed form within its chemical industries. In the event of war or crisis the leadership may decide to produce Chemical Weapon stockpiles or convert more flexible manufacturing plants to clandestine Chemical Weapon production. As the chemical industry is spreading, countries such as China and India are developing large Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF), of which an estimated 10- 15 percent are flexible multipurpose industries that could be diverted easily to Chemical Weapons production.285

284 Jonathan B. Tucker, “The Future of Chemical Weapon,” The New Atlantic, No.26, Fall 2009/ Winter 2010, pp. 13-18. 285 Ibid.

2.5 Challenges to Chemical Industry

Although the chemical industry has immense contribution in the economic prosperity of the nations, yet it has serious repercussions due to the dual- use nature of chemicals. The following discussion assist spelling out a few important challenges associated with the chemical industry.

2.5.1 Environmental Challenges Chemical industries create hazardous waste that can be harmful to both the environment and human health. This has been true from the very beginning e.g. when the British alkali industry grew after 1850, more and more people filed complaints who lived close to the alkali plants. This resulted in the Alkali Act in 1864 for regulating the release of hydrochloric acid fumes into the atmosphere. Resultantly, chemical industries started disposing their waste into the rivers. Consequently, the British government introduced another Act called Rivers Pollution Act of 1876 for regulating the discharge of industrial waste into rivers. This Act gave adequate protection to industrial estates by stating that local authorities should be satisfied that no material injury shall be inflicted on the industries in areas specified for manufacturing.286 Moreover, the public authorities and civic society in developed countries realized taking into account the social vulnerabilities287 to environmental hazards. 288 Early synthetic dye production also caused significant environmental hazards, e.g. in 1984, Fuchsine was bankrupted by paying the compensation to the victims of the arsenic water poisoning caused by chemical plant. 289

286 “Key Dates in the Social History and Development of Great Britain- 1000- 1899,” Education Resources. Available at www.thepotteries.org/dates. 287 Social inequalities significantly contribute to producing social vulnerabilities and susceptibility of humans to harm. 288 Vulnerability to environmental hazards varies among different social groups. Vulnerability is a social condition, and a measure of societal resistance to hazards. See Susan L. Clutter, et al., “Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards,” Social Science Quarterly, Vol.84, No.2, June 2003, p.1. 289 Susan L. Cutter, et al., ibid, p.2.

Modern societies face environmental issues, especially developing states due to unplanned urbanization, industrialization, mass consumption and disregard for the environmental safety. The pollution of environment is not just a health issue; rather it is a social issue, which can destroy families and communities. The problem with developing countries is that either they have not developed environmental pollution control measures, or they lack the implementing structure for the effective implementation of related international regimes, national laws, regulations and policies. The environmental problems are rapidly growing due to prevailing emphasis on economic growth at the expense of health. Therefore, the governmental authorities need to have effective strategies for environmental protection. This will contribute to preventing worsening health issues and also to the sound social development.290

2.5.2 Safety Challenges In the first half of the 20th century, the chemical industry significantly improved the lives of people and had good reputation. However, in the second half many industrial accidents caused human and environmental disasters and raised safety concerns to the forefront. Fore example, in 1976, dioxin, an extremely toxic chemical released from a chemical plant in Milan, Italy and affected the population of Seveso, where approximately 37,000 people were exposed to this toxic chemical.291 Four percent of farm animals died and to prevent food contamination an additional 80,000 were killed. In 1984, a chemical plant in Bhopal, began leaking Methyl isocyanate (MIC) due to runaway reactions. MIC release resulted from mixing incompatible materials and the failure of several layers of protection.292 The disaster at Bhopal compelled governmental authorities, civic society and chemical plants owners to comprehensively address the safety issues caused by chemical industry.293 In 1986, a fire at a Sandoz chemical plant in Switzerland significantly polluted

290 Japan International Control Agency, Japan’s Experience in Public Health and Medical System: Towards Improving Public Health and Medical Systems in Developing Countries, (Tokyo: Institute for International Cooperation, 2004), p.146. 291 Jurg Gerber, et al., ed., Encyclopedia of White-Collar Crime, (London: Greenwood Press, 2006), p. 260. 292 Dr. M. Sam Mannan, “Lessons from Process Chemical Incidents and Accidents”, Presentation at The International Meeting On Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8 – 9 November 2012. 293 Ward Morehouse and M. Arun Subramaniam, “The Bhopal Tragedy: What Really Happened and What it Means for American Workers and Communities at Risk,” A Report for the Citizens Commission on Bhopal, (New York: Council on International and Public Affairs, 1986).

the Rhine River.294 In 1980, chemicals unlawfully buried in the Love Canal started leaking and caused the evacuation of the local people. Similarly obsolete pesticide stockpiles cause immense environmental and human harm almost globally. According to an estimate “more than 50,000 tons of pesticides were buried in countries of the former Soviet Union and Africa.” 295 Such accidents and irresponsible attitude amply highlighted the perils of chemical production and storage facilities in densely populated areas.

2.5.3 Chemical Terrorism: A Devastating Threat A successful terrorist attack on a major chemical industry would have detrimental repercussions not only for the chemical industry and national economy but would also have very devastation implications for the innocent people.43 Therefore, industrial chemical facilities attain the status of critical infrastructure44 and hence they are vulnerable to complex terrorism.45 After the attacks of 9/11, the US comprehensively reviewed the national critical infrastructure for identifying potential terrorist targets. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified seventeen distinct categories as the critical infrastructure, one of which is the chemical industry and hazardous materials sector.46 Numerous studies have been undertaken for understanding the vulnerabilities of chemical plants, processes, and chemical transportation.47 The landmark attacks of 9/11 highlighted security as a main concern for chemical industry.

43 Top fifty U.S. chemical companies amassed over $253 billion in sales in 2004. Alexander H. Tullo, “Top 50 Chemical Producers,” Chemical & Engineering News, 83, 16 May 2005, pp. 17. 44 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 define critical infrastructure as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the US that incapacitation or destruction of such systems and assets would have debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” 45

294 “Sandoz Chemical Spill Turns Rhine Red,” BBC News, 1 November 1986. 295 The World Bank, “Obsolete Pesticide Stockpile: An Unwanted Legacy of the African Landscape,” 5 August 2013, p.1.

Thomas Homer Dixon, “The Rise of Complex Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, No. 128, January–February 2002, p. 52. 46 The US Committee on Assessing Vulnerabilities of the Nation's Chemical Infrastructure, “Terrorism and Chemical Infrastructure: Protecting People and Reducing Vulnerabilities”, 2004, p.1. 47 The significant studies, inter-alia, include: (a) American Chemistry Council. Protecting a Nation: Homeland Defense and the Business of Chemistry. Arlington, VA; 2002. (b) J.B. Tucker, “Chemical Terrorism: Assessing Threats and Responses.” High Impact Terrorism: Proceedings of a RussianAmerican Workshop (Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 2002); (c) U.S. Department of Justice. Assessment of the Increased Risk of Terrorist or Other Criminal Activity Associated with Posting Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information on the Internet. Washington, DC: 2000; (d) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. Washington, DC, 2003; (e) U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Washington, DC, 2005; (f) American Petroleum Institute and the National Petrochemical and Refiners Association. 2004. Security Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries. Washington, DC; (g) National Institute of Justice. 2002. A Method to Assess the Vulnerability of U.S. Chemical Facilities. Washington, DC; (h) Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites. New York, 2002. H.E Jose Bustani, former Director General OPCW noted “WMD terrorism is one of the most important subjects of the contemporary international agenda.” 296 The potential use of chemical weapons adds a perilous dimension to terrorism. Anyone with access to modern chemical technology and a college level science education can produce enough chemical agents even in his basement that should suffice for devastating cities.297 The raw materials are easily available from chemical fertilizer and pharmaceutical plants and stores, medical suppliers, etc. Therefore, there is a dire need for creating a culture of security, domestic deterrence and responsible attitude by chemical facilities and handlers. In fact, “responsible behavior within industry is the primary defence to stop commercially available toxic chemicals getting into the wrong hands”.298

It is generally felt that the potential threat from attack on chemical facilities has not received adequate attention. 299300 Moreover, in the industrial plants there is no good

296 H.E Jose Bustani, Director General OPCW Note, “Responses to Global Terrorist Threats,” S/ 292/ 2002, OPCW Technical Secretariat, 29 January 2002. 297 American Chemistry Council and Cefic, “American Chemistry Council and Cefic Views on the Future Operation of the OPCW,” May 2011, p.3. 298 American Chemistry Council and Cefic, “American Chemistry Council and Cefic Views on the Future Operation of the OPCW,” May 2011, p.3. 299 John F. Sopko, “The Changing Proliferation Threat,” Foreign Policy, No. 105, Winter 1996–1997, pp. 3- 300 ; Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, No.1, JanuaryFebruary 1998, Amy E. Smithson and Lesley-Anne Levy. Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response, Report No. 35, Washington, DC: Stimson Center, October 2000;

understanding of protection from the insider threat.301 Jonathan B. Tucker and Amysands believe that “attacks on chemical industrial facilities may become a shift in chemical warfare from the state owned Chemical Weapons programs of the Cold War to improvised agents and methods for terrorism.”302 This makes sense, because it is much easier to attack a rail car or a truck full of toxic industrial chemicals or loosely guarded chemical facility than entering a military facility and obtaining Chemical Weapons.54 History is undoubtedly a guide and it tells us that Chemical Weapons have been used both by military forces on the battlefield and by terrorists in population centres. In this respect, they are unique among the family of WMD.55 The Aum Shinrikyo cult’s Sarin attack at the Tokyo sub-way marked the dawn of “catastrophic” terrorism involving CBRN weapons and material. This attack killed 19 people and approximately 5000 were injured. So many people were shocked and rushed to hospitals that the hospital staff panicked and could not properly dispense medical treatment.56 Experts on the subject believe this disastrous threat is quite plausible today.”57

2.5.4 Proliferation Concerns What was a more defined and focused WMD proliferation threat in the early 1990’s has become more diversified with the rise of global networks of terrorists. These Non State Actors are present in many regions of the world and are easily and frequently moving across borders. Therefore, concerted efforts are required for preventing proliferation of WMD not only to states but to also to Non State Actors at international level.58 The chemical industry is both the object of non-proliferation measures undertaken under the CWC and also a partner in the implementation of such non-proliferation

Christopher F. Chyba, Jean Pascal Zanders, “Assessing the Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists,” Nonproliferation Review, 64, 1999, pp. 17–34; Gregory Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” International Security, Vol.28, No.3, Winter 2003–2004, pp. 84- 122. 301 The US Committee on Science and Technology on Countering Terrorism, “Toxic Chemicals and Explosive Material”, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, 2002, p.128. 302 Jonathan B.Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.55, No.4, July– August 1999, pp.46–47; Margaret E. Kosal, “Near Term Threats of Chemical Weapons Terrorism,” Conference on Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks, Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School, 29–30 June 2005.

100

54 FBI Agent Troy Morgan quoted in Carl Prine, “Chemical Industry Slowly Boosts Security,” Pittsburgh Tribune- Review, 22 June 2003. Available at www.pittsburghlive.com 55 Margaret E. Kosal, “Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce The Chemical Terror Threat”, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, September 2008, p.8. 56 Dr Yasuo Seto, “The Sarin Gas Attack in Japan and the Related Forensic Investigations,” OPCW, 1 January 2001, p.4. 57 Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow, Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy, Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project 1, No. 6 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University; Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University, 1998); Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow, “Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger,” Foreign Affairs 77, No. 6, November/December 1998, p. 81. This group advised “The danger of WMD being used against America and its allies is greater now than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.” 58 Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, The U.S. Threat Reduction Programs Coordinator, Presentation at the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012, p.2. measures. As the CWC transforms its role from disarmament treaty to Confidence Building Measure and non-proliferation, the industry best practices in housekeeping and customer vetting can substantially contribute to the global non-proliferation efforts.303

Chemical companies do not make chemical weapons, yet some common dualuse chemicals can be misused or developed into Chemical Weapons. Therefore, the primary mission of the chemical industry with respect to the CWC is non-proliferation. In this regard, the developed countries have taken substantive measures such as the chemical industry’s Responsible Care programme, which promotes safety and security best practices for safeguarding workers, local communities and the environment. Responsible Care initiatives educate industry managers regarding their responsibilities for protecting sites from terrorist attack; and through “Know Your Customer” codes prevent dual-use toxic chemicals from going into the wrong hands.304 This programme comprehensively covers the safe and secure management of chemicals throughout the “value chain” through

303 Rene van Sloten, “Chemical Industry Compliance of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” OPCW Seminar on OPCW Contribution to Security and Non-proliferation, OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, 1112 April 2011. 304 American Chemistry Council and Cefic, “American Chemistry Council and Cefic Views on the Future Operation of the OPCW,” May 2011, p.5.

101

guidelines for research and development, procurement of raw- material, chemical production, sales, distribution, transportation, handling, use and waste disposal.305

It was confirmed in 2013 that European chemical companies had been exporting dual-use chemicals to Syria with the approval of their national authorities. Public attention was drawn to this fact after Syria used Chemical Weapons against its own people. Controlling the international transfers of dual-use chemicals is quite complicated. For example, the EU regulates the transfers of dual-use chemicals through binding laws. But, when the chemicals are exported then the EU cannot supervise their use. 306 Chemical industry operations need to be closely regulated and wide security measures are required. The security measures should not be limited to border security checks, but comprehensively vetting the traders such as the U.S. initiative called CT-PAT (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism). New restrictions on the marketing are required, e.g. the EU’s REACH regulation controls marketing of toxic chemicals sold on both domestic and global markets. The UNSC Resolution- 1540 on illicit brokering and transit substantially supports the non- proliferation process. This resolution comprehensively caters for chemical proliferation and terrorism.307 The industry should support the multilateral non-proliferation efforts such as the Australia Group.308 At the end of the day, chemical industry has a critical role in assisting the non-proliferation efforts. Legislations and inspections can contribute to some extent but eventually, it is the responsible behavior of chemical industry, which is the key to non-proliferation efforts.

2.6 Impact of Scientific and Technological Developments

305 Bernhard Thier “Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Programme Reflects its Commitment to NonProliferation,” European Chemical Industry Council, 24 September 2008, p.3. 306 Ian Anthony, “Exports of Dual- Use Chemicals to Syria: An Assessment of European Union Export Control,” Non- Proliferation Paper, No. 35, January 2014, p.1. 307 UNSC Resolution- 1540 (2004), Preamble paragraphs 1,4,5,7,11, and 12; and acting under Chapter-7 of the UN Charter paragraphs 1,3,5 and 8(c). 308 American Chemistry Council and Cefic, “American Chemistry Council and Cefic Views on the Future Operation of the OPCW,” op.cit, p.5.

102

Scientific and technological developments have revolutionized the field of chemistry. For example, neuroscience was initially a branch of biology but now it has become multidisciplinary and closely associated with chemistry. Even more revolutionary is the field of nano-chemistry, which deals with the assemblies of atoms or molecules at the nanoscale and nanotechnology or the creation of new chemical manufacturing methodologies 309 Therefore, new and more lethal forms of Chemical Weapons can emerge from chemical biology, neuroscience and nano-chemistry. These scientific and technological advances and their practitioners are available throughout the world and can be misused.310

Large numbers of commercial chemical industries are capable of producing Schedule-1 chemicals, which is another significant threat to the Convention. Such plants can perform wide range of chemical processes and possess latest technology for processing unpredictable range of toxic chemicals. Such industries have characteristics just like Schedule-1 facilities such as special filtration equipment, chemical resistant equipment etc. Moreover, such plants are capable for “Just-in-time” production. Therefore, chemical industries do not require storing large quantity of raw material at the plant sites, which could have previously indicated suspicious activities.

Significant majority of modern chemical plants utilize computers for the manufacturing process. The plants and computers perform efficient reactions and enhances safety for the operators. Moreover, it limits the release of toxic vapours into the atmosphere that might be detected by monitoring equipment. If this technology is viewed from the proliferation perspective, it becomes obvious that automated control offers similar advantages to Non State Actors. The chemical industry is transforming rapidly, one significant new trend is “the increased emphasis on the production of chemicals that have

309 Prof. William W. Keller, “Toward a ‘Chemical Safety and Security Leadership Forum’ The Advent of CBRN Security Culture”, International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012, p.2. 310 Ibid.

103

desirable biological effects, such as pharmaceuticals, crop protection chemicals, etc.” 311 The methods for the discovery and production of such products are equally relevant from the non-proliferation perspective. Moreover, the expertise and relevant technology is globally so wide-spread that the OPCW alone cannot ensure effective control. Therefore, the chemical industry and relevant national authorities have to perform their due role.

2.7 Lack of Awareness Regarding CWC in Industry

Awareness of CWC is high among those who are responsible or related to the national implementation of the Convention. However, it remains low among other communities such as those producing and handling chemicals, transporters, chemistry teachers and students, etc. These communities should have good awareness regarding the CWC because of their access to toxic chemicals and the prevalent threat of proliferation and terrorism. Requisite awareness among such professionals will be useful in a way that they do not get involved in activities prohibited under international and national laws; and also they inadvertently do not contribute to the re-emergence of Chemical Weapons. There is a need to enhance the level of awareness particularly amongst the scientific and academic communities, about the Convention, which will significantly directly and indirectly contribute to effective national implementation of the Convention.312

There is a need to reach out to those chemical industries that had not yet registered with the concerned governmental authorities and to educate such industries to submit correctly their annual declarations. A study by the National Authority of Argentine revealed a systemic lack of correct understanding among the chemical industry owners, managers and legal representatives of the obligations under the CWC and the national implementing legislations and regulations. Most chemical industry managers know nothing regarding the legal norms and obligations under the CWC. Because, most of the

311 George W. Parshall, Graham S. Pearson, et al., “Impact of Scientific Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention”, IUPAC Technical Report, Vol. 74, 2002. 312 Djafar Benachour and Daniel Feakes, “Education, Outreach and Awareness-raising after the Third Review Conference,” OPCW Today, Vol.2, No.5, December 2013.

104

graduate courses in chemistry, chemical engineering, bio-chemistry, pharmacy, environmental issues, and industry do not include the teaching of the national laws and regulations implementing the CWC obligations. This subject is too important and should not be limited to future plant managers of declarable facilities. Such a project should have a broader scope with a view to promoting a culture of the responsible use of technical and scientific knowledge among all professionals in the chemical fields.313

The first line of defence against an act of violence is human awareness. The destruction of Chemical Weapons stockpiles is nearing completion, which will leave terrorists with two options, either to produce Chemical Weapons or misuse highly toxic industrial chemicals. Therefore, it is imperative that both the OPCW and the States Parties focus on the non-proliferation aspects of the Convention and the chemical industry by promoting industrial best practices in safety and security, raising awareness amongst the scientific community and managers of chemical industry, especially educating and focusing on small and medium sized chemical industries. Such measures would foster responsible culture. One way of assessing the standards of non-proliferation in a chemical industry is the amount of available codes of practice.

Codes provide moral direction and the base upon which legal measures stand. Guns, guards and gates may at times prove ineffective. This is where codes of practice deliver, by setting standards of expected behavior from all employees of the industry. And the expected behavior is based on the set of moral values. The enforceable codes of practice make a relation and connection between the conduct and behavior of employees and legal norms and regulations. Thus codes are useful in establishing a culture of security that provides moral and principled impetus for the employees. 314 Codification of non- proliferation ideals would map the awareness standards regarding non-proliferation in chemical industry. According to H.E Ambassador Uzumcu the Director General OPCW,

313 Gustavo Zlauvinen, “The Argentine Project on Education and the CWC,” OPCW Today, Vol.2, No.5, December 2013, pp.1-2; see also Argentina Report on its Activities to the Eighteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties, held in November 2013, C-13/ NAT.3 dated 2 December 2013. 314 Aaron C Gluck, “How Codes of Practice Enhance a Chemical Security Culture,” OPCW Today, Vol.2, No.5, December 2013.

105

the chemical industry should be the primary areas of focus for awareness and education because they handle and trade huge amounts of toxic industrial chemicals or have access to such chemicals and dual-use technology.315

2.8 Conclusion

Chemical industry is extremely important for the development of national economy, and has attained immense diversity and innovation. This industry had played extremely constructive role in the CWC negotiations, it has key role today, and it will remain critically involved in addressing the future challenges of chemical safety and security. In the past many chemical disasters have occurred. The chemical industries should be maintained and operated in a manner to effectively safeguard the at-risk communities from catastrophes and for preventing poisoning of the precious environment. To safeguard chemical industry from terrorist attacks, it is imperative to understand the vulnerabilities of chemical plants, chemical processes and transportation. Chemical terrorism is one of the most important subjects of the contemporary security studies. In fact, the requisite materials, technology and know how are widely and easily available. Therefore, there is a dire need to create a culture of security, domestic deterrence and responsible attitude by chemical industries. But the scope of these closely interrelated challenges are so wide that well-coordinated synergetic efforts by the international regimes, relevant national authorities, chemical industry, civic society and above all the academic and scientific community will be required. Nonetheless, it is believed that responsible behavior within the industry is the primary defence against chemical weapons proliferation and terrorism. In this regard, chemical industry’s best practices and chemical site house keeping and customers vetting would substantially contribute to non-proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts.

Chemical industry does not produce chemical weapons but some common dualuse chemicals can be used for military and commercial purposes or misused by the terrorist

315 Ibid.

106

groups for their nefarious designs. Therefore, the primary mission of the chemical industry with regard to the CWC is non-proliferation. Industry should support multilateral arrangements such as the CWC, the UNSC Resolution-1540, the Australia Group, etc and should undertake voluntary measures such as the Responsible Care Programme for promoting safety and security best practices for safeguarding workers, local communities and the environment. Industry Codes such as “Know Your Customer” can effectively prevent dual-use industrial chemicals going into wrong hands.

The advancement in science and technology has also revolutionized the field of chemistry. Therefore, new and more lethal chemical weapons can emerge in the near future from nano-chemistry, chemical-biology, neuroscience, etc. These advancements have tremendously improved the safety of operators but they are also offering similar advantages to the Non-State Actors. The troublesome issue is that the advanced technology, know- how, soft-ware and expertise are easily globally available. Awareness of CWC and the non-proliferation initiatives is low among those producing and handling chemicals. They should be well-aware of such international security concerns because of their access to toxic chemicals and the prevalent threat of proliferation and terrorism. This will significantly contribute to national implementation of the Convention and safety and security of chemical industry. Necessary legislation and inspections can contribute to some extent but eventually, it is the responsible behavior of chemical industry, which is the key to non-proliferation efforts.

CHAPTER 3

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

107

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) was opened for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993, and with the 65th ratification by Hungary, on 29 April 1997 the CWC entered into force with 87 States Parties.316 Thus, the CWC assumed the status of an international legal arrangement for the prohibition of Chemical Weapons.317 Both the CWC and its implementing body the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are designed flexible enough to effectively respond to changing international security environment and the requirements of States Parties, and the challenges posed by the raid advancements in the field of science and technology. The major goal of the CWC as specified in the preamble of the Convention318 is to achieve progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective multilateral control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of WMD; and to promote international cooperation in the field of science and technology and promoting free trade in chemicals. There is no other legal instrument relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that is as widely accepted and as comprehensive as the CWC.319 This chapter contains explanations and examination of various aspects of the CWC such as national obligations and significance of national implementation measures, the need for transforming the mandate of the OPCW and improving routine industrial inspections, export control regime under CWC, the CWC mechanism for consultations, cooperation and fact-finding, the CWC positive security assurance in the form of ‘assistance and protection’, national protective programmes under CWC, and the scientific and technological developments and their implications on the Convention.

316 Eric P. J. Myjer, ed., Issues of Arms Control Law and the Chemical Weapons Convention, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and Kluwer Law International, 2001), p.ix. 317 Ramesh Thakur, “Chemical Weapons and the Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Ramesh Thakur and Era Haru, ed., The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Challenges and opportunities, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006), p.5. 318 Chemical Weapons Convention, Preamble, p.1. 319 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW Opening Address, “OPCW in a Changing Environment- Promoting Security and Cooperation,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contributions in the Sphere of Security and Non-proliferation of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, 11- 12 April 2011.

108

3.1 National Implementation Measures under CWC

The CWC’s Article- VII deals with national implementation measures under the Convention and obligates each State Party to enact national CWC implementing legislation, and related regulations for criminalizing prohibited activities, and also inform the OPCW regarding such implementing measures. Under this Article, States Parties are also obliged to extend necessary cooperation to other states for legal assistance, and safety and environmental issues. Moreover, each States Party is obliged to establish or designate a National Authority on CWC for effective implementation of the Convention and necessary liaison with the OPCW and other States Parties (SP).320 These measures include “prohibiting natural and legal persons from engaging in activities prohibited to a State Party.”321 The purpose of this specific provision is to extend the Article- I prohibitions “on the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of Chemical Weapons (CW),” 322 to activities by private individuals and non– governmental entities. Thus, in addition to each State Party's Article- I obligation, each State Party (SP) is under obligation to take necessary national measures for preventing individuals and non– governmental entities from undertaking activities prohibited under the Convention.

Article- VII obligates each State Party “to prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction from undertaking any prohibited activity, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity.” 323 This Article thus covers the activities of private individuals and non–governmental entities, regardless of their nationality, on a State Party’s territory or anywhere outside its territory that is under its jurisdiction, e.g. ships or aircraft flying its flag. States Parties must enact penal legislation, which can be civil, administrative or criminal nature. This Article also obligates states to extend their national implementing legislation and related regulations

320 OPCW, “Overview of the Chemical Weapons Convention”, p.1 Available at www.opcw.org. 321 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article VII, Paragraph 1. 322 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article I, Sub- Paragraph 1(d). 323 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article VII, Paragraph 1.

109

extra-territorially for legally covering the activities of its citizens outside its national territory or any place under its jurisdictions.

The article- VII requires States Parties to provide requisite legal assistance to other states for implementing national obligations under Article VII.324 The aim of this provision is to facilitate legal inter-state cooperation that would contribute to national implementation of the Convention. This article requires States Paries to accord the highest priority to the safety of people and in safeguarding the environment from hazardous effects of chemicals, and in this regard encourages inter-state cooperation.325 The purpose of this paragraph is to create a general obligation for the States Parties to protect the people and the environment while carrying out activities permitted under the Convention, such as destruction of Chemical Weapons, operation of commercial chemical industry, disposal of chemicals, etc.326

Many people mistakenly understands that verification is the responsibility of the OPCW, whereas, National Authorities on CWC have the most crucial role in ensuring verifications at national level, and implementing the Convention. Robinson argued that “it would be an error to regard responsibility for CWC verification as lying solely with the Technical Secretariat.” 327 National Authorities have to collect data from relevant industries/ facilities and make annual declarations to the OPCW. This data helps in implementation and verification measures both by the OPCW and the National Authority. The latest scientific and technological developments in the field of chemistry and chemical industry could contribute to the challenges related to proliferation and terrorism.328 The

324 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article VII, Paragraph 2. 325 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article VII, paragraph 3. 326 This obligation is repeated in more detail for the destruction of Chemical Weapons (paragraph 10 of Article IV), for the destruction of CWPF (paragraph 11 of Article V), and for the permitted production of Schedule 1 chemicals (paragraph 7 of Part VI of the Verification Annex). 327 Daniel Feakes and Julian Perry Robinson, “National Implementation Measures: Role of the OPCW Secretariat,” paper presented at the 15th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the CBW Conventions, Approaching the First CWC Review Conference, the Netherlands, 23– 24 June 2001. 328 George W. Parshall, Scientific and Technical Developments and the CWC, in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Challenges and Solutions, (Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2001), pp. 53–58.

110

National Authorities should be aware of the dual-use chemicals and technologies and equipped and authorized to monitor them.329

3.2 Need for Transformation of OPCW

Article- VIII of the Convention establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its three organs, the Conference of the States Parties (CSP), the Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS). The OPCW is responsible for implementing the Convention, and sets forth general provisions regarding the OPCW. The CSP is the policy–making body for the Convention and comprises of all States Partiess. The EC is the executive body and consists of 41 members. The CSP and the EC settle disputes regarding application/ interpretation of the CWC.330 The Technical Secretariat is the international body responsible for conducting the international verification. 331 This Article delineates powers and responsibilities of the CSP, the EC, and the TS. It establishes the privileges and immunities necessary for its delegates and representatives and the Director General and the OPCW staff for the discharge of their responsibilities. The CSP has to ensure compliance with the Convention, to handle issues of non-compliance in the light of the recommendations of the EC. In case of noncompliant behavior, the CSP has the requisite power for limiting and even suspending the privileges and rights of a State Party.332 The CSP also has power to bring the matter to the attention of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. This Article also establishes that the CWC does not undercut any State's obligations under the Geneva

329 The European Commission proposes that by 2012 all new and existing chemicals will undergo a comprehensive risk assessment. Such information would prove invaluable to National Authorities monitoring compliance with CWC obligations. European Commission, White Paper: Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, COM (2001) 88 final, 27 February 2001. 330 It may be noted that the OPCW Executive Council (EC) and the Conference of States Parties (CSP) play an important role in dispute resolution, but the CWC does not empower them to impose resolution of a dispute. 331 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article VIII, pp. 19-28. 332 CWC, Paragraph 2 of Article XII gives the Conference of States Parties the power, subject to Executive Council recommendation, to restrict or suspend a State Party's rights and privileges under the CWC if the State Party has not responded to an Executive Council request for action regarding suspected noncompliance.

111

Protocol of 1925 or the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 333

Much of the OPCW’s resources are devoted to the verification of declared Chemical Weapons (CW) stockpiles and facilities. Due to the ongoing destruction of declared CW stockpiles, the intensity in CW destruction and related verification activities will reduce substantially in the coming years, which will warrant the transition of the OPCW verification regime to one with new priorities. The destruction of the Chemical Weapons stockpiles is not an end in itself; rather it is the first step for ensuring a world safe and secure from the misuse of chemicals and related technologies.334 As Chemical Weapons stockpiles are nearing elimination, the verification of their continued nonproduction will remain a key challenge to the OPCW. The Routine Industrial verification requires improvement taking into account the changing security environment, advances in science and technology, and latest trends in chemicals manufacturing and trade.

The OPCW implements a monitoring regime over the global exports and imports of Schedule chemicals, which will further gain importance. States Parties should strengthen their domestic rules and procedures as part of an enhanced CWC enforcement and monitoring effort.335 This broader effort will not only necessitate intensifying and increasing the number of routine inspections in the chemical industry but a more intelligent and qualitative selection methodology of chemical plant sites for inspection. Keeping in view the safety and security concerns, the OPCW should help develop and enhance the chemical-security culture in States Parties and assist them in preventing the risks associated with the accidental or deliberate release of toxic chemicals.336

333 Article VIII establishes that a State Party that withdraws from the CWC is still bound by any other treaty to which it is a party, in particular, the Geneva Protocol of 1925. 334 Prof. William W. Keller, “Toward a ‘Chemical Safety and Security Leadership Forum’ The Advent of CBRN Security Culture”, op.cit, p.2. 335 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu DG OPCW statement to the UN Session of the General Assembly, New York, 19 November 2012, p.8. 336 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, “Director General OPCW Opening Statement” at the Table-Top Exercise on the Preparedness of States Parties to Prevent Terrorist Attacks Involving Chemicals, Warsaw, Poland, 22 November 2010, p.1.

112

Since 9/11 the security environment has substantially changed. Many security analysts have expressed serious concerns about the possibility that terrorist organizations might misuse chemicals in their acts of terror, or may attack commercial chemical facilities or chemicals carrying vehicles during the transportation. The OPCW is obliged to use its mandate and expertise as part of the wider struggle against terrorism and proliferation. 337 The threat of the terrorist organizations prompted the United Nations Security Council Resolution- 1540 (UNSC Resolution 1540) 338 and other complementary measures by international agencies, including the OPCW, to prevent proliferation of WMD to Non- State Actors and to mitigate the consequences of their misuse.339 The OPCW industrial verification regime can contribute substantially in this international struggle, provided it is adapted to the latest developments in science and technology, manufacturing processes and security environment. For example, with regard to chemical proliferation and terrorism, the OPCW will need to increase and intensify its verification regime and would require reaching beyond the scheduled chemicals to other types of agents such as novel agents and dual-use toxic industrial chemicals that are more likely to be acquired by Non State Actors.

The changing security environment and scientific advances are posing many challenges to the CWC, such as Military forces are often operating against Non State Actors in non-traditional battlefield, in urban scenarios. Therefore, military commanders are considering using non-lethal incapacitating chemical agents for law enforcement and against terrorists. Nevertheless, if used in a battlefield or during counter-terrorism operations, this would be the use of Chemical Weapons prohibited under the Convention. 340 Such developments will have serious implications for the CWC and will undermine the

337 Ahmet Uzumcu, “Opening Statement,” ibid. 338 U.S. Department of State, UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Available at www.state.gov. 339 The UN Security Council requested relevant international organizations to evaluate ways for enhancing the effectiveness of their action against terrorism, especially those organizations that control the use of or of access to chemical and other deadly materials (see Security Council Resolution- 1456), For OPCW struggle against terrorism see OPCW document RC-1/5, May 2003, para. 7; Additional emphasis was endorsed by the Second CWC Review Conference, see OPCW document RC-2/4, 18 April 2008, section on agenda item 9(c)(vii): Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons. 340 International Committee of the Red Cross, Proceedings of the Expert Meeting “Incapacitating Chemical Agents: Iimplications for International Law”, Montreux, Switzerland, 24–26 March 2012; S. Mogl (ed.), Technical Workshop on Incapacitating Agents: Spiez, Switzerland, 8–9 September 2011, Spiez Laboratory, 2012.

113

immense global efforts made so far against Chemical Weapons.341 Moreover, terrorists may also acquire such lethal agents.

3.2.1 Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges States might evade the CWC by developing a novel agent while asserting that the CWC allows for the use of toxic chemicals for “law enforcement purposes including domestic riot control.” This provision has broader implications, for example, permitting occupying forces to use RCAs abroad.342 Similarly, some SPs believe that toxic chemicals other than RCAs could also be used for law enforcement purposes. Such developments have following legal and practical implications: a. Legal Implications. The abovementioned measures and wrong interpretation of the Convention would seriously undermine the basic spirit of the CWC, i.e. not to develop, produce, and stockpile Chemical Weapons. For example, the very term ‘nonlethal toxic chemical’ is incorrect, because the lethality is dependent on factors such as, the dosage, vulnerabilities of people and the dispersal methods. If such agents are used by the military in the battlefield, they would significantly increase the lethality of other conventional weapons and the number of casualties.343 b. Practical Implications. Inspectors might find Chemical Weapons at the stages of development, production, or stockpiling and a State Party could claim that these arms are absolutely legitimate and developed for law enforcement purposes. This would substantially complicate the OPCW counter-proliferation efforts.

3.2.2 Threat of NSAs Misusing Toxic Industrial Chemicals

341 Ralf Trapp, “The OPCW in Transition: from Stockpile Elimination to Maintaining a World Free of Chemical Weapons”, UNIDIR, Agent of Change? The CW Regime, Disarmament Forum, 2012, p.1. 342 Kyle M. Ballard, “Convention in Peril? Riot Control Agents and the Chemical Weapons Ban,” Arms Control Today, September 2007, pp. 12-16. 343 Ibid.

114

The emerging threat of Non State Actors (NSA) misusing toxic industrial chemicals necessitates an effective OPCW verification mechanism and robust national systems to prevent, deter and respond to such attempts. These national measures are made obligatory for states in both the CWC and the UNSCR-1540. The OPCW working closely with other international and national organizations would need to help States develop this capacity. Thus OPCW would require a strategic approach to draw on the synergy of its various assistance programmes. In this context, regional approaches could prove more fruitful for effectively identifying needs and executing assistance programmes.344 An example is the establishment of Regional Centres of Excellence on Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Risk Management sponsored by the European Union and technically supported by the OPCW, IAEA and other partners.345 The development of OPCW as a forum for promoting international cooperation will broaden the scope of Article X and XI, which deals with assistance and protection, and international and technological cooperation, respectively. This development will significantly transform the OPCW.346

3.2.3 Verifications for Non-Compliance Concerns The OPCW verification in the broader context requires systematic monitoring and assessment of new scientific and technological developments with implications for CWC. Therefore, the OPCW needs to develop its capacity for undertaking verification activities related to non-compliance concerns such as clarifications, fact-findings including

344 Ralf Trapp, “The OPCW in Transition: from Stockpile Elimination to Maintaining a World Free of Chemical Weapons”, UNIDIR, Agent of Change? The CW Regime, Disarmament Forum, 2012, p.5. 345 The CBRN Centres of Excellence Programme is implemented by the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and the EU Joint Research Centre, and financed through the EU’s Instrument for Stability; see Regulation (EC) no. 1717/2006. 346 Ambassador Dr. Jan Borkowski, “Development of the OPCW Engagement in Chemical Safety and Security – Perspective from Poland” International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, 8- 9 November 2012, Tarnów, Poland, p.2.

115

Challenge Inspections and Investigations of Alleged Uses (IAU) of Chemical Weapons.347 Some States Parties are likely to resist such adaptations of the OPCW verification mechanism, but without such transformations, the OPCW’s contribution to nonproliferation and international security will reduce substantially.

3.2.4 Need for New Arms Control Approaches In the context of the BWC, but equally pertinent to the CWC, McLeish and Trapp make a point that from an arms control perspective, the advances in the life sciences, their increasing global distribution, and the growing interdependence of life science research translate more and more into a post-proliferation world. In such a world, traditional models of proliferation control and top down government approaches are certain to fail. From a broader regulatory perspective, the state alone is no longer able to control the way that life sciences discoveries are used. The circumstances beg instead for a governance system that brings together all stakeholders.348 For example, industry has a key role to guard against the proliferation of dual-use chemicals and products. Industry can undertake ‘customer vetting’ and monitor the use of their products. Similarly, the public interest groups such as NGOs can also educate masses regarding responsible use of chemicals and keep an eye on the sales and transfers of chemicals. Since, NGOs work very closely with the communities and public, they can also gather information, which might help law enforcement agencies in preventing the acts of clandestine production or acquisition of Chemical Weapons, illegal smuggling, etc.

3.2.5 Globally Dispersed Chemical Industry From the economic incentive, some developed countries encourage chemical companies to locate production facilities throughout the world. From the CWC perspective, it implies more sites to be inspected and monitored. The task of international

347 Ralf Trapp, “The OPCW in Transition: from Stockpile Elimination to Maintaining a World Free of Chemical Weapons”, UNIDIR, Agent of Change? The CW Regime, Disarmament Forum, 2012, p.4. 348 Caitríona McLeish and Ralf Trapp, “The Life Sciences Revolution and the BWC: Reconsidering the Science and Technology Review Process in a Post-Proliferation World,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.18, No.3, November 2011, p. 540.

116

control is further complicated when such chemical industry sites are location in countries that have internal unrest, terrorism and lack competent regulatory authorities.349 Moreover, commercial technologies could be misused for the development of novel Chemical Weapons. Globalization has dispersed the chemical industry and free trade policies have complicated the OPCW task of controlling transfers of chemical precursors.350

3.3 Need to Intensify Routine Industrial Inspections under CWC

Industry verification is based on checking declared data. On-site inspections provide an opportunity to check on those declarations. Analytical tests are performed to confirm the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals. This approach requires improvement, because the Non State Actors may not try to acquire or manufacture huge stockpiles of lethal agents. They may develop new scenarios, and acquire or manufacture new chemical warfare agents.351 Such an evolution was anticipated by the negotiators of the CWC, in the verification regime for “Other Chemical Production Facilities” (OCPFs).352 Therefore, the negotiators of the CWC kept the goal of industrial inspections open-ended with an aim to confirm that activities at an inspected facility are consistent with the Convention. Keeping in view, the proliferation concerns and the scourge of international terrorism, the industrial verification has to move beyond simply confirming the declared data; rather critically evaluating whether activities and facilities are in line

349 Author’s meeting with Fillipa Lentzos, London School of Economics, London, The U.K., 27 April 2007; See also International Council of Chemical Associations Paper, Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Presented during OPCW Conference of States Parties and the Chemical Industry, The Hague, The Netherlands, 11 June 2007, p.3 350 The UK Paper, “The Changing Face of the Chemical Industry: Implications for the Chemical Weapons Convention”, OPCW Conference of the States Parties, 24 April 2003. 351 Ralf Trapp, “The OPCW in Transition: from Stockpile Elimination to Maintaining a World Free of Chemical Weapons”, op.cit, p.3. 352 Part IX of the CWC Verification Annex defines OCPFs as plant sites that produce by synthesis more than 200 metric tons per year of Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOCs). This definition also encompasses one or more plants that manufacture more than 30 metric tons of an unscheduled DOC containing phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine (PSF). These facilities must be declared, and subsequently inspected by the OPCW.

117

with the obligations under the CWC. This is in fact, utilizing the General Purpose Criterion, which calls for comprehensive coverage of all toxic chemicals and their precursors.

Verification provides an opportunity to a state to demonstrate its compliance when faced with allegations/ suspicions thus serving a reassurance function. MacEachin identifies the ‘defining objective’ of on-site verification as denying ‘a potential treaty violator the means for concealing proscribed programmes under the cover of legitimate activities’ thus highlighting the deterrence function of verification. 353 A Group of Governmental Experts appointed by the UN Secretary in its 1995 report, stated that ‘verification can be generically defined as a process in which data are collected, collated and analyzed in order to make an informed judgment as to whether a party is complying with its obligations or not.’354 This definition introduces the concept of verification, ideally as a process cooperative.355

The CWC verification includes on-site inspections of commercial chemical plants/ OCPFs to guard against proliferation in the guise of chemical manufacturing for peaceful purposes.356 The CWC verification system is based on monitoring compliance of CWC at national and international level. The international level is based on national declarations, routine inspections and challenge inspections. The elements at the national level include implementing comprehensive legislation and related regulations, data collection and the establishment of National Authority on CWC. The General Purpose Criterion (GPC) is integral to both national and international verification. The main challenge of CWC verification relates to the dual-use nature of chemical technology.

353 Douglas MacEachin, “Routine and Challenge: Two Pillars of Verification”, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 39, March 1998, pp.1–3. 354 UN document, A/50/377 dated 22 September 1995. 355 Allan Krass, Verification—How Much Is Enough?, (London, Taylor and Francis1985); Julian Perry Robinson, “Chemical Warfare Arms Control: A Framework for Considering Policy Alternatives,” SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies No. 2, (London, Taylor and Francis, 1985). 356 Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), Getting Verification Right: Proposals for Enhancing Implementation of the CWC (London: VERTIC, 2002), p. 4.

118

During negotiations of the CWC, the negotiators faced few hard facts such as many toxic dual-use chemicals are continuously discovered. Thus the list of banned chemicals cannot remain current, the Schedule chemicals alone (Appendix-II) do not provide an adequate basis for verifying the nonproduction of Chemical Weapons. Therefore, the negotiators introduced four measures into the CWC to help verify the General Purpose Criterion. This verification “safety net” consists of: routine inspections of OCPFs; second, use of sampling and analysis during Routine Inspections; third, challenge inspection of a suspect facility (declared or undeclared), and fourth, national obligation to establish National Authority and pass national implementing legislation to monitor the GPC.357

However, the States Parties have not fully made use of these measures and the prevailing assumption among many States Parties seems to be that if a toxic chemical or precursor is not listed in one of the three schedules, it is not a security threat. In view of the large number of dual-use unschedule chemicals, the routine verification regime in its present form creates false confidence in compliance, especially due to rapid advances in science and technology. The OPCW’s Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) noted in 2003, “[T]he number and types of unscheduled chemicals that could cause considerable harm, if they were misused for [chemical warfare] purposes, have expanded significantly ... the inspection regime of the OPCW, perhaps with the exception of challenge inspection, would at this moment not be capable of detecting such a violation.” 358 The OPCW routine inspections validate the information submitted by States Parties in their initial and annual declarations. Routine inspections also serve as deterrent against considering a covert Chemical Weapons programme within its civilian industry. 359 Inspections of commercial industrial plants (Other Chemical Production Facilities) are designed to confirm the nonproduction of Schedule 1 chemicals and the non- diversion of other scheduled chemicals and Unscheduled Discreet Organic Chemicals (DOC) to

357 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Verifying the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing Elements”, April 2008, p.3. 358 OPCW Technical Secretariat, “Note by the Director General: Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science and Technology,” RC-1/DG.2, 23 April 2003, p. 11. 359 Douglas MacEachin, “Routine and Challenge: Two Pillars of Verification”, op.cit, p.1.

119

weapons programmes. Regime for the verification and declaration of OCPF facilities is at Appendix-III.

The CWC negotiators divided chemicals as per the risk factors into four categories, Schedule 1 chemicals- ‘a high risk’, Schedule 2 chemicals- ‘a significant risk’ and Schedule 3 chemicals- ‘a risk’ and Unscheduled Discreet Organic Chemicals (DOCs).360 But it is difficult to compare a small lab producing 1 g/ year of Sarin with a multi-purpose pesticide plant producing 1000s of tones of pesticide that could readily produce Sarin. Therefore, the CWC negotiators left such risk assessment to future Technical Secretariat.361 But the negotiators provided flexibility and the verification procedures were designed to be open to future adjustments in the light of practical experiences and developments in industry, with risk assessment by Technical Secretariat of OPCW.362

The OPCW officials, some States Parties and CWC experts have expressed concern about the growing number of OCPFs with 10-15 percent perceived as susceptible to manufacturing Chemical Weapons, because of their flexible production technologies.363 Pfirter the former DG OPCW told Arms Control Today that he views OCPFs as a “risk category” and the OPCW’s reform efforts have to ensure that most relevant “facilities to the Convention” are inspected.364 The OCPFs are about five times the number of declared facilities that produce Schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals. 365 Moreover, most Schedule 2 facilities are unable to produce Schedule 1 chemicals, whereas, about 10- 15 percent of OCPFs have flexible production equipment that are capable of producing chemical warfare

360 Chemical Weapons Convention, Annex on Chemicals, p.49. 361 Bob Mathews, “Other Chemical Production Facilities Inspections”, Presentation at the CWC Second Review Conference Open Forum, 9 April 2008. 362 Ibid. 363 Ralf Trapp, “The Chemical Weapons Convention—Multilateral Instrument with a Future,” in Ramesh Thakur and Ere Haru, ed., The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation, Challenges and Opportunities, (New York: UN University Press, 2006), p. 29. 364 Oliver Meier, “Chemical Weapons Parlay’s Outcome Uncertain”, News/ Analysis, Arms Control Association, April 2008, p.11. 365 Jiri Matousek, “Chemical Weapons Convention: Status and Actual Problems of Implementation,” 25th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the CWC and BTWC, Geneva, November 18-19, 2006.

120

agents or precursors.366 Therefore, the number and intensity of inspections at OCPFs need to be enhanced and those sites should be selected that pose the highest risk of misuse. 367 Of greatest concern are DOC PSF plants and multi-purpose plants with special ventilation system.

3.3.1 OPCW Experiences in OCPF inspections Rules and procedures for the Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOCs), and the “Other Chemical Production Facilities” (OCPFs) are specified in Part- IX of the Verification Annex. Overall, the complex verification regime for the CWC has operated fairly well, but several important limitations have become apparent during the implementation. If not corrected, these problems could impede the treaty’s ability to prevent the proliferation of Chemical Weapons.368 Since entry into force, States Parties have declared almost 4,300 inspectable DOC-producing OCPFs. The OPCW announced in March 2012 that the overall number of such inspections since entry into force of the CWC had reached 1,000, or around 23% of inspectable facilities.369 Yet, if the process of inspecting 157 facilities per year continues, it will take the OPCW at least another 20 years to inspect the remaining OCPFs.370 The facilities of greater concern would have to be re-inspected, so the process will further prolong. This approach does not effectively respond to the CWC non- proliferation objectives.

The OPCW Technical Secretariat concluded that earlier OCPF inspections undertaken had shown that some facilities are highly relevant to the object and purpose of the Convention and their production equipment and hardware provide flexibility and

366 Ralf Trapp, “The Chemical Weapons Convention—Multilateral Instrument with a Future,” op.cit, p.29. 367 OPCW Technical Secretariat, “Note by the Director-General,” p. 17, para. 4.4(a). 368 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Verifying the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing Elements”, op.cit. 369 “OPCW Inspects 1000th OCPF Plant Site“, OPCW, 15 March 2012.

370 This is a largely theoretical value that assumes the even distribution of OCPFs across States Parties. However, since, some States have large number of OCPFs and taking into account the limits for Schedule 3 and OCPF facilities of a maximum of 20 inspections per country per year as contained in paragraph 13 of Part IX of the CWC‘s Verification Annex, the process is bound to take considerably longer.

121

containment. 371 The experience of OCPF and scheduled chemicals inspections reveal following:372

a. In some States Parties, less than one percent OCPFs are inspected. b. Technical Secretariat of OPCW assessed that ‘the level of OCPF inspections still does not provide adequate non-proliferation assurances’(RC-2/DG.2). c. Not all OCPF inspection sites were ‘relevant’. This can be attributed to States Parties submitting insufficient or faulty information in declarations. d. Almost all Schedule- 1 facilities have no break-out production capability or diversion potential. e. Most Schedule- 2 facilities have little potential to produce Schedule- 1 chemicals or to divert Schedule- 2 chemicals. f. None of the Schedule- 3 facilities were able to produce Schedule 1chemicals.

g. However, of the tiny fraction of inspected OCPFs, some could produce Schedule- 1 chemicals and up to 500 others could have similar potential. h. Random Selection processes do not ensure ‘equitable geographic distribution’.

3.3.2 Issues Hindering Routine Industrial Inspections

3.3.2.1 Destruction of Chemical Weapons The slow pace of destruction of Chemical Weapons (CW) has contributed to hindering the OPCW’s ability to work on the non-proliferation objectives of the Convention. The OPCW is spending most of its verification resources on monitoring the Chemical Weapons destruction, and only about 20 percent of inspectors’ time is left for the industry verification, according to the November 2007 OPCW report. Declared Chemical Weapons stockpiles are under strict monitoring and gradually being destroyed, threats in the medium to long term are more likely from the misuse of scientific and technological

371 “Note by the DG OPCW to the First Review Conference,” Conference of the States Parties, OPCW document RC- 1/DG.1, 17 April 2003, p. 12. 372 Bob Mathews, “Other Chemical Production Facilities Inspections”, op.cit, 9 April 2008.

122

developments by either States or Non State Actors. Therefore, shift of resources and efforts would be beneficial for the effectiveness of the CWC as a nonproliferation tool. 373

3.3.2.2 Concerns of Non-Aligned Movement Some countries are wary of increasing the number and intensity of Routine Inspections. Since, chemical industry is gradually moving from industrialized countries to developing countries, some developing countries fear that their industrial inspections will significantly increase in numbers and intensity. Some nonaligned countries view it that developed countries want to portray developing nations as less responsible than industrialized West and the U.S want to focus the OPCW verification on problem states. A statement by the Ambassador of Cuba at the OPCW on behalf of NAM countries stated that the CWC inspection regime must “correspond to the hierarchy of risks inherent to the respective category of chemicals.” 374 It implies that the focus of the CWC inspection regime may continue according highest priority to Schedule-I, II and III chemicals and there is little need to focus on the use of Discreet Organic Chemicals (DOCs) and related chemical facilities. This aspect was debated during the Second CWC Review Conference in 2008. Again on behalf of NAM countries, Cuba maintained the abovementioned position.375 In a broader context, the solution lies in best possible enforcement of General Purpose Criterion.”

3.3.2.3 Geographic Imbalance: OCPF Inspections Due to the current inspection site selection methodology, the OPCW inspections are not undertaken with equality, e.g. “a country having seven declared facilities is treated exactly like a country that has 1,000 facilities. This implies inspecting 100 percent facilities

373 VERTIC, Getting Verification Right: Proposals for Enhancing Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, London, October 2002, p.10. 374 Oliver Meier, “Chemical Weapons Parlay’s Outcome Uncertain”, News/ Analysis, Arms Control Association, April 2008, p.11. 375 Dr. José A. Díaz Duque, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment of the Republic of Cuba, Statement on behalf of NAM to the CWC and China, at the Second CWC Review Conference, OPCW document RC-2/NAT.5, 7 April 2008, p. 4.

123

in a country with seven facilities and somewhat less than one percent of the facilities in a country with 1,000 facilities.” This technical anomaly in site selection methodology needs to be addressed.376 This aspect is related to number of issues such as the desirable number of industrial inspections, information available to the OPCW regarding these industrial facilities, the available expertise at the OPCW for correctly assessing the capabilities of industrial facilities during inspections, and the use of on-site sampling and analysis.

3.4 Consultations, Cooperation and Fact Finding under CWC

Article- IX of the Convention provides a comprehensive mechanism for the consultation and clarification, in case of concerns regarding possible non-compliance. This Article specifies the procedures for requesting and conducting a challenge inspection by any State Party in any State Party.377 The salient aspects of this article are given as following: 378 Procedures for a State Party to request and receive clarification from another State Party regarding compliance concerns. The basic rights and obligations regarding ‘challenge inspections’ that can be requested by a State Party that has concerns regarding compliance with the Convention by another State Party. The detailed procedures for conducting challenge inspections are given in the Verification Annex (Part X). The negotiators of the CWC visualized synergistic interaction between the Routine and Challenge Inspection mechanisms.379 This Article obligates States Parties to consult and cooperate on any issue relevant to the Convention’s implementation. States Parties can seek clarification through the OPCW or other international mechanism, including the framework of the UN and in accordance with its Charter. It is noteworthy that, while the CWC encourages consultations as a first step, a State Party is not obliged to first exhaust such attempts at resolving concerns bilaterally before requesting a challenge inspection. The main function of on- site verification is deterrence function i.e.

376 Oliver Meier, “The Chemical Weapons Convention at 10: An Interview with OPCW Director General Rogelio Pfirter”, Arms Control Today (ACT), April 2007. 377 OPCW, “Overview of the Chemical Weapons Convention”, p.1. Available at www.opcw.org. 378 “Chemical Weapons Convention”, Article IX, pp. 29-33. 379 Jonathan Tucker, ed., The Conduct of Challenge Inspections Under the Chemical Weapons Convention: Proceedings of an Expert Workshop Held on May 29–31, 2002, in Washington, DC, Monterey, Monterey Institute of International Studies, August 2002, p. 1.

124

to deny a treaty violator the means and chance for concealing proscribed programmes.380

Challenge Inspections are conducted by the Technical Secretariat, at the request of a State Party. It serves following purposes: deter prohibited activities at undeclared facilities, deter the abuse of declared facilities, and enable States Parties to demonstrate compliance with the Convention. 381 No State Party has ever used their right to request for Challenge Inspection, due to the associated political costs, hence; it is felt that “Challenge Inspection is not a “normal” component of the CWC verification regime.” 382 This approach is weakening the CWC verification regime. The CWC negotiators intended that “Challenge Inspections would capture clandestine Chemical Weapons development and production facilities, and prohibited activities that are not subject to Routine Inspection.”383 Therefore, in view of the advances in science and technology that is rapidly transforming chemical industry; the Challenge Inspection is gaining added importance in the non-proliferation regime of the CWC.

The US has publicly accused Sudan and Iran of violating the CWC during the First Review Conference of the CWC, yet it has not pursued such allegations through Challenge Inspection. 384 States Parties prefer to address their concerns regarding compliance through confidential bilateral channels, because requesting a Challenge Inspection would be perceived as a confrontational act by the accused country, and such a measure would also disclose sensitive intelligence information for justifying the Challenge Inspection request.385 To make Challenge Inspections more palatable, it should be used initially for resolving ambiguities and clarifying information, having minimal political costs. Hence, it is imperative to reduce the political cost of Challenge Inspection and make

380 Douglas MacEachin, “Routine and Challenge: Two Pillars of Verification”, op.cit, pp. 1–3 381 . Stephen G. Rademaker, “The U.S National Statement to the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” 28 April 2003; See also Jonathan B. Tucker, “Verifying the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing Elements,” Arms Control Today, February 2007, p.8. 382 Jonathan B. Tucker The Conduct of Challenge Inspections Under the Chemical Weapons Convention: Proceedings of an Expert Workshop Held on May 29–31, 2002, in Washington, DC, op.cit, p. 21. 383 Ibid. 384 Stephen G. Rademaker, loc.cit. 385 OPCW, Decision No. 45, “Illustrative List of Objective Indicators to Facilitate the Executive Council in Addressing Any Concern, in Accordance with Paragraph 22 of Article IX, Whether the Right to Request a Challenge Inspection Has Been Abused,” First Conference of the States Parties, C-I/DEC.45, May 16, 1997.

125

it more palatable. Moreover, the OPCW should frequently conduct Challenge Inspection Exercises with participation of DG OPCW and the permanent representatives of States Parties at The Hague and the representatives of National Authorities. This would ensure requisite preparation of the OPCW, and the international community would be suitably sensitized. Germany hosted a mock Challenge Inspection in March 2006.386

3.5 Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Weapons

Chemical Weapons inflict immense and inexplicable sufferings on a mass scale. Large number of states does not have requisite capacity for protecting their populations against Chemical Weapons. When states join the CWC, they renounce Chemical Weapons, and in return they receive positive security assurance in the form of international support if their security is threatened by the use or threat of use of Chemical Weapons. This security guarantee is important because Chemical Weapons do exist, universality is still not achieved, and the concerns of chemical terrorism exist. The CWC defines assistance “as coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection against Chemical Weapons, including, inter alia, detection equipment, alarm systems, protective and decontamination equipment; medical antidotes and treatments, and advice on any of these protective measures.”387

In the historical perspective, the negotiators of the CWC emphasized establishing an international mechanism for the Investigation of Alleged Use (IAU) of CW and for delivering assistance and protection to the victims of chemical attacks under an international emergency response mechanism. After 9/11, the OPCW confirmed that this mechanism could be invoked if terrorists used toxic chemicals. Importantly, the recent exercises of IAU of CW and the delivery of assistance through the OPCW in Ukraine (field exercise, 2005), Poland (table-top exercise, 2010) and Tunisia (field exercise, 2010) all used a terrorist attack with improvised Chemical Weapons or the release of an industrial

386 OPCW, “Germany Hosts Challenge Inspection Exercise,” OPCW Press Release, April 6, 2006. 387 CWC, Article X.

126

toxic chemical as the exercise scenario.388 The complexities involved in an international response to such an attack became apparent in a recent study published by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF).389 It observed that “there are a large number of UN and other international agencies and organizations that have partial mandates… in the area of prevention, preparedness and response to possible terrorist attacks with chemical or biological weapons or materials”.390

If a State Party requests assistance, the OPCW is responsible for coordinating and delivering the requisite assistance and protection means. The assistance and protection capabilities include “expertise in predicting hazards, detecting and decontaminating chemical agents, medical relief, and on-site coordination with humanitarian and disaster response agencies.”391 The resources contemplated in the CWC include a data bank of protection information, bilateral assistance amongst states, expert advice for developing national protective capacity, a voluntary fund and other general types of assistance.

3.5.1 Forms of Assistance State Party may provide assistance as following:392 States Parties may contribute to a voluntary fund for assistance, which is administered by the OPCW Technical Secretariat.393 Conclude an agreement with the OPCW concerning the procurement, upon demand, of assistance.394 Thirdly, States Parties may declare the type and kind of assistance it might provide when required. If a State Party subsequently is unable to provide the pledged assistance, it can provide some kind of assistance of its own choosing. The Technical Secretariat of OPCW compiles such pledges and coordinates the establishment

388 Ralf Trapp, “The OPCW in Transition: from Stockpile Elimination to Maintaining a World Free of Chemical Weapons”, UNIDIR, Agent of Change? The CW Regime, Disarmament Forum, 2012, p.6. 389 United Nations CTITF Report, United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Interagency Coordination in the Event of a Terrorist Attack Using Chemical or Biological Weapons or Materials, August 2011. 390 Ibid, p.vii. 391 CWC, Article X. 392 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article X, Paragraph 7. 393 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article VIII, Paragraph 34(b). 394 CWC, Article VIII, Paragraph 34 (c).

127

and maintenance of the stockpiles of emergency assistance.395 If we draw a parallel with the working of the IAEA, it has also established a database of national assistance capabilities and a network of States willing and able to provide international assistance.396

3.5.2. Circumstances and Conditions for Requesting Assistance A State Party may request for assistance in response to actual use of Chemical Weapons (CW), the threat of use or threatening activities by anyone, including Non State Actors, and Non State Parties to the Convention. The conditions for state requesting and receiving assistance are as following:397 CW have been used against a state, Riot Control Agents (RCAs) have been used as a method of warfare, or a state is feeling threatened by the activities of a state that are in contravention to Article-1 of the Convention. Article- 1 establishes the fundamental prohibitions with regard to Chemical Weapons development and proliferation. For example the Article- I obligates states “never under any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain Chemical Weapons, or transfer directly or indirectly Chemical Weapons to anyone.”83

3.5.3 Bilateral and Regional Assistance Some States Parties contend that a State requesting for Challenge Inspection of another State has to first utilize other provisions of the CWC regarding facts finding and cooperation, such as utilizing the good offices of the OPCW to provide clarification on suspected activity either from own sources or from the suspected State. “Nothing in the CWC shall be interpreted as impeding the right of States Parties to request and provide bilateral assistance.”84 The purpose of this provision is to clarify that Article X does not replace bilateral assistance mechanism, but Article X actually complements such measures. In this regard, the OPCW should strengthen national and regional response systems.

395 CWC, Article VIII, Paragraph 39(b). 396 OPCW Table-top Exercise, IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, Warsaw, Poland, November 2010. 397 CWC, Article X, Paragraph 8. 83 CWC, Article I, Paragraph 1(a) 84 CWC, Article X, Paragraph 6.

128

While international assistance in emergency response remains important, it would be even more important that states themselves strengthen their internal response systems and regional response system against hostile acts involving the release of toxic, infectious or radiological materials. They must also develop and exercise protocols for informationsharing and coordination of response measures with their neighbours. These measures should not be restricted to chemical accidents/ incidents rather they should cater for a holistic, all-risks approach.398 The most important aspect is developing the capacity of the local and national response mechanism. This is particularly important in case of chemical terrorism or accident because effective response is required in matter of hours rather than days and weeks. The impact of biological or radiological incidents is often delayed and response measures are stretched over longer periods of time.399

3.5.4 Procedure for Investigation and Provision of Assistance The procedures for investigation and provision of assistance are as under:400

3.5.4.1 Investigations The Requesting State Party (RSP) submit request along with relevant information to the DG OPCW. The request is transmitted to the Executive Council (EC) and all assisting States Parties within 12 hours.401 The Director General will initiate investigations within 24 hours, which must be completed and the report submitted to the EC within 72 hours. However, if required, additional time can be given, but then interim report(s) will be submitted. The Ekeus panel observed that the OPCW may find it challenging to maintain a critical mass of well-trained inspectors for conducting investigations of alleged use. Therefore, there is a need for developing new concepts for maintaining readiness, such as utilizing expertise available outside the OPCW. The OPCW has to select and train such

398 Ralf Trapp, “The OPCW in Transition: from Stockpile Elimination to Maintaining a World Free of Chemical Weapons”, op.cit, p.7. 399 Ibid. 400 CWC, Article X, Paragraphs 9, 10, and 11. 401 CWC, Article-X, Paragraph 9.

129

experts periodically. 402 Moreover, necessary coordination with the investigation mechanism of the UN Secretary-General for investigations of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons, and even with the INTERPOL will be beneficial.

3.5.4.2 Supplementary Assistance The DG OPCW provides supplemental assistance as directed by the Executive Council in response to the abovementioned investigation. The Executive Council shall meet not later than 24 hours after receiving an investigation report to consider the situation and shall take a decision by simple majority within the following 24 hours on whether to instruct the Technical Secretariat to provide supplementary assistance.403

3.5.4.3 When Time is Insufficient If the information from the ongoing investigation or other reliable sources would prove that there are victims of Chemical Weapons and immediate action is indispensable, the Director–General shall notify all States Parties and shall take emergency measures of assistance, using the resources the OPCW has placed at his or her disposal.404 The basic concept is keeping limited stockpile at Headquarters, and sufficient stockpiles within States Parties in various regions. These stockpiles would be dispatched within hours by one direct airlift along with the OPCW Assistance Coordination and Assessment Team (ACAT). The ACAT would assess the needs and then assets stockpiled within States Parties would be dispatched.

The Secretariat would ensure efficient and timely delivery of assistance. The ACAT would set up a reception centre and an On-site Operation Coordination Centre (OSOCC) to deliver the assistance. The States Parties would provide experts free of charge

402 Technical Secretariat, Note by the Director General. Report of the Advisory Panel on Future Priorities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW document S/951/2011, 25 July 2011, Annex 2, para. 68. 403 Supplementary assistance is assistance in addition to that provided by States Parties pursuant to paragraphs 7 (b) and (c) of Article X of the CWC. 404 CWC, Article X, Paragraph 11.

130

to the OPCW to reinforce the ACAT. The OPCW would facilitate all this effort through coordination with relevant international organizations including the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) mechanism would be formally adopted as the mechanism for coordinating relief efforts, and arrangements would be made accordingly involving OPCW, WHO, INTERPOL and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).405

3.6 National Protective Programme under CWC

The CWC gives full right to States Parties for conducting research, cooperation with other States Parties, or use any means for developing national capacity for protection against Chemical Weapons.406 However, the CWC obligates States Parties to annually provide information regarding protective programmes to the OPCW Technical Secretariat. This national declaration substantially contributes to enhancing transparency and developing requisite confidence that national protective programs are purely for protective purposes.407 However, the level of reporting from States Parties is not satisfactory, e.g. between 1997 and 2002, only 35 of the then 147 member States provided this information to the Technical Secretariat at least once. During 2002, only 22 States Parties submitted declarations of national protective programmes.408 Not all States Parties have protective programmes, however, declarations of a ”Single Small Scale Facility” (SSSF), or an ”Other Facility for Protective Purposes” (OFPP), and notifications of transfers of Schedule- 1 chemicals, all strongly suggest that activities related to

405 United Nations CTITF Report, Interagency Coordination in the Event of a Terrorist Attack Using Chemical or Biological Weapons or Materials, op.cit, p.viii. 406 CWC, Article X, Paragraph 2. 407 According to paragraph 9 (b) of Article II, "protective purposes" are those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and Chemical Weapons. 408 Director General OPCW Report, “Updated Annexes to the Status of Implementation of Articles X and XI as of 31 December 2002,” OPCW Document EC-31/DG.2/Add.1, 18 March 2003.

131

protective purposes are taking place. There is therefore a discrepancy between what is being declared and what appears to be taking place in individual States Parties.409

The aim of this national report is to provide the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW and other State Parties with an overview and scope of the States Party’s defensive programme against Chemical Weapons. Indeed, it provides guidance to States for improving their defensive capabilities. 410 The term ‘national programme’ should not be interpreted narrowly. This national report should include a broad range of government sponsored activities, which are intended to enhance protection from the threat of Chemical Weapons attack, both in the short and long term. This information should be unclassified or classified at the lowest level so that it can be analyzed at various levels and can be shared with States Parties. This national declaration should be mandatory and a State may submit ‘Nil report’ if it does not have national protective programme. This would help in achieving desired transparency.411

The OPCW Technical Secretariat maintains freely available information in a data bank for the use of any requesting State Party. The information are obtained from open sources, and information provided by States Parties.412 Moreover, each State Party has the right to participate in, the exchange of scientific and technological information regarding means of protection against Chemical Weapons, and related material and equipment.413 The OPCW also organizes courses and workshops for governmental experts and emergency response units and governmental officials and experts such as Swiss Exercise Course on Protection Against Chemical Weapons, Advanced Training Course in Civil Defence Against Chemical Weapons, Regional Advanced Assistance and Protection Courses on Chemical Emergency Response, OPCW Assistance and Protection Training Course for Instructors, Regional Workshops on Assistance and Protection of the CWC and

409 The UK paper on “Declaration of National Protective Programmes under Article X”, Conference of the States Parties, RC-1/ NAT.4, 15 April 2003, p.1. 410 Ibid. 411 Ibid. 412 CWC, Article X, Paragraph 5. 413 CWC, Article X, Paragraph 3.

132

Issues of Regional Coordination held in all regions of the world, etc. The aim of these training programmes is to build and develop emergency response systems and national capacities against the use of Chemical Weapons, or serious threat of use of Chemical Weapons.414

3.7 Export Control Regime under CWC

The CWC has a multilateral mechanism for addressing the challenge of chemical proliferation but the outcome would depend upon the commitment and political will of States Parties to CWC. Until the mid- 1980s, there was unregulated trade in the dual-use chemicals. Iraq produced Chemical Weapons from production equipment and chemicals that were provided by Western companies. Therefore, after the discovery of Iraqi clandestine programme, in 1984, several countries realized the importance of chemical export controls and imposed national export controls on Chemical Weapons precursors.415 In June 1985 these countries met to harmonize their national exports control and it marked the beginning of Australia Group.416 This Group functions on the basis of consensus and has no charter.

New states are given membership based on the condition that they have established a legally binding export control system, and have renounced CW. The Australia Group harmonizes exports control on dual-use chemical production equipment, 54 dual-use chemical precursors and also coordinates export controls on Biological Weapons material and equipment. Australia Group shares information on export control enforcements and intelligence on proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.417 The main intention behind forming Australia Group was to counter chemical and biological

414 H.E Ahmet Uzumcu Director General Statement to the United Nations General Assembly, op.cit, p.4. 415 These countries included Australia, Canada, the European Community (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the UK), Japan, New Zealand and the US. 416 Ian Anthony and Sibylle Bauer, “Transfer Controls,” SIPRI Year Book, (Stockholm: 2006), p.780. 417 Julian Perry Robinson, “The Australia Group: A Description and Assessment”, in Hans Gunter Brauch, Henry J. van der Graaf, John Grin and Wim Smit, eds., Controlling Military Research and Development and Exports of Dual use Technologies as a Problem of Disarmament and Arms Control Policy in the 1990s (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), p.160.

133

weapons proliferation but some States view it as a discriminatory interest group that impedes legitimate trade.418

3.7.1 Scope of CWC Export Controls Some States Parties are of the view that the CWC covers only Schedule chemicals.419 Whereas, Article-II amply clarifies that the term “Chemical Weapons” has broad meaning and is not limited to chemicals listed in the three Schedules of the CWC. The Annex of schedule chemicals itself states that schedules “do not constitute a definition of Chemical Weapons.” The CWC obligates State Parties (SPs) to monitor and if necessary restrict transfers of all toxic chemicals and their precursors. 420 Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: “To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; To use chemical weapons; or engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; or assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.”421 Thus Article-I prohibits transfer of dual-use chemicals, dual-use equipment, finances, and even intangible technology such as production know-how that are intended for use in prohibited activities.

The chapeau of Article VI, paragraph 2, provides a legal basis for requiring States Parties to implement chemical export controls. It stipulates that “each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only … transferred… for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.” This sentence makes clear that the term “necessary measures” is applicable on all dual-use toxic chemicals and chemical precursors and is not restricted to chemicals and precursors listed in the three lists

418 th NAM, “The Final Document of the 12 Summit of the Non- Aligned Movement”, 2-3 September 1998, Durban, South Africa; K. Subrahmanyam, “Export Controls and North South Controversy”, Washington Quarterly, Vol.16, Spring 1993, p.143. 419 India, “Chemical Trade and International Cooperation under the CWC,” OPCW PrepCom Document PC- XIII/B/WP.7, 23 February 1996, p.2. 420 Urs Cipolat, “The New Chemical Weapons Convention and Export Controls: Towards Greater Multilateralism?” Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol.21 (Spring 2000), p.417. 421 Chemical Weapons Convention, Artilce I, paragraph 1.

134

of schedule chemicals. Thus, regarding non-proliferation obligations, both Article- VI and Article-I compliments each other.

3.7.2 Export Control Provisions under CWC The General Purpose Criteria (GPC) under CWC is extremely important regarding export controls under CWC because the CWC schedules cannot cover all known and unknown precursors. For example, “when the chemical export controls were imposed on Iraq in the mid-1980s, Iraq could no longer import the mustard gas precursor thiodiglycol. In response, Iraq started importing precursors 2- chloroethanol and sodium- sulfide, which are not listed in the CWC schedules.”422 Moreover, Article-I specifies that States Parties undertake never to “transfer, directly or indirectly Chemical Weapons to anyone, nor to assist, encourage or induce in anyway, another State to engage in prohibited activities.” States Parties are also obligated to declare transfer of such chemicals among themselves, and implement specific restrictions on transfer of Schedule chemicals to non- State Parties. The specific restrictions under CWC are: a. Schedule-1 Chemicals. They can only be transferred among States Parties in limited quantities and for a specific purpose. Transfers of Schedule-I chemicals to and from non- States Parties is prohibited. Once schedule-I chemicals are transferred they cannot be retransferred to another State Party. b. Schedule- 2 Chemicals. As of 29 April 2000, the export or import of Schedule- 2 chemicals to and from non-States Parties is prohibited. c. Schedule- 3 Chemicals. For the export of Schedule- 3 chemicals to nonState Party an End-Use Certificate is required. It is widely felt that more restrictions may be imposed in the future.

3.7.3 Trade Restrictions under CWC

422 Australia, “National Export Licensing Measures,” OPCW PrepCom Document PC XIII/B/WP.9, 26 March 1996; Australia, “Non-paper: Chemical Weapons Convention Industry Verification: Inspection of Schedule 3 and Discreet Organic Chemical (DOC) Facilities,” OPCW CSP Document C-VI/ NAT.7, 24 June 1999.

135

The CWC export control regime has two distinct elements: one, restrictions and prohibitions on trade among States Parties; second, regarding non-States Parties, the reporting of trade and certain trade regulations. The international trade among States Parties in Schedule-1 chemicals is small and only for medical purposes, which primarily involves saxitoxin and Ricin.423 Nevertheless, the OPCW always find major discrepancies between the submissions of importing and exporting States. 424 The issue of discrepancies is pertinent for the inter-state trade regarding Schedule- 2 and 3 chemicals. The OPCW puts in concerted efforts to reconcile the said discrepancies but the outcome remains unsatisfactory.425 The second element of the CWC export control regime is regarding restrictions and prohibitions on the Schedule chemicals’ trade with non- States Parties.

Since the entry into force of the Convention, the provision of Schedule-1 chemicals to non-States Parties is prohibited. Since 29 April 2000 the OPCW has prohibited the transfers of Schedule- 2 chemicals to non-States Parties. 426 However, the transfer of Schedule-3 chemicals to and from non-States Parties is permitted by the Convention. But, the Convention obligates States to seek End User Certificate prior to export of Schedule-3 chemicals in question. The volume of trade in Schedule- 3 chemicals is fairly large. The OPCW is considering even banning trade in Schedule- 3 chemicals with non- States Parties. But, since the consumption of Schedule-3 chemicals is so large, mostly States are reluctant for this prohibition, rather, they prefer to tighten up the rule of seeking End User Certificate.

The OPCW is disposed for a complete ban on the transfer of Schedule-3 chemicals to non-State Party, since it may serve as incentive for joining the Convention.427 Some

423 Daniel Feakes, “Export Controls, Chemical Trade and the Chemical Weapons Convention,” in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Challenges and Solutions, (Washington D.C.: 2001), p.48. 424 Takuya Igarashi, “Lessons from Investigations into Discrepancies in Import and Export Data of Schedule 2 and 3 Chemicals”, presentation to the First Annual Meeting of the National Authorities and Chemical Industry Representatives, The Hague, 26-27 June 1999. 425 nd Jose M. Bustani, “Opening Statement by the Director General to the Executive Council 22 Session”, 5 December 2000. 426 Daniel Feakes, “Export Controls, Chemical Trade and the Chemical Weapons Convention,” loc.cit. 427 Daniel Feaks’s interview at The Hague, The Netherlands, 18 January 2000.

136

States Parties do not have the legal basis for requiring the certificates, while others have the necessary legislation but lack the resources to enforce it effectively. It is also not clear how a State Party would know if a non-State Party had reexported a Schedule-3 chemical, and how it can be prevented. Other options include imposing a partial ban limited to Schedule-3A chemicals, or a ban on imports.428 Moreover, the chemical industry is of the view that additional restrictions on Schedule-3 chemicals would be detrimental to the international production and provision patterns of chemicals and consumer products.429

3.7.4 National Export Controls Obligations States Parties to the CWC are obliged to enact comprehensive CWC implementation legislation, regulations and adopt necessary administrative measures for implementing the Convention. Legislative and regulatory harmonization can facilitate developing international response against proliferation. Despite national legislative and administrative measures, much depends on the responsible attitude and functioning of the chemical industry. Ideally, the chemical industry should meticulously monitor and control their imports and exports of chemicals. This would serve as good confidence building measure, enhance transparency of international trade in relevant chemicals, and significantly reduce the risk of misuse by Non State Actors. In view of the global spread of chemical technology, “export controls can delay but not deny sensitive technology to determined proliferators.” 430 As Brad Roberts had argued, “the classic case for export controls is that they retard weapons acquisition programmes while also making them more costly… although the time they buy and the costs they impose are shrinking.” 431 Regarding impact on trade, instead of restricting trade, the export controls may actually enable trade by creating confidence among suppliers that the recipients will not misuse their products.

428 Ibid. 429 Richard H. Burgess, “Chemical Industry and the CWC”, in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Challenges and Solutions, Monterey Institute of International Studies, p.47. 430 Richard Cupitt, “The Future of Export Controls”, presentation at the 2000 Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference, 16-17 March 2000. 431 Brad Roberts, “Rethinking Export Controls on Dual-Use Materials and Technologies: From Trade Restraints to Trade Enablers”, The Arena, No.2, June 1995, p.3.

137

Some experts consider the intangible technology transfer as one of the main proliferation threats. Therefore, States Parties should make concerted efforts in addressing the issue of intangible technology transfer432 The national declarations on transfers of Schedule chemicals is a fundamental part of international monitoring regime, which enables the OPCW to effectively monitor the international trade of Schedule chemicals and analyze suspicious trends and transfers. 433 However, due to inadequate and incorrect national declarations, the system could not deliver as envisaged by the framers of the Convention. As a matter of fact, many States Parties do not have necessary regulations for collecting requisite data, and collectively the reporting by States Parties has little harmonization. As a result, the data declared by States Parties cannot serve as an effective non-proliferation tool.434

3.7.5 Capacity Building of Customs Authorities The OPCW and World Customs Organization (WCO) have concluded an agreement for the capacity building of national customs services and CWC National Authorities. 435 Similar training programmes have also been initiated for the customs officials of former Soviet republics, e.g. the US Department of Defence, FBI and Customs Service had trained and equipped the border security officials in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for deterring, preventing, and investigating the transfers of NBC weapons and materials.436 DG OPCW is of the view that the monitoring of transfers and trade in chemicals will need to be made more rigorous for effective implementation of export control regime under CWC. All States Parties should have the ability to fully

432 Timothy Williams, “U.S. Controls on Technology Transfers by Intangible Means,” The Monitor, No.6, Summer 2000, p.12. 433 Daniel Feakes, Challenges in the Implementation of Export Controls under the Chemical Weapons Convention, in Rodrigo Yepes-Enríquez and Lisa Tabassi, eds., Treaty Enforcement and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters, (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2002), p. 338. 434 Ibid. 435 Ercan Saka, “The Role of Customs Services and the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) Enforcement Programme to Combat Illicit Movement of Prohibited Chemical weapons”, Reader: International Symposium on Cooperation and Legal Assistance for the Effective Implementation of International Agreements”, OPCW, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2001, p.140. 436 U.S. Department of Defence, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001.

138

monitor the import and export of chemicals of concern by enhancing the knowledge and skills of their relevant governmental authorities, especially the customs authorities. OPCW conducts regular training programmes for customs officials in States Parties. Such training programmes and cooperation with the WCO will likely increase the capacity of individual States Parties.437 Customs and law enforcement officials hold annual meetings under the Australia Group and the European Union,438 which can serve as a model for the OPCW.439

3.7.6 Need for Multilateral Effort During the negotiations of the CWC, many believed that the Australia Group would get dissolved after the entry into force of the CWC. The Group’s position is that it is contributing to the international non-proliferation efforts.440 The CWC is an international regime; any state can join the CWC without any conditions, unlike the Australia Group. Export control regime should be based on universal adherence; therefore, international regime proves more fruitful as compared to ad-hoc agreements.441 The proliferation of WMD is a major threat to the international community. Therefore, the counter proliferation strategy should view this issue as a global issue. Acting in small groups is not enough. The European Union approach provides suitable guidelines that multilateral cooperation is the best response for addressing the issue of proliferation.442

437 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW, “Opening Statement” at the Table-Top Exercise on the Preparedness of States Parties to Prevent Terrorist Attacks Involving Chemicals, Warsaw, Poland, 22 November 2010, p.4. 438 Article-15 of the EU Regulations on Dual-Use Goods requires member States to “take all appropriate measures to establish direct cooperation and exchange of information between competent authorities.” 439 The E.U., “Council Regulations (EC) No 1334/ 2000”, 22 June 2000; Official Journal of the European Communities, L 159, 30 June 2000, pp.1- 215. 440 U.S., “Export Controls and Chemical Weapons Convention,” OPCW Conference of States Parties Document, C- IV/ NAT.2, 29 April 1999. 441 Jose M. Bustani, “Opening Statement by the Director General OPCW to the Conference of the States Parties at its Fifth Session,” OPCW CSP Document C-V/DG.11, 15 May 2000. 442 Nico Frandi, “Enhancing Chemical Safety and Security: The European Union Support to the Work of the OPCW”, The International Meeting On Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8 – 9 November 2012, p.1.

139

3.8 Scientific & Technological Developments: Implications on CWC

3.8.1 Development of Incapacitating Agents A number of states are attempting developing incapacitating agents utilizing pharmaceutical chemicals or toxins.443 According to the ICRC, “there is clearly an ongoing attraction to ‘incapacitating chemical agents’ but it is not easy to determine the extent to which this development has moved.” 444 The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry has noted “efforts are reportedly underway in some States Parties to develop weapons with nonlethal properties for use in law enforcement situations. But such weapons may also be thought to have utility in counter-terrorism or urban warfare situations.”445 The CWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of Chemical Weapons “under any circumstances”.446

The CWC defines Chemical Weapons as including: “toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.” 447 Thus, such incapacitants would be considered Chemical Weapons if they were used for purposes other than those permitted purposes specified in the CWC 448 or if their use was inconsistent with the types and quantities restriction of the CWC449 and still the use should be in conformity with the “principles and applicable norms of international law”.450

443 M. Crowley, Dangerous Ambiguities: Regulation of Riot Control Agents and Incapacitants under the Chemical Weapons Convention, 2009 444 ICRC, Expert Meeting: Incapacitating Chemical Agents, Implications for International Law, Montreux, Switzerland, 24–26 March 2010, p. 3. 445 M. Balali-Mood, P. Steyn, L. Sydnes and R. Trapp, Impact of Scientific Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention (IUPAC Technical Report), IUPAC, 2008, p. 185. 446 CWC, Article-1, p.2. 447 CWC, Article-II, paragraph 1. 448 CWC, Article-II, paragraph 9. 449 CWC, Article-II, paragraph 1.a. 450 The First and Second CWC Review Conferences both recognized the existence of “principles and applicable norms of international law” of relevance to the use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited, but did not elaborate upon them.

140

Many in the medical communities have questioned the feasibility of developing a truly non-lethal incapacitating agent.451 The British Medical Association believes that “the incapacitants that could incapacitate the right intended people do not exist and is unlikely in the foreseeable future.”452 Similarly, study conducted by the Royal Society in 2012 concluded that “it is not technically feasible to develop an absolutely safe incapacitating chemical agent453 and delivery system combination because of inherent variables such as the size, health and age of the target population.” 454 Efforts by a number of states to develop and deploy so-called “non-lethal” chemical agents will have significant implications on the Convention and the international norm against the hostile use of toxic chemicals will be seriously undermined.

3.8.2 Automated Control of Chemical Industry Since the last two decades, computers are increasingly used in the chemical manufacturing processes. This automation helps in creating efficient reaction conditions and also provides substantial safety to the operators. However, automated control offers similar advantages in the context of producing Chemical Weapons. The automated control reduces the release of toxic vapours in the atmosphere that could have been detected by sensitive environmental monitoring equipment. Moreover, the equipment, software, and know-how are commonly available, which from the Chemical Weapons proliferation point of view is troublesome.455

451 L. Klotz, M. Furmanski and M. Wheelis, “Beware the Siren’s Song: Why ‘Non-Lethal’ Incapacitating Chemical Agents are Lethal”, Federation of American Scientists, 2003, p. 7. 452 British Medical Association, The Use of Drugs as Weapons: The Concerns and Responsibilities of Healthcare Professionals, 2007, p. 1. 453 This is a function of dose, something that was impossible to regulate in the Moscow Theatre Siege action. This presents serious challenges for proponents of Non Lethal Weapons (NLWs). Drugs are difficult to use as weapons as there is no difference between a drug and a poison. In the absence of ability to closely control dose, there is no such thing as a non-lethal weapon. 454 The Royal Society, Brain Waves Module 3: Neuroscience, Conflict and Security, 2012, p. iv. See also S. Mogl ed., Technical Workshop on Incapacitating Chemical Agents, Spiez, Switzerland, 8–9 September 2011, Spiez Laboratory, 2012. 455 George W. Parshall, Graham S. Pearson, et al., “Impact of Scientific Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention”, IUPAC Technical Report, Vol.74, 2002.

141

3.8.3 Micro-Reactors Micro-reactors have moved to industrial production. It provides safety during manufacture, handling and storage of chemicals. This technology gives improved reactivity, product yield, selectivity and produces fewer waste streams. 456 But, these advantages could also be used by the terrorists for the production of new chemical warfare agents. Moreover, if States decide to produce Chemical Weapons in such reactors, there would be fewer clues that might indicate that such prohibitive activities were taking place.457 The proliferation of dangerous chemicals and the possibility of their use by terrorists are real threats, and they relate directly to the implementation of the Convention and the work of OPCW. These threats necessitate reforming the OPCW.458

3.8.4 Sophisticated OCPF Facilities A significant threat to the CWC is posed by the sophisticated OCPFs that are capable of producing Schedule- 1 chemicals with little or no physical conversion. Such facilities are quite flexible regarding processing and production of chemicals, keeping in view the needs of variety of customers. Resultantly, such facilities are just like Schedule- 1 production facilities. Moreover, the capabilities for “Just-in-time” production does not require storing large quantities of raw materials at plant sites, which is the major indicator for suspicious activities.

3.8.5 Fusion of Chemistry and Biology Several scientific disciplines such as chemistry, mathematics, engineering and information technology are converging under the life sciences, thereby blurring the borders between chemistry and biology.459 Such fusion will lead to unexpected discoveries and

456 Ralf Trapp, “Advances in Science and Technology and the Chemical Weapons Convention” Arms Control Association, April 2008, p.2. 457 Ibid. 458 Nico Frandi, “Enhancing Chemical Safety and Security: The European Union Support to the Work of the OPCW”, op.cit, p.2. 459 See “Chapter 4: Integration of Multiple Disciplines in Life Science Research”, in Life Sciences and Related Fields: Trends Relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention, National Research Council of the National Academies, 2011, pp. 81–92.

142

insights. But these developments also carry risks regarding the potential for their misuse. These advances are spreading throughout the world. They can develop new cures but can also produce Chemical Weapons.460 Therefore, the OPCW must broaden its mandate for effectively addressing such extraordinary technological developments.

3.9 Conclusion

The ongoing destruction of declared Chemical Weapons stockpiles suggests that the intensity of verifying and monitoring destruction facilities and activities will substantially reduce. This phase should mark the transition of the OPCW verification regime to one with new priorities. In fact, the destruction of the Chemical Weapons stockpiles is not an end in itself; rather it is the first step towards a world safe and secure from the abuse of dual-use chemicals and technologies. The CWC and the OPCW will have to suitably adapt to evolving security environment, otherwise, the Convention risks becoming outdated and will be unable to effectively address emerging challenges to international security. The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Geneva (1980-81) Charles C. Floweree stated “The means by which these agreements survive and adapt to changing conditions after they enter into force deserve as much attention as the negotiations that produced them in the first place.”461 The broader international efforts against proliferation should not only necessitate intensifying and increasing the number of routine industrial inspections, but also a more qualitative selection methodology of chemical plant sites should be developed for inspecting most relevant facilities at priority. Moreover, the OPCW should help enhance the chemical-security culture in States Parties and should fully utilize its mandate, expertise and resources as an essential contribution to the international effort against terrorism and proliferation. In this context, the OPCW would require a strategic approach for drawing on the synergy of its various assistance programmes and various initiatives of other international agencies.

460 Prof. William W. Keller, “Toward a ‘Chemical Safety and Security Leadership Forum’ op.cit, p.2.

461 Ambassador Charles C. Floweree, “On Tending Arms Control Agreements,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol.13, No.1, Winter 1990, pp.199- 214.

143

Keeping in view the advances in the life sciences and their global distribution and easy availability, the traditional state-centric concepts of counter-proliferation approaches are most likely not to deliver as expected. Instead, the new circumstances necessitate counter-proliferation initiatives that bring together all stakeholders. Moreover, the Routine Industrial verification regime in its present form creates false confidence in compliance. This routine verification mechanism requires review for suitably adapting to current challenges. The review and reform efforts must ensure that most relevant “facilities to the Convention” are inspected. The Non-State Actors may develop new scenarios, and acquire or manufacture new chemical warfare agents. Keeping in view, the concerns of proliferation and terrorism, the OPCW industrial verification has to move beyond simply confirming the national declarations, rather, the OPCW has to critically evaluate whether on-going activities and facilities are in line with the obligations under the CWC. The OPCW has to utilize the General Purpose Criterion, which is integral to both national and international implementation and verification measures and the GPC calls for comprehensive coverage of all toxic chemicals and their precursors. The concept of verification shall be implemented and adopted as a process cooperative. Moreover, due to the present site selection methodology, the Routine Inspection effort is applied with inequality.

The Routine and Challenge Inspection mechanisms should interact synergistically. No State Party has ever used their right to request for Challenge Inspection, due to the associated political costs, hence; it is felt that Challenge Inspection is not a “normal” component of the regime. This approach is seriously weakening the CWC verification regime.462 In view of the advances in science and technology that is rapidly transforming chemical industry; the Challenge Inspection mechanism is gaining added importance in the CWC verification and non-proliferation regime. To make Challenge Inspections more palatable, it should be used initially for resolving ambiguities and clarifying information, having minimal political costs.

462 Jonathan B. Tucker The Conduct of Challenge Inspections Under the Chemical Weapons Convention: Proceedings of an Expert Workshop, op.cit, p. 21.

144

The positive security guarantee to States Parties in the form of ‘OPCW Assistance and Protection’ provision will remain important as long as Chemical Weapons exist, universality of CWC is not achieved and the threat of the use of these weapons by terrorists continues. The complexities involved in an international response to chemical terrorism are numerous. The OPCW should help states develop national capacities and should encourage regional cooperation and coordination; and such programmes should not be restricted to chemical accidents/ incidents rather they should cater for a holistic, all-risks approach. Moreover, States should submit rigorously prepared annual declarations regarding National Protective Programmes. This national report should include a broad range of government sponsored activities, which are intended to enhance protection from the threat of Chemical Weapons attack, both in the short and long term. The declaration of national protective programmes should be mandatory, which would significantly contribute to achieving desired transparency.

The CWC has a comprehensive and multilateral mechanism for addressing the chemical proliferation concerns, but the outcome is dependent upon the commitment and political will of States Parties. Declared Chemical Weapons stockpiles are under strict monitoring and gradually being destroyed, threats in the medium to long term are more likely from the misuse of scientific and technological developments by either States or Non State Actors. States Parties should pay due attention to the intangible technology transfer such as technical know-how, and comprehensively incorporate the General Purpose Criteria (GPC), which is extremely important because the CWC schedules do not and cannot include all known precursors. All States Parties should develop the capacity to fully monitor the import and export of chemicals of concern by enhancing the knowledge and skills of their relevant governmental authorities, especially the customs authorities. The proliferation of WMD is a major threat to the international community; therefore, the counter proliferation strategy should view this issue as a global issue and adopt a multilateral approach. Nonetheless, much depends on industry’s role; ideally, all major producers of scheduled chemicals and certain unscheduled chemicals should monitor and control their imports and exports of chemicals. This would increase transparency,

145

contribute to confidence building, and reduce the risk of misuse of chemicals by Non-State Actors.

It is felt that at some point in future, the CWC would become primarily a confidence building measure and many of the OPCW key performance indicators would shift from Chemical Weapons related activities to industry programmes and activities related to national implementation measures, provision of assistance and protection and the economic and technological developments in the field of chemistry. Legal instruments preceding the CWC failed because they were devoid of verification provisions. Today, the international community as a whole has to ensure that the prohibitions under CWC are implemented so comprehensively that enables the verification regime to effectively cover new chemicals and new means of production of chemicals. Moreover, States Parties should deny Non- State Actors access to chemicals of concern or the means of their production. This necessitates effective national implementation of the Convention, including measures such as systematic national declarations, appropriate controls on transfer of chemicals and regulatory measures to identify and track toxic chemicals. Many people mistakenly believe that the OPCW is mainly responsible for the CWC verification regime; whereas, National Authorities on CWC have the most crucial role in ensuring verifications at national level, and effectively implementing the Convention. The National Authorities on CWC must effectively monitor and inspect chemical industry, and the OPCW inspections and monitoring of data should be considered as an important supplementary assistance.

CHAPTER 4

COUNTERING CHEMICAL PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM

4.1 General

Al-Qaeda attacks on 9/11 ushered in a new era of conflict and have changed global priorities, security landscape and also amply demonstrated that organized terrorist groups

146

have the proven capacity to threaten international peace and security. 463 The security landscape has changed significantly regarding nonproliferation threat. What was a more targeted and defined threat in the early 1990’s has become more diversified with an increased number of terrorist organizations on the international scene. The Non State Actors (NSA) are present in many regions of the world and are easily moving across borders. Therefore, various programs have been introduced for preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiological (CBRN) proliferation464 not only to states but also to NSA.465 The U.S. in the early 1990’s focused on preventing the spread of Soviet-era WMDs, their associated material, know-how and expertise through various efforts. However, now, the international community through various arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regime, etc is focusing on other regions of the world to engage them as partners in multilateral efforts for preventing WMD proliferation466 and terrorism.5 Chemical safety and security programmes are undertaken as part of this international effort to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism. These programs are designed for preventing access to Chemical Weapons, their precursors, dual-use infrastructure and expertise. As recognized by the United Nations, the proliferation of WMD constitutes one of the most pressing challenges to global peace and security.6 Therefore, the scope of these programmes is international, since insecure dual-use material anywhere in the world can be a risk to the international community.7

Regarding security of chemical industry, it is generally felt that the potential threat from attack on industrial chemical facilities has not received adequate attention.8 Moreover, the industrial plants are not designed to withstand well-executed attack by a

463 Brian M. Jenkins, “The Organization Men: Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack,” in James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose, How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p.8. 464 Non-proliferation is based on four key pillars: treaty-based, arms control and disarmament treaties; export control regimes; 'hands-on counter-proliferation', such as UNSCR- 1540, Proliferation Security Initiative, etc; and defence and consequence management as stated by Mark Smith, Caitríona McLeish, “Countering CBW Proliferation,” Report on Wilton Park Conference 871, Wilton Park, 28- 30 September 2007, p.2. 465 Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, The US Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs, Presentation at the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012, p.2. 466 ‘Proliferation’ increasingly refers to the spread of dual-use technology that can be weaponised should possessors choose to do so. Mark Smith, Caitríona McLeish, “Countering CBW Proliferation,” Report on Wilton Park Conference 871, Wilton Park, 28- 30 September 2007, p.1.

147

terrorist group, nor is there good understanding of protection from a well-placed insider threat.9 Attacks on chemical industrial facilities may become a shift in chemical warfare from the state owned Chemical Weapons programs of the Cold War to improvised agents and methods for terrorism.10 In the same context, it is far easier to attack during the chemical transportation through a rail car or a truck full of toxic industrial chemicals than

5 Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Presentation at the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, op.cit, p.2. 6 OPOC Technical Secretariat, Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General Address to the Seminar on the CWC and Chemical Safety and Security Management for Member States of the Region of Southeast and South Asia,” Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 8- 11 May 2012. 7 Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Presentation at the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, op.cit, p.2. 8 John F. Sopko, “The Changing Proliferation Threat,” Foreign Policy, No. 105, Winter 1996–1997, pp. 3– 20; Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, No.1, January 1998, Amy E. Smithson and Lesley-Anne Levy. Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response, Report No. 35 (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, October 2000); Christopher F. Chyba, Jean Pascal Zanders, “Assessing the Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol.6, No.4, 1999, pp. 17–34; Gregory Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” International Security, Vol.28, No.3, Winter 2003–2004, pp. 84– 122. 9 The US Committee on Science and Technology on Countering Terrorism, “Toxic Chemicals and Explosive Material”, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, 2002, p.128. 10 Jonathan B.Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.55, No.4, July–August 1999, pp.46-52; Margaret E. Kosal, “Near Term Threats of Chemical Weapons Terrorism,” paper presented at the Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks Conference, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, 29-30 June 2005. compromising the security of a military base and obtain Chemical Weapons.467 If history is taken as a guide, Chemical Weapons have been used both by opposing military forces on the battlefield and chemical material such as Sarin gas by terrorists in population centres. Therefore, Chemical Weapons are unique among the family of WMDs.468

467 FBI Agent Troy Morgan quoted in Carl Prine, “Chemical Industry Slowly Boosts Security,” Pittsburgh Tribune- Review, 22 June 2003. 468 Margaret E. Kosal, “Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce the Chemical Terror Threat”, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, September 2008, p.8.

148

The primary focus of this chapter is on the roles and significance of the CWC, national implementation of CWC, the OPCW and the chemical industry in countering proliferation and terrorism. In addition, a brief overview on the probability of chemical terrorism is also part of this chapter. The first section contains the discussion on prospects of chemical terrorism; significance of national export controls, monitoring of dual-use chemicals and equipment, and correct national declarations to the OPCW in countering the challenges of proliferation. It also highlights the limitations of the OPCW verification system, which reveals the significance of effective national implementation of the Convention, and especially the national verification, monitoring and control mechanism on Schedule chemicals, dual-use chemicals and related equipment and technology. In addition, this chapter contains information on the OPCW using its expertise in cooperating with various international organizations, agencies and arrangements, and thus contributing to the global struggle against terrorism and proliferation. Question arises, does changing security landscape necessitate the need to transform the mandate of the OPCW, and refine and intensify the routine OPCW industrial verification mechanism? The final section of this chapter contains the discussion on the role of chemical industry for providing enabling environment to the OPCW and National Authorities for effective implementation of the legal and moral norms of the Convention and thus safeguarding workplaces, communities and the environment.

4.2 Prospects of WMD Terrorism

Chemical Weapons have been used with brutal regularity over the twentieth century, and tragically in the 21st century also. The effects of Chemical Weapons would defy any description. It is enough to look at the pictures of victims to understand the agony that they must have gone through from Lepar in Belgium to Sardasht in Iran, from Halabja in Iraq to Ghauta in Syria. In the words of Ambassador Jose Bustani “WMD terrorism is one of the most important subject of the contemporary international agenda.”469 The Aum Shinrikyo cult’s attack in 1995 at the Tokyo sub-way system proclaimed the dawn of a new

469 H.E. Jose Bustani, Director General OPCW, “Possible Responses to Global Terrorist Threats,” OPCW Document No. S/292/2002, 29 January 2002.

149

age of “catastrophic” terrorism involving Chemical Weapons. Experts believe this catastrophic threat is perfectly plausible, today.” 470 The discussion of unconventional terrorism had spread from academic and government circles to Hollywood, which prepared movies showing terrorists endeavours to attack with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.471 Novelists also took up similar lines.472 President Clinton read one such novel Cobra Event, which made him so worried about unconventional terrorism that it caused him sleepless nights. He remarked

“If the issue is, is it a near certainty that at some time in the future there will be some group, probably a terrorist group that attempts to bring to bear either the use or the threat of a chemical or biological operation, I would say that is highly likely to happen sometime in the next few years.”473 Importantly, many scholars have argued that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are not weapons of choice for terrorists. Stern writes that “most terrorists will continue to avoid WMD for a variety of reasons,” preferring instead the “gun and the bomb.”474 Brian Jenkins agreed that most terrorist organizations are technologically conservative, but he also noted that the self-imposed moral restraints on terrorist actions are fading away.475 Moreover, most terrorist organizations pursue political objectives. Therefore, they strive to gain public sympathy and wish to benefit politically after carrying out any terrorist act. As Brian Jenkins has remarked, terrorists want lots of people watching, not lots of people

470 Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow, Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy, Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project 1, No. 6 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, 1998); Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow, “Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger,” Foreign Affairs Vol.77, No. 6, November/ December 1998, p. 81. 471 The Rock, 1996; Executive Decision, 1996; The Long Kiss Goodnight, 1996; Face Off, 1997; Chill Factor, 1999; and Mission: Impossible- 2, 2000. 472 Tom Clancy, Executive Orders (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1996); Robin Cook, Contagion (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995); Robin Cook, Vector (New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 1999). 473 President William J. Clinton, “Interview of the President by the New York Times” (Washington, DC: White House, 23 January 1999). Earlier, President Clinton stated: “In light of what happened in Japan, all advanced countries should be very, very concerned about the prospect of the merger of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction…” “Transcript of Remarks by President Clinton and President Yeltsin in a Joint Press Conference in Moscow,” US Newswire, 10 May 1995. 474 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.70. 475 Brian M. Jenkins, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? A Reappraisal,” in Harvey W. Kushner, ed., The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium, (SAGE Publication, 1998), pp. 225- 49.

150

dead.476 Moreover, terrorist groups wish to survive and prosper politically. Their leaders understand that a Hiroshima-like disaster would effectively mean the end of their movements.477 Therefore, mass killing is not in their interest. Conversely, the new trends in current terrorist organizations modous operandi underscores that transnational terrorist organizations have been ignoring the moral constraints on the mass killing.

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal is of the view that terrorism is changing its character and meaning constantly. Consequently, disagreements exist at various levels on the very definition of the term ‘terrorism’; and the common understanding of terrorism has become too vague, expansive and simplistic. Since, terrorism is constantly changing and growing more violent; it indicates that the possibility of WMD terrorism does exist. Terrorist groups demonstrated new capacities when they launched the landmark attacks of 9/11. Moreover, Al-Qaeda is striving to acquire WMD capability. The existence of black markets, easy availability of chemical and biological dual-use agents, their knowhow and equipment suggests that the threat of WMD terrorism warrants serious consideration.478 Moreover, the current trends in terrorism as cited in succeeding paragraph are dangerous.

“Terrorist groups are operating globally as part of the worldwide network. They are integrated by transnational non-state organizations through global networks of terrorist cells located in many countries involving unprecedented level of communication and coordination…Modern terrorism is very lethal… terrorists are now killing as many people as possible for the sake of instilling fear in the public. In few countries, the use of chemical and biological agents for such nefarious acts has given birth to the fear that terrorists might one day use Nuclear Weapons. The Bush Administration in its war against terrorism cited the role played by states in supporting and sponsoring terrorism has enhanced the striking power and

476 Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Super-terrorism Scare”, Foreign Policy, No.112, Fall 1998, p.4. 477 Ibid. 478 Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “WMD Terrorism and Pakistan: Counter Measures,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, Vol.1, No.2, Fall 2008, pp.105-109.

151

capabilities of ordinary terrorist organizations. These trends show that the Weapons of Mass Destruction suit terrorists’ strategy.”479

Bruce Hoffman noted in 1993 that, because “religious terrorist violence inevitably assumes a transcendent purpose and therefore becomes a sacramental duty, it arguably results in a significant loosening of the constraints on the commission of mass murder.” 480 With moral restraints loosening, Richard Falkenrath predicted in 1998 that “it is certain that more and more Non- State Actors will become capable of NBC weapons acquisition and use.”481 The U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security warned that the “expertise, technology, and material needed to build the most deadly weapons known to mankind including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons are spreading inexorably.”482 Similarly, experts argue that the mix of religiously inspired terrorism and availability of requisite technology “will impel terrorists to overcome technical, organizational and logistical obstacles to WMD use.”483 Former U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen summed up his clarity of mind regarding mass-destruction terrorism: "the question is no longer if this will happen, but when."484

4.2.1 Al-Qaeda Seeking WMD The preceding discussion manifests that international terrorist groups, operating in loosely organized global networks, could acquire WMDs to unleash massive destruction on vulnerable population and economic centers. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that terrorists enjoys immense initiative and flexibility and they can strike anywhere, any time. The attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that terrorists were smart enough to transform airplanes into missiles having WMD as its warhead.485 The 9/ 11 Commission concluded that Al

479 Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Pakistan’s Judicial System: Curbing the Menace of Terrorism,” 21 March 2005, pp.3- 4. 480 Bruce Hoffman, “‘Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative,” RAND Document, P-7834, 1993. 481 Richard A. Falkenrath, “Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” Survival, Vol.40, No. 3, Autumn 1998, p.53. 482 Office of Homeland Security, “National Strategy for Homeland Security,” July 2002, p. ix. 483 Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism,” Survival 42, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 72. 484 Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Super-terrorism Scare”, op.cit, p.1. 485 Margaret E. Kosal, “Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce the Chemical Terror Threat”, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, September 2008, p.5.

152

Qaeda and other terrorists were seeking nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and that the US must invest maximum effort in preventing terrorists acquiring such deadly weapons. 486 Regarding chemical terrorism, Al-Qaeda has tested unspecified lethal chemical agents on animals.487 The recovered tactical manual, Muswatul Jihad alAfghani (The Encyclopedia of Jihad), contains 11 volumes on the development and concepts of terrorist operations with chemical agents and explosives. The CIA asserts that Al Qaeda “has crude procedures for making mustard agent, Sarin, and VX.” 488 The FBI’s NIPC Information Bulletin confirms the stated CIA assertion that Al Qaeda had “experimented with procedures for making Blister (Mustard) and Nerve (Sarin and VX) chemical agents.” 489 Another terrorist group, Ansar-al-Islam in Northern Iraq was reportedly developing cyanide-based chemical agents in 2002.490

If terrorists decide to stun the international community then WMD become more attractive and the dual-use phenomenon is facilitating access.491 Terrorist tactics are likely to increase the CBRN weapons use.492 For instance, Sarin, a chemical nerve agent, was used in the Tokyo subway system in 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo cult.493 After 9/11 large number of scholars immensely focused on the terrorist using CBRN weapons, for instance in the period from 2000- 2012 more than 25 reputed studies out of 60 specifically look at the possibility of terrorist use of CBRN weapons. 494 Anthrax bacteria were used in 2001 in the U.S., Ricin was mailed to the White House in 2003 and Congress in 2004. There

486 The 9/ 11 Commission Report, 2004 cited by Margaret E. Kosal, “Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce the Chemical Terror Threat”, loc.cit. 487 Judith Miller, “Qaeda Videos Seem to Show Chemical Tests”, The New York Times, 19 August 2002, p. 1A; Dana Priest, “Archive of Al Qaeda Videotapes Broadcast: Dogs Shown Dying from Toxic Vapor,” The Washington Post, 21 August 2002, p. A13. 488 CIA, “Terrorist CBRN: Materials and Effects,” CTC 2003-40058, May 2003. 489 NIPC “Information Bulletin” quoted in John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective,’ Washington Quarterly, Vol.26, No.4, 2003, p.38. 490 The U.S. Senate, “Report on Pre-War Intelligence on Iraq,” September 2006, p. 92. 491 Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Jan- Feb., 1998), p.5. 492 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Report for Congress, “Terrorist Motivation for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use,” 28 March 2003. 493 David E. Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo (1995)” in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 494 Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker, “Forecasting the Unpredictable: A Review of Forecasts on Terrorism 2000- 2012”, International Centre for Counter- Terrorism, The Hague, The Netherlands, July 2012, p.7.

153

have been arrests of individuals and terrorist organizations trying to develop and use Chemical Weapons. Videotapes acquired and broadcast by CNN have shown the effects of a chemical agent on test animals.495 In 2003, lawenforcement officials arrested several people accused of manufacturing Ricin in a London apartment.496 Thus, the terrorists have clearly demonstrated their intent for seeking and using traditional or improvised chemical agents.497

4.2.2 Prospects of Chemical Terrorism Chemical Weapons may produce variety of effects and thus enhance the terrorists’ operational flexibility, such as, for some Chemical Weapons there exists a delay before symptoms develop that allows terrorists to avoid arrest. 42 The variety of potential effects and timing can complicate medical treatment and preparedness, as it might not be readily apparent what chemical agent has caused the symptoms, and which antidote will be effective.43 For producing desired results terrorists can select from a wide variety of Chemical Weapons. Moreover, toxic industrial chemicals e.g. chlorine or phosgene are easily available and do not require special expertise for use as Chemical Weapons.44 Scientific and technological developments are facilitating and providing unprecedented opportunities for terrorists.45 And the easy availability of dual-use chemical materials and technologies provide opportunities for terrorists that are in many ways more threatening than nuclear, biological or radiological terrorism.

Chemical agents appear in several types: Choking Agents that damage lung tissue, Blood Agents that cause vital organs to shut down, Blister Agents damage the skin, and the most lethal Nerve Agents damage the nervous system. There are various methods for infecting target population, such as inhalation, skin absorption, and ingestion. The dander is complicated by the fact that many deadly chemicals, or their components, are commercially available. Effectively disseminated, a single release of a Chemical Weapon

495 Nic Robertson, “Disturbing Scenes of Death Show Capability with Chemical Gas,” CNN, 19 August 2002. 496 Dana A. Shea and Frank Gottron, “Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism,” CRS Report, RS 21383, 17 April 2013. 497 With regard to chemical and biological defense, the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction identified three pillars namely, Nonproliferation (impeding proliferation through diplomacy),

154

could cause tens of thousands of casualties.46 A lesson from the anthrax attack in 2001 could be that terrorists may not need to kill 3,000 people to create panic and

Counter-proliferation (impeding proliferation through deterrence, passive defense, interdiction and military action) and Consequence Management (detection, resilience, and mitigation). 42 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context,” CRS Report, RL31831, 28 March 2003. 43 P. Baker and S.B. Glasser, “U.S. Ambassador Critical of Russia in Hostage Crisis: Gas Secrecy May Have Cost Lives,” The Washington Post, 30 October 2002. 44 Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Controller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, Statement before the House Committee on Government Reforms, 20 October 1990. 45 Brian M. Jenkins, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? A Reappraisal,” op.cit, pp. 225- 49. 46 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993). insecurity. The anthrax attack killed only five persons but effectively unnerved millions of people.498 According to the “capabilities proposition”, anyone with access to dual-use chemical and basic chemistry education can produce enough chemical agents in the basement, which would be enough for devastating a population centre. Moreover, the raw materials are readily available from chemical plants, stores and university laboratories. Most counter-proliferation policies are based on this assumption. 499 Therefore, the counter-proliferation policies should address the issue of easy availability of dual-use chemicals and equipment.

4.2.3 Weak and Failing States There is a strong relationship between weak and failing States 500 and terrorist groups. Weak and failing states enable terrorist groups to thrive and even acquire

498 Bruce Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, RAND, 2002, p.11. 499 Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Super-Terrorism Scare”, op.cit, p.3. 500 “Weak states include a broad continuum of state that are: inherently weak because of geographic, physical or fundamental economic constraints; basically strong but temporarily or situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism or external attacks and a mixture of the two. Weak states typically harbour ethnic, religious, linguistic or other inter-communal tensions that have not yet, or not yet thoroughly become overtly violent. Urban crime rates tend to be higher and increasing. In weak states, the ability to provide adequate measures of other political goods is diminished or diminishing. Physical infrastructural networks have deteriorated. Schools and hospitals show signs of neglect, particularly outside the urban cities. GDP per capita and other economic indicators have fallen or are falling. Weak states usually honour rule of law precepts the breach.

155

unconventional capabilities for catastrophic attacks. This relationship is significant for counter- terrorism and counter- proliferation policies. Eliminating all terrorist groups or effectively checking their reach is practically impossible. Therefore, a viable approach could be limiting the freedom of action of a group’s activities i.e. eliminate or restrict the physical sanctuary within a state. Collapsed or abruptly transitioning states present an extreme danger because, then a state becomes unable to exercise control over terrorist activities on its soil. Moreover, such a state may also possess dual-use WMD materials that terrorists would like to acquire. Therefore, a range of diplomatic, economic, and military policies are required to support weak and failing states for reducing the terrorist threat and ensuring international security.501

4.3 CWC Role: Countering Chemical Terrorism and Proliferation

The CWC is a key multilateral treaty for preventing and prohibiting the proliferation of Chemical Weapons, reducing the risk of chemical terrorism through the universality and effective implementation of its provisions. The national obligations specified in Article- VII of the Convention i.e. to take legislative action, including the enactment of penal legislation and extending international legal cooperation prove that the OPCW has the requisite authority to engage in the global struggle against terrorism. Effective implementation of the CWC and its universality will facilitate more effective global action against chemical terrorism and proliferation. Comprehensive national implementation of the CWC legislation is the States Parties key for obtaining complete and

They harass civil society. Weak states are often ruled by people, elected or not.” “Failing states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. In more failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. The official authorities face a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state. It is not the absolute intensity of violence that identifies a failed state; rather it is the enduring character of that violence as in Angola, Burundi and Sudan. Corruption reaches destructive scale. For a state to fail is not that easy. Crossing from the weakness into failure takes will as well as neglect.” Refer: Robert I. Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp.4- 14. 501 John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.26, No.4, Autumn 2003, p.11.

156

reliable information from the chemical industry, effectively prosecuting the violation of the Convention; and international cooperation and assistance in enforcing CWC internationally.

4.3.1 Chemicals Misuse: A Criminal Offence To completely rule out the possibility of the use of Chemical Weapons, the CWC not only establishes legal norms for its States Parties, but also requires them to enact prohibitions for their individual citizens who, anywhere in the world, engage in prohibited activities. In fact, the Convention requires making the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of Chemical Weapons a criminal offence in all States Parties, and for all citizens, irrespective of where the offence may have been committed. Similarly any assistance, encouragement or inducement to engage in such prohibited activities is also prohibited. Therefore, the CWC constitutes a solid legal basis for preventing and prosecuting chemical terrorism. With regard to counter- terrorism, the effective implementation of the Convention by all States Parties would incur four benefits; one, denying terrorists access to dual-use chemicals that could be used as Chemical Weapons; two, deterring the potential supply of knowledge, equipment and chemicals to terrorists; three, ensuring that any involvement with Chemical Weapons could be effectively prosecuted; four, increasing the effectiveness of legal action against terrorists involved in prohibited activities. 502 For example, the Government of Pakistan approved the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2012, which is covering all aspects of financing terrorism including provisions on freezing, seizing and forfeiture of assets and properties of those involved in financing terrorism.503

4.3.2 Terrorism Related Provisions in CWC The CWC has many useful provisions, which enables States Parties and the

502 Ambassador Dr. Jan Borkowski, “Development of the OPCW Engagement in Chemical Safety and Security – Perspective from Poland” International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, 8- 9 November 2012, Tarnów, Poland, p.2. 503 Lieutenant General Michael D. Barbero Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, 13 December 2012, pp.3-5.

157

OPCW to effectively counter terrorism, for example504 a. The CWC prohibits development, production, stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons, and improvised terrorist devices containing toxic chemicals: (1) Article I. ‘Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances ... to assist, encourage or induce in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.’505 (2) Article II. All toxic chemicals for non-permitted purposes are covered by the definition of Chemical Weapon.506

b. Article IV and V. CWC destruction obligations and related security measures make it increasingly difficult for a terrorist group to obtain Chemical Weapons from military stockpiles.507 c. Article VI. This Article makes it more difficult for a terrorist group to acquire Schedule chemicals, especially Schedule- 1 chemicals. d. Article VII. It requires enactment of CWC national implementing legislation prohibiting any activity for misuse of chemicals or in contravention of the CWC. e. Article IX. Challenge Inspection and Investigation for Alleged Use (IAU) of Chemical Weapons could serve as deterrent against prohibited activities including terrorist activities.508 f. Article X. This Article ensures provision of requisite assistance by the OPCW and States Parties in the event of a terrorist attack or a serious threat of attack involving chemicals.

504 Dr Bob Mathews, “Improvised Chemical Devices, Chemical Security and the CWC”, Presentation at the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012. 505 CWC, Article I, Sub-paragraph 1(d). 506 CWC, Article-II, Paragraph 1 and 2. 507 To facilitate a systematic destruction and verification process, Chemical Weapons are divided into three Categories: Category 1: It includes Schedule 1 chemicals and munitions filled with Schedule 1 agents. Category 2: It includes munitions filled with toxic chemicals other than Schedule 1 chemicals. Category 3: Unfilled munitions and devices, and any other equipment specifically designed for delivery of Chemical Weapons. 508 The Verification Annex of the CWC is the most detailed and specifies comprehensive procedures for conducting inspections at Chemical Weapons facilities or sites and industrial facilities.

158

g. Article XI. It covers international cooperation including enhanced chemical security for raising barriers to chemical terrorism. h. OPCW Action Plans on Universality. This plan along with Article- VII support efforts to prevent chemical terrorism including ‘safe havens’ for such purposes.

4.3.3 Assistance and Protection under CWC The Article- X of the Convention gives the right to States Parties to engage in protective programmes against Chemical Weapons, and in this regard participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information. This Article also obligates the OPCW to maintain a data bank regarding means of protection against Chemical Weapons, and to provide, upon request expert advice and assistance in developing national protective programme. Article- X also establishes the right of each State Party to receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of Chemical Weapons. The States Parties have to provide assistance through the OPCW, and the national pledges of assistance form the basis of OPCW assistance delivery capability.

States Parties are not adequately reporting on their respective National Protective Programmes. Resultantly, the OPCW lacks requisite information, and it faces difficulties in analysis and planning for developing National Protective Programmes; and the provision of assistance to States in the event of an emergency. The OPCW Technical Secretariat prepares updates for the EC and CSP on the OPCW’s state of readiness for delivering assistance to States Parties. These reports include, inter alia, the status of planning assistance delivery operations for various scenarios including terrorist attacks, training of relevant staff; and exercises. To further improve the assistance and protection capability, the OPCW should maintain and earmark a sufficient pool of technical experts and their reserves who could be employed in the event of an emergency. They should also be imparted necessary training.

4.3.4 National Implementation Measures under CWC: Safeguard against Chemical Proliferation and Terrorism

159

A critical element in the CWC non-proliferation regime is effective national implementation measures. The existence of loopholes in national legislative and administrative measures could encourage possible criminal and terrorist uses of chemicals. 509 Each State Party has to enact and implement comprehensive national implementation legislation and related regulations with penal provisions for effectively preventing and redressing any violation of the Convention by their nationals in any area under their jurisdiction or control. It is believed that Chemical Weapons will be the weapon of the weak States or groups. 510 Thus being low technological weapon, they become suitable for terrorist organizations and weak states.

4.3.5 National Verification Mechanism The national implementation measures will be effective, if a state has enacted comprehensive implementing legislation incorporating the GPC and established a knowledgeable and effective National Authority. For example, the OPCW Routine Industrial inspections do not and cannot monitor compliance of all national obligations under CWC. The OPCW expects an effective national verification system to be implemented by the National Authorities. In this regard, the CWC specify “each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.”511

4.3.6 National Obligations under CWC The CWC establishes the responsibility of each State Party to actively prevent acts of terrorism involving Chemical Weapons, and to cooperate with other States Parties in the

509 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, DG OPCW, “Opening Statement” at the Table-Top Exercise on the Preparedness of States Parties to Prevent Terrorist Attacks Involving Chemicals, Warsaw, Poland, 22 November 2010, p.4 510 Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, No.1, Jan- Feb 1998, p.1. 511 CWC, Article VI, Paragraph 2.

160

investigation and prosecution of crimes related to violations of the Convention. The Convention stipulates, that each State Party shall fulfill national obligations under CWC, which will have direct bearing on the international struggle against terrorism:512 Although all States Parties to the CWC are complying with the provisions of the CWC in varying degrees keeping in view their understanding, and resources but there is a need to standardize important obligations such as import/ export controls, nomenclature of various chemicals, various national declarations, national legislations for making it comprehensive, related rules and regulations, etc.

4.3.7 Destruction of Chemical Weapons Regarding the destruction of Chemical Weapons, the Convention obligates States Parties to take appropriate measures to secure their Chemical Weapons storage facilities and to prevent any movement of their Chemical Weapons out of such facilities, except for their removal to destruction facilities. 513 This necessitates adequate physical security measures during the storage, transportation and destruction phases. The OPCW and the States Parties may consider or further improve following measures for denying Non- State Actors access to chemical Weapons and related equipment: a. Further improvements in physical security at Chemical Weapons Storage and Destruction Facilities. b. Identify and rectify weak points that could be exploited by terrorists, for the whole cycle from storage at Chemical Weapons storage facilities to destruction at Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities (CWDF). One vulnerable point in moving Chemical Weapons from storage facilities to destruction facilities is the temporary holding areas at CWDFs. These are areas of considerable activity, and therefore managers have to ensure both physical security and meticulous accountancy of all Chemical Weapons to prevent theft and diversion. c. The designing and commissioning of future Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities (CWDF) should enhance physical security that would also prevent

512 CWC, Article I, VI and VII. 513 CWC, Article IV, Paragraph 4.

161

illegal access. Moreover, States can share best practices that safeguards chemicals and Chemical Weapons facilities from terrorist attacks and thus reduce the risk of toxic releases. d. Possessor states should accord high priority to the OPCW timelines for the destruction of Chemical Weapons and Chemical Weapons Production Facilities (CWPF). e. Preventing the transfer of knowledge and expertise regarding production and use of Chemical Weapons.

4.3.8 Monitoring Mechanism for Imports and Exports Monitoring imports and exports of relevant chemicals is an essential part of the Convention’s nonproliferation regime. The CWC obligates States Parties to effectively control and annually report to the OPCW all exports and imports of Schedule chemicals above certain thresholds. In certain cases, trade is restricted to Non States Parties to the Convention. The OPCW utilize the annual national declarations and implements a monitoring regime over the global exports and imports of Schedule chemicals. This monitoring will gain further importance in future. Therefore, States Parties would also need to reinforce their domestic rules and procedures as part of enhanced CWC enforcement and monitoring effort.514 The monitoring of trade in chemicals by the OPCW and the States Parties need to be made more stringent. All States Parties should have the ability to effectively monitor the import and export of chemicals of concern by enhancing the capacity of their relevant governmental authorities, especially the customs authorities.515

The CWC role in preventing the spread of chemical terrorism is embodied in the Convention obligation to each State Party that they take all necessary measures in terms of national implementation to prevent any person within their jurisdiction or control from

514 Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu DG OPCW “Statement to the United Nations Session of the General Assembly,” New York, 19 November 2012, p.8. 515 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, DG OPCW, “Opening Statement” at the Table-Top Exercise on the Preparedness of States Parties to Prevent Terrorist Attacks Involving Chemicals, op.cit, p.4.

162

developing, producing, stockpiling, and acquiring Chemical Weapons. Thus each State Party to the CWC is obliged both under the UNSC Resolution 1540 and the CWC to have in place effective legislative package and enforcement capability to prevent terrorists from developing Chemical Weapons within their territory or jurisdiction of control. The OPCW may find it politically difficult to interfere in various national measures, therefore the sovereign states in whose territory the terrorists are operating are obliged to effectively implement the CWC and take necessary measures against terrorists.516

4.4 OPCW Role: Countering Chemical Proliferation and Terrorism

The intensification of international strategic trade and industrial activities has resulted in dual-use items becoming more accessible to Non- State Actors517 that might attempt to use them for terrorist purposes.518 No State is immune from Non State Actors attempting to divert sensitive materials, equipment and technology from their legitimate and peaceful purposes. Therefore, any weakness in the national and international control mechanisms can have serious implications for international security.519 The OPCW has recognized the roles of ‘chemical safety and security’ in the prevention of chemical terrorism, based on the outcome of both the First and Second CWC Review Conferences. In this regard, the OPCW actively contributes in various UN meetings regarding prevention of WMD-terrorism. Moreover, the role of the OPCW has been recognized in various

516 Oliver Meier Interview with U.S. Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Threat Reduction, Export Controls, and Negotiations, interviewed on 8 February 2008, p.5. 517 Security Council Resolution 1540 defines a non state actor as an “individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities, which come within the scope of this resolution”. Some characteristics can be ascribed to actors other than a terrorist such as traffickers or technicians who obtain and proliferate CBW at various stages during a weapons’ life cycle. Whilst the terrorist as a potential user of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has been studied for decades, the trafficker is a new type of non-state actor in the non-proliferation field. 518 The availability of cheap, commercial and dual-use CBW technologies means Non-State Actors may have access to them for potential weapons use. UNSC Resolution- 1540 paragraph 8.d. recognizes this concern for dual-use technologies by calling on all states to work with and inform industry and the public, including academia, of their legal obligations under UNSCR- 1540. 519 Nicolas Kasprzyk, 1540 Committee Expert, “Resolution 1540 and the Prevention of the Proliferation of WMD to Non-State Actors: implications for Chemical Security”, the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8– 9 November 2012, p.1.

163

United Nations Resolutions for preventing WMD-terrorism, including UNSC Resolution- 1456 (2003)520 and UNSC Resolution- 1540 (2004).

520 UNSC Resolution- 1456 was adopted on 20 January 2003 in a ministerial level Security Council meeting. This Resolution calls on all States to prevent and suppress all kind of support for terrorism. The Security Council reaffirmed that terrorism constituted one of the greatest threats to international peace, and expressed concerns regarding nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or related material or technology might be exploited for terrorism. In this regard, measures to prevent the financing of terrorism had to be strengthened and terrorists prevented from making use of drugs and arms trafficking and money laundering. Reference: “Ministerial- Level Meeting Calls for Urgent Action to Prevent, Suppress all Support for Terrorism,” United Nations, 20 January 2003.

164

The OPCW is an inspiring example for effective multilateralism. 521 The EU Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy recognizes the CWC and OPCW as foundation for the whole disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. 522 The OPCW actively participates in activities supporting the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. The OPCW activities are guided by the OPCW Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism and cover subjects of contemporary importance, such as safety and security of chemical plants and related table-top exercises designed to test the OPCW preparedness, procedures and necessary coordination amongst various stakeholders in the case of terrorist use of Chemical Weapons.523 Moreover, for reassurance the OPCW provides information from national declarations, on request, to other States Parties. However, very small numbers of states utilize this regulated transparency, which can prove an effective confidence building measure.524 This internal transparency mechanism will also contribute to states making correct national declarations to the OPCW, which would inturn, contribute to non- proliferation measures.

The OPCW is concerned regarding the proven threat of chemical terrorism and proliferation, which are complex issues and warrants comprehensive consideration and response. OPCW is an important international security institution that has to use its mandate and expertise as part of the global struggle against the menace of terrorism. Pfirter the former Director General OPCW pointed out that the expectations of the international community and member states are big that the OPCW should cooperate in anti-terrorism efforts.525 Pfirter also appreciated the ongoing cooperation between the OPCW and the Committee implementing UNSCR- 1540, which requires all States to implement national

521 Catherine Ashton, The E.U. High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her intervention to mark the commemoration of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 3 September 2012. 522 Nico Frandi, “Enhancing Chemical Safety and Security: The European Union Support to the Work of the OPCW”, The International Meeting On Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012, p.1 523 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW, “Opening Statement” at the Table-Top Exercise on the Preparedness of States Parties to Prevent Terrorist Attacks Involving Chemicals, op.cit, p.4 524 OPCW document C-VI/5, 17 May 2001. Available at www.opcw.org. 525 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW, “Opening Statement” at the Table-Top Exercise on the Preparedness of States Parties to Prevent Terrorist Attacks Involving Chemicals, loc.cit.

165

measures to prevent Non-State- Actors from acquiring WMDs. Moreover, to address the concerns regarding terrorism and proliferation, Pfirter urged developing States to translate CWC obligations into comprehensive national implementing legislations and related regulations.526

A foundation for OPCW support for efforts against terrorism is Article X, which requires States Parties to provide emergency assistance and protection to a State Party in case of use or threat of use of Chemical Weapons. The OPCW technical Secretariat is responsible for coordinating offers of assistance from member states, which has been discussed in detail in Chapter-3. A Working Group against Terrorism was established where States Parties supported the OPCW’s participation in anti-terrorism efforts. Moreover, the CWC Second Review Conference reaffirmed concerns expressed at the First Review Conference that chemical facilities may become subject to attacks or other incidents that could lead to the release or theft of toxic chemicals. Moreover, the Second Review Conference welcomed the fact that some States Parties had taken measures to minimize such risks and encouraged States Parties to exchange their experiences and best practices.527

The OPCW makes its contribution to the Global anti-terrorism efforts in vital areas such as: prevention, mitigation and response, technical assistance, information exchange and international cooperation, and safety and security of chemical plants. In the area of prevention, the CWC requires States Parties to prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on their territory or in any other place under their jurisdiction from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party including enacting penal legislation.528 The OPCW undertakes activities in the field of training provided to States Parties as part of national and regional capacity building measures and thus mitigating the consequences of a terrorist attack with use of Chemical Weapons, e.g. in the field of analytical chemistry, training for emergency

526 Oliver Meier, “Chemical Weapons Parlay’s Outcome Uncertain”, News/ Analysis, Arms Control Association, April 2008, p.12. 527 Krysztof Paturej, “OPCW’s Role in Global Efforts Against Terrorism,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-Proliferation, OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, 11 April 2011, pp.1-2. 528 CWC, Article-VII, paragraph.1.

166

managers and first responders, medical counter measures, etc. A good example of coordination of response to WMD attacks is the ASSISTEX exercise. The exercise conducted a mock Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons and required coordination with international consequence management personnel from OPCW member states, international organizations and regional organization. In addition, the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the OPCW states:529

“the OPCW and the United Nations shall, in accordance with their respective mandates, explore possibilities for cooperation in the provision of assistance to States concerned in cases of use or serious threat of use of Chemical Weapons, as provided for in paragraph 10 of Article X of the CWC.”

4.4.1 International Cooperation The OPCW has established and maintained channels of communication with a number of sub-regional, regional, and international organizations and agencies in the field of counter-terrorism. The aim of these contacts has been to identify ways in which these organizations can assist one another, pursuant to relevant mandates, by exchanging information, knowledge and expertise as needed, and by coordinating programme activities that relate to action against terrorism. The role of the OPCW has been recognized in the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy which “encourages the IAEA and the OPCW to continue their efforts, within their respective mandates, to help states build capacity to prevent terrorists from accessing nuclear, chemical, or radiological materials, to ensure security at related facilities, and to respond effectively in the event of an attack using such materials.530 The OPCW is an active member of the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force. 531 Through this task force the OPCW is participating in the implementation of the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy by continuing its efforts, within its mandate, in helping states to build capacity to prevent

529 Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations and OPCW, Article- II, Sub-paragraph 2(d), 2001. 530 United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, 2006. 531 The United Nations Secretary General established the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) through the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. CTITF is mandated to enhance coherence and coordination of the global counter- terrorism efforts. CTITF consists of 31 international

167

terrorists from acquiring chemical materials, to ensure security at related facilities, and to respond effectively in the case of attack using such materials.

4.4.2 Enhancing Safety and Security at Chemical Plants The OPCW mandate, functions and culture of multilateral cooperation for international security make it a most suitable forum for exploring further avenues regarding safety and security of chemical plants.81 Strengthening safety and security at chemical plant sites is an important task in preventing the hostile use of chemicals. With the rapid development of chemical industry production and development of biochemistry, and their spread to new areas of the world, the enhancement of security in the area of legitimate production, transportation, and use of chemicals and bio-agents is assuming much greater importance. In partnership with the ICCA, CEFIC, EU, national governments, and national chemical associations, the OPCW is developing its role as a platform of support for global cooperation in decreasing the chemical threat by promoting awareness of chemical safety and security, training, exchange of best practices and fostering cooperation between chemical professionals.

OPCW will continue to develop relations and partnerships, as appropriate, with relevant regional and international organizations related to chemical safety, chemical industry associations, and the private sector and civil society, in order to promote awareness of the objectives and purposes of the Convention. Enhancing a chemical security culture will provide greater assurances that the national chemical security

entities including the OPCW, which makes contribution as per their respective mandates. The CTITF also ensures that the United Nations system is attuned to the needs of the member States. 81 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW Opening Address, “OPCW in a Changing Environment- Promoting Security and Cooperation,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-Proliferation, OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, 11- 12 April 2011. p.1.

168

systems can accomplish their functions of preventing, detecting and responding to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, and illegal transfer of chemical materials from their associated facilities and transports.532

4.4.3 OPCW Exercises and Outreach The OPCW is conducting variety of exercises, seminars, workshops, open forums, etc. Below are given few events that explain what aims and objectives the OPCW pursue in conducting such events:

4.4.3.1 Field Exercises To minimize the risk of terrorist attacks with the use of chemicals and to take prior measures to limit the potential impact of terrorist acts the OPCW, National Coordinator for counterterrorism, UNICRI, INTERPOL joined forces to organize a global chemical counter-terrorism table-top exercise named Chemical Global Shield from 8- 11 November 2012 in the Netherlands.533 The exercise had unique characteristics such as a realistic scenario, high technology table top exercise, and it involved several countries from different regions and international organizations. The exercise was designed for senior policy makers and middle ranking management officials from national and international authorities directly engaged in prevention and response to terrorist attack.

The exercise augmented the OPCW’s relationship with relevant national and international partners and key stakeholders against CBRN proliferation and terrorism and built the OPCW role as a platform for cooperation in prevention, preparedness, and responses against misuse of toxic chemicals.534 Such exercises comprehensively review how different international organizations and States Parties and other stakeholders would

532 Krysztof Paturej, “OPCW’s Role in Global Efforts Against Terrorism,” op.cit, p.4.

533 “International Table-Top Exercise: Chemical Shield-2011,” CBRN Centre of Excellence Newsletter, Vol.2, January 2012. 534 Krysztof Paturej, “OPCW’s Role in Global Efforts Against Terrorism,” op.cit, p.6.

169

respond collectively to a terrorist attack with Chemical Weapons, and the level of coordination among different entities for the provision of assistance.

4.4.3.2 Table Top Exercises Following a successful conduct of the Table Top Exercise (TTE) on the preparedness of States Parties to prevent terrorist attacks involving chemicals (Warsaw, 22- 23 November 2010), the OPCW has developed a programme to address the different stages of the prevention of and preparedness for a crisis linked to the malicious use of toxic chemicals. The TTEs are not stand-alone events, but part of a larger programme on the promotion of the OPCW as a platform for consultations and cooperation, both bilaterally and regionally on ways to prevent terrorists from acquiring and/ or using Chemical Weapons.

The TTE programme creates a platform to review and improve the interaction between the different national agencies and authorities involved in countering terrorist threats involving toxic chemicals. The programme support States Parties in adopting measures to review their state of prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist incidents involving toxic industrial chemicals, to integrate these measures with preparations they have already made to mitigate risks associated with chemical accidents and environmental incidents, and to address CBRN terrorism risks in a comprehensive fashion. To achieve this aim, the Technical Secretariat has developed a module and a methodology for working with States Parties that wish to conduct such exercises. Moreover, the OPCW has prepared a set of standard materials and tools that can be made available to States Parties conducting such exercises.

4.4.3.3 Seminars and Workshops The OPCW conducted a seminar on “International Response and Mitigation of a Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons or Materials, from 16- 17 May 2011 at the OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, for supporting implementation of the CWC and the United Nations Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy. This seminar carried out a comprehensive review on how the United Nations system and international organizations

170

from different disciplines would respond individually and as a whole, to a terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons or materials, as well as the level of planned coordination among the different entities in the rapid provision of assistance to the affected state(s).535 Such programmes are part of a wider initiative, e.g. the first workshop on the international response and mitigation of a terrorist use of nuclear and radiological weapons or materials was organized in 2010 in Vienna by IAEA.536

4.4.4 Need to Review OPCW Mandate The context of the CWC is constantly changing. States Parties have traditionally remained concerned regarding the threat of large scale Chemical Weapons. Hence, the OPCW verification regime remained focused on the verifiable destruction of declared Chemical Weapons stockpiles. However, the tremendous changes in production technology and the rise of Non- State Actors make dual-use toxic chemicals and facilities more relevant to the Convention.537 This necessitates necessary changes in the OPCW functioning, national implementation and both national and international verification regime.

Moreover, while the OPCW’s mandate has not changed since 9/ 11, the new threat posed by the possible use of Chemical Weapons by terrorists requires a reevaluation of the OPCW mandate and its functioning. This re-evaluation must include whether the CWC can respond effectively to new and emerging threats, such as terrorism and proliferation. This evaluation will ensure the integrity of the CWC, which will substantially contribute to the international security. Moreover, the development of the OPCW as a platform to promote international cooperation, and enhance chemical safety and security, will broaden the scope of Article- X (on assistance and protection) and Article- XI (on international and

535 Ibid, p.5. 536 Ibid. 537 Leiv K. Eydnes, “IUPAC, OPCW, and the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Chemistry International, Vol. 35, No.4, July- August 2013.

171

technological cooperation), both of which are central for the OPCW transformation. 538 There is a dire need to strengthen national controls on toxic chemicals, and enhance the safety and security of chemical industry and transportation of chemical agents.

The major part of OPCW resources are focused on verifying the destruction of declared Chemical Weapons stockpiles. The ongoing pace of destruction indicates that this task will be completed within next few years, which will necessitate internal changes in the Technical Secretariat. The OPCW has to remain operationally effective for responding to different contingencies, such as conducting Challenge Inspections at a short notice and Investigations of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons. 539 Therefore, the OPCW will gradually need to refocus its resources and efforts for ensuring that the CWC remains a safeguard against proliferation.

4.4.5 OPCW Industry Verification Regime The OPCW industry verification regime and the data monitoring of trade in relevant chemicals is the backbone of the CWC non-proliferation objectives. The OPCW continuously refine and enhance intensity of industrial inspections with a focus on facilities most relevant to the object and purpose of the Convention.540 This will ensure that all categories of relevant chemical facilities are adequately covered by the OPCW verification regime. Legal instruments regarding Chemical Weapons that preceded the CWC failed because they did not have effective verification mechanisms. Today, keeping in view the scientific and technological developments, and the threat of proliferation, it is imperative that States enact comprehensive legal prohibitions under the CWC that would enable the CWC verification regime to effectively cover new chemicals and means of production.541

538 Ambassador Dr. Jan Borkowski, “Development of the OPCW Engagement in Chemical Safety and Security- Perspective from Poland” International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012, p.2. 539 Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu DG OPCW, “Statement to the United Nations General Assembly,” New York, 19 November 2012, p.6. 540 Ibid, p.7

541 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW Opening Address, “OPCW in a Changing Environment- Promoting Security and Cooperation,” op.cit, p.1.

172

The OPCW routine industrial inspections are extremely important in preventing the misuse of commercial chemicals by Non State Actors and thus for the effectiveness of the OPCW non-proliferation regime. The issue of further consolidating OPCW regime was critically examined in the previous chapter i.e. Chapter 3 of this thesis.

4.4.6 OPCW- UN Cooperation The OPCW is effectively cooperating with the UN in the area of chemical threat. This includes supporting implementation of the UNSC Resolution- 1540, UNSC Resolution- 1456 and the work of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). The OPCW has concluded with the UN a Supplementary Arrangement to the OPCW Relationship Agreement. This Arrangement establishes the modalities for conducting an Investigation of Alleged Use (IAU) of Chemical Weapons in a State Not Party, if requested by the UN Secretary General. The UN Global CounterTerrorism Strategy, adopted in September 2006, encourages the IAEA and the OPCW to continue their efforts to help States in building capacity for preventing terrorists from accessing nuclear, chemical, or radiological materials, to ensure security at related facilities, and develop the capacity for responding effectively in the event of an attack using such materials.542

This Global Strategy specifically cited the danger of WMD and calls upon member States, the United Nations and specialized agencies and organizations to cooperate to prevent this threat from becoming reality. Under Panel-II of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which deals with measures for preventing and combating terrorism, Member States invites the UN to improve coordination in planning a response to an attack using nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons or materials so that Member States can receive adequate assistance.543 The CTITF Working Group on

542 Ambassador Dr. Jan Borkowski, “Development of the OPCW Engagement in Chemical Safety and Security – Perspective from Poland” op.cit, p.1. 543 Mrs. Grace A. Asirwatham, Deputy Director General OPCW, “Closing Remarks,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-Proliferation, OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, The Netherlands, 11 April 2011, p.1.

173

Preventing and Responding to WMD attacks is co-chaired by OPCW and IAEA.544 The Working Group has produced a report on “Interagency Coordination in the Event of a Terrorist Attack Using Chemical or Biological Weapons and Materials”. The report concluded, inter alia,

“… Chemical plants are at increased risk of terrorist attacks and the international system should strengthen efforts to enhance safety and security at chemical plants and in the transportation of chemicals. Moreover, the international organizations should work towards a global chemical security culture.”545

The UNSC Resolution- 1540 establishes a binding obligation on all UN member states under Chapter- VII of the UN Charter to take and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of WMD, related material and their means of delivery. The UN Organization for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) help ensures that states understand the national obligations under UNSCR- 1540. Including chemical security in these outreach efforts helps bring the issue of chemical safety and security to the international community and helps ensure that no state or Non- State Actor is a source or beneficiary of WMD proliferation.

Resolution- 1540 arises from the UNSC Resolutions dealing with counterterrorism, in particular UNSCR- 1373 (2001). Therefore, it is taken as a counter-terrorism resolution. However, UNSCR- 1540 is collectively a counter-terrorism, counterproliferation and non- proliferation measure. If implemented effectively this Resolution could substantially contribute to non-proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts.546 The OPCW, the GP, the Tarnow Center and other efforts by international organizations if coordinated with the UNSCR- 1540 Committee and UNODA could substantially improve the effectiveness of their programmes in chemical safety and security.547

544 It includes Interpol, WHO, IAEA, IMO, ICAO, UNICRI, OPCW, UNODA, and the 1540 Committee. 545 Zeeshan Amin, “United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force” Statement at International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, 8 November 2012, p.2. 546 Canada Report on Wilton Park Conference WPS 06/7, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Facing Future Challenges”, 29 September- 1 October 2006, p.7. 547 Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, The US Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs, Presentation at the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012, p.4.

174

4.5 Role of Chemical Industry: Countering Chemical Proliferation and Terrorism

The CWC was negotiated in 1980s; hence, the design of CWC is based on chemical industry that has evolved over almost three decades. Although, the CWC has averted military uses of Chemical Weapons, yet the changing nature of chemical industry and significant advances in the field of science and technology are presenting serious challenges to the OPCW and the implementation of the Convention. This will necessitate concrete measures for adaptation by the OPCW, National Authorities and chemical industry.548 The terrorists can misuse some very common chemicals. Therefore, the CWC obligates chemical industry to meticulously monitor the production, processing, consumption, import and export of Schedule and Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOC). Similar provisions of the Convention are applicable on both governmental authorities and public bodies such as academic institutions to prevent dual-use chemicals going into wrong hands.549

Each State Party is obliged to declare to the OPCW all production, processing, consumption, and export and import of Schedule chemicals and production of DOCs above certain thresholds.550 This national obligation is linked with the obligations of chemical industry. For example, the chemical industry has to make correct data declarations to the National Authority, and register with the National Authority those dual-use equipment and chemicals that can produce Schedule chemicals. Moreover, to contribute to counter proliferation and counter terrorism efforts, the chemical industry should flag those chemicals that are listed in the CWC Schedules, so that purchasing managers are forewarned. Chemical industry should have detailed policies so that all employees are aware of their obligations in preventing the misuse of chemicals.

548 Grace A. Asirwatham, Deputy Director General, OPCW, “Closing Remarks,” Seminar on the OPCWContribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-proliferation,” op.cit, p.3. 549 International Council of Chemical Association, “Paper Prepared for the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” June 2011, p.2. 550 Ibid.

175

4.5.1 Responsible Care Programmes The chemical industry has played an important role in the evolution of the verification regime of the CWC. The chemical industry has adopted Responsible Care Programme and other such measures, which amply demonstrates its sense of responsibility. Responsible Care Management Code has prompted safety and security policies for safeguarding the environment, communities and the employees. In the light of the Code chemical industries must maintain written safety and security policies and related processes, which would educate the employees regarding CWC Schedule chemicals and their families. Responsible Care Programme has introduced Responsible Security Code. This Security Code is designed to assist companies in continuously improving their security performance by identifying and addressing vulnerabilities, prevent security incidents, mitigate the effects of an incident, capacity building of employees, and improving working relationship with relevant public authorities and stakeholders.

This Security Code requires serious involvement of senior management in security measures and programmes, such as provision of requisite resources, conducive environment and effective accountability. The management of industry has to ensure that requisite security measures are taken commensurate with the prevailing risks and threats. Moreover, chemical industry has to periodically review security policies and programmes for keeping them relevant to various challenges. In addition to physical security, the Responsible Care Security Code also ensures that dual-use chemicals do not go to wrong hands. In this regard, industry associations formulate best practices. The OPCW may compile such best practices and disseminate them to all stakeholders. Furthermore, the OPCW and National Authorities must fully utilize the industrial verification regime also, because effective non-proliferation programmes cannot be left on entirely voluntary basis. To facilitate industry, ideally a single company policy on record keeping, declarations and export controls should cover CWC and all other restrictions on trade. 551 A new and

551 Rene van Sloten, “Chemical Industry Compliance of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” OPCW Seminar on OPCW Contribution to Security and Non-proliferation, OPCW Headquarters The Hague, The Netherlands, 11-12 April 2011, p.3.

176

growing aspect to Responsible Care is the introduction of Security Code of Conduct, which is designed to help companies achieve continuous improvement in security performance using risk-based approach to identify, assess and address vulnerabilities, prevent or mitigate incidents, enhance training and response capabilities, and maintain and improve relationship with key stakeholders and authorities. As effective security practices evolve, companies are encouraged to keep pace by enhancing security awareness and compliance through training and guidance. They should also open and maintain effective lines of communication such as sharing effective security practices with others throughout the industry and maintaining interaction with law enforcement agencies.

4.5.2 Chemical Plant Security The security of chemical plants and the transportation of chemicals are extremely important for preventing access of Non-State Actors to toxic chemicals. The discharge of this national obligation, in close coordination with relevant international bodies will significantly contribute to the counter proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts.552 In this regard, the OPCW can provide a forum for consultations and cooperation, and can exchange the best practices of different States for enhancing security of chemical facilities safeguarding toxic chemicals during transportation. Such deliberations at international and national level will enable National Authorities to know their partners in implementing the Convention and thus effectively ensuring non-proliferation of Chemical Weapons.

4.5.3 Chemical Transportation Security Transportation means and facilities are often targets of terrorist attacks and hijacking. The peculiar characteristics of transportation system make them especially vulnerable and hence lucrative targets. Therefore, an organized terrorist group can cause immense damage with relatively small but well deployed force. To protect critical infrastructure, there is a need to reduce risks associated with transportation of chemicals.

552 Grace A. Asirwatham, Deputy Director General, OPCW, “Closing Remarks,” op.cit, p.4.

177

Chemical transportation includes activities both inside and outside the industry. The security efforts would protect employees, environment, and community; ensures productive operations and helps in developing constructive relations with communities and local authorities. In this regard, risk management is the key to an effective transportation security. The chemical industry has to undertake meticulous coordination with governmental authorities; the industry must consider and rank potential of product to the public and the environment, focusing on those shipments prone to acts of terrorism. This will enable industry to prioritize security risk reviews. 553 The security of chemical transportation is covered in detail in Chapter-5.

4.5.4 Insider Threat The “insider threat” is becoming an increasingly serious concern for critical infrastructure. An “insider” is an employee or anyone else who has routine access to critical facilities and systems. This group also includes contractors, temporary help, and outsourcers. Insiders, because of their access and positions of trust, can intentionally or accidentally become terrorist surrogates. Current policies protecting chemical industry from terrorist attack has focused excessively on reducing vulnerability by focusing on the “insider” threat regarding sabotage.554 Scholars believe that the most serious threat to a hazardous installation is posed by external adversaries helped by insiders.555

4.5.5 Security Culture The Center for International Trade and Security held a workshop on the development of “Sustainable CBRN Security Culture”. The main common element from

553 American Chemistry Council, Transportation Security Guidelines for the US Chemical Industry, The Chlorine Institute Inc, National Association of Chemical Distributors, 2001, p.7. 554 GAO, Homeland Security: Federal and Industry Efforts Are Addressing Security Issues at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Action Is Needed, GAO-05-631T, 27 April 2005, available at www.gao.gov; J.R. Lemley, Vasilis M. Fthenakis, and Paul D. Moskowitz, “Security Risk Analysis for Chemical Process Facilities,” Process Safety Progress, Vol. 22, No. 3, September 2003, pp. 153-161. 555 Paul Baybutt and Varick Ready, “Protecting Process Plants: Preventing Terrorist Attacks and Sabotage,” Homeland Defense Journal, Vol. 2, No.3, 12 February 2003, pp. 1- 5.

178

various participants was developing and maintaining a security culture at the facility. 556 For the management, the best way to create a culture of safety and security in the workplace is to set a good example every day by meticulously following and enforcing safety and security rules and procedures.557 A security effort works best when employees perceive it as an important element of the company’s mission. Employees are more likely to see security as a company priority if the company’s top management visibly supports security efforts such as including security as company’s core values and establish security policies, which are effectively implemented and reviewed. Managers may consider establishing partnerships or relationships with local, provincial, and federal law enforcement agencies. Through such a network, managers may learn more easily of looming threats, dangerous trends, and security measures. Similarly internal communication channels and collaboration is also very important.

4.6 Conclusion

The terrorist attacks of 9/ 11 have changed global priorities and security landscape. Now not only states, but also organized terrorist groups have the proven capacity to threaten international peace and security, destabilize governments and foment regional unrest and instability. Moreover, the expertise, technology, and material needed for building the most deadly CBRN weapons are spreading inexorably to different regions. The easy availability of dual-use chemical materials and technologies provide opportunities for terrorists that are in many ways more threatening than nuclear, biological and radiological terrorism. Therefore, the counter-proliferation policies should address the issue of easy availability of dual-use chemicals and equipment. Moreover, there is a strong relationship between weak states, terrorism and proliferation. Therefore, a range of diplomatic, economic and military policies are required to support weak and

556 Prof. William W. Keller, “Toward a ‘Chemical Safety and Security Leadership Forum’ The Advent of CBRN Security Culture”, International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012, p.3. 557 Yagya Prakash Saxena, “Introducing and Managing Chemical Safety and Security Practices in India”, The International Meeting On Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012.

179

failing states.

The CWC is a key multilateral treaty for preventing and prohibiting the proliferation of Chemical Weapons, and reducing the risk of chemical terrorism through its effective national implementation. The CWC constitutes a solid legal basis for preventing and prosecuting chemical terrorism. The effective implementation of the Convention by all States Parties would deny terrorists groups’ access to dual-use chemicals that could be used as Chemical Weapons, would also deter the potential supply of knowledge, equipment and chemicals to terrorists; and would also help in prosecuting criminals and terrorists.

The existence of inadequacies in the national legislative and administrative measures could encourage Non State Actors misuse of chemicals. The national implementation measures will be effective if a State has enacted comprehensive implementing legislation incorporating the General Purpose Criteria (GPC) and established a knowledgeable and effective National Authority. The OPCW routine industrial inspection can not monitor compliance of all national obligations under CWC. Moreover, the OPCW may find it politically difficult to interfere in various national measures. Therefore, the OPCW expects an effective national verification system to be implemented by the National Authorities, which will have direct bearing on the international struggle against terrorism and proliferation. The OPCW utilizes national declarations and implements a monitoring regime over the global exports and imports of Schedule chemicals. This monitoring will gain further importance in future. Therefore, the States Parties would also need to reinforce their domestic rules and procedures as part of enhanced CWC enforcement and monitoring effort.

The role of the OPCW regarding counter proliferation and terrorism has been recognized in various UN Resolutions such as UNSC Resolution- 1456 (2003) and UNSC Resolution- 1540 (2004). The European Union WMD Strategy recognizes the CWC and the OPCW as foundation for the whole disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. The OPCW actively participates in activities supporting the implementation of UNSC Resolution- 1540 and the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. The OPCW

180

is an important international security institution that has to use its mandate and expertise as part of the global struggle against the menace of terrorism; and is contributing to the global counter-terrorism efforts in such vital areas such as: prevention, mitigation, and response, technological assistance, information exchange and international cooperation, and safety and security of chemical plants. Moreover, as part of national and regional capacity building measures, the OPCW undertakes activities in the field of training provided to States Parties, thus contributing to mitigating the consequences of a terrorist attack with the use of Chemical Weapon.

Importantly, the OPCW mandate has not changed since 9/ 11, whereas, the new threat posed by the possible use of Chemical Weapons by terrorists and the threat of proliferation requires a re-evaluation of the OPCW mandate and its functioning. This evaluation will ensure the integrity of the CWC which will substantially contribute to the international security. Moreover, the development of the OPCW as a platform to promote international cooperation, and enhance chemical safety and security will broaden the scope of Article X (on assistance and protection) and Article XI (on international and technological cooperation), both of which are central for the OPCW transformation. The destruction of Chemical Weapons stockpiles is nearing completion; therefore, the OPCW will gradually need to refocus its resources and efforts for ensuring that the CWC remains a safeguard against the re-emergence of Chemical Weapons and terrorism. In this regard, the OPCW industry verification regime and the data monitoring of trade in relevant chemicals is the backbone of the CWC non-proliferation objective. Keeping in view, the scientific and technological developments and the threat of proliferation, the OPCW should refine and enhance intensity of industrial inspections with a focus on facilities most relevant to the object and purpose of the Convention.

The chemical industry can perform the key role in countering chemical proliferation and terrorism. The design of CWC is based on chemical industry that has evolved over almost four decades. The scientific and technological developments and the changing nature of chemical industry are posing serious challenges to the verification regime and the implementation of the Convention. To safeguard against the threat of proliferation and

181

terrorism, as per the CWC, the chemical industry is required to meticulously monitor the production, processing, consumption, import and export of Schedule chemicals and Discreet Organic Chemicals. In this regard, chemical industry should have detailed policies and procedures and should play a constructive and positive role for providing enabling environment to the OPCW and National Authorities for effectively implementing the legal and ethical norms of the Convention. The responsible attitude of the industry as envisaged in the Responsible Care Programme would adequately safeguard workplaces, communities and the vital environment. It will substantially contribute to both counter- proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts. Moreover, such interactions at national level will enable all stakeholders to know their partners in implementing the Convention.

182

CHAPTER 5

SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

Introduction

The safety and security of Chemical Industry is a daunting task because handling chemicals at any stage is immensely difficult as well as risky. The frightening factor is that an accident at chemical facility can have devastating repercussions for the entire town or region. Similarly, chemically loaded ship wreckage at coast can threaten the whole coast. Nonetheless, the chemical industry is prone to numerous devastating risks, which can become cause of major accidents, 558 with disastrous effects on precious lives and the environment. Therefore, it is imperative to accord requisite importance to the safety and security of chemical industry, which will safeguard against major hazards.559 As compared to the first half of the twentieth century, the number of hazardous chemical facilities has increased significantly due to ever growing demands for wide variety of products. Concurrently, industrial plants are growing in various groups and have come closer to population centres due to the rapid growth in population and poor land- planning and implementation. As a result, the likelihood of an accident in one chemical company can cause domino effects. 560 In the words of Genserik Reniers “if multi-plant safety precautions seem to be expensive or multi-plant security requirements appear to be unrealistic, check out an external domino effect or a terrorist suicide attack. You may be truly surprised.”561

558 One definition of a major accident is “an accident in the processing, storage or transport of hazardous substances which has the potential to have an off-site impact resulting in the death of people.” Genserik L.L. Reniers, Multi- Plant safety and Security Management in the Chemical and Process Industry, (Weineim: Wells, John Wiley & Sons, 2010), p.5. 559 Ibid. 560 Domino effect can be described as one accident causing a secondary accident and then possibly another accident in nearby plant, and so on. 561 GenseriK L. L. Reniers, op.cit, p.xiii.

183

Traditionally, safety related measures have been based on hard-earned operating experience. But, now management of industry recognizes that reacting to accidents and then taking preventive measures is not an appropriate response because the potential effects of industrial accidents and attacks are disastrous. Furthermore, today’s technical, social and political environment also demands that decision makers take a more proactive approach to safety and security issues.562 Therefore, many disastrous industrial accidents resulted into significant international and national process safety and risk management regulations.563 The dual-use phenomenon has further complicated the safety and security of chemical industry. For example, natural gas is highly flammable and is required for producing ammonia. Ammonia stored in tanks poses an inhalation hazard to workers and the local community in case of accidental or deliberate release. Inorganic acids, including phosphoric acid, sulphuric acid and nitric acid are used for the production of fertilizers. They also pose a health hazard via skin and eye contact or inhalation of the acid mist.564

This chapter covers the safety and security of chemical industry. For the sake of understanding the gravity of threat, the major chemical industrial disasters such as Bhopal India (1984), Toulouse France (2001), BP Texas City USA (2005), Buncefield Fire U.K (2005), Cheme-Pack The Netherlands (2011) are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. The primary objective of this discussion is to be aware of the immediate and the underlying causes of chemical disasters. The major accidents are followed by a discussion on safety of chemical industry for understanding various significant safety measures and the responsibilities of various stakeholders such as public authorities, chemical industry, civil society, local community, academia, media, NGOs, etc. This chapter also analyses the security of chemical industrial sites, the security of transportation of hazardous chemicals and the cyber security of chemical industry. The final section contains a few

562 Ibid. 563 OPCW, “Process Safety Management: Introduction, History, Current Trends, and Resources, Grulac Regional Seminar on Chemical Safety and Security Management,” Mexico City, Mexico, 22- 23 October 2013. 564 Sandia National Laboratories, International Chemical Threat Reduction Department, Safety and Security Training for the Chemical Industry, Document No. 2011-5598 P, 21 October 2010, p.5.

184

recommendations for various stakeholders to enhance the safety and security of chemical industry.

5.1 Major Chemical Accidents

We learn best through our own experiences, but mistakes could be disastrous in a chemical plant. Accidents in chemical industries constitute major threat to the public and the environment because of its magnitude and long term effects, therefore, chemical accidents must be prevented. Chemical processing industries deal with thousands of chemicals and many sophisticated processes. Many factors can cause accidents; therefore, the study of chemical accidents might help in preventing their recurrence by formulating appropriate policies and best practices. Some of the worst disasters of toxic releases occurred in toxic industrial chemicals like Methyl isocyanate (MIC), Ammonia, Chlorine, etc. Therefore, the safety and security of chemical industry must be accorded due importance. In the past many chemical accidents have occurred, but the disasters that proved major moments for learning as specified in the preceding paragraph are discussed in detail in succeeding paragraphs.

5.1.1 Bhopal Disaster, India (1984) It is the worst chemical accident in history. On 4 December 1984, a run-away chemical reaction took place in the Union Carbide Pesticide Plant in Bhopal, which caused leakage of toxic chemicals. The safety valve failed due to increased temperature and pressure. The protective systems designed for minimizing leakage failed to function, refrigeration system also did not function, scrubbing system, which could have absorbed some leaked gases was not installed and the flare system for burning discharged vapours was out of order. Methyl isocyanate (MIC) release resulted from the mixing of incompatible materials. Thus approximately 25- 27 tons of MIC spread through Bhopal and about half a million people were exposed to this deadly gas. Several of the abovementioned safety failures were attributed to inadequate budgeting.8 The consequences were terrifying, “about 3,000- 7,000 people were killed immediately; 20,000

185

cumulative deaths; 200,000- 500,000 injured; posttraumatic stress; and continued medical consequences.”9

The International Confederation of Free Trade Union, and International Federation of Chemical, Energy and General Workers Union (ICFTU-ICEF) Mission investigated the disaster at Bhopal.10 This Mission interviewed wide-ranging stakeholders and researched from extensive sources, which helped in identifying the following causes of Bhopal tragedy.11 The accident was probably triggered by a runaway reaction that happened when water entered methyl Isocyanate (MIC) storage tank. This was attributed to faulty maintenance procedure. The underlying causes were unsafe operating procedures, insufficient safety in the process design, unserviceable safety equipment, poor maintenance, not enough manning levels, and insufficient workers’ training and skill development. Prior to this disaster, a small scale release had occurred, which caused one death and numerous injuries. However, adequate investigative and corrective actions were not taken despite strong protests from the Labour Union that represented Bhopal workers.12

8 Dr. M. Sam Mannan, “Lessons from Process Chemical Incidents and Accidents”, Presentation at The International Meeting On Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012. 9 Frank Lees, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 3: 1996, pp. A5.1- A5.11. 10 Lane Kirkland, “The Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission to Study the Causes and Effects of the Methyl Isocyanate Gas Leak at the Union Carbide Pesticide Plant in Bhopal, India, on December 2-3-1984” 1985, p.1; The board included representatives of ICEF, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organization (AFLCIO), U.S.A, United Steelworkers of America, U.S.A, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), chemical industry federation of the French Confederation of Democratic Trade unions (CFDTFUC), and employee of La Littorale, UCC Plant at Beziers , France; Indian National Chemical Workers' Federation (INTUC), Union Carbide Karmachari Sangh, Madhya Pradesh HMS, ICFTU Asian and Pacific Regional Organization (APRO). 11 In compiling the report, the ICFTU-ICEF investigation mission relied on several sources of European, American and Indian news; technical journals; Union Carbide technical reports and manuals; documents from the U.S. Congress; materials published by Indian scientific organization and correspondence between the Bhopal labour unions and Indian government. The team also interviewed more then thirty Union Carbide workers including several workers who were on duty on the night of the deadly release, as well as leaders of the local and national Union. 12 Lane Kirkland, “The Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission,” op.cit, p.1.

186

Though, the management of the industry and Union Carbide India limited (UCIL) were responsible for the operating and maintenance errors. However, the UCIL's parent multinational, the U.S-based Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) can also not be absolved from responsibility because the UCC requested for a process design with large MIC storage tanks, which was not supported by the engineers of the UCIL. Moreover, the 1982 corporate inspection report revealed that the UCC knew that the Bhopal plant had major safety issues, but the company did not initiate requisite corrective action. Though, the Indian government and the provincial authorities of Madhya Pradesh were not directly responsible, yet effective implementation of workers safety and environmental regulations could have prevented this disaster. 565

5.1.2 Toulouse, France (2001) Almost two weeks after the attacks of 9/ 11, an explosion at a fertilizer industry in Toulouse, France killed 30 people, injured 3,500, destroyed 11,000 homes and 27000 houses were damaged.566 The blast destroyed the fertilizer plant, and the vapor cloud that spread over the community contained ammonia and other toxic chemicals. The financial losses exceeded $ 850 million.567 The French Environmental Agency calculated that up to 300 metric tons of Ammonium Nitrate (AN) exploded that caused a severe blast that registered 3.4 on the Richter scale.568 “The energy released by the Toulouse explosion (1.55 × 1012 joules) was approximately half of the energy released in the combustion of 86,000 liters of jet fuel in the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 (3.2 × 1012

565 Ibid, p.3. 566 “Fatal Blast Rocks Atofina Fertilizer Plant in France,” Chemical Week, Vol.163, No.35, 19 September 2001, p. 7; Ian Young, “Legacy of Toulouse Disaster Still Weighs Heavy,” Chemical Week, Vol.164, No.18, 14 May 2003, pp.34- 35. 567 Alex Scott, “Fatal Atofina Explosion Heightens Safety Fears,” Chemical Week, Vol.163, No.36, 26 September 2001, p.9. 568 French Environment Ministry, “The Major Hazard in Toulouse,” 6th Meeting of the Committee of the Competent Authorities Responsible for the Implementation of Directive 96/ 82/ EC, Antwerp, Belgium, 10- 12 October 2001.

187

joules).”569 This was explosion of “off-spec” AN in a warehouse.570 The most likely cause was AN storing with chlorinated compounds, which led to the detonation.571

5.1.3 BP Texas City, USA (2005) On 23 March 2005, a vapour cloud explosion and subsequent fire killed 15 people and harmed over 170 on the Isomerization Unit at the BP Texas City Refinery. The explosion took place when heavy than air hydrocarbon vapours contacted an ignition source. Technically, the liquid rundown from the tower was not proper, and the inability of responding effectively caused the loss of containment, which resulted into an explosion. The severity increased because there were many trailers sited close to the plant. Moreover, many injured could have left the dangerous area, had they been informed by an effective warning system, but the supervisors of this Unit were not present for ensuring compliance with standing procedures. The causes of this accident could have been significantly reduced by discontinuing the use of the blow-down stack and hydrocarbon service and instead installing inherently safer options.572

The investigation team found that the working environment in BP- Texas had lacked trust, a sense of purpose and motivation. Moreover, the responsibilities of supervisory staff were not clear and rules were not consistently followed. The employees were not delivering their duties with commitment and rigour and individuals were not interested in suggesting or initiating improvements. There was confusion over roles and responsibilities and a general lack of clear accountabilities. The level of understanding of hazards of process safety was poor; as a result people were accepting and working with very high levels of risk. The Performance Management Process and vertical communication was poor. The top management had no independent means of

569 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 21. 570 Dr. M. Sam Mannan, “Lessons from Process Chemical Incidents and Accidents”, The International Meeting On Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8 – 9 November 2012. 571 N. Paltrinieri, et al., “Lessons Learned from Toulouse and Buncefield Disasters: From Risk Analysis Failures to the Identification of Atypical Scenarios Through a Better Knowledge Management”, Risk Analysis, Vol.38, No.2, 2012, pp.1404-1419. 572 J. Mogford, Investigation Team Leader, “Fatal Accident Investigation Report,” Isomerization Unit Explosion Final Report, Texas City- 2005, USA, 9 December 2005, p.i.

188

understanding the deteriorating standards in the plant. In short, the standard procedures, policies and expected behavior were not met in number of areas 573

5.1.4 Buncefield Disaster, the UK (2005) On 11 December 2005, a series of explosions and subsequent fire destroyed the Buncefield Oil Storage depot and caused widespread damage to the local community. 574 Moreover, this accident resulted in the loss of approximately 2 Billion Euros and is considered the largest fire accident of peacetime Europe.575 This oil storage depot was the fifth largest out of 108 depots at the U.K. The safety system for checking the supply of petrol to the tank and for preventing overflow failed to function. Hence, up to 300 tonnes of petrol escaped from the tank.576 The fuel tank had two form of level control: a gauge to monitor the filling operation; and an Independent High Level Switch (IHLS) to close supply of oil when the tank was filled till desired level.

Both the abovementioned gauges did not function.577 Thus, the control room staff was unaware that the tank was filling to dangerous level. In fact, the gauge to monitor filling operations had struck intermittently after the tank was serviced in August 2005. However, the site management and the contractors for maintaining the system did not address the obvious technical unreliability. The IHLS required just a padlock for keeping its check lever functional. The second safety feature around the tank was a bund retaining wall for preventing release of oil into the atmosphere. This containment also failed, because of improper design and inadequate maintenance.

The above-mentioned failures were the technical causes of the initial explosion. However, behind these technical failures were the underlying causes, which could be attributed broadly to the management failures, such as:

573 Ibid, pp. i- ii. 574 “How Buncefield Fire Unfolded,” BBC News, 13 July 2006. 575 Genserik L. L. Reniers, op.cit, p.15. 576 “The Final Report of the Major Incident Investigation Board,” The Buncefield Incident, 11 December 2005, Vol. 1, 2008, p.20. 577 The U.K. Environment Agency, Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMACH), “Buncefield: Why Did it Happen?” p. 1. Available at www.hse.gov.uk.

189

“Management systems were deficient and instructions were not properly followed, despite the fact that the systems were independently audited. Two, pressure on staff had been increasing before the incident. The site was fed by three pipelines, and the control room staff had little control on two pipelines in terms of flow rates and timing of receipt. This meant that staff did not have sufficient information easily available to them to manage precisely the storage of incoming fuel. Three, throughput had increased at the site. This put more pressure on site management staff and further degraded the ability to monitor the receipt and storage of fuel. The pressure on staff was made worse by lack of engineering support from the Head Office.” 578

The above-mentioned pressures created a culture where the primary focus was on keeping the process operating and the process safety was not given due importance and attention. This incident teaches us the importance of understanding and assessing major accident risks and the need to have a safety culture to seriously take the signals of failure in safety critical equipment and to systematically address those failures as early as possible. Moreover, at the core of managing a hazardous installation should be dedicated and positive process safety leadership with requisite resources for process safety.579 Regarding the underlying causes of this disaster, the Honourable Justice Calvert Smith aptly remarked “the failing had more to do with slackness, inefficiency and a more-orless complacent approach to matters of safety.”580

5.1.5 Cheme-Pack, the Netherland (2011) In January 2011, Cheme-Pack, a chemical packaging plant in the South of the Netherland caught fire leading to an enormous cloud of potentially toxic smoke and 41.5 million Euros worth of damage. Fortunately, there were no casualties and the cloud turned out to be non-toxic but many understandably worried about the release of 23,500 litres of chemicals into the air and considered how an accident of this scale could have happened. This incident highlights the importance of laws and regulations for chemical plant safety

578 Ibid, p.4. 579 Ibid, p.5. 580 Honourable Justice Calvert Smith, Comments When Passing Judgment on the Defendents- Buncefield Fire, St Albahs Crown Court, 16 December 2010.

190

and security. The CWC requires Member States to “…assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment…” and to “…cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this regard.”581 Moreover, as per the Convention, States Parties producing Schedule- 1 chemicals are required “to ensure the safety of people and protect the environment.”582 Nevertheless, each State party can do so”…in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions.”

The Netherlands has many laws and regulations concerning chemical plant safety and security, but in the case of Chemie-Pack, inspections had revealed a number of noncompliance issues such as the lack of risk analysis, insufficient fire prevention measures and the lack of personnel safety training. In 2008, the company received an administrative fine, which was not paid. It was issued a license in 2010 based on their most recent inspection in 2009. The Dutch prosecutors concluded that Chemie-pack was acting in violation of its license and therefore, started criminal investigations against Cheme-Pack.583 This incident highlights the importance of effective implementation of national legislations and regulations.

The CWC assigns highest priority to chemical plant safety and security and protecting the environment. It states “States Parties producing chemicals to ensure the safety of people and protect the environment. Nevertheless each State Party can do so in accordance with its own national standards and laws. 584 The examination of this case revealed that Cheme-pack invested little in imparting personal safety training to its employees and had inadequate fire prevention measures. 585 Thus Cheme-Pack was operating in violation of its obligations under license but the governmental authorities need

581 CWC, Article VII. 582 CWC, Verification Annex ,Part VI (b) (7). 583 Scott Spence, “Effective Legislative Framework for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons Proliferation,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution to Security and Non-Proliferation of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands, 11-12 April 2011, p.2. 584 CWC, Article VII, paragraph.3; CWC, Part VI (B) (7). 585 Scott Spence, “Effective Legislative Framework for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons Proliferation,” op.cit, p.2.

191

to have effectively implemented national regulations. This incident proves that laws are only worth the paper if they are not effectively implemented.

5.2 International Initiatives: Safe Management of Chemicals

5.2.1 Earth Summit- 1992 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development also known as the Earth Summit was held in Rio de Janerio from 3-14 June 1992. This conference was attended by representatives of 172 states including 116 heads of states; representatives of 2400 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Moreover, 17,000 people attended parallel NGOs forums. The issues included systematic scrutiny of the patterns of production particularly the production of toxic components such as poisonous waste including radioactive chemicals; water scarcity; reducing vehicle emissions affecting public health; searching alternative sources of energy for replacing the use of fossil fuels.586 Thus, this conference was unprecedented in terms of its size and the scope of concerns. This conference sent out a message that nothing short of complete transformation of our attitude and behavior would bring about the necessary change. This conference emphasized that sound chemicals management means that chemicals are produced and used in such a way to minimize the adverse effects on human health and the environment. Agenda-21 was one of the outcome of this conference. 587

5.2.2 Agenda-21 Agenda- 21 was adopted by all the states that participated in the Earth Summit. It is non-binding, voluntary UN implementation plan for sustainable development. It is an action agenda for the UN, multilateral organizations and states for execution at all levels from international to local level. Agenda-21 is divided into 40 chapters that have been grouped into four sections. Section-1 deals with social and economic issues such as

586 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janerio, 3-14 June 1992. Available at www.un.org. 587 United Nations Sustainable Development, “Agenda-21, Chapter-1,” United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janerio, Brazil, 3- 14 June 1992, para 37.1- 37.5.

192

promoting health, combating poverty, etc. Section-2 deals with conservation and management of resources for development such as controlling pollution, protecting environment, etc. Section-3 strengthens the role of major groups such as children, women, industry workers, etc. Section-4 covers the means of implementation such as education, international organizations, etc.588

5.2.3 World Summit on Sustainable Development- 2002 The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) produced three outcomes namely, the political declaration ‘Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development’, the ‘Johannesburg Plan of Implementation’, and the ‘Type-II’ commitments by governments and other stakeholders such as Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). This Summit meeting accorded enhanced role to the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development with regard to the monitoring and implementation of Agenda- 21, and developing coherence and partnership in national implementation measures.589 An important aspect of this conference was the proposed ‘corporate accountability and responsibility measures’. In this regard, the civil society pressed the case for an international regulatory mechanism for corporations that enjoy power just like member states of the UN.

Regarding sound management of chemicals, the Johannesburg Implementation Plan states “renew the commitment, as advanced in Agenda-21, to sound management of chemicals throughout their life cycle and of hazardous waste for sustainable development and for the protection of human health and the environment, inter alia, aiming to achieve by 2020 that chemicals are used and produced in ways that lead to the minimization of significant adverse effects on human health and the environment.” 590 Aimed at supporting

588 Agenda 21, United Nations Environment Programme. Available at www.unep.org. 589 Dr. Peter Doran, “World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg), An Assessment for International Institute for Sustainable Development, Briefing Paper, 3 Oct 2002, p.1. 590 UN, “Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,” Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August- 4 September 2002, (New York: United Nations, 2002), p.20; Dr. Peter Doran, “World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg), An Assessment for International Institute for Sustainable Development, Briefing Paper, 3 Oct 2002, p.9.

193

countries to achieve the set objective, a Strategic Approach for International Chemicals Management (SAICM) was adopted during the International Conference on Chemicals Management held in Dubai in 2006.

5.2.4 Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management (SAICM) The Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management (SAICM) was adopted by the International Conference on Chemical management (ICCM) on 6 February 2006.591 It is basically an international policy framework for strengthening the safe and sound management of chemicals, with an aim to coordinate and support a process leading to achievement of the set objective at the Earth Summit in 2002. SAICM covers risk assessment of chemicals and harmonized labeling up to tackling obsolete and stockpiled products. It also carries provision for national centres aimed at helping countries, especially in the developing world, train staff in chemical safety including dealing with spills and accidents.

The Member States are obliged to use and produce chemicals in ways that minimize adverse effects on health and the environment. It is important because the global chemical production is set to increase by 80 percent in the next fifteen years and the chemical production is shifting from the developed to the developing world. As aptly remarked by Klaus Toepfer “if the past is our guide, some seemingly benign products can prove to have deleterious impacts; in this regard the developing countries need help in term of the better use, handling and disposal of chemicals.”592

5.3 Prevention of Chemical Accidents

591 United Nations Environment Protection Programme, Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management: SAICM Texts and Resolutions of the International Conference on Chemical Management, 2006, p.5. 592 Global Outreach Campaign, “What is Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management,” Available at www.ipen.org/campaign.

194

Chemical accident can happen anywhere,593 and the chemical disasters mentioned in the preceding part of this chapter amply demonstrate the enormous threat of chemical accidents. The main purpose of safety programmes at hazardous chemical industry is to prevent accidents. For effective accident prevention, cooperative efforts are required, i.e. the industry, local authorities and the civil society should work as team.594 All hazardous chemical industries should make concerted efforts to achieve the safety standard of zero incidents; and should comply with the same overall safety objectives irrespective of their size and location. Management of hazardous installations and concerned government authorities are responsible for the safe operation of facility.

5.3.1 Role of Industry in Preventing Accidents The chemical industry should identify hazards and assess various risks from the stage of design throughout operations. It should assess the possibilities of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, technical failures, human failures, theft, etc. Such assessments should be undertaken as a regular feature by group of experts. Safety culture should be developed in chemical industry, and the industry must establish Safety Management System, which includes, inter alia, creating an effective organization, formulating appropriate procedures, educating and training employees, provision of necessary resources. An effective management system requires periodic reviews and effective monitoring mechanism. The chemical industry should prefer utilizing inherently safer technology, which would reduce the impact of an accident or attack e.g. by storing only required amount of hazardous chemicals on-site and using safer chemical processes. ” 595 Other measures could be reducing operating pressures and temperatures.

5.3.2 Role of Public Authorities in Preventing Accidents

593 New Jersey Division of Fire Safety, Department of Community Affairs, “Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) Title III, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know”, Fire Service Reference Booklet- 2, 1 February 2011, p.1. 594 The social fabric includes community experience with hazards, and community ability to respond to, cope with, recover from, and adapt to hazards, which are influenced by economic and demographic characteristics. The social fabric contributes to the overall vulnerability of the area. 595 Jeff Johnston, “New Voices for Plant Security,” Chemical and Energy News, Vol. 82, 22 November 2004, pp.51- 53.

195

Public authorities 596 ought to set general safety objectives, establish a control framework and inspect and enforce safety measures. They ensure that the management of industry ensures the safe operation of hazardous installations, and keep public informed regarding potential risks and safety measures. Regarding Other Chemical Industries (OCIs), the Public Authorities assist OCIs in developing safety programmes. Since OCIs have a less formal operating structure and tend to employ few safety specialists, therefore, Public Authorities facilitate OCIs for concluding co-operative arrangements with larger industries, professional organizations, customers, suppliers, etc for jointly improving safety.

For most enterprises, the level of investment in security reflects implicit riskversus- consequence tradeoffs, which are based on: “(1) what is known about the risk environment? and (2) what is economically justifiable and sustainable in a competitive marketplace or in an environment of limited resources?” 597 Therefore, keeping in view the threats and the severe consequences, the public authorities provide necessary information to industry for crucial security investment decisions. Public authorities facilitate deliberations and dialogue among the stakeholders e.g. industry, public authorities, public, NGOs, media, etc. To better understand the risks posed by hazardous installation, public authorities assist both the public and the media. 598 The media can be utilized by contributing to the safety programmes undertaken by chemical industry and public authorities.

5.3.3 OPCW Role The OPCW has an obligation to encourage the safe and secure use of chemicals.

596 The term “public authorities” is used in this research that includes wide range of government bodies at local, provincial and national level that are responsible for implementing national legislations, environmental protection, public health, occupational health and safety, civil defence, emergency response, and other aspects of chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response. 597 The U.S. National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, February 2003, p.11. 598 Ashok S. Kalelkar, Arthur D., “Investigation of Large-Magnitude Incidents: Bhopal as a Case Study”, Presented at the Institution of Chemical Engineers, Conference On Preventing Major Chemical Accidents, London, 1988, p.7.

196

OPCW is in a unique position in the world to promote chemical safety and the National Authorities and chemical facilities of the Member States are crucial to implement the plan.599 With the major task of the destruction of Chemical Weapon stockpiles nearing completion in the foreseeable future, there is a need for strengthening the long-term mission of the OPCW. The OPCW is and will remain the only international mechanism to ensure that Chemical Weapons will never again re-emerge. The OPCW should effectively contribute to the chemical safety and security and the possible misuse of dualuse industrial chemicals. The OPCW contribution to chemical safety and security shall become a part of the larger effort for preventing the re-emergence of Chemical Weapons and the misuse of toxic industrial chemicals.600

5.3.4 Safety Culture There is no single definition of safety culture. However, the U.K. Health and Safety Executive define it as “...the product of the individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and pattern of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of an organization’s health and safety programme.”601 The safety culture depicts the organization’s overall attitude to safety, or as Williamson et al put it, “a safety culture comprises the organizational responsibility for safety, the management attitude towards safety, the management activity in responding to safety problems, safety training... workers’ involvement in safety, and the status of the safety officer and the safety committee.”602 Since, the attacks of 9/ 11, the chemical industry is working on developing security culture along side the safety culture. Such learning are crucial for an effective safety and security culture.603

599 OPCW, “Process Safety Management: Introduction, History, Current Trends, and Resources, Grulac Regional Seminar on Chemical Safety and Security Management,” Mexico City, Mexico, 22- 23 October 2013. 600 OPCW, “Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW Address” Seminar on the CWC and Chemical Safety and Security Management for Member States of the Region of Southeast and South Asia,” Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 8- 11 May 2012. 601 U.K. Health and Safety Executive, Safety Culture: A Review of the Literature, Document No. HSL/ 2002/ 25, 2002, p.1. 602 Ann M. Williamson, et al., “The Development of a Measure of Safety Climate: The Role of Safety Perceptions and Attitudes,” Safety Science, Vol. 25, Issue.1-3, February- April 1997, pp.15- 27. 603 Genserik L. L. Reniers, op.cit, p.1.

197

The values of the groups help shape the beliefs and attitudes of the individual, which in turn, play a significant role in determining behaviour. 604 A safety culture can be observed by the actions of personnel at various levels of the organization. Each enterprise should have a corporate safety culture, which should be a part of the overall Safety Policy. The safety culture largely depends upon the visible commitment of the senior management. Similarly, there should be bottom-up commitment also i.e. the enthusiastic involvement of all employees by adhering to safety policies and procedures. The industry must specify rights and responsibilities of all concerned. The corporate safety culture must safeguard against complacency or any relevant inadequacies and should help in developing an atmosphere in which employees can easily discuss errors and near-misses in order to put them right. The management of industry must ensure that all safety policies and procedures are disseminated to all employees. Moreover, the management must train the concerned employees and provide them requisite resources and assistance in discharging their responsibilities. Developing safety culture is a process of collective learning. In short, the main goal of a plant safety culture is to motivate employees to perform their duties in such a way that enhanced safety becomes a natural by-product.605

5.3.5 Role of Community in Preventing Accidents Communities in the vicinity of hazardous installations should know the risks of industrial accidents and response measures in case of an incident. For this purpose, the risk communication between the industry and the community is extremely important. 606 Informed public would enthusiastically contribute to the decision-making processes and

604 th Centre for Chemical Process Safety, Safety Culture: “What is at Stake” Preparation for 10 Global Congress on Process Safety, 30 March- 2 April 2014, p.1. 605 Genserik L. L. Reniers, op.cit, p.36. 606 Risk communication is the purposeful exchange of information about risks. In some cases, it is used to mean only access to information. In a more comprehensive context, and in the context of chemical safety and security, risk communication should be a two-way process based on openness and trust.

198

will take appropriate measures for reducing risks. Communities should choose their representatives to communicate their concerns and feedback to the public authorities, management of industry, relevant NGOs and other stakeholders. 607

5.3.6 Role of Academic Institutions Academic institutions can contribute to chemical accident prevention by motivating students to undertake research in the prevention, preparedness and response to industrial accidents. In this regard, academic institutes can formulate desired research topics. 608 Academic institutions can also provide education and training to responders and community leaders. The courses can cover prevention, preparedness and response to chemical accidents in their curricula. Academic community as a primary source can develop new concepts and principles, 609 and academic centers can provide analysis, research and development (R&D), and educational programmes regarding safety and security of chemical industry.610 Academia can also contribute substantially in supporting the government agencies in identifying relevant chemicals and facilities and associated risk assessments. Moreover, they can develop generic chemical safety and security requirements and conduct research in areas that would contribute to chemical safety and security. 611 Moreover, academia can play an important role in developing chemical safety and security culture in their respective organizations and institutions and thus contribute to safety and security of chemical facilities. This would necessitate that academia may be provided opportunities to attend national and international courses, workshops, seminars, exercises, etc on safety and security aspects under CWC.

5.3.7 Safety Policy

607 Howard Kunreuther, “The Weakest Link: Managing Risk Through Interdependent Strategies”, in Paul R. Kleindorfer and Yoram Wind, eds., The Network Challenge: Strategy, Profit and Risk in an Interlinked World, (Wharton School Publishing, 2009), p.9. 608 Adam S. Markowski, “Safety and Risk Management Aspects for Major Accident Industry in Poland”, International Conference on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 7-8 November 2012. 609 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, 18 December 2008, p.16. 610 The U.S. National Infrastructure Protection Plan- 2009, p.2. 611 Dr Bob Mathews, “Improvised Chemical Devices, Chemical Security and the CWC”, Presentation at the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012, p.2.

199

Each chemical industry must have a meaningful Safety Policy. It should include safety culture, aims and principles regarding safety, and incorporating the “zero incidents” goal and those safety objectives set by public authorities. From this document should emanate further documents such as detailed working papers and instructions. This Policy should be reviewed regularly in the light of changes in technologies, laws, rules and regulations. The input from employees must be sought during review. Employees responsible for the development of corporate safety policies should have direct access to the top management and should not be placed under the production management. Moreover, public should have access to the Safety Policy.

The development and implementation of a Safety Policy by an industry should be coordinated and integrated with occupational health, safety, and the environmental protection. All these aspects will come under the General Management System, which addresses prevention, preparedness and response to chemical incidents, procedures and resources for implementing the Safety Policy. In fact good safety management system is good business practice, because it reduces the costs related to time lost in accidents, disruption of operations, insurance premiums and it also improves goodwill with the local community and national authorities. Generally, managers face difficulty assessing lowprobability risks, for example, prior to the Bhopal disaster, the chemical industry would treat accident as one that will not happen at their facility. But after Bhopal, a vast majority of chemical companies undertook detailed study of chemicals with catastrophic risk potential and took special measures to professionally deal with them.612

5.3.8 Awareness Raising in Industry Chemical industry should be one of the primary areas for awareness and education because the employs of the industry formulate group that is the most likely to handle and trade large amounts of toxic chemicals or have access to dual-use equipment. Chemical companies should treat codes as a catalyst for investment and gaining new business

612 Howard Kunreuther, op.cit, p.10.

200

opportunities. Security provides tangible benefits for profitability, such as, protection against theft, diversion, sabotage, and proliferation. Large chemical companies are more likely to include security and non-proliferation in their codes as compared to small companies. Hence, large chemical industries can act as advocates in education and awareness raising programmes for small companies. Even though small chemical facilities are less likely to handle large quantities of toxic chemicals as larger companies, they are just as susceptible to theft or diversion of chemicals, equipment or information.613 Small chemical companies that face the same threat without the capital to purchase expensive security systems should address that limitation by including security and non-proliferation consciousness as a principle, so that employees would know how to react to a security incident. Awareness raising influences employees to not just follow the law because it is the law, but because it is the right thing to do with little to almost no investment needed.

5.3.9 Two- Way Communication For the exchange of safety information it is imperative that effective two-way communication channels between management and labour must be established. This will also help in creating a high level of motivation amongst employees for efficient and safe functioning of installation. Important communication linkages should not be blocked, e.g. language differences, or that someone do not care, etc. Formal Safety Committees should be established for consultations between the management and labour. But a safety committee can never be a substitute for direct two-way communication between the management and the labours. Such committees will obtain maximum benefit from the experience and practical knowledge of labours. The management must provide specific safety training and necessary resources to Safety Committees. Safety Committees may be established at individual hazardous installations, at corporate, sectoral, national and international levels.

5.3.10 International Transfer of Technology

613 Aaron C. Gluck, “How Codes of Practice Enhance a Chemical Security Culture,” OPCW Today, Vol.2, No.5, December 2013, p.19.

201

Whenever a process technology or other safety technology is transferred, it must be ensured that both the supplier and the recipient conduct a detailed fact-finding study and risk assessment, that the receiver will be able to operate the technology in question in a safe manner, taking into account local circumstances and legal and administrative requirements for the safe operation. This is particularly important because research on the causes of industrial incidents over a thirty year period indicates that only one percent was attributable to sabotage, whereas 44 percent accidents were caused by mechanical failure.614 Therefore, before acquiring a hazardous plant(s), an industry must undertake comprehensive hazard evaluation. At the same time, the supplier of the technology should be obliged to reveal all known and suspected safety issues with the technology. The purchaser must ensure that the said disclosures are complete in all aspects and all necessary measures have been taken for safe operations.

5.4 Preparedness for Chemical Accidents

Chemical industry manual reveals that the industry is responsible for the on-site emergency planning, whereas, the off-site planning is the responsibility of public authorities. These organizations are created by the state to look into matters of public interest. The planning for disasters is basically a cooperative effort by all concerned that includes, inter alia, the industry, public authorities, NGOs, representatives of local community, media, response teams, health and medical authorities. Emergency preparedness is a continuous process such as planning, organizing, training, evaluating exercises and taking corrective actions for the shortfalls.615

The main goal of emergency planning is to contain an accident as quickly as possible. First of all, the hazardous installation has to be identified that requires emergency planning. Both on/off -site emergency plans should be prepared, coordinated and specific

614 Marsh & McLennan, Large Property Damage Losses in the Hydrocarbon-Chemical Industries a ThirtyYear Review, 18th Edition (New York: Marsh and McLennan Protection Consultants, 1998). 615 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, 18 December 2008, p.9.

202

responsibilities should be designated. The emergency plans for a chemical facility should also include transport accidents carrying hazardous substances and even natural calamities. Emergency planning process should explain various scenarios, possible risks, and the areas, which may be contaminated. Keeping in view the social fabric, this should also include which areas will require evacuation or sheltering in place. This data would help in assessing the nature, type and effectiveness of construction in the vicinity of chemical industry. If the structures are old and not weatherized, then they will not provide requisite protection against toxic chemical release. 616 Where structures would be airtight, people may shelter in place. Thus two different actions may be implemented, but this would necessitate immense coordination.

5.4.1 Role of Industry: Preparedness Phase The hazardous installations must develop and maintain comprehensive on-site emergency plans. The plan should evaluate the existing hazards and the related medical needs including antidotes for the employees and the local community; and when necessary proper shutdown of operations/ processing. The availability of medical supplies and antidotes by industry is important especially if the local medical authorities do not maintain such stocks. The execution of on-site plans is the responsibility of the management of the industry. However, the public authorities should periodically review said plans. In this regard, the input from independent experts can also be extremely useful. Moreover, if a facility lacks requisite resources then the public authorities should develop their cooperative relationship with a larger enterprise. All employees must know the immediate response for limiting the release of hazardous chemicals, evacuating the facility in an orderly manner and assembling at a pre-designated assembly area.

616 John Sorensen, Barbara Vogt, Barry Shumpert, “Planning Protective Action Decision Making: Evacuate or Shelter-in-Place?”, ORNL/ TM-2002/ 144, 2002, p.17. This document was prepared for Federal Emergency Management Agency, Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program and U.S. Department of Energy.

203

The management of industry must assist public authorities in the development of off-site emergency plans. This will also facilitate the compatibility between both on-site and off-site emergency plans. While preparing emergency plans, the input from the local community must be sought. This would enhance confidence of the public regarding the commitment of industry and public authorities concerning safety and security. Management should provide information regarding hazardous substances held at the industry, such as toxicological and eco-toxicological properties. On the pretext of trade secrets the industry must not withhold information from the concerned public authorities because that information would be required for developing off-site emergency plans. However, the public authorities must ensure necessary confidentiality. Labour organizations can perform very useful roles in preparing and responding to a chemical accident. They can assist the management of industry in preparing, testing and reviewing emergency plans; and disseminating requisite information to the employees and also the local community. Labour organizations can also train their safety representatives who safeguard the health and safety interests of the employees.

5.4.2 Role of Public Authorities: Preparedness Phase The national level public authorities should develop general principles and guidelines for response to chemical accident. In the light of the general guidelines, the public authorities at local levels should develop appropriate preventive and response capabilities. Public authorities should ensure that the large chemical industry, OCIs and commercial users of hazardous chemicals assess all possible accident scenarios and prepare appropriate emergency plans. The planners must take into account the weather patterns during various seasons and the worst case climatic conditions, which is mild wind with stable atmospheric conditions.617

Geospatial information that pertains to the geographic location and the characteristics of natural and man-made features must be maintained and updated. This

617 John Sorensen, Barry Shumpert, Barbara Vogt, op.cit, p.17.

204

information is integrated with various types of assessments and situational reports, other data and imagery. Geospatal information is essentially required for the command structure, which is helpful in proper resource management and keeping the public informed. 618 Public authorities at all levels should integrate emergency plans for hazardous installations with emergency plans for natural disasters and civil defence, due to similarities. This would result in better coordination. Moreover, the National Authorities must maintain an up-to- date list of national and international experts in responding to a disaster.

Designated hospitals and medical facilities should formulate detailed emergency plans that should be fully compatible with off-site emergency plans. The off-site plans should cater for arranging sufficient transport at short notice for the transportation of victims to hospitals. The medical staff should be trained in emergency medicine and medical toxicology. The health department staff must include veterinarians to take care of wildlife and livestock. The hospitals should be sited at safe distance from a hazardous installation and out of the vulnerable zone i.e. out of the possible path of dispersion of a toxic release. If the hazardous installation can cause trans-boundary effects in case of an accident then the emergency plans must be developed in consultation with the neighbouring countries.

5.4.3 Role of Community: Preparedness Phase Generally, the local community is viewed as helpless victims and planning is based on outside assistance. However, the emphasis is gradually changing and local community is viewed as the first line of defence both in planning and responding to an accident.619 The capacity of local community should be developed to control the distribution of resources and plans and implement long term social and economic revival of the community. 620 The community representatives should be actively involved in the preparation of emergency plans, reviews and

618 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, op.cit, p.27. 619 Mary B. Anderson and Peter J. Woodrow, Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster (London: Intermediate Technology Publication, 1998). 620 M.A. Brennan, “Community Volunteers: The Front Line of Disaster Response”, The International Journal of Volunteer Administration, Volume XXIV, No. 4, 2005, p.3.

205

testing said plans during field exercises. They should assist both the industry and the public authorities in educating the at-risk community regarding various hazards and possible response measures such as preparation of suitable shelters at homes or in community, protective measures in the event of an accident, relevant protective equipment and medicines, how to remain informed regarding response guidance provided by the public authorities, etc.

5.4.4 Informing Public Keeping the public informed is an essential part of the emergency prevention, preparedness and response plans. It is the right of the public to be aware regarding the risks from the hazardous installations in their area. This responsibility is performed by the industry, public authorities, NGOs and other public interest groups. But this information flow has to be two-way for achieving desired effect. Input from the representatives of the local community should be obtained when the communication with the public is being designed. Those people should be designated for providing information to public who have both knowledge and skills and who enjoy respect in the community. The public authorities should discuss risks acceptability with the public for seeking requisite input from the community. Employees should be trained to inform and educate their community, since they have best access to the community and have the strongest incentive for protecting their community and families. Moreover, media should be utilized as an objective source of information; and media should be trained in formulating and implementing communication with the public regarding an emergency.

206

5.4.5 Evacuate or Shelter in Place The decision to evacuate or shelter-in-place depends on two questions: “Will shelter-in-place provide adequate protection against the release? Is there enough time to evacuate people?” In most cases a combined response may be initiated, e.g. the locality close to and in the path of the release may be advised to shelter-in-place, whereas, the areas at some distance from the release, which allows reaction time, may be recommended to immediately evacuate. This combined approach will necessitate good communication with the public.621 Poor communication will cause panic and people would take independent decisions. 622 Some researchers believe that the public immediate response should be shelter-in-place when alerted regarding a chemical emergency. This response should have three stages: “shelter, shut, and listen.” 623 This approach reduces public social amplification factors and facilitates communication with the public.

5.5 Response to Chemical Accident

Response to a chemical accident is to manage the consequences and quickly return to normalcy. It includes all necessary actions after a chemical accident or an imminent accident. 624 For an effective response well trained and equipped response groups are required. These groups will require reliable communication networks, which would

621 Barbara Muller Vogt and John H. Sorensen, Description of a Survey Data Regarding Plant Accident, West Helena, Arkansas, Prepared for the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, ORNL/ TM- 13722, March 1999, pp.23- 24. 622 Compliance rates for sheltering have not been extensively documented. In situations where both shelter and evacuation have been advised, compliance with sheltering has not been very high. Refer Barbara Muller Vogt and John H. Sorensen, Ibid, p.17. 623 John Sorensen, Barry Shumpert, Barbara Vogt, “Planning Protective Action Decision- Making,” op.cit, p.14. 624 OECD Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness and Response, “Guidance for Industry Management and Labour, Public Authorities, Communities and Other Stakeholders”, OECD Environment, Health and Safety Publication, Series on Chemical Accident, No.10, 2nd ed, p.12. The US Committee on Science and Technology on Countering Terrorism, “Toxic Chemicals and Explosive Material”, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism

207

facilitate local, provincial and national groups to effectively work together.625 Moreover, the cooperative potentials of local community is of vital importance, and some scholars believe that in disasters people are often models of cooperation”626

5.5.1 Relevant Departments for Response Many cities and industries in developed countries have trained and well equipped Hazardous Material teams for effectively responding to toxic industrial chemicals releases and accidental spills. Emergency response personnel for responding to chemical accident or terrorism will come from governmental authorities at various levels, NGOs, private sector, armed forces, medical authorities, media, etc.627 All fire departments should have specially trained personnel who can operate wearing respirators and protective gear. They must be educated regarding special hazards of chemical fire. Policemen are neither trained nor equipped for responding to a chemical accident or terrorism. Though, they will be mainly responsible for maintaining order when an accident or incident takes place. If part of police force is trained and equipped for operating in CBRN environment, this would be a significant resource for effectively responding to accident. WMD Civil Support Teams can facilitate communications amongst various teams of responders and in undertaking chemical analyses.

The military units maintain up-to-date protective equipment, prophylactics, and have developed excellent operating procedures. 628 They are especially well trained in protection against Chemical Weapons and operating in contaminated environment and taking medical counter-measures against various chemical warfare agents. In this context,

625 , 2002, p.127.

626 Lee Clarke, “Panic: Myth or Reality?” Ethnic News Watch, Fall 2002, p.1. 627 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, 18 December 2008, p.9. 628 , 2002, p.128.

The US Committee on Science and Technology on Countering Terrorism, “Toxic Chemicals and Explosive Material”, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism

208

the role of community volunteers is also very important and they are usually the first to respond in any emergency. Hence, they should be actively involved in emergency planning, reviews and in responding to an accident. “Emergency Response preparedness and mitigation are often hampered by lack of coordination and conflicting interests.” 629 One way to mobilize local community and harmonize conflicting priorities of various groups is the establishment of Community Emergency Response Teams.630

The role of media is crucial in emergency response. In many cases, media is the only sources of information in the early stages. The public authorities and industry can utilize media for educating masses regarding health and safety aspects during an emergency by constantly providing public service information.631 The incident commander must have quick access to a pool of reliable expertise called “reach-back” because chemistry is a complex subject and the first responders cannot understand the technicalities of WMD terrorist attacks. Besides chemical terrorism, this panel of experts can provide beneficial advice and input in the event of chemical spills and accidents. Moreover, computer models have been developed such as the Protective Action Dosage Reduction Estimator to estimate the chemical arrival time in various areas and the level of concentration of toxic gases. 632 Therefore, the incident commander should be equipped with such software and requisite expertise.633

629 Mitigation is an important part of emergency response. It reduces harm to life, property and the environment. It includes public education, land use planning, making use of shelters and safe rooms, security of important documents, reviewing hazard zones, developing evacuation routes and giving requisite input for strategic planning. 630 M.A. Brennan, “Community Volunteers: The Front Line of Disaster Response”, The International Journal of Volunteer Administration, Volume XXIV, No. 4, 2005, p.3. 631 David Howe, Senior Director for Response and Planning, The Homeland Security Council, Planning Scenarios Executive Summaries, July 2004, p.5. 632 John Sorensen, Barry Shumpert, Barbara Vogt, “Planning Protective Action Decision,” - op.cit, p.20. 633 , 2002, p.129.

The US Committee on Science and Technology on Countering Terrorism, “Toxic Chemicals and Explosive Material”, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism

209

5.5.2 Role of Public Authorities: Response Phase The public authorities should immediately activate the emergency plans to contain the accident. Designated spokespersons should start informing and guiding the public and shun the idea that bad news will cause panic. Modern research reveals that “people can handle very terrifying news properly and cooperatively. Therefore, public authorities

The US Committee on Science and Technology on Countering Terrorism, “Toxic Chemicals and Explosive Material”, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism

210

should take community as partners in response”.634 The best way to address panic is to keep the public informed. Therefore, Information management is as necessary for successful field operations as good logistics.635 An efficient system should be established for continuously updating situation.

The decision to evacuate public or advice them to shelter in place is one of the most crucial decision for the public authorities. This decision is based on the available resources and the social fabric of the society. 636 Immediate response decisions should be based on the need to protect people from the adverse effects of toxic release. However, the concerned officials must take into account the long term effects of an incident on the human health and the environment. It is note worthy that those exposed to toxic chemicals may be affected even if the symptoms are not visible. Therefore, medical authorities have to keep such individuals under observation and transported to appropriate medical facilities. Thus the public authorities have to ensure adequate medical and transportation facilities.

The public authorities must ensure that required medicines and antidotes are held on the facility. Moreover, children being sensitive population should be given higher priority for medical care. The medical authorities must also address the physiological and psychological effects on the victims of a chemical accident. Emergency assistance may be obtained from national, regional and international authorities. Assistance from neigbouring countries may prove more effective because it may involve less time. Therefore, suitable agreements may be concluded with regional countries for collective planning, training and the provision of mutual assistance in case of an accident. Moreover, foreigners may also be caught up in the incident, which would necessitate close liaison with the embassies.

5.5.3 Role of Community: Response Phase

634 Lee Clarke, “Panic: Myth or Reality?” op.cit, p.6. 635 Michael Luhan, Head OPCW Media and Public Affairs, “Crisis Communication Planning: OPCW’s Ten Commandments”, CBRNE Table Top Exercise, Warsaw, 22 November 2010. 636 John Sorensen, Barry Shumpert, Barbara Vogt, “Planning Protective Action Decision,” op.cit, p.12.

211

Government resources are never enough for effectively responding to a major incident. Therefore, the community services are an important resource in helping victims and local people. Civil society organisations can provide immense support in almost every field. During the 2005 London bombings the civil society supported medical and health staff, railway stations, police, local authorities and provided humanitarian assistance and information to public.637 Therefore, preparing for a CBRN attack must include training professional and reliable volunteers from the community.638 Moreover, the NGOs can be utilized for provision of psychological, humanitarian and social support to the local community. 639

The civil society in close coordination with public authorities must monitor the hazardous installation. In the event of an unusual situation they must immediately inform the concerned authorities. Moreover, Disaster Research Centre at Delaware conducted research and found that people rarely lose control. Despite immense destruction, people join hands and evolve an organized response to a disaster, e.g. almost everyone in the World Trade Centre survived if they were below where the airplanes struck.640 However, we often witness stampedes also, so it may not be absolutely correct that people always remain in control.

5.5.4 Role of Media: Response Phase The media ought to be given access to designated officials for providing timely and credible information and guidance to the public. During CBRN attack the security organizations desire to protect certain information and the health staff try to ensure public safety by providing correct and timely information to the public. The media must consult health authorities prior to providing information/ guidance to the public regarding health

637 Robin Hart, “Trans-border Consequence Management: Responding to Major Acts of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive or Nuclear Terrorism”, Report on Wilton Park Conference 855, 18- 20 June 2007, p.7. 638 Guidance for UK Emergency Planners and Responders. Available at ww.ukresilience.info. 639 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, 18 December 2008, p.12. 640 Lee Clarke, “Panic: Myth or Reality?” op.cit, p.2.

212

aspects of the incident. This aspect has to be sensibly addressed by media working closely with public authorities, health department and security organizations. The media should not react only to the prevailing situation but map out how the situation would develop and in this regard, seek the expert opinion from security, medical and logistics experts. Media should not disturb the activities of response teams by seeking access to restricted areas. Media should identify good sources, and remain available and respectful to them.641

Majority of journalists and reporters are not experts or adequately know the CBRN issues. These are specialized subjects; therefore, media does face difficulty when there is a need for speedy reporting. This problem was faced during the 2003 Ricin incident in the U.K.642 To train and educate media, the media representatives need to be involved in planning for various contingencies along with other stakeholders such as management of industry, health officials, public authorities, law enforcement agencies, first responders, NGOs, community representatives, etc. Moreover, media representatives may be given opportunities to attend national and international courses and exercises for prevention, preparation and response to CBRN incidents. Thus, media will learn its important role regarding educating masses for preventive, preparatory and response measures; and also the importance of providing correct and timely information to the public, which is the most cost- effective means of saving lives and increasing public understanding.

5.5.5 Role of Medical Authorities: Response Phase Medical staff should be provided specialized information and should have the services of specialists. Professional psychiatrics should be made available. Moreover, managing information through media will be of crucial importance because of immense psychological impact of a terrorist attack with CBRN weapons. Moreover, the success of response operations will depend to a large extent on the public response. Therefore, providing information to the public especially the threat assessment to their safety and

641 Michael Luhan, “Crisis Communication Planning: OPCW’s Ten Commandments,” op.cit.

642 Mark Smith, Caitríona McLeish, “Countering CBW Proliferation,” Report on Wilton Park Conference 871, Wilton Park, 28- 30 September 2007.

213

health should not be left to security officials. This is a specialized task and should be performed by health professionals, as was performed during the Litvinenko case,643 which substantially reduced public fear.644

5.6 Trans- Boundary Cooperation

Every state should prepare for the worst-case situation due to the magnitude of disaster from a chemical accident and the prevailing international security environment. Moreover, states have limited capacities, therefore, international assistance and cooperation will be essentially required and this warrants political commitment, meticulous preparation, planning and coordination and the provision of requisite resources to those who would respond to any CBRN incident. Neighbouring countries should regularly meet and extend requisite cooperation with an aim of preventing accidents capable of causing trans- boundary effects. The country where hazardous installation is located should provide all necessary information to neighbouring countries, which would help in mitigating the effects of an accident. Moreover, the neighbouring states must periodically coordinate their emergency plans.

In Europe enough experience exists for the provision of assistance in the wake of natural calamities and industrial accidents on a bilateral basis. A number of

Mediterranean countries have developed joint mechanism for fighting forest fire.645 For developing regional cooperation 11 countries in the Euro- Baltic has established a

643 Alexander V. Latvinenko was an ex KGB officer who was critic of Kremlin and consequently received political asylum in the U.K. On 1 November 2006, he fell ill after meeting with Russian contacts at the U.K. Subsequently, he died three weeks later. The medical examination revealed that he was victim of lethal polonium 210 induced acute radiation syndromes. Litvinenko’s allegation that Kremlin was behind his malady attracted immense media coverage of this case. Refer: “Alexander V. Latvinenko,” The New York Times, Updated on 18 December 2012. 644 Robin Hart, “Trans-border Consequence Management: Responding to Major Acts of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive or Nuclear Terrorism”, Report on Wilton Park Conference 855, 18- 20 June 2007, p.8. 645 France, Italy, Spain, Croatia, Portugal, Greece, and Slovenia.

214

comprehensive network of experts. 646 Trans-border cooperation is a challenging undertaking and is complicated due to differences in languages, operating procedures, difference of protective equipment, training standards, national legislations and regulations. In this regard, the EU has established a Monitoring Information Centre

(MIC) at Brussels, which coordinates and supports various civil protection efforts.647

5.7 Site Security of Chemical Industry

In the prevailing international security situation, the management of chemical industry must address the security requirements of their installations. “One of the least predictable, most dangerous risks in chemical industry is the leakages of toxic chemicals.”648 It is note worthy that a successful terrorist attack against chemical industry can have far greater consequences for the community as compared to attacks on other industries. The potential threat from terrorists targeting chemical facilities is both strategic and symbolic. But the careful study of chemical industry reveals that it is a soft target for terrorists because they are not properly designed to withstand a terrorist attack. Security substantially contributes to the integrity of operations. Even a small incident can leave employees distracted. A major incident, such as a deliberate release of hazardous chemicals can cause enormous harm to humans, animals, property and the environment, associated litigations and costly remediation, and would seriously damage company’s operations and reputation.

5.7.1 Concept of Interdependent Security Networks increase interdependencies and this has security implications. The actions or inactions of one player in a network can cause havoc on everyone in the network.

646 It includes Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Germany Latvia, Poland, , Lithuania, Denmark, Norway and NW Russia. 647 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/mic.htm#intro 648 Yagya Prakash Saxena, “Introducing and Managing Chemical Safety and Security Practices in India”, The International Meeting On Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012.

215

Therefore, a network is as strong as its weakest link. Based on the same logic, encouraging a party to invest in security measures becomes crucial but also quite difficult.649 Assume that in a group of three countries each country has a nuclear reactor and if each country invests in a set of safeguards, this would reduce the chances of an accident and consequent contamination to zero.

Associated with this issue is the ripple effect from an accident that does not cause contamination but would initiate further governmental regulations. For example, in the U.S., an accident at any plant is likely to lead to costly regulatory interventions at all plants. That is why the U.S. government established the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident. This institute ensures that plants performing well are not held hostage by the safety problems of plants with poorer safety records. 650 In an interdependent security the risks faced by various parties and their investment in security depend on the choices and investments made by all parties. Moreover, when an agent invests in own security, it also reduces the risks of other parties.651 5.7.2 Risk Based Performance Standards The U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued the Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards (CFATS) in 2007. The CFATS specified risk based performance standards for physical security at chemical facilities holding threshold amount of 342 chemicals.652 Thus, almost 1000 facilities were identified as highest risk facilities and they were termed Tier- 1 and Tier- 2 facilities.653 CFAT places strong emphasis on the insider threat. The CFATS lacks milestones for structured compliance and no protection for the

649 Howard Kunreuther, “The Weakest Link: Managing Risk Through Interdependent Strategies”, op.cit, p.1. 650 Ibid, p.5. 651 Geoffrey Heal, Howard Kunreuther, “Interdependent Security: A General Model”, August 2005, p.1. 652 US Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: DHS Is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed, GAO-06-150, January 2006. 653 Margaret E. Kosal, “Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce the Chemical Terror Threat”, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, September 2008, p.21.

216

whistleblower. Moreover, such risk based performance should incentivize the adoption of safer chemical manufacturing technologies and processes for reducing risks.654

5.7.3 Protection of Built Infrastructure There is no dedicated solution for CBRN security. Therefore, a collaborative effort would serve better for addressing the issues of safety and security. One such project is SPIRIT (Safety and Protection of Built Infrastructure to Resist Integral Threats) funded by the European Commission that commenced in August 2010. Its salient aspects are:655 Philosophy. Try to marry safety and security as much as possible.

Objective. Provide the requisite technology and training for security against terrorist threats to minimize the consequences of attk.

Security by Design. For current buildings, undertake security assessment and suggest improvement for security. For future constructions, ensure security by design.

5.7.4 Voluntary Media Codes The provision of correct and reliable information during a terrorist attack enhances public confidence and reduces panic. During anthrax mailing attack, some media sources did not provide complete and reliable information, which heightened public anxiety and complicated government mitigating efforts.656 Moreover, at times media mix own opinions with facts, which creates confusion and misleads the public.657

654 Lois Ember, "Chemical Plant Security," Chemical & Engineering News 85, 9 April 2007, p. 13. 655 Maarten S. Nieuwenhuizen, “EU FP 7 SPIRIT (Safety and Protection of Built Infrastructure to Resist Integral Threats) Project Concerning CBRE Infrastructure Protection”, International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012. 656 D.H. Frazer, “Health Experts Warn Against Anthrax Advice,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 20 October 2001. 657 J. Zagars, “Just the Facts?” The Washington Post, 8 November 2001.

217

For accurate reporting, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences suggests developing a voluntary media code for the coverage of terrorist attacks.658 Some media experts suggest a more restrained approach when reporting news regarding terrorism and internal security. Some experts doubt provision of reliable information after a chemical or biological attack, especially when the situation would be evolving and some media sources would be providing contradictory news. 659

5.8 Security of Hazardous Chemicals Transportation

Transport means and facilities are often targets of terrorist attacks and hijackings. The 9/ 11 terrorist attacks added a new dimension to hijacking by turning four jet airliners into guided missiles. Given the track record, the transportation systems may be exploited again by terrorists.660 The characteristics of transportation systems make them especially vulnerable and therefore, attractive targets. Fast moving vehicles are in a precarious and fragile position. Therefore, an organized terrorist group can cause immense damage with relatively small but well timed and placed force.661 To protect critical infrastructure, the risks associated with road and rail transportation should also be addressed. Huge quantities of “hazardous and toxic materials,” are transported by road and rail. These materials are transported through or near major population centers.662

Transportation specialists, managers of industry and public authorities are responsible for the secure transportation of chemicals. The security measures specified in the succeeding part will substantially contribute to the security of transportation of

658 National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2002). 659 Kenneth Chang and Judith Miller, “Duct Tape and Plastic Sheeting Provide Solace, If Not Security,” The New York Times, 13 February 2003. 660 The US Committee on Science and Technology on Countering Terrorism, “Making the Nation Safer,” op.cit, p.210. 661 Ibid. 662 US Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Available at www.phmsa.dot.gov; and US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board Safety Bulletin. No. 2005-06-I-LA. June 2007.

218

chemicals. Chemical transportation includes activities both inside and outside industry. 663 The security efforts protect employees, environment, and community; ensures productive operations and helps in developing constructive relations with local authorities.664

5.8.1 Security Assessment of Transportation Chemical companies should perform various risk assessments and should adopt tiered approach for risk- based assessment, i.e. evaluating and prioritizing threats. This approach would ensure economical and judicious allocation of resources for perceived threats. The U.S Surface Transportation and Rail Security (STARS) Act of 2007 authorized new security assessments, research and development, grants, and specific security plans for transportation of hazardous materials.665 The security assessment of some hazardous material would warrant that adequate care should be taken to safeguard information by ensuring requisite security of e-mails and conferences through phones and internet, etc.

5.8.2 Transportation Security Measures Chemical Distribution Risk Management has two components, i.e. risk assessment and risk reduction. The transportation security measures comprises following sequential process that addresses both the risk assessment and reduction components: 666 Step 1: Chemical Listing. The transporter should prepare a list of chemicals to be transported for evaluation. Step 2: Chemical Hazard Ranking. The chemicals should be ranked such as high hazard, medium hazard, low hazard according to their attractiveness for theft or sabotage, and the hazards they pose to life and the environment. Other ranking

663 The greater risk is associated with rail transport of hazardous materials. The decision-making process regarding their transport is complex and requires close coordination between industry and government and a sector-wide information sharing process. Refer The U.S. National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003, p.68. 664 Transportation Security Guidelines for the US Chemical Industry, American Chemistry Council, (The Chlorine Institute Inc, National Association of Chemical Distributors, 2001). 665 Recommendations of The U.S. 9/11 Commission Act, 2007. 666 Transportation Security Guidelines for the US Chemical Industry, op.cit, p.7.

219

systems can be developed based upon multiple factors such as toxicity, explosivity, flammability, reactivity and vapour pressure. Step 3: Exposure Ranking. Rank the exposure potential of product i.e. its effects on human health and the environment. Pay particular attention to those shipments, which are more lucrative for terrorism. Much detail are not required, the main aim is simple relative ranking of exposure potential. These factors include, inter alia, shipments predictability, proximity to population centres, environmental factors, placarded vs. non-placarded loads.667 Step 4: Prioritizing Security Risk. The above-mentioned measures i.e. ranking chemical hazard and ranking exposure facilitate prioritizing reviews of security risks. Step 5: Conducting Security Risk Reviews. Security risk reviews are carried out for better anticipating and thus preventing incidents that can damage public health, assets and the environment. The steps mentioned above helps in prioritizing the risk and thus enable managers to focus on the transportation of chemicals of significant concern, and rationally and appropriately allocate resources. Risk reviews are focused on current capabilities and prevailing conditions and generally following questions are deliberated: What is the current situation and current activities? What can go wrong? What are the hot-spots, which merits considerations? What could be done for addressing areas of concern?

5.8.3 Security Reviews A diverse team of experts should undertake security reviews such as experts from transportation, security, logistics, emergency responders, public authorities, media, etc. Addressing security concerns are imperative because of the growing concerns regarding terrorism and sabotage. When a company invests resources in security efforts, it contributes to safe and secure transportation of chemicals and products. Appropriate

667 An important area of concern is the marking of container cars to indicate the specific type of hazardous materials being transported. During an emergency response, placards on rail cars help to alert first responders but the system of markings should be such that terrorists cannot easily decipher.

220

security measures protects the community, the environment, the normal functioning of the industry and contribute to better working relationship with the community and the concerned public authorities. The effective security measures also provide a mechanism for controlling and accounting in the event of an emergency. Security reviews generally include assessment of hazard, exposure, threat and vulnerability as following: 668

5.8.3.1 Hazard Assessment It develops understanding of the potential consequences of a visualized incident when the product is being transported. Possible impact areas under different release scenarios are estimated in this assessment. This includes the hazardous properties of the shipment.

5.8.3.2 Exposure Assessment The exposure assessment evaluates the degree of potential exposure to incidents considering factors such as the toxicity, other adverse effects, number of tank cars and trips, volume of chemicals, proximity to population centres, predictability and attractiveness of shipment, etc.

5.8.3.3 Threat Assessment This assessment would include, inter alia, physical attack, contamination, theft, breach of sensitive information system, container tampering.

5.8.3.4 Vulnerability Assessment It considers the shipments’ characteristics that make them more or less vulnerable to various identified threats e.g. security for shipment in transit and temporary storage, ease of access to shipment, special procedures or controls employed for security, Special training imparted, mode specific vulnerabilities, etc.

668 Transportation Security Guidelines for the US Chemical Industry, op.cit, p.11.

221

5.9 Cyber Security in Chemical Industry

Keeping computers and networks free from viruses and hackers is just as important as keeping thieves and terrorists out of the chemical plant. Traditionally, the chemical industry remained focused on safety and productivity. However, 9/ 11 prompted enhancing security measures across different industry sectors. Reducing and eliminating control system vulnerabilities against physical and cyber attack is necessary to ensure the safety and integrity of these systems. The DHS has developed a strategy to secure vulnerabilities, which includes Control Systems Security and Test Center (CSSTC) to examine control systems. The CSSTC promotes a proactive approach to introduce standards, products and processes to the industry that enhances security of control systems. 669 Many industrial operations are controlled by Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are computer systems designed to automate and control plant functions. These systems stress interoperability, but in the prevailing security environment it is imperative to better understand the automatic control system and to improve the system for resisting cyber-attacks.670

Cyber-security threats happen every day in all fields of life. With the modernization of control system more systems are interconnected and linked to the internet. With each additional connection one more doorway gets open to hackers. In the past little were known regarding the operations of chemical industry. In 2004 at one of the cyber forums in the USA a hacker gave a presentation on control systems, which reveals hackers interest and the rising visibility of control systems of industry. 671 The CERT Coordination Center analyzed statistics regarding cyber-attacks from 1988- 2003.

669 Jeffery Hahn, Donna Post Guillen, Thomas Anderson, “Process Control System in the Chemical Industry: Safety vs. Security”, 20th Annual CCPS International Conference, Idaho National Laboratory, April 2005, p.2. 670 The US Committee on Science and Technology on Countering Terrorism, “Toxic Chemicals and Explosive Material”, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, 2002, p.128. 671 Jeffery Hahn, Donna Post Guillen, and Thomas Anderson, op.cit, p.3.

222

The number of cyber-security incidents in 1999 were about 10,000, and in 2003, almost 140,000.672 This exponential increase proves another important fact i.e. there are more people who are proliferating cyber attacks.

Some hackers can create problems at a very large scale. For example, Media Corp News reported “North Korea has trained more than 500 computer hackers capable of launching cyber warfare against the United States… They had undergone a five-year university course…” 673 Cyber attacks can slow or halt the computer’s response, can produce unwanted and unexpected results. The critical infrastructure of the chemical industry provides lucrative targets to hackers. In the chemical industry where efficiency is critical to making profit, an undetected cyber attack can slow down the process. An article from the Rand Corporation stated, “attacks in cyberspace blur traditional boundaries between nations and private interests, cannot be foreseen or tracked via classical intelligence methods, and are all but indistinguishable from accidents, system failures or

674 even hacker pranks.”

5.9.1 Addressing Vulnerabilities within Control Systems Taking action to reduce vulnerability will reduce the probability of a successful cyber attack. The significant vulnerabilities found within control systems and suggested responses are: One, the network separation is inadequate, therefore, for effective cyber security the corporate and real-time control systems should be separated with a properly configured firewall. Two, the issue of corporate internet interface develops vulnerabilities. When the industry assumes that if the corporate network is protected then the rest of the control system is protected it leaves the process control network vulnerable. Some of the best and most secure networks have been compromised by an employee bringing in a laptop with an embedded Trojan or Worm, and connecting to the production network. Therefore, defense in depth is essential for cyber-security. Three, contractors keep open the option of

672 Ibid, p.4. 673 “North Korea Ready to Launch Cyber War”: Media Corp News – Channel News Asia International, 4 October 2004. 674 Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddle, and Peter A. Wilson, Strategic Warfare: A New Face of War, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND MR- 661, OSD, 1996).

223

remote maintenance of process control system. Many control systems have wireless access, which need to be secured with encryption or passwords because, for convenience, equipment vendors often leave open ports for remote maintenance. Four, the use of dual- cards by operators, i.e. if a single computer has direct access to both the corporate and process control networks through separate network cards, a hacker can bypass the firewall. Five, null session authentication, shared folders, everyone permission also creates serious vulnerabilities. These commonly found security “no-no’s” are primarily used for exploiting a system once access is gained by the hacker. The fewer internal access controls, the easier is penetration and then exploitation.675

The use of obvious PC names also significantly facilitate the hackers, e.g. if a hacker enters the process control network and finds the names of the equipment, instrumentation and controllers; then he can conveniently find process LAN and associated systems. Seven, outbound filtering of data is very useful for cyber security, i.e. all incoming and outgoing data needs to be appropriately filtered. Everyone must know, which systems are allowed to communicate and observe any anomaly. Eight, the workstations and servers for process control should be properly patched. Nearly every critical exploit for the past several years has had a patch. Keep anti-virus software updated, and must test them. Comprehensive cyber security policies and their effective implementation is an excellent safeguard. Even the best network can be defeated if the company policies are not comprehensive or not properly implemented e.g. for convenience, passwords are kept very simple, written in files and shared. For cyber security the staff has to be adequately educated. A few secrets learned through social engineering or by gaining access to the network will make the hackers’ job very easy. Therefore, effective implementation of a comprehensive cyber security along with the counterintelligence programme will deliver the desired security.676

675 Jonathan Pollett, “Risk Mitigation- Top Ten Security Issues”, UTC SCADA Security Conference, 22 September 2004. 676 Ibid.

224

5.10 Conclusion

Handling chemicals is extremely difficult and the risks can cause major accidents with devastating effects on humans, property and the environment. Therefore, the policy makers should adopt a more pro-active approach regarding safety and security of chemical facilities, especially the issue of easy availability of dual-use material and equipment needs to be addressed. Some of the worst disasters of toxic releases have occurred in toxic industrial chemicals. Therefore, the safety and security of chemical industry must be accorded due importance. The chemical disasters mentioned in this chapter were caused by variety of underlying causes. They were caused by inadequate attention to safety, unsafe operating procedures, inadequate maintenance, unserviceable safety equipment, insufficient manning levels, not effectively implementing workers safety and environmental regulations, stressful working environment, violation of rules, lack of motivation, lack of accountability, lack of root-cause investigations of near misses, poor level of hazard analysis, etc.

These incidents teach us important lessons that the management and the concerned staff must understand the risks of major accidents, the safety critical equipment and the safety system for controlling the failure of safety equipment and any incident. The safety culture of an enterprise must look for any signal of failure and address the unreliability of the safety critical equipment at utmost priority. Moreover, positive and dynamic leadership must be made available for looking after the process safety. The leadership must provide requisite time, priority and resources for continuously improving process safety.

For effective accident prevention, cooperative efforts are required i.e. the industry, local authorities and the civil society should work as a team. Moreover, all hazardous installations irrespective of their size and location should comply with the same overall safety objectives. The industry should undertake hazard identification and risk assessment right from the design stage throughout the operations. It should address the possibilities of natural disasters, terrorism, technological failures, theft, sabotage, etc. Safety culture should be developed and the industry must strive for utilizing inherently safer technology

225

and processes. The public authorities should specify general safety objectives, and should ensure the industry operates in safe manner and the management of the industry keep public informed regarding potential risks and safety measures. Regarding Other Chemical Industries (OCI), the public authorities may assist such industries for entering into cooperative arrangements with relevant public authorities, industry associations, larger industries, professional organizations, etc for obtaining requisite assistance and jointly improving safety.

Each chemical industry must develop a corporate safety culture and should guard against complacency. The safety culture must create an atmosphere of trust and openness. Communities located close to hazardous installation must know the risks of accident and response measures in the event of an incident. Communities should choose their representatives to communicate their concerns and feedback to the public authorities, management of the industry, relevant NGOs and other stakeholders. Moreover, research and academic community can immensely contribute to safety and security of the industry. The latter ought to develop and teach chemical safety and security culture in their respective institutions and thus contribute to safety and security of chemical industry. Moreover, chemical industry should be one of the primary areas for awareness raising and education because they are the group that is the most likely to handle and trade large amount of toxic chemicals or have access to dual-use equipment.

Regarding preparedness for chemical incidents, the management of chemical industry must assist public authorities in developing plans for addressing off-site emergency. While preparing emergency plans, the input from the local community must be sought. This would also enhance the confidence of the public. Public authorities at various levels must integrate natural disasters and civil defence plans with emergency plans for hazardous installations. Due to many similarities, this will result in economy of efforts and better coordination amongst various stakeholders.

Designated hospitals and medical facilities should formulate emergency plans and in collaboration with public authorities should cater for sufficient transport at short notice

226

for the transportation of victims to hospitals. If the hazardous installation can cause trans- boundary effects in the event of an accident then in due consultation with the neighbouring countries the emergency plans should be developed. The local community should be utilized as the first line of defence both in planning and responding to an accident. The public has the right for information regarding the hazard in their area and the essential parts of the emergency prevention, preparedness and response plans. This responsibility should be performed by the chemical industry, public authorities, NGOs, and other public interest groups.

Regarding response to an accident, it must be remembered that the best way to address public panic is to keep them informed. Therefore, information management is as necessary for successful field operations as good logistics. The public authorities must ensure that required medicines and antidotes are held on the facility. The medical authorities must also address the psychological and physiological effects on the victims of a chemical accident and should accord priority to children. The national level public authorities should have arranged emergency assistance from national, regional and international authorities; and especially assistance from the neighbouring countries. The media should have access to designated officials for providing timely and accurate information to the public. Majority of the journalists have little understanding of CBRN incidents. Therefore, they should seek the expert opinion of medical, logistics and security officials prior to providing information through media.

No state can effectively handle a major CBRN incident at its own resources. Therefore, trans-boundary cooperation is must. Neigbouring countries should regularly meet and extend requisite cooperation with an aim of preventing accidents capable of causing trans-boundary effects. The country where hazardous installation is located should provide all necessary information to neighbouring countries, which would help in mitigating the effects of an accident. Moreover, the neighbouring states must periodically coordinate their emergency plans and tests such plans during field exercises.

227

A successful terrorist attack against chemical industry can have greater consequence for the community than attack on other industries. For physical security of industry, the public authorities must establish risk based performance standards for industry based on certain thresholds of chemicals. The industry must undertake security assessments for current buildings and suggests improvements, and for future constructions the industry must ensure security by design. Moreover, diverse team of experts undertake security reviews such as experts from transport, security, logistics, emergency response, public authorities, etc. The said security reviews include assessment of hazard, exposure, threat and vulnerability.

The handling, storing and processing of hazardous chemicals within a society and at chemical industrial facilities must be managed in a holistic public and private role management framework. The management of industrial safety is a mix of engineering and management skills focused on preventing catastrophic accidents. Chemical accidents are rarely identical, however the underlying causes such as problems associated with safety culture, operations, supervision, maintenance, training of employees, etc that caused the disasters at Bhopal, Toulouse, Buncefield, etc are not unique to those industries. Highly dangerous chemicals are produced, stored, used, and transported in every country and the disasters mentioned above in this chapter are neither the first nor the last of the series. Chemical industries have to focus on the safe and secure handling of chemicals. Moreover, chemical industry ought to have the requisite tools and knowledge for ensuring safe and secure transportation, storage, handling and use of chemicals.677

CHAPTER 6

PAKISTAN’S CHEMICAL INDUSTRY:

677 OPCW, “Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, Director General OPCW Address,” Seminar on the CWC and Chemical Safety and Security Management for Member States of the Region of Southeast and South Asia,” Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 8- 11 may 2012.

228

MANAGEMENT OF CHEMICALS

Introduction

Pakistan possesses a vibrant chemical industry and is also doing its best to manage chemicals efficiently for preventing industrial chemical accidents, the inadvertent chemical misuse and chemical terrorism. Being a State Party to the CWC, it has enacted necessary legislative and administrative measures for safe and secure management of chemicals and related facilities. Indeed, the management of chemicals is a cross-sectoral subject, therefore, it requires comprehensive national legislations, effective national implementation of multilateral treaties and establishing appropriate supporting and implementing infrastructures. Dr. Amin Badshah is of the view that comprehensive and sound management of chemicals require covering every stage of the chemical life cycle i.e. from import or production through disposal. 678 This necessitates long-term planning, meticulous coordination and excellent team work amongst all stakeholders not only at national level but also at international level.

The relevant governmental authorities require skilled and experienced human resource for effectively implementing various plans, policies and legal instruments. Concurrently, industry also shares equal responsibility for the sound management of chemicals because no inspector can understand the hazards of chemicals better than the management and operators of the chemical facilities. Therefore, the chemical industry and related associations have to adopt voluntary non-regulatory measures in the field of security, environmental management, and occupational health and safety aspects. Thus the governmental authorities, chemical industry, trade associations, civil society have to work as team and strive for achieving standards as per the international best practices and standards for safeguarding the human health and the wider environment from the adverse

678 Author’s Meeting with Dr Amin Badshah, Chairman Department of Chemistry, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, 28 April 2014.

229

effects of hazardous and toxic chemicals. 679 This would necessitate effective national coordinating mechanism and capacity building for correctly viewing the bigger national and international pictures and implementing integrated national programmes for the sound management of chemicals.

The sound management of chemicals requires national safety and security culture. It necessitates that the governmental authorities think strategically and focus on developing literacy level, establish an authentic national data base on chemicals, capacity building of law enforcement agencies and implementing agencies, and adequately train technical staff for monitoring and verification purposes. Moreover, the public authorities have to support multilateral initiatives by effectively implementing national obligations, encourage and promote international cooperation, provide adequate funding and accord due priority to occupational safety and health matters, enhance general awareness of industry workers and the public, especially the at-risk communities, actively involve the academia, Community Based Organizations (CBO), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and introducing the discipline of chemical management in the university curricula.

Although, the primary focus of this chapter is Pakistan’s legal regulatory and nonregulatory mechanism for the management of chemicals, yet the proper understanding of country’s chemical industry is imperative for critical examination of its safety and security arrangements as well as understanding Islamabad’s compliance with the CWC. The chapter also contains discussion on Pakistan’s membership of international legal instruments and national implementing measures, international best practices. The responsibilities of various ministries, departments and inter-ministerial coordinating mechanism for the management of chemicals in Pakistan are also spelled out in the following discussion. The contributions of local community, academia, public interest groups, etc for the safe and sound management of chemicals are also analyzed. Finally,

679 Author’s meeting with Ms. Teo Sieu Lan, Assistant Director General National Authority on CWC, Singapore Customs, Singapore, 4 June 2010.

230

before conclusion, Pakistan disaster management mechanism is discussed specifically for the management of chemical industrial disasters and disasters at port terminals.

6.1 Overview of Pakistan Chemical Industry

In 1947, when Pakistan was created, the chemical industry was virtually nonexistent and even today the chemical industry of Pakistan is at embryonic stage. For example, the production of even dyestuffs and pesticides is based on imported material. Thus the value addition is limited only to formulations. Pakistan’s economy is based on agriculture; therefore, the chemical industry mainly meets the agricultural requirements. Chemical products are increasingly used in variety of sectors such as industrial, consumer and defence sectors. Most of the chemical industry is situated in urban population center such as Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Gujranwala, Gujrat, Faisalabad, Multan, Hyderabad, and Sialkot.

In early 1950‘s, Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) was setup for providing industrial base to the country. Resultantly, major chemical industries such as Pak Dyes & Chemicals, and Pak- American Fertilizers, and Antibiotics (Penicillin) were established at Mianwali District. This Industrial Estate played crucial role for the development of chemical industry.680 Pakistan chemical industrial sector comprises small, medium and large units with mix of new and old technology. Pakistan also has sophisticated enterprises such as Engro Chemicals, Dawood Hercules, Sitara Chemicals, Fauji Fertilizers, Clariant Pakistan, ICI Pakistan, Sindh Alkalis, Berger Paints, Pak-Arab Fertilizers, Fatima Fertilizer Company Limited, Brin’s Oxygen Company (BOC) Pakistan. The overview of Pakistan’s chemical industry is given in the succeeding paragraphs.

6.1.1 Chemicals’ Exports and Imports

680 Sohail A. Paracha, “Comparative Analysis of Pakistan and India Chemical Industry: Sectoral Analysis of Pakistan- India Trade Normalization,” Working Paper by Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development, August 2012, pp.6-7.

231

The global chemical industry is one of the fastest growing sectors of the manufacturing industry and is estimated worth US$ 2.5 trillion.681 Pakistan rank is 93rd in global exports of chemicals and India is 18th.682 During 2010 Pakistan exported chemicals and related products worth US $ 0.17 billion and the imports of chemicals also reached US $ 3.9 billion. Due to heavy demands, the chemical industry of Pakistan has attracted foreign direct investment worth US$ 253 million (2005-2010).683 The current manufacturing capacity in Pakistan is still insignificant both in level and scale keeping in view the potentials of chemical sector.

The productivity as well as research and development to improve chemical reactions, processes, and value addition of locally available minerals remain low in Pakistan. The domestic demand for chemical products is constantly increasing, especially for fertilizers, pesticides and plastics. However, the absence of a clear national policy framework on the development of chemical sector is causing haphazard growth based on short-term needs.684 Similarly, Pakistan's pharmaceutical industry is in developing stage with an export turnover of over US$ 93.6 million in 2008-09. Pakistan’s pharmaceutical industry has the capacity to significantly contribute to national exports.685

6.1.2 Dyes & Pigments Today around two hundred large and medium sized processing mills exist along with thousands of small dye houses in Pakistan. It is estimated that this industry consumes over 22,000 tons of dyestuff and pigments686 annually. Small quantities of direct dyes and pigment dyes are being manufactured locally. The intermediates required for dyes are being

681 Ibid, p.12. 682 The top ten chemical producers are USA, Germany, China, Belgium, Japan, France, Netherland, United Kingdom, Ireland and Republic of Korea. Refer Sohail A. Paracha, loc.cit. 683 Sohail A. Paracha, loc.cit. 684 Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2009- 12, Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, August 2009, p.31. 685 Ibid. 686 Dyes are used for coloring leather, cosmetics, petroleum products, plastics and textile materials paper, hair, fur, greases, foods, drugs and waxes. Pigments are used for imparting color to articles.

232

imported especially from China. There are six units in the organized sector producing dyestuff, namely BASF Karachi, Clariant Karachi, M.B. Dyes Gadoon Amazai, Chemi Dyestuff Industries Karachi, and Gadoon Dyes Chemicals Gadoon Amazai.687

6.1.3 Pesticides and Fertilizers Pesticides 688 are produced at Lahore, Multan and Karachi. 689 Pakistan has no manufacturing facilities for pesticides. Earlier Pakistan had two manufacturing units that produced Benzene Hexa Chloride (BHC) and Dichloro Diphenyl Trichloro Ethane (DDT). They were located at Kala Shah Kaku (Punjab) and Nowshera (KPK). These units have been closed because the above-mentioned two chemicals were banned for use internationally. According to the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, 30 companies are formulating pesticides, and they are effectively meeting the local requirements. Regarding fertilizers, in Pakistan Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Potassium are major nutrients provided to the soil. Fertilizers such as Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN), Urea, Triple Super Phosphate (TSP), Nitro-Phosphate (NP), Di- Ammonium Phosphate (DAP), Single Super Phosphate (SSP), and Sulfate of Potash (SOP) provide the abovementioned nutrients. The share of Urea in the total fertilizer consumed in Pakistan is 71 percent; Di Ammonium Phosphate 15 percent; and other fertilizers like CAN, NP, SSP and NPK have 14 percent share.690

6.1.4 Oleo Chemicals Oleo chemicals 691 are used in pharmaceutical products, skin care products, cosmetics, soaps, shampoos, plastics, detergents and many other industries. The most commonly used raw materials are coconut oil, soyabean palm kernel oil, palm stearin, rapeseed oil, cottonseed oil, tallow, etc. In 1987, Crystal Chemicals Lahore was established

687 “National Profile for Chemical Management,” Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, p.148. 688 Pesticides are mostly used for enhancing agricultural productivity and for household hygiene. Pesticides for crops are classified into insecticides, fungicides, rodenticides and weedicides. 689 “National Profile for Chemical Management,” op.cit, p.100. 690 Ibid, p.92. 691 Oleo chemicals are used in consumer items and are derived from various fats and oils, thus oleo chemicals are a renewable source and is environment friendly.

233

as the country’s first oleo plant, which continued its operation till 1997. The other two main industries are Nimir Industrial Chemicals Limited Lahore, and Gamalux Oleochemicals,Karachi.

6.1.5 Sulphuric Acid The chemical industries producing Sulphuric Acid692 are Lyallpur Chemicals & Fertilizers Jaranwala, Hazara Phosphate Haripur, Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) Wah, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) D.G. Khan, Rawal Chemicals Hattar, Ambar chemicals Hattar, Attock Chemicals Hattar, Rawal Chemicals Sheikhupura, Prime Chemicals Sheikhupura, Ittehad Chemicals Lahore, Karsaz Chemicals Lahore, Riaz Aslam Chemicals Chunian, Cresent Chemicals Sukkur, Excide Pakistan Ltd Karachi, Pak Chemicals Karachi, Acid Ind Pvt Ltd Karachi.693

6.1.6 Soaps, Detergents, Cosmetics and Soda Ash Basic raw materials for soap are tallow, palm stearin and caustic soda. There are several units in the organized as well as unorganized sector involved in the manufacture of soap, both toilet and laundry. Regarding detergents, the basic raw materials are Linear Alkyl Benzene (LAB) Sulfonates, Sodium Sulfate, Sodium Silicate, Bleaching powder, Rock salt, Caustic soda and Soda ash. Colgate-Palmolive is the leading manufacturer of Detergent Powders in the Country. The cosmetics sector covers tooth paste, shampoo, shaving cream, face cream, face powder and other face lifting beauty applications.

Unilever Pakistan, Colgate-Palmolive, Kohinoor Soap & Detergents and Wazir Ali Industries are major players in this sector. Small cosmetic manufacturing units are located in Mingora, Swat.694 ICI Pakistan and Olympia Chemicals produce soda ash.695

692 The demand of Sulphuric Acid is like a barometer of industry in any country. It is of great commercial importance for use in manufacture of fertilizers, acids, heavy chemicals, dyes and pigments, plastics, explosives, textiles, paints, leather tanning, oil refining, water treatment, treatment of cotton seeds, etc. 693 “National Profile for Chemical Management,” op.cit, pp.91-92. 694 Ibid, pp.89-90. 695 Soda Ash is commonly known as washing soda. It is used in the manufacture of glass, soaps, detergents, sodium silicate, paper, caustic soda, paint, petroleum refining, inorganic chemicals.

234

6.1.7 Paints and Varnishes Paints are coloured & opaque coatings while varnishes are clear coatings. In Pakistan, they are categorized in three major segments: one, decorative household paints; two, industrial and automobile paints; and three, refinish paints for repair and renovations. This industry comprises large number of manufacturers and outlets all over Pakistan. There are three major producers of paint and together they meet 45 percent local requirement. They are Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) Pakistan, Berger Paints and Buxly Paints. The manufacturers of decorative paints are ICI Pakistan, Berger Paints, Buxly Paints, Master Paints, Brighto and Gobbis. Moreover, in the unorganized sector, over 400 units are manufacturing paints and varnishes.

6.1.8 Textile, Tannery and Water Treatment Chemicals The textile industry uses large number of textile chemicals for processing various textile fibers both natural and synthetic.696 There are several small units manufacturing textile chemicals but still large quantities are imported also. The eight major producers of textile and tannery chemicals are Clariant Jamshoro, BASF Chemicals & Polymers Karachi, M.B. Dyes Gadoon Amazai, Universal Karachi, ICI Karachi, Sandalbar Faisalabad, Nimir Chemicals Lahore, and Delta Chemicals Lahore. Moreover, several types of chemicals are used in the treatment of municipal and industrial water.697 Most of these chemicals are being imported. Some simple chemicals like sulphuric acid, caustic soda, alums, chromates, activated carbon and chlorine are manufactured locally. Some companies are involved in formulation of water chemicals from the imported chemicals.

6.1.9 Food Chemicals and Petrochemicals

696 The chemicals used in the textile industry include caustic soda, hydrogen peroxide, bleaching powder, soda ash, sodium carbonate, softeners, emulsifiers, acids, dyes & pigments, waterproofing agents, etc. 697 Water treatment chemicals include chlorine, oxygen scavengers, alum, pH regulators, corrosion inhibitors, activated carbon and ion exchange resins.

235

Food Chemicals can either be natural or synthetic. They are used to give colour to food, enhance taste and increase their shelf life. They can be classified in six main groups such as preservatives, colours, flavour enhancers, antioxidants, stabilizers and sweeteners. A number of units are engaged in the manufacture of various food chemicals in Pakistan in organized as well as in unorganized sector. Two major units in organized sector are Habib Arkady Ltd Karachi and Leiner Pak Gelatin Ltd., Kala Shah Kaku, Lahore. The petrochemical industry of Pakistan is limited to production of polyvinyl chloride synthetic fibers, such as aromatics polyester, polyamide, Purified Terephthalic Acid (PTA) and carbon black. Petrochemicals provide raw materials for plastics, detergents, dyes, paints, varnishes and pesticides industry in Pakistan. They are also used as additives in the lubricating oils. Most of the specialty chemicals 698 and fine chemicals belong to the petrochemical group.699

6.1.10 Formaldehyde, Hydrochloric Acid & Nitric Acid Formaldehyde is a raw material for the manufacture of Urea formaldehyde and Phenol formaldehyde. The raw material used for Formaldehyde is Methanol, which is being imported. The companies involved in manufacturing formaldehydes are Wah Nobel, Dynea Pakistan Ltd Karachi, Super Chemicals Ltd Karachi, Pakistan Resins Ltd Azad Kashmir, Izhar Enterprises Ltd Lahore and HTG Petrochemicals Hub. Moreover, Hydrochloric acid is produced on demand by Ittehad Chemicals and Sitara Chemicals from the excess chlorine by-product available with them. Nitric acid is produced by POF Wah and Pak Arab Fertilizers, Multan for their captive use. Small local demand is met through their surplus production.700

6.1.11 Alkyd Resins and Acetic Acid

698 Specialty Chemicals are developed and produced to fulfill exact requirement of a customer. These are made in batch process on a smaller scale, have high value addition and are technology oriented. 699 “National Profile for Chemical Management,” op.cit, p.90. 700 Ibid, pp.92- 93.

236

There are thirteen units manufacturing alkyd resins. 701 Moreover, in the unorganized sector, there are number of manufacturers. 702 Alkyd Resin is produced locally; however a small amount is imported also.703 Regarding Acetic Acid, it is mostly used as an intermediate for manufacturing other chemicals such as acetic anhydride, acetate esters, which are used for making acetate fibers, plastic, varnishes, aspirin, synthetic rubber, and pharmaceuticals. At present, there are three units in Pakistan namely, Wah Nobel Acetates Ltd Wah, Ravi Rayon Pvt Ltd Lahore, Midas Chemicals, Lahore.704

6.2 Pakistan’s Legal and Regulatory Mechanism

A comprehensive and well defined legal framework along with implementation mechanism is imperative for sound management of chemicals. Pakistan has developed fairly comprehensive legislations covering most stages of chemical life cycle. By and large fifty-three Acts and related rules and regulations cover the management of chemicals in Pakistan. There are certain legal instruments which were formulated for particular category of chemicals, and some have relevance for chemicals. Moreover, industry has also adopted non-regulatory mechanisms, e.g. OHSAS (Occupational Health and Safety Assessment System), etc, besides the Chemical Weapons Convention (discussed in Chapter-3) and related Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, and Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules-2010, (discussed in Chapter-7). Below are some of the laws and related rules and regulations, which assist us in understanding Pakistan’s legislative mechanism for managing chemicals and related environmental aspects. However, in Pakistan, effective implementation of laws is required. In fact, the ineffective implementation of laws can be attributed to lack of public awareness, lack of inspections, vigilance and monitoring.705

701 Alkyd resins are effective protective coatings, and are used for manufacturing enamel paints. 702 “National Profile for Chemical Management,” op.cit, p.103. 703 Prospects of Chemical Industry in Pakistan, 2003. 704 “National Profile for Chemical Management,” op.cit, pp.93. 705 “National Capacity Assessment for Implementation of SAICM in Pakistan,” Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, project for 2006- 2009.

237

6.2.1 Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (PEPA), 1997 Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (PEPA), 1997 provides legal authority for addressing environmental issues. This Act has been discussed in Chapter-7.

6.2.2 Hazardous Substances Rules, 2007 These Rules makes it obligatory on the licensee to ensure employing qualified technical experts with necessary experience and knowledge regarding the handling, storage and use of the hazardous substances.706 The licensee shall provide requisite information including safety precautions and if required provide training to the employees of the facility to which the hazardous substances are sold regarding the handling, storage and use of the hazardous substances.707 The packing and labeling should be such that it can be used, transported and stored without deterioration or leakage that may harm the environment. Moreover, the licensee shall provide necessary instructions for the safe use, storage and handling of the hazardous chemicals.

Proper safety conditions must be ensured inside the premises of the facility. The workers must be provided protective clothing and equipment and they should not be allowed to contact hazardous substances with exposed skin and eyes.708 No worker above 60 years age or below 18 years shall be given job that requires physical handling of hazardous substances. The industry must ensure that all workers are adequately trained in safety precautions.709 For the purpose of verification of any matter, the staff of relevant federal agency can enter and inspect the facility that is generating, collecting, treating,

706 Hazardous Substances Rules- 2007, Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, Section.8 (2) a, 7 April 2009. 707 Ibid, Section.8 (2) e. 708 Ibid, Section.11. 709 Ibid, Section.12 (a) (b).

238

storing, disposing or handling hazardous substance. The relevant federal agency shall inspect such facilities at least once a year.710

An applicant has to submit a safety plan that shall include hazard analysis, assessment of environmental effects in case of a major accident, description of response and mitigation measures for addressing adverse effects. The said safety plan shall be critically evaluated by the concerned government agency for ensuring that it covers all anticipated contingencies. Moreover, on receipt of license, the licensee is obliged to inform all stakeholders who are likely to be affected by the approved safety plan.711 When a major accident occurs in an industry, the management must notify the federal and provincial agencies within 24 hours and weekly thereafter.

In response, the federal agency in close coordination with the concerned provincial agency shall undertake analysis of the accident and initiate action for controlling the situation and mitigating the adverse environmental implications and preventing its recurrence. Regarding waste management, the licensee is obligated to annually submit information to the concerned federal agency regarding the characteristics and quantity of hazardous substances generated in the previous year and waste management plan. The waste management plan shall ensure that the hazardous waste is not mixed with non- hazardous waste; and shall ensure that the transportation and disposal of the hazardous waste does not affect the environment.712

6.2.3 National Environmental Quality Standards (Certification by Laboratories) This Act provides the regulations for the certification of a laboratory to function as an environmental laboratory. The purpose of an environmental laboratory is to ensure that all the provisions of National Environmental Quality Standards are being complied by. According to this Act, the environmental laboratory is responsible for testing and analyzing the samples of water, soil, air, wastes and effluents for determining whether the sample is

710 Ibid, Section.16 (1). 711 Ibid, Section.17 (1) (2). 712 Ibid, Section.19 (1) - (4).

239

to test and analyze samples of effluents, soil, water, air, or wastes to determining whether they comply with the NEQS; to issue test reports to the industries and annually submit consolidated test reports to the concerned federal agency.713

6.2.4 Environmental Tribunal Rules, 1999 These Rules, issued under Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, allow for the establishment and functioning of environmental tribunals. The Rules provide for procedural and operational matters including the qualifications of tribunal members. 714 Proceedings of the Tribunal are open to the public, except in certain specified matters.715 Tribunals are required to make every effort to dispose of cases within a 60 day period.716

6.2.5 Drugs Act, 1976 This Act regulates the manufacture, distribution import and export of pharmaceutical drugs. Although the law is federal, provincial governments are assigned specific responsibilities. Provincial governments are responsible for regulating the sale of drugs. 717 They are required to set up a quality control board 718 and a drug testing laboratory. 719 Provincial governments may appoint analysts and inspectors, 720 set up provincial drugs courts721 and constitute a provincial appellate authority.722 The Provincial Quality Control Board has the powers to cancel the license of drug manufacturer or seller if they are found violating or acting in contravention of this Act.723 For the purposes of this law, drugs are defined to include substances used for the “destruction or repulsion of

713 National Environmental Quality Standards (Certification of Environmental Laboratories), Section- 3. 714 Environmental Tribunal Rules- 1999, Section 4. 715 Ibid, Section 18. 716 Ibid, Section 16. 717 The Drugs Act 1976, Section 6. 718 Ibid, Section 11. 719 Ibid, Section 15. 720 Ibid, Section 16- 17. 721 Ibid, Section 31. 722 Ibid, Section 9.A. 723 Ibid, Section 11.

240

vermin, insects, rodents and other organisms that cause, carry or transmit disease in human beings or animals, as well as pesticides that may pose a public health hazard.”724

6.2.6 The Dangerous Cargoes Act, 1953 This Act covers the safety of ports regarding handling, transit and storage of dangerous cargoes and related matters. 725 The central Government can make rules for preventing and responding to fire or explosion on vessels holding dangerous cargoes, and the transit and storage of dangerous cargoes.726 The contravention of Act or related rules is “punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees or with both.”727 Moreover, under this Act police may arrest any person even without warrant; and the orders made in good intention under this Act cannot be questioned by any court of law.728

6.2.7 The Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance, 1971 & Rules, 1973 This Ordinance regulates the import, distribution, manufacture, formulation, use, and sale of pesticides. Under this Ordinance, the sale, import, formulation, manufacture, offer for sale, holding stocks, advertisement of pesticide are prohibited unless duly registered.729 “The contravention or failure to comply with this provision is punishable, for the first offence, with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees and for every subsequent offence with fine not be less than rupees 2000/- or more than rupees 3000/and in default of payment of any such fine with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year.”730 The act of giving false warranty to a dealer or purchaser is “punishable with fine which may extend to rupees 1000/-.”731

724 Ibid, Section 3(g) (iii) and 3 (g) (iv). 725 The Dangerous Cargoes Act, 1953, Section. 3. 726 Ibid, Section 9. 727 Ibid, Section 9. 728 Ibid, Section 10 and 11. 729 The Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance, 1971 & Rules 1973, Chapter II, Section 4. 730 Ibid, Chapter IV Section 21. 731 Ibid, Section 22.

241

“The unlawful use of registration number or hindering the inspector from performing his duty is punishable with fine not less than rupees 2500/- or more than rupees 5000/- or with imprisonment for term not less than one year or more than two years.” 732 For enforcing this Ordinance, the Federal Government in coordination with the Agriculture Pesticide Technical Committee can make rules for registration procedure and certificates; the function of the pesticides laboratory; rules for taking samples by inspectors; methods and the result of the analysis; dangerous and poisonous pesticides; storage and quantities of pesticides that can be stored, the safeguard of workers against pesticides; conditions for using pesticides especially in agriculture; precautions against poisoning by pesticide and investigating poisoning by pesticides.733

6.2.8 The Railways Act, 1890 According to this Act, general rules should be made by the railway company for declaring and identifying dangerous or offensive goods, and for ensuring the safe transportation of such goods.734 This Act covers the carriage of goods of dangerous or explosive nature by railway.735 The carriage of any dangerous or offensive goods is not allowed by railway until a prior notification of their nature is given to the station-master and their nature is distinctly marked on the package. According to this Act, if a person violates this Act and carries dangerous goods on railway is punishable with “fine which may extend to rupees 500/-, and is also responsible for any damage and injury caused by the dangerous good.”736

6.2.9 Pakistan Merchant Shipping Ordinance, 2001 The law covers the prevention of pollution from ships. 737 This Ordinance is implementing the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships-

732 Ibid, Section 23. 733 Ibid, Section 29. 734 Ibid, Chapter VI, Section 47, Sub-section (1) (c). 735 The Dangerous Cargoes Act, 1953, Chapter VI, Section 59. 736 Ibid, Chapter IX, Section 107. 737 Pakistan Merchant Shipping Ordinance 2001, Chapter 43, Sections 552-575.

242

1973. According to this Ordinance, tankers above a specified tonnage must obtain an international pollution prevention certificate,738 and such ships must not discharge harmful substances and sewerage into the sea except in designated areas.739 The violation of this provision is “punishable with imprisonment for a minimum term of two years and a maximum fine of 1 million US dollars as well as cleaning charges.” 740 For ensuring compliance, the authorized governmental officials can survey ships.741

6.2.10 The Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1976 This Act declares the maritime zones and territorial waters of Pakistan and preservation and preventing and controlling marine pollution.742 According to this Act, foreign super tankers, ships transporting nuclear or other harmful substances or materials and nuclear powered ships may enter or pass through Pakistan’s territorial waters after giving prior notice to the Federal Government.743

6.2.11 The Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886 According to this Act, port would be kept pollution free by the board and “no discharge of solid and liquid wastes, oily noxious, radioactive and hazardous substance, bilge discharges from tankers and vessels, residues and mixtures containing noxious solid and liquid wastes, unwashed cargo tanks and line washing garbage would be made within the Port limits.”744 Contravention of this provision is liable to “penalty not exceeding ten million rupees for each contravention in addition to the charges for cleaning of the Port and removal of pollution.”745

6.2.12 The Baluchistan Local Government Ordinance, 2001

738 Ibid, Section 553. 739 Ibid, Section 554- 556. 740 Ibid, Section 556- 574. 741 Ibid, Section 559– 562. 742 The Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1976, Section 5 (2) (d), 4 (b) (iii) and 6. 743 Ibid, Section 3, sub-section (3). 744 The Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886, Chapter X, Section 90 (1) & (2). 745 Ibid, Section 90 (3).

243

Under this Ordinance, the manufacturing, storing, trading or carrying dangerous chemical, hazardous, offensive or inflammable material without license; discharging dangerous and hazardous chemical in any drain, or public water course or public land are prohibited and local government is responsible to safeguard such places. 746 The contravention of this Ordinance is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend to fifteen thousand rupees, or with both. If the offence continues then the offender may be fined which may extend to one thousand rupees on daily basis.747

6.2.13 Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 2001 Under this Ordinance, district governments are responsible for environmental protection and the control of pollution. In city districts, “the Zila (Town) Council approves plans for environmental control and ecological balances and oversees the implementation of rules and by-laws on environment.”748 Union Nazims (Mayor) are required to submit to the relevant authorities’ reports on a number of matters including environmental and health hazards.749 Local councils may frame by-laws for preventing pollution of air, water or soil, and the provincial government should guide the district governments in promoting environmental security.750

The subject of environment has been decentralized and is to be administered by the district law office, which is responsible for assisting in the implementation of PEPA 1997 and the rules and regulations framed under PEPA.751 The provincial government may set up district municipal office for environmental control.752 According to the Sind Local Government Ordinance:

746 The Baluchistan Local Government Ordinance, 2001, Section 195. 747 Ibid, Section 141(2). 748 Sindh Local Government Ordinance 2001, Section 40(a) and 40(b). 749 Ibid, Section 80 (f) (iii). 750 Ibid, Section 127(3). 751 Ibid, Section 14. 752 Ibid, Section 14 and 35.

244

“Discharging industrial, commercial or other waste, dangerous chemicals and hazardous or offensive materials into drains and water bodies or onto public land is an offence punishable with a maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of 15,000 rupees, in addition to a fine of 1,000 rupees for each day that the offence continues to be committed.”753

Similar penalties apply for the unauthorized manufacture and sale of explosive materials or any dangerous hazardous chemical.754

6.2.14 The Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001 This Ordinance authorizes the local governments for good governance, and at grass- root level encourages the involvement of people in matters affecting their wellbeing. This Ordinance prohibits producing, storing, trading, discharging or carrying detonators, dangerous chemical material without valid license. 755756 The offenders can be punished with “imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend to rupees 15000/- or with both.” Moreover, the local government must formulate a scheme for the drainage and sewerage of industrial and commercial waste and effluents.757

6.2.15 The NWFP Local Government Ordinance, 2001 This Ordinance authorizes the local governments for good governance, and at grass- root level encourages the involvement of people in matters affecting their wellbeing. This Ordinance prohibits producing, storing, trading, discharging or carrying detonators , dangerous chemical material without valid license.758 The offenders can be punished with “imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend to fifteen thousand rupees, or with both.” Moreover, the local government must formulate

753 Ibid, Section 141(2) (a). 754 Ibid, Fourth Schedule, Part I, Item 19. 755 The Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001, Chapter XIX Section 195, Sixth Schedule, paragraph. 756 . 757 Ibid, paragraph 45. 758 Ibid, paragraph 44.

245

a scheme for the drainage and sewerage of industrial and commercial waste and effluents.759

6.2.16 Import and Export Policy Order, 2013 Pakistan promulgated Export Policy Order- 2013 and Import Policy Order- 2013 in the light of Imports and Exports (Control) Act- 1950. Pakistan is making concerted efforts and is quite successful in the effective implementation of Export Control Act- 2004.760 Export Policy Order control export of all Schedule chemicals 761 as per the CWC and Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance- 2000 and CWC Implementing Rules- 2010.762 It also contains a format of End User Certificate763 and detailed instructions for filling the End User Certificate.764 The instructions are basically formulated in order to prevent the misuse of chemicals by the recipient. The ‘negative list’ includes export of dyes and chemicals to Afghanistan.765 The necessary coordination is mostly undertaken by Ministry of Commerce. However, the standard of implementation of various policies, rules and regulations requires improvement.

6.2.17 The Poisons Act, 1919 The State Government has the power to regulate the possession for sale and the sale of any specified poison as well as to grant the license to possess or sale the poison. 766 Imports without a license of any poison restricted under this Act or contravention of any condition of a license is punishable with “imprisonment for a term which may extend to

759 Ibid, paragraph 45. 760 Author’s meeting with Director General Ministry of Commerce (MoC) and Assistant Director Policy, MoC on 9 October 2013. 761 Export Policy Order-2013, Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, 9 March 2013, pp.694- 697. 762 Schedule- I and Schedule- II chemicals cannot be exported to states not party to CWC, and Schedule-III chemicals can be exported to states not party to CWC. However, the importing State must ensure that the chemical in question is not misused. In this regard, the importing state has to provide End User Certificate to the exporting state. 763 Export Policy Order-2013, op.cit, pp. 698- 699. 764 Ibid, pp.699- 701. 765 Ibid, p.692. 766 The Poisons Act, 1919 (XII of 1919), Section 2 (1) & (2).

246

three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.” 767 According to this Act, the local administration can enter and search the premises in which he has reason to believe that any poison is possessed or sold, or any poison liable to confiscation in contravention of this Act is kept or concealed.768

6.2.18 Labour Policy, 2006 The Labour protection covers safety at work, occupational health, and the impact of operations on the environment. The management of an industry or enterprise is responsible for addressing issues related to the above-mentioned three areas. However, the employees are responsible to extend full cooperation to the management for fulfilling their obligations. The safety and health related aspects can be improved by developing ‘safety and health culture’ in an enterprise. The management of industry has to ensure that hazards in the workplace are minimized, controlled or ideally eliminated. The management has to provide protective clothing and equipment to workers and constantly strive to eliminate and reduce hazards.

At the same time, workers are responsible to take health and safety matters seriously. This policy encourages industries in all sectors and industries of all sizes to formulate and implement health and safety policies taking into account the input from employees. The management of facility must pay attention to chemical usage and storage, illumination, dust, noise, humidity, ventilation, temperature and any other aspect affecting the health of workers in short or long-term. The enterprises are encouraged to train managers and workers for the implementation of safety and health policies and rules. Moreover, the enterprises are responsible for ensuring that their operations and waste disposal does not harm the wider environment.

6.2.19 Explosives Act, 1884

767 Ibid, Section 6. 768 Ibid, Section 7 (1) & (2).

247

This federal law covers the production, possession, use, sale and transport of explosives. The production, import or possession of any explosive substance is prohibited without license.769 The federal government may ban the production, import or possession of any material considered dangerous.770 The maximum fine for illegally manufacturing, possessing or importing explosives is rupees 5,000/-. Government may declare any substance dangerous to life or property, keeping in view the processes involved in its manufacture and its explosive properties. 771 Such materials may include chemical substances that are explosive in nature.772

6.3 Non- Regulatory Mechanism for Managing Chemicals

In order to involve industries in analyzing and reporting environmental performance, SMART programme (Self Monitoring and Reporting Tools) has been introduced.773 The data reported by the industry enables government agencies to control pollution levels of industry. This system requires more frequent monitoring of the industry where pollution impacts are high or toxic. 774 Moreover, environmental Technology Program for Industry (ETPI) was initiated in 1996 by the Government of Netherlands and the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI).775 The aim of this programme is to assist Pakistani industries in identifying and implementing the most economical pollution prevention and abatement technologies. However, the EPAs do not have adequate monitoring capacity. Hence, the government officials and industry representatives agreed to develop a mechanism where the industry

769 Explosives Act 1884 (No. IV), Section 5. 770 Ibid, Section 6. 771 Ibid, Section 17. 772 Ibid, Section 4(7). 773 The industry has been classified into three categories, with different reporting frequencies. ‘Category A’ industry will report their emission levels every month, ‘category B’ industry quarterly and ‘category C’ industry biannually. 774 Environmental Management Consultants, “Guidelines for Self- Monitoring and Reporting by the Industry,” Final Report, March 1998, p.2. 775 National Environmental Consulting (NEC) Pvt Ltd is the lead consulting firm, in consortium with four other consulting firms of HASKONING Royal Dutch Consulting, KRACHWERKTIGEN (KWT), Management for Development Foundation (MDF) The Netherlands, and Hagler Baily for implementing this project.

248

would itself monitor and declare the level of its pollution. The governmental authorities would analyze the said declarations and if required would undertake verification of the industrial declaration. Moreover, the declarations of industry would be placed in the public domain to enable independent research and analysis by environmental NGOs and other public interest groups for monitoring and assessing the performance of industry and the entire system.776

Pakistan Tanners Association (PTA) is implementing Introduction of Cleaner Technologies Programme (ICTP) for tanneries of Punjab, financed by The Royal Netherlands Embassy. For effluent treatment PTA has established a company, Environmental Management Limited, an Occupational Health and Safety Programme, a Solid Waste Management Programme, and a drainage system for about 160 Tanneries located at Korangi. The Combined Effluent Treatment Plant (CETP) for Kasur has been completed and PTA is supporting establishment of a tannery zone for Sialkot.777 Moreover various international safety standards have also been introduced such as ISO- 14001, Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) Management System and OHSAS- 18001.778 OHSAS- 18001 obligates organizations to document the areas covered by their OH&S policy and monitor and evaluate progress in achieving desired results. These standards for occupational health and safety and environmental management are adopted by declared chemical industries of Pakistan and other larger enterprises.779

776 Haroon Ayub Khan, “Implementing NEQS Pakistan’s Experience in Industrial Pollution Control,” Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Working Paper, No.38, 1998, p.5. 777 T. Javed, “Role of Pakistan Tanners Association in Addressing Environmental Concerns,” Published by Lahore University of Management Sciences, 2007. 778 Occupational Health & Safety Adviser Services (OHSAS) is an international occupational health and safety management system specification. OHSAS-18001 was created by large number of national experts, national standard bodies and certification bodies. OHSAS reduce the risks to employees and improve occupational health and safety system. Refer OHSAS 18001, “Health and Safety Standard.” Available at www.ohsas.18001. 779 Authors visit to Engro Chemicals Pakistan Ltd, Daharki, 6 November 2009; Fauji Fertilizer Mirpur Mathelo, 6 November 2009; Pak-Arab Fertilizer Multan, 24- 28 February 2010; Fauji Fertilizer Ghoth Machi, 5 November 2009.

249

The major impediment is that majority of the workforce in Pakistan are illiterate and not adequately trained in Occupational Health and Safety (OHS). The subject of OHS is not included in any curricula, and the physicians for OHS are inadequate. This implies that OHS requires definite improvement especially in small industries.780 For example, in Pakistan, laws exist for labeling drugs and pesticides, but no provision covers the labeling of industrial chemicals. As a result, in most of the cases, the containers of chemicals are without labels. In case they are labeled, then the label is in foreign language and does not provide any information on safety precautions or emergency measures. Even the chemicals manufactured indigenously rarely bear marking in national language i.e. ‘Urdu’. Keeping in view, the low literacy level, proper labeling in Urdu is required.781 Moreover, the small and medium chemical industries in Pakistan adopt very few occupational hygiene controls. Most small industries are without proper ventilation system, and majority of small chemical industries do not consider substitution of hazardous chemicals or processes. Personal protective equipment is hardly ever provided to workers in small industries. Similarly, the availability of fire fighting, first aid and transport in case of emergency and waste disposal are inadequate.104

6.4 Multilateral Instruments

Pakistan participated in the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment (1972), at Rio de Janerio and is signatory to Agenda-21 for safeguarding the wide environment and promoting sustainable development. Pakistan has ratified the Rio Convention i.e. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and prepared the Biodiversity Action Plan, ratified the Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) (1997) and United

780 Tariq Sultan Paracha, “Country Profile on Occupational Safety and Health in Pakistan,” Centre for the Improvement of Workers Condition and Environment Lahore, Pakistan; and Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, Kuopia, Finland, 2003, p.3. 781 Ibid, p.32. 104 Ibid, p.33.

250

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1994).782 Moreover, Pakistan is party to Chemical Weapons Convention, Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM), Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), Rotterdam Convention on prior informed consent (PIC) for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides and Basel Convention on the control of trans- boundary movement of hazardous waste and their disposal.

The effective implementation of Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management (SAICM) in Pakistan will improve the safety and working of large number of stakeholders in public and private sector, civil society and public interest groups such as NGOs, CBOs, labour organizations, etc. The International Cooperation Wing of the Ministry of Climate Change is responsible for the implementation of SAICM in Pakistan and is serving as a focal point for interacting with international and national partners. In this regard, regular consultations and coordination with civil society and the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) takes place.

The NTACC hold meetings for regulating the import, export, production and use of chemicals. However, Pakistan requires an action plan for awareness raising of civil society organizations regarding the adverse effects of chemicals on humans and the environment with special focus on workers working in industries and agricultural fields.783 The effective implementation of SAICM warrants effective participation of civil society in chemical management. For the sound management of chemicals the development of a governance framework for SAICM implementation is imperative. Such governance will provide enabling environment for effective planning, coordination, and mainstreaming the chemicals related issues in the national development planning.

782 Muhammad Khurshid, Environmental Initiatives: Global and National Perspective in Pakistan, (Islamabad: Classical Printers, 2006), pp. 15-16. 783 Dr. Khalid Mehmood, “National Capacity Assessment for Implementation of SAICM,” Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, Project for 2006- 2009.

251

The International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention, 155 provides a framework for addressing safety and health issues at all levels and provide the basis for the development of national laws, regulations, polices and their implementation for improving work safety and health. In Pakistan, of particular concern are Other Chemical Industry (OCIs) that have hazardous working environments. The Labour Inspection Policy- 2006 address this issue through a labour extension approach, designed to ensure that basic safety and health information and advice is made available to, and acted upon by the informal economy, workplaces and OCIs. The Government must demand written safety and health policies from all industries, and must ensure the implementation of such safety policies.

In 2004, the World Customs Organization adopted Global Harmonized System (GHS) of nomenclature. The GHS categorizes chemicals according to the type of hazards they present and this system ensures provisions of safety labels and safety data sheets as required under Rotterdam Convention. GHS aims at ensuring that information on toxicity and physical hazards from chemicals is available for enhancing the protection of human health and environment during chemical life cycle. GHS is not yet implemented in Pakistan, in fact little is known about GHS.784 Therefore, necessary awareness raising regarding GHS, training and capacity building should be undertaken at priority. This capacity building would contribute to both national and international efforts. Pakistan international obligations under various multilateral agreements must be suitably incorporated into existing national legislative and administrative measures.

6.5 Ministries and Agencies Managing Chemicals

The management of chemicals in Pakistan is done through a structured governmental mechanism where the mandates and responsibilities of various ministries, and departments relevant to management of chemicals is defined through national legal instruments and related rules and regulations. The organizations created for the

784 National Capacity Assessment of Pakistan for Implementation of Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management (SAICM), Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, November 2009, p.15.

252

management of chemicals are established through the Acts of Parliament. The ministerial setup for the management of chemicals is well defined, but they need capacity building.785 The table given below identifies various ministries and their responsibilities with regard to management of chemicals.786

Ministry Responsibilities Ministry of Climate Ministry of Climate Change implements PEPA-1997 and related Change rules and regulations. This ministry deals with four multilateral agreements relevant to chemicals, namely, Implementation of World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), Rotterdam Convention, United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) and Economic & Social Commission

Pakistan They promote research and develop Science & Technology, Environmental which may contribute to the prevention of pollution, protection

Protection Agency, of the environment, and sustainable development. They also Provincial EPAs specify safeguards for the prevention of accidents and disasters; and encourage the involvement of NGOs, CBOs for preventing and controlling pollution and promoting sustainable development. Ministry of Health MoH is responsible for the overall control of importing, (MoH) producing, storing, marketing, transporting and handling of pharmaceutical products both in finished and raw forms. National institute of NIH implements rules related to drugs and waste management Health (NIH) such as Drugs Act- 1976.787 Ministry of Food, This ministry is responsible for import, production, marketing, Agriculture and distribution, transport, storage, use and handling of pesticides; Livestock second, the storage, distribution, transportation, use and handling of imported fertilizers; third, to monitor the use of both imported and locally produced fertilizers.

785 Ibid, p.7. 786 “National Profile for Chemical Management,” op.cit, pp.222- 228. 787 Sania Nishtar, “The Gateway Paper; Health System in Pakistan– a Way Forward,” Pakistan’s Health Policy Forum and Heart File, 2006, p.128.

253

Ministry of Industry This ministry implements the Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance, and Production 1971 & Rules 1973, Development of Industries (federal control) (Repeal) Ordinance, This Ministry is responsible for:788 • Domestic production, storage, transportation, distribution and handling of the locally produced fertilizer and all other chemicals. • Provide safety guidelines to industry and ensure its implementation. • Safety related awareness raising in industry. • Prepare inventory of hazardous chemicals and raw materials used in various industries and study the hazards posed by industry. • Develop physical capacity for managing industrial disasters. Department of Plant This department is responsible for registration of pesticides and Protection other related regulatory aspects. Ministry of Finance MoF implements the Customs Act 1969. It places import levies (MoF) on the import of all chemicals through the Customs Department.

Ministry of Labour This Ministry implements the Labour laws, Factories Act and and Manpower Regulations & Rules, Fatal Accident Act, and Hazardous Occupation rules. This ministry develops respect for human rights and work on human resource development.

Ministry of MoC implements Export Policy Order and Import Policy Order. Commerce (MoC) MoC through Trade Policy regulates the import and export of chemicals and raw materials used for chemical production.789

Ministry of Textile It implements National Environmental Quality Standards, Industry SMART Rules- 2001 and related rules. Ministry of Science MOST initiates and monitor various programmes for technology and Technology development and industrialization. For effective management of (MOST) chemicals, it implements Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority Act- 1996, and related rules.

788 Ministry of Environment, National Capacity Assessment of Pakistan for Implementation of Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management (SAICM), op.cit, p.21. 789 “Trade Policy: 2012- 15,” Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, 8 March 2013.

254

Science and It collects and maintains all data regarding S&T activities in the Technology (S&T) country, and undertakes research for determining critical factors Section, Planning for S&T development. Commission National Fertilizer NFDC provides objective advice to government, fertilizer Development Centre industry and stakeholders on all matters related to fertilizers. (NFDC) Moreover, it undertakes research on fertilizers, soil fertility, and plant nutrition management; and undertakes surveys at farm level to monitor impact on crop productivity and problems faced by farmers. NFDC has also developed close relations and cooperation with international fertilizer community.790 Ministry of Ministry of Communication is the policy making and Communication administrative authority on communication and transport sector in the country.791 It also handles transportation of chemicals and related equipment. Ministry of Ports & This ministry implements The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act- Shipping 1925, the Dangerous Cargoes Act- 1953, Port Qasim Authority Act- 1973. The Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act- 1976, and The Karachi Port Trust Act- 1886. This Ministry acts as safety administration and controls pollution from ships in harbour and territorial waters. Ministry of Foreign National Authority on CWC is located at MFA. The National Affairs (MFA) Authority is responsible for national implementation of CWC. 792 MFA plays an important role in multilateral negotiations, signing and ratification of international Conventions and Protocols.

Ministry of Petroleum It implements Petroleum Exploration and Production Rules- 2009.793

Ministry of Railway Implementation of The Railways Act- 1890.794

790 National Fertilizer Development Centre, posted on home page of Science Pakistan. Available at www.pakchem.net/2011/08. 791 Home page of Ministry of Communication website. www.communication.gov.pk. 792 CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Section 9, p.5. 793 Petroleum Exploration & Natural Resources Policy 2009, Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Resources, Government of Pakistan, March 2009. 794 The Railways Act 1890, (Corrected up to December 1996), Ministry of Railways, Government of Pakistan. 1997.

255

Federation of FPCCI is the apex body representing country’s industry, trade and Pakistan Chambers of services. It advocates the collective concerns and aspirations of Commerce and the private sector and offers solid advice and assistance to the Industry (FPCCI) Government, thus serving as a bridge between the private sector and the government.795

6.6 Inter- Ministerial Coordination Mechanism

Often different ministries work in their respective domain and implement relevant legal instruments. This significantly reduces inter-ministerial coordination and interaction between officials and experts. The major drawbacks of the Pakistani enforcement mechanism are lack of public awareness, and ineffective monitoring and inspections by the public authorities.796 Presently, efforts are being made to enhance requisite interministerial and inter-agency coordination. 797 For an integrated national approach on chemical management, a participatory decision making approach is highly imperative whereby various actors can exchange information, co-ordinate activities and make collective decisions. Therefore, following inter-ministerial commissions have been established for better coordination.

National Technical Advisory Committee on Chemicals (NTACC) has been established in the Ministry of Environment. The main objective of NTACC is to advise and facilitate the Government on Integrated Chemical Management (ICM) and allied issues.798 However, the NTACC is also facing constraints in capacity in terms of information

795 The Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, “Role and Function of FPCCI in the Growth of Trade, Industry, Services, SMEs, Commerce & Economic Development of Pakistan.” Available at www.fpcci.com.pk. 796 Dr Khalid Mehmood, “National Capacity Assessment for Implementation of SAICM in Pakistan,” International Cooperation Wing, Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, project for 2006-2009, p.iv. 797 Author’s meeting with Mr. Naeem Zaid, Director General Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad, Pakistan, 6 September 2013. 798 Zaigham Abbas, “E- Waste Management in Pakistan,” Regional Workshop on WEEE/ E- Waste Management, Osaka, japan, 6-9 July 2010,

256

collection and identification for proper analysis and input.799 The Agricultural Pesticide Technical Advisory Committee (APTAC) comprises members from the central and provincial government, representatives of trade and industry. This Committee advices the central government on technical matters arising out of the implementation of the Agricultural Pesticide Ordinance, 1971.800

APTAC recommends registration applications of the pesticide companies for marketing pesticide brand in Pakistan for consideration by APTAC. Furthermore, in the light of Agricultural Pesticides Rules, 1973, APTAC examines the implementation of these rules and make necessary amendments to the federal government, register pesticides and approve technical specifications of registered pests both for import and local procurement.801 Furthermore, for the elimination of adulteration in pesticides a steering committee has been made that comprises of the officials from the Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Livestock, Task Force for Agriculture in Punjab, Department of Agriculture, Pakistan Pesticides Association, and generic pesticides importers.802

6.7 Role of Community and Public Interest Groups

In Pakistan the NGOs and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) are involved in variety of fields such as advocacy, lobbying, policy analysis, emergency response, rehabilitation and relief activities, etc. According to the United Nations Development Programme more than 8000 NGOs and CBOs are working in Pakistan.803 Large numbers

799 Dr. Khalid Mehmood, “National Capacity Assessment for Implementation of SAICM in Pakistan,” Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, project for 2006- 2009, p.8. 800 Agricultural Pesticide Ordinance, 1971, Ministry of Law & Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Chapter-III, Section.12 (1) and (2), 25 January 1971. 801 Agricultural Pesticides Rules, 1973, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of Pakistan, Section.19, 13 August 1973. 802 S.R.O. 909 (1)/ 98, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, Government of Pakistan, 13 August 1998. Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance, 1971 (II of 1971), op.cit, Section.12, Sub- section 10. 803 “A Study of NGOs in Asia: Pakistan,” Transparency Watch Organization, 1999, p.3. Available at www.transparencywatchorganization.com.

257

of said NGOs are working exclusively on the issues of environmental pollution.804 The Self Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism under PEPA also place industrial declarations regarding pollution levels in the public domain, which enables NGOs and CBOs to monitor the industrial declarations and actual emissions and discharges from the industry.805

In Pakistan, not even a single NGO or CBO is working exclusively on the safe and secure management of chemicals. Thus, the NGOs are contributing indirectly to the sound management of chemicals, whereas, they require special capacity building. Various NGOs have immense capacities and their cross cutting potentials can prove extremely beneficial for comprehensive chemical management in the country, if they are utilized in a concerted and coordinated manner. Moreover, there is a need to create some sort of national mechanism, where by the NGOs can be utilized in monitoring and inspecting chemical facilities and management. This will substantially contribute to the safety and security of chemical facilities, the wider environment and the human health.

Industry in Pakistan has a significant base of trade unions. Some of the major trade unions include, All Pakistan Federation of Labour (APFL), Pakistan Workers Federation (PFW), All Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions (APFTU), Pakistan National Federation of Trade Unions (PNFTU), All Pakistan Trade Union Congress (APTUC), All

Pakistan Federation of United Trade Unions (APFUTU), and All Pakistan Trade Union Federation (APTUF). One of the basic objectives of these trade unions is to improve the working conditions and health and safety standards for workers; and introduce social security system for all workers. The trade unions also disseminate information to workers and provide policy input on issues related to workers. However, there analytical capacity is limited for understanding the environmental issues, international security issues,

804 Author’s meeting with Dr. Riffat N. Malik, Chairperson Department of Environmental Sciences, Quaidi- Azam Universirty, Islamabad, Pakistan, 26 March 2014. 805 Haroon Ayub Khan, “Implementing NEQS Pakistan’s Experience in Industrial Pollution Control,” op.cit, p.5.

258

collaboration with international partners, etc. This limitation can be addressed with the strategic tool of enhancing literacy level.

In Pakistan, food production and processing have become much more intensive, and the use of fertilizers, pesticides and other preservative chemicals have increased manifolds. The existing legislation does not offer adequate consumer protection, and public awareness is limited regarding the effects of these chemicals, pesticides and fertilizers on human health. In this regard, the Consumer Association of Pakistan has proposed a regulating system named REACH (Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals). This initiative is a step in the right direction because it aims phasing out problematic substances and making available to the public information regarding effects of used chemicals on health. Such associations are striving that manufacturers ensure that their consumer products fulfill the highest health and ecological criteria.

6.8 National Chemical Disaster Management

Pakistan has faced variety of natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, droughts, landslides, sea-based hazards and cyclones. Mostly, reactive response remained the predominant way of responding to disasters. In 1960s Pakistan faced heavy floods, hence a flood control programme was launched.806 In 1974 government introduced National Disaster Plan, which for the first time envisaged organizational structure, responsible agencies and operating procedures for relief operations. However, the plan was not implemented. In 2002, fire broke- out in the 17- storey Shaheed-i-Millat Secretariat in Islamabad, consequently, Pakistan Emergency Service Ordinance was promulgated. 807

806 Muhammad Zaidi, “Poor Disaster Management,” DAWN, 23 April 2012. 807 Ibid.

259

This Ordinance mandated Pakistan Emergency and Fire Council, and a Rescue and Fire Service. Unfortunately, both of them did not materialize.808

In October 2005 a devastating earthquake in Pakistan revealed the weaknesses of Pakistan emergency and disaster-response apparatus. Therefore, Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Ordinance (NDMO) was promulgated in 2006 for establishing a systematic mechanism of disaster management. This Ordinance established National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) headed by the Prime Minister, National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and provincial and district disaster management authorities (PDMAs and DDMAs). Similar institutional arrangements have also been made for Northern Areas, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K).

The creation of the National Disaster Management Commission and its executive organ the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is major improvement in the national perspective on disaster management. The NDMA serves as focal point whenever disaster management plans are implemented. The Disaster Management Authorities have a clear mandate for coordination with all stakeholders in government, international organizations, humanitarian organizations, etc. Moreover, under this system, a comprehensive approach including prevention, preparedness, response and mitigation measures have also been identified in line with best international practices. NDMO provides a broad based mechanism for dealing with all eventualities regarding chemical and industrial accidents or incidents.

6.8.1 Management of Industrial Disasters The NDMA is mandated to provide generic guidelines, formulate various committees and departments, and their specific tasks for addressing disasters at

808 Ibid.

260

industries.809 It provides a framework for the federal government, concerned ministries and provincial governments for enacting their comprehensive roles and responsibilities for handling an industrial disaster. 810 This national plan is focused in detail and quite comprehensive in scope covering the whole country; however, concerned PDMA/ DDMA would be responsible for monitoring and response to the chemical/ industrial disasters within provincial limits.811 The Provincial Disaster Management Authorities implement disaster management plans at provincial levels and undertake necessary coordination with concerned ministries, organizations and the DDMAs. Similarly, provinces have established DDMAs in almost all the districts.

The NDMA has prepared National Contingency Plans for Disasters for ensuring an effective response to various types of disasters. These plans delineate a comprehensive preparedness and response system, which involve both public and private resources for synergetic effect.812 The plans specify responsibilities and identify the lead and supporting agencies at various levels and their responsibilities for the preparation and implementation of disaster management plans, and related legislations.813

6.8.2 Management of Disasters at Port Terminals The chemical stockpiles at various port terminals can cause immense disasters. The inspection of all vessels that passes through the ports is extremely difficult due to the size and complexity of ports. Furthermore, the manual and technological inspection methods

809 NDMA should serve as the primary liaison and facilitator for cooperation among federal agencies, provincial and local governments, and the private sector. 810 U.S. has National Incident Management System (NIMS)- 2008. It is a comprehensive approach to incident management. It standardizes resource management procedures for facilitating better coordination among various organizations, and can also be used for all incidents from large to day-to-day incidents. 811 The U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)–7 directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a national policy for federal agencies to identify and prioritize Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) in order to prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts to destroy or exploit them. 812 The US National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets identifies a clear set of goals and objectives and outlines the guiding principles for securing vital infrastructure and identifies major initiatives for meeting near-term protection priorities. 813 The National Disaster management Plans are adaptable at any level from routine, local incidents to incidents requiring the activation of interprovincial mutual aid for coordinated national response.

261

are costly and limited.814 Therefore, proper plans and organizations are required for dealing with such emergencies at port terminals handling hazardous chemicals, petrochemicals, lubricant and liquid gases. This plan provides necessary guidelines for coordination amongst various organizations and agencies that have role in disaster management at port terminals. Operation rooms will be established at various port terminals for activating on- site and off- site emergency plans, manage disaster and evacuate people to safety. 815

The plans for managing disaster at port terminals draw its mandate from National Disaster Management Ordinance- 2007.816 For effectively managing possible disasters, various terminals have been divided into four zones namely, Zone-A Terminal (Port Qasim), Zone-B Terminal (Karachi Port Trust), Zone-C Terminal (Inside Karachi city), and Zone-D terminal (Gawadar Port). 817 Terminal Disaster Management Authorities (TDMA) have been established, which are headed by Chairman Port Qasim Authority for Zone-A, Chairman Karachi Port Trust for Zone-B, DG PDMA Sindh for Zone-C, and Chairman Gwadar Port Authority for Zone- D.818

NDMA is mandated to coordinate national level response seeking requisite assistance from various ministries and organizations, Pakistan Army, Pakistan Navy, Karachi Port Trust (KPT), Port Qasim Authority, provincial/ local government authorities, and various NGOs such as Edhi Welfare, etc.819 A disaster at Zone- A can be managed by Port Qasim Authority. Each Terminal Disaster Management Authorities (TDMA) has to utilize its own resources and if required the resources of other TDMAs. In Zone- B, Karachi Port Trust can employ its own resources and the resources of other agencies. Any disaster in Zone- C i.e. interior Karachi city would cause immense material

814 The U.S. National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003, p.72. 815 Pakistan National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), “National Contingency Plan to Combat Disaster at Port Terminals at Karachi and Surroundings”, National Contingency Plan to Manage Industrial/ Technical Disasters, 2010, p.83. 816 Ibid, p.84. 817 Ibid, pp.84-87. 818 Ibid, pp.86-87. 819 Ibid, p.89.

262

and human loss. Therefore, PDMA will require the help of local government and all possible assistance from other TDMAs.

6.9 Realistic Account

Pakistan has comprehensive disaster management legislations and implementation plans, yet Pakistan has no formal or informal mechanism for investigating a chemical incident; record of chemical accidents is not maintained in an organized manner and disaster management basically revolves around rescue and relief operations. Moreover, though disaster management at chemical facilities is part of National Contingencies Plans, yet these plans are not tested during field exercises. Police, fire fighters and other emergency services are not properly equipped and trained for effective and harmonized response to a chemical disaster. The Other Chemical Industries (OCIs) have no chemical hazard identification system. Only few major hospitals have proper decontamination facilities, stocks of antidotes, and appropriate equipment for the emergencies. 820 The national contingency plans need to be improved by regularly testing plans and improving coordination during field exercise. Moreover, such exercises would prove beneficial if all stakeholders especially the policy making level officials participate and perform their respective roles during such exercises.

In Pakistan, the mandates of various ministries and institutions related to chemical management are well defined. But the relevant institutions require capacity building regarding implementation of policies, rules, regulations and acts; as well as the understanding of health issues caused by chemicals, availability of information, risk assessments, protection of at-risk communities, promotion of safe chemical and process alternatives, etc. The lack of human resource, insufficient understanding of the regulatory framework within implementing agencies, meager funds, inadequate career progression opportunities for the technical staff and uncoordinated approaches are main impediments that need to be addressed at priority. Furthermore, national monitoring and surveillance

820 National Capacity Assessment of Pakistan for Implementation of Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management (SAICM), op.cit, pp.21-22.

263

system is required for chemical management; and close collaboration among concerned authorities may be developed for efficient management of chemicals. 821 The concerned agencies need to develop efficient monitoring and surveillance system; and effectively enforce various laws and related rules and regulations regarding chemicals.

The priority concerns related to chemical management include the pollution of waterways, groundwater, air, soil contamination, occupational health chemical accidents, hazardous waste disposal, and related issues exist throughout the country. These problems are addressed by various ministries but there is lack of coordination amongst various ministries and organizations, which prevents synergy of effort. The lack of capacity for collecting and analyzing chemicals related data and issues further prevent coordination amongst various ministries and organizations for the management of chemicals. 822 Moreover, participation of academia such as distinguished scholars, heads of the departments of chemistry, environmental sciences, and chemical technology of the major universities and prominent experts on the subject may also be included in the National Technical Advisory Committee on Chemicals (NTACC). This will substantially improve the quality of input and national policies.

In Pakistan, overall, fifty-three legislations and rules are regulating the use of chemicals. The legislations regarding import, export, and production of chemicals are comprehensive; whereas, legislation concerning disposal, transportation and storage of chemicals are inadequate.823 There is no law dealing with safe and secure storage and transportation of chemicals. Though, Explosives Act exists but that it only covers chemicals with explosive properties. Pakistan’s legislation does not provide adequate consumer protection, and public awareness is limited regarding the adverse effects of chemicals on human health. These areas warrant priority considerations and related

821 Author’s meeting with Mr. Muhammad Afzal Khan, Director Chem- Bio Defence Cell (CBDC), Defence Science & Technology Organization (DESTO), SPD, Chaklala, Pakistan, 14 June 2013. 822 Author’s meeting with Dr. Abda Farooqi, Associate Professor, Department of Environmental Sciences, Quaid-i-Azam Universirty, Islamabad, Pakistan, 24 March 2014. 823 “National capacity Assessment for Implementation of SAIM in Pakistan,” op.cit, p.iv.

264

legislations. Moreover, the capacity of concerned ministries with regard to implementation of laws requires improvement.824 Basically, the regulatory framework is not effectively enforced, which is the main drawback of the whole system. Some of these Acts require review, keeping in view the prevailing security situation. Moreover, the penalties for environmental offences ought to induce deterrence, and also rectify the damage caused to the environment. For example, imposing Rupees.500/- fine for discharging industrial waste in the water body may not yield desired effect.

The availability of accurate data is the key factors in facilitating systematic planning and development. The data regarding chemicals and related aspects is maintained by relevant departments and agencies. However, there is no central national data for undertaking broader analysis and strategic planning. In fact, the national capacity for collecting data and its expert analysis is insufficient. Industries especially the OCIs neither maintain such records comprehensively, nor do they report to concerned authorities. Public access to available data is also not easy. Database related to occupational accidents, chemical accidents, chemical injuries, drinking water and food contamination, chemical poisoning, and deaths caused due to chemicals is not held.825 The industry as well as related institutions does not maintain any record in a structured and transparent manner. There is no data regarding areas heavily polluted by hazardous chemicals, food and drinking water contamination, sites of obsolete chemicals, and storage and transportation of chemicals. In addition, national information system regarding chemicals and related safety aspects does not exist.826

Participation of NGOs and public interest groups in policy formulation and implementation of national rules and regulations is of crucial importance for sound management of chemicals in the country. In Pakistan, almost 800 NGOs are involved in advocacy, lobbying, policy issues, emergency response, rehabilitation and relief activities,

824 Ibid, p.8. 825 Author’s meeting with Dr Amin Badsha, Chairman Department of Chemistry, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, 28 April 2014. 826 National Capacity Assessment of Pakistan for Implementation of Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management (SAICM), op.cit, p.9.

265

and implementation of developmental projects. However, mostly they work in isolation and thus requisite synergy is not achieved. Therefore, their contributions and capacities should be augmented with an effective consultative and coordinating mechanism. Moreover, most of the NGOs are working on environmental issues but no NGO or Community Based Organization (CBO) is working exclusively on the safe and sound management of chemicals. Thus the NGOs require special capacity building and functioning in chemical management. The NGOs can also be effectively utilized in monitoring and inspecting chemical facilities and related activities, which will contribute to the sound management of chemicals.

Pakistan is party to large number of multilateral instruments. Their effective national implementation would benefit many stakeholders in public, private and civil society and will also contribute to related international efforts.827 For instance, Pakistan is party to International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention but the situation in Other Chemical Industries (OCIs) and informal sector are frequently characterized by hazardous working environments. Pakistan Labour Inspection Policy-2006 addresses this issue, but the basic safety and health information is not provided to workers. Hence, the government and the management of industry need to ensure that policies are effectively disseminated, implemented and the awareness level of workers is improved. Similarly, the Global Harmonized System (GHS) of nomenclature is extremely useful in classifying chemicals according to the type of hazards and ensuring that requisite information on physical hazards and toxicity from chemicals is available to users. Pakistan needs to implement GHS by building the capacity of relevant organizations and educating masses regarding the benefits of adopting GHS.

827 Author’s meeting with Mr. Naeem Zaid, Director General Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad, Pakistan, 6 September 2013.

266

Regarding disaster management, it is encouraging that Pakistan has established a comprehensive disaster management mechanism by promulgating National Disaster Management Ordinance- 2006, and establishing National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC), National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMA), and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMA). This comprehensive approach includes prevention, preparedness, responses and mitigation measures in line with international best practices. Pakistan disaster management mechanism is broad based and deals with all types of eventualities including industrial and chemical disasters. The national contingency plans for various disasters are designed to ensure timely, calibrated and effective response to any accident or incident. These plans are quite comprehensive but they need to be further refined and tested during field exercises involving all stakeholders especially the policy makers.828 Unfortunately, there is very little coordination between various stakeholders and field exercises are seldom conducted that too with insufficient participation. In this context, the emergency responders from various departments needs to be adequately trained, equipped and developed into a pool of experts that could be confidently employed anywhere in the country or abroad on short notice.

Pakistan ought to develop a comprehensive approach for risk mitigation and regional coordination as established by the E.U. In this regard, it is imperative that various states undertake the assessment of needs, identify national resources and develop coherent CBRN policy. The objective of such efforts ought to identify and maximize the use of national and regional resources and develop capacity building at national and regional level for CBRN risk mitigation. Moreover, the focus of the CBRN policies should be on coordination, standardization and communication.829 The regional states would need to

828 Author’s meeting with Mr. Muhammad Afzal Khan, Director Chem- Bio Defence Cell (CBDC), Defence Science & Technology Organization (DESTO), SPD, Chaklala, Pakistan, 14 June 2013.

829 Francesco Marelli, “A Comprehensive Approach Towards CBRN Risk Mitigation and Cooperation with OPCW,” Seminar on OPCW Contribution in the Field of Security and Nonproliferation, The Hague, The Netherlands, 11- 12 April 2011.

267

exchange best practices, methodologies and test regional response in field exercises. Such exercises would prove more fruitful with the participation and involvement of the experts from the OPCW, IAEA, WHO, etc, and the relevant national policy making officials.

268

CHAPTER 7

PAKISTAN: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION

Introduction

The effective national implementation is an imperative feature of the nonproliferation apparatus of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which obliges the States Parties to constitute comprehensive legislative and administrative measures to prevent and redress any breach of the Convention by their nationals within their territorial jurisdictions. Indeed, the existence of loopholes inside the national implementing institutions/ authority facilitates the terrorist groups to employ chemistry as well as chemicals for the terrorist acts.830 Article- VII of the CWC provides the basis for national implementation measures (Appendix- IV), which obligates States to ensure that no one undertakes prohibited activities on its territory; establish or designate a National Authority for CWC implementation and inform the Organization for the Prohibitions of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of the legislative and administrative measures taken for the implementation of CWC. 831 Being a party to the CWC, Pakistan has been seriously engaged in the effective implementation of the Convention and has put in place comprehensive legislative and administrative measures.

Comprehensive national implementation of the CWC in each State Party is dependent upon comprehensive national legislation. 832 Article- VII of the Convention

830 H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu, “Director General OPCW Opening Statement” at the Table-Top Exercise on the Preparedness of States Parties to Prevent Terrorist Attacks Involving Chemicals, Warsaw, Poland, 22 November 2010, p.4. 831 D. Feakes, “The In-Depth Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Second Review Conference“, in R. Trapp ed., OPCW Academic Forum. Conference Proceedings, OPCW, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, TNO Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research, 2007, p. 110. 832 Author’s meeting with Angela Woodward, Director National Implementation Measures Verification Research Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), London, U.K. 23 April 2007.

269

obligates States Parties to “adopt the necessary measures for implementing its obligations under the CWC.”833 These measures include obligations under Articles- I and VI of the CWC, which necessitates incorporation of the General Purpose Criteria (GPC) into national implementing law. Because, only prohibiting activities related to Schedule chemicals will be partial fulfillment of national obligations. The present challenges of proliferation of WMD and international terrorism also necessitate that States Parties enact comprehensive legislation.

The alarming factor is that ‘some States Parties have restricted the applicability of the CWC to Schedule chemicals only’834; this restriction is against the object and purpose of the CWC. The comprehensive legislation enables State Party to deter individuals from producing and using dual-use industrial chemicals as Chemical Weapons. These concerns necessitate requisite tracking of the domestic transfers of toxic and dual-use industrial chemicals.835 The individual quality of national implementation contributes to the standard of international implementation.’ 836 Moreover, comprehensive legislation enables National Authorities in obtaining complete and correct data from chemical industry on declarable activities under the Convention, prosecute those who violate the CWC, including terrorist activity, and enforcing effective export and import controls under the Convention.837

Pakistan possesses a vibrant chemical industry and is doing its best to comply with the demands of the CWC. The critical examination of Pakistan’s CWC compliance necessitates a proper understanding of the country’s chemical industry. Therefore the overview of Pakistan’s chemical industry has already been given in chapter-6 (Pakistan:

833 CWC, Article-VII, paragraph 1- 7. 834 Andy Mash, et al., “Maintaining the Effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), (Stockholm: Solna, 2002). 835 For example, the British legislation controls access to dangerous pathogens and the 2001 Anti- Terrorism, Crime and Security Act covers toxic chemicals. 836 Andy Mash, op.cit, p.10. 837 Author’s meeting with Mr. Mark Alborn, OPCW Head Implementation Support Branch, during a course organized by Singapore National Authority and OPCW at Singapore Customs, Singapore, 4 June 2010. .

270

Management of Chemicals). This chapter begins with the discussion on the functions and powers of Pakistan National Authority on CWC and also on certain measures for revitalizing Pakistan National Authority. This chapter also covers Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000 and Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules- 2010 by presenting the comprehensiveness of the said legal instruments and how they redress and remedy any violation by its citizens any where, including the aspects of extra-territorial application and provision of legal cooperation to the international community for safeguarding and upholding the credibility of the CWC. This chapter also includes Pakistan Export Control Regime for preventing the proliferation of WMD, related material, technology and their means of delivery; which is followed by Pakistan export control arrangements under CWC, such as, how transfers of Schedule chemicals is prohibited/ controlled to non-States Parties; and criminalizing offences such as variety of transfers that can be used in prohibited activities. Pakistan Export and Import Policy Order-2013 implements national controls on large number of items identified by relevant ministries and organizations. The said policy is also included in this chapter with regard to export and import controls of Schedule chemicals and other dual-use chemicals and products. Safeguarding the environment and human health is an important obligation under CWC, which Pakistan fulfills by implementing Pakistan Environmental Protection Act- 1997 (PEPA), therefore, PEPA is discussed in the final section of the chapter.

7.1 Pakistan National Authority on CWC

The CWC obligates States Parties to establish or designate a National Authority with mainly two functions, i.e. to fulfill national obligations under CWC; and to serve as a national focal point for the OPCW and other States Parties. 838 Therefore, monitoring national obligations is the main responsibility of the National Authorities. In fact, the National Authority performs the role of guardian for the national monitoring regime; and their weaknesses will undermine the overall CWC verification regime. 839 Effective

838 CWC, Article VII, paragraph 4. 839 Daniel Feakes, “Evaluating the CWC Verification System”, UNIDIR Disarmament Forum, No.4, April 2002, p.4.

271

National Authorities are essential for the future of the CWC. Therefore, the National Authorities should be empowered, equipped and provided with adequate human resources.840

7.1.1 Powers and Functions of National Authority The Government of Pakistan has designated the Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to serve as National Authority for the Implementation of CWC.841 Therefore, Pakistan’s National Authority on CWC is located at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Islamabad. Disarmament- C Branch of the MFA works on CWC matters and is headed by Director General National Authority. The Director General National Authority is assisted by a serving Lieutenant Colonel from Pakistan Army as Director National Authority (NA). The National Authority works closely with Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) for effective implementation of CWC and to respond to any chemical accident/ incident in Pakistan. They collectively undertake following functions: a. Verification activities. b. Outreach to chemical industries regarding CWC obligations.842 c. Provide requisite training to their members both inland and abroad. d. Conduct seminars and workshops on various aspects of CWC. e. Conduct international training as part of assistance to the OPCW.

7.1.2 Policy Guidelines & Record Keeping

840 The E.U. has started implementing a policy that all existing and new chemicals would undergo comprehensive risk assessment. Such measures will only be possible if National Authorities have sufficient skilled and qualified human resources. Refer: European Commission, White Paper: Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, COM (2001) 88 final, 27 February 2001. 841 CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Section 9, p.5. 842 Presently in Pakistan, there is no federal authority that ensures uniform and comprehensive security standards for chemical facilities.

272

Pakistan’s National Authority formulate policy for regulating the imports or exports, production, acquisition, processing, consumption, transfer, and storage of the Schedule chemicals and Un-Schedule Discreet Organic Chemicals (UDOCs), Phosphorous, Sulfur and Fluorine (PSF) DOCs. 843 Moreover, the National Authority ensures that any facility involved in production, imports or exports consumption, processing, acquisition, storage and transfer of the Schedule chemicals or Unschedule DOCs, PSF DOCs shall be obliged to:844

a. Maintain record of abovementioned activities in electronic and hard copy. b. Submit any information or document required by National Authority or any authority designated by National Authority. c. The facility under inspection has to allow the staff of National Authority or its designated authority to access required records. d. Facilitate National Authority by providing requisite information for the purpose of preparing Annual Declarations to the OPCW.

Any person, who exports or imports, consumes, transfers, possesses and produces, any Schedule chemical or who produces Un-Schedule Discreet Organic Chemicals (UDOC) and DOC with elements of Phosphorus, Sulfur and Fluorine (PSF) or holds a Riot Control Agent (RCA) shall provide the required information at appropriate time to the National Authority. Moreover, the facility has to maintain and keep the relevant documents in Pakistan, and whenever required, shall submit them to the National Authority.845

7.1.3 Power to Enter and Search Premises Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance empowers the National Authority or its designated authority to enter and search, remove or immobilize objects. The Ordinance

843 Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, SubRule 5 (3), p.4. 844 Ibid, Sub-Rule 5 (1), p.4. 845 CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, op.cit, Sub-Section 21(1), p.8.

273

states “If a magistrate is satisfied on information on oath that an object is on premises and that is a Chemical Weapon; then he may issue a warrant authorizing the National Authority to enter the premises, if necessary by force, at any time within one month from the time of the issue of the warrant and to search them.” 846 A person who acts under the abovementioned authorization “may take with him such other persons and such equipment as necessary or he may make the object safe, and may seize and remove it, if it is reasonably practicable to do so.”847 This provision is quite helpful in deterring any clandestine activity, because the National Authority along with law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies can enter any premises, which is suspected of involvement in any prohibited activity.

7.1.4 Data Collection from Industry Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance empowers National Authority on CWC for collecting data for ensuring that no activity takes place in violation of the CWC. Here again GPC is of crucial importance and would enable Pakistan to ensure that Unschedule DOCs and precursors are ‘only produced, acquired, retained, developed, used, or transferred within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Pakistan must be proactive in collecting CWC-relevant data and confirm implementing the scope and applicability of the GPC. Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance obligates chemical facilities for declaring data to the National Authority for subsequent monitoring and verification purposes by the National Authority according to the verification provisions of the CWC and Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000.848

7.1.5 Facilitating OPCW Inspections The National Authority shall facilitate the OPCW as stated below in conducting

846 Ibid, Sub- Section 24 (2). 847 Ibid, Sub- Section 24 (4). 848 Ibid, Section 7, p.4.

274

Routine Industrial Inspection, Challenge Inspection or Assistance Inspection by:849 a. Formulating teams of experts in consultation with Ministries of Defence, Health, Industries, and SPD.

b. Verification activities at declared chemical industries at least once a year. c. Ensuring that the inspection activities are conducted smoothly by the OPCW inspection team.

7.1.6 National Authority’s Wide Area Network (WAN) As part of a broader framework for the CWC implementation, the National Authority has established Wide Area Network (WAN), which is fully operational and has automated the chemical industry’s import and export data declarations. This computerized data is utilized for preparation of electronic declarations for submission to the OPCW. WAN is also used to disseminate appropriate information to the chemical industry and other stakeholders. WAN is completely national initiative and is proving beneficial in outreach to industry. More precisely, Pakistan’s policy is to continue supporting all multilateral legal instruments and initiatives that promote regional and international security, arms control and non-proliferation on equitable and just basis.

7.1.7 Need to Relocate and Reorganize National Authority Presently, National Authority on CWC is working under DG Disarmament-C Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). It is felt that National Authority may be placed under Pakistan Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV), which will improve its working. The reasons for this suggestion are that SECDIV is looking after nuclear and biological technology and material. The inclusion of National Authority on CWC will put all control lists and WMD related subjects under one organization. Moreover, both SECDIV and National Authority on CWC are located in MFA, therefore, no administrative implications will take place. If we take the example of India, it has only one list of control items called SCOMET (Special Chemical, Organisms, Material, Equipment

849 Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules 2010, op.cit, Rule 8, p.6.

275

and Technology). So Pakistan can also place nuclear, chemical and biological control lists under one centralized organization. This will facilitate interaction with international organizations and also facilitate national working. The chemical importers, exporters and users would know that one public authority deals with all control lists.

The SECDIV was specifically created as licensing authority for goods and technology related to nuclear and biological weapons and their delivery systems, which also include certain chemicals. Whereas, National Authority regulates the import and export of schedule-I, II and III chemicals such as Sarin, Soman, Tabun, VX, Sulfur Mustard from Schedule-I; Amiton, PFIB, BZ, Arsenic Trichloride from Schedule-II; and Phosgene, Cyanogen Chloride, Hydrogen Cyanide from Schedule-III lists. SECDIV has created a proper licensing regime, whereas, National Authority is so far relying only on NOCs.850 If National Authority comes under SECDIV then export/ import of all sensitive chemicals will be controlled with proper licensing regime.

Furthermore, interaction with international organizations will be facilitated, e.g. Australia Group (AG) interacts with SECDIV on biological matters and with National Authority on matters related to chemicals. Thus, if National Authority comes under SECDIV then one organization will deal with AG, which will result in better coordination and implementation. Furthermore, Strategic Plans Division (SPD) is obliged to support federal government in nonproliferation efforts as per National Command Authority (NCA) Act-2010. SPD provides military input to MFA, whereas, SECDIV draws heavily on the expertise of SPD. SPD is also supporting National Authority during OPCW Routine Industrial Inspections of the declared chemical industries. This adjustment will further facilitate SPD support to MFA.

National Authority does not control chemicals related technology. This technology is controlled by SECDIV, thus responsibilities regarding chemicals and related technology are divided between two independent organizations. Placing National

850 Author’s meeting with SECDIV officials on 19 September 2013; and Author’s meeting with Director National Authority on CWC on 8 November 2013.

276

Authority under SECDIV will facilitate and improve overall strategic export controls. Regarding the availability of human resource, National Authority comprises one director (Lieutenant Colonel) and two clerks. DG National Authority/ Disarmament-C is mainly symbolic head, since he has to look after all national disarmament issues. Therefore, National Authority requires a dedicated Director- General, additional officers and technical experts for effective functioning.

The said reorganization will become much easier when National Authority is placed under SECDIV. For example, SECDIV is headed by a Director General and is organized into four directorates namely Directorate of Domestic and International Policy, Directorate of Licensing and Regulations, Directorate of Information Technology and Directorate of Enforcement. SECDIV has wide variety of highly qualified technical experts from the nuclear, chemical and biological fields. Its approved strength is 85 members. The staff of SECDIV comes from diverse organizations such as Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Ministry of Commerce, Federal Bureau of Revenue (FBR), Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM). Thus National Authority will be suitably staffed, reorganized and supported, which would enable National Authority to perform regulatory and monitoring functions even more efficiently.

The present level of coordination amongst National Authority MFA, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industry and Ministry of Environment requires definite improvement. The representatives of abovementioned ministries in SECDIV will facilitate improved coordination amongst all relevant ministries and organizations, which is imperative for the safe and sound management of chemicals. With present resources the National Authority is doing good job, but its mandate spreads throughout the country and the present organization and infrastructure cannot justify the huge task that has been explained in preceding paragraphs.

7.2 Pakistan’s CWC Implementation Ordinance- 2000

Pakistan has a dualist legal system; therefore, the CWC Implementation

277

Ordinance- 2000 was promulgated, which gives effect in Pakistan to the CWC. This Ordinance is a dedicated Act that gives effect to Pakistan’s obligations, responsibilities and rights as a State Party to the CWC. Moreover, it is a comprehensive legislation and its scope effectively covers all the national obligations under the CWC such as prohibitions of all kind as specified in the Convention; penal provisions; extraterritorial applications; declaration obligations; and regime for Schedule- I, II and III chemicals, such as regulation, licensing, import/ export controls, inspections, access to facility, samples, inspectors’ privileges and immunities, confidentiality aspects, mandate and enforcement powers of National Authority, etc. The salient aspects of Pakistan’s CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000 are given in succeeding paragraphs.

7.2.1 Fundamental Prohibitions under Article- I of the Convention Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance prohibits both natural and legal persons from undertaking any activity that is not permitted to a State party. This law aims to extend all prohibitions under CWC especially the prohibitions under Article- I regarding the production, acquisition, development, retention, transfer, stockpiling or use of Chemical Weapons, to activities by non–governmental entities and private individuals. Thus, in addition to obligations specified in Article I, paragraph 1(d) of the CWC i.e. “not to assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in prohibited activities”, Pakistan is obliged to take positive steps to ensure that non–governmental entities and private individuals do not engage in activities prohibited under the Convention. 851 Whoever contravenes the abovementioned provisions is “liable for punishment with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty-five years.”852 This punishment seems to have enough deterrence value. This level of punishments is implemented in developed states also, such as Australia. 853

851 Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, op.cit, Sub-Section-3 (1), p.3. 852 Ibid, Sub-Section-3 (3), p.3. 853 In Australia a maximum penalty of life imprisonment is prescribed if any individual violates the obligations under Article-1 (CWC) obligations such as engages in acquisition, production, development, retention, stockpiling, transfer or use of Chemical Weapons; or who encourages, assists, or induces anyone in anyway to undertake prohibited activities.

278

7.2.2 Permitted Purposes In the light of the CWC, this Ordinance has specified as under the meaning of permitted purposes as “industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; protective purposes, which are directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against Chemical Weapons; military purposes not connected with the use of Chemical Weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; and law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.”854 This Ordinance further clarifies that no person shall acquire, produce, possess, transfer, use, import or export any Schedule chemical, Unschedule DOCs and any DOCs with the elements of Phosphorous, Sulfur or Fluorine (PSF DOC) except for permitted purposes under Pakistan CWC Ordinance. 855 “Whoever contravenes the provisions of this section shall be guilty of an offence punishable with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.” 856 This punishment has little deterrence values and therefore, it needs suitable review.

7.2.3 Enacting and Extending Extra-Territorial Penal Legislation Pakistan CWC Ordinance prohibits “natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any prohibited activity such as for the production of Chemical Weapons constructing or altering any premises, or installing any equipment.”857 These rules govern the activities of non–governmental entities and private individuals regardless of their nationality. In this regard, Pakistan has enacted penal legislation 858 called CWC Implementation Rules- 2010, in the light of the CWC. 859 Whosoever contravenes the

854 Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, op.cit, Sub-section 2.(1) f, p.2. 855 Ibid, Sub-Section-5 (1), pp.3-4. 856 Ibid, Sub-Section-5 (2), pp.3-4. 857 Ibid, Sub-Section 4 (1), p.3. 858 The term "penal" implies that the legislation can be of a criminal, civil and/or administrative nature, so long as penalties are involved. 859 CWC, Article VII, sub-paragraph 1.a, p.17.

279

abovementioned provisions “shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty-five years.” 860 This duration of punishment seems to have adequate deterrence value. The CWC Implementation Ordinance extends its penal legislation to any prohibited activity under the Convention undertaken anywhere i.e. outside its territory but places under its jurisdiction, by its citizens according to the international law. 861

7.2.4 Transfer of Schedule Chemicals The CWC Implementation Ordinance obligates that no person shall transfer Schedule chemicals to a State Party (SP) or, to a non- State Party to the CWC except in accordance with the CWC Verification Annex. Whoever contravenes the provisions of this section shall be fined which may extend up to ten thousand rupees.862 The fine seems very minimal and thereby may be having very limited deterrence value. Therefore, the fine should be reviewed and implemented to strengthen the nonproliferation preventive measures.

7.2.5 Provision of Legal Assistance to States Parties The CWC obligates States Parties to cooperate with each other and to provide appropriate legal assistance to each other for facilitating the implementation of the Convention.863 This provision mainly looks after the activities of private individuals and non–governmental entities, in case if they engage in prohibited activities. In this regard, the extension of Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance to external territories can prove helpful. Moreover, the Convention does not elaborate the legal assistance and cooperation, which may be required of States Parties. Therefore, States Parties will have to utilize existing international agreements, related domestic legislation and ad- hoc arrangements

860 CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, op.cit, Sub-Section 4 (3), p.3. 861 Ibid, Section 25, p.10 862 CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, op.cit, Section 6. (1) (2), p.4. 863 CWC, Article VII, Paragraph 2.

280

on legal assistance for initiation of proceedings, the guarantee of due process, specific assistance, and extradition of alleged offenders.864

7.2.6 Safety of People and the Environment The Article- VII of the CWC obligates States Parties to accord highest priority to the safety and protection of human health and the environment, and in this regard undertake appropriate cooperation with other States Parties.865 This is a general obligation for the States Parties to ensure the safety of people and the environment when undertaking activities required under CWC. Pakistan is a non-possessor of Chemical Weapons right from the outset, however, the object and spirit of the CWC is suitably reflected in both the CWC Implementation Ordinance and CWC Implementation (Rules) 2010. Moreover, Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (PEPA) 1997 also addresses this national obligation, which is covered in detail subsequently.

7.2.7 Pakistan’s Cooperation with OPCW The CWC requires each State Party to extend requisite cooperation to the OPCW in the performance of its functions, especially providing assistance to the OPCW Technical Secretariat.866 Pakistan is actively cooperating with international community through the OPCW. Pakistan has pledged assistance to the OPCW in case of chemical accident/ incident anywhere in the world. In 2011 Pakistan conducted an international course on ‘Assistance and Protection’, which has become a regular OPCW training event and is actively supporting the object and purpose of the CWC at the forum of OPCW. To assist the OPCW in verification activities, as per Pakistan’s CWC Implementation Ordinance, a

864 OPCW, Technical Secretariat, Survey of National Implementing Legislation, Document No. S/ 259/ 2001, 16 May 2001, p.2. Author’s meeting with Violeta Artos, Senior Officer Industry Verification Branch of OPCW, Doha, Qatar, 23 October 2008. 865 Chemical Weapons destruction as per paragraph 10 of Article IV; CWPF (Chemical Weapons Production Facility) destruction as per Article V, paragraph 11; Schedule 1 chemicals permitted production as per Part VI, paragraph 7 of the Verification Annex. 866 CWC, Article VII, paragraph 7, p.18. Author’s meeting with Mr. Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry, Pakistan Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the OPCW The Hague, The Netherlands, 26 November 2009.

281

person shall be guilty of an offence and “shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both”, if he “refuses without reasonable excuse to comply with a request made by a police officer or a member of the in-country escort for the purpose of facilitating the conduct of inspection; interferes without reasonable excuse with any container, instrument or other object installed; and obstructs a member of the inspection team or of the in-country escort, or the observer, in the conduct of inspection.” 867

7.2.8 Pakistan’s National Data Declarations and Verifications Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance empowers National Authority for the collection of data to ensure that no activities take place in violation of CWC obligations. The Ordinance obligates chemical facilities regarding data declarations to the National Authority to be used subsequently for national declaration to the OPCW and monitoring and verification activities by both the OPCW and National Authority. 868

7.2.9 Informing OPCW Regarding Implementation Measures The Article- VII of the CWC obligates States Parties to inform the OPCW Technical Secretariat regarding national legislation and related rules and regulations for the implementation of the CWC. Pakistan has duly informed the OPCW regarding CWC Implementation Ordinance 2000, and CWC Implementation (Rules) 2010. Both these documents are available on OPCW website.869

7.3 Pakistan’s CWC Implementation Rules 2010

867 CWC Implementation Ordinance- 2000, op.cit, Section 19, p.7. 868 Ibid, Section 7, p.4.

869 The OPCW Action Plan on National Implementation should be renewed and expanded to ensure that States Parties incorporate the General Purpose Criterion (GPC) into their national implementation laws, rules and regulations and “empower their National Authorities to collect all of the data needed to monitor domestic implementation effectively.” Refer: OPCW, “CWC National Implementation Legislation Database”, Available at www.opcw.org.

282

A crucial element in the non-proliferation regime of the CWC is effective national implementation. This requires that States Parties establish the administrative measures necessary to prevent and redress any breach of the CWC by their nationals in any area under their jurisdiction. The existence of loopholes could encourage possible terrorist uses of chemistry and chemicals. 870 Pakistan attaches very high importance to the effective implementation of the CWC and has put in place comprehensive legislative and administrative measures for its effective implementation. Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules are at Appendix- V.

7.3.1 Establishment of Advisory Committee The Government of Pakistan has established an Advisory Committee for responding to any crisis situation regarding chemical accident/ incident. The Additional Secretary (UN) Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been designated as the Chairman of the Committee, Its members include representative(s) of Ministry of Defence, Strategic Plans Division, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Interior (including Police, Civil Defence, Federal Investigation Agency, Fire Brigade, etc), National Disaster Management Authority, Civil Aviation and Ambulance Services, Strategic Export Control Division, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Law and Justice, Federal Board of Revenue, Ministry of Environment, and Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. 871 Director General National Authority CWC shall serve as the Secretary of the Committee.872

7.3.2 Functions of the Advisory Committee The Advisory Committee has following functions: a. “The Advisory Committee may advise and give recommendations to the National Authority on CWC for the issuance of guidelines for an emergency

870 Author’s meeting with Mr. Daniel Feaks, University of Sussex, The U.K., 22 April 2007. 871 Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules 2010, op.cit, Sub-Rule 3 (5), p.3. 872 Ibid, Rule 3, p.3.

283

situation that may occur due to any accident or sabotage at any chemical facility.” 873

b. “The National Authority may seek recommendations from the Advisory Committee, as and when required, on any matter related to implementation of the CWC Ordinance or Rules made there under.” 874

7.3.3 Emergency Coordination Cell In case of an emergency in any facility the National Authority shall coordinate with concerned federal and provincial governmental departments in dealing with crisis and “form an emergency coordination cell consisting of members as the National Authority considers appreciate.”875 The emergency may be “an accident at any facility; loss or theft of Schedule chemical(s), Unschedule DOCs, PSF DOCs during its transportation; terrorist activity at the facility or during transportation.”876 In this context, for assistance and protection, the NDMA will launch proper response system.877

7.3.4 Chemical Industries’ Declaration Obligations In the light of Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules- 2010, a facility is obligated for making declaration to the National Authority as specified below:878 Serial Category Activities Threshold Quantity for Declaration a. Schedule I Production Any quantity permissible under license b. Schedule II Production, consumption, More than: processing 1 Kg of Schedule 2A* 100 Kg of Schedule 2A 1 Ton of Schedule 2B

873 Ibid, Rule 4, p.3. 874 Ibid, Rule 4, p.3. 875 Ibid, Sub-Rule 13 (1), p.8. 876 Ibid, Sub-Rule 13 (2), p.8. 877 Ibid, Sub-Rule 13 (4), p.8. 878 Ibid, Rule 6, p.4.

284

c. Schedule III Production, consumption, More than 30 ton processing d. DOCs Production, consumption, More than 200 ton processing e. PSF DOCs Production, consumption, More than 30 ton processing

The annual declaration by a facility regarding imports or exports, production, acquisition, processing, storage, consumption, transfer, of Schedule chemicals, DOCs, UDOCs shall be submitted to National Authority not later than 44 days after the end of the previous year.879

7.3.5 Cooperation with OPCW Inspection Team Pakistan National Authority is responsible to monitor and facilitate verification activities conducted by the OPCW. The National Authority may facilitate by appointing team of technical and security experts in coordination with the Ministry of Industries, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Health and Strategic Plans Division; inspect declared chemical industry at least once in a year; and ensure that the inspection team is not obstructed during their verification activities.880 Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance provides to the OPCW inspectors all the immunities and privileges as provided under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations- 1961 and the First Schedule of the Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act- 1972.881

The rights and obligations of the OPCW Inspection Team and the Pakistan’s National Authority include: “Inspectors shall have access to the requisite records in the facility and they shall be under no obligation to compensate for any business loss that may occur during an inspection. The inspection team shall have the power to take samples from

879 Ibid, Sub-Rule 6 (2), p.5. 880 Ibid, Rule 8, p.6. 881 Ibid, Rule 9, p.6.

285

the facility for the purpose of verification with the concurrence of DirectorGeneral National Authority.”882 According to the CWC Implementation Rules:

“An OPCW inspector who has a sample from a facility shall allow the inspector of the National Authority to retain a portion of that sample. And if the inspector analyzes the sample at the facility, he shall allow the inspector/ technical expert designated by the National Authority to be present during analysis. Moreover, the National Authority may disallow the OPCW inspector to use or access their inspection equipment if it does not meet the description of approved equipment or for authentication purpose does not bear a document or stamp from the OPCW.”883

This provision is very useful for safeguarding vital national information. OPCW inspections are intrusive, and States were initially concerned that while demonstrating their compliance during inspections, they may compromise on sensitive information. However, the CWC allows States to exercise their due rights such as the one mentioned above for adequately protecting vital information. The OPCW inspection equipment has to be duly certified and must be approved OPCW inspection equipment. If a State can prove that the equipment is not duly ‘approved equipment’, then the inspected state can retain said equipment at the Point of Entry of the OPCW Inspection Team. However, the State Party will arrange the requisite inspection equipment from own sources. Pakistan has acquired OPCW inspection equipment and its scientific experts are appropriately trained for its correct application and analysis.

7.3.6 Registration of Chemical Industry Any chemical industry/ facility that produces, consumes, possesses, transfers, imports and exports Schedule chemicals, PSF DOCs or Unshedule DOCs shall be registered. As per the CWC Implementation Rules, no facility will undertake abovementioned activities without registration. The facility shall provide information including, inter alia, number of plants and their specific production capacity; available

882 Ibid, Rule 10, p.6. 883 Ibid, Sub-Rule 10 (3), p.6.

286

storage space; daily consumption of chemicals; complete record of consumption, production and processing; details of the technicians on facility; details of Schedule chemical, Unschedule DOCs and PSF DOCs; response measures and procedures in case of an emergency at the facility; or any other information, which is required by the National Authority or its designated authority.884

7.3.7 Permit for Import and Export of Schedule Chemicals In the light of the CWC Implementation- Ordinance and CWC Implementation Rules, the National Authority may issue a permit to any facility that intends to export or import Schedule I, II or III chemicals and their mixtures. 885 For obtaining permit, the importer or exporter shall apply at least forty-five days prior to the intended export or import.886 For securing the permit, the chemical importing company or exporting company has to fulfill certain requirements such as providing information on the purpose of import, quantity of imported chemicals, the end uses, name and address of end user (s), certificate that Schedule chemical will not be re-transferred, and will be used for permitted purposes under CWC, etc.

7.3.8 Offences and Penalties The prevention of the misuse of the chemicals require executing apparatus as well as a proper legal system. So that violators should be checked adequately. The CWC Implementation Rules specify “imprisonment for a term, which may extend to two years or with fine or with both to any person involved in any of the following offences”:887 a. Not appropriately cooperating with the OPCW inspection team in the

884 Ibid, Rule 10, p.7. 885 Ibid, Sub-Rule 12 (3), p.8. 886 The CWC requirement to declare aggregate annual data for imports of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals is implemented by compiling information from industry and Pakistan Customs Authorities. Author’s meeting with Mr. Asfar Bilal, Director National Authority on CWC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, 8 November 2013. 887 Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules 2010, op.cit, Rule 14, p.8.

287

conduct of verification activities. b. Submission of wrong declarations to the National Authority and not maintaining information as specified in Pakistan CWC Ordinance.888 c. Not registering the facility involved in production, consumption, transfer, processing, import and export of Schedule chemicals, PSF DOCs, or Unshedule DOCs or as specified in Pakistan CWC Ordinance.

7.3.9 Identification of Chemicals of Concern Easily and immediately identifying all shipments of Schedule chemicals is very important for subsequent monitoring, control, correct declarations at various levels and maintaining data base. Pakistan uses a system of numerical codes for classifying traded commodities that comprises 8-10 digits. This system is used by the World Customs Organization (WCO). Pakistan National Authority on CWC uses the Central Abstract Service Registry (CASR) Numbers, as given in the CWC. This difference creates difficulties in identification of chemicals of concern. The OPCW Preparatory Commission has requested World Customs Organization (WCO) to amend the HS and create individual identification codes for all CWC Schedule chemicals. This aspect needs to be addressed. One way could be that States Parties make necessary changes in national statistical nomenclatures, as done by Australia. Australia uses a 8- 10 digit system of numerical codes for classifying traded commodities, which is based on the six digit Harmonized Commodity Description Encoding System (HS), administered by the World Customs Organization (WCO). In the light of the WCO recommendation and permission by the OPCW, Australia has implemented changes to its import code system since 1 January 1997.889

888 Ibid, Section 21. 889 “Australia Approach to National Implementation of CWC,” p.4. Available at www.dfat.gov.au/cwco.

288

7.4 Pakistan’s Export Control Regime

Pakistan is fully committed to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their related materials and means of delivery. As a responsible State and whilst safeguarding foreign policy interests and national security, Pakistan is fulfilling its international obligations. Pakistan is implementing effective export controls in line with its obligations under various international instruments including CWC, BWC, Convention for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Code of Conduct (CoC), etc. 890 Islamabad, immediately responded to the UNSC Resolution- 1540 by legislating Pakistan Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery System Act, 2004.

7.4.1 Pakistan Export Control Policy It is the policy of Pakistan to control the export and re-export (transshipment, transit) of goods and technology that would make a significant contribution to the military capability of countries that pose a threat to international security; that would contribute to the proliferation of WMD and means of their delivery; that would contribute to the threat of international terrorism.891 The export control policy obligates national authorities to provide the public with clear and efficient export control policies, guidelines, procedures and enforcement mechanisms. The national authorities have to consult to the maximum extent practicable with the public and affected industries with respect to the implementation of these policies. This policy demands cooperation with the international community for controlling exports that would contribute to the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means. Furthermore, Pakistan would maximize trade among nations and minimize uncertainties for exporters.”892

890 Author’s meeting with Mr. Zafar Ali, Director General Pakistan Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV), Islamabad, 19 September 2013. 891 Ibid.

892 Nazir Hussain, Additional Foreign Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Pakistan Export Controls Regime: Legislative Framework,” Brussels Export Controls Conference, 16- 17 November 2006.

289

7.4.2 Pakistan’s International Obligations Pakistan is party to Chemical Weapons Convention, Early Notification in case of a Nuclear Accident, Assistance in case of Nuclear or Radiological Accident, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention. That’s why Pakistan has adopted various measures to fulfill the demands of the said Conventions. A few of the legal and administrative instruments are enlisted in succeeding paragraphs.893

7.4.2.1 Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950 (Act No. XXXIX of 1950) This law empowers the Federal Government to control, restrict or prohibit the import or export of goods prohibited or restricted under Sea Customs Act- 1878. This Act prohibits selling or purchasing import license and prohibits sale and transfer of goods by industrial consumer, and disallow the industrial consumer the use of goods for the purpose(s) other than those for which the license were issued.

7.4.2.2 CWC Implementation Ordinance, 2000 (Ordinance No. LIV of 2000) This legal instrument gives effect to the national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This Ordinance is further given penal provisions by Pakistan CWC Implementation Rules, which criminalizes all CWC prohibitions.

7.4.2.3 Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (PNSRP) Ordinance,1984 and PNSRP Regulation,1999 It sets provisions for controlling the import and export of nuclear substances and radioactive materials. This Act established the Directorate of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection. This Directorate is empowered to formulate and enforce regulations related to

893 Ibid.

290

nuclear safety and security; issue licenses for nuclear facilities and activities; and inspect all licensed nuclear facilities.

7.4.2.4 Statutory Notifications Statutory Notification No. SRO-782 (1), 1998 prohibits export of fissionable materials. Statutory Notification No.SRO-23 (1)/1999 prohibits the export of AntiPersonnel Landmines. Statutory Notification No.SRO-124 (1)/ 1999 is for export of arms, ammunitions, and explosives; it requires Defence Ministry’s No Objection Certificate. Statutory Notification No.SRO-482 (1)/2000 and SRO 111 (1)/2004 sets export policy through this notification. This notification lays down provisions for the control of imports and exports of radioactive material and nuclear substances.

7.4.2.5 Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2001 Provision of NOC is mandatory for import or export of any radiation source or radioactive materials. This law empowers Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) to issue ‘No Objection Certificate’ for the imports and exports of any radiation source or any radioactive material.

7.4.2.6 Export Control Act on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems-2004 “This Act enables the Government to control export, re-export, transshipment, transit of goods, technologies, material and equipment that will contribute to the designing development, production, stockpiling, maintenance or use of nuclear and biological weapons and their delivery system. It also prohibits diversion of controlled goods and technologies. Its jurisdictions cover every citizen of Pakistan within and beyond Pakistan,

291

any person serving Pakistan, any foreigner in Pakistan, any ground transport, ship or aircraft registered in Pakistan, where ever it may be.”894

7.5 Pakistan Export Controls under CWC

Through CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000 and CWC Implementation Rules2010 Pakistan undertake never to “transfer, directly or indirectly Chemical Weapons to anyone, nor to assist, encourage or induce in anyway,” another State to engage in prohibited activities. For effective enforcement of CWC export controls Pakistan has legalized CWC prohibitions. Moreover, Pakistan has also implemented specific restrictions on transfer of Schedule chemicals to non- State Parties as specified below:895 a. Schedule-1 Chemicals. They can only be transferred in limited quantities only among States Parties that too for specific declared purpose. b. Schedule 2 Chemicals. The import or export of Schedule- 2 chemicals from non-States Parties is prohibited. c. Schedule 3 chemicals. An End-Use Certificate must be obtained for the export of Schedule- 3 chemicals to non-State Party.

7.5.1 Scope of Pakistan Export Controls under CWC The scope of Pakistan’s export controls under CWC takes into account the definition of “Chemical Weapons”, which has a wider meaning and is not limited to Schedule chemicals listed in the CWC or families of Schedule chemicals. The CWC Implementation Ordinance requires National Authority to monitor transfers of all toxic chemicals and their precursors. The Article-I prohibitions duly incorporated in Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000 and CWC Implementation Rules-2010 prohibit and make criminal offence the transfer of financial resources, equipment, and intangible technology that are intended for use in prohibited activities.

894 Author’s meeting with Mr. Zafar Ali, Director General Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV), 19 September 2013. 895 Author’s meeting with Director National Authority, Mr Asfar Bilal, op.cit.

292

7.5.2 Export Controls Incorporated in National Legislation Pakistan has enacted CWC implementing legislation and adopted CWC Implementation Rules-2010 for effective implementation of the Convention thus contributing to international efforts against proliferation. Pakistan has ensured that export control provisions under CWC are properly implemented in the abovementioned legislative and administrative instruments.

7.5.3 Correct and Timely National Declarations Pakistan meticulously prepares its national annual declarations on transfers of Schedule chemicals and regularly and timely submits national declarations to the OPCW.896 Such national measures enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to effectively monitor the international trade and movement of Schedule chemicals. Pakistan seriously takes the significance of such reports as a non-proliferation tool.

7.5.4 Capacity Building of Customs Authorities The OPCW in collaboration with the World Customs Organization conducts courses for national customs services and National Authorities. Pakistan fully avail such training opportunities and has an active outreach programme to educate Customs Authorities regarding national export control obligations under CWC. 897 Pakistan also train and equip border security personnel to prevent, deter and investigate transfer of WMD related material and technology. The monitoring of transfers and trade in chemicals will need to be made more rigorous for effective implementation of export control regime under CWC. Pakistan is striving hard to be able to fully monitor the import and export of chemicals of concern by enhancing the knowledge and skills of their relevant governmental authorities, especially the customs authorities.

896 Ibid.

897 Author’s meeting with Dr. Irfan Yousaf Shami, Director General Pakistan National Authority on CWC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, 4 March 2010.

293

7.5.5 Transfer of Schedule Chemicals Schedule chemicals should be transferred in accordance with the verification Annex of the CWC as specified below:898

a. Schedule I. According to Part- VI of Verification Annex. b. Schedule II. According to Part- VII of Verification Annex. c. Schedule III. According to Part- VIII of Verification Annex.

7.5.6 National Data Declarations and Verification Measures In the light of the CWC, Pakistan Implementation Ordinance obligates chemical facilities regarding data declarations to the National Authority to be used subsequently for monitoring and verification activities. It specifies the import, export, production, acquisition, and use of chemicals listed in: a. “Schedule- I chemicals shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on site instruments in accordance with Part-VI of the Verification Annex; b. Schedule- II chemicals shall be subject to data monitoring and on-site verification in accordance with Part- VII of the Verification Annex; c. Schedule III chemicals and facilities shall be subjected to data monitoring and on-site verification in accordance with Part- VIII of the Verification Annex;

d. The production, use, acquisition, export or import of any UDOCs or DOC PSF and related facilities shall be subjected to data monitoring and eventual on-site verification in accordance with the CWC Verification Annex.” 899

898 Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, op.cit, Sub-Section-6 (1), p.4; Trade in Schedule 2 chemicals was prohibited with non-States Parties since 2000. Trade in Schedule 3 chemicals with non-State Parties has been possible since 2002, but so far States Parties have not reached consensus. Jonathan B. Tucker, “Strengthening the CWC Regime for Transfers of Dual-Use Chemicals,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, March 2007, p. 2. 899 CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, op.cit, Section 7, p.4.

294

7.6 Pakistan Export & Import Policy Order 2013

Pakistan promulgated Export Policy Order- 2013 and Import Policy Order- 2013 in the light of Imports and Exports (Control) Act- 1950. Pakistan is making full efforts to ensure effective implementation of Export Control Act-2004, has enforced Licensing and Enforcement Rules-2009, and revised control lists 2011. Pakistan’s various ministries and departments are working in complete coordination for the export/ import control of chemicals and Pakistan’s policy standards for said control are based on international standards. The necessary coordination is mostly undertaken by Ministry of Commerce.900 However, the standard of implementation of various policies, rules and regulations require improvement.

7.6.1 Export of Chemicals Schedule- I & II chemicals cannot be exported to non-States Parties to CWC. Since Schedule-III chemicals have wide commercial utility, therefore, they can be exported to states not party to CWC with the restriction that such chemicals will be used only for purposes permitted under CWC. The receiving state and the end-user shall complete Form T 30 (Appendix-D to the Policy Order), before importing these chemicals from Pakistan. Moreover, the exporter has to obtain permit from the National Authority prior to the exports.901 Handbook on Chemicals- 2009 should be consulted for the identification of chemicals.902

7.6.2 Restrictions Imposed under Other Laws

900 Author’s meeting with Mr Naeem Zaid, Director General Ministry of Commerce (MoC), 9 October 2013.

901 “Export Policy Order-2013,” Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, 9 March 2013, pp.681682. 902 Available at www.opcw.org.

295

Restrictions or conditionality imposed under following national legal instruments and the implementing rules made there under shall be treated to be restrictions and conditionalities under this Order, those relevant to chemicals are:-903

a. The Antiquities Act, 1975 (VII of 1976) b. The Arms Act, 1878 (XI of 1878) c. The Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969) e. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 f. The Merchandize Marks Act, 1889 g. The Poisons Act h. The Exports Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004. i. The Petroleum Act, 1934 j. The Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 k. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance- 2000 l. Any other law notified in the official gazette by the federal government.

Under duty drawback scheme the dyes and chemicals are included in the ‘Negative List’ for exports to Afghanistan.904 Appendix-B of Export Policy Order- 2013 enforces that imports of the following chemicals shall be allowed only on meeting conditions as stipulated in succeeding paragraphs.

7.6.3 Schedule- I, II & III Chemicals under CWC905 The importers and industries shall, not less than sixty days before transfer of any chemical specified in Schedule-I inform the National Authority on CWC and the Federal Board of Revenue. Schedule-I& II chemicals can be imported from States Party to Chemical Weapons Convention. The importers and industries shall maintain record of their imports and subsequent sale and use of these chemicals. Such record shall be submitted by the importers and industries on quarterly basis to the National Authority on CWC and the

903 “Export Policy Order-2013,” op.cit, pp.682- 683. 904 Ibid, p.692. 905 “Import Policy Order-2013,” Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, 9 March 2013, pp.735736.

296

Federal Board of Revenue. For any Schedule chemical prior permission shall be obtained 60 days in advance from the National Authority on CWC.906

7.6.4 Acetic Anhydride, N-Aceylanthranilic acid, Isosafrole, Ephedrine, etc a. Industries can undertake import after obtaining NOC from the Ministry of Narcotics Control. b. Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) will determine the import quantity in consultation with the Ministry of Health and concerned pharmaceutical units. c. Research laboratories of educational institutions can import Acetone, hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid after obtaining NOC from the Ministry of Narcotics Control.907

7.6.5 Methyl ethyl ketone, Dyes and Insecticides Only industrial consumers with valid license under PEPA, 1997 can import Methyl ethyl ketone.908 For the import of Dyes the supplier has to certify that they do not contain or are based on benzidine.909 The import of insecticides will take place in the light of the provisions of the latest Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance-1971 and related rules.910

7.7 Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (PEPA) 1997

Environmental protection provisions are part of Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution, which provides the legal basis for the national environmental initiatives. Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (PEPA) provides legal authority for addressing environmental issues with wide jurisdictions and grant broad regulatory powers to

906 Author’s meeting with Director National Authority, Mr. Asfar Bilal, op.cit. 907 Ibid, pp.727- 728. 908 Ibid, pp.728. 909 Ibid, pp.729.

910 Ibid, pp.730.

297

regulatory bodies for implementing rules made under PEPA, 1997. The Government has made various rules under this Act such as pollution charge for industry, environmental sampling, National Environmental Quality Standards (NEQS), establishment of environmental tribunals, and environmental impact assessment of development projects. 911 PEPA requires “the federal government agency shall establish systems and procedures for surveys, surveillance, monitoring, measurement, examination, investigation, research, inspection and audit to prevent and control pollution.”912

PEPA does not allow the discharge of hazardous substances that is more than the limits mentioned in the NEQS.913 PEPA allows “an environmental protection order to be issued in cases where discharges and emissions are found to be causing or likely to cause an adverse environmental effect.”914 This Act obligates all industry owners to undertake Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) or an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) prior to commencement of construction or operation of a facility unless the designated government agency provides approval in the light of IEE and EIA.915 Moreover, for the involvement of the local people, the Act stipulates that every EIA shall be conducted with due participation of the public.916

The Act has a wide scope for regulating industrial activities, and can levy pollution charges on the polluter, 917 licensing, 918 and environmental protection orders 919 i.e. the Federal Agency may address the issue of pollution of the environment by issuing an environmental protection order. The “penalty for non-compliance with the provisions

911 Author’s meeting with Dr Riffat N. Malik, Chairperson Department of Environmental Sciences, Quaid- iAzam Universirty, Islamabad, Pakistan, 26 March 2014. 912 Guidelines for Self Monitoring and Reporting by the Industry, Ministry of Environment, Final Report, March 1998. 913 Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, 1997, Section 11; SRO 742 (I) /93, 24 August 1993; and SRO 549(I)/2000, 8 August 2000. 914 Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, op.cit, Section 16. 915 Ibid, Section 12. 916 Ibid, Section 12 (3). 917 Ibid, Section 11-12. 918 Ibid, Section 14-15. 919 Ibid, Section 16.

298

governing discharges and emissions, IEE and EIA, and prohibitions on import of hazardous substances”920 is punishable with “a fine, which may extend to one million rupees, and if the contravention continues then a fine to the tune of one hundred thousand rupees on daily basis.”921 Penalties for those who repeat their environmental offences may also include closing or confiscating the facility, equipment, machinery or the material used in harming the environment; the concerned governmental authority may also order the offender to restore the environment and pay compensation for damage to property and health or any bodily harm.922

Regarding handling hazardous substances, PEPA “prohibits the generation, collection, consignation, transportation, treatment, disposal, importation, storing or handling of any hazardous substance without a license issued by the Federal Agency; and in such manner as may be contradictory to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, or any international treaty, convention, protocol, code, standard, agreement or other instrument to which Pakistan is a party.”923

7.7.1 National Environmental Quality Standards Rules, 2001 (Self-Monitoring and Reporting by Industry) This Act is meant for self-monitoring and reporting by industry to ensure National Environmental Quality Standards, by reducing discharge of liquid effluents and gaseous emissions in order to control environmental pollution. Under this instrument, all industries are required to submit correct Environmental Monitoring Reports to the concerned federal agency. 924 The Environmental Monitoring Report comprises of “a liquid effluents monitoring report and a gaseous emissions monitoring report.”925 And all measurements of the standards contained in the Environmental Monitoring Report should be based on test

920 Ibid, Section 11- 13. 921 Ibid, Section 17. 922 Ibid, Section 17(5). 923 Ibid, Section 14. 924 “National Environmental Quality Standards Rules- 200,” (Self-Monitoring and Reporting by Industry), Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, Section 3. 925 Ibid, Section 9 (1).

299

reports conducted by certified environmental laboratory.926 Sampling, testing and analysis of effluents, gaseous emissions and waste are to be carried out in accordance with the Environmental Samples Rules, 2001.927

7.7.2 Pakistan Environmental Samples Rules, 2001 These Rules permit authorized officers to inspect any premises and obtain samples of effluents or emissions. 928 These rules set the procedures for taking, storing and transporting samples, conducting Initial Environmental Estimation (IIE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The said IEE and EIA include public hearings, recording decisions and issuing notices. According to these Rules, an EIA is must for any project that may cause an “adverse environmental effect”.929 These Rules also specify the types of small-scale projects that require an IEE such as water treatment and supply installations, manufacturing and processing activities, waste disposal facilities, construction work, water management, etc.930 These rules specify various types of large projects that require an EIA, such as, mining, airports and railway installations, highway construction projects, etc.931 The projects have to be monitored after completion and the owners have to submit annual reports to the federal agency regarding operational activities with an emphasis on measures for mitigating the adverse environmental implications.932 Under these rules, the Federal Agency has the powers to cancel any project if the owner violates the conditions of the approval of the project, or submit false information to federal agency.933

The Rules are very comprehensive, but we need to develop our implementation capacity. For example, in Karachi several tanneries were discharging toxic effluents that were

926 Ibid, Section 9 (2). 927 Ibid, Section 10. 928 Environmental Samples Rules- 2001, Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, Section 4, and 7(1). 929 Ibid, Section 5(a). 930 Ibid, Schedule- I. 931 Ibid, Schedule- II. 932 Ibid, Section 18. 933 Ibid, Section 19.

300

causing harm to humans and the environment. Hence, in September 2003 the Sindh Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) issued ‘show-cause notices’ to the tanneries asking them to comply by national environmental laws. Subsequently, in May 2005 SEPA issued ‘Environmental Protection Order’ to the tanneries in question. But no follow-up implementation actions were taken. On 10 May 2007, SEPA took samples and found extreme toxicity in the industrial effluent; and lodged formal complaint against the tanneries in Environmental Tribunal. SEPA did not exercise its powers for four years in addressing harm to the environment; and subsequently, in January 2007 SEPA requested the Environmental Tribunal for the withdrawal of the complaints. On 17 January 2009, the Environmental Tribunal disposed off nine complaints against the tanneries in question, and identified the inefficiency of SEPA.934

7.8 Conclusion

Pakistan attaches very high importance to the effective implementation of the CWC and for this purpose has put in place comprehensive legislative and administrative measures. Pakistan has included obligations under Article-I and Article- IV of the CWC, which effectively incorporates the General Purpose Criteria (GPC) into national implementation law. Thus, Pakistan’s CWC implementation legislation is not limited to Schedule chemicals rather it also addresses the concerns of international terrorism and proliferation. This legislation enables requisite tracking of the domestic transfers of toxic and dual- use industrial chemicals. Moreover, it also enables National Authority to obtain complete and correct information from the chemical industry on activities declarable under the CWC.

Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance is a dedicated Act that gives effect to Pakistan’s obligations such as the CWC prohibitions of all kinds, penal provisions, extraterritorial application, import/ export controls, access to chemical industrial facilities

934 Mukhtar Alam, “Karachi: Environmental Tribunal Assails SEPA’s Performance,” DAWN, 24 January 2009.

301

or related facilities, enforcement power of the National Authority, etc. In addition to the prohibitions as specified in Article-I of the CWC. Pakistan also takes positive steps for preventing private individuals and non-governmental entities from engaging in prohibited activities. Pakistan’s administrative measure such as the CWC Implementation Rules2010 is also a dedicated instrument, which effectively prevents and redresses any breach of the CWC.

Pakistan is committed to preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, materials and their means of delivery. While safeguarding foreign policy interests and national security Pakistan as a responsible state is fully committed to fulfill its international obligations for enhancing international peace and security. Pakistan is implementing its export control policy in line with its obligations under CWC, BWC, CPPNM, and other multilateral arms control and disarmament treaties. It is Pakistan’s policy not to export or re-export goods and technologies that would contribute to the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

For the effective enforcement of CWC export controls, Pakistan has criminalized CWC prohibitions. Moreover, Pakistan has also implemented specific restrictions on transfer of Schedule chemicals to non-State Parties in the light of the CWC. The CWC Implementation Ordinance requires National Authority to monitor inside Pakistan transfers of all toxic chemicals and their precursors. Pakistan fully avail the OPCW capacity building programmes in various fields and has initiated an active outreach for educating Pakistan Customs Authorities regarding export control obligations under CWC and other multilateral arms control instruments.

Pakistan’s National Authority works closely with National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and thus collectively they undertake numerous activities such as verification activities, outreach to industry regarding national obligations, providing necessary training to industries and conduct international training as part of assistance to the OPCW and the States Parties to the CWC. Pakistan

302

National Authority is proactive in collecting CWC related data mainly from the declared industry of Pakistan and trade associations. However, it need to collect data from all relevant facilities regardless of their size and would thus actually confirm implementing the scope and applicability of the GPC. In this regard, the National Authority would require adequate technical expertise for professional analysis of declarations and data submitted by industry, trade associations and various organizations.

The technical experts would prove extremely beneficial in National Authority’s outreach activities for the chemical industry. For vitalizing the National Authority, placing it under Strategic Exports Control Division (SECDIV) could substantially improve its capacities in terms of skilled manpower, expertise, and its working. By doing so, all the control lists and the subjects of WMD related export control will come under one organization that will facilitate interaction and working with multilateral bodies and national stakeholders. Pakistan has comprehensive policies, legislations and implementing rules. But the problems of implementing legal and administrative instruments are faced throughout the country, which are caused by lack of coordination amongst relevant ministries and organizations. Since SECDIV has representation from almost all relevant ministries and organizations and experts in variety of arms control, disarmament and non- proliferation fields, and thereby the problem of coordination is addressed, which facilitates implementation of legal instruments. Resultantly, Pakistan’s National Authority on CWC would be suitably staffed, reorganized and supported, which would enable it to perform its regulatory and monitoring functions even more effectively.

CHAPTER 8

PAKISTAN’S CHEMICAL INDUSTRY: CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SAFETY AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The human imagination is imperative for foreseeing catastrophic incidents in the form of accidents, natural calamities and terrorist acts. An accident in a chemical industry

303

located in or adjacent to a population centre may cause thousands of fatal human casualties, loss of property and harm to the wider environment. Therefore, states are obliged to take comprehensive legislative and administrative measures for the safety and security of chemical industry. Such a realization and national measures are required especially in developing countries where industries are located in population centers and the national rules and regulations are not very effectively implemented. The preceding chapters manifests that Pakistan has adopted appropriate national measures for the safety and security of chemical industry as well as safeguarding human health and the environment.

Importantly, in Pakistan, there is marked difference between the safety and security standards of declared chemical industries and the Other Chemical Industries (OCIs). Therefore, for better and comprehensive analysis, this chapter discusses the safety and security standards and measures by both the declared chemical industry including related major enterprises of Pakistan, and the Other Chemical Industry (OCIs). Moreover, it analyses in detail national concerns and requirements for addressing issues related to chemical industry such as the misuse of fertilizers in Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) by the terrorists, smuggling concerns, environmental implications, issues regarding waste disposal, specialized treatment, etc.

8.1 Collection of Empirical Data

While collecting the empirical data and primary sources, the author concluded that Pakistan possesses a huge chemical industrial infrastructure, yet it lacks an objective analysis regarding the safety and security of the chemical industry. Therefore, for the sake of understanding the safety and security measures and standards at chemical industries in Pakistan; policies and national measures of various ministries and organizations; the concerns and views of various States and the OPCW; the author visited number of chemical industries throughout the country and abroad, various ministries and organizations of the Government of Pakistan, the OPCW, academic institutions, laboratories, transport

304

companies, at-risk communities, medical facilities, etc. A few important industries and organizations, which I visited for the collection of primary data are listed below:

Serial Place of Visit Meeting with Date

a. Engro Chemicals, Pakistan Top management of industry 2-5 Jun 2008 Ltd, Dharki including safety and security officers and plant operators. b. Dawood Hercules Ltd, Top management of industry 3 Nov 2009 Lahore including safety and security officers and plant operators. c. Pak- Arab Fertilizer, -do- 4 Nov 2009 Multan d. Fauji Fertilizer, Ghoth -do- 5 Nov 2009 Machi e. Engro Chemicals Pakistan Top management of industry 6 Nov 2009 Ltd, Daharki including safety and security officers and plant operators, medical officer, employees. f. Fauji Fertilizer Mirpur Top management of industry 6 Nov 2009 Mathelo including safety and security officers. g. Clariant Pakistan Limited, Top management of industry and 7 Nov 2009 Jamshoro plant operators h. Super Chemical Karachi Top management of industry and 8 Nov 2009 plant operators i. Chemi-Dyestuff, Hub Top management of industry and 9 Nov 2009 plant operators

j. Dynea Pakistan Limited, Top management of industry and 9 Nov 2009 Hub plant operators k. OPCW Headquarters, The Deputy Director General OPCW, 7-18 Apr Hague Mr Malik Azhar Elahi, Senior 2008 OPCW Policy Officer, OPCW Strategy and Policy Officer Mr Daniel Feaks, and delegates from various States Parties.

305

l. OPCW Laboratory & Management of laboratory 10 Apr 2008 Equipment Store in Rijswijk, The Netherland m Permanent Mission of Mrs. Kehkashan Azhar, Acting 16 Apr 2008 Pakistan to the OPCW, Permanent Representative The Hague of Pakistan n. Chemical Industry at Doha Middle level management of 23 Oct 2008 industry Dr. Violeta Artos, Senior Officer Industry Verification Branch of OPCW Mr V.B. Dhavle, Senior Officer Industry Verification Branch of OPCW o. Pak- Arab Fertilizer, Top management of industry 24- 28 Feb Multan including safety and security 2010 officers. p. Singapore National Director General Singapore 3 June 2010 Authority National Authority and Mr. Mark Alborn OPCW Head Implementation Support. q. Chemical Industry at Middle level management of 4 June 2010 Singapore industry r. Ittehad Chemicals Ltd, Middle level management of 1 Apr 2013 Kala Shah Kaku, Lahore industry. s. Chem- Bio Defence Cell Director CBDC 14 June 2013 (CBDC) Defence Science and Technology Organization (DESTO) Strategic Plans Division (SPD) t. Sardar Chemical Top management of industry 16 Aug 2013 Industries Ltd, Gadoon Amazai u. MB Dyes Chemical and Top management of industry 16 Aug 2013 Silk Industries (Pvt) Ltd, Gadoon Amazai

306

v. AJ Textile Mills, Gadoon Top management of industry and 16 Aug 2013 Amazai safety and security officers and plant operators w. Ink Chemicals, Gadoon Top management of industry 16 Aug 2013 Amazai x. Razar Chemical Top management of industry 17 Aug 2013 Industries, Gadoon Amazai y. University of Sussex, the Mr. Daniel Feaks 22 Apr 2007 U.K, Chem- Bio Research Cell z. Verification Research Dr Michael Crowley Former 23 Apr 2007 Training and Information Head VERTIC, Ms Angela Centre (VERTIC), London Woodword Programme Director for National Implementation Measures at VERTIC. aa. London School of Dr. Filippa Lentzos 27 Apr 2007 Economics bb. Social Security Hospital Medical staff 17 Aug 2013 Gadoon Amazai cc. Working Folks Grammar Staff of the school 17 Aug 2013 School & College Gadoon Amazai dd. Police Station Gadoon Police Non Commissioned 17 Aug 2013 Amazai officers and soldiers. SHO was committed on some duty. ee. Pakistan Strategic Exports Director General SECDIV 19 Sep 2013 Control Division ff. Chemical Laboratory at Ph.D and M.Phil scholars 6 Nov 2013 Chemistry Department, working in the laboratory Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad. gg. National Institute of Dr. Tahir Ameen, Director NIPS 6 Nov 2013 Pakistan Study (NIPS), QAU Islamabad. hh. Polykim Factory, Hattar Employees 27 Mar 2014

307

ii. Amber Chemicals Private Operator of control room and plant 27 Mar 2014 Limited, Hattar and middle level management of industry jj. Attock Chemicals Hattar Middle management 27 Mar 2014

kk. Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd, Top management and security 27 Mar 2014 Hattar staff ll. New Malik Enterprises Manager 28 Mar 2014 Goods Transport Company, Tarnol mm. Azam Transport Private Manager and drivers 28 Mar 2014 Limited, Tarnol nn. Galiat Hazara Goods Drivers 28 Mar 2014 Transport Company oo. Police Station Hattar Non- Commissioned Officers 27 Mar 2014

pp. Attock Petrolium ltd, Administrative officers and 28, 29 and 30 Rawalpindi security staff. However, despite Mar 2014 visiting three times, no proper visit was granted. qq. Pakistan Customs Senior officials June 2005 Authorities rr. National Logistics Cell Middle level officers Aug 2013

ss. Pakistan National Director General National June 2009, Authority on CWC Authority (NA) and Director NA Jan 2010, Aug 2010, Nov 2010, Sep 2013 tt. Strategic Plans Division Research analysts working on the 21 Aug 2013 (SPD) subject of CWC

uu. Ministry of Commerce Director General MoC and 6 Sep 2013 (MoC) Assistant Director Policy vv. Department of Chairperson DES, and Ph.D and 26 Mar 2014 Environmental Sciences M.Phil scholars (DES), Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

308

ww. At-risk communities in Shop keepers, residents, teachers, 8 Nov 2007 Karachi medical staff, policemen, drivers, etc. xx. At-risk communities in -do- 8 Nov 2007 Mirpur Mathelo yy. At-risk communities in -do- June 2009 Dharki zz. At-risk communities in -do- 14 Oct 2010 Rawalpindi aaa. At-risk communities in -do- 28 Feb 2010 Multan bbb. At-risk communities in -do- 4 April 2011 Lahore ccc. At-risk communities in -do- 3 Sep 2011 Haripur ddd. At-risk communities in -do- 1 Apr 2013 Kala Shah Kako eee. At-risk communities in -do- 17 Aug 2013 Gadoon Amazai fff. At-risk communities in -do- 27 Mar 2014 Hattar ggg. Chemistry Department, Chairperson Chemistry 28 Apr 2014 QAU, Islamabad Department

8.2 Declared Chemical Industry: Safety and Security

8.2.1 Safety Policy Declared chemical industries have meaningful Safety Policies. They have tried to cultivate safety culture by focusing on the aims and principles regarding safety for achieving the “zero incidents” goal and the safety objectives set by public authorities. 935 Based on this policy, the industry has developed detailed safety instructions. This policy

935 Author’s visit to Engro Chemicals Pakistan Ltd, Daharki, 6 November 2009; Fauji Fertilizer Mirpur Mathelo, 6 November 2009; Pak-Arab Fertilizer Multan, 24- 28 February 2010; Fauji Fertilizer Ghoth Machi, 5 November 2009.

309

is reviewed regularly and input from employees is also obtained during review of safety policies. In the light of safety policy, the management develops and regularly updates its safety programme with requisite input from employees. 936 Line management keep supervisors informed on safety matters and the senior management extends requisite support to the line management for safety-related actions. The development and implementation of the Safety Policy is integrated with other aspects of occupational safety, health and environmental protection, as part of a total risk management programme. It includes, inter alia, chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response measures.937

8.2.2 Security Policy A security effort works best when employees perceive it as an important element of the company’s mission. Employees are more likely to see security as a company priority if the company’s top management visibly supports security efforts such as including security as company’s core values and establish security policies, which are effectively implemented and reviewed. 938 Security is a natural outcome of the safety culture of chemical industry. By reducing risks of threats such as terrorism, violence at workplace, sabotage, etc; the security policy contributes to risk management and safety management.

Security policy just like safety policy safeguards the community, the wider environment, the employees and keep the industry operational and productive. The security policy includes risk assessment i.e. identifying assets that must be protected from any malicious act. The security policy directs the management of industry to work closely with law enforcement agencies and identify threats to vulnerable assets. The risk assessment at chemical industry is quite unique because a successful terrorist attack against chemical

936 Author’s meeting with Mr. Asfar Bilal, Director National Authority on CWC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, 8 November 2013. 937 Author’s visit to Fauji Fertilizer, Ghoth Machi, 5 November 2009; Clariant Pakistan Limited Jamshoro, 7 November 2009; Daud Hercules Ltd Lahore, 3 November 2009; Super Chemicals Karachi, 8 November 2009. 938 Author’s meeting with the Chief Executive of Engro Fertilizers Pakistan Limited, Dharki, 3 June 2008.

310

industry will have much greater consequences for the community. This realization does exist in the declared industry of Pakistan. That is why they follow comprehensive security polices.939

8.2.3 Safety Management System Safety management systems includes, inter alia, appropriate technology and establishing effective organizational structure e.g., procedures, education, training programmes, sufficient well-trained staff, and provision of necessary resources. Moreover, effective review and monitoring mechanism exist for the safety management systems. The Industry periodically monitors and review safety performance to determine how specific safety-related policies and decisions have been implemented and thus demonstrate commitment to safety, which also motivates employees.940 It also includes fundamental changes that would lower the impact of an accident or attack by making chemical processes inherently safer or by storing smaller amounts of hazardous materials onsite.”941

A large decentralized firm with many divisions will likely need some type of coordinating mechanism from top management to encourage investments in safety. For example, DuPont has a process safety management group that is responsible for making sure that all the different divisions in the firm follow appropriate procedures.942 Moreover, any change in infrastructure, procedures and policies is analyzed thoroughly, managed and monitored diligently. Management of industry co-operates with public authorities in

939 Author’s visit to Fauji Fertilizer, Goth Machi, 5 November 2009; Engro Chemicals Pakistan Ltd, 2- 5 June 2008; Daud Hercules Ltd Lahore, 3 November 2009; Fauji Fertilizer Ghoth Machi, 5 November 2009. 940 Author’s visit to Dawood Hercules Ltd, Lahore, Pakistan, 3 November 2009; Engro Chemicals Pakistan Ltd, 2- 5 June 2008; Chemi- Dyestuff, Hub. 941 Jeff Johnston, “New Voices for Plant Security,” Chemical and Energy News, Vol. 82, 22 November 2004, pp.51-53. 942 Howard Kunreuther, “The Weakest Link: Managing Risk Through Interdependent Strategies”, in Paul R. Kleindorfer and Yoram Wind eds., The Network Challenge: Strategy, Profit and Risk in an Interlinked World, (Wharton School Publishing, 2009), p.9.

311

meeting their responsibilities, and ensures that the contracted party incorporates safety related responsibilities in their policies. Moreover, all employees are trained and encouraged to wholeheartedly implement safety policies and practices.

8.2.4 Security Management System Chemical hazards evaluations are routinely performed in the chemical industry to answer questions: How likely is a chemical release? And how harmful would it be? These evaluations can subsequently be incorporated into a vulnerability assessment, which helps in understanding how attractive is the facility to terrorists. Process Hazard Analysis (PHAs) are often undertaken to evaluate the potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases, and major spills of chemicals. The PHAs focus on human actions, equipment failure, external factors, which helps in determining hazards and potential failure points. After evaluating the assets 943 then the security managers ascertain vulnerable assets.

The said procedure helps in judiciously allocating requisite resources. Intelligence on possible adversaries is vital for this analysis, which can be obtained from law enforcement agencies, neigbouring industry, research from open sources and community. Correlations of motivation, goals and targets help in identifying threat.944 It is essential to assess the physical factors that make a facility attractive. The physical factors are addressed by making the facility or location less attractive. The management strives to reduce the risk of terrorists exploiting available infrastructure for causing masseffect terrorism. This necessitates reducing risk at the industry and limiting vulnerabilities as much as possible.945 In the light of above-mentioned deliberations emergency response plans are formulated, which are examined through security audits conducted by security professionals.

943 In security terms, assets are broadly defined as people, information, and property. 944 Paul Baybutt, “Assessing Risks from Threats to Process Plants: Threat and Vulnerability Analysis”, Process Safety Progress, Vol.21, No. 4, December 2002, p.3. 945 Margaret E. Kosal, “Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce the Chemical Terror Threat”, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, September 2008, p.9.

312

8.2.5 Vulnerability Assessments The comprehensive risk assessment is conducted to identify assets to be protected, likely threats and the consequences, for example, if the ‘control room’ is not at secure place or not adequately physically protected or strict assess control not implemented. Then this is a significant vulnerability, which if exploited could cause the release of toxic gases into the atmosphere with obvious devastating consequences. To ascertain the attractiveness of the facility as terrorist target, and how harmful would be the chemical release? A Chemical Hazards Evaluation and Process Hazard Analysis are conducted to examine safety critical equipment, instruments, human actions, and external factors, which help determine potential failure points and hazards.946 This examination helps in evaluating the potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases, and major spills of chemicals.

To correctly understand the threat, necessary coordination is undertaken with the law enforcement agencies. Physical factors are assessed to reduce the risk of terrorists exploiting available infrastructure or toxic industrial chemicals for an attack on industry. However, the vulnerability of transportation of chemicals needs improvement. 947 Mitigation assessment is conducted for mitigating the effects of released chemicals in case of an accident. However, communication with the local community regarding risks and hazards and response to accidents is not good enough.948 Declared chemical industries train security experts and conduct security audits for ascertaining whether the security policies and measures in place are appropriate or requires improvements.949

8.2.6 Safety and Security Culture

946 Author’s visit to Engro Chemicals Pakistan Ltd, Daharki, 2- 5 June 2008; Fauji Fertilizer Mirpur Mathelo, 6 November 2009; Pak- Ara Fertilizer Multan, 24- 28 February 2010. 947 Author’s observation during field visits throughout the country. 948 Author’s visit to Hattar Industrial Estate, 27 March 2013 and villages at Dharki, 2-5 June 2008, Kala Shah Kako Lahore, 1 April 2013; Gadoon Amazai, 17 August 2013. 949 Author’s visit to Pak- Arab Fertilizer, Multan, 24- 28 February 2010; Fauji Fertilizer, Goth Machi, 5 November 2009; Engro Chemicals Pakistan Ltd, 2- 5 June 2008; Daud Hercules Ltd Lahore, 3 November 2009.

313

The management makes concerted effort for creating a culture of safety and security at the workplace by setting personal examples and meticulously following and enforcing safety and security policies and procedures. Safety and security are emphasized as company missions.950 In this context, the top management visibly supports security efforts such as establishing comprehensive security policies, which are effectively implemented and reviewed. 951 Moreover, the management of industry works closely with federal, provincial and local law enforcement agencies to remain aware of the prevailing security situation and potential threats to facility. Two-way communication system is established for effective communication between the management and employees at all levels. Moreover, formal Safety Committees are established for consultations between the management and labour.952 The management provides specific safety training, requisite support and necessary resources to Safety Committees.953

8.2.7 Incident Reporting and Analysis The declared chemical industry maintains detailed records of security incidents, and analyzes various trends.954 This helps in identifying issues of security concern. Managers have established several channels for incident reporting such as the phone number of the concerned officials are circulated; anonymous employee hot lines are established for reporting suspicions; and it has been made obligatory for employees to report security incidents. The safety and security culture developed in Pakistan’s declared chemical industry enable employees to openly discuss shortcomings in safety and security measures.

950 Engro Fertilizer Pakistan Limited Dharki has achieved level 4 of the DuPont Safety Management System. To achieve world class safety management system, Engro has aligned its safety policy with DuPont standards since 2003. Refer Engro site www.engro.com. 951 Author’s observations during visit to declared chemical industries such as Engro Chemicals Pakistan Limited, Pak-Arab Fertilizer, Clariant Pakistan Ltd, Jamshoro, etc. 952 Author’s interview of Mr. Muhammad Shahid, a Plant Operator of Fatima Fertilizer Company Limited, Rahim Yar Khan, 31 March 2014. 953 Author’s visit to Pak-Arab Fertilizer, Multan, 4 November 2009; Engro Fertilizers Ltd, Dharki, 2-5 June 2008; Fauji Fertilizer Goth Machi and Fauji Fertilizer Mirpur Mathelo, 5-6 November 2009; Daud Hercules Ltd Lahore, 3 November 2009; Pak-Arab Fertilizer, Multan, 4 November 2009. 954 Author’s visit to Fauji Fertilizer Goth Machi, 5 November 2007; Fauji Fertilizer Goth Machi, 5 November 2009; Daood Hercules Ltd Lahore, 3 November 2009, Sardar Chemical Industries Limited Gadoon Amazai, 16 August 2013.

314

This attitude enables timely remedial measures by the management and constant improvement. Moreover, proper emergency response and crisis management exists for preventing an intrusion or attack. In this regard, comprehensive emergency response plans and emergency response communication system are developed.955

8.2.8 Safety Training and Education Management of industry provides appropriate education and training to all employees including temporary employees.956 The education covers hazard identification, risk evaluation and prevention, actions in emergency situation, etc. Safety is part of initial induction training and subsequently regular refresher training and education is imparted. 957 Moreover, input from the labourers’ representatives is also sought when formulating safety training programmes and syllabus. Simulator training is also provided for learning corrective actions of modern system operations. Training is imparted in group form which helps in developing team spirit and positive group behavior. By doing so the staff at various managerial levels understands each other tasks and responsibilities. Managers are trained to implement appropriate measures in the event of an emergency. The managers are trained in safety leadership, safety and health analyses, accident investigation and reporting. Mock emergency situations are depicted for practicing emergency response by the managers. Such trainings are followed by an incisive debriefing sessions. Moreover, an up-to-date record is maintained of all safety-related training for all employees. 958

8.2.9 Access Control

955 Author’s visit to Fauji Fertilizers, Ghoth Machi, 5 November 2009; and Engro Chemicals Ltd, Dharki, 6 November 2009. Clariant Pakistan Limited Jamshoro, 7 November 2009. 956 Author’s visit to Engro Fertilizers Pakistan Ltd, Daharki, 6 November 2007; Fauji Fertilizer, Mirpur Mathelo, 6 November 2009; Super Chemical Karachi, 8 November 2009. 957 Author’s interview of Mr. Muhammad Shahid, a Chemical Plant Operator at Fatima Group, op.cit.

958 Author’s visit to Engro Chemicals Pakistan Ltd, 2-5 June 2008; Daood Hercules Limited Lahore, 3 November 2009; Clariant Pakistan Limited Jamshoro, 7 November 2009.

315

The declared chemical industries have established comprehensive entry- exit system for controlling the entry and exit of vehicles and personnel. The credentials of visitors are thoroughly checked and processed at appropriate level before permitting the visit.959 Various security measures are taken such as, only authorized access is permitted and entry of vehicles and visitors are subjected to search. Visitors fill up their particulars in a log book and they are searched and escorted. Particular attention is paid to access control at loading and unloading areas. A system specifies the type of transport to enter at which gates, under what conditions and at what times. To maintain an audit trail of entry/ exit, mostly an electronic card access control system at main entrances, telecommunication rooms, control rooms and server rooms has been installed. Closedcircuit television system is installed for monitoring key areas and restricted areas. A system of property passes has been instituted for taking out personal items from the site and a system of employee photo ID badges is implemented.960

8.2.10 Safe Storage of Chemicals Procedures are established at storage facilities to minimize the risks of accidents and prevent degradation of hazardous substances and packages. The declared industry strictly follows all relevant legislative requirements and applicable codes of practice for the safe storage of hazardous substances. To prevent fires and explosions, consideration are given to whether the conditions of storage create special risks e.g. temperatures and pressures. Moreover, potential sources of ignition are strictly avoided. Storage plan is periodically analyzed, kept up-to-date and made easily accessible to employees, labour representatives and emergency responders. 961 Incompatible substances are segregated. The management strive for fool-proof measures to minimize the possibility of deliberate releases e.g. terrorism and sabotage; the management also designate certain areas to which access is strictly controlled. Written standard operating procedures and safety instructions

959 Author’s experience at Attock Petroleum Limited, Rawalpindi on 28 and 29 March 2014. 960 Author observed these aspects to varying degrees in all declared chemical industries but especially at Engr Fertilizers Ltd and Fauji Fertilizer Limited, Mirpur Mathelo and Goth Machi, 5- 6 November 2009. 961 Author’s observed this aspect at all visited declared chemical industries.

316

accompany new products, processes or equipment before they are handed over from one department to another, this enables knowledge/ experience to pass on.

8.2.11 Safety Reporting by Industry Industry submits its projected activities to the public authority in advance, and periodically thereafter. Public authorities need to have sufficient qualified and trained staff for analyzing the declarations of industry and providing suitable guidance. Moreover, the declared chemical industry maintains records of accidents and near-misses, but the public authorities do not maintain a national database for such incidents and nearmisses. This report should be reviewed regularly including review by Public Authorities and should, inter alia, include surrounding area e.g. sensitive environments, the population and activities; on-site emergency plans, including the relationship with off-site plans and communication arrangements; and co-ordination with emergency response personnel. Moreover, the public authorities and the management of industry must strive to address safety matters at priority; because most often delay in undertaking minor repairs have caused major industrial accidents.

8.2.12 Land Use Planning Chemical industry is not appropriately separated by appropriate distances from other installations and developments for mitigating the adverse effects of toxic releases, fires, and explosions. 962 Public authorities partially implement land-use planning arrangements for ensuring that new hazardous installations are suitably sited for protecting health, environment, and property. During my visit to Sardar Chemicals Ltd Gadoon Amazai, it was observed that the medical facility and school were located within few hundred meters from the said industry. Similarly, most of the declared chemical industries such as, Pak-Arab Fertilizer Multan, Dawood Hercules Limited Lahore, Super

962 Author’s visit to at-risk localities in Multan, 24- 28 February 2010; Gadoon Amazai, 17 August 2013; Jamshoro, 7 November 2007; Karachi, 8 November 2007; Lahore, 3 November 2007.

317

Chemical Karachi, Chemical Dyestuff Hub, etc are located in thickly populated areas. The public authorities should ensure that proper land use planning is implemented and must prevent inappropriate subsequent residential or other developments near industry.

8.2.13 Disaster Management The declared chemical industries have comprehensive disaster management plans. Dedicated officers are responsible to identify every possible scenario and formulate efficient responses. To prevent any accident and be able to handle any chemical disaster, they have comprehensive incident investigation procedures, control of critical devices and systems, safety regulations, disaster management, emergency plans and internal and external audit of safety, etc. In case of any accident, the management of industry and public authorities will activate their emergency plans with an aim to localize and contain the accident.963 The emergency managers would continuously obtain information and advice from the management of the industry, medical, technical experts and response personnel on how best to manage the emergency. Based on the likely exposure, the emergency managers would decide whether the potentially affected public should shelter indoors or be evacuated.964 The immediate response decisions would be based primarily on the need to protect people from acute toxic effects.

8.2.14 Leading Safety Indicators Mostly DuPont system is being implemented. 965 This system warrants that management has to continuously dedicate time to improve safety by using leading safety indicators. This system also requires technical improvement, excellent house keeping, development of technical facilities and training of technical persons; critically monitoring quality of meetings, decisions and their subsequent implementation. Industrial hygienists

963 Author’s visit to Super Chemical Karachi, 8 November 2009; Pak-Arab Fertilizers Multan, 24- 28 February 2010; Dynea Pakistan Limited Hub, 9 November 2009. 964 John Sorensen, Barry Shumpert, Barbara Vogt, “Planning Protective Action Decision- Making: Evacuate or Shelter-in-Place?” ORNL/TM-2002/144, June 2002, p.12. 965 Author’s visit to Fauji Fertilizers Mirpur Mathelo, 6 November 2009; and Engro Chemicals Pakistan Ltd, Daharki, 2-5 June 2008.

318

use environmental monitoring and analytical methods to detect the extent of workers exposures and implement control measures for controlling the potential health hazards. The industries have acquired third party certifications, such as ISO certification for environmental management system, environmental excellence awards, and notably the latest certification from ESHA (Environmental Safety and Health Affairs). 966 Declared industry also follows OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration).

8.2.15 Documentation and Hygiene Comprehensive records of every activity are maintained and critically evaluated. It includes scheduled maintenance record, process analysis record, daily production record, etc. The stocks of every chemical are precisely maintained with the help of both computers and bin cards.967 Moreover, the management of industry fully understands that adequately safeguarding information and documents will contribute to the overall safety and security. To protect trade secrets, the management of industry undertakes certain measures such as they strictly protect process flow diagrams, formulations, instrument and piping designs and recipes.

Managers identify critical information, and then conduct threat analysis to identify the group or person who has the desire and capability to acquire sensitive information and thus use it for releasing toxic gases in the environment or help in attacking the facility or help in stealing products. Subsequently, the managers conduct vulnerability analysis for correctly identifying the vulnerabilities; and how would the adversary gather information that would be used for exploiting the weakness. In the light of above-mentioned analysis, the risk is assessed and countermeasures are taken for the safeguard of information and

966 Author’s visit to Fauji Fertilizer Mirpur Mathelo, 6 November 2009; Engro Chemicals’ Dharki, 2-5 June 2008; Pak-Arab Fertilizer Multan, 24- 28 February 2010. 967 Author’s visit to Dynea Pakistan Ltd, Hub, Baluchistan, 9 November 2009.

319

documents. 968 Moreover, special attention is paid to occupational health and safety management system.969 It encompasses regular vaccinations, upkeep of sanitation, health and hygiene related lectures, etc.

8.2.16 Community’s Right to Know Communities in the vicinity of hazardous installations are mostly unaware of the risks of accidents and response measures in the event of an accident. 970 The risk communication between the industry and the community also needs to be developed. In this connection, communities have not selected their representatives for communicating their concerns and feedback to the public authorities and industry. Featuring a multiple variable approach to risk communication study, if the industry is not responsive to community needs regarding their awareness of facility security efforts, area residents are likely to oppose rather than support these facilities, will be less aware of proper security measures for an emergency, and less likely to behave as desired.971

During the 1980s, iconic toxic methyl isocyanate gas spill in Bhopal, India, and the oil tanker Exxon Valdez running aground in Alaska, highlighted the role of risk communication as an integral part of strategic preparation and crisis response. The lack of strategic risk management and communication caused many people to distrust and even oppose chemical industry. It prompted federal legislators at the U.S. to create the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Acts of 1986 (SARA), which included community right-to-know provisions (SARA Title III). SARA Title- III gives the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) oversight of risk communication efforts related

968 Author’s visit to Engro Chemicals’ Pakistan Limited, Dharki, 6 November 2009; Fauji Fertilizers Mirpur Mathelo, 6 November 2009; Pak-Arab Fertilizers, 24- 28 February 2010. 969 Author’s meeting with the Chief Executive of Engro Fertilizers Pakistan Ltd, Dharki, 6 November 2009; and General Manager of Sardar Chemical Industries Ltd, Gadoon Amazai, 16 August 2013. 970 Author’s visit to all industries listed above in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan. 971 Michael J Palenchar, Robert L Heath and Emily Dunn, “Terrorism and Industrial Chemical Production: Contemporary Implications for Risk Communication”, Paper presented at the Eighth International Public Relations Research Conference, held at The Institute for Public Relations, Gainesville, 10-13 March 2005, p.3.

320

to the formation of Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC) in communities near high-risk industries.972 In fact, the sense of risk arises from normal concerns about the probability that a risk could occur that would cause damage to people or the environment. It became better understood after Three-Mile Island.973

8.2.17 Field Exercises Response to an emergency encompasses variety of activities and large number of national and international response agencies gets involved. Their operations and activities require meticulous planning, preparation and coordination, which are put to test during field exercises. Field exercises are not sufficiently conducted both for accidents and terrorist act on the chemical facility and during transportation. National Disaster Management Authority conducted an exercise at Engro Chemicals Ltd Dharki in 2010 but it did not involve important stakeholders such as public authorities, health and medical officials, local community, NGOs, media, etc. Moreover, the exercise was restricted to inside the facility and focused on controlling the release of toxic chemicals only. The community and public authorities are usually not involved in such disaster management exercises.974

8.2.18 Role of Academic and Research Institutions The academic and research institutions could contribute constructively to chemical accident preventions. In this context, they could adopt various techniques, procedures or codes of conduct at the institutions. Ironically, students are not adequately motivated in universities for undertaking research in chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response. Furthermore, academia and research centers do not provide independent analysis, research and development (R&D) support, and educational programmes regarding prevention, preparedness and response to chemical accidents. Dr. Riffat N. Malik pointed

972 William Leiss, “Three Phases in the Evolution of Risk Communication Practice”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol.545, May 1996, pp. 85-94. 973 V. T. Covello, “Risk communication: An Emerging Area of Health Communication Research”, In S. A. Deetz, ed., Communication Yearbook, Vol.15, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992) pp. 359-373.

974 Author’s interview of Mr. Muhammad Shahid, Chemical Plant Operator, op.cit, 6 November 2009.

321

out that: “The academic institutions are producing nothing regarding the safety and security of chemical industry and the environmental implications for the undergraduate and graduate students and teachers, journalists, lawmakers, and first responders.”975

Chemical risk assessment and chemical hazard assessment studies and chemical life cycle management issues are not part of the university curricula.976 In a meeting Dr. Amin Badshah, Chairman Chemistry Department mentioned “the lack of requisite resources for chemical safety and security is the main cause of insufficient safety and security measures at institutional level.” 977 He cited attending an international workshop on safety and security and appreciated that opportunity of learning and subsequently taking requisite safety and security measures at his department, and transferring that knowledge to students and faculty. It is felt that the national authorities and the Ministry of Education ought to provide such capacity building opportunities to the heads and faculty of chemistry, international relations, defence and strategic studies, international law, chemical engineering, etc.

8.3 Other Chemical Industry (OCI): Safety & Security Puzzles

8.3.1 Occupational Safety and Hygiene There is a marked absence of engineering and other occupational safety and hygiene control measures in Other Chemical Industry (OCI) and the concept of substitution is unpopular. Majority of OCIs possess very little fire fighting capacity. 978 Ventilation systems are inadequate. Proper personal protective equipment is almost nonexistent e.g. in some OCIs workers use car tire tubes for protecting foot, as improvised personal protective

975 Author’s meeting with Dr Riffat N. Malik, Chairperson Department of Environmental Sciences, Quaid- iAzam University, Islamabad, 26 March 2014. 976 Author’s meeting with PhD and MPhil scholars of Chemistry Department, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 6 November 2013. 977 Author’s meeting with Dr. Amin Badshah, Chairman Department of Chemistry, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 28 April 2014. 978 Author’s visits to Amber Chemicals Private Limited, Hattar, 27 March 2014; Polykim Factory, Hattar, 27 March 2014; MB Dyes Chemical and Silk Industries (Pvt) Limited, Gadoon Amazai, 16 August 2013; Ink Chemicals Gadoon Amazai, 16 August 2013; Razar Chemical Industries, Gadoon Amazai, 17 August 2013.

322

equipment. The use of lotions and barrier creams for protection against the effects of solvents is non-existent.979

OCIs have inadequate first aid and fire fighting facilities. With few exceptions, air monitoring is unknown. Majority of OCIs are without any established social security systems.980 For example, producing a batch of solvent ink entails mechanical mixing of ink pigment powder, mono or mixture organic solvent, resin and antifoaming agents. During this process, workers are exposed to appreciable levels of powder and solvent vapours. National legislation regarding safety and health of workers is inadequate. Moreover, national occupational safety policies do not exist.981 Therefore, there is lack of training and sensitization on safety aspects especially in OCIs.

8.3.2 Environmental Damage Chemical liquids, solids, gases and fumes are released to the environment that damage and pollute cultivable land, water sources and thus harming health of plants, humans and animals. Industrial waste is thrown in broken ground just beside the roads and residential areas. 982 Most of the industrial chemicals used by OCIs are packaged in plastic containers which are corrosion proof. People use these empty containers for the storage and carriage of water and foodstuffs.983 This in-turn contaminates food and water with adverse health effects both in long-term and short-term. In larger cities, chemicals are sold in markets such as cereals and grocery items.984 The chemicals sold in such markets include

979 Author’s visit to Polykim Factory, Hattar, 27 March 2014. 980 Author’s visit to Amber Chemicals Private Limited, Hattar and Polykim Factory, Hattar, 27 March 2014. 981 “National Capacity Assessment of Pakistan for Implementation of Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management (SAICM),” Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, November 2009, p.17. 982 Author’s visit to Hattar Industrial Estate, 27 March 2014. 983 Author’s observation in the communities of Lahore, Rawalpindi, Karachi, Hattar, Kharian, etc. 984 Author’s visit to Lahore, 1- 3 July 2012.

323

toxic and flammable materials that pose grave dangers to residents, general public and the immediate environment.985

The discharge of untreated chemical wastes from tanneries into the environment defies human imagination. The toxic industrial waste such as heavy metals enters the food chain and drinking water supply that eventually causes serious diseases in the residents of Sialkot and surrounding areas.986 Moreover, in OCIs the workers are neither educated nor informed regarding the hazards posed by the chemicals they work with. This can also be attributed to poverty, illiteracy and inadequate capacities of law enforcement agencies.987

8.3.3 Textile Dyeing This industry uses variety of chemicals including dyes and pigments, flammable and explosive solvents, bleaching agents, acids and alkalis. The dyes include certain chemicals that are hazardous to human skin, some Azo colouring agents have carcinogenic and mutagenic properties. Most of the dyes used in Pakistan textile industry are Azo dyes.988 During this process, chemicals are manually mixed and thus workers gets exposed to harmful chemicals. Liquid waste from industry is usually discharged into the municipal sewers. The open drains of municipality when blocked cause spillage in the vicinity and consequently on numerous occasions have damaged the limbs of children.

An example can be the Sindh Industrial Estate (SITE), which houses about 300 small and medium factories, and is without hazardous waste disposal mechanism. On daily basis, it generates almost 180 tonnes of both hazardous and non-hazardous waste, which is dumped outside on open plots and land depressions. Just to quote one incident, a chemical factory dumped hazardous waste on an open plot in a residential area, which caused many serious and minor injuries to children when they came in contact with the hazardous waste.

985 Author’s visit to Sialkot, 8- 9 March 2013. 986 Qaiser Mahmood, et al., “Toxic Chromium from Tanneries Pollute Water Resources and Soils of Sialkot (Pakistan),” Chemical Society of Pakistan, Vol. 32, No. 5, May 2010, p.1. 987 National Capacity Assessment of Pakistan for Implementation of Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management (SAICM), op.cit, p.19. 988 Author’s meeting with the management of A.J. Textile Mills, Gadoon Amazai, 16 August 2013.

324

Of the injured children, one died in April 2006 and another badly injured boy lost his both legs, which had to be amputated. 989 The hazardous waste contained toxic chemicals such as Calcium Sulphate, Aluminum Silicate, Magnesium Hydroxide and Phosphorous Pentoxide.990

8.3.4 Storage of Chemicals In OCIs, no procedures are followed for preventing degradation of hazardous substances. The legislative requirements for the safe storage of chemicals are not followed.991 In fact, proper storage facilities do not exist and the storage facilities are not inspected by the public authorities. Chemical containers are not properly labeled. Majority of the OCIs such as pesticides formulators store enough chemicals for few weeks use on the premises during peak seasons. Such storage faculties are devoid of any health and safety measures.992 Moreover, OCIs pack their industrial chemicals in corrosion proof and very hard plastic containers. Such features of the containers encourage people to use them for storage of water and foodstuffs, which have serious health effects.

8.3.5 Waste Disposal OCIs generate huge quantity of hazardous waste. The unattended chemical waste dumping sites scatter all over the country and are considerable risk to the public health and the environment. The data related to obsolete chemical stocks, chemical waste site, and contaminated areas in general does not exist or not provided by the relevant stakeholders. There are no chemical waste disposal facilities in the country.993 The information about these facilities could not be collected due to non- availability of database. The capacities of

989 Mukhtar Alam, “Sindh Industrial Estate (SITE) Lacks Safe Disposal for Hazardous Waste,” DAWN, 3 March 2010. 990 Ibid. 991 Author’s visit to Ambar Chemical Industries (Private) Limited, Hattar, 27 March 2014. 992 Author’s visit to Sialkot, 8- 9 March 2013.

993 Author’s meeting with Dr Abda Farooqi, Department of Environmental Sciences, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 26 March 2014.

325

existing waste recycling facilities are not known. The national capacity for data collection on production, storage, transport, use and waste disposal of chemicals is generally low. Technical infrastructure for recycling and recovery as well as for disposal of chemicals in the country is at a very low profile. There is no sustainable monitoring mechanism for emissions from waste storage sites. Overall Pakistan has a poor capacity for data acquisition of chemical waste production, storage, recycling and monitoring.

OCIs often abandon toxic chemicals, e.g. a Pakistani NGO named the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) noticed a dilapidated DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) factory in Nowshera, KPK. This factory is located near Kabul River that provides drinking water to more than 800,000 people. The SDPI in collaboration with researchers from Peshawar University studied soil, water and abandoned bags of chemicals in the DDT factory. The results revealed widespread contamination in the factory and surrounding area.994 SDPI raised the matter with local authorities and successfully proposed that clean-up of the site be added to Pakistan’s activities under national implementation of Stockholm Convention.

8.3.6 Public Authorities Public authorities do not effectively and regularly inspect and enforce safety measures in chemical industry. The public authorities does not ensure that the management of industry keep public informed regarding potential risks from the hazard in their area and related safety measures.61 Public Authorities does not assist OCIs in developing safety programmes and entering into cooperative arrangements with larger industries and associations.995 Since OCIs have a less formal operating structure and fewer resources, therefore, such collaborative arrangements would economize on efforts and resources and

994 Mahmood A. Khwaja, M. Rasul Jan, and Kashif Gul, Physical Verification and Study of Contamination in and Around an Abandoned DDT Factory in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) Pakistan, May 2006. 61 Author’s visit to Gadoon Amazai, 17 August 2014. 995 Author’s visit to National Authority on CWC, 5 September 2012; Lahore, 1-3 July 2013, Sialkot, 8-9 March 2013 and Gadoon Amazai, 17 August 2013.

326

also contribute to the interconnected security. Moreover, public authorities should provide opportunities for dialogue amongst stakeholders e.g. industry, public authorities, media and the public. This will help in mutual learning regarding various hazard scenarios and appropriate response in the event of an emergency.

8.3.7 Land Use Planning OCIs are not separated by appropriate distance from other installations and residential areas for preventing and mitigating adverse effects of toxic releases, fires and explosions.996 Public authorities hardly implement land use planning arrangements for ensuring that OCIs are properly sited for safeguarding health, environment and property. In Sialkot, large numbers of industries are located inside residential colonies. As a result, the waste is disposed in normal sewerage and the noise and fumes further contaminates the environment. In this context, the socio-economic factors play a dominant role, e.g. the Government of Punjab has allocated land for establishing an exclusive tannery zone outside Sialkot. But, the owners of tanneries and the local people are not very keen to move their business to a new location due to financial implications. Moreover, the law enforcement agencies also do not adequately assert their authority mostly due to lack of capacity, political considerations and sluggish judicial system.

8.3.8 Voluntary Safety and Security Measures Larger industries have initiated non- regulatory safety and security programmes. But, unlike large size industries, the OCIs lack requisite resources and expertise for undertaking such programmes. In this connection, the OCIs need the assistance of larger enterprises and public authorities. Moreover, for addressing the resource constraints, the development of the culture of safety and security is very important for OCIs. This culture is required throughout the country, but it is dependent on the overall literacy level and general awareness of masses. When the public would demand for their right to safety and

996 Author’s visit to Sialkot, 8- 9 March 2013 and Kala Shah Kako, 1 April 2013.

327

security from the harmful effect of OCIs then the government will have to take necessary measures. On the contrary, when the public is silent and only concerned about making daily earning and worst still if their representatives in the legislation making are silent; then the culture of safety and security may not flourish as desired. Once public authorities will demand safety and security of the communities and the wider environment, and in this process create certain incentives and disincentives then the OCIs will also resort to voluntary safety and security measures for earning the good will in the community and also at national and international levels. In this context, the NGOs can prove very fruitful role in raising general awareness and educating masses to ask for their due rights of safe and secure working conditions and living environment.

8.4 Safety and Security of Chemical Industry: National Concerns and Requirements

8.4.1 Waste disposal The major chemical wastes are generated by chemical industry, hospitals, laboratories, port and shipping, community and agriculture sectors. The unattended dumping sites of chemical waste are spread throughout the country. They are posing considerable risk to the public health and the environment. But, there is no chemical waste disposal facility in the country.997 The data related to obsolete chemical stocks, chemical waste site, and contaminated areas in general does not exist or not provided by the relevant stakeholders. The national capacity for data collection on chemical production, transport, use, storage, and waste disposal is generally low. Technical infrastructure for recycling and recovery as well as for disposal of chemicals in the country is at a very low profile. There is no sustainable monitoring mechanism for emissions from waste storage sites. Overall Pakistan has weak capacity for data acquisition of chemical waste, storage, recycling and monitoring, which are essential for proper waste management in the country.998

997 Author’s meeting with Dr Abda Farooqi, op.cit. 998 Ibid.

328

In the above-mentioned context, let’s take the example of the Hattar Industrial Estate located at district Haripur, Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa (KPK). It has 184 functional small, medium and large size industries such as chemical industry, textile mills, food processing industries, leather industry, etc. Moreover, 91 units are closed and 69 are under- construction. These plants have no waste treatment facilities, and the hazardous waste is discharged in Jhar, Noro and Dojal Nullahs. This hazardous industrial waste then passes through more than 100 villages of Haripur and Attock districts. The waste also gets absorbed in cultivated lands, thus the toxic waste enters the food chain.

Approximately 20 percent of the local community is facing health problems such as, lungs, stomach, kidney, bones and skin diseases. 999 The Sarhad Development Authority must strictly enforce National Environmental Quality Standards (NEQS) on relevant industries, ensure that every hazardous industry has waste treatment facility and promote awareness of workers and local community regarding safeguarding from adverse effects of hazardous material.1000

8.4.2 Misuse of Fertilizers in Improvised Explosive Devices The fertilizers could be used for developing Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). The transnational terrorists’ organizations have been using fertilizers for IED. For instance, Lieutenant General Michael D. Barbero, Director Pentagon’s Joint Improvised Explosive Devices Defeat Organization told the Senate hearing that virtually all of Ammonium Nitrate1001 found in Afghanistan has come from Pakistan.1002 General Barbero stated:

999 Raham Ghaffar, “Plotting Techniques of Hattar Industrial Estate and its Environmental Implications,” Environmental News, 8 December 2012, pp.1-5. 1000 Ibid. 1001 Ammonium Nitrate was the main component in the 1995 Oklahoma city bombing. 1002 When Calcium Ammonium Nitrate is processed and mixed with fuel oil, this fertilizer becomes a deadly explosive. The Department of Defence (DoD) officials estimated that a 110 pounds bag of Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) yields about 82 pounds of explosive material, and this small amount can destroy an armoured vehicle. Refer: “IEDs and Pakistani Fertilizers,” Think Defence, 16 July 2012, p.1.

329

“IED events increased 80 percent, from 9,300 in 2009 to 16,800 in 2011. IEDs remain the leading cause of civilian, military and law enforcement casualties in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. More than 60 percent of U.S. combat casualties in Afghanistan, both killed and wounded in action, are a result of IEDs. During 2012, 1874 U.S. casualties were caused by IEDs…Pakistan has a significant and growing IED challenge that threaten its own soldiers and populace. As of November 2012, there have been more than 926 IED attacks inside Pakistan, resulting in excess of 3,700 casualties.1003 Fertilizer based explosives still remain our greatest challenge in Afghanistan. Today, more than 85 percent of IEDs employed against coalition forces are Home Made Explosives (HME) and of these, about 70 percent are made with Ammonium Nitrate derived from Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN).”10041005 Robert P. Casey a Democrat from Pennsylvania said the “IEDs incidents have increased in Afghanistan. The flow of chemicals coming from across the border has not diminished.” The proper and well regulated use of fertilizers is in the interest of Pakistan.1006 Casey said “IEDs had killed 2,395 people inside Pakistan during 2011.1007 This requires restrictions on the sale of Ammonium Nitrate and a national monitoring mechanism that monitors the sale, distribution and use of chemicals. To evade border guards, the factories dye Ammonium Nitrate, and disguise it as detergent due to milky white colour. This necessitates capacity building of border guards and customs officials. To address the misuse of Ammonium Nitrate, the Pentagon officials are working closely with the Pakistan government and representatives of the industry producing CAN. 1008 Moreover, the illegal traffic of banned chemicals especially pesticides through border movement is a major concern. Some mechanism need to be developed for control of illegal traffic, and capacity building of law enforcing agencies and custom department.

8.4.3 Environmental Implications

1003 Worldwide IED Database, Institute for Defence Analysis, 1 January 2012 through 13 November 2012. 1004 Lieutenant General Michael D. Barbero “Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs,” 13 December 2012, pp.2- 1005 . 1006 In Pakistan, Ammonium Nitrate (AN) is produced by Pak-Arab Fertilizers Multan and Fatima Group.

1007 AFP, “US Presses Pakistan on Bomb Fertilizer,” DAWN, 14 December 2012. 1008 Michael D. Barbero, op.cit, p.2.

330

Large quantities of water are used in the chemical industry for process cooling and washing. The untreated water causes contamination. Unplanned urbanization and industrial growth in urban population centres such as Karachi, Lahore, Gujranwala, Sialkot, etc has created huge environmental problems. Large quantities of industrial and sewage wastes find their ways either into the air or natural water bodies. All the big cities are situated at the banks of the rivers. Thus, they dump their liquid and solid industrial wastes directly into their water bodies. Due to open dumping of industrial/ municipal wastes the underground quality of water, near and in the big cities is deteriorating with the passage of time. In Urban areas, about 50 percent of the water is obtained from wells and bore holes. Due to changing patterns of monsoon, the dependence on ground water is constantly increasing. This is particularly true for Pakistan, which is water stressed. In Pakistan, the water scarcity is aggravating due to non-development of water sources and several droughts.

The quality of water in major cities such as Karachi, Lahore, Gujrat, Peshawar, Faisalabad, Sialkot and Sheikhupura are constantly deteriorating because of unchecked disposal of untreated industrial wastewater and excessive use of fertilizers and insecticides. The groundwater and surface water of Sialkot has been degraded due to industrial waste that is discharged improperly. The tanneries alone discharge approximately 1.1 million liters of untreated effluents per day.1009 Almost all the industries discharge huge amount of polluted amount with dissolved toxic substances into nearby ponds, agricultural lands, rivers, streams, open ditches, and plots. Toxic effluents percolate into the soil that pollute and contaminate sources of water supplies. Industrial waste dumping sites and flooding during monsoon further contribute to contamination. In Sialkot, there are 248 tanneries functioning. These tanneries have been established without proper system of waste disposal and land use planning. Most of the tanneries are functioning along Sialkot-

1009 Rizwan Ullah, Riffat Naseem Malik and Abdul Qadir, “Assessment of Groundwater Contamination in an Industrial City, Sialkot, Pakistan,” African Journal of Environmental Science and Technology, Vol.3, No.2, December 2009, pp.429- 430.

331

Sambrial road, Sialkot- Pasrur road, Sialkot- Daska road and Sialkot- Head Marala road. These tanneries are causing huge environmental pollution for Sialkot and suburbs.1010

According to an estimate 90 million meter leather is annually manufactured while chemical consumption is 65,000 tons for leather processing in tanneries in Pakistan,1011 Approximately, 25 percent chemicals are utilized and absorbed but the remaining 75 percent are discharged as industrial effluent. Overall, the tannery industry use 40,000 ton toxic chemicals. Out of this, the tanning sector of Sialkot uses 9,600 tons of chemicals. The waste generated by this industry is discharged into seasonal nullah Aik and Bhed of Sialkot. These nullahs pass through the city polluting the environment. Those tanneries, which are located outside the municipal limits, discharge their waste into Palkku Nullah. Earlier, the pure water of these nullahs was used for irrigation, fishing and washing clothes. Now, they are like drains filled with toxic industrial waste.

This problem is not limited to Sialkot, in fact, the sub-soil water of Dhaska, Sambrial and Sialkot tehsils is becoming contaminated and unusable for irrigation or human consumption.1012 During monsoon, the industrial waste spread over vast tracts of the agricultural land damaging both the crops and the land. This has immense implications for human health and the environment. For example, cattle drink contaminated water, which makes their milk unhealthy and unsafe. Moreover, milkmen use polluted water for adulterating milk. Due to the above-mentioned reasons various diseases are increasingly spreading, e.g. over 70 percent people of Sialkot, Daska and Sambrial tensils are suffering from stomach and liver diseases. 1013 In view of the above, Punjab government is developing a new tanneries zone near Sambrial, where the

1010 Ibid. 1011 Business Recorder, “Tanneries Affecting Sialkot’s Environment,” News Channel, 30 April 2008. Available at www.pakistan.com. 1012 Ibid. 1013 Ibid.

332

tanneries of Sialkot would be shifted.1014

8.4.4 Medical Treatment and Learning Chemicals are increasingly used in the agricultural, industrial, and consumer sectors of Pakistan. But, these chemicals are causing health and environmental problems throughout their life cycle from import or production up to disposal. Moreover, most of the industries are situated in urban population centers without requisite treatment and pollution control facilities. Unfortunately there is no centralized specialized treatment facility in the country.1015 Moreover, the medical curriculum of our universities is not suitably designed for addressing the challenges of this time. In Pakistan, not even a single medical college teaches ‘disaster management’ to the students.1016 The medical staff is not sufficiently trained in emergency medicine and medical toxicology. At many places hospitals are sited close to hazardous installation in the vulnerable zone. Moreover, they do not possess requisite specialized facility and ante-dotes for responding to toxic release.1017

8.4.5 Transportation of chemicals The transportation system for chemicals with regard to specialized vehicles and necessary training of drivers, managers and police officials is inadequate.1018 There does not exist any data relevant to transport of chemicals. The rail and road means of transportation passes through or near major population centres and no special precautionary and security measures are taken for ensuring safe and secure transportation of

1014 “Sialkot: Tanneries Pollution Reduced, DAWN, 25 January 2005. 1015 “National Profile for Chemical Management,” op.cit, p.4. 1016 Kiran Ejaz, “Disaster Management Never Part of the Medical Curriculum in Pakistan,” Journal of Pakistan Medical Association, May 2011. 1017 Author’s visit to Social Security Hospital, Gadoon Amazai, 17 August 2013. This hospital is located hardly 500 meters from Sardar Chemical Industries Limited. And adjacent to this hospital is Working Folk Grammer School & College. This shows that the hazards associated with chemical industries are not considered during Land Use Planning. 1018 Author’s meeting with Dr. Amin Badshah, Chairman Department of Chemistry, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, 28 April 2014.

333

chemicals.1019 A registration mechanism and its effective implementation is required for transportation of chemicals in Pakistan.

8.4.6 Need for Voluntary Media Codes The provision of correct and reliable information during a terrorist attack or chemical accident enhances public confidence and reduces panic. In Pakistan during disasters media plays many constructive roles such as it promotes national solidarity, motivate rescue and relief operations, builds a communication bridge between the general public, victims, and the donors, etc. Nevertheless, media at times violates self-imposed ethical standards and codes e.g. using enflaming terminologies and tone that leaves negative impact on the victims, viewers and the donors.1020

It was observed that at numerous occasions, media does not maintain balance in making emotional appeal by showing horrible pictures of disaster and victims endlessly. 1021 Moreover, most of the times media try to be the first in breaking news, followed by variety of opinions, analysis, which are mixed with facts, and thus creates confusion. For accurate reporting, it is suggested that voluntary media codes may be developed for the coverage of terrorist attacks or chemical accident. Media need to be trained regarding the peculiarities of chemical accident/ incident because it is a specialized subject. Moreover, media must perform the role of the watch-guard on relief and rehabilitation efforts and undertake independent analysis of national policy issues with regard to disaster prevention, preparedness and response.

1019 Author’s visit to New Malik Enterprises Goods Transport Company, Tarnol, 28 March 2014; Azam transport Private Limited, 28 March 2014; and Galiat Hazara Goods Transport Company, Tarnol, 28 March 2014. This aspect was confirmed during meeting drivers transporting hazardous chemicals. The drivers were uneducated and knew no response measure in the event of an emergency. 1020 Author’s meeting with Mr. Amir Jadoon, Pakistan Television Official, Islamabad, 10 September 2014. 1021 Anam Muzamill, “A Comparative Study of Natural Disasters News Coverage in Pakistan by DAWN and The News (The Case of Earthquake 2005 & Floods 2010),” International Conference on Communication, Media, Technology and Design, 9- 11 May 2012, Istanbul, Turkey; I. Maqbool and F. Nawaz, eds, Disaster Reporting handbook, (Islamabad: NDMA, 2008), pp. 26- 29.

334

8.4.7 Technical Infrastructure In Pakistan, a wide range of laboratory infrastructure has been set up at national level. These labs conduct chemical residue monitoring, quality control regulation, monitoring and surveillance of edibles, certification, diagnosis, imparting training, and research and development. Many laboratories have been accredited and provide training regarding chemical management. 1022 Moreover, many academic institutions teach chemical engineering, environmental management and environmental studies, chemistry, etc but the chemical management is not taught. In the prevailing environment, the universities need to teach chemical management, waste management, and related subjects.1023

8.4.8 Chemical Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Follow-up The National Disaster Management Plan though includes response to chemical accidents, but it is still not implemented as required. Most of the industries do not have a chemical hazard identification system and the public authorities do not maintain record of chemical accidents. There is lack of information regarding hazard identification, risk assessment and management. The emergency services in the country are inadequate except in few big cities, and the emergency services personnel are not specifically trained and equipped for responding to chemical accident/ incident. Various institutions dealing with chemical management, environmental management and disaster management are functioning in isolation. Thus they need coordination and collaborative efforts for addressing national concerns and issues.1024 Pakistan concept of preparedness for disasters is restricted to relief operations. Moreover, no institution exists for preparedness, mitigation and rehabilitation other than relief.1025

1022 Author’s meeting with Dr. Riffat N. Malik, op.cit. 1023 Ibid. 1024 Ibid. 1025 NDMA, “National Disaster Management System in Pakistan” Presentation available at ndma.gov.pk/Document.

335

8.4.9 Awareness Raising of Workers and the Public Workers and the local community have the right to be provided with appropriate information i.e. regarding chemical hazards, how to remain safe and how to respond in the event of an emergency. Government has taken number of measures in this regard but they seem inadequate. For proper awareness raising, various segments of society such as media, academics, legislators, senior officials, chemical industry, transporters, relevant public authorities, etc should be adequately educated and sensitized regarding the enormous hazards and associated risks, which chemical industry poses to the society and the environment and how to respond to accidents and mitigate their adverse effects.

8.4.10 Preparing and Making Available Emergency Experts National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) regularly trains fire fighters, staff of civil defence, rescue organizations, etc but their data is not maintained and there is no arrangement for making available the trained personnel at short notice. Such trained experts should be regularly trained and given periodic refresher training and employed at places where they can be immediately utilized. Moreover, the national and local authorities must maintain an up-to-date list of designated national and international experts in various fields who can be made available in the event of an accident or terrorist attack. These experts should also be involved in emergency planning and testing various plans during field exercises.

8.4.11 Obsolete Pesticides There are large stockpiles of obsolete pesticides all over the country.1026 The major use of pesticides is on cotton crop, the dominant sub-sector of Pakistan's agriculture. The cholinesterase activity levels measured in the blood of cotton pickers in Multan and Bahawalpur divisions have showed chronic pesticides poisoning.1027 The residual effects

1026 Author’s meeting with PhD Scholars of the Department of Environmental Sciences, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 28 March 2014. 1027 M. Azam Khan, et al., “Economic Evaluation of Pesticide Use Externalities in the Cotton Zones of Punjab, Pakistan,” The Pakistan Development Review, Vol.41, Part-II, Winter 2002, pp.690- 691.

336

of pesticides applied on crops appear in the food chain. This can have serious implications for public health. The increased pesticides use also severely affects the wild honeybee colonies and thus affect the ecology and deprive farmers of direct and indirect benefits. The use of pesticides on crops is also resulting in the poisoning of domestic animals through various ways. Animals succumb to acute poisoning, other consequences are health decline, loss in milk productivity and vigor.

8.4.12 Pharmaceutical Waste Pharmaceutical sector causes water pollution in Pakistan. The pharmaceutical industry produces less wastewater but it contains substantial amounts of organic and inorganic pollutants, exceptionally high quantity of grease, etc. Therefore, the pharmaceutical waste is highly contaminated. Solid waste comprises of spent solvents packaging material and damaged bottles, expired or rejected medicines. Waste from pharmaceutical industry producing penicillin is strong and generally cannot be treated with domestic normal methods. Moreover, every pharmaceutical industry requires special waste water treatment because generic techniques do not yield desired results. 1028 And pharmaceutical waste water if disposed with insufficient treatment may lead to great harm to human health, the environment and water sources. The pharmaceutical waste both directly and indirectly causes a number of health related problems.

8.5 Conclusion

The declared chemical industries of Pakistan pay special attention to occupational health, have meaningful safety policies and are striving for “zero incidents” goal. The development and implementation of safety policy is integrated with comprehensive risk management programmes, which includes chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response. Chemical Hazard Evaluation (CHE) and Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) are conducted to examine equipment, safety critical instruments, human action and external

1028 Muhammad Saleem, “Pharmaceutical Waste Water Treatment: A Physicochemical Study,” Journal of Research (Science), Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 2007, pp.1-2.

337

factors, which helps in identifying potential failure points. Moreover, physical factors are assessed for reducing the risks of terrorist incidents. The vulnerability of transportation of hazardous chemicals and safety related dialogue and communication with the local community need improvement. The declared chemical industries maintain records of all safety and security incidents, and undertake detailed analysis of various trends. Moreover, proper response and crisis management exists for preventing intrusion or terrorist act.

The management of declared industry provides safety and security training to all employees. Safety is included in initial basic training and subsequently refresher training is provided periodically. Comprehensive access control is established, and the passage of vehicles and personnel out of, into, and within the industry is effectively managed. However, most of the declared industry is not separated by appropriate distance from other installations and residential areas. The public authorities need to ensure that proper land use planning is implemented and prevent residential developments near industry. Though the declared industries have comprehensive disaster management plans, yet, such plans should be periodically tested in the field exercises involving all stake holders. Moreover, the research and academic institutions need to contribute to minimizing the adverse effects of chemical waste on human health and the environment.

The preceding discussion underlines that in Pakistan there is a lack of preliminary hazard analysis in the Other Chemical Industries (OCIs). Most of the industries do not have a chemical hazard identification system and they do not even maintain a record of scheduled maintenance, process analysis, chemical accidents, near- misses, etc. There is lack of information regarding identification of hazards, assessment & management of risks, and relationships between disaster likelihoods and disaster preparedness. OCIs have no concept of safety policies or requisite infrastructure for prevention, preparedness and response to accidents. No substantive measures are taken for the security of the industry and the transportation of hazardous substances. Public authorities hardly check OCIs for safety and security measures. The OCIs do not keep the public informed regarding potential risks from the hazard in their facility. OCIs have no cooperative arrangements

338

for safety and security with larger enterprises and have no culture of conducting dialogue with stakeholders such as local community, media, public authorities, special interest groups, etc. Moreover, OCIs have hardly any disaster management plans or dedicated safety and security officers to identify possible scenarios.

Regarding smuggling of Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) to Afghanistan and its subsequent use in the manufacture of IEDs, the Government of Pakistan adopted a National Counter IED Strategy for preventing CAN and other precursors smuggling out of the country in June 2011, build counter IED capacity through training and equipping, launched public awareness programme for countering IEDs, strengthened and updated the existing legislative framework regarding explosives and terrorism. These are substantive national measures but they require requisite resources and effective implementation and border control for achieving the desired outcome. Pakistan has a 1500 miles long porous border with Afghanistan and generally there is lack of enforcement in the border region. These factors need to be considered for addressing the issue of dual-use precursors i.e. CAN. In this regard, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the U.S. have concluded a tripartite border control Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Agreement in November 2012 and are working on comprehensive border control strategy. The Government of Pakistan approved the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2012, amending the 1997 Anti Terrorism Act. The new legislation strengthens the provision of the 1997 Anti Terrorism Act by covering all aspects of financing terrorism including provision to freeze, seize and forfeiture assets and properties of those involved in financing terrorism.1029

1029 Lieutenant General Michael D. Barbero Statement, op.cit, pp.3-5.

339

CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of this study was to critically examine implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Pakistan, the safety and security of chemical industry in Pakistan, and the management of chemicals in Pakistan, with an aim to devise appropriate measures to maximize the safety and security of chemical industry and chemicals in Pakistan, and further improve the national implementation of the CWC in Pakistan. Moreover, to study how the CWC, OPCW and the chemical industry can contribute to addressing the current and future challenges related to proliferation and terrorism.

During the said process, examination of certain related aspects became imperative and essential, such as, the scientific and technological developments and their implications for the Convention in general and the CWC industrial verification regime in particular; examination of major chemical disasters and ‘the safety and security best practices and national measures’ of the developed states regarding accidents prevention, preparedness and response; the chemical industry site security, transportation security and cyber security; the role of chemical industry, academia and the civic society with regard to safety and security of the chemical industry; the examination of chemical disaster management mechanism in Pakistan as well as the one enshrined in the Convention in the form of “Assistance and Protection” under CWC.

The Chemical industry is extremely important for the development of national economy. This industry had played extremely constructive role in the CWC negotiations, it has key role today, and it will remain critically involved in addressing the future challenges. In the past, many chemical disasters have occurred such as Bhopal (1984), Toulouse, France (2001); B.P. Texas City (2005), Buncefield, the UK (2005), etc. Therefore, the chemical industry needs to be operated in extremely safe and secure manner. To safeguard chemical industry from terrorist attacks, it is imperative to understand and address the vulnerabilities of chemical plants, chemical processes and transportation.

340

Importantly, combating the chemical terrorism is a daunting task because the requisite materials, technology and know how are widely and easily available in both developed and developing countries. Therefore, there is a dire need to create a culture of safety and security, domestic preventive arrangements and responsible attitude by chemical industry. The range of these interrelated challenges are so wide that wellcoordinated synergetic efforts by the international regimes, relevant national and international authorities, chemical industry, civic society and the academic community are immensely imperative. Concurrently, the capacity building of these stakeholders, especially the academia is essentially required for raising CWC related awareness at the very base by transferring knowledge to students. Nonetheless, the responsible behavior or security culture that a chemical industry employs is the primary defence against the chemical disasters as well as illegal proliferation of chemical materials.

International regimes and institutions have miserably failed when they do not remain relevant to future challenges. It seems that the mandate of the OPCW requires transition to new priorities, keeping in view the ongoing pace of destruction of declared Chemical Weapons stockpiles and the challenges of proliferation and terrorism. In fact, the destruction of the Chemical Weapons stockpiles is not an end in itself; rather it is the first step towards a world safe and secure from the abuse of dual-use chemicals and technologies. The CWC and the OPCW will have to suitably adapt to evolving security challenges, otherwise, the Convention risks becoming outdated. Perhaps, the scope of any regime plays an important role in its success or failure; therefore, the scope of the CWC has to be appropriately adjusted for addressing current and future challenges.

The international effort against proliferation should not only necessitate intensifying and increasing the number of routine industrial inspections, but also a more qualitative selection methodology of chemical plant sites for inspecting most relevant facilities at priority. The OPCW and the National Authorities have to implement and adopt the concept of verification as a process cooperative. This cooperation may include, inter alia, sharing of information, use of on-site sampling and analysis, and developing the

341

desired level of capacity for correctly assessing the facility capabilities. Moreover, the OPCW ought to utilize its mandate, expertise and resources as contribution to the synergetic international effort against terrorism and proliferation.

Pakistan has a vibrant chemical industry with a mix of new and old technology. Pakistan’s economy is based on agriculture; and 60- 70 percent of overall industrial sector is also dependent on agricultural commodities. Hence, the demand for chemical products would constantly increase, and consequently, the chemical industry would develop throughout the country. The level of effectiveness of an international regime can be measured by the level of national implementation of the regime. Pakistan attaches very high importance to the effective implementation of the CWC and for this purpose has put in place comprehensive legislative and administrative measures. Pakistan has included obligations under Article-1 and Article-IV of the CWC, which effectively incorporates the General Purpose Criteria (GPC) into national implementation law. Thus, Pakistan’s CWC implementation Ordinance-2000 is not limited to Schedule chemicals rather it also addresses the concerns of international terrorism and proliferation.

Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance enables requisite tracking of the domestic transfer of toxic and dual-use industrial chemicals. Moreover, it also enables National Authority to obtain complete and correct information from the chemical industry on activities declarable under the CWC. The penal provisions of the CWC Implementation Rules can effectively prevent and redress any breach of the CWC. Moreover, Pakistan’s CWC Implementation Rules are quite strict and thus have requisite deterrence value, e.g. if someone assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in prohibited activities, the person can be imprisoned for a term, which may extend up to 25 years.

Nonetheless, the penal measures for certain provisions of Pakistan CWC Implementation Ordinance require immediate review. For example, Pakistan CWC

342

Implementation Ordinance (Sub-sections 5(1), 6(1) & (2)) impose a fine of just 10,000 Rupees for acquiring, possessing, transferring, importing or exporting Schedule chemicals, DOCs or DOC (PSF) in violation of the Convention. This fine does not serve the desired purpose of deterrence. Similarly, as per Section-21 of the CWC Implementation Ordinance, a person who produces, processes, consumes transfers or import any Schedule chemical, DOCs or DOC (PSF) is obliged to provide prescribed information to the National Authority. The contravention of this provision is punishable with imprisonment for two years or fine or both. This Section is so fundamental that it provides the legal foundation for national non-proliferation measures. Hence, the punishment merits review for enhancing its deterrence value.

Pakistan has established National Authority on CWC in the Disarmament- C Branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), headed by Director General Disarmament-C. He is assisted by a serving Lieutenant Colonel from Pakistan Army as Director National Authority (NA), two clerks and 3- 4 staff members for the automated Wide Area Network (WAN). The Director General is responsible to look after all arms control and disarmament affairs. Hence, his role as Director General National Authority is just symbolic in nature. Moreover, National Authority has no dedicated technical staff for analyzing industrial declarations, preparation of national declarations, national verification measures, outreach to industry, etc. Though, Pakistan’s National Authority works closely with National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and Strategic Plans Division (SPD), yet this is an ad-hoc arrangement for fulfilling important national and international obligations and outreach to mainly declared chemical industry.

Since 2011, Pakistan conducts every year an Assistance and Protection Course for the States Parties of the CWC as ‘assistance’ to the OPCW. Similarly, Pakistan also conducted Course on Electronic Declarations of National Authorities (EDNA) in 2011 as a form of assistance to the OPCW. Pakistan National Authority is proactive in collecting CWC related data mainly from the declared industry of Pakistan. However, it needs to collect data from relevant facilities that pose risk to humans and the environment regardless

343

of their size or production capacity. Such measures actually confirm implementing provisions of the General Purpose Criteria (GPC). For awareness raising regarding obligations under CWC, Pakistan conducted a seminar for the representatives of the declared industry of Pakistan in 2005. Such seminars may be conducted more frequently; but this would necessitate enhancing technical capacity of National Authority.

The CWC Implementation Ordianance-2000 and its national record manifests that Islamabad has not been transferring directly or indirectly any listed chemicals or related technology to anyone, and Pakistan is fully committed not to assist, induce or encourage in anyway another State for engaging in activities prohibited under the CWC. Pakistan has criminalized CWC prohibitions; and has also implemented specific restrictions on transfer of Schedule chemicals to non-States Parties. Beside effective export controls, the CWC Implementation Ordinance requires Pakistan National Authority to monitor inside Pakistan transfer of all toxic chemicals and their precursors. Moreover, Pakistan in collaboration with the OPCW is constantly building capacities of relevant national institutions such as Customs Authorities, border guards, Frontier Constabulary, etc.

Pakistan National Authority on CWC could perform more effectively, if it is placed under Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV). It is because, presently, the SECDIV is monitoring export controls of both nuclear and biological control lists; and also control imports and exports of equipment and technology relegated to chemicals. On the other hand, the National Authority controls only the imports and exports of Schedule chemicals under CWC. By placing National Authority under SECDIV, all WMD related control lists will come under one organization, which will facilitate interaction and working with multilateral bodies and national stakeholders. Pakistan has comprehensive legislations and implementing rules, but the problem of implementing legal and administrative instruments are faced throughout the country. This issue can be attributed to lack of coordination among relevant ministries and organizations.

344

By placing National Authority under SECDIV, the problem of coordination would be substantially resolved because SECDIV has representation and experts from relevant ministries and organizations. Consequently, Pakistan’s National Authority would be suitably staffed, reorganized and supported, which would enable it to perform its regulatory, monitoring and routine functions even more effectively. Revitalizing Pakistan National Authority is imperative because the context of the CWC is changing. States Parties have traditionally been concerned with massive Chemical Weapons and the Schedule chemicals. However, changes in production technology may make other types of chemicals and facilities more relevant. Furthermore, scenarios involving the production of Chemical Weapons on a small scale by terrorists are totally different from state- sponsored programmes. These developments require effective national monitoring and detection capabilities.

The declared chemical industries of Pakistan pay special attention to occupational health and safety; and strive for zero incident goal. Comprehensive safety polices are developed, which are integrated with risk management programmes regarding chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response. Chemical hazard evaluation and process hazard analysis is conducted to examine equipment, safety critical instruments, human actions and external factors. Moreover, physical factors are assessed for reducing the risks of terrorist incidents. However, the vulnerability of transportation of hazardous chemicals and safety related communication with the local at-risk community needs definite improvement.

The declared industry maintains record of safety and security incidents, and undertakes analysis of various trends. Proper response and crisis management exists for preventing intrusion or terrorist acts. The management of declared chemical industry provides safety and security training to all employees. Comprehensive access control is established. However, most of the declared industry is located inside or very close to population centres. In this regard, the public authorities need to ensure that proper land use planning is implemented for keeping residential developments away from industry. The

345

declared industries have comprehensive disaster management plans, but such plans are rarely tested in field exercises. Moreover, the industry, NDMA and National Authority will benefit more from such exercises if all the stakeholders are involved including relevant regional and international organizations and partners.

Importantly, most of the Other Chemical Industries (OCIs) do not have chemical hazard identification system and do not maintain record of scheduled maintenance, chemical incidents, near-misses, etc. OCIs have inadequate concept of safety policies or creating requisite infrastructure for prevention, preparedness and response to accidents. Adequate security measures are not taken for site security and the transportation of hazardous substances. Public authorities hardly check OCIs for safety and security measures. OCIs have no cooperative arrangements for safety and security with larger enterprises and public authorities; and have no culture of conducting dialogue with local community, public authorities, special interest groups, etc regarding potential risks from the hazards in the facility.

The OCIs have hardly any disaster management plans or dedicated safety and security officers. There is a marked deficiency of occupational safety and hygiene control measures. Majority of the OCIs have inadequate fire fighting and first aid capacity. Personal protective equipment is not provided to workers, and majority of the OCIs are without any established social security systems. In OCIs the workers are neither educated nor informed regarding the hazards posed by the chemicals they work with. Moreover, Pakistan does not have national occupational safety policy, which contributes to the lack of training and sensitization on safety aspects in OCIs. It is suggested that the relevant public authorities and management of chemical industry consider adopting as much as possible the safety and security related ‘best practices’ and measures discussed in ‘Chapter 5’ of this study.

Regarding security of hazardous chemical transportation, the public authorities and the chemical companies may perform comprehensive risk assessments and security reviews

346

with diverse team of experts. In Pakistan, mostly, vehicles carrying hazardous chemicals move without requisite security escorts and arrangements; and the drivers lack special training for transportation of hazardous material. Most of the truck drivers are uneducated, hence they do not understand the hazards associated with the toxic chemicals, and how would they respond in the event of an accident, theft or terrorism. Therefore, some educational and training criteria may be set for issuing license to the drivers transporting hazardous chemicals. In fact, an exclusive category of drivers may be created who are trained in transporting hazardous substances. This is a serious vulnerability, which needs to be addressed at priority.

Another alarming fact is that the private transport companies in the country possess insufficient specialized vehicles for the transportation of hazardous chemicals. Industry keeps own transport or use private trucks, which are mostly just normal tankers, without any specialized equipment or storage tanks. This aspect merits research for introducing reliable specialized vehicles and safe and secure transportation of hazardous chemicals. The vehicles transporting hazardous chemicals may be moved with requisite security arrangements on roads that by-passes major population centres. Pakistan Motor Way passes at a distance from population centres and the level of security is relatively better as compared to the Grand Trunk Road and other communication links. Therefore, hazardous chemicals may be moved on roads that are relatively safe and secure and move at safe distance from population centres. Necessary legislations regarding safe and secure transportation of chemicals may be enacted and effectively implemented. Moreover, comprehensive chemical transportation and emergency response plans may be developed for the safe and secure transportation of hazardous chemicals.

The cooperative efforts for effective accident prevention are essential, i.e. the industry, local authorities and the civil society need to work as a team. All hazardous installations irrespective of their size need to comply with the same overall safety standards. The industry must undertake comprehensive hazard identification and risk assessment from the design stage throughout the operations. Safety culture need to be developed and the

347

industry must establish safety management system. The chemical industry may strive for utilizing inherently safer technology and processes. The public authorities may specify general safety objectives, establish control framework and inspect and enforce safety measures. Public authorities need to ensure the industry operates in safe manner and the management of industry keep public informed regarding potential risks and safety measures. In this regard, public authorities may assist OCIs for entering into cooperative arrangements with relevant public authorities and larger industries.

If the hazardous installation can cause trans-boundary effects in the event of an accident, then the emergency plans may be developed in due consultations with the neigbouring states. During response phase, the national authorities would need emergency assistance from national and international organizations. In this regard, the assistance from the neighboring states will be especially beneficial, since it can be delivered in less time. This would necessitate collective planning, training and testing emergency response plans during field exercises. Such cooperation would improve interstate cooperation also, because as per the regime theory, inter-state cooperation for addressing an issue may produce unintended cooperation in other issue-areas. Thus international regimes and institutions constantly develop because the cooperation generates ‘positive externalities’. Moreover, as Keohane said regimes would also reduce cost effect, and the marginal costs of dealing with additional issues will be lower.

The services of the community and civil society from both sides of international border need to be fully utilized in helping victims and local people. Therefore, preparing for a chemical incident must include training professionals and reliable volunteers from the community and the NGOs for the provision of assistance to the community. It would prove very useful if the civil society voluntarily monitor the hazardous installation for any unusual signs or disregard by the industry for the safety of the local community and preservation of the environment. Chemical disaster or terrorism will require swift and firm response. Therefore, Pakistan may develop consultative mechanism with neighbouring states, which will ensure that requisite skills and resources are identified, developed and

348

mobilized in a way that will minimize operational difficulties in the event of chemical accident or terrorism.

The priority concerns related to management of chemicals in Pakistan includes the improper disposal of waste, pollution of waterways, air and soil, chemical safety and security, safe transportation, improper storage, Persistent Organic Chemicals (POPs), and chemical residue in food and drinking water. These problems exist throughout the country. The mandates of various ministries and institutions related to chemical management are well defined. But the relevant institutions require capacity building especially regarding implementation of national laws, rules and policies. The lack of human resource, insufficient understanding of the regulatory framework within implementing agencies, meager funds, and uncoordinated approaches are the main impediments that need to be addressed at priority. Furthermore, effective national monitoring and surveillance system, and close collaboration among concerned ministries and organizations are prerequisites for the safe and sound management of chemicals.

In Pakistan, overall, 53 legislations and rules are regulating the use of various groups of chemicals and related aspects. The legislations regarding import, export, and production of chemicals are comprehensive; whereas, legislations concerning disposal, transportation and storage of chemicals are inadequate. There is no national law for the safe and secure storage and transportation of chemicals. The Explosives Act is used but this law cover only those chemicals that have explosive properties. Pakistan’s legislation does not provide adequate consumer protection, and public awareness is limited regarding the adverse effects of chemicals on health. These areas warrant immediate considerations and related legislations. Pakistan has many legal instruments but the capacity of concerned ministries requires improvement. Therefore, all institutions responsible for enforcing these Acts and rules may develop institutional capacity.

In Pakistan, the legislative regulatory framework is not effectively enforced, which is the main drawback of the whole system. Keeping in view the prevailing security

349

environment, some of these Acts require review for the sound management of chemicals. Moreover, the penalties for environmental offences need to be reformatory in nature, and should induce deterrence, restraint, and also rectify the damage caused to the environment. For effective implementation of any law, the penalty must deter the felon, e.g. imposing Rupees.500/- fine for discharging industrial waste in the water body may not yield desired effects. Significant quantities of chemical wastes are generated by chemical industry; and the unattended dumping sites of chemical waste are found throughout the country, which contaminates food and drinking water. But, there is no chemical waste disposal facility in the country, and no monitoring mechanism for emissions from chemical waste sites.

Pakistan also faces the issue of smuggling of chemicals and their misuse by terrorists. It is facing a growing Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) challenge that threatens its soldiers and populace. In response to this issue, the Government of Pakistan has adopted a National Counter IED Strategy in June 2011 for preventing CAN and other precursors smuggled out of the country, build counter IED capacity through training and equipping, strengthened and updated the existing legislative framework regarding explosives and terrorism. These are substantive measures but they require requisite resources, effective implementation and border control for achieving desired results.

The Government of Pakistan has approved the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill- 2012, amending the 1997 Anti Terrorism Act. The new legislation strengthens the provision of the 1997 Anti Terrorism Act by covering all aspects of financing terrorism including provisions on freezing, seizing and forfeiture of assets and properties of those involved in financing terrorism. For effective monitoring and management of dual-use chemicals, it is imperative that the industry must verify the identity of the buyers and record all transactions. The national authorities need to develop national monitoring mechanism that monitors the sale, distribution and use of chemicals.

Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Ordinance (NDMO)- 2006 established

350

National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC), National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), provincial and district authorities (PDMAs and DDMAs) and similar institutional arrangements for Northern Areas, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K). The creation of said organizations is a major improvement in the national perspective on disaster management. Moreover, under this system, a comprehensive approach including prevention, preparedness, response and mitigation measures have also been identified in line with international best practices. NDMO provides broad based mechanism for dealing with chemical and industrial accidents. In the same context, National Contingency Plans have been formulated for ensuring timely, well- calibrated and effective response to any eventuality.

The National Contingency Plans for Disasters are quite comprehensive but they need to be regularly improved and tested during field exercises involving all stakeholders especially the policy makers and representatives of relevant international organizations such as the OPCW and the IAEA. Ironically, there is little coordination between various stakeholders and field exercises are seldom conducted that too without involvement of major stakeholders. Moreover, NDMA does train first responders but no structured system exists for their refresher training or their centralized employment. In fact, the emergency responders from various departments need to be continuously trained, equipped and developed into a pool of experts that could be confidently employed anywhere in the country or abroad on short notice. In this regard, the regional approach is ideal for mobilizing and maximizing national and regional resources. The regional states ought to have coherent CBRN policy, exchange best practices, methodologies; focus on coordination, standardization and communication; and testing plans in the field exercises, as being done by the E.U. states.

The data regarding chemicals and related aspects is maintained by relevant departments and agencies. However, there is no national or provincial database for undertaking strategic analysis and planning. In fact, Pakistan’s national capacity for data collection and expert analysis is inadequate. Data do not exist regarding salient aspects of

351

chemical management, such as chemical accidents, fatalities, injuries, mitigation measures, polluted and contaminated sites, food and drinking water contamination, obsolete chemicals’ sites, storage and transportation of chemicals, etc. In addition, there is no national information system regarding chemicals and related safety aspects. These issues merit serious academic research. Industries especially the OCIs neither maintain such records comprehensively, nor do they report to concerned authorities due to fear of reprisals. Public access to available data is not easy and it takes too long in acquiring data from governmental agencies. Therefore, a comprehensive national mechanism may be developed in Pakistan for the collection, compilation, analysis and dissemination of data for the safe and sound management of chemicals. In this regard, the involvement of public interest groups such as NGOs and trade associations can prove quite helpful.

The community and public interest groups such as NGOs, trade unions, labour organizations, etc can contribute significantly to the sound management of chemicals in Pakistan. In this regard, education is the strategic tool. In Pakistan, subjects related to safety and security of chemical industry and national obligations under CWC are not taught in academic institutions. Therefore, the academia need to cover these topics and work on enhancing awareness of the students of chemistry, chemical engineering, international relations, chemistry, defence and strategic studies, international law, etc. In this regard, the National Authority may work closely with the Ministry of Education. However, this approach and the related study material would be useful only if it contains both national and global perspective.

In Pakistan, almost 800 NGOs are involved in advocacy, environmental issues, emergency response, rehabilitation, etc. But no NGO or Community Based Organization (CBO) is working exclusively on the safe and sound management of chemicals. Thus the contribution of NGOs is of indirect nature. Moreover, most of the NGOs are working in isolation, and thereby their contributions are insignificant on national issues. In this context, the governmental authorities need to involve NGOs as partners with specific

352

mandates regarding chemical safety and security issues. The NGOs can also be utilized in monitoring and inspecting chemical facilities and related activities.

Industry in Pakistan has significant and organized base of trade unions and labour organizations. These organizations are striving to improve the working conditions in industry, and introduce social security system for the workers. An important limitation of such organizations is lack of education. Resultantly, there analytical capacity is very limited in understanding wider environmental issues, the significant role of community in safety and security of chemical industry, community’s rights and obligations, etc. In Pakistan, consumer associations are also quite active. They are striving to phase-out problematic substances and make available to the public information regarding effects of chemicals on human health. But, Pakistan’s existing legislation does not offer adequate consumer protection; and public awareness is limited due to low literacy level.

To conclude, Pakistan has fulfilled the fundamental obligations under CWC such as the establishment of National Authority on CWC, enacting comprehensive CWC implementation legislations and related rules and regulations. However, Pakistan needs to further improve the implementation of General Purpose Criteria (GPC) of the Convention by developing national best practices, rules and norms. This would ensure effective monitoring and regulatory control on the imports, exports, processing, consumption, transportation, and use of various categories of chemicals, especially dualuse toxic chemicals and related technology that could be misused for proliferation and terrorism purpose. The National Authority needs to be suitably staffed, reorganized, relocated and provided requisite human resource especially the technical experts so that it can even better perform its regulatory, monitoring, outreach, verification and declaration obligations. Pakistan National Authority ought to undertake comprehensive survey to identify declarable industries and seek annual declarations from all high risk facilities for correctly monitoring and understanding their capacities. This will significantly contribute to safeguarding the human health and the precious environment. Indeed, this will necessitate concerted efforts for the capacity building of relevant governmental authorities; and

353

involving various stakeholders especially the industry and public interest groups as partners. Moreover, there is a need to further improve inter-ministerial and inter- departmental coordination for the sake of effective implementation of various legal Acts and related rules and regulations. Industry has key role in preventing the misuse of chemicals. Therefore, chemical industry needs to invest in their safety and security, and take measures such as customer vetting and monitoring the use of their products. Pakistan is a responsible and responsive country and is working closely with the OPCW and the international community for realizing the objectives of the CWC. This collaboration may be further enhanced by training relevant sections of academia by the OPCW and National Authority, so that they spread CWC related knowledge and ‘safety and security culture’ encompassing both national and international perspective at the grass root level. Pakistan takes the safety and security of chemical industry seriously. The safety and security standard of the declared chemical industry and larger enterprises is very good. However, with regard to Other Chemical Industries (OCIs), there is definite room for improvement.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Aftalion, Fred., A History of the International Chemical Industry: From the 'Early Days' to 2000, Second ed, Philadelphia: Chemical Heritage Foundation, 2001.

Aggarwal, Vinod K., Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade, California, University of Califormia Press, 1985.

Aggarwal, Vinod. K., ed. Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages and Nesting. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1998.

Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, “Theories of International Regimes”, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 55, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

354

Anderson, Mary B. and Peter J. Woodrow, Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster, London: Intermediate Technology Publication, 1998.

Anthony, Ian and Sibylle Bauer, “Transfer Controls,” SIPRI Year Book, Stockholm: 2006.

Arora, Ashish, Landau, Ralph and Rosenberg, Nathan, eds. Chemicals and Long-Term Economic Growth: Insights from the Chemical Industry, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998.

Arthur A. Stein., Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Aslam, Wali, The United States and Great Power Responsibility in International Society, New York: Routledge, 2013.

Axelrod, Robert The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books, 1984.

Baron, J., Thinking and Deciding, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Bergen, Peter L. Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, New York: Free Press, 2001.

Blaikie, P., T. Cannon, I. Davis, and B. Wisner, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters, 2nd edition, New York: Rutledge, 2004.

Booth, Ken ed, New Thinking about Strategy and International Security, London: Harper- Collins, 1991.

Buzan, Barry, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold-War Era, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson, eds, The Expansion of International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

355

Carr, Edward Hallett, Twenty Years Crisis, 1919- 1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Polgrave Publishers, 2001.

Chandler, Alfred D., Shaping the Industrial Century: The Remarkable Story of the Evolution of the Modern Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries. Harvard University Press, 2005.

Derry, Thomas Kingston; Williams, Trevor I. A Short History of Technology: From the Earliest Times to A.D. 1900, New York: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Drabek, T.S., Human System Responses to Disaster: An Inventory of Sociological Findings, New York: Springer, 1986.

Drell, Sidney D, Sofaer, Abraham D, and Wilson, George D, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1999.

Flynn, Stephen E., America the Vulnerable, New York: Harper Collins, 2004. Fred Aftalion, A History of the International Chemical Industry, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991.

Garfield, Simon, Mauve: How One Man Invented a Color That Changed the World, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.

Gerber, Jurg, Eric L. Jensen and Jiletta L. Kubena, ed., Encyclopedia of White-Collar Crime, London: Greenwood Press, 2006.

Gruber, Lloyd, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Gurr, Nadine and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002.

Haas, Ernst, The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social and economic Forces, 1950- 1957, 2nd Edition, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968.

Haas, Ernst, Beyond the Nation State, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.

356

Haber, L. F., The Chemical Industry During the Nineteenth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958.

Haber, L. F., The Chemical Industry, 1900-1930, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Haimes, Y.Y., Risk Modeling, Assessment, and Management, 2nd Edition, Washington, DC: New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2004.

Hardin, Russell, Collective Action, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

Hasenclever, A., Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Hayek, Friedrick, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol.1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.

Hoffman, Bruce Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Holsti, Kalevi, Taming the Sovereign: Institutional change in International Politics, London: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Homburg, Ernst, Anthony S. Travis and Harm G. Schröter, eds., The Chemical Industry in Europe, 1850-1914: Industrial Growth, Pollution, and Professionalization. Boston, Kluwer Academic, 1998.

Houts, P. S., P.D. Cleary, and T.W. Hu, The Three Mile Island Crisis: Psychological, Social and Economic Impacts on the Surrounding Population. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988.

Ikenberry, G. John, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Kahler, Miles and David A. Lake, Globalization and Governance: Definition, Variation, and Explanation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

357

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Boston: Little Brown, 1977.

Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, New York: Harper Collins, 1989.

Kitz, Janet F. Shattered City: The Halifax Explosion and the Road to Recovery, Halifax: Nimbus Publishing Limited, 1989.

Kletz, Trevor A., What Went Wrong? Case Studies of Process Plant Disasters, Burlington MA: Gulf Professional Publishing, 1998.

Krasner, Stephen D., ed, International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 1983.

LaPierre, Dominique and Javier Moro, Five Past Midnight: The Epic Story of the World’s Deadliest Industrial Accident, New York: Warner Books, 2002.

Laqueur, Walter, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, New York: Oxford Press, 2000.

Laqueur, Walter No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, New York: Continuum, 2003.

Lavoy, Peter R., Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds. Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000.

Lindell, M.K., and R.W. Perry, Behavioral Foundations of Community Emergency Planning. Washington, DC: Hemisphere Press, 1992.

Maizels, A., Industrial Growth and World Trade: World Trends in Production, Consumption and Trade in Manufactures , Cambridge University Press, 1963.

Malone, David and Yuen Foong Khong, Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspective, London: Lynee Rienner Publishers Inc, 2003.

358

Mickolus, Edward F., Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock., International Terrorism in the 1980’s: A Chronology of Events, Vol. 1, Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989.

Mileti, D.S., Disasters by Design, Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press, 1999.

Minituglia, Bill., City on Fire: The Forgotten Disaster that Devastated a Town and Launched a Landmark Legal Battle, New York: HarperCollins Press, 2003.

Morehouse, W, Subramaniam MA., The Bhopal Tragedy: What Really Happened and What it Means for American Workers and Communities at Risk, New York: Council on International and Public Affairs, 1986.

Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, Fourth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.

Murmann, Johann Peter, Knowledge and Competitive Advantage: The Co-evolution of Firms, Technology, and National Institutions in the Synthetic Dye Industry, 1850-1914, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Myjer, Eric P. J. ed., Issues of Arms Control Law and the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and Kluwer Law International, 2001.

National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2002.

Nye, Joseph S., and John D. Donahue, ed., Governance in a Globalizing World, Virginia: R.R. Donnelley and Sons, 2000.

O’Hanlon, M., Orszag, P.R., Daadler, I.H., Destler, I.M., Gunter, D., Litan, R.E., and Steinberg, J., Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.

Pidgeon, N., Kasperson, R.E., and Slovic, P., eds. The Social Amplification of Risk, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Pisupati, Balakrishna, Charlotte Bournal, Elizabeth Maruma and Alphonse Kambu, “Issues of Compliance: Considerations for the International Regime on Access and Benefit Sharing,” Nairobi: UN Nairobi Publishers, 2004.

359

Reniers, Genserik L. L., Multi-Plant Safety and Security Management in the Chemical and Process Industries, Weinheim: John Wiley & Sons, 2010.

Rittberger, Volker, ed. Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Rotberg, Robert I., ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.

Russett Bruce and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organization, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001.

Ruggie, John Gerard, ed., The Antinomies of Interdependence, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

Slovic, P., The Perception of Risk. London, UK: Earthscan, 2000. Smil, Vaclav, Enriching the Earth: Fritz Haber, Carl Bosch, and the Transformation of World Food Production, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.

Smith, Adam, Wealth of Nations, London: Printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776.

Stephens, Hugh W., The Texas City Disaster, 1947. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1996.

Tabassi, Lisa and Scott Spence., Improving CWC Implementation: The OPCW Action Plan, Verification Yearbook 2004, London: VERTIC, 2004.

Tierney, K.J., M.K. Lindell, and R.W. Perry, Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press. 2001.

Tucker, Jonathan B., ed. Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000.

Tucker, Jonathan B. ed., The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Challenges and Solutions, Washington D.C.: Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, 2001.

VERTIC, Getting Verification Right: Proposals for Enhancing Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, London: VERTIC, 2002.

360

Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics, Reading, MAS: Addison- Wesley Publishers, 1979.

Waltz, Kenneth N., Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

Young, Oran R., Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.

Young, Oran R. International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994.

RESEARCH ARTICLES/ MONOGRAPHS

Alter, Karen J., and Sophie Meunier, “The Politics of international Regime,” Working Paper No. 07-003, Buffett Centre for International and Comparative Studies, June 2007.

Anthony, Ian, “Exports of Dual- Use Chemicals to Syria: An Assessment of European Union Export Control,” Non- Proliferation Paper, No. 35, January 2014.

Asian Development Bank, “A Study of NGOs in Asia: Pakistan, Transparency Watch Organization, 1999.

Batsanov, Sergey, “Approaching the 10th Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Plan for Future Progress,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, July 2006.

Baybutt, Paul “Assessing Risks from Threats to Process Plants: Threat and Vulnerability Analysis”, Process Safety Process, Vol. 21, No. 4, December 2002.

Ballard, Kyle M., “Convention in Peril? Riot Control Agents and the Chemical Weapons Ban,” Arms Control Today, No.7, September 2007.

Baybutt, Paul, and Varick Ready, “Protecting Process Plants: Preventing Terrorist Attacks and Sabotage,” Homeland Defense Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3, 12 February 2003.

361

Betts, Richard K., “The New Threat of Mass Destruction”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1, Jan - Feb 1998.

Benachour, Djafar, and Daniel Feakes, “Education, Outreach and Awareness-raising after the Third Review Conference,” OPCW Today, Vol.2, No.5, December 2013.

Bowman, E.H. and H. Kunreuther, “Post Bhopal Behavior of a Chemical Company,” Journal of Management Studies, 25, 1988.

Botcheva, Liliana, and Lisa L. Martic, “Institutional Effects on State Behaviour: Convergence and Divergence,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1, March 2001.

Brian M. Jenkins, “Terrorism and Beyond: A 21st Century Perspective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.24, No.5, 2001.

Burgess, Richard H. “Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the United States of America- A Viewpoint from Industry”, The Monitor, Nos. 5- 6, Fall 1999/ Winter 2000.

Buzan, Barry “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century”, International Affairs, Vol.67, No.3, July 1991.

Carter, Ashton B., John M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow, “Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger,” Foreign Affairs Vol.77, No. 6, November/December 1998.

Carroll, Raymond and Loren Jenkins, “Italy: ‘Our Own Hiroshima,’ ” Newsweek, 16 August 1976.

Cipolat, Urs, “The New Chemical Weapons Convention and Export Controls: Towards Greater Multilateralism?” Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, Spring 2000.

Clutter, Susan L., Bryan J. Boruff and W. Lynn Shirley, “Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards,” Social Science Quarterly, Vol.84, No.2, June 2003.

Coglianese, C., and D. Lazer, “Management-based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals,” Law and Society Review, Vol.37, No.4, 2003.

362

Cohen, Stephen and John Zysman, “Double or Nothing: Open Trade and Competitive Industry,” Foreign Affairs Vol.61, No.5, Summer 1983.

Collins, Larry, James C. Belke, Marc Halpern, Ruth A. Katz, Howard C. Kunreuther, and Patrick J. McNulty, “The Insurance Industry as a Qualified Third Party Auditor,” Professional Safety, Vol.47, No.4, 2002.

Congleton, Roger D. “Terrorism, Interest- Group Politics, and Public Policy: Curtailing Criminal Modes of Political Speech,” Centre for Studying Public Choice, 11 January 2001.

Cornish, Paul, “The CBRN System: Assessing the Threat of Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons in the UK,” Chatham House, February 2007.

Cox, Robert W., “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.10, No.2, Summer 1981.

Crowley, Michael “Keeping the Genie in the Bottle: Preventing the Proliferation and Misuse of Incapacitants”, in UNIDIR, Agent of Change? The CW Regime, Disarmament Forum, 2012.

Cusack, Thomas R., and Richard J. Stoll, “Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.38, No.1, March 1994.

Cutter, Susan L., Bryan J. Boruff, W. Lynn Shirley., “Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazard”, Social Science Quarterly, Vol.84, No.2, June 2003.

Dando, Malcolm “Science and the “New” Chemical Weapons Convention: Multiple Roles for Civil Scientists?,” in UNIDIR The Agent of Change: The CW Regime, Disarmament Forum, 2012.

Dechy, N., T. Bourdeaux, N. Ayrault, M-A.Kordek, and J-C. Le Coze, “First Lessons of the Toulouse Ammonium Nitrate Disaster,” Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol.111, 2004.

Dhara, V. R., and R. Dhara, “The Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal: A Review of Health Effects,” Archives of Environmental Health, Vol.57, No.5, 2002.

363

Digangi, Joe “Civil Society Actions for a Toxic-Free Future”, New Solutions- Building New Coalitions, Vol.21, No.3, 2011.

Dixon, Thomas Homer, “The Rise of Complex Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, No.128, January–February 2002.

Dunbobbin, Brian R., Thomas J. Medovich, Marc C. Murphy and Annie L. Ramsey, “Security Vulnerability Assessment in the Chemical Industry,” Process Safety Progress, Vol.23, No.3, September 2004.

Ejaz, Kiran “Disaster Management Never Part of the Medical Curriculum in Pakistan,” Journal of Pakistan Medical Association, May 2011.

Ember, Lois “Worst-Case Scenario for Chemical Plant Attack,” Chemical & Engineering News, Vol.80, 2002.

Ember, Lois "Chemical Plant Security," Chemical & Engineering News, Vol.85, April 9, 2007.

Engelmann, R. J., W. R. Pendergast, J. R. White, and M. E. Hall., "The Effectiveness of Stationary Automobiles as Shelters in Accidental Releases of Toxic Materials," Atmospheric Environment Vol.26a, No.17, 1992.

Falkenrath, Richard A., “Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” Survival, Vol.40, No.3, Autumn 1998.

Feakes, Daniel “Export Controls, Chemical Trade and the Chemical Weapons Convention,” in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Challenges and Solutions, Washington D.C.: 2001.

Feakes, Daniel, “Evaluating the CWC Verification System,” Disarmament Forum, No. 4, 2002.

364

Feakes, Daniel., “The In-Depth Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Second Review Conference“, in R. Trapp, ed., OPCW Academic Forum. Conference Proceedings, 2007.

Ghaffar, Raham “Plotting Techniques of Hattar Industrial Estate and its Environmental Implications,” Environmental News, 8 December 2012.

Fidler, D. P., The Meaning of Moscow: "Non-Lethal" Weapons and International Law in the Early 21st Century, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol.525, No.859, 2005.

Fidler, David P., “The Chemical Weapons Convention After Ten Years: Successes and Future Challenges”, The American Society of international Law, Vol.11, No.12, 27 April 2007

Floweree, Charles C., “On Tending Arms Control Agreements,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1990.

Flynn, Stephen E. “America the Vulnerable”, Foreign Affairs, Vol-81, No-1, January/ February 2002.

Ford, J.K., and A.M. Schmidt, “Emergency Response Training: Strategies for Enhancing Real-world Performance,” Journal of Hazardous Materials, 75, 2000.

Gluck, Aaron C., “How Codes of Practice Enhance a Chemical Security Culture,” OPCW Today, Vol.2, No.5, December 2013.

Gowa, Joanna, “Cooperation and International Relations,” International Organization Vol.40, No.1, Winter 1986.

Goldsmith, Jack, and Daryl Levincon, “Law of States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law,” The Harvard Law Review, Vol.122, No.7, May 2009.

Grieco, Joseph M. “Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma,” Journal of Politics, Vol.50, 1988.

Grieco, Joseph M., “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization, Vol.42, No.3, Summer 1988.

365

Granot, H., “Planning For The Unthinkable: Psychosocial Reaction To Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) Weapons,” Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol.21, Spring 2000.

Guven, Onur “On Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education,” OPCW Today, Vol.2, No.5, December 2013.

Haggard, Stephan and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization, Vol.41, No.3.

Hass, Ernst B. “On Systems and International Regimes,” World Politics, Vol.27, January 1975.

Hoffman, Bruce, “‘Holy Terror’: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative,” RAND Document P-7834, 1993.

Hoffman, Bruce “Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Analysis of Trends and Motivations,” RAND Document, P-8039, 1999.

Hoffman, Bruce., “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, No.25, 2002.

“International Table-Top Exercise: Chemical Shield-2011,” CBRN Centre of Excellence Newsletter, Vol.2, January 2012.

Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz “WMD Terrorism and Pakistan: Counter Measures,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, Vol.1, No.2, Fall 2008.

Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz “Pakistan’s Judicial System: Curbing the Menace of Terrorism,” 21 March 2005.

Jervis, Robert “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol.30, No.2, January 1978.

Jenkins, Brian M., “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” The RAND Corporation Paper, November 1975.

Jenkins, Brian M., “Terrorism and Beyond: A 21st Century Perspective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.24, No.5, 2001.

366

John F. Sopko, “The Changing Proliferation Threat,” Foreign Policy, No.105, Winter 1996–1997.

Johnson, Jeff, “Chemical Accident Data: Plethora of Confusion,” Chemical & Engineering News, 77, March 1999.

Johnston, Jeff, “New Voices for Plant Security,” Chemical and Energy News, 82, 22 November 2004.

Jones, Scott “Resolution 1540: Universalizing Export Control Standards?” Arms Control Today, Vol.36, No.4, May 2006.

Johnston, Jeff, “New Voices for Plant Security,” Chemical and Energy News, Vol.82, 22 November 2004.

Juurlink, Ludo, “Chemistry in Conflict: Spreading the Word to High School Students,” OPCW Today, Vol.2, No.5, December 2013.

Kaplan, David E., “Aum Shinrikyo (1995)” in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.

Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization, Vol.52, No.4, Autumn 1998.

Kelliher, Marybeth “Terrorism, Industry Prevention and the Chemical Weapons Convention”, Pure Appl. Che., Vol.74, No.12, 2002.

Kelle, Alexander, “The CWC After Its First Review Conference: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?” Disarmament Diplomacy, No.71, June- July 2003.

Kelle, Alexander, “Chemical and Biological Weapons Export Controls. Towards Regime Integration?“ in D. Joyner, ed., Multilateral Export Control Regimes, 2006.

Kelle, Alexander “Non-proliferation and Preventing the Re-emergence of Chemical Weapons”, UNIDIR, Agent of Change? The CW Regime, Disarmament Forum, No.1, 2012.

Keohane, Robert and Jpseph Nye, “International Integration and Interdependence”, in

367

Fred Grenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol.8, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975. Keohane, Robert O., “The Demand for International Regimes,” International Organization, Vol.36, No.2, Spring 1982.

Keohane, Robert O., “The Demand for International Regimes,” in Krasner ed., International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Khan, Haroon Ayub, “Implementing NEQS Pakistan’s Experience in Industrial Pollution Control,” Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Working Paper, No.38, 1998.

Khan, M. Azam, Muhammad Iqbal, Iftikhar Ahmed, and Manzoor H. Soomro, “Economic Evaluation of Pesticide Use Externalities in the Cotton Zones of Punjab, Pakistan,” The Pakistan Development Review, Vol.41, Part-II, Winter 2002.

Koblentz, G. D., “Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction? Assessing the Risk of CBRN Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.23, No.4, 2011.

Koblentz, Gregory, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare”, International Security, Vol.28, No.3, Winter 2003-2004.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization, Vol.55, No.4, Autumn 2001.

Kosal, Margaret E., “Terrorism Targeting Industrial Chemical Facilities: Strategic Motivations and the Implications for U.S. Security,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 2006.

Krasner, S.D., “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organizations, Vol.36, No.2, Spring 1982.

Krasner, Stephen D. “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.

368

Krisch, Nico “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order,” The European Journal of International Law, Vol.16, No.3, 2005.

Kunreuther, H., N. Novemsky, and D. Kahneman, “Making low Probabilities Useful,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol.23, No.2, 2001.

Kunreuther, H., P. McNulty, and Y. Kang, “Improving Environmental Safety Through Third Party Inspection,” Risk Analysis, Vol.22, No.2, 2002.

Kunreuther, H., and H. Geoffrey, “Interdependent Security,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Special Issue on Terrorist Risks, Vol.26, 2003.

Kupperman, Robert “A Dangerous Future: The Destructive Potential of Criminal Arsenals” Harward International Review, Summer 1995.

Leiv K. Eydnes, “IUPAC, OPCW, and the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Chemistry International, Vol.35, No.4, July- August 2013.

Lemley, J. R., Vasilis M. Fthenakis, and Paul D. Moskowitz, “Security Risk Analysis for Chemical Process Facilities,” Process Safety Progress, Vol.22, No.3, September 2003.

Lindell, M. K., “Assessing Emergency Preparedness in Support of Hazardous Facility Risk Analyses: An application at a U.S. Hazardous Waste Incinerator,” Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol.40, 1995.

Lindell, M. K., and R.W. Perry., “Community Innovation in Hazardous Materials Management: Progress in Implementing SARA Title III in the United States,” Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol.88, 2001.

Lois Ember, “Worst-Case Scenario for Chemical Plant Attack,” Chemical & Engineering News, Vol.80, 18 March 2002.

Mahmood, Qaiser, Uzaira Rafique, Aisha Ashraf, Abida Kalsoom Khan, Sadia Nasreen, and Rehana Rashid, “Toxic Chromium from Tanneries Pollute Water Resources and Soils of Sialkot (Pakistan),” Chemical Society of Pakistan, Vol.32, No.5, May 2010.

369

Manley, Ron G., “Verification Under the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Reflective Review,” Pure and Applied Chemistry, Vol. 74, No.12, December 2002.

Marybeth Kelliher, “Terrorism. Industry Prevention and the Chemical Weapons Convention”, Pure Appl. Chem, Vol.74, No.12, 2002.

Mearsheimer, John J. “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic, Vol.266, No.2, August 1990.

Mearsheimer, John J., “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol.19, No.3, 1994- 95.

Measheimer, John J., “A Realist Reply,” International Security, Vol.20, No.1, Summer 1995.

Mileti, D.S., J.H. Sorensen, and P.W. O’Brien, “Toward an Explanation of Mass Care Shelter use in Evacuations,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Vol.10, No.1, 1992.

Mitchell, Ronaldo B., “Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance,” International Organization, Vol.48, No.3, 1994.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel, “International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.51, Issue.4, October 2007.

Morrow, B. H., ‘‘Identifying and Mapping Community Vulnerability,’’ Disasters Vol.23, No.1, 1999.

Murmann, Johann Peter, Chemical Industries After 1850, Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, 17 May 2002.

Nagendrappa, G., “Sir William Henry Perkin: The Man and his ‘Mauve’,” Resonance, September 2010.

Nguyen, M. “Senate Struggles with Riot Control Agent Policy,” Arms Control Today, Vol.74, No.2, Jan/ Feb 2006.

370

Nishtar, Sania, “The Gateway Paper; Health System in Pakistan– a Way Forward,” Pakistan’s Health Policy Forum and Heart File, 2006.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr., “Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes,” International Organization, Vol.41, 1987.

Onur Guven, “On Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education,” OPCW Today, Vol.2, No.5, December 2013.

Parachini, John V., “Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 24, 2001.

Paracahi, John V., “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol.26, No.4, Autumn 2003.

Paracha, Sohail A., “Comparative Analysis of Pakistan and India Chemical Industry: Sectoral Analysis for Pakistan- India Trade Normalization,” Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development, August 2012.

Parshall, George W., Graham S. Pearson, Thomas D. Inch and Edward D. Becker, “Impact of Scientific Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention”, International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry Technical Report, Vol.74, No12, 2002.

Paracha, T. Sultan, “Country Profile on Occupational Safety and Health in Pakistan,” Centre for the Improvement of Workers Condition and Environment Lahore, Pakistan; and Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, Kuopia, Finland, 2003.

Phimister, J., Oktem, U., Kleindorfer, P. and Kunreuther, H, “Near-Miss Incident Management in the Chemical Process Industry,” Risk Analysis, Vol.23, 2003.

Prine, Carl, “Chemical Industry Slowly Boosts Security”, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, Vol.22, June 2003.

Puchala, Donald and Raymond Hopkins, “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

371

Ralf, Trapp, “Advances in Science and Technology and the Chemical Weapons Convention” Arms Control Association, Vol.80, No.1, April 2008.

Reisch, Marc S., “Twenty Years After Bhopal,” Chemical & Engineering News, Vol.82, No.7, June 2004.

Robert O. Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,” in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, Newyork: Columbia University Press, 1993.

Robert O. Keohane, “The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies,” in Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschholf, eds., America and Europe in an Era of Change, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993.

Roberts, Brad, “Rethinking Export Controls on Dual-Use Materials and Technologies: From Trade Restraints to Trade Enablers,” The Arena, No.2, June 1995.

Robinson, Julian Perry “The Australia Group: A Description and Assessment”, in Hans Gunter Brauch, Henry J. van der Graaf, John Grin and Wim Smit, eds., Controlling Military Research and Development and Exports of Dual use Technologies as a Problem of Disarmament and Arms Control Policy in the 1990s, Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992.

Rosenau, James N., "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics," International Organization, Vol.40, Autumn 1986.

Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,” International Organization, Vol.29, Summer 1975.

Saka, Ercan “The Role of Customs Services and the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) Enforcement Programme to Combat Illicit Movement of Prohibited Chemical Weapons”, Reader: International Symposiumon Cooperation and Legal Assistance for the Effective Implementation of International Agreements”, OPCW, 2001.

Saleem, Muhammad “Pharmaceutical Waste Water Treatment: A Physicochemical Study,” Journal of Research (Science), Vol.18, No.2, April 2007.

372

Sallee, Rad “Houston Area No Stranger to Industrial Disasters,” The Houston Chronicle, 24 December 1996.

Siirola, Jeff, and Scott Berger, “Measuring Improvements in Process Safety,” Chemical Week, Vol.166, No.41, 15 December 2004.

Simon, Steven and Daniel Benjamin., “America and the New Terrorism,” Survival, Vol.42, No.1, Spring 2000.

Snidal, Duncan, “The Theory of International Politics,” World Politics, Vol.38, No.1, October 1985.

Snidal, Duncan “Coordination versus Prisoner’s Dillema: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes,” American Political Science Review, Vol.79, No.4, December 1985.

Snidal, Duncan, “Relative Gains the Pattern of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review, Vol.85, No.3, 1991.

Sopko, John F. “The Changing Proliferation Threat,” Foreign Policy, No.105, Winter 1996–1997.

Sprinzak, Ehud, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,” Foreign Policy, No.112, Fall 1998.

Strange, Susan “The Management of Surplus Capacity or How Does Theory Stand Up to Protectionism Seventies Style?” International Organization, Vol.33, Summer 1979.

Stein, Arthur A., “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” International Organization, Vol.36, Spring 1982.

Strange, Susan “Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regimes Analysis,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Subrahmanyam, K., “Export Controls and North South Controversy”, Washington Quarterly, Vol.16, Spring 1993.

Tabassi, L., and S. Spence, “Improving CWC implementation: the OPCW Action Plan“, in T. Findlay, ed., Verification Yearbook 2004, VERTIC, 2004.

373

Thier, Bernhard, “Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Programme Reflects its Commitment to Non-Proliferation,” European Chemical Industry Council, 24 September 2008.

Trapp, Ralf, “The Chemical Weapons Convention—Multilateral Instrument with a Future,” in Ramesh Thakur and Ere Haru, eds., The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation, Challenges and Opportunities, New York: UN University Press, 2006.

Trapp, Ralf, “The OPCW in Transition: from Stockpile Elimination to Maintaining a World Free of Chemical Weapons”, UNIDIR, Agent of Change? The CW Regime, Disarmament Forum, 2012.

Tucker, Jonathan B. and Sands, Amy., “An Unlikely Threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.55, No.4, July- August 1999.

Tucker, Jonathan B., “Verifying the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing Elements,” Arms Control Today, Vol.37, No.1, January/ February 2007.

Tucker, Jonathan B. “Strengthening the CWC Regime for Transfers of Dual-Use Chemicals,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, Vol.75, March 2007.

Tucker, Jonathan B., “The Future of Chemical Weapon,” The New Atlantic, No.26, Fall 2009/ Winter 2010.

Tweedie, S.W., J.R. Rowland, S.J. Walsh, R.P. Rhoten, and P. I. Hagle, “A Methodology for Estimating Emergency Evacuation Times,” The Social Science Journal Vol.23, 1986.

Ujihara, A. M., "Responding to Chemical Accidents by Sheltering in Place." Resources, No.94, 1989.

Ullah, Rizwan, Riffat Naseem Malik and Abdul Qadir, “Assessment of Groundwater Contamination in an Industrial City, Sialkot, Pakistan,” African Journal of Environmental Science and Technology, Vol.3, No.12, December 2009.

Upstill, Garrett, Alan J. Jones, Tom Spurling and Greg Simpson, “Innovation Strategies for the Australian Chemical Industry,” Journal of Business Chemistry, September 2006,

374

Urbanik, T, “State of the Art in Evacuation Time Estimates for Nuclear Power Plants,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Vol.12, No.3, November 1994.

Urbanik, T, “Evacuation Time Estimates for Nuclear Power Plants,” Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol.75, 2000.

Valencia, Mark J., “The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Glass Half-Full,” Arms Control Today, Vol.37, No.5, June 2007.

Watkins, Karen, “Fertilizer Plant Explodes in France,” Chemical & Engineering News, Vol.79, No.40, 1 October 2001.

Webber, Frederick L. A., “U.S. Industry Perspective on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention”, OPCW Synthesis, November 2000.

Wilson, D. J., "Stay Indoors or Evacuate to Avoid Exposure to Toxic Gas?" Emergency Preparedness Digest, Jan- Mar 1987.

Williams, Timothy, “U.S. Controls on Technology Transfers by Intangible Means,” The Monitor, No.6, Summer 2000.

Williamson, Ann M. Anne-Marie Feyer, David Cairns and Doborah Biancotti, “The Development of a Measure of Safety Climate: The Role of Safety Perceptions and Attitudes,” Safety Science, Vol.25, No.1-3, February- April 1997.

Wood, Andrew and Shelina Shariff, “Fallout From Channelview Explosion Keeps on Coming,” Chemical Week, Vol.147, No.3, July 1990.

Young, Ian, “Legacy of Toulouse Disaster Still Weighs Heavy,” Chemical Week, Vol.164, No.18, 14 May 2003.

Young, Oran R., “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Young, Oran R. “International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions,” World Politics, Vol.39, No.1, 1986.

Young, Oran R., and Gail Osherenko, “The Formation of International Regimes:

375

Hypotheses and Cases,” in Young and Osherenko, eds., Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.

Zanders, Jean Pascal “Assessing the Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol.6, No.4, Fall 1999.

Zlauvinen, Gustavo “The Argentine Project on Education and the CWC,” OPCW Today, Vol.2, No.5, December 2013.

DOCUMENTS

Alder, Dominik M., “Statement of the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the OPCW, Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” General Debate, OPCW HQ, The Hague, 8 April 2008.

American Chemistry Council, “Protecting a Nation: Homeland Defense and the Business of Chemistry,” Arlington, VA, 2002.

Australia, “Non-paper: Chemical Weapons Convention Industry Verification: Inspection of Schedule 3 and Discreet Organic Chemical (DOC) Facilities,” OPCW CSP Document C-VI/ NAT.7, 24 June 1999.

Australia, “Australia Approach to National Implementation of CWC,” Available at www.dfat.gov.au/cwco, and accessed on 9 November 2012.

Australia, “National Export Licensing Measures,” OPCW PrepCom Document PC XIII/B/WP.9, 26 March 1996.

Australia, “Non-paper: Chemical Weapons Convention Industry Verification: Inspection of Schedule 3 and Discreet Organic Chemical (DOC) Facilities,” OPCW CSP Document C-VI/ NAT.7, 24 June 1999.

Azhar, Kehkeshan, “Statement of the Acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan, Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” OPCW HQ, The Hague, 7–18 April 2008. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 17 April 2013.

376

Barbero, Michael D. “Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs,” 13 December 2012. Available at www.foreign.senate.gov, and accessed on 10 March 2014.

Bustani, M. Jose, “Possible Responses to Global Terrorist Threats,” OPCW Document No. S/292/2002, The Hague, 29 January 2002.

Bustani, Jose M. “Director General OPCW Note: Responses to Global Terrorist Threats,” S/ 292/ 2002, The Hague, 29 January 2002. Available at www.opcw.org., and accessed on 4 June 2013.

Bustani, Jose M. “Director General OPCW Opening Statement to the Conference of the States Parties at its Fifth Session,” OPCW CSP Document C-V/DG.11, 15 May 2000. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 5 June 2013.

Bustani, Jose M. “Opening Statement by the Director General to the Executive Council 22nd Session”, 5 December 2000. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 5 June 2013.

Canada Technological Background Paper: “Production, Processing and Consumption Plant Site Operations and their Relationships to the Issue of Low Concentration of Schedule 2 and 3 Chemicals,” 21st Session of the OPCW Executive Council, 3- 6 October 2000.

Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, her intervention during the Commemoration of the Entry into Force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 3 September 2012. Available at www.consilium.europa.eu, and accessed on 11 December 2012.

Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, “Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites,” New York, 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorist CBRN: Materials and Effects (U),” CTC 200340058, May 2003.

“Convention on the Trans-boundary Effects of Industrial Accidents,” 17 March 1992.

377

Available at www.unece.org, and accessed on 19 December 2011. “Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,” 25 June 1998. Available at www.unece.org/env, and accessed on 25 December 2011.

Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System,” Washington, DC, 2008. Available at www.fema.gov, and accessed on 17 August 2011.

Department of Transportation, Transport Canada, and Secretariat of Transport and Communications, “Emergency Response Guidebook,” Washington, DC, 2008. Available at www.ehso.com, and accessed on 13 March 2013.

European Commission, White Paper: Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, COM (2001) 88 final, 27 February 2001. Available at www.isopa.org, and accessed on 15 April 2013.

“European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road,” 30 September 1957. Available at www.unece.org/trans/danger, and accessed on 20 April 2013.

“European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways,” 25 May 2000, Available at www.unece.org/trans/danger, and accessed on 13 July 2013.

European Union, “Council Regulations (EC) No 1334/ 2000”, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 159, 30 June 2000.

European Union, Commission of the European Communities, “CBRN Action Plan,” 2009. Available at ec.europa.eu, accessed on 16 August 2013.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Incident Management System: An Introduction,” Washington, DC, 2004. Available at www.fema.gov, and accessed on 13 September 2013.

French Environment Ministry, “The Major Hazard in Toulouse,” 6th Meeting of the Committee of the Competent Authorities Responsible for the Implementation of Directive,” 96/82/EC, Antwerp, Belgium, 10–12 October 2001.

378

House Select Committee on Homeland Security Hearing on “Combating Terrorism: The Role of Broadcast Media,” 15 September 2004.

Howe, David, “Planning Scenarios Executive Summaries”, The Homeland Security Council, July 2004. Available at archive.org/stream/NationalPlanningScenario, and accessed 0n 3 November 2012.

IAEA, “Guidelines for Integrated Risk Assessment and Management in Large Industrial Areas,” ISSN 1011-4289, 1998.

ICFTU, “Is There a Bhopal Near You? Unions Drive to Prevent Chemical Disasters Worldwide: Trade Union Principles for the Prevention of Chemical Disasters,” Brussels, 1986.

ILO, “Prevention of Major Accident Hazards: an ILO Code of Practice,” Geneva, 1991.

ILO, Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, 25 June 1990. Available at www.ilo.org/safework, and accessed on 23 April 2012.

ILO, Convention Concerning the Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents, 22 June 1993, Available at www.ilo.org/safework, and accessed on 15 January 2012.

India, “Chemical Trade and International Cooperation under the CWC,” OPCW PrepCom Document PC-XIII/B/WP.7, 23 February 1996.

“International Council of Chemical Associations Paper,” Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 11 June 2007.

IPCS, OECD, UNEP, IE, and WHO, “Health Aspects of Chemical Accidents, Guidance on Chemical Accident Awareness, Preparedness and Response for Health Professionals and Emergency Responders,” 1994. At seach.oecd.org, and accessed on 3 January 2012.

Javits, Eric M. “Statement to the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” 7 April 2008. At carnegieendowment.org and accessed on 13 March 2013.

Kazi, Mustafa Kamal, “Statement to the First Special Session of the Conference of States Parties,” 30 April 2003. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 3 July 2012.

379

Kingdom of Sweden, “Technological Development and Industry Inspections,” RC1/NAT.28, May 8, 2003. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 7 January 2014.

Luhan, Michael, “Crisis Communication Planning: OPCW’s 10 Commandments”, CBRNE Table Top Exercise, Warsaw, 22 November 2010. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 9 April 2013.

Martin, Christopher, “Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure: Making Our Program More Effective,” Strategy Research Project, 15 March 2006. Available at www.dtic.mil, and accessed on 25 May 2013.

Merritt, C., “Chemical Attack on America: How Vulnerable are We?” Testimony before U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, First Session, 27 April 2005. Available at www.gpo.gov, and accessed on 10 February 2011.

Mogford, J. “Fatal Accident Investigation Report,” Isomerization Unit Explosion Final Report, Texas City- 2005,” 9 December 2005. Available at cip.management.dal.ca, and accessed on 5 March 2013.

NAM, “The Final Document of the 12th Summit of the Non- Aligned Movement”, Durban, 2- 3 September 1998.

National Response Team, “Developing a Hazardous Materials Exercise Program: A Handbook for State and Local Officials,” NRT-2, Washington, DC, 1990. Available at nepis.epa.gov, and accessed on 3 December 2012.

Nunn, Sam, “Statement to the U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, regarding Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 104th Congress, Washington, D.C., 31 October and 1 November 1995. Available at www.archive.org, and accessed on 4 February 2012.

OECD, “Chemical Hazards and their Control in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) – an Approach to Hazard Reduction,” Paris, 2001. Available at www.oecd.org, and accessed on 8 January 2012.

380

OECD, “Guiding Principles: Chemical Accident Prevention,” 2003. Available at www.mzp.cz, and accessed on 3 June 2011.

OPCW Technical Secretariat, “Note by the Director General: Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science and Technology,” RC-1/DG.2, 23 April 2003. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 8 May 2012.

OPCW Technical Secretariat, “Background Paper on the Conduct of Inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention and Related Issues,” RC-1/S/1, 17 April 2003. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 3 August 2012.

OPCW, “Decision: Plan of Action Regarding the Implementation of Article VII Obligations,” Conference of the States Parties, Document C-8/DEC.16, 24 October 2003. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 6 March 2011.

OPCW, “Director General OPCW Note to the First Review Conference,” OPCW document RC-1/DG.1, 17 April 2003. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 4 February 2011.

OPCW Technical Secretariat, “Note by the Technical Secretariat: Support by Inspected States Parties for Sampling and Analysis Under Article VI of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” S/548/2006, 10 February 2006. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 17 November 2012.

OPCW, “Germany Hosts Challenge Inspection Exercise,” 6 April 2006. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 22 June 2010.

OPCW, “Report of the Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Second Review Conference, Document RC- 2/4, 18 April 2008. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 10 May 2013.

OPCW, “Risk Assessment of the Different Types of Plant Sites/ Facilities under Article VI of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Document RC-2/NAT.11, 9 April 2008. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 11 February 2013. OPCW Technical Secretariat, “Note by the Director General: Report of the Advisory

381

Panel on Future Priorities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,” OPCW document S/951/2011, 25 July 2011. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 5 January 2013.

OPCW, “Note by the Director General: Report to the Conference of the States Parties at its Sixteenth Session on the Status of Implementation of Article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” The Hague, 29 July 2011. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 13 December 2012.

OPCW, “OPCW Conference on International Cooperation and Chemical Safety & Security: Outcome Document,” The Hague, 2011. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 16 February 2013.

OPCW Executive Council, “Note by the Director-General: Response to the Report of the Seventeenth Session of the Scientific Advisory Board,” OPCW document EC-67/DG.11, 9 February 2012. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 4 June 2013.

OPCW, “OPCW Inspects 1000th OCPF Plant Site“, 15 March 2012. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 9 June 2013.

OPCW, “Director General Ahmet Uzumcu Address to the Seminar on the CWC and Chemical Safety and Security Management for Member States of the Region of Southeast and South Asia,” Kuala Lumpur, 8- 11 May 2012. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 8 October 2012.

OPCW Technical Secretariat, “State of Participation in the CWC as at 14 October 2013,” S/1131/ 2013, The Hague, 14 October 2013. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 1 February 2014

CWC Implementation Ordinance-2000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 24 January 2011.

CWC Implementation Rules- 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan. Available at www.mfa.gov, and accessed on 12 August 2011. Pakistan, “Demographics Profile,” 2013. Available at www.indexmundi.com, and accessed on 17 January 2014.

382

Pakistan NDMA Presentation, “National Disaster Management System in Pakistan” Available at ndma.gov.pk/document, and accessed on 4 January 2014.

Pakistan, Ministry of Railways, “The Railways Act 1890,” (Updated in 1996), 1997. Available at jamilandjamil.com, and accessed on 2 December 2013.

Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, “Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2009- 12, 27 July 2009. Available at www.commerce.gov.pk, and accessed on 2 December 2013.

Pakistan, Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, “Role and Function of FPCCI in the Growth of Trade, Industry, Services, SMEs, Commerce & Economic Development of Pakistan,” Available at www.fpcci.com.pk, and accessed on 4 January 2014.

Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, “Trade Policy: 2012- 15,” Islamabad, 8 March 2013. Available at www.commerce.gov.pk, and accessed on 9 October 2013.

Pakistan, Ministry of Environment, “National Profile on Chemical Management,” 2009. Available at www2.unitar.org, and accessed on 12 November 2013.

Pakistan, Ministry of Environment, “Hazardous Substances Rules 2007,” Islamabad, 7 April 2009. Available at www.environment.gov, and accessed on 22 November 2013.

Palarino, R. Nicholas., and Robert Briggs., “Briefing Memorandum for the hearing Combating Terrorism: Chemical Plant Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations,” 19 February 2004.

Rademaker, Stephen G. “National Statement to the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” 28 April 2003. Available at www.cwc.gov/outreach, and accessed on 15 February 2013.

Sandia National Laboratories, International Chemical Threat Reduction Department, “Safety and Security Training for the Chemical Industry,” Document No. 2011-5598 P. 21 October 2010.

383

Smith, Calvert, “Comments When Passing Judgment on the Defendents- Buncefield Fire, St Albahs Crown Court,” 16 December 2010.

Sorensen, John, Barry Shumpert, Barbara Vogt, “Environmental Sciences Division, “Planning Protective Action Decision- Making: Evacuate or Shelter-in-Place?,” ORNL/TM-2002/144, June 2002. Available at web.ornl.gov, and accessed on 13 July 2013.

“The 9/ 11 Commission Report,” 2004. Available at www.9-11commission.gov, and accessed on 19 August 2013.

U.K. Health and Safety Executive, “Safety Culture: A Review of the Literature,” Document no. HSL/2002/25, 2002. Available at www.hse.gov.uk, and accessed on 20 September 2013.

U.K. Paper, “The Changing Face of the Chemical Industry: Implications for the Chemical Weapons Convention”, OPCW Conference of the States Parties, The Hague, 24 April 2003.

U.K. paper on “Declaration of National Protective Programmes under Article X”, Conference of the States Parties, RC-1/ NAT.4, OPCW HQ, The Hague, 15 April 2003.

U.K. Paper, “The Changing Face of the Chemical Industry: Implications for Chemical Weapons Convention”, OPCW Conference of the States Parties, 24 April 2003.

U.K. “The Final Report of the Major Incident Investigation Board,” The Buncefield Incident, 11 December 2005, 2008. Available at www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk, and accessed on 5 May 2012.

UNEP, “APELL Handbook: Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level: A Process for Responding to Technological Accidents,” ISBN 92-807-1183-0, 1988.

UNEP, “APELL Storage of Hazardous Materials: A Technical Guide for Safe Warehousing of Hazardous Materials,” 1990. Available at www.mzp.cz, and accessed on 21 May 2013.

384

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks,” OTA-ISC-559, Washington, DC, August 1993. Available at www.princeton.edu, and accessed on 2 March 2012.

United Nations, “Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,” Johannesburg, 26 August- 4 September 2002, New York, 2002. Available at www.un.org/jsummit, and accessed on 7 October 2012.

United Nations, “Ministerial- Level Meeting Calls for Urgent Action to Prevent, Suppress all Support for Terrorism,” 20 January 2003. Available at www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org, and accessed on 25 July 2013.

United Nations Environment Protection Programme, “Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management,” 2006. Available at www.saicm.org, and accessed on 13 October 2012.

UN, “Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Model Regulations,” UN document ST/SG/AC.10/1/ Rev.17, 2011. Available at www.unece.org, and accessed on 17 August 2013.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and U.S. Department of Transportation, “Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis,” Washington, DC, 1987. Available at www2.epa.gov, and accessed on 12 September 2012.

U.S. Fire Administration, “Phillips Petroleum Chemical Plant Explosion and Fire: Pasadena,” Texas, USFA-TR-035, 1989. Available at www.usfa.fema.gov, and accessed on 27 April 2013.

U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Guide for All Hazard Emergency Operations Planning,” SLG-101. Washington, DC, September 1996. Available at www.fema.gov, and accessed on 14 May 2013.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “66,000 Facilities Need to Prepare “Worst-Case” Scenario Plan,” 6 April 1998. Available at www.epa.gov, and accessed on 15 October 2013.

385

US PIRG, “At Risk and In the Dark: Will Companies In Our Communities Reduce Their Chemical Disaster Zones?” 1999.

US EPA, “Guidance for Auditing Risk Management Plans (RMPs),” 1999.

U.S. Department of Justice, “Assessment of the Increased Risk of Terrorist or Other Criminal Activity Associated with Posting Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information on the Internet,” Washington, DC, 2000.

USA PATRIOT Act, 2001. Available at www.gpo.gov, and accessed on 14 March 2012.

U.S. Army Office of the Surgeon General, “U.S. Army, Draft Medical NBC Hazard Analysis of Chemical-Biological-Radiological- Nuclear-High Explosive Threat, Possible Scenarios & Planning Requirements,” October 2001. Available at https://archive.org, and accessed on 23 June 2013.

U.S. Department of Defence, “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” January 2001.

U.S. Senate, Chemical Security Act, 2002. Available at www.gpo.gov, and accessed on 19 November 2012.

USA Homeland Security Act, 2002. Available at www.dhs.gov, and accessed on 23 Dec 2013.

U.S. General Accounting Office, “Program Evaluation: Strategies for Assessing How Information Dissemination Contributes to Agency Goals,” GAO-02-923, September 2002. Available at www.gao.gov, and accessed on 21 April 2013.

U.S. Department of Justice, “A Method to Assess the Vulnerability of U.S. Chemical Facilities,” Washington, DC, 2002. Available at www.ncjrs.gov, and accessed on 9 September 2012.

U.S. Office of Homeland Security, “National Strategy for Homeland Security,” July 2002.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,” Washington, DC, February 2003. Available at www.dhs.gov, and accessed on 13 September 2013.

386

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), “Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness is Unknown” Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-03-439 Washington, D.C, March 2003. Available at www.gao.gov, and accessed on 3 January 2014.

U.S. National Infrastructure Protection Center, “Homeland Security Information Update: Al Qa’ida Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threat and Basic Countermeasures,” Information Bulletin 03-003, 12 February 2003.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities Report for Chemical Facilities,” version 1, Washington, DC, 17 July 2003.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, “Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies Report: Phase- I Final Report,” Washington, DC, 2003.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Capabilities Based Planning Overview. 2004.

U.S. Homeland Security Council, “Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries,” Washington, DC, July 2004. Available at https://kensascity.feb.gov, and accessed on 13 June 2013.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Office of Science and Technology Policy, “The National Plan for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection”, 2004. Available at www.dhs.gov, and accessed on 3 November 2012.

U.S. General Accounting Office, “Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention Raise Concerns About Proliferation,” GAO-04-361, March 2004. Available at www.dhs.gov, and available at 17 December 2012.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “The Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan,” Washington D.C, 2005.

Merritt, C., “Chemical Attack on America: How Vulnerable are We?” Testimony before U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2005. Available at www.gpo.gov, and accessed on 12 January 2013.

387

U.S. GAO, “Homeland Security: Federal and Industry Efforts Are Addressing Security Issues at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Action Is Needed,” GAO-05-631T, 27 April 2005. Available at www.gao.gov, and accessed on 13 May 2013.

U.S. Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” 30 August 2005. U.S. “Senate Report on Pre-War Intelligence on Iraq,” September 2006.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Homeland Security: DHS Is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed,” January 2006, GAO-06-150. Available at www.gao.gov, and accessed on 18 August 2012.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident Management System,” 18 December 2008. Available at www.fema.gov, and accessed on 10 September 2013.

U.S. “National Infrastructure Protection Plan,” 2009. Available at www.dhs.gov, and accessed on 3 December 2012.

Uzumcu, Ahmet., “Statement to the Fourteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties,” OPCW document C-14/DG.13, The Hague, 30 November 2009. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 16 March 2013.

Uzumcu, Ahmet, “Director General OPCW Opening Address: OPCW in a Changing Environment- Promoting Security and Cooperation,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-Proliferation, The Hague, 11- 12 April 2011. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 7 October 2012.

Uzumcu, Ahmet, “Director General OPCW Address to the Seminar on the CWC and Chemical Safety and Security Management for Member States of the Region of Southeast and South Asia,” Kuala Lumpur, 8- 11 May 2012. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 14 March 2014.

Uzumcu, Ahmet, “Director General OPCW Address to the Sixty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” New York, 18 November 2012. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 6 August 2013.

388

Uzumcu, Ahmet, Director General OPCW, Statement to the United Nations General Assembly Session, New York, 19 November 2012. Available at www.opcw.org, and accessed on 1 December 2012.

Vogt, Barbara Muller and John H. Sorensen, “Description of a Survey Data Regarding Plant Accident West Helena,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, ORNL/ TM- 13722, March 1999. Available at orise.orau.gov, and accessed on 27 September 2013.

Witmer, Pam, “Statement to the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Combating Terrorism: Chemical Plant Security Hearing,” 23 February 2003.

INTERVIEWS

Alborn, Mark, OPCW Head Implementation Support Branch, Singapore National Authority, Singapore, 4 June 2010.

Ali, Zafar, Director General Pakistan Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV), Islamabad, 19 September 2013.

Amin,Tahir, Director National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, 9 October 2013.

Artos, Violeta, Senior Officer Industry Verification Branch of OPCW, Doha, Qatar, 23 October 2008.

Azhar, Kehkashan, Acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the OPCW, Pakistan Mission at The Hague, The Netherlands, 11 April 2008.

Badshah, Amin, Chairman Department of Chemistry, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, 28 April 2014.

Bilal, Asfar, Director National Authority on CWC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, 8 November 2013

389

Chaudhry, Aizaz Ahmed, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the OPCW The Hague, The Netherlands, 26 November 2009.

Crowley, Michel, Director Verification Research Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), London, U.K., 23 April 2007

Dhavle, V.B., Senior Officer Industry Verification Branch of OPCW, Doha, Qatar, 23 October 2008.

Elahi, Malik Azhar, Senior Policy Officer at the OPCW, Montreux, Switzerland, 26 March 2010.

Feaks, Daniel, OPCW Strategy and Policy Officer, OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, The Netherlands, 27 November 2009.

Khan, Muhammad Afzal, Director Chem- Bio Defence Cell (CBDC), Defence Science & Technology Organization (DESTO), SPD, Chaklala, Pakistan, 14 June 2013.

Lan, Teo Sieu, Assistant Director General National Authority on CWC, Singapore Customs, Singapore, 4 June 2010.

Lentzos, Filippa, Expert on Social Shaping of Risks and Threats, London School of Economics, London, The U.K., 27 April 2007.

Malik, Riffat N., Chairperson Department of Environmental Sciences, Quaid-i-Azam Universirty, Islamabad, Pakistan, 26 March 2014.

Wade, Stephen, Head OPCW Declaration Branch, OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, The Netherlands, 28 November 2009.

Woodward, Angela Director National Implementation Measures Verification Research Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), London, U.K. 23 April 2007.

Zaid, Naeem, Director General Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad, Pakistan, 6 September 2013.

Meetings/ Interviews with the Management and Safety and Security officers, and

390

Employees of Following Chemical Industry Engro

Chemicals, Pakistan Ltd, Dharki, 2-5 June 2008

Dawood Hercules Ltd, Lahore, 3 November 2009.

Pak- Arab Fertilizer, Multan, 4 November 2009.

Fauji Fertilizer, Ghoth Machi, 5 November 2009.

Fauji Fertilizer Mirpur Mathelo, 6 November 2009.

Clariant Pakistan Limited, Jamshoro, 7 November 2009.

Super Chemical Karachi, 8 November 2009.

Chemi-Dyestuff, Hub, 9 November 2009.

Dynea Pakistan Limited, Hub, 9 November 2009.

Ittehad Chemicals Ltd, Kala Shah Kaku, Lahore, 1 April 2013.

Sardar Chemical Industries Limited, Gadoon Amazai, 16 August 2013. MB Dyes

Chemical and Silk Industries (Pvt) Ltd, Gadoon Amazai, 16 Aug 2013

AJ Textile Mills, Gadoon Amazai, 16 Aug 2013.

Ink Chemicals, Gadoon Amazai, 16 Aug 2013.

Razar Chemical Industries, Gadoon Amazai, 17 Aug 2013

Amber Chemicals Private Limited, 27 Mar 2014.

Attock Chemicals Hattar, 27 Mar 2014.

Dewan Salman Fibre Limited, Hattar, 27 Mar 2014

Visits to At-Risk Communities (Interaction with local People)

Karachi, At-risk communities, November 2007.

Mirpur Mathelo, At-risk communities, 8 November 2007.

Dharki, At-risk communities, June 2009. Rawalpindi, At-risk communities, 14 October 2010.

391

Multan, At-risk communities, 28 February 2010.

Lahore, At-risk communities, 4 April 2011.

Haripur, At-risk communities, 3 September 2011.

Kala Shah Kako, At-risk communities, 1 April 2013.

Gadoon Amazai, At-risk communities, 17 August 2013.

Hattar, At-risk communities, 27 March 2014.

Other visits and meetings with relevant people are given in chapter-8.

REPORTS

Amy E. Smithson and Lesley-Anne Levy, “Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response,” Report No. 35, Washington, DC: Stimson Center, October 2000.

Argentina Report on its Activities to the Eighteenth Session of the Conference of States Parties held in November 2013, C-13/ NAT.3, The Hague, 2 December 2013.

Bowman, Steve, CRS Report, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Terrorist Threat,” 7 March 2002.

Balali-Mood, Mahdi, Pieter S. Styeyn, Leiv K. Eydnes and Ralf Trapp, “Impact of Scientific Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention, IUPAC Technical Report,” Pure and Applied Chemistry, Vol. 80, No. 1, 2008.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth, CRS Report, “Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context,” 28 March 2003.

Canada Report on Wilton Park Conference WPS 06/7, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Facing Future Challenges”, 1 October 2006.

Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorist CBRN: Materials and Effects (U),” CTC 200340058, May 2003.

392

CTITF Report, United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Interagency Coordination in the Event of a Terrorist Attack Using Chemical or Biological Weapons or Materials, August 2011.

Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, "Report on Scientific Studies on the Release Factors Related to Bhopal Toxic Gas Leakage", December 1985.

“Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire. BP Texas City,” Texas, March 23 2005. US Chemical Safety Board. Report No. 2005-04-I-TX, March 2007.

Lane Kirkland, “The Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission to Study the Causes and Effects of the Methyl Isocyanate Gas Leak at the Union Carbide Pesticide Plant in Bhopal, India, on December 2-3-1984” 1985.

Parshall, George W., Graham S. Pearson, Thomas D. Inch and Edwin D. Becker, International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry Technical Report, “Impact of Scientific Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention”, Vol 74, No.12, 2002.

“Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science and Technology” (RC-1/DG2 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 23 April 2003.

Shea, Dana A., “Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and Options for Lessening Their Impact”, CRS Report for Congress, 1 December 2004.

Shea, Dana A., and Frank Gottron, CRS Report, “Small-scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons,” 20 May 2004.

Shea, Dana A., and Frank Gottron, CRS Report RS21383 “Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism,” 17 April 2013.

Schwab, J., K.C. Topping, C.C. Eadie, R.E. Deyle, and R.A. Smith, “Planning for Postdisaster Recovery and Reconstruction,” PAS Report 483/484. Chicago IL: American Planning Association, 1998.

Schierow, Linda-Jo “Chemical Plant Security,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report, 26 July 2002, updated 20 January 2004.

393

The 9/11 Commission Report.

Union Carbide Corporation, “Bhopal Methyl Isocyanate Investigation Team Report,” Danbury, CT: March 1985.

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, “Hazard Investigation: Improving Reactive Hazard Management,” Report No. 2001-01-H, October 2002.

OPCW Executive Council, “Report of the OPCW for 2005,” C-11/4, 6 December 2006.

U.S. National Commission on Terrorism, “Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report of the National Commission on Terrorism,” Washington: GPO, 2000.

CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS

Adam S. Markowski, “Safety and Risk Management Aspects for Major Accident Industry in Poland”, Conference on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 7-8 November 2012.

Asirwatham, Grace A., “Deputy Director General OPCW Closing Remarks,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-Proliferation, OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, 11 April 2011.

Belke, J., “Chemical Accident Risks in U.S. industry—A Preliminary Analysis of Accident Risk Data from US Hazardous Chemical Facilities,” The 10th International Symposium on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries. Stockholm, Sweden, 2001.

Cupitt, Richard, “The Future of Export Controls”, The 2000 Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference, 16-17 March 2000.

394

Frandi, Nico, “Enhancing Chemical Safety and Security: The European Union Support to the Work of the OPCW,” The International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8 – 9 November 2012.

Hart, Robin, “Trans-border Consequence Management: Responding to Major Acts of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive or Nuclear Terrorism”, Report on Wilton Park Conference 855, 18- 20 June 2007.

Hughes, Kathryn, “National and International Chemical Security Activities at the US National Academy of Sciences”, the Conference on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8 November 2012.

Hussain, Nazir, “Pakistan Export Controls Regime: Legislative Framework,” Brussels Export Controls Conference, 16- 17 November 2006.

ICRC, Proceedings of the Expert Meeting “Incapacitating Chemical Agents- Implications for International Law”, Montreux, Switzerland, 24–26 March 2012.

Igarashi, Takuya, “Lessons from Investigations into Discrepancies in Import and Export Data of Schedule 2 and 3 Chemicals”, First Annual Meeting of the National Authorities and Chemical Industry Representatives, The Hague, 26-27 June 1999.

International Council of Chemical Associations, “Paper for Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” the Conference of the States Parties and Chemical Industry, The Hague, 11 June 2007.

Kalelkar, Ashok S., “Investigation of Large-Magnitude Incidents: Bhopal as a Case Study,” Conference on Preventing Major Chemical Accidents, Institution of Chemical Engineers, London, May 1998.

Kasprzyk, Nicolas, “Resolution 1540 and the Prevention of the Proliferation of WMD to Non-State Actors: implications for Chemical Security”, the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8– 9 November 2012

Keller, William W., “Toward a ‘Chemical Safety and Security Leadership Forum’ The Advent of CBRN Security Culture”, International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012.

395

Kosal, Margaret E., “Near Term Threats of Chemical Weapons Terrorism,” Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks Conference, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, 29–30 June 2005.

Kukhar, Valery P., “Strengthening Chemical Safety and Security in the Area Chemical Activities in Ukraine”, the International Meeting On Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnów, Poland, 8– 9 November 2012.

Lindell, M.K., R.W. Perry, and C.S. Prater., “Organizing Response to Disasters with the Incident Command System/Incident Management System (ICS/IMS),” International Workshop on Emergency Response and Rescue,Taipei, 2005.

Mathews, Bob “Improvised Chemical Devices, Chemical Security and the CWC”, The International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, Tarnow, Poland, 8- 9 November 2012.

Matousek, Jiri, “Chemical Weapons Convention: Status and Actual Problems of Implementation,” 25th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the CWC and BWC, Geneva, 18-19 November 2006

Meier, Oliver, “Statement of Arms control Association to the Meeting with NonGovernmental Organizations at the OPCW,” The Hague, 19 November 2007.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel, “International Institutions and the Management of Contentious Issues,” Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society, Arizona, 2002.

Muzamill, Anam “A Comparative Study of Natural Disasters News Coverage in Pakistan by DAWN and The News (The Case of Earthquake 2005 & Floods 2010),” International Conference on Communication, Media, Technology and Design, 9- 11 May 2012, Istanbul, Turkey.

Paturej, Krysztof “OPCW’s Role in Global Efforts Against Terrorism,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-Proliferation, OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, 11 April 2011.

Rapacki, Zalzislaw “United Nations General Assembly Resolution on CWC

396

Implementation- an Important Tool to Generate International Support for the Comprehensive Ban of Chemical Weapons and Implementation of the CWC Provisions,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-Proliferation, The Hague, 11 April 2011.

Runn, Per “Report of Working Session1: Convergence of Biology and Chemistry,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution to Security and non-Proliferation,” OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, 11-12 April 2011.

Sloten, Rene Van, “Chemical Industry Compliance of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” OPCW Seminar on OPCW Contribution to Security and Non-proliferation, OPCW Headquarters The Hague, 11-12 April 2011.

Smith, Mark, and Caitríona McLeish, “Report on Wilton Park Conference 871”, Countering CBW Proliferation, Wilton Park, 28- 30 September 2007.

Spence, Scott “Effective Legislative Framework for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons Proliferation,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution to Security and non-Proliferation,” OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, 11-12 April 2011.

Toth, Tibor “Address to the Seminar,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and Non-Proliferation, OPCW Headquarters, The Hague, 11 April 2011.

United Nations Sustainable Development, “Agenda-21, Chapter-1,” United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janerio, Brazil, 3- 14 June 1992.

Uzumcu, Ahmet, “OPCW in a Changing Environment- Promoting Security and Cooperation,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contribution in the Sphere of Security and NonProliferation, The Hague, 11 April 2011.

Uzumcu, Ahmet, “OPCW in a Changing Environment- Promoting Security and Cooperation,” Seminar on the OPCW’s Contributions in the Sphere of Security and NonProliferation of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, 11- 12 April 2011.

397

NEWSPAPERS/ NEWS

Alam, Mukhtar “Sindh Industrial Estate (SITE) Lacks safe Disposal for Hazardous Waste,” DAWN, 3 March 2010.

“Alexander V. Latvinenko,” The New York Times, Updated on 18 December 2012.

Avis, Peter “Planned Chemical Plant Stirs Hopes and Old Fears in India,” Toronto Star, 4 February 1995.

Baker, P., and S.B. Glasser, “U.S. Ambassador Critical of Russia In Hostage Crisis: Gas Secrecy May Have Cost Lives, He Says,” The Washington Post, 30 October 2002.

Baker, Al, and William Rashbaum, “U.S. Feared Cyanide Attack on New York Subway” The New York Times, 18 June 2006.

“Blast at Union Carbide,” Courier-Mail (Brisbane, Australia), 6 July 1983.

Bockman, Christopher “Mystery and Pain Go On for Toulouse,” BBC News, 22 October 2001.

Chang, Kenneth and Judith Miller, “Duct Tape and Plastic Sheeting Provide Solace, If Not Security,” The New York Times, 13 February 2003.

Crossette, Barbara, “Bhopal’s Tragedy Revisited; 10 Years After the Gas,” New York Times, 11 December 1994.

“CSB Issues Preliminary Findings in Toxic Gas Release at MFG Chemical: Cites Lack of Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response Problems,” CSB News, 16 November 2004

Dobbs, Michael “Trial on Chemical Plant Blast Opens; Mystery of Toxic Waste Remains” Washington Post, 19 April 1983.

Falk, Dorian, “Extremists Said Thursday They Had Bombed the Villa of Chemical Company Executive,” Associated Press, 7 July 1977.

398

Feldman, Linda “Beyond Duct Tape: Blind Fear Vs. Informed Planning,” Christian Science Monitor, 18 February 2003.

Halaby, Jamal, “Extremists Claim Responsibility for U.S. Chemical Factory Blast,” Associated Press, 13 July 1990.

Hind, Rick, and David Halperin, “Lots of Chemicals, Little Reaction,” New York Times, 22 September 2004.

“How Buncefield Fire Unfolded,” BBC News, 13 July 2006.

Iqbal, Anwar “Pakistani Firm Makes IED-Proof Fertilizer,” DAWN, 1 March 1013.

Jaber, Hala, “Falluja's Defenders Says They Will Use Chemical Weapons,” Sunday Times (London), 31 October 2004.

Kammerer, Peter “Dead Men Walking at Work Every Day,” South China Morning Post, 2 May 2004.

“Killed Executive Linked to Pollution Disaster,” Associated Press, 5 February 1980.

Maraniss, David “Texas Chemical Plant Blast Kills 17,” Washington Post, 7 July 1990.

McGlinchey, David “United States: Rumsfeld Says Pentagon Wants Use of Nonlethal Gas,” Global Security Newswire, 6 February 2003.

Mostyn, Richard “Stopped at Border, Man Carried Lethal Toxin,” Yukon Times, 23 February 1996.

Mukhtar Alam, “Karachi: Environmental Tribunal Assails SEPA’s Performance,” DAWN, 24 January 2009.

Murray, A., “U.S. Should Prepare Public For an Attack, Not Scare It,” The Wall Street Journal, 15 October 2002.

O’Connor, S., “No Threat Before Factory Bombing,” The Telegraph, 5 July 1985.

“Our Unnecessary Insecurity,” New York Times, 20 February 2005.

Pianin, Eric, “Study Assesses Risk of Attack on Chemical Plant,” Washington Post, 12 March 2002,

399

Robertson, Nic, “Disturbing Scenes of Death Show Capability with Chemical Gas,” CNN, August 19, 2002 Selsky, Andrew, “U.S. Investigation of Deaths of Colombian Police Discovers Trace of Cyanide,” Associated Press, 21 August 2002.

“Steps Being Taken to Curb Smuggling of Fertilizer,” DAWN, 7 January 2012.

“Swiss Chemical Company Agrees to Pay for Pollution Damage,” AP, 25 March 1980.

“Thousands Die in Halabja Gas Attack,” BBC News, 16 March 1988.

“U.S. plants open to terrorists,” CBS News, June 13, 2004.

“U.S. Presses Pakistan on Bomb Fertilizer,” DAWN, 14 December 2012.

Wark, Penny “The Toxic Legacy of the Explosion of a Pesticide Factory in Bhopal is Still Felt 20 Years On,” The Times (London), 25 May 2004.

Zagars, J., “Just the Facts?” The Washington Post, 8 November 2001.

400

GLOSSARY

Annual Declarations States Parties of the OPCW are required to make annual declarations to the OPCW detailing any activities undertaken with regard to the destruction of Chemical Weapons, the processing and consumption of Scheduled chemicals, the production sites of Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOC), and export and import of Scheduled chemicals.

Assistance and Protection Under the CWC, States Parties have pledged to provide assistance and protection to fellow States Parties when they are threatened with the use of Chemical Weapons or have suffered a chemical attack. If a State Party requests assistance, the Technical Secretariat of OPCW is responsible for the effective coordination of assistance and protection measures provided by member states.

Challenge Inspection This OPCW inspection is initiated by the suspected violation of the CWC, after receiving and considering request from another State Party. It is the most intrusive inspection, which is conducted on very short notice, of any facility or location declared or undeclared in a State Party.

Chemical Terrorism It involves the misuse of chemicals to destroy life, economy, environment, and thus produce panic, disruption, and chaos.

Chemical Weapons Chemical Weapons means the following, together or separately as per the CWC: a. ”Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.

401

b. Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a) above. c. Any equipment designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b) above.”

Conference of the States Parties (CSP) CSP is the main policymaking body of the OPCW. It is composed of all States Parties and meets annually or for any special session when necessary.

Consumption The conversion of a chemical into another chemical through chemical reaction.

Declared Chemical Industries Declared chemical industries are those industries, which produced more than 200 tones of unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOCs) by synthesis during the previous calendar year; or which produced more than 30 tones of DOCs containing the elements of Phosphorous, Sulfur and Fluorine (PSF chemicals) by synthesis during the previous calendar year. These facilities must be declared, and subsequently inspected by the OPCW.

Destruction The irreversible conversion of toxic chemicals, munitions or other delivery devices and thus render them unusable.

Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOC) Chemicals consisting of all compounds of carbon except for its oxides, sulfides, and metal carbonates.

Dual- use

402

In the context of CWC, this term is used for chemicals and related equipment that has both peaceful and Chemical Weapons applications.

End User Certificate (EUC) This document certifies that the chemical in question will be used for peaceful purpose(s). The exporting State obtains EUC prior to the transfer of Schedule- III chemicals to a State not Party to the CWC.

Executive Council (EC) EC is the executive organ of the OPCW. It is composed of representatives from 41 States Parties. The members are elected by the States Parties to serve for two year term.

General Purpose Criteria (GPC): Concept This is a concept built into the definition of Chemical Weapons as the required measure for national implementation of the CWC. Rather than relying on a list of prohibited chemicals, the CWC considers any toxic chemical or precursor a Chemical Weapon unless it was intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, and only as long as their types and quantities are consistent with the stated purposes. The schedules should not be confused with a list of prohibited chemicals or a definition of Chemical Weapons. Their sole purpose is to guide routine verification activities.

Geneva Protocol of 1925 This treaty prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and bacteriological methods of warfare. Though, Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war, but it does not prohibit their development or possession.

Hazard An inherent characteristic of chemical that has the potential for causing harm to people, property or the environment.

403

Hazard Mitigation Measures Measures that can provide passive protection to persons at the time of an incident.

Incapacitating Agent A chemical agent that produces temporary physical or psychological debilitation thus renders humans or animals unable to function normal.

Inherently Safer Processes A process can be termed “inherently safer” if hazards are eliminated or greatly reduced. And this process becomes a permanent process thus safety is “built in” to the process, not added on. Through this concept, hazards are eliminated, not controlled.

Inspectorate The body within the OPCW Technical Secretariat that conducts all types of onsite inspections.

International Cooperation The cooperative efforts of States Parties and the OPCW to provide assistance and protection to States Parties, promote the development of chemistry, and assist in international implementation of the convention.

Lethality A measure of the impact of a toxic chemical on life processes (human, plant, or animal); or the speed with which a toxic chemical inflicts death.

National Authority on CWC The National Authority is the focal point for coordination with the OPCW and other States Parties on CWC related matters. Moreover, its primary responsibility is the effective national implementation of the CWC.

National Implementation Legislation

404

The national implementing legislation is obligatory on the States Parties for the national implementation of the CWC. This legal Act or its related national implementing regulations criminalizes the prohibitions of the Convention and thus enables the prosecution of individuals for violation of the Convention. The appropriate incorporation of the General Purpose Criteria (GPC) of the CWC into the national implementation legislation gives it the character of ‘comprehensive’ national implementation legislation.

Nonproliferation Prevention of the spread of tools of war and violence; with respect to the CWC: chemical weapons, toxic chemicals, precursors and related technology that could be misused.

Non- State Actors Individuals or groups that have immense influence at national and international level and are functioning without the support or direction of any sovereign government.

OPCW The Organization for the Prohibitions of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the implementing body for the CWC. It comprises the Conference of the States Parties (CSP), the Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS).

Other Chemical Industry For the purpose of this study, the industry, which is below the declaration threshold as for the declared chemical industry (explained above), but which produces, consumes or uses significant quantities of toxic industrial chemicals have been termed as Other Chemical Industry (OCIs).

Other Chemical Production Facility (OCPF) Facilities that produce DOCs, or DOC (PSF) above certain thresholds and are subject to declarations and inspections by OPCW.

405

Plant Plant is defined as a relatively self contained area, structure, or building containing one or more units with auxiliary and associated infrastructure such as an administrative section, storage/ handling area for feedstock and products, waste disposal area, analytical laboratory, medical facility and records associated with the movement into and from the site.

Precursor Any chemical reactant that takes part at any stage in the production of a toxic chemical.

Processing A physical process such as purification, extraction and formulation during which a chemical is not converted into another chemical.

Production The formation of a chemical through a chemical reaction.

Prohibited Purposes The use of toxic chemicals or precursors in the development or production of Chemical Weapons, as prohibited under Article I of the CWC; the term also applies to the transfer or use of Chemical Weapons, preparations to use Chemical Weapons militarily, or assisting in the performance of these prohibited activities.

Proliferation ‘Proliferation’ increasingly refer to the spread of dual-use technology that can be weaponised should possessors choose to do so, and that dual-use nature is the root problem for Chemical proliferation efforts.

406

PSF Chemicals This term is used for DOCs containing phosphorous, sulfur or fluorine. If a plant produces more than 30 tonnes of PSF chemicals annually, it is subject to declaration and verification under the CWC.

Public Authorities The term Public Authorities mean wide range of government bodies at national, provincial and local level, which are responsible for implementing national legislations, public health, environmental protection, emergency response, civil defence, occupational health and safety, and related aspects of chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response.

Purposes not Prohibited under the CWC It means following: a. Industrial, agricultural, medical, research, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; b. Protective purposes, i.e. those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and CW; c. Military purposes not connected with the use of CW and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; and d. Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes. Review Conference It is a special session of States Parties that is convened every five years at The Hague for reviewing the operation of the CWC.

Risk The result of a threat with adverse effects on a vulnerable system.

Routine Inspection

407

It is normal OPCW inspection of declared chemical industries and also of the facilities related to Chemical Weapons. Such inspections are conducted in accordance with agreed plans and are normal confidence-building activities.

Schedule Chemicals The Convention contains three lists of schedule chemicals called Schedules- 1, 2 and 3. They are based on the potential for use in prohibited activities, quantity of peaceful production; history of use as a chemical weapon; and level of toxicity. Differing limits on production, declarations and verification are placed for the facilities that produce, process and consume the chemicals of three schedules, and a fourth category, Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF). The explanations of various categories of chemicals and national obligations are given in succeeding paragraphs as per the CWC.

Schedule 1. Chemicals that pose the most risk to the object and purpose of the Convention, e.g. chemical agents or their precursors or used for Chemical Weapon purposes. These chemicals have little or no use for commercial purposes and thus produced very little. Schedule 2. Chemicals with lesser but significant risk to the object and purpose of the Convention, e.g. precursors of Schedule 1 chemicals. They have some commercial uses but not produced in large quantities. Schedule 3. Chemicals posing some risk to the object and purpose of the Convention, e.g. chemicals that are precursors of Schedule 1 or 2 chemicals. These chemicals have immense commercial uses, therefore, produced and traded in large quantities. Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) SAB is a subsidiary body of the OPCW. It is responsible to provide advice on scientific and technological developments that have implications for the implementation of the CWC.

State Party

408

A State that has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Technical Secretariat (TS) It is the main implementing body of the OPCW. It comprises of an inspectorate and technical support staff.

Threat The intent and capability to adversely affect (cause harm or damage to) the system.

Toxic Chemical Any chemical that can cause death, permanent harm or temporary incapacitation to humans or animals.

Toxicity The ability of a substance to cause harmful effects on humans or animals.

Toxin A poison formed as secretion in the metabolism of a vegetable or animal organism. Toxins can also be produced synthetically.

Verification Verification in the context of CWC is undertaken by means of analysis of national declarations, data monitoring and on-site monitoring and inspections.

Vulnerability Vulnerability is the manifestation of the inherent states of the system (e.g., physical, technical, organizational, social, cultural) that can be exploited by an adversary to adversely affect (cause harm or damage to) that system.

409

410

Appendix- I

ARTICLE- I OF CWC: GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:

a. To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; b. To use chemical weapons; c. To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; d. To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare. Appendix- II

LISTS OF SCHEDULE CHEMICALS

The following Schedules list toxic chemicals and their precursors. For the purpose of implementing this Convention, these Schedules identify chemicals for the application of verification measures according to the provisions of the Verification Annex. Pursuant to

411

Article II, subparagraph 1 (a), these Schedules do not constitute a definition of chemical weapons.

(Whenever reference is made to groups of dialkylated chemicals, followed by a list of alkyl groups in parentheses, all chemicals possible by all possible combinations of alkyl groups listed in the parentheses are considered as listed in the respective Schedule as long as they are not explicitly exempted. A chemical marked "*" on Schedule 2, part A, is subject to special thresholds for declaration and verification, as specified in Part VII of the Verification Annex.)

Ser Schedule I (Toxic Chemicals) CAS Registry Number (1) O-Alkyl (<=C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates e.g. Sarin O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (107-44-8) Soman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate (96-64-0) (2) O-Alkyl (<=C10, incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidocyanidates e.g. Tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl (77-81-6) phosphoramidocyanidate (3) O-Alkyl (H or <=C10, incl. cycloalkyl) S- 2dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts e.g. VX: O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl (50782-69-9) methyl phosphonothiolate (4) Sulfur mustards: 2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide (2625-76-5) Mustard gas: Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide (505-60-2) Bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane (63869-13-6) Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2- (3563-36-8) chloroethylthio)ethane

1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane (63905-10-2) 1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane (142868-93-7) 1,5-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane (142868-94-8) Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether (63918-90-1) O-Mustard: Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether (63918-89-8)

412

(5) Lewisites: Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine (541-25-3) Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine (40334-69-8) Lewisite 3: Tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine (40334-70-1) (6) Nitrogen mustards: HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine (538-07-8) HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine (51-75-2) HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine (555-77-1) (7) Saxitoxin (35523-89-8) (8) Ricin (9009-86-3) Schedule I (Precursors) (9) Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonyldifluorides e.g. DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride (676-99-3) (10) O-Alkyl (H or <=C10, incl. cycloalkyl) O- 2dalkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts e.g. QL: O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl (57856-11-8) methylphosphonite (11) Chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl (1445-76-7) methylphosphonochloridate (12) Chlorosoman: O-Pinacolyl (7040-57-5) methylphosphonochloridate

Schedule- II (Toxic Chemicals) (1) Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2- (78-53-5)

(diethylamino)ethyl] phosphorothiolate (2) PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2- (382-21-8)

(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene (3) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (*) (6581-06-2)

Schedule II (Precursors) (4) Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 1, containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded one methyl, ethyl or propyl (normal or iso) group but not further carbon atoms,

413

e.g Methylphosphonyl dichloride (676-97-1) Dimethyl methylphosphonate (756-79-6) Exemption: O-Ethyl S-phenyl (944-22-9) Fonofos: ethylphosphonothiolothionate (5) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidic dihalides (6) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates (7) Arsenic trichloride (7784-34-1) (8) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid (76-93-7) (9) Quinuclidin-3-ol (1619-34-7) (10) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl2- chlorides and corresponding protonated salts (11) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane- 2-ols and corresponding protonated salts

Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol (108-01-0) and corresponding protonated salts N,N-Diethylaminoethanol (100-37-8) and corresponding protonated salts (12) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane- 2-thiols and corresponding protonated salts

(13) Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide (111-48-8) (14) Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-ol (464-07-3)

Schedule- III (Toxic Chemicals) (1) Phosgene: Carbonyl dichloride (75-44-5) (2) Cyanogen chloride (506-77-4) (3) Hydrogen cyanide (74-90-8) (4) Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane (76-06-2) Schedule- III (Precursors) (5) Phosphorus oxychloride (10025-87-3) (6) Phosphorus trichloride (7719-12-2) (7) Phosphorus pentachloride (10026-13-8) (8) Trimethyl phosphite (121-45-9)

414

(9) Triethyl phosphite (122-52-1) (10) Dimethyl phosphite (868-85-9) (11) Diethyl phosphite (762-04-9) (12) Sulfur monochloride (10025-67-9) (13) Sulfur dichloride (10545-99-0) (14) Thionyl chloride (7719-09-7) (15) Ethyldiethanolamine (139-87-7) (16) Methyldiethanolamine (105-59-9) (17) Triethanolamine Triethanolamine

Appendix- III

PART IX- ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER CWC- REGIME FOR OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCTION FACILITIES (OCPFs)

A. Declarations

List of Other Chemical Production Facilities

1. The initial declaration to be provided by each State Party pursuant to Article- VI, paragraph 7, shall include a list of all plant sites that:

a. Produced by synthesis during the previous calendar year more than 200 tonnes of unscheduled discrete organic chemicals; or b. Comprise one or more plants which produced by synthesis during the previous calendar year more than 30 tonnes of an unscheduled discrete organic chemical containing the elements phosphorus, sulfur or fluorine (hereinafter referred to as "PSF plants" and "PSF chemical").

2. The list of other chemical production facilities to be submitted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not include plant sites that exclusively produced explosives or hydrocarbons.

415

3. Each State Party shall submit its list of other chemical production facilities pursuant to paragraph 1 as part of its initial declaration not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it. Each State Party shall, not later than 90 days after the beginning of each following calendar year, provide annually the information necessary to update the list.

4. The list of other chemical production facilities to be submitted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall include the following information on each plant site:

a. The name of the plant site and the name of the owner, company, or enterprise operating it; b. The precise location of the plant site including its address; c. Its main activities; and d. The approximate number of plants producing the chemicals specified in paragraph 1 in the plant site.

5. With regard to plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (a), the list shall also include information on the approximate aggregate amount of production of the unscheduled discrete organic chemicals in the previous calendar year expressed in the ranges: under 1,000 tonnes, 1,000 to 10,000 tonnes and above 10,000 tonnes.

6. With regard to plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (b), the list shall also specify the number of PSF plants within the plant site and include information on the approximate aggregate amount of production of PSF chemicals produced by each PSF plant in the previous calendar year expressed in the ranges: under 200 tonnes, 200 to 1,000 tonnes, 1,000 to 10,000 tonnes and above 10,000 tonnes.

Assistance by the Technical Secretariat

7. If a State Party, for administrative reasons, deems it necessary to ask for assistance in compiling its list of chemical production facilities pursuant to paragraph 1, it may request the Technical Secretariat to provide such assistance. Questions as to the

416

completeness of the list shall then be resolved through consultations between the State Party and the Technical Secretariat.

Information to States Parties

8. The lists of other chemical production facilities submitted pursuant to paragraph 1, including the information provided under paragraph 4, shall be transmitted by the Technical Secretariat to States Parties upon request.

B. Verification

General

9. Subject to the provisions of Section C, verification as provided for in Article VI, paragraph 6, shall be carried out through on site inspection at:

a. Plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (a); and b. Plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (b) that comprise one or more PSF plants which produced during the previous calendar year more than 200 tonnes of a PSF chemical.

10. The programme and budget of the Organization to be adopted by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (a), shall contain, as a separate item, a programme and budget for verification under this Section after its implementation has started.

11. Under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall randomly select plant sites for inspection through appropriate mechanisms, such as the use of specially designed computer software, on the basis of the following weighting factors:

a. Equitable geographical distribution of inspections; b. The information on the listed plant sites available to the Technical Secretariat, related to the characteristics of the plant site and the activities carried out there; and

417

c. Proposals by States Parties on a basis to be agreed upon in accordance with paragraph 25.

12. No plant site shall receive more than two inspections per year under the provisions of this Section. This shall not limit inspections pursuant to Article- IX.

13. In selecting plant sites for inspection under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall observe the following limitation for the combined number of inspections to be received by a State Party per calendar year under this Part and Part VIII of this Annex: the combined number of inspections shall not exceed three plus 5 per cent of the total number of plant sites declared by a State Party under both this Part and Part VIII of this Annex, or 20 inspections, whichever of these two figures is lower.

Inspection Aims

14. At plant sites listed under Section A, the general aim of inspections shall be to verify that activities are consistent with the information to be provided in declarations. The particular aim of inspections shall be the verification of the absence of any Schedule 1 chemical, especially its production, except if in accordance with Part VI of this Annex.

Inspection Procedures

15. In addition to agreed guidelines, other relevant provisions of this Annex and the Confidentiality Annex, paragraphs 16 to 20 below shall apply.

16. There shall be no facility agreement, unless requested by inspected State Party.

17. The focus of inspection at a plant site selected for inspection shall be the plant(s) producing the chemicals specified in paragraph 1, in particular the PSF plants listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (b). The inspected State Party shall have the right to manage access to these plants in accordance with the rules of managed access as specified in Part X, Section C, of this Annex. If the inspection team, in accordance

418

with Part II, paragraph 51, of this Annex, requests access to other parts of the plant site for clarification of ambiguities, the extent of such access shall be agreed between the inspection team and the inspected State Party.

18. The inspection team may have access to records in situations in which the inspection team and the inspected State Party agree that such access will assist in achieving the objectives of the inspection.

19. Sampling and on site analysis may be undertaken to check for the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals. In cases of unresolved ambiguities, samples may be analysed in a designated off site laboratory, subject to inspected State Party's agreement.

20. The period of inspection shall not last more than 24 hours; however, extensions may be agreed between the inspection team and the inspected State Party.

Notification of Inspection

21. A State Party shall be notified by the Technical Secretariat of the inspection not less than 120 hours before the arrival of the inspection team at the plant site to be inspected.

C. Implementation and Review of Section B

Implementation

22. The implementation of Section B shall start at the beginning of the fourth year after entry into force of this Convention unless the Conference, at its regular session in the third year after entry into force of this Convention, decides otherwise.

23. The Director General shall, for the regular session of the Conference in the third year after entry into force of this Convention, prepare a report which outlines the experience of the Technical Secretariat in implementing the provisions of Parts VII and VIII of this Annex as well as of Section A of this Part.

419

24. At its regular session in the third year after entry into force of this Convention, the Conference, on the basis of a report of the Director General, may also decide on the distribution of resources available for verification under Section B between "PSF plants" and other chemical production facilities. Otherwise, this distribution shall be left to the expertise of the Technical Secretariat and be added to the weighting factors in para 11.

25. At its regular session in the third year after entry into force of this Convention, the Conference, upon advice of the Executive Council, shall decide on which basis (e.g. regional) proposals by States Parties for inspections should be presented to be taken into account as a weighting factor in the selection process specified in para 11.

Review

26. At the first special session of the Conference convened pursuant to Article- VIII, paragraph 22, the provisions of this Part of the Verification Annex shall be re examined in the light of a comprehensive review of the overall verification regime for the chemical industry (Article VI, Parts VII to IX of this Annex) on the basis of the experience gained. The Conference shall then make recommendations so as to improve the effectiveness of the verification regime.

Appendix- IV

ARTICLE- VII OF CWC:

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

General Undertakings

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention. In particular, it shall:

420

a. Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity; b. Not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention; and c. Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with international law.

2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1.

3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties.

Relations between the State Party and the Organization

4. In order to fulfil its obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with the Organization and other States Parties. Each State Party shall notify the Organization of its National Authority at the time that this Convention enters into force for it.

5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and administrative measures taken to implement this Convention.

6. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in

421

connection with the implementation of this Convention. It shall treat such information and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Convention and in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Confidentiality Annex.

7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat.