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Spudm26 (The 26Th Subjective Probability, Utility, and Decision Making Conference) the Biennial Meeting of the European Association for Decision Making SPUDM26 (THE 26TH SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY, UTILITY, AND DECISION MAKING CONFERENCE) THE BIENNIAL MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION FOR DECISION MAKING Organizing committee: Shahar Ayal, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya (Chair) Rachel Barkan, Ben Gurion University of the Negev David Budescu, Fordham University Ido Erev, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology Andreas Glöckner, University of Hagen, Germany and Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods, Bonn Guy Hochman, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya llana Ritov, Hebrew University Shaul Shalvi, University of Amsterdam Richárd Szántó, Corvinus University of Budapest Eldad Yechiam – Technion – Israel Institute of Technology SPUDM 26 Conference Master Schedule Sunday - August 20 (Yama, David Elazar 10, Haifa, Near Leonardo Carmel Beach) 16:30 – 18:00 Early registration 18:00 – 19:45 Welcome Reception and Light Dinner 19.45 – 20.00 Greetings 20.00 – 20.30 Maya Bar Hillel, The unbearable lightness of self-induced mind corruption 20.30 – 21.30 Andreas Glöckner, Presidential Address 21.30 –22.00 Desserts Monday - August 21, Industrial Engineering and Management Faculty, Technion 7.45 Bus from Leonardo and 8.00 Bus from Dan Panorama 8:15 - 8.40 Coffee and registration 8:40 - 8:55 Avishai Mandelbaum, Dean of the Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Welcome to the Technion and the big data revolution. 9:00 – 10:30 Paper Session 1 10:30 – 11:00 Coffee Break 11:00 – 12:30 Paper Session 2 12:30 – 14:00 Lunch Break 14:00 – 15:00 Keynote Address 1 – Ido Erev, On anomalies, forecasts, and the big data revolution 15:00 – 16:30 Paper Session 3 16:30 – 17:00 Coffee Break 17:00 – 18:30 Paper Session 4 18:30 “Random Matching Dinner” in Haifa restaurants (free-choice, not covered by the conference) Tuesday - August 22, Industrial Engineering and Management Faculty, Technion 8:00 Bus from Leonardo and 8.15 Bus from Dan Panorama 8:30-9.00 Coffee 9:00 – 10:30 Paper Session 5 10:30 – 11:00 Coffee Break 11:00 – 12:30 Paper Session 6 12:30 – 13:30 Lunch Break 13:30 – 14:30 EADM General Assembly 14:30 – 15:30 Keynote Address 2 - Slater lecture, Valerie Reyna, A fuzzy-trace theory of risky decision-making: Healthy, unhealthy, and downright criminal 15:30 – 16:00 Coffee Break 16:00 – 17:30 Paper Session 7 17:30 – 19:30 Posters event and competition Wednesday - August 23, Industrial Engineering and Management Faculty, Technion 8:00 Bus from Leonardo and 8.15 Bus from Dan Panorama 8:30 – 9.00 Coffee 9:00 – 10:30 Paper Session 8 10:30 – 11:00 Coffee Break 11:00 – 12:30 Paper Session 9 12:30 – 14:00 Lunch Break 14:00 – 15:00 Keynote Address 3 -Slater lecture, Alvin E. Roth, Repugnant transactions and forbidden markets 15:30 – 22:00 Mount Carmel tour and conference dinner Invited Lecture – Yossi Ben Artzi, University of Haifa, Collision of Empires and interests: 19th Century Palestine under global, local and national pursuit Thursday - August 24, Industrial Engineering and Management Faculty, Technion 8:00 Bus from Leonardo and 8.15 Bus from Dan Panorama 8:30 – 9.00 Coffee 9:00 – 10:30 De Finetti and Jane Beattie Awards and winner presentations 10:30 – 11:00 Coffee break 11:00 – 12:30 Paper Session 10 12:30 – 14:00 Farewell Lunch Time Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, August 22 Wednesday, August Thursday, August 24 August 20 August 21 23 8.30 – 9.00 Avishai Coffee and registration Coffee Coffee Mandelbaum 9.00 – 10.30 Session 1 – Session 5 – Symposia Session 8 – Symposia De Finetti and Jane Symposia Beattie Awards and winner presentations 10.30 – 11.00 Coffee Break Coffee Break Coffee Break Coffee Break 11.00 – 12.30 Session 2 Session 6 Session 9 Session 10 12.30 – 14.00 Lunch Break Lunch Break Lunch Break Farewell lunch EADM General assembly 14.00 – 15.00 Keynote address (13.30-14.30) Keynote address 3 – 1 – Ido Erev Keynote address 2 – Alvin E. Roth 15.00 – 16.30 Session 3 Valerie Reyna 16-00-17.30 Session 7 15.30 Mount Carmel 16.30 – 17.00 Early Coffee break tour and conference registration dinner (till 22.00) 17.00 – 18.00 Session 4 17.30-19.30-posters 18.00-20.00 Welcome event Invited Lecture – Reception and Random Matching Yossi Ben Artzi, Light Dinner Dinner” in Haifa University of Haifa, 19:45 - restaurants Collision of Empires Greetings and interests: 19th 20.00 – 20.30 Maya Bar Century Palestine Hillel under global, local and national pursuit 20.30 – 21.30 Andreas Glöckner 21.30 – 22.00 Desserts SUNDAY, AUGUST 20, 2017 Yama, David Elazar 10, Haifa (near Leonardo Carmel Beach) 16.30 - Early Registration 18.00 18.00- Welcome Reception and Light Dinner 19.45 19.45- Greetings 20.00 20.00- Maya Bar Hillel, Hebrew University of Jerusalem - The unbearable lightness of 20.30 self-induced mind corruption 20.30- Andreas Glöckner, University of Hagen and Max Planck Institute for Collective 21.30 Goods - Presidential Address 21.30- Desserts 22.00 MONDAY, AUGUST 21, 2017 Industrial Engineering and Management Faculty, Technion 7.45 Bus from Leonardo 8.00 Bus from Dan Panorama 8.15 – Coffee and registration 8.40 8.40 – Avishai Mandelbaum, Dean of the Faculty of Industrial Engineering and 8.55 Management, Welcome to the Technion and the big data revolution. (Baltimore Auditorium, Bloomfield Building) Track 1 Track 2 Track 3 (Cooper 215) (Cooper 216) (Cooper 112) Session 1 The psychology of gains Perspectives on Behavioral decision 9.00 - and losses: Beyond loss overconfidence and its research and climate 10.30 aversion determinants change Symposia Organizers: Eldad Organizer: Organizer: Yechiam, Thorsten Dan Zakay David Budescu Pachur Discussant: (ICORE 1*) Klaus Fiedler Eldad Yechiam - The Asher Koriat - Emily Ho - Using relative “approach” effect of Can we tell whether our judgements to estimate losses emerges with beliefs and judgments probability distributions of experience and exposure are true or false? future emissions Tomás Lejarraga - How Dan Zakay - A temporal Stephen Broomell - The the threat of losses model of meta- cognitive perception of daily makes people explore feelings about the temperatures as evidence more than the promise of accuracy of retrieved of global warming gains knowledge Guy Hochman - Keeping Tamar Kugler – The dark Astrid Kause -Framing your gains close but your side of social capital: climate uncertainty: Frame money closer: The effect Interlock network, CEO- choices reveal and of prepayment on choice board network, and CEO influence climate change and performance overconfidence beliefs Thorsten Pachur - On the Klaus Fiedler - Speed- Stephen Lewandowsky – psychological origins of accuracy tradeoffs in The ‘pause’ in global buyer-seller differences sample-based decision warming in historical and in pricing making conceptual context: Scientific decision making under uncertainty Wändi Bruine de Bruin - Public priorities and expectations for climate change impacts in the United Kingdom 10.30 - Coffee Break 11.00 Session 2 Behavioral Decision from Meta-Cognition, Decision Making in 11.00- Finance 1 Experience Judgments and the field and society 12.30 (Cooper 214) (Cooper 215) Preferences (Cooper 112) (Cooper 216) Doron Kliger- Ori Plonsky - Andrea Isoni - Peter Ayton - Time-induced Psychological A validation test for Decision making up stress effect on forest: Integration self-reported in the air: Effects of financial decision of social and data measures of pilot status and role making in real sciences to imprecision assignment on markets: The predict human safety critical flight- case of traffic choice behavior deck decisions congestion Janine Hoffart - Christin Schulze - Aleksandra Sigal Vainapel -Long Risk-return belief By coincidence or Litvinova- distance, short odds: and the affect by design? Harnessing the Drones, manned heuristic Pattern matching wisdom of the inner aircrafts, and and probability crowd by exploiting tolerance of enemy maximizing in confidence collateral casualties groups and individuals Orly Sade- Does Gail Gilboa Caspar von Ian Belton – financial Freedman - On Schenck- Testing Public judgments regulation the impact of for overconfidence about the effect of unintentionally rewarding and cognitive personal mitigation ignore less repentance dissonance effects on criminal privileged in a valuation sentencing populations experiment Moran Ofir - Manal Hreib - Chiara Scarampi- Naveh Eskinazi - Borrowers Closed Circuit Age differences in Economic indicators responses to Television and the the effect of for assessing trust protective parking lot metacognition on within the Jewish mortgage paradox financial decision- society in Israel and regulation making their effect on welfare Sandra Emuna Eliav - Laura Rebecca Michael Sobolev - Andraszewicz – Interrupted Rettig- Beehive: A platform The effect of Generally higher for mobile experiencing a search for but not generally experiments historical treasures better: How financial crash – competence and An empirical confidence affect evidence estimation Simon McNair- Sebastian Daniel Barkoczi - Piers Fleming - How does Olschewski- The wisdom of Personal data consumer Taking Risks for select cues privacy behaviour vulnerability Others in and concern - a impact financial Decisions from survey on the outcomes? The Experience: importance of value mediating and Uncertainty and as a moderator moderating role Anti-Social of psychological Behavior characteristics. 12.30 - Lunch Break 14.00 14.00 - Keynote Address 1 - Ido Erev, Technion- Israel Institute of Technology, On 15.00 anomalies, forecasts, and the big data revolution (Baltimore Auditorium, Bloomfield Building) Session 3 Behavioral Learning Risk Perception
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