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Spitting Blood: Medieval Mongol Medical Practices 175

Chapter 7 Spitting Blood: Medieval Mongol Medical Practices1

Timothy May

In 1201, during a battle along the Onon River in northern , Chinggis suffered a neck wound, presumably from an arrow. , one of his sub- ordinates, saved his khan by sucking the wound, thereby preventing blood clots and possible embolism from occurring. When Chinggis Khan awoke, he glanced around and noticed that he was surrounded by blood splatter. His reaction is both laconic and exasperated: “What is this? Could you have spat farther away?”2 But for the presence of one of his servitors, Temüjin (the man who became Chinggis Khan and established the largest contiguous empire in history) would have died from a neck wound in a battle that is even now forgotten in history and would have been of even less consequence in world history with his death. Although a number of studies on Mongol warfare have been written, much less attention has been given to the medical care associated with the wounds sustained through warfare.3 While the incident between Jelme and Chinggis Khan demonstrates that the possessed a more sophisticated under- standing of trauma medical care than one might suspect, other incidents

1 My thanks go to Scott Jacobs for funding part of the research for this article. 2 The Secret History of the Mongols, §145. Henceforth, SHM. The best translation is Igor de Rachewiltz, trans. and ed., The Secret History of the Mongols (Leiden: Brill, 2004). For this work, I have also consulted Frances W. Cleaves, trans. and ed., The Secret History of the Mongols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1982); Urgunge Onon, trans. and ed., The Secret History of the Mongols: The Life and Times of Chinggis Khan (London: Routledge Curzon, 2001); and Mongoliin Nuuts Tovchoo, ed. Sh. Gadambaa (: Bükh erkh khamgaaladsan, 2012). Hereafter, Section numbers are given in parentheses in the text. 3 A Soup for the Qan: Chinese Dietary Medicine of the Mongol Era as Seen in Hu Szu-Hui’s Yin-Shan Cheng-Yao: Introduction; Translation; Commentary and Chinese Text, ed. and trans. Paul D. Buell and Eugene N. Anderson (London: Kegan Paul, 2000); F.W. Cleaves, “A Medical Practice of the Mongols in the Thirteenth Century,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 17 (1954): 428–44; Sophia C. Kaszuba, “Wounds in Medieval Mongol Warfare: Their Nature and Treatment in The Secret History, with Some Notes on Mongolian Military Medicine and Hygiene,” Mongolian Studies 19 (1996): 59–68; R.C. Rudolph, “Medical Matters in an Early Fourteenth Century Chinese Diary,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 2 (1947): 209–306. The latter does not directly deal with military medical practices, yet still offers some useful infor- mation from the period.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004306455_009 176 May reveal that the Mongols incorporated not only native Mongolian practices but also other medical techniques as the empire expanded. The battle itself took place after Temüjin and his suzerain, Toghril (d. 1203), Khan of the Kereit, fought a confederation of led by Jamuqa (d. 1205– 6), who challenged Toghril’s domination of Central Mongolia in 1201. Toghril and Temüjin defeated Jamuqa’s confederation, which promptly fell apart. As the various components of the confederation fled the battlefield, Toghril and Temüjin took the opportunity to finish matters. Toghril pursued Jamuqa, his former war leader and servitor, or nökör. Temüjin chased the Tayichi’ut, another branch of the Mongols and rivals for the leadership of the Mongols (SHM, §142–144). A’uchu Ba’atur, the leader of the Tayichi’ut rallied his forces at Ülengüt Turas along the Onon River, keeping the river between Temüjin’s army and the Tayichi’ut. The river proved to be an insufficient barrier, however, and Temüjin’s Mongols forced a crossing. The resulting battle ranged widely and throughout the day, ceasing only with nightfall. Under the cover of darkness, both sides retired to their camps. Due to Temüjin’s successful efforts to cross the river, both camps were hastily formed and near each other. Furthermore, due to the far-flung battle and the fact that fighting ended with only nightfall, for those left on the battlefield – the wounded, stragglers, and even people displaced by the attack from the Tayichi’ut camp – it was not clear which camp belonged to whom (SHM, §144).4 At some point late in the battle, Chinggis Khan received an arrow wound in the neck. He attempted to staunch the bleeding but failed to do so. The Secret History of the Mongols says: “He waited until sundown, then he pitched camp just there where the two armies had encamped right next to each other” (SHM, §145).5 Although the source indicates that he was in a weakened condition, it still says that he made a camp there. Regardless of the camp situation, Chinggis Khan’s wound continued to bleed. Jelme sucked the wound, spat out the blood, and continued to watch him. The sources indicate that they were not alone: “Still, Jelme, not trusting other people, stayed there and looked after him” (SHM, §145). There are several

4 The pell-mell situation of the camps is further evinced in §145. After Chinggis Khan awakes in the middle of the night, he tells Jelme he is thirsty. Jelme then sets off to find kumiss (fer- mented mare’s milk) for Chinggis Khan to drink. He entered the nearby camp of the enemy and finds a bucket of fermenting cheese curds. The camp was largely deserted and the anony- mous author of The Secret History notes that the people had fled, thus, allowing Jelme to complete his mission unobserved. 5 There is some question about the veracity of this statement. If it was a formal camp, complete with a fire, it is doubtful that either side would have ignored it although, in the post-battle chaos, perhaps Chinggis Khan’s and Jelme’s camp blended in with everyone else.