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Dark Web Investigation, Security Informatics and Law Enforcement, 274 INDEX INDEX A AlphaBay, 40, 100, 107, 108, Acquiring content, 126–127 239, 240 Active vendor shops Alternative analysis, 142 CharlieUK, 104 Analysing content, 130 ChemSpin, 107 Anonymising software, 61 cocaine market, 106 Antiterrorism Dark Web, 104 measures, 192 DutchDrugz, 105 Antiterrorism investigations, 197 ElHerbolario, 105 Appaloosa Chat, 269 EU cocaine, 106 Application programming interfaces Gammagoblin, 105 (APIs), 131 JOB, 105 Artefacts, 123–126 RechardSport, 105 Artifcial intelligence (AI), 146, Acute privacy protection, 200 152, 260 Adequate level of protection, 231–232 and machine learning, 146 Aero Marketplace, 109 Ask.fm, 70 Agent provocateur, 175 Asrar al-Dardashah, 68 Agora, 108 As-Sahab, 52 Agora and Evolution marketplaces, 87 Assessing Alemarah, 68 surveillance technologies, 167, 168 Algorithm Audax Rio EC U20, 269 (in)scrutability, 154–155 Authorisation, 211 functionality and rationale, 154–155 Automated mass collection, 174 Algorithms, 151–153 Automated TENSOR tool, 227 unfairness, 156, 157 Automated tool, 167 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 273 B. Akhgar et al. (eds.), Dark Web Investigation, Security Informatics and Law Enforcement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55343-2 274 INDEX agent provocateur, 175 Bilateral agreements, 232 antiterrorism operations, 169 Bilateral and multilateral agreements, appropriateness of selector, 165, 166 177, 197 automated search, 174 Bitcoin, 77, 79, 88, 93–95, 127, 129 chilling effects, 166–167 Bitdefender, 237 citizens, 161–163 Bitmessage, 61, 63 convention, 173 Black hat hackers, 38, 39 cross-border cooperation, 172 Black Market, 110 cross-border investigations, 177 Blockchain technology, 115 different and challenging Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), 243 question, 164 Businesses and IT industry, 32, 33 Directive on Combating Buyers, 40–42 Terrorism, 223–225 effectiveness, 163 genuinely pertinent C information, 164 Cannabis, 104 implementation and utilisation, Cannabis Growers and Merchants 173, 174 Cooperative (CGMC), 102 information exchange, 178 Captcha, 131 investigation, 172, 173 Charter of Fundamental Rights, legislation legal framework, 169 214–218, 223, 225 names of particular individuals, Charter of the United Nations, 196 selectors, 165 Chat rooms, 72, 73 names of specifc groups, 165 Child pornography, 180, 181, 249 particular keywords, selectors, Child sex abuse (CSA), 35 164, 165 Child sexual abuse material (CSAM) searches, 189, 198, 215 Matthew Falder case, 254–259 social media companies, 184 Operation Sweetie, 260–263 terrorism acts vs. an individual, 164 PlayPen, 249–254 undercover operation, 169, 175 Chilling effects, 166–167 Automation impact, 174, 175 Citizens, 166 automated tool, 161–163 right to be trusted, 158 B Citizen’s trust, 157 Basel Institute on Governance, 113 Cloud computing, 204 Bayonet, 112 Cloud Evidence Group, 210 Behavioural patterns/technical CoE Convention on Cybercrime faults, 34 Article 14(2), 203 Berlusconi Market, 102 Article 16, 203 Best evidence rule, 185 Article 17, 204 Bias Article 18, 204 decision-making process, 156 Article 19, 204, 205 risk of potential, 155, 156 Article 20, 205, 206 INDEX 275 Article 21, 206 digital evidence (see Digital Article 32(b), 212 evidence) defnes, 208 ECHR, 198–201 drafters, 208 Member States, 197 international treaty, 202 system of safeguards, 206–208 national laws, 201 24/7 network, 213, 214 parties, 202 Council of Europe Convention on provisions, 202 Cybercrime, 173 Combating Terrorism, 162 Counterterrorism, 162, 190–193, 195 Common-law jurisdictions, 185 national and international, 190 Communications Court of Justice of the European cybersecurity, 67 Union (CJEU), 215 email dead dropping, 67 Crawlers, 182, 184 encrypted (see Encrypted Crime communication) international law, 197 Internet Memes (JPEGs/ types, 119 GIFs), 66, 67 Criminal activities, 119 social media, 60 (see also Criminal actors Social media) black hat hackers, 38, 39 steganography, 66, 67 criminal services, 35 terrorist media, 67–68 criminal trade, 35 types, 59 CSA, 35 video games, 66 cybercriminals, 35–36 watermarking, 66, 67 cyberterrorists, 44, 45 worldwide network, 59 hacktivists, 37–38 Content insider threat, 42–44 abstract types, 124 state-sponsored attackers, 39, 40 acquiring, 126–127 trade and service providers and analysing, 130 buyers, 40–42 graph theory, 123 virus-hacking tool coders, 38, 39 SNA, 123 Criminal behaviour, 120 triplestores, 123 Criminal investigation, 112, 227 understanding, 127–129 Criminal law, 170 Content fltering, 176 Criminal law systems, 206 Convention on Cybercrime, 177, 178 Criminal offences Copyright issues defnition, 219 law enforcement, 182 Criminal procedural law, 170 media analysis, 184 Criminal services, 35 search engines, 182, 183 Criminal trade, 35 violation, 182–184 Criminalising Terrorist-Related Corporate assets, 32 Activity, 219, 220 Council of Europe (CoE) Cross-border collection, 170 cybercrime, 201, 202 Cross-border investigations, 177 276 INDEX Cryptocurrencies, 78, 79, 90 onion link, 55 digital currencies, 92 online terrorist recruitment, 70 and fat currencies, 91, 93 and propaganda, 53–56 mining, 91 surface web, 4 Cryptographic algorithm, 269 technology, 29 Cyber defence, 39 Tor website, 28 Cyber syndicates, 39 users, 29 Cyberattack, 33, 39, 40, 53, 80 web browser computer program, 4 Cybercrime, 21, 22, 201, 202 Dark Web market, 85, 97 Cybercrime Convention Committee buyers and vendors, 86 (T-CY), 210, 211 characteristics and features, 86 Cybercrime legislation, 218 charges and combinations, 90 Cybercriminals, 35–36 credibility and reliability, 241 Cyber-espionage, 39, 40 dark markets, 87, 88 Cybersecurity environment, 85 voice communication, 67 fnish early markets, 89 Cyberterrorism, 80 goods and services, 87, 88 Cyberterrorists, 39, 44, 45 Hansa, 237–241 Cyberthreats, 32 internet and mobile technologies, 86 invite/referral, 89 D registrations and transaction Dark markets, 34, 39, 78, 79, 114 payments, 89 Dark Wallet, 77–79 types, 245 Dark Web, 4, 129 WSM (see Wall Street automated tool (see Market (WSM)) Automated tools) Dark Web policing, 112 and darknets (see Darknets) Darknet markets, 86, 99 and encrypted communication (see Darknets, 7, 8, 27–34, 45, 131 Encrypted communication) vs opennet mode, 18 classifcation, 28, 29 Dash/Darkcoin, 97 communication, 29 Data mining, 153, 156, 157 criminal actors (see Criminal actors) Data processing development, 27 criminal investigations, 227 double nature, 28 EU Institutions, Bodies, Offces and environment, 29 Agencies, 228, 229 funding; and buying, 77–79 GDPR, 229, 230 hiring criminals, 58, 59 minimum harmonisation, 229 infrastructure, 8 scope of Union law, 228 legal vs. illegal, 28 Data protection, 176 networks, 4 Data Protection Authorities, 230, 231 non-criminal actors (see Non-­ Data request, 20 criminal actors) Data transfers INDEX 277 international, 231 Digital goods and services, 109 Member States, 231 Digital hashing, 122 third countries, 231, 232 Digital identities, 32 Daughter, 255 Digital signatures, 122 Dead and scam markets and vendors Digital systems, 120 Aero Marketplace, 109 Digital wallets, 93 Agora, 108 Directive (EU) 2016/680 AlphaBay, 107 data protection; contents, 226, 227; evolution, 108 criminal investigations, 227; hansa market, 108 EU Institutions, Bodies, Offces outlaw market, 109 and Agencies, 228, 229; Dead dropping, 67 GDPR, 229, 230; independent Decentralised marketplaces, 114 supervisory authority, 230, Decision-making algorithms, 153 231; legislative competence, Decision-making process, 156 225, 226; minimum Decision-making rules, 152 harmonisation, 229; scope of Decriminalisation, 181 Union law, 227, 228 Deep Web, 5 data transfers; international, 231; acquisition, 131 Member States, 231; third databases, 7 countries, 231, 232 sources, 131 profling, 233 Defense Advanced Research Project Directive on Combating Agency (DARPA), 8 Terrorism, 162 Democratic government, 161 automated tools, 223–225 Department of Justice (DOJ), 253 Criminalising Terrorist-Related Derogatory remarks, 179 Activity, 219, 220 Digital currency, 91 Financial Action Task Force Digital evidence, 185 (FATF), 219 communication partners, 206 fundamental rights and court proceedings, 204 freedoms, 223 data-related search, 204 investigative measures and tools, and international 221, 222 cooperation, 208–211 jurisdictions, 222 Internet, 203 Lisbon Treaty, 218 IP-based investigations, 204 Paris attacks, 219 national authorities, 203 Permanent Representatives obligation, 205 Committee, 219 preservation, 204 United Nations Security Council procedural powers, 203 Resolution, 219 reasonable, 205 victims of terrorism, 220, 221, 224 and safeguards, 203 Distributed denial-of-service attacks traffc data, 205 (DDoS), 32 without MLA, 211, 213 Domestic law, 193, 197 278 INDEX Dream Market, 100 Enterprise Ethereum Alliance Dual criminality, 171 (EEA), 115 Dudebuy, 244 Entities, 123–126 Due process rights, 193 ePrivacy Directive, 216 Dutch and Lithuanian legal assistance ePrivacy Regulation, 216 treaty, 239 Escrow markets, 88 Dutch authorities, 87 Ethereum (ETH), 94, 115 DutchDrugz, 105 Ethical and societal issues automation impacts, 174 copyright issues, 182–184 E crime investigations, 177, 178 E-commerce, 76 data protection, 176 Effective investigative tools, End User Agreement, 184–186 162, 224 illegal content, 178–180 Electronic data, 197 licensing, 184–186 Electronic Frontier Foundation responsible authorities, 174 (EFF), 9 Ethical issues, 151 Electronic health record (EHR) Ethnic/political minorities, 158, 159 systems, 33 EU counterterrorism strategy,
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