Nº 204 - JUNE 2015

Gender inequality and state fragility in the Sahel

Clare Castillejo

>> There is increasing commitment among international actors to integrate a gender perspective into support for fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS). This commitment is expressed in the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1325 on women HIGHLIGHTS security and peace (SCR 1325), which calls for ‘women’s equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and • There is a mutually promotion of peace and security’; in the New Deal for Engagement reinforcing relationship in Fragile States, agreed by fragile countries, development partners and between gender inequalities international organisations in 2011, which states that ‘the and state fragility in the Sahel. empowerment of women […] is at the heart of successful peacebuilding and statebuilding’; and in the policies of numerous multilateral and • Women’s political, economic bilateral donors. However, despite these commitments, in practice and social exclusion is being international engagement in FCAS frequently overlooks the complex exacerbated by the rise of connections and mutually-reinforcing relationship between gender radical Islamist opposition inequality and the weak governance, under-development movements. and conflicts that characterise these states. • International actors must recognise the centrality of This oversight is particularly glaring in the Sahel. Sahelien states are not gender to security, sustainable only deeply fragile, but also, according to the United Nations (UN), development and political have the highest levels of gender inequality in the world. Across the outcomes in the Sahel. region, women’s profound political, economic and social exclusion is both exacerbated by and contributes to fragility dynamics, and acts as a barrier to effective peacebuilding. The Sahel desperately requires an international response that takes gender seriously. GENDER INEQUALITY AND STATE FRAGILITY IN THE SAHEL

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>>>>>> THE STATE FRAGILITY - GENDER opposition movements across the region, whose INEQUALITY RELATIONSHIP growing political and social influence is under - mining hard-won gains in women’s rights. Indeed The Sahel is one of the world’s most under-devel - – as in many FCAS – Sahelien women’s rights are oped regions. According to the World Bank, increasingly caught up in broader political contes - around half of the Sahel’s population lives on less tations over the nature of state and society. than US$1.25 per day, while countries such as Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso remain Not only does fragility negatively affect women’s stuck at the bottom of the UN’s Human Devel - rights, but gender inequalities in the Sahel also opment Index. Women are particularly disadvan - fuel fragility. Most obviously, these inequalities taged by a number of inter-twined factors such as contribute to both rapid population growth and the region’s extreme poverty; weak state institu - continued under-development. It is now widely tions; lack of basic services; unstable, unaccount - recognised, as detailed in the World Bank’s 2011 able and corrupt politics; and highly patriarchal World Development Report, that ‘greater gender social structures. Given this context, progress on equality can enhance productivity, improve women’s rights in the Sahel has been very limited development outcomes for the next generation, compared to elsewhere in Africa. Out of 152 and make institutions more representative’. In countries on the UN Gender Inequality Index, addition, recent academic research, such as that Niger ranks 151, Chad 150 and Mali 148. emerging from Uppsala University in Sweden, demonstrates significant links between high levels According to the UN, the Sahel faces four over - of gender inequality and high levels of intra-state lapping crises – political, environmental, develop - armed conflict, in part because of macho social mental and humanitarian – all of which are attitudes. worsening gender inequalities. UN Women describes how, across the Sahel, ‘women are Women’s political participation caught up in vicious cycles of chronic poverty, Women in the Sahel are highly excluded from environmental stress and deprivation, denial of political life. Sahelien women’s expectations that their basic rights and different forms of violence democratisation would significantly increase their are compounded by the overlap of harmful tradi - political participation have been largely unmet. tional practices, social constructs and religious Across the region, women’s representation in par - fundamentalism’. liament is 15 per cent, while in Mali it is just 10 per cent, in Niger 13 per cent and in Chad 15 per In recent years, governance has atrophied and vio - cent. Campaigns for the introduction of quotas lence has spiralled in the Sahel, as states have for women in political office have faced extreme failed to live up to the promises of democratisa - opposition from conservative religious groups. tion; political, regional and ethnic grievances have However, in some cases, this opposition has been intensified; upheavals in the Maghreb have overcome and meaningful quotas established. For fuelled insecurity in neighbouring Sahelien coun - example, in Senegal women now constitute 43 tries; and transnational criminal networks have per cent of the national assembly, well above the expanded their presence. This deteriorating situa - average for developed countries, while in Mauri - tion has a direct impact on women’s security, as tania they make up 25 per cent, similar to many most horrifically illustrated in the violence expe - European countries. rienced by women in Mali during the 2012 crisis, or today in Northern Nigeria at the hands of The nature of politics in the Sahel is a major bar - Boko Haram. However, it also has more insidious rier to women’s political participation. Political effects on women’s rights. Grievances over the parties tend to be centralised around individual failure of Sahelien states to deliver democracy or male leaders, to sideline women members within development have led to a rise in radical Islamist powerless ‘women’s wings’, and to be reluctant to POLICY BRIEF - Nº 204 - JUNE 2015

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field women candidates. Even where women are ments and conservative religious forces in the selected as candidates, they frequently lack the Sahel. This mirrors dynamics seen elsewhere clientelist networks or financial resources across North Africa, such as Morocco or Egypt, required to mobilise or buy votes. Moreover, once where family law reform has been a central battle - elected it is difficult for women to influence deci - ground in power struggles between political elites sion making, as they face significant discrimina - and Islamist opposition. tion and lack access to the informal spaces and networks in which political deals are done. Family law in most Sahelien countries is based on Women are rarely given senior political roles, customary and Islamic law and gives women very although there have been surprising exceptions to few rights. Across the region, women have this, with women briefly becoming prime minis - mobilised to demand reform of these laws, but ters in Senegal in 2001 and Mali in 2011. have faced a backlash from conservative forces. For example, in Mali a 2009 draft family code that Excluded from formal structures, Sahelien would have increased the age of marriage to 18, women have built informal networks for political given daughters inheritance rights and recognised influence. A recent Centre for Humanitarian women as equal to their husbands, was abandoned Dialogue report describes how Sahelien women due to pressure from the High Council of Islam in have participated in Mali and religious groups. In Niger, an attempt to Women's profound REFAMP, a net - reform family law in 2011 was also abandoned work of African under pressure from Islamist associations. political, economic women parliamen - tarians and minis - A recent Wilson Center report outlines how fam - and social exclusion ters. In Burkina ily law in Northern Nigeria is caught up in broad - is exacerbated by Faso, Nigerien and er struggles over religious, regional and political Senegalese women identities. It describes how women activists nego - and contributes to have formed cross tiate the contestation between Islamist and secu - party associations to larist Nigerian identities by using both conflict dynamics press for greater rep - sophisticated religious interpretations and Nige - resentation of women ria’s constitution and human rights commitments in politics. However, it is within civil society – to promote their rights. where the stakes are lower and clientelist networks less powerful – that women have had the greatest While women’s status within the family is often space to mobilise and channel their political voice. presented as pertaining entirely to the personal sphere, it has profound implications for broader Women’s political exclusion clearly contributes to development and fragility dynamics. Such disem - exclusionary and unaccountable governance in powerment at household level limits women’s the Sahel. It also means that women’s rights and ability to access services, economic opportunities, needs are not policy priorities, with direct impli - or resources such as land; to participate in public cations for achieving broader development goals. life; or to escape abuse. Discriminatory family Critically, in some of the most troubled Sahelien laws therefore prevent women from contributing contexts, including Mali, Northern Nigeria and effectively to political and socio-economic devel - Niger, conservative religious movements are opment and stability, and contribute to the pop - increasingly preventing women from participat - ulation pressures discussed below. ing in public life. Education and population Women’s rights within the family The Sahel has some of the world’s worst indic - Women’s family rights are a central area of con - tors in terms of women’s education, with literacy testation between governments, women’s move - rates across the region much lower for women >>>>>> GENDER INEQUALITY AND STATE FRAGILITY IN THE SAHEL

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>>>>>> than men. For example, in Niger literacy among remain politically, economically and socially mar - 15-24 year olds is 52 per cent for men compared ginalised. As the United Nations Population Fund with 23 per cent for women. A major factor lim - argues, ‘where choices improve for women and iting girls’ access to education is early marriage, girls, fertility declines and opportunities expand with the average age of marriage being 15.7 in [this can] set counties in the Sahel on the path to Niger, 16.6 in Mali and 17.1 in Mauritania. sustained, inclusive social and economic growth’. According to a recent report by Mireille Affa’a- While Niger and Burkina Faso have adopted some Mindzie for the International Peace Institute, limited policies to promote family planning, it this situation is exacerbated as ‘girls education is appears that slowing population growth is not a further weakened by the growing conservative serious priority for most Sahelien states. religious trend’. For example, in Niger in 2012 religious groups blocked legislation that would have helped protect schoolgirls from early mar - WOMEN’S RESPONSE TO FRAGILITY riage by raising the age of compulsory education AND CONFLICT from 12 to 16. The denial of girls’ right to edu - cation clearly reduces their personal autonomy According to Affa’a-Mindzie, ‘although women and their ability to contribute fully to economic, [in the Sahel] are disproportionately affected by political and social life. It also contributes to the conflict, their protection in conflict-affected con - region’s high fertility rates. texts and their participation in conflict preven - tion and peace initiatives remain marginal at Although countries such as Chad, Mauritania, best’. For example, women have been largely Burkina Faso and Niger are experiencing some of excluded from both national and international the world’s highest economic growth rates, this is peace processes in Mali, despite their vocal not translating into greater GDP per capita or demands for inclusion. Where there have been enhanced well-being. A central reason for this is efforts to include women in peace activities, such the region’s slow demographic transition – child as those supported by the Nigerien High Author - mortality has fallen rapidly, but fertility rates have ity for Peacebuilding, these are very much at the not. Niger has the world’s highest fertility rate, margins of real political processes. This exclusion with an average of 7.6 children per woman, while from formal peacebuilding processes reflects in Chad the rate is 6.6 and in Mali 6.1. As a Sahelien women’s exclusion from broader politi - result, the UN predicts that the Sahel’s popula - cal life. It inevitably impoverishes such processes, tion will rise from the current 100 million people with neither women’s knowledge nor interests to 340 million by 2050. As the population being taken into account. expands in the context of constrained resources and livelihoods and increased impacts of climate Exclusion from formal processes has not stopped change, population pressure can become a major Sahelien women from mobilising at regional, driver of fragility. As the World Bank states, ‘the national and local level to address conflict. For lagging demographic transition in the Sahel example, the pan-African non-governmental places the region at higher risk of extreme pover - organisation (NGO) Femmes Africa Solidarité ty, growing inequities, slower economic growth works across the Sahel to promote a women, peace and […] instability’. and security agenda. Likewise, regional and nation - al women’s organisations came together in Senegal Evidence from around the world demonstrates that in 2012 to support a non-violent election, includ - reducing fertility rates requires the provision of ing by mobilising female election monitors. Dur - appropriate family planning services, and – crucial - ing the conflict in Mali, women lobbied peace ly – empowering women to delay marriage and negotiators in Ouagadougou and West African child bearing. Therefore, the Sahel’s population heads of state, demonstrated for peace, and in some crisis cannot be solved while Sahelien women places engaged in mediation with rebels. POLICY BRIEF - Nº 204 - JUNE 2015

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However, women’s organisations face significant Across the Sahel, there are a range of internation - challenges in mobilising effectively in response ally supported initiatives to address women’s to conflict. These relate both to the insecure and needs, tackle gender inequalities and empower discriminatory environment, and to the weak - women. International actors support a wide range ness and divisions within Sahelien women’s of services provision for women and girls. They movements. Not only do women’s organisations undertake activities to promote women’s political face serious capacity and financing constraints. voice and participation, such as funding women’s They are also inevitably fractured by the civil society organisations, building the capacity same political and social cleavages (ethnic, reli - of women in politics, and supporting national gious/secular, class based, rural/urban, etc.) that and regional coalition building. While more lim - divide the rest of society, which have limited ited, there have also been international initiatives their impact. to support women’s engagement in peacebuild - ing, such as support for women’s regional peace Critically, women’s organisations are often over - networks and training of women mediators. looked by international actors. International Notably, in 2013 the European Union’s (EU) funding for them is mostly small, piecemeal and External Action Service (EEAS) and the UN host - generally does not support them to develop a ed a conference on women’s leadership in the strategic agenda. Moreover, international actors’ Sahel, which focused on conflict and stability. inevitable focus on engagement with male power holders means that they often do not appreciate While such activities may be valuable, they tend to the value of listening to women’s voices. In fact, be small, underfunded and – critically – discon - as Lakshmi Puri, deputy executive director of nected from each other and from broader efforts UN Women, points out ‘women’s perspectives to address Sahelien fragility and development on tensions in social relations, their awareness of challenges. The Sahel’s complex problems require threats to personal, family and community secu - a response that is both genuinely multidisciplinary rity, are critical elements of stability and conflict – connecting actors working across development, prevention and constitute some of the most security, political, and humanitarian fields – and effective early warning systems’. that meaningfully integrates gender throughout. Such a response would enable international actors to better understand and address, for example, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE connections between failing governance, the rise of extremism, girls’ access to education and age of There is growing evidence that placing gender marriage, population pressures, and security chal - issues centrally within peacebuilding and state - lenges related to conflict over resources or wide - building processes, including by meaningfully spread youth unemployment. including women in such processes, improves peace and stability outcomes. Conversely, International actors’ strategies for engagement in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes can the region illustrate their failure to recognise the provide important opportunities to address centrality of gender to achieving broader goals. entrenched gender inequalities and enhance While the EU supports some gender related activ - women’s rights, as state-citizens relations are ities in the Sahel through its development and renegotiated, power is redistributed and institu - humanitarian assistance, the 2011 EEAS Strategy tions are reformed. The Sahel, plagued by for Security and Development in the Sahel makes extreme gender inequality and state fragility, no mention of women, gender or the region’s requires an international response that links pressing population challenges. This absence is peacebuilding, statebuilding and gender equali - disappointing given that the EU Consensus on ty. Yet, the international community has largely Development identifies gender equality as one of failed to provide one. the five essential principles of development coop - >>>>>> GENDER INEQUALITY AND STATE FRAGILITY IN THE SAHEL

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>>>>>> eration. Meanwhile, in the UN Integrated Strategy to mobilise, develop their own agendas, and par - for the Sahel gender is mainstreamed throughout ticipate in decision making. Greater attention the first strategic goal on governance, but entirely must also be paid to advocacy with male political absent from the other two goals on security and leaders on gender issues, as well as addressing long-term resilience. sources of resistance and backlashes against women’s rights. The fact that gender remains peripheral for many international development and security actors is Promoting gender equality is not an add-on but a not unique to the Sahel. This situation is com - must in the Sahel. As leading scholars from the mon in FCAS because of trade-offs between University of California, Berkley, argue in a addressing the priorities of local elites and pro - recent report, ‘investing in women […] is proba - moting international norms, as well as lack of bly a more predictable way of preventing conflict leadership, knowledge, skills and incentives on over resources (as is currently occurring in Dar - gender among international staff and failure to fur), or the proliferation of terrorist cells (as has include gender in political analysis. Indeed, a taken place in Mali) than military action. It is a 2010 Organisation for Economic Cooperation slower way of defusing conflict or pre-empting and Development (OECD) study on aid alloca - the rise of fundamentalism, but a more sure one’. tions for gender equality in fragile states conclud - ed that donors are not living up to their Clare Castillejo is senior researcher at FRIDE. international commitments in this area. This Policy Brief belongs to the FRIDE project ‘The Fragile Sahel: A challenge for Europe', carried out in CONCLUSION cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. We acknowledge the generous Addressing the Sahel’s multiple challenges support of DIMES. For further information requires recognising the centrality of gender to on this project, please contact Clare Castillejo political, security, development and sustainabili - ([email protected]). ty outcomes for the region. It also requires greater strategic prioritisation, funding and human resources dedicated to gender issues by both international actors and local governments. e-mail: [email protected] Sustained support is needed for Sahelien women www.fride.org