Nº 204 - JUNE 2015 Gender inequality and state fragility in the Sahel Clare Castillejo >> There is increasing commitment among international actors to integrate a gender perspective into support for fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS). This commitment is expressed in the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1325 on women HIGHLIGHTS security and peace (SCR 1325), which calls for ‘women’s equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and • There is a mutually promotion of peace and security’; in the New Deal for Engagement reinforcing relationship in Fragile States, agreed by fragile countries, development partners and between gender inequalities international organisations in 2011, which states that ‘the and state fragility in the Sahel. empowerment of women […] is at the heart of successful peacebuilding and statebuilding’; and in the policies of numerous multilateral and • Women’s political, economic bilateral donors. However, despite these commitments, in practice and social exclusion is being international engagement in FCAS frequently overlooks the complex exacerbated by the rise of connections and mutually-reinforcing relationship between gender radical Islamist opposition inequality and the weak governance, under-development movements. and conflicts that characterise these states. • International actors must recognise the centrality of This oversight is particularly glaring in the Sahel. Sahelien states are not gender to security, sustainable only deeply fragile, but also, according to the United Nations (UN), development and political have the highest levels of gender inequality in the world. Across the outcomes in the Sahel. region, women’s profound political, economic and social exclusion is both exacerbated by and contributes to fragility dynamics, and acts as a barrier to effective peacebuilding. The Sahel desperately requires an international response that takes gender seriously. GENDER INEQUALITY AND STATE FRAGILITY IN THE SAHEL 2 >>>>>> THE STATE FRAGILITY - GENDER opposition movements across the region, whose INEQUALITY RELATIONSHIP growing political and social influence is under - mining hard-won gains in women’s rights. Indeed The Sahel is one of the world’s most under-devel - – as in many FCAS – Sahelien women’s rights are oped regions. According to the World Bank, increasingly caught up in broader political contes - around half of the Sahel’s population lives on less tations over the nature of state and society. than US$1.25 per day, while countries such as Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso remain Not only does fragility negatively affect women’s stuck at the bottom of the UN’s Human Devel - rights, but gender inequalities in the Sahel also opment Index. Women are particularly disadvan - fuel fragility. Most obviously, these inequalities taged by a number of inter-twined factors such as contribute to both rapid population growth and the region’s extreme poverty; weak state institu - continued under-development. It is now widely tions; lack of basic services; unstable, unaccount - recognised, as detailed in the World Bank’s 2011 able and corrupt politics; and highly patriarchal World Development Report, that ‘greater gender social structures. Given this context, progress on equality can enhance productivity, improve women’s rights in the Sahel has been very limited development outcomes for the next generation, compared to elsewhere in Africa. Out of 152 and make institutions more representative’. In countries on the UN Gender Inequality Index, addition, recent academic research, such as that Niger ranks 151, Chad 150 and Mali 148. emerging from Uppsala University in Sweden, demonstrates significant links between high levels According to the UN, the Sahel faces four over - of gender inequality and high levels of intra-state lapping crises – political, environmental, develop - armed conflict, in part because of macho social mental and humanitarian – all of which are attitudes. worsening gender inequalities. UN Women describes how, across the Sahel, ‘women are Women’s political participation caught up in vicious cycles of chronic poverty, Women in the Sahel are highly excluded from environmental stress and deprivation, denial of political life. Sahelien women’s expectations that their basic rights and different forms of violence democratisation would significantly increase their are compounded by the overlap of harmful tradi - political participation have been largely unmet. tional practices, social constructs and religious Across the region, women’s representation in par - fundamentalism’. liament is 15 per cent, while in Mali it is just 10 per cent, in Niger 13 per cent and in Chad 15 per In recent years, governance has atrophied and vio - cent. Campaigns for the introduction of quotas lence has spiralled in the Sahel, as states have for women in political office have faced extreme failed to live up to the promises of democratisa - opposition from conservative religious groups. tion; political, regional and ethnic grievances have However, in some cases, this opposition has been intensified; upheavals in the Maghreb have overcome and meaningful quotas established. For fuelled insecurity in neighbouring Sahelien coun - example, in Senegal women now constitute 43 tries; and transnational criminal networks have per cent of the national assembly, well above the expanded their presence. This deteriorating situa - average for developed countries, while in Mauri - tion has a direct impact on women’s security, as tania they make up 25 per cent, similar to many most horrifically illustrated in the violence expe - European countries. rienced by women in Mali during the 2012 crisis, or today in Northern Nigeria at the hands of The nature of politics in the Sahel is a major bar - Boko Haram. However, it also has more insidious rier to women’s political participation. Political effects on women’s rights. Grievances over the parties tend to be centralised around individual failure of Sahelien states to deliver democracy or male leaders, to sideline women members within development have led to a rise in radical Islamist powerless ‘women’s wings’, and to be reluctant to POLICY BRIEF - Nº 204 - JUNE 2015 3 field women candidates. Even where women are ments and conservative religious forces in the selected as candidates, they frequently lack the Sahel. This mirrors dynamics seen elsewhere clientelist networks or financial resources across North Africa, such as Morocco or Egypt, required to mobilise or buy votes. Moreover, once where family law reform has been a central battle - elected it is difficult for women to influence deci - ground in power struggles between political elites sion making, as they face significant discrimina - and Islamist opposition. tion and lack access to the informal spaces and networks in which political deals are done. Family law in most Sahelien countries is based on Women are rarely given senior political roles, customary and Islamic law and gives women very although there have been surprising exceptions to few rights. Across the region, women have this, with women briefly becoming prime minis - mobilised to demand reform of these laws, but ters in Senegal in 2001 and Mali in 2011. have faced a backlash from conservative forces. For example, in Mali a 2009 draft family code that Excluded from formal structures, Sahelien would have increased the age of marriage to 18, women have built informal networks for political given daughters inheritance rights and recognised influence. A recent Centre for Humanitarian women as equal to their husbands, was abandoned Dialogue report describes how Sahelien women due to pressure from the High Council of Islam in have participated in Mali and religious groups. In Niger, an attempt to Women's profound REFAMP, a net - reform family law in 2011 was also abandoned work of African under pressure from Islamist associations. political, economic women parliamen - tarians and minis - A recent Wilson Center report outlines how fam - and social exclusion ters. In Burkina ily law in Northern Nigeria is caught up in broad - is exacerbated by Faso, Nigerien and er struggles over religious, regional and political Senegalese women identities. It describes how women activists nego - and contributes to have formed cross tiate the contestation between Islamist and secu - party associations to larist Nigerian identities by using both conflict dynamics press for greater rep - sophisticated religious interpretations and Nige - resentation of women ria’s constitution and human rights commitments in politics. However, it is within civil society – to promote their rights. where the stakes are lower and clientelist networks less powerful – that women have had the greatest While women’s status within the family is often space to mobilise and channel their political voice. presented as pertaining entirely to the personal sphere, it has profound implications for broader Women’s political exclusion clearly contributes to development and fragility dynamics. Such disem - exclusionary and unaccountable governance in powerment at household level limits women’s the Sahel. It also means that women’s rights and ability to access services, economic opportunities, needs are not policy priorities, with direct impli - or resources such as land; to participate in public cations for achieving broader development goals. life; or to escape abuse. Discriminatory family Critically, in some of the most troubled Sahelien laws therefore prevent women from